Truste me they are not. You have a perspective of us because you visited my country multiple times but remember just for tourism. It is important to emphasise that touristic countries tend to make an unrealistic mask just to attract a lot of people (Spain does it) I don’t know which territories you visited but I guess the common ones as Andalucía or another Mediterranean beach. Well yes they are happy more they have to because we are in a mess. I don’t even understand my own compatriots but it seems very legit the 38 %.
I was buying some stuff in a market and a random dude asked us: “do you have some coins?” And then some woman replied “I wish I could give you some coins but I earn 400 € at month”
This made me feel sad my own country man... — javi2541997

Yes it was mostly touristic regions I guess, the Catalonia region multiple times and the Sevilla region. So I take your word for it. But then I don't really believe the numbers are that high in my country, people generally don't seem all that happy. Maybe material wealth (in which we do ok I guess) does paper over a lot of perceived unhappiness, certainly in reporting considering wealth is seen as a measure of 'succes' a lot of time...

But yeah the bad situation Spain, and the other southern European countries, are in at the moment, is really a shame. The Euro was a very bad deal for the south.

And I agree Christianity is to be blamed for everything.
— ChatteringMonkey

How convenient. — synthesis

I was only semi-serious... But Christianity has played an important role in how we got where we are now.

I understand that, I'm just disputing your claim that religion is a story. It's not a story. The gods are real, God is real. From my perspective, obviously, you have your Modernist perspective. — Dharmi

Your disagreement about the existence of Gods and God is noted.

I think there is a problem of meaning, certainly in the west. I think meaning for most people is tied to having a perspective of playing some role in the larger societies they are part of. Historically religion played a huge part in providing that, even if it was just a story people told.
— ChatteringMonkey

Yes, but that religion is "just a story" is a very Modernist type of thing claim. Premodern religion, pagan religions, were not stories. They were the way things are. The metaphysical underpinning of ultimate reality itself. Ancient people had methods of knowing this Ultimate, through what Plotinus termed theurgy, but what the Vedic tradition refers to as yoga. It's not just a story, if anything, Modernity is "just a story"

Modernity has absolutely nothing to do with Greco-Roman civilization, it's a deviation and perversion of Dark Age Christendom which stole, plagiarized and appropriated the writings of the ancients like Plato and Aristotle to create this catastrophe of a so-called civilization which is destroying the whole planet as we speak. Modernity is a story, not Premodernity. — Dharmi

Sure, as someone born in the modern age, I think it save to say I view things from a modernist perspective... I'm a product of the times, I'm not sure how that could be otherwise.

And I agree Christianity is to be blamed for everything.

I find these numbers very hard to believe. China at 93%? And my country in the 70ties while Spain only at 38. I've been to Spain multiple times, and didn't have the impression that people were fundamentally more unhappy. Spain has been through a rough patch lately to be sure, with lots of unemployment and lack of perspective in general, but these numbers seem exaggerated.

That said, I'll throw two completely different ideas at this question of meaning/happiness :

1. Expectations matter. Perception of ones happiness will invariably be relative to ones expectations about happiness. If you have high expectations, chances are you will report being less happy than someone with low expectations in the same circumstances. This might some of what's going on with Spain, historically coming from a more rich/prominent position than it has now.

2. I think there is a problem of meaning, certainly in the west. I think meaning for most people is tied to having a perspective of playing some role in the larger societies they are part of. Historically religion played a huge part in providing that, even if it was just a story people told. With secularization in the west people have lost that... and not a whole lot has come in it's place. What is the role now for the average person? Working some unfulfilling BS job to be a consumer and keep the economy going so the rich can get richer? That is if you can get a job anyway. Maybe the question of meaning is hitting Spain especially hard now because it is traditional more Catholic than the rest of Europe and late to the secular party? And so it hasn't had the time to deal with this question of meaning for a secular point of view?

"The most general formula on which every religion and morality is founded is: "Do this and that, refrain from this and that--then you will be happy! Otherwise..." Every morality, every religion, is this imperative; I call it the great original sin of reason, the immortal unreason. In my mouth, this formula is changed into its opposite--first example of my "revaluation of all values": a well-turned-out human being, a "happy one," must perform certain actions and shrinks instinctively from other actions; he carries the order, which he represents physiologically, into his relations with other human beings and things. In a formula: his virtue is the effect of his happiness."

