But can a “form of life” include a more generous scope for philosophical language that abstracts from experience (or "my world") to question itself? — J

Fascinating question. It would be odd indeed if a being having a generous scope regarding the use of language for the questioning of being lacked the scope of language necessary to formulating the question, let alone proposing some possible answers.

Good to know about him because I have something extra to read. — MoK

Being and Time is his most noted work. I highly recommend.

What do you mean by "limited" in this case? — MoK

No time, no whole.

Similarly, perhaps the whole is limited by time.
— Arne
What do you mean? — MoK

By saying "perhaps the whole is limited by time" I mean perhaps the whole is limited by time. It is an idea that emerged shortly before I said it and I suspect I am not the first person to consider something to that effect. I have not thought it through to the point of making it a proposition. Thus the word "perhaps."

But Heidegger was quite concerned with metaphysics and was a phenomenologist. — MorningStar

I am not saying Heidegger is correct. I am only clarifying how Heidegger distinguishes between fear and anxiety. Whether he is correct is a different question.

Heidegger's primary concern is ontology rather than metaphysics. And phenomenological description was his preferred ontological approach. For Heidegger, either the nature of being as phenomenologically described strikes one as accurate or it does not. If it strikes one as accurate, then just keep moving. If it strikes one as inaccurate, then it is time to get hermeneutical. :-)

Actually, I am very open to changing my mind if I am shown to be wrong. :wink: — MoK

I have no doubt.

I was joking.

I didn't say that your statement is on me. I mean, we both conclude that the whole is limitless — MoK

I agree that the whole includes "all". I neither agree nor disagree that the whole is "limitless."

I suspect "all" and "limitless" have different implications regarding ideas such as finite/infinite.

Similarly, perhaps the whole is limited by time.

I don't think that time ever comes. — MoK

how newtonian of you. :-)

glad to see that you agree that the whole is limitless. — MoK

I state unequivocally that the whole cannot be limited by "thingness." How you interpret my statement is on you.

that the question is ill-formed — unenlightened

I agree. My immediate response was that these are "laws of nature" and not "laws for nature." Whether anything is classified as a "law of nature" depends upon whether human beings conclude it will admit of no exceptions. And we have been wrong so many times that we are not even bound to our conclusions, let alone nature.

Exactly. The flaw in the notion of a limited whole is our obsession with "thingness". By definition, a limit to the whole cannot be a "thing" or it would be included in the whole.

If there is a whole, then it includes all. If it does not include all, then it is not the whole. Beyond that is philosophy as industry.

discussion is about identity and resentment in particular and apparently there is no word in German that is precise enough to mean resentment. — Chet Hawkins

Indeed. And that is the primary reason Walter Kauffman initially used "re-sentiment" rather than resentment. But dong so came with its own set of issues so Kauffman eventually reverted to resentment.

I remind myself from time to time that carving up philosophy into parts is intended to facilitate rather than impede an understanding of the whole

Beyond that, philosophy as industry is the primary driving force behind the notion that it matters whether the subject matter is technically ontology, metaphysics, or epistemology.

I do not think I would agree with this Heideggerian distinction between fear and anxiety. — Metaphysician Undercover

.

My only intent is to clarify the basis for Heidegger's distinction, i.e.,whether the source of the phenomenon is within the world.

And you are welcome.

why is it the things that by nature must necessarily be the closest to us, most intimately connected to us, the things that must be us, are the hardest things to see? — Fire Ologist

we are force-fed the realness of sense perceptions.

The object of fear is the unknown, in a sense there is no object, and that produces the fear. — Metaphysician Undercover

.

Not quite. Whether the object of fear is known is irrelevant to Heidegger's distinction between fear and anxiety. Instead, the source of the phenomenon (within the world or not within the world) determines whether the phenomenon is fear or anxiety.

That in the face of which one has fear is always an entity within the world while that in face of which one has anxiety is not an entity within the world. See Being and Time at 230-231, (Macquarrie & Robinson).

Simply put, "the forest and the trees" is not a good analogy for understanding Heidegger's distinction between fear and anxiety.

thank you. I shall Google.

Heidegger is easier to understand if one grasps that his primary concern is ontology rather than metaphysics no matter how much of a fiction one considers either or both to be.

But really, even there, we are in the cave, using Fictional tools to excavating fiction. — ENOAH

Perhaps.

Have you read Being and Time?

Russell gets too much credit for suggesting a set that cannot be.

What I am trying to show is that there are two cases where what you consider as the whole is either limited or limitless — MoK

And therein is your flaw. Considering the whole to be limited is simply a mistake in logic. And we already knew that.

Remember, there is Reality; it's accessed by being, not knowing. — ENOAH

Interesting. Though I agree that knowledge is derivative of being, what is the basis upon which you imply "reality" is any less derivative of being than is knowledge?

