Would they belong to "Ding-An-Sich"? or would they be just invention of human mind? What do we have to do or what can we do with Thing-in-itself? — Corvus
Embodied theorists reverse the traditional scheme of prioritization of thought over feelings, by making affective inputs the condition of possibility of relevance and meaning in thought. It is through the feeling body that things show up as salient; an alteration in how the body feels is at the same time a shift in how the world appears and in how one relates to it. — Joshs
between science and Mwrleau-Ponty, it is because the particular brand of naturalism that a science is in thrall to makes no room for Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. Varela, Thompson, Gallagher, Petitot and others claim phenomenology can be naturalized
once we transform and update our thinking about scientific naturalism so as to accommodate it. — Joshs
Also, note that it ignores phenomenology, existentialism, and critical theory, which were concerned much more with life and society than with language. On the other hand, I guess maybe that by 1967, post-... — Jamal
Hmmm... (I guess I should reread The Origins of Geometry.)As it turns out, Dilthey’s historicism ends up
idealizing history in a way that Husserl avoids. — Joshs
Together with Dilthey, Yorck was the first philosopher to elaborate the specific concept of historicity [Geschichtlichkeit] as a defining characteristic in the ontology of human beings. In particular, Yorck emphasized the generic difference between the ontic and the historical...Yorck aimed exclusively at the — plaque flag
The unitary structure of the three ecstasies, future-present-having been, determines the ‘is’, the essence, the Being of being as this structure of transit. — Joshs
Would also be interested in you translating this out of Heideggerese. — fdrake
Are you referring to significant places or objects that may evoke strong associations and potent meanings due to their having being integral to important life events, or something else? — Janus
Without recognition there would be no continuity of experience. Without memory there could be no recognition. The condition known as "anterograde amnesia" attests to this.So memory is necessary, if not sufficient it seems; which leaves me wondering what are the other factors you have in mind. The world itself, with its similarities and differences? — Janus
Memory is always in play. Perhaps the sense of "continuity" in our experience is on account of a story we are constantly telling ourselves, choosing the aspects of experience that we can make coherent and consistent with what we remember from previous experience. — Janus
Husserl’s solution ( which was also William James’) was to argue that the present moment is ‘specious’. That is , it includes retentions and protentions (expectations). One could not hear a melody as a melody if all that one was aware of was individual notes in an isolated and punctual ‘now’. Husserl asserted that the just prior note is retained alongside the now itself. This provides us with the sense of continuity. In addition, the new always shades an element of similarity with what preceded it ... — Joshs
... What I had in mind was the self-reflexivity of becoming as difference rather than identity. What returns to itself is always an utterly new and different meaning. There is nothing evolutionary or cumulative in this self-reflexive unfolding, no aim or goal. The self is remade in every repetition ,,. — Joshs
As you stress, Heidegger adds the radically subjective moment, which is a bit tricky to connect with the rest (which is not to say impossible.) Anyway, what do you think about Hegel influencing Heidegger ? And what do you make of the significance of death in Heidegger ? — green flag
“Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without any previous appropriation of the matter. Idle talk, which everyone can snatch up, not only divests us of the task of genuine understanding, but develops an indifferent intelligibility for which nothing is closed off any longer ...” — Joshs
Perhaps Heidegger was influenced by Kierkegaard in this. In his journal (I paraphrase), he criticizes the fantasy of presuppositionless philosophy by emphasizing that the medium, language, is already there, as a kind of inescapable presupposition. This is one of my favorite themes in Heidegger. This inherited ... — green flag
like the way the I.E.P. explains Heidegger’s relation to metaphysics: — Joshs
There are those, such as Derrida, who argued that Heidegger hadn’t managed to escape metaphysics with his approach, but Heidegger himself believed that what he was doing with his fundamental ontology no longer fell within the category of a metaphysics but instead inquired into the very ground of metaphysics itself. — Joshs
The guiding question is about beings, things that are. The grounding question is not about any particular being or all beings, it is about Being, the wonder that there is anything at all. Heidegger's claim is that the grounding question of Being became lost as the focus was narrowed and guided by the question of beings. — Fooloso4
Absolutely read him like a Nazi. Does that mean a phenomenological "sense of community", as Heidegger's described it, is a Nazi concept? Remains to be seen. — fdrake
It’s not a sense of community. The “they” can be thought as something like Freud’s superego— the sense of what “they” think and “they” believe. The masses, the mainstream, the general culture, this vague sense of “what one does.” — Mikie
“Fichte introduced into German philosophy the three-step of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, using these three terms. Schelling took up this terminology. Hegel did not. He never once used these three terms together to designate three stages in an argument or account in any of his books. And they do not help us... — Dermot Griffin
“Hegel provides the most extensive, general account of his dialectical method in Part I of his Encyclopaedia of
Philosophical Sciences, which is often called the Encyclopaedia Logic [EL]. The form or presentation of logic, he says, has three sides or moments (EL §79). These sides are not parts of logic, but, rather, ... — Joshs
Hegel is not saying the materiality of the world is fake. Like Aristotle he is say the form of objects is what we conceive and therefore the intelligibility of the world. Not separate from its material. — Jackson
ultimately Hegel holds that what we can consider as 'world' is ideal. — Tobias
I've studied a lot of his work and see that nowhere. Please cite something by Hegel. — Jackson