Did he think first we should achieve happiness which then will make us virtuous? — deusidex

Basicly yes... although there is no 'should', it's meant to be descriptive of how one ends up being virtuous.

His point here is that moralists and religions got the direction of causation wrong. He thinks you do not become happy because you do good, or follow some prescribed moral rules. He thinks you will do good because you are "happy".

Also note the quotes there, happy and virtue will not have the same meaning as it has for those moralists and religions.

Ok I see now what my difficulty with the categorization may be. You're looking at it from an American perspective for the most part I guess. In my country, and most of European Countries, we don't have a two-party system. We have 5 "main-stream" parties and a couple of extreme parties at either end, who have to form coalitions to form a government. So "agrees with you politically" is not a simple black or white matter usually.
— ChatteringMonkey
Yes, absolutely. In European countries, things are not so either-or or black-and-white as in the US. Although there is a less or more visible trend toward such a simplification and polarization of political life in Europe as well. — baker

Yes definitely. There's a trend of 'extremist' or 'populist' parties gaining more traction in Europe now for 20 or more years, depending on the country. The difference with the US is I guess that they are for the most part not subsumed in the traditional parties and so don't get all that much chances to effectively take part in power. But the trend is unmistakably there and probably caused by more or less the same socio-economic dynamics, i.e. globalization, neo-liberal policies and rise in inequality from the 1970 on wards.

I would have a category for 'totally different or incompatible' for the genuinely religious and traditional. It's not that I think they have bad intentions (5) or that they are duped or misinformed (if they consciously affirm their faith) (4), but that they have a totally different and incompatible way of thinking about ethics and society.
— ChatteringMonkey

If they’re well-intentioned just for bad reasons, that would put them in group 2. E.g. if you’re a socialist atheist and a socialist Christian agrees with you politically but for religious rather than rational reasons, they’re group 2 to you. OTOH a prosperity theologian would be group 5 to you: they really wholeheartedly and devoutly believe something that is completely contrary to any good reasons you can think of. — Pfhorrest

Ok I see now what my difficulty with the categorization may be. You're looking at it from an American perspective for the most part I guess. In my country, and most of European Countries, we don't have a two-party system. We have 5 "main-stream" parties and a couple of extreme parties at either end, who have to form coalitions to form a government. So "agrees with you politically" is not a simple black or white matter usually. A socialist Christian and a socialist atheist would typically not be voting for the same party, and those parties may or may not be in the same ruling coalition.

I think you've misunderstood what Pfhorrest is talking about. He's suggesting a way of approaching people who disagree with you using categories relative to the person using them. — Isaac

I did misread him, I thought he had a more objective distinction in mind. My reaction was maybe a bit to strong because of that.

What is this other category in which we could place those who disagree with us ethically aside from misinformed, misguided, or wrong? — Isaac

I would have a category for 'totally different or incompatible' for the genuinely religious and traditional. It's not that I think they have bad intentions (5) or that they are duped or misinformed (if they consciously affirm their faith) (4), but that they have a totally different and incompatible way of thinking about ethics and society.

following your categorization someone who disagrees with you can only incorrect, because they are either confused/not informed enough/to be converted (middle group) stupid/misguided (4th group), or morally corrupt (5th group). Doesn't seem all that respectful to me.
— ChatteringMonkey

I think you've misunderstood what Pfhorrest is talking about. He's suggesting a way of approaching people who disagree with you using categories relative to the person using them. So there are no other ways to categorise those who disagree with you ethically. They're either wrong, misinformed (where an ethical choice might be based on empirical data), or misguided (where an ethical choice might require some complex consideration). I'm not sure what other category you might imagine putting people in...

'Also right' doesn't work because that would take them outside the scope of the people being considered (those who disagree with you).

'Differently right'...? 'Using alternative facts'...? 'Not yet right'...?

What is this other category in which we could place those who disagree with us ethically aside from misinformed, misguided, or wrong? — Isaac

Well there's always the possibility that you are or I am wrong, no? If two people disagree about something, isn't it strange to assume that one is always automatically right and the other must be wrong? Seems like a constructive conversation would have to start from the idea that you might also be wrong about some things. Otherwise aren't you effectively always taking on the role of teacher/moral authority? I don't think anyone really likes being on the receiving end of such a conversation.