And even Plato did not go so far as to claim the shadows upon the wall were "fictions."

our knowledge comes to a certain extent before the object, making our concept of „objects“ and the inference to future occurrences from past ones possible — Pez

This reminds of Heidegger's notion that being is that upon which beings are already understood. There is no being in the absence of at least a "vague and average" understanding of beings. So even if we grant for the sake of argument the irrefutability of Hume's logic, the rigor of logic is not the primary basis upon which we make our way about in the world. Instead, we make our way about the world from within our already existing "vague and average" understanding of the world. The number of actions submitted to the rigors of logic are few and far between.

It requires no proof here that Language isn't the "thing" it only re-presents the "thing." — ENOAH

But why is language any less a "thing" than whatever "thing" it represents? Can we even talk about language if we do not consider language to be the "thing" about which we talk? Are you suggesting that thing-ness itself is the fiction?

I thought so.

I'm curious - you don't think reality is one of these - or do you have a presupposition about the nature of reality which informs the others? — Tom Storm

Interesting. I have long defined and consider philosophy to be an ongoing discussion over the nature of reality/being (ontology?). So in some sense and in so far as they are real, the nature of morality, the nature of knowledge, and the nature of art are encompassed within the "nature of reality." They are grist for the ontological mill.

Descartes. And I reject the notion that what constitutes a paradigm shift in one area defines a paradigm shift for all areas. Philosophy of mind, ontology, epistemology, and metaphysics as well as the scientific method are deeply rooted in Cartesianism for better or worse.

All paradigm shifts are philosophical. All paradigm shits are rooted in the way we look at the nature of being of particular areas of study. And it just does not get any more ontological than that.

Yes I don't think his audience was the average man. — ChatteringMonkey

I agree. It is the exceptional man "who has organized the chaos of his passions, given style to his character, and become creative. Aware of life's terrors, he affirms life without resentment." -- Walter A. Kaufmann

In: The Encyclopedia of of Philosophy, Vol. 5, Pages 504-514, Macmillan, New York. at page 511.

First everyone was enslaved by the "ego or conscience", both which you left undefined.

Now everyone is enslaved by "the will", which you have also left undefined.

You are simply repeating the same claim using different terms.

Where is your argument?

The will rules — Piers

Substituting "the will" for "ego or conscience" changes nothing.

The self can be slave to "the will" ego or conscience, or the self can be master of "the will" ego or conscience. You have provided insufficient support for your claim that the former is necessarily the case.

You keep making the same unsupported claim using different terms. Repeating the claim will not make it true nor does it persuade.

Where is your argument?

But it is always interesting to ask whether a belief is held on rational grounds and if one wants to know whether that belief counts as knowledge, it is essential to ask that question. — Ludwig V

I agree. People do tend to treat their beliefs as if they were facts and no good comes of it. On the hand, I am resistant to the notion that established knowledge is supposed to be the only basis for action.

What is your question? You seem to be asking all sorts of questions but the title of the discussion refers to "a question."

And are only Christians allowed to respond?

Please advise at your earliest convenience.

sort of like identical twins. they are exactly the same until they aren't.

In place of this false unique — Isaac Kramnick

You seem to be asking us to choose between a post modernist view of the self or a "false" view of the self.

Is that not akin to seeking my opinion regarding which cookie is better, the good one on the right or the terrible tasting one on the left.

Why would I choose the "false" view?

Belief is connected to knowledge through rationality. — Hallucinogen

The epistemological status of belief is relevant only to those who insist it must be.

I have no problem with anyone (including Plato) presuming the moral perfection of the Gods without argument, especially an idealist such as Plato. Why would he waste his time arguing the perfection of that which appears to us as if it were shadows upon a wall in a cave? Is there a difference between the "ideal" and the "perfect" when it comes to the Gods?

Seems to me that free will is the ability which everybody has to choose
how to serve their Master, whether ego or conscience. — Piers

The self can be slave to ego or conscience, or the self can be master of ego or conscience. You have provided insufficient support for your claim that the former is necessarily the case.

Kaufmann, Walter A.. Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (Princeton Classics Book 3). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.

in tandem with

Nietzsche, Friedrich. Delphi Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche (Illustrated) (Series Five Book 24) Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

modern philosophy appears above all as the construction of a technical jargon reserved for specialists — Dermot Griffin

Richard Rorty suggested to the effect that modern philosophy is more about "skillful" conversation and less about "interesting" conversation.

as Vaskane suggested, it is not a quote from Nietzsche. Instead, it is a scholar's "summarized" description of Nietzsche's overman/superman/ubermensch.

"The overman is the type approximated by Goethe—the human being . . . who has organized the chaos of his passions, given style to his character, and become creative. Aware of life's terrors, he affirms life without resentment." -- Walter A. Kaufmann

In: The Encyclopedia of of Philosophy, Vol. 5, Pages 504-514, Macmillan, New York. at page 511.