So I understand the idea of 'pure maths' but I'm finding the idea of 'pure physics' pretty hard to get my head around.....
... of the following argument: Since the deconstructionist (which is to say, isn't it, the skeptic-relativist-nihilist!) is supposed not to believe in truth, stability, or the unity of meaning, in intention or "meaning-to-say, " how can he demand of us that we read him with pertinence, precision, rigor? How can he demand that his own text be interpreted correctly? How can he accuse anyone else of having misunderstood ..., — Joshs
Husserl makes a distinction between bound and free idealities. Spoken and written language, and all other sorts of gestures and markings which intend meaning, exemplify bound idealities.Even as it is designed to be immortal, repeatable as the same apart from any actual occurrence made at some point, — Joshs
Then dasein is defined by dasein. That is okay because he already made ‘clear’ :D how what he says isn’t ‘circular’ though right. — I like sushi
The difference I see with Heidegger is that Heidegger takes pragmatic awareness as a totality of relevance that unifies our total past as background ‘framing’ of every disclosure of a ready to hand thing. Husserl begins instead with the perceptual object that only indirectly links back to a larger totality of our past experience. — Joshs
Did you already say the idea came from Heidegger via Husserl? If so, my apologies I missed it. I'm not aware of that idea deriving from Husserl, but in any case it is abundantly clear in Heidegger.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Always_already — Janus
Very well said. Our secular age, with its scientism and capitalism is ultimately based on "naturalism" and "materialism," or even "physicalism." Two other -isms branch off from these: hedonism and consumerism. That's a lot of -isms. But if we look around, this explains a large part of our world. It shows up in the "American Dream" of basically aspiring to be nothing more than a wage slave who can maybe one day own a house and a little land (property, assets -- "stuff"). It shows up in our addictions to technology, the most obvious being smart phones. — Xtrix
For Heidegger we are never conscious to ourselves , because reflection is transformation. So absence for Heidegger makes its way into the heart of experiencing every moment, in that the self is never present to itself as consciousness, self-reflexivity and self-awareness. We are fundamentally absent to ourselves. — Joshs
What I have in mind specifically is his analysis of what he calls the statement in B&T. He refers to this as an extreme of interpretation and of the present to hand. He derives the ‘is’ from the ‘as’ structure, in which we take something as something. I consider the following analysis to inextricably link the ‘is’ to the ‘as’ , the ‘as’ to temporality, and temporality to being ( the ‘is’). — Joshs
This sounds a lot more like Kant than Heidegger (Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind). Understood most primordially, there is no presence of something objective, no — Joshs
0. In the Introduction, Kant says that the Critique is not a doctrine; yet here he calls part of it the Doctrine of Elements (and later the Doctrine of Method). Why? — darthbarracuda
Ah. Then the question would be where does intentionality not arise in our mental life for Husserl? — Manuel
I'm afraid you still haven't explained what the terms existence and essence in Heidegger mean. You vaguely allude to the meanings in traditional metaphysics such as what and that. That can mean anything — David Mo
I had mentioned the problem of the various verbal games with the concept of "existence" and "essence" and you don't even mention them. Where are we going? — David Mo
At the beginning of section #9 of Being and Time, Heidegger makes a nice word game between essentia, existenze, existentia, being, being-present-hand and others that may end your patience. If you resist — David Mo
If "care" has nothing to do with caring then why would he have called it "care"? — Metaphysician Undercover
Not really. If you have a passage you're thinking specifically about, please direct me to it.
Heidegger often says that time, "temporality," is the horizon for any understanding of being. That's a difficult sentence to get your mind around, but since we're essentially caring, temporal beings (human beings), and we have an understanding of being, it is only through temporality that something like "being" can be understood. — Xtrix
I don't quite understand what you're getting at here. How does the second sentence relate to the first? And what does the second mean? — Xtrix
Why does Kant separate the appearance into form and matter? Why does he suppose that the sensations cannot already be given to us ordered a certain way, and instead supposes that sensations are just give to us in a disordered way? It seems like an arbitrary distinction he makes in order to create the need for pure intuition and the Categories. — Kryneizov
From B34 onwards I have found more than fifty occurrences of the term "sensible intuition" in the English version of Cambridge University Press, 1998. Which German term are they translating? — David Mo
Intuitions. — Mww
In Kantian terminology I'm using now, intuitions are not templates (a priori), they are the content of our ideas. Space and time are the templates of sensible intuition. The metaphysical error is to use space and time templates without sensible material.
You are probably using "intuition" in other sense. — David Mo
Could be, but....what is the sensible content of an idea? “Invisibility” is an idea, but hardly has sensible content. — Mww
So, is invisibility a metaphysical idea? Or is it the result of applying a logical (non-x) category to things in general? I would say that "nothingness" is a metaphysical idea when you turn a logical relationship (negation) into a substance: "the" nothingness. Perhaps the same can be done with "the" Invisibility. Parmenides started with that - it is said. — David Mo