But aside from that I also do believe that you can come to different conclusions on ethical questions. And I don't mean this in a totally relativistic sense, better and worse arguments can be made, something can be more or less coherent, you can be misinformed etc... but usually - if it's not about extreme clear-cut cases - ethics is not like mathematics or science where you can demonstrate with absolute certainty that this one answer is the right one. And with politics I think this becomes even more questionable because of the enormous complexity involved. There are ideas that seem better or worse, but I don't think anybody really "knows" with any kind of certainty, and I would have that epistemic uncertainty reflected in the terms I use and in the way I approach those conversations.

Rarely have I seen someone change their minds following rational arguments.
— ChatteringMonkey

This is why I am pursuing the sociological approach which views detailed ideological positions as representative of more fundamental social trends, driven by actual volitional energies of the "whole man". If we can understand why groups of people come to believe what they do then we can begin to find ways to bridge the disparate positions. And indeed, we can see that these type of inter-evolutions and even reconciliations do occur, aiding us in our analysis. — Pantagruel

I think that's a step in the right direction, but it might also be worth considering that it's not a real possibility to bridge certain disparate positions. Beliefs seem to be clustered in coherent wholes, i.e. you typically don't just change your mind on some fact or value in isolation, but because it fits better into a larger structure of beliefs that is already there. And those seem very hard to alter, as is I think well documented with the phenomenon of religious conversion or de-conversion.

The topic of this thread isn't determining which is which, but just what's a good way to address people relative to their place on a spectrum of (dis)agreement about which is which. "A good way" both in the sense of a kind and respectful way, and also in the sense of a productive and effective way. — Pfhorrest

Judging from the reactions, it would seem that what you are proposing isn't very effective and productive. And honestly, I don't know why that should be all that surprising considering following your categorization someone who disagrees with you can only be incorrect, because they are either confused/not informed enough/to be converted (middle group) stupid/misguided (4th group), or morally corrupt (5th group). Doesn't seem all that respectful to me. If I were to make a guess, it's this kind of attitude that drives people in the middle group to the other side.

Rarely have I seen someone change their minds following rational arguments. And people seem to especially resist being told what to think or do if they feel like something is being forced onto them. What maybe helps is just listening without trying to convert them and trying to engage them on their terms. But yeah nobody ever does that.... ships passing in the night, all the time.

I think it's useful to differentiate between at least these five different shades of ideological (dis)agreement, and treat each kind of person differently in conversation:

- People who solidly hold correct opinions for good reasons

- People who just socially identify with the side of those correct opinions

- People who don't have strong opinions one way or the other and just try to give all ideas a fair shake

- People who have been duped or manipulated into thinking that bad causes are good causes

- People who honestly and devoutly have genuinely bad intentions — Pfhorrest

This seems like a bit of a biased categorization, because I think the basic disagreement is one of methodology. One group doesn't think the way to arrive at 'correct opinions' is through reason, or at least reason alone, but via tradition predominately. In making distinctions this way you are already favoring one method above another, and misrepresent people who favor the other method by looking at it solely the perspective of your preferred method.

What I think could help, is trying to understand why people come to different opinions, and see if there is enough of a common methodology and basic values that I think are necessary to make it even possible to continue discussing these things rationally. If not, there's little point to it, and the best thing to do might be to just agree to disagree.

Pfhorrest covered most of it.

Maybe I would add, you need something to reflect on. The "self" gets formed in relation to the world and to others... via your experiences.

There's nothing wrong with reflecting on your "self", on your experiences, from time to time, but if you do nothing else, you end up with nothing to reflect on.

The mistake is I think in thinking that by reason alone, or that 'in-ward looking'/introspection will bring you closer to some kind of true, pristine self, apart from the world.

Ask the obvious question: is he telling the Prince what to do? If so, it's a moral document. — Banno

Sure, moral in the widest sense.

My original point was just that Machiavelli's claims like, "It's better to act cruel" could be refuted in a couple of different ways: Either by saying that cruelty is simply bad (which would be a moral evaluation) or by saying that cruelty does in fact not contribute to staying in power (which would be more a matter of causation). If Machiavelli is predominantly making claims in the latter sense, then it would seem more convincing to me to try to refute them on those terms.

