there is a logical structure underlying both language and the world — Fooloso4

and doesn't there also have to be a logical structure underlying mind?

Is there a reason one cannot say of ontology that any truth regarding same cannot be accessed by Language but only by being (that) Being? — ENOAH

The nature of being (ontology) is inaccessible in the absence of being.

A deeper understanding of the nature of being (ontology) can be facilitated with the use of language.

I suspect the above is "truth regarding" all intellectual pursuits.

Is there something about ontology that necessarily transcends human Consciousness — ENOAH

Perhaps. Dasein is constitutively pre-ontological. Please see Being and Time.

Also, consciousness is derivative of being-in-the-world. Ibid.

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Is there something about ontology that necessarily transcends human Consciousness — ENOAH

Not all ontologies are the same. Heidegger would say yes. Please see Being and Time.

didn't even H in B and T, purport to embark upon ontology but really end up providing a philosophical reflection upon the Human as Subject, Mind as opposed to its Natural Organic Reality? — ENOAH

What Heidegger does in Being and Time is consistent with Heidegger's intentions as set forth in the Introduction to Being and Time. Please see Being and Time at page 64.

Is metaphysics for skilled specialists — Joshs

The systematization (schematization?) is nothing new. Plato schematized as have many philosophers throughout history. Some wish to explain everything while others wish everything to be explained.

And in contemporary philosophy, those wishes are evidenced in responses (including some of mine) to questions such as "What's your description of metaphysics?"

I suspect one could Google and find a chart with "Metaphysics" at the top.

It has more to do with the dynamics of conformity. Metaphysics is what One does.

but what is your best description of Metaphysics? — Rob J Kennedy

Contemporary metaphysics represents the systematizing of philosophy.

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Heidegger considers this classical understanding of being to belong to metaphysics, whereas his fundamental ontology overcomes metaphysics. — Joshs

Excellent point.

extracted from the rest of metaphysics — ENOAH

I do not know what that means. Ontology is not "extracted" from the rest of metaphysics. Metaphysics is an emphasis upon what is, epistemology is an emphasis upon how do what know what is, while ontology is an emphasis upon the nature of what is. There is no necessary hierarchical relationships upon the separate areas of emphasis.

Indeed, the areas of emphasis are to a large degree artificial and serve the purpose of making philosophy in general more accessible by dividing it up in a somewhat artificial manner. When I say my primary area of interest is ontology, I am not saying to the exclusion of all other areas.

You want to talk metaphysics, then we can talk metaphysics and you may run circles around me. If you want to talk epistemology, then we can talk epistemology and you may run circles around me. If you want to talk ontology, then we can talk ontology.

And if you do not want to talk ontology, then that is fine too. But only a metaphysician would attempt to persuade that metaphysics is some sort of umbrella term that includes ontology and epistemology. It is not.

and the "problem" with "pure" ontology — ENOAH

I do not understand what you mean by pure ontology. I have never referred to pure ontology. I am not familiar with the term.

And you may rest assured that my understanding of the nature of being (my ontological disposition) provides me with useful knowledge each and every day.

If your understanding of the nature of being fails to provide you with useful knowledge each and every day, then your understanding of the nature of being is insufficient. And that is on you.

The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. — Wittgenstein

One could just as well say that the limits of my language and the limits of my world are the limits of me.

And I for one am tired of being written out of the equation.

they are not propositional and are not as clearly beholden to local axioms as a more fully developed linguistic system — Tom Storm

Well said. And more than a minor point.

but even grunts, growls, and purring excite our language based desire to interpret. is it not in our linguistic nature to interpret the as-structure of all that comes at us? though the grunt, growl, and purr lack discernable syntax, it could be risky to interpret them as semantically void.

This is possible because there is a logical structure underlying both language and the world — Fooloso4

Be that as it may, that does not answer the question of whether logic and language are separable. All it does is raise the parallel question of whether logic and the world are separable. I suspect they are not. No logic, no language. No language, no logic.

And to simply say that one underlies the other gives no necessary primordiality to one or the other. It is not as if we could strip the world away and examine the underlying logic or take away the underlying logic and observe the world. No logic, no world. No world, no logic.

The only useful purpose of their intellectual separation is to facilitate an understanding of the unitary phenomenon of the logical world created with language. Can it get more transcendental than that?

chicken or the egg. and with no language to express the axioms, silence. and speaking only for myself, silence is preferable to incoherence.

It is logic rather than language which is transcendental. — Fooloso4

Are logic and language separable? First we divide the whole into parts to facilitate an understanding of the whole and then we proceed to destroy the whole by declaring some parts more real than others. The notion of either logic or language without the other is as non-sensical as a one sided coin.

