What do you think of Terrapin Station's reply to me? — Sam26
This is an interesting development. You have used the word "judged' here, and Witty makes no such mention. You seem to be anticipating what will follow in the text. However, do you think that understanding a definition requires being judged as understanding? — Metaphysician Undercover
Couldn't one understand the definition, and go away with that understanding, without ever being judged as having understood? — Metaphysician Undercover
Terrapin appears to want to have it both ways, appearing to say that meaning can be private even if it's also public. I'm not convinced. — Luke
Yes. Also, I believe that Wittgenstein alludes to judging in section 35 that follows, when he says that it depends "on the circumstances — that is, on what happened before and after the pointing — whether we should say "He pointed to the shape and not to the colour"." [my bolding] — Luke
Wittgenstein notes that characteristic experiences are characteristic "because they recur often (but not always) when shape or number are 'meant'." Wittgenstein notes that there is no characteristic experience which accompanies pointing to a piece in a game as a game piece. Nonetheless, one can still mean that this game piece is called the king, rather than (e.g.) this piece of wood is called the king. — Luke
Terrapin appears to want to have it both ways, appearing to say that meaning can be private even if it's also public. — Luke
Just to remind you, at this point in the text there is nothing to indicate that meaning could be private, or "public" (whatever "public" might mean in this context). These terms do not seem to relate. — Metaphysician Undercover
There clearly is judgement referred to, on the part of the hearer. The hearer must judge the act of the giver, "he pointed to the shape", or "he pointed to the colour", which transposes into "he meant the shape", or "he meant the colour". However, what I was referring to was the need to expose the reciprocal judgement from the giver, "you judged my pointing correctly", "you judged my pointing incorrectly". This reciprocal judgement is not brought out by Wittgenstein, at this point, though you referred to it "...understanding a definition is usually judged by how the hearer goes on to use the word...". — Metaphysician Undercover
What I interpret as important with this discussion of "characteristic experiences", is the qualification of "not always". — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't at all believe that meaning is public. It's not at all possible to make meaning public in my view. Meaning isn't the same thing as a definition.
Re the writing thing, I wasn't proposing a definition. — Terrapin Station
Okay. — Luke
In fact, I wonder what you will get out of reading the PI if you don't understand this central point. — Sam26
Meaning isn't the same thing as a definition. — Terrapin Station
§37. Wittgenstein asks us to try and identify "the relation between name and thing named". — Luke
In a way, it's the opposite; language all the way down, a sort of linguistic idealism — Πετροκότσυφας
Instead he says a lot about how language structures our experience. — Πετροκότσυφας
And we can also say the word "this" to the object, as it were address the object as "this"—a queer use of this word, which doubtless only occurs in doing philosophy.
For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.
in particular,
Meaning isn't the same thing as a definition.
— Terrapin Station
Why would this be worthy of mention here? — Banno
Hmm, I can't say I really recognize this in Witty - how language structures meaning (which is in turn structured by our forms-of-life), yes, [...] I've already read Witty as a linguistic materalist par excellence. Maybe this will come out in the reading more as we go along. — StreetlightX
Experience might not be the right term, it's probably too broad. What I mean is how it makes possible different ways of seeing and acting within the world. — Πετροκότσυφας
Whoa, that looks at first glance like an aggressively Kantian reading of Wittgenstein. — John Doe
For Wittgenstein, there are similarly illusions generated by the illegitimate employment of language itself, the confusion of kinds when 'language goes on holiday' and attention is not paid to the language-games or grammar to which uses of words belong. — StreetlightX
40 ...—It is important to note that the word "meaning" is being used illicitly if it is used to signify the thing that 'corresponds' to the word. That is to confound the meaning; of a name with the bearer of the name.
Hah, well, considering I read the PI as a Critique of Pure Language, I'm not exactly concealing my 'Kantian aggression' here. But it's important not to get too caught up in things here - I simply meant a paraphrase of this: — StreetlightX
I appreciate your remarks upon remarks 36 to 39 as they look at how "corresponding" is assumed so often while not looking at how it is done. — Valentinus
A part of the book that can be overlooked is the way Wittgenstein is teaching a method for doing philosophy. §37 is a case in point. He does not go off theorising about names and the named, but rather draws our attention to a few examples. He want us to look to what is being done here. — Banno
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