Yeah ok, but I don't think Montaigne is saying that only to clean up his image, I think he means it, or at least it seems like he does to me.
— ChatteringMonkey
If he was a mediator between the Protestants and the Catholics, he surely meant it.

Yet I think that many politicians could honestly agree with Montaigne and then when engaged in politics follow the advice of Machiavelli. — ssu

Ok, so you saying that they are talking about different things then? Machiavelli about how to be effective in politics, and Montaigne more about his own personal view on things. I probably agree with that for the most part.

I'm not sure, I'm not exactly a Machiavelli scholar, I read The prince.

What do you think he is saying then, that a ruler should be cruel, not because that is how you best stay in power (as a matter of causal description), but as some kind a moral imperative? That would be a weird thing to say.

Or maybe you think he says these things as some kind of apologetics for abject behaviour? That could make more sense.

I guess my question is, if it's rethorics, what is it he's trying to sell then? Maybe himself as a potential advisor to the prince, that could make sense too.

You do have a-moral or hypothetical shoulds, no? If you want healthy teeth, then you should brush your teeth.... is that a moral claim? I'd say no. And I think it's that kind of should statements he is making. If you want to stay in power as a prince etc...

From SEP:
Machiavelli criticizes at length precisely this moralistic view of authority in his best-known treatise, The Prince. For Machiavelli, there is no moral basis on which to judge the difference between legitimate and illegitimate uses of power.

Seems he was making normative claims. — Banno

Is that a normative claim though? Seem more like a meta-normative/a-moral claim to me.

It's obvious when someone is basically cleaning his image, he would say as Shklar referred "that the sight of cruelty instantly filled him with revulsion." — ssu

Yeah ok, but I don't think Montaigne is saying that only to clean up his image, I think he means it, or at least it seems like he does to me.

If everybody is cruel, wouldn't that entail, given the idea that cruelty is a vice, that everybody is psychologically deformed. What then would be the cause of that deformity?
— ChatteringMonkey

if everyone is psychologically deformed, would that not suggest, rather than a deformation, everyone has a certain , unappealing, aspect or proclivity to cruelty? How is it a deformity if it is universal? — Book273

That's exactly what I'm asking. A deformity would suggest that something caused it other than 'nature' or evolution, if it were natural we would call it something like a proclivity, yes. Montaigne, and with him a lot people, seem to think it's a deformity though. So the question in that account is then, what caused it?

Basically, Do you believe some people require a larger effort in self reflection, meditation and self-directed positive cognitive training to maintain the same good traits/values as someone who just does it in the first place without thinking? — Benj96

Yes, because 'natural' is not really natural... nobody is expected to behave good as a baby. There's allways an education preceding the age where one is considered morally responsible. And since not everybody has had an equally good education, there will be differences.

'Without thinking', or 'natural', or 'intuitive' always also means trained to behave in that way to some extend... that's a point that virtue ethics usually makes clear, a point that is perhaps a bit forgotten in this day and age.

Yes, I think that quote is in line with what I said, usually Machiavelli is dismissed because of some moral evaluation, he is bad/immoral because of this and that. But that is usually not all that convincing because he is not really making normative claims, he sticks to a-moral description and prediction. She tries to make an argument on his terms, i.e that his description and the conclusions he draws from them are not really realistic... if she succeeds is another matter, but it's at least an argument that is aimed at the right place.

She contrast Machiavelli to Montaigne, who were not that far apart, and to Montesquieu who live a bit later, but there she does make note of differences in cultural contexts.

Also, it's not about painting Machiavelli a bad guy in some kind of moralistic sense, read the article and you'll see, it's not that long.

"European culture is unique in the assertion of political interest".[6] — GoldMane

Was it that European culture was especially unique in that regard, or that European culture just happened to be more technologically advanced at the time inter-continental assertion of political interest became possible?

Wars, domination and population displacement seem rather commonplace for most cultures in history. For instance genomics seem to indicate that Africa was much more diverse before Bantu swept across the continent and displaced a lot of the other African groups. Assertion of political interest at least doesn't seem entirely alien to Africans, or to other cultures in general, either.

To be clear, I'm not saying the claim is false, I just wonder to what extend it was European Culture in particular that was the driver behind what happened historically. I could buy that a kind of universalism born out of Christianity had something to do with it, that seemed to be relatively unique to Europe at least.

Interesting read, thanks.