But can a “form of life” include a more generous scope for philosophical language that abstracts from experience (or "my world") to question itself? — J

Fascinating question. It would be odd indeed if a being having a generous scope regarding the use of language for the questioning of being lacked the scope of language necessary to formulating the question, let alone proposing some possible answers.

Good to know about him because I have something extra to read. — MoK

Being and Time is his most noted work. I highly recommend.

What do you mean by "limited" in this case? — MoK

No time, no whole.

Similarly, perhaps the whole is limited by time.
— Arne
What do you mean? — MoK

By saying "perhaps the whole is limited by time" I mean perhaps the whole is limited by time. It is an idea that emerged shortly before I said it and I suspect I am not the first person to consider something to that effect. I have not thought it through to the point of making it a proposition. Thus the word "perhaps."

But Heidegger was quite concerned with metaphysics and was a phenomenologist. — MorningStar

I am not saying Heidegger is correct. I am only clarifying how Heidegger distinguishes between fear and anxiety. Whether he is correct is a different question.

Heidegger's primary concern is ontology rather than metaphysics. And phenomenological description was his preferred ontological approach. For Heidegger, either the nature of being as phenomenologically described strikes one as accurate or it does not. If it strikes one as accurate, then just keep moving. If it strikes one as inaccurate, then it is time to get hermeneutical. :-)

Actually, I am very open to changing my mind if I am shown to be wrong. :wink: — MoK

I have no doubt.

I was joking.

I didn't say that your statement is on me. I mean, we both conclude that the whole is limitless — MoK

I agree that the whole includes "all". I neither agree nor disagree that the whole is "limitless."

I suspect "all" and "limitless" have different implications regarding ideas such as finite/infinite.

Similarly, perhaps the whole is limited by time.

I don't think that time ever comes. — MoK

how newtonian of you. :-)

glad to see that you agree that the whole is limitless. — MoK

I state unequivocally that the whole cannot be limited by "thingness." How you interpret my statement is on you.

that the question is ill-formed — unenlightened

I agree. My immediate response was that these are "laws of nature" and not "laws for nature." Whether anything is classified as a "law of nature" depends upon whether human beings conclude it will admit of no exceptions. And we have been wrong so many times that we are not even bound to our conclusions, let alone nature.

Exactly. The flaw in the notion of a limited whole is our obsession with "thingness". By definition, a limit to the whole cannot be a "thing" or it would be included in the whole.

If there is a whole, then it includes all. If it does not include all, then it is not the whole. Beyond that is philosophy as industry.

discussion is about identity and resentment in particular and apparently there is no word in German that is precise enough to mean resentment. — Chet Hawkins

Indeed. And that is the primary reason Walter Kauffman initially used "re-sentiment" rather than resentment. But dong so came with its own set of issues so Kauffman eventually reverted to resentment.

I remind myself from time to time that carving up philosophy into parts is intended to facilitate rather than impede an understanding of the whole

Beyond that, philosophy as industry is the primary driving force behind the notion that it matters whether the subject matter is technically ontology, metaphysics, or epistemology.

I do not think I would agree with this Heideggerian distinction between fear and anxiety. — Metaphysician Undercover

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My only intent is to clarify the basis for Heidegger's distinction, i.e.,whether the source of the phenomenon is within the world.

And you are welcome.

why is it the things that by nature must necessarily be the closest to us, most intimately connected to us, the things that must be us, are the hardest things to see? — Fire Ologist

we are force-fed the realness of sense perceptions.

The object of fear is the unknown, in a sense there is no object, and that produces the fear. — Metaphysician Undercover

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Not quite. Whether the object of fear is known is irrelevant to Heidegger's distinction between fear and anxiety. Instead, the source of the phenomenon (within the world or not within the world) determines whether the phenomenon is fear or anxiety.

That in the face of which one has fear is always an entity within the world while that in face of which one has anxiety is not an entity within the world. See Being and Time at 230-231, (Macquarrie & Robinson).

Simply put, "the forest and the trees" is not a good analogy for understanding Heidegger's distinction between fear and anxiety.

thank you. I shall Google.

Heidegger is easier to understand if one grasps that his primary concern is ontology rather than metaphysics no matter how much of a fiction one considers either or both to be.

But really, even there, we are in the cave, using Fictional tools to excavating fiction. — ENOAH

Perhaps.

Have you read Being and Time?

Russell gets too much credit for suggesting a set that cannot be.

What I am trying to show is that there are two cases where what you consider as the whole is either limited or limitless — MoK

And therein is your flaw. Considering the whole to be limited is simply a mistake in logic. And we already knew that.