I'm not sure what to make of it yet. It's seems a plausible psychological account for what "putting cruelty first" would entail, at face value.

What is interesting to me though is the idea that cruelty has to be a vice, and born out of vice... out of psychological deformities. Because in Montaignes world it's not only the zealot that is cruel, everybody is cruel... it's just that it is especially damning for Christianity because it is considered a vice there too. Hence the misanthropy.

If everybody is cruel, wouldn't that entail, given the idea that cruelty is a vice, that everybody is psychologically deformed. What then would be the cause of that deformity?

Culture could be one answer, but that seems like a difficult case to make considering that the culture was Christian and Christianity considers cruelty a vice. So it seems rather that culture is unsuccessful in rooting out something that is already there. Or maybe you would have to invoke some other opposing cultural influence as the cause, or maybe Christianity having a particularly inverse effect here?

But if not culture, then that would mean that we are cruel naturally, which would mean that we are psychologically deformed naturally. This seems problematic too, by itself. And while maybe you could make an argument for this, it would presumably have to entail some kind of supra-natural standard, from which you can evaluate that nature?

So while I definitely have the same intuition as Montaigne, I'm not sure how you would argue the point from a psychological descriptive point of view, not in the least because a certain Moustache, I will not invoke his name, gives a psychological account for cruelty at base precisely not being born out of deformity.

It has foreign policy on trade (it is, after all, a trade union first and foremost). The notion of an EU armed forces keeps getting floated. That would, I agree, be a big step toward state status. — Kenosha Kid

Yes that is true, it started as only a trade union and for that purpose it can do some foreign policy. And it has expanded a bit over the years since its conception, but trade is still the larger part of it. There no political and cultural unity, nor unity concerning social policy etc..

I'd say the most important difference is that the EU lacks foreign policy and military competences, and an executive power that can represent the EU in these matters... as such it doesn't really have agency as a state would have vis a vis the rest of the world.

Also while it does have a parliament, the main political body is still the council of the EU, consisting of the leaders of the different memberstates. That organ determines the most important issues, not the parliament.

So I don't think the EU would qualify as a state, but is rather a treaty between states... hence memberstates.

I think the apparent need for rules is an interesting point. Needing structure and rules does not mean these rules are not invented and without genuine force.
— Andrew4Handel

Try driving on the wrong side of the road and feel the genuine force.The idea that social pressure is unreal is as ridiculous as that it is unnecessary. A path is made by walking on it, something that sheep manage with no detectable entitlement. Habit and custom arise and establish themselves naturally, and entitlement is established in this way too; it is not a precondition of social organisation, nor is it anyone's invention. So far, I can see no radical distinction between the way a river course is established by a process of erosion, and the way a society is established and becomes regulated. Sometimes rivers flood and change course, and sometimes societies suffer revolutions. River courses are not fictional. — unenlightened

Good analogy!

It's interesting that a good analogy or metaphor can be more insightful, than trying to capture it in abstract categories like subjective/objective, absolute/relative, real/fictional etc etc... Good stuff.

Plato, Hume, Nietzsche and then straight to existentialist if that is your interest... i'd skip all the rest.

Hume, "an inquiry concerning human understanding", his later book (not the big tome) is enough to get a decent understanding of his philosophy.

Nietzsche, "Genealogy of morals", and "beyond Good and Evil", are maybe the two books that I definitely would read.

Hume is missing, I'd read some of him first. And yes I'd always just start with Plato, if you haven't already.

It's not that Trump merely captures what lives among people, he actively forged it into a populist movement for his own gain.
— ChatteringMonkey
But how can this be proven? — baker

I'd think pointing at his speeches and his rethorics would be enough as proof for forging a populist movement... but that is not illegal I don't think.

What is illegal is sedition, or staging an insurrection. And I don't know US law enough to know what would count as proof in court. I'd think his speech just before the riots where he literally said that 1) the elections were fraudulent and 2) that they should walk to the capitol, would enough to start a case, but if that would be enough to legally convict him, I don't know.

I don't quite see it like that.

There is certainly discontent among a certain percentage of the population with their lives and how the political system doesn't seem to do anything about that. Without that Trump would be impossible, that is true. But this discontent is to some extend politically formless without someone organizing it in a certain direction. It's not that Trump merely captures what lives among people, he actively forged it into a populist movement for his own gain. And that is I think Trumps responsibility. A non-malicious and somewhat competent politician would presumably stop short of that and have the decency to not use racist, anti-media etc etc rethorics and the foresight to know that this would cause all kinds of trouble.... He could have gone in other directions with this.

So he already paved the way for the riots before the riots, but the riots themselves are probably even more blatantly his fault because here he actively misled his followers by creating and spreading the lie of election fraud. The rioters think they were doing the right thing... because he misled them. Maybe you can say that they should have been more skeptical of Trumps claims, or maybe they just used Trump as an excuse to unleash their frustrations.... and so also bear some responsibility there. And I would agree with that, but still, ultimately I think this is Trumps doing predominately and he should be held accountable for that.

Trump thrives on attention and adoration. He lives for it. He's a moron and a narcissist, which 100% explains his actions. He lost an election to a corpse, so he has to rationalise that both for himself and his millions of cult followers. So naturally it was a fraudulent election.

The impeachment is floating a very different version of Trump, one who is blessed with understanding of others and the cunning to use this to deliberately guide his mob into violent insurrection without ever explicitly stating that this is what he wants: Trump as master manipulator, shadowy Bond villain, astute strategist and a man of subtle means. That isn't Trump. He has none of those qualities. And yet if we wish to convict him on the impeachment charges, in the absence of an overt call to arms, we have to pretend that is what Trump is.
— Kenosha Kid
So ... I'm confused. — baker

My take on Trump is that he is kind of an exception to the rule in that he is both incompetent and malicious... which makes it hard to determine what exactly determines what actions of his.

I think he definitely knew that he was inciting them before and even during the riot (his twitter video), probably knew and wanted for things to get out of control, and saw himself as some kind of strong man taking matters into his own hands (look at the imagery with his black gloves and flags waving in the background, it doesn't get any more fascist qua imagery.)... That would be the malicious part.

But then he probably was also to blinded by his own image and narcissism to fully appreciate the gravity of the situation and the consequences. It was a half-assed attempt at insurrection and ultimately to laughably amateurish to really take seriously as an attempt at insurrection... he was living out a narcissist power fantasy.

So incompetent or malicious? Probably a bit of both.

Despite that, is it possible to distinguish between (a sufficiently advanced) cluelessness/incompetence and malice? If yes, how? — baker

Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice...? — Outlander

Yes, frequency would be an indicator I think. When someone makes what seems like a stupid decision, you might think it could be incompetence or ignorance... When they make what seem like stupid decisions all the time, you have to start wondering if they really had good intentions you assumed they had to begin with, and what other intentions they could have for deciding as they do. At some point incompetence and ignorance just stops being the most credible explanation.

in a constructivist metaethics you can have different societies construct different values, whereas in moral realism values would be the same over different societies.
— ChatteringMonkey

Beware to differentiate between descrfiptive and metaethical moral relativism here. Moral realists (or more broadly moral universalists, not all of whom are robustly realists) don't deny that different societies come up with different value systems, they just don't say "...therefore no value system is any more correct or incorrect than any other". It's possible for there both to be disagreement, and for the participants in that disagreement to be more or less correct or incorrect than each other because there is such a thing as universally correct despite disagreement about what it is. — Pfhorrest

Yes, agreed, I should have said, "should be the same" instead of "would be the same".

Can we just assume there has to be an essence? A lot of philosophy historically has been about trying to extract essences out of things, to its detriment I would say.

I do agree that if there is something at the heart of ethics than it would be value. But I don't think value is something unmediated, directly given like you seem to be pointing to with value-qualia, but rather something constructed socially.

I'm not sure I have much to add here, it seems i'm going the opposite direction. I think more can be learned if you look at morality from a societal and historical perspective, rather than trying to look for essences or basic principles.
— ChatteringMonkey

Then the consequence to this needs to be made clear: If value is both given in the world, not some theoretical construct or simply part of the ethical equation which subsumes valuing under a complex contingent consideration, but an actual given simplicter, that is, irreducibly "there"; as well as being the foudation of ethics (and aesthetics, says Wittgenstein) then we must conclude the unpopular view is true: moral realism. — Constance

At first I was kind of surprised that you would come to conclude that moral realism follows from what I said about values, because I would conclude from values being socially constructing that something like a constructivist metaethics would follow. But yes, from the point of view of an individual in a certain society, morality would look largely the same no matter if constructivism or moral realism were true. Where I think those metaethical theories would make a difference in practice is that in a constructivist metaethics you can have different societies construct different values, whereas in moral realism values would be the same over different societies.

If it were a matter of what you call mundane qualia, being appeared to redly, and the like, then I would agree that what presents itself to inquiry is a blank when considered apart from (conceptual) meaning and identity, which is reducible to pragmatics, I would add. But qualia is infamously vacuous. A spear in your kidney is not. What makes a spear in your kidney "bad" at all, in any possible disputed judgment, is not mundane qualia, but value qualia.
I do share your thoughts about rape and racism. But this argument is really very different as it asks more fundamental questions. I say rape is morally bad, not to put too fine a point on it, but then, why? I say the same about many things, but the matter always turns to some pain or gratification, some discomfort or joy that is THE determining ground at the level of basic questions. No pain or pleasure, suffering or bliss in play: NO ETHICS.
I am dismissing the particulars of a given case, in the same way Kant dismissed such things, such accidents. Kant was looking into a specific dimension of experience, the rational structure of judgments. Here, I am abstracting from all the is an accident, a mere contingency, vis a vis ethics, like the conditions of a rape AS a rape: not all ethical affairs are rape affairs, nor are they stealing affairs, not this nor that, and on and on. No specific conditions are essential, and are therefore dismissible in determining what the nature of ethics is. it is the essence of ethics I am on about: what has to be the case in order for ethics to be possible. Value is this, or, metavalue. Yes, you can also look to conflicts of value acquisition: no conflict, no competing value-things, no ethics, but note: it is the value that is at the heart of what makes an entanglement what it is: all issues turn on what is at stake, and this is always value. — Constance

Can we just assume there has to be an essence? A lot of philosophy historically has been about trying to extract essences out of things, to its detriment I would say.

I do agree that if there is something at the heart of ethics than it would be value. But I don't think value is something unmediated, directly given like you seem to be pointing to with value-qualia, but rather something constructed socially.

I'm not sure I have much to add here, it seems i'm going the opposite direction. I think more can be learned if you look at morality from a societal and historical perspective, rather than trying to look for essences or basic principles.

Suffering is an interpretative event after the fact, no doubt, when it is contextualized, weighed in theory and among competing justifications, and so on. But pain as such? How can this in any way be interpretative? Interpretation requires language, consideration, a taking something up AS something. How is this there, in scorching of the live finger? One receives this instantly, not deliberatively. — Constance

If you have a persistent headache, focusing on it seems to make the pain worse. Or rather the pain is probably still there, you just don't notice it as much if your attention is elsewhere. Is that an interpretative event? Maybe not.

Morality is analyzable, and so I agree morality is NOT only about screaming pain (or intense gratification), and I would add, obviously. But the argument then asks about what this complex affair is and finds that the essential part of it is the element of the presence that carries its own measure of valuation. We cannot say what this is, and this is why Wittgenstein would never talk about it (save in the Tractatus and the Lecture on Ethics where he essentially says it should be passed over in silence), but its presence does, as with logic, "show" itself in the event. — Constance

See I don't know if I agree with this. I spoke about meaning and identity, and added the examples of rape and racism to my previous post, probably after you read it. It seems to me that meaning and identity as part of a larger social context, play a large part in why we consider certain things immoral. And those are I think underdetermined if you would view them only from a present moment. Meaning and identity precisely play out in time, over extended periods. What is the most damaging thing about racism, is not any direct physical pain or direct material consequences it may have (those are bad too to be clear), but social exclusion, imposition on identities, and the fact that it prevents people from building up a meaningful life in society.

Frankly, I don't see your position on this. Do you think there is something of the "identity and meaning we give to our lives" that intervenes between you and the screaming pain? Do you think pain is an interpretative event? — Constance

Morality is not only about screaming pain is my point. In some extreme case it might be the only thing that matters, but it usually is not.

And yes and no, I think suffering is an interpretative event, which I would argue we care more about than pain.

Edit: Here's an example, I think it would to simplistic, if not plainly incorrect, to say that racism is morally wrong only because of the physical pain it causes.

Edit 2: Another example, rape even if it would be relatively painless physically (for instance by drugging someone), would be morally wrong.