It sounds like I had it right: you think physicalism should be rejected if physics doesn't have a complete, verifiable description of reality.
— Relativist
That physicalism should be rejected, if the thesis is that 'everything is ultimately physical' while what is physical can't be defined. — Wayfarer
I explained that it is consistent with QM. Metaphysical theories generally are not falsiable in a scientific sense. All we can do is examine them for coherence, explanatory scope, and parsimony. It is falsified if it is incoherent or cannot possibly account for some clear fact of the world. It ought to be rejected if an alternate coherent theory provides better explanations and/or is more parsimonious.If it hasn't been falsified by quantum physics, it's not falsifiable. So again, it appeals to science as a model of philosophical authority, but only when it suits. — Wayfarer
I posted this comment some days ago, do you think it has any bearing on the argument?
...
Do you see the point of this criticism of philosophical naturalism? — Wayfarer
Special relativity shows that time is relative to a reference frame. That a sort of subjectivity, but you seem to be suggesting it's mind-dependent. OK, but I see no reason to think so.I will note here my conviction that time has an inextricably subjective element — Wayfarer
To understand anything will necessarily entail relating it to our human perspectives. This doesn't preclude expanding our perspectives when it is demonstrably deficient.This highlights how understanding “what exists” inevitably involves interpreting it through something that only a perspective can provide. — Wayfarer
Philosophical analysis requires more precision than ordinary language often delivers.I suppose it all depends on how one qualifies belief. Still, in ordinary life, when a guy is asked, "do you believe your team will win?" or, as a different example, "do you believe she'll say 'yes'?", the guy might well honestly answer with a categorical, "Hell yea!" (rather than with a, "well, it depends") ... yet without being foolish enough to presume that this honestly held belief is in a full blown correlation to a not yet actualized future reality. But I get it, this to you would not be a "strictly true belief". — javra
It's a false dichotomy that a scientific model is either literally true, or it is merely empirically valid. Structural realism is a middle ground.he’s deeply committed to the empirical success and practical validity of science but questions whether we should interpret scientific theories as giving us a literal account of an objective, mind-independent reality. — Wayfarer
Reality = everything that exists; observable reality is a subset. Empirical science is limited to the observable; theoretical physics stretches this limit by extrapolating. If there is more to existence than what science can possibly discover or extrapolate, how then can it be discovered? If there exists a God of religion, then perhaps by praying or dying, but I personally see no reason to believe such things exist.Another basic point in this context is the distinction between reality, as the aggregate or sum total of observable phenomena and the objects of scientific analysis, and being, as a description of the existence as experienced by human beings. This is where I think physicalism over-values scientific method, for which physicalism may be an effective heuristic while being descriptively accurate within its scope. But many of the questions of philosophy may not be amendable to scientific analysis. Unless you're a positivist, that doesn't make them meaningless. — Wayfarer
No, it doesn't. Physicalism is consistent with, but not identical to, scientific realism.which also implies distance from physicalism. — Wayfarer
Sure, but then you have some loose epistemic probability in mind, and a more precise statement of your belief would identify this. So it is not strictly true that the guy believes his team will win. Rather, he believes it more likely than not that they will win, or that it is a near certainty, or some other probabilistic qualification.Then he doesn't have a categorical belief that his team will win. Rather, he believes it probable that his team will win.
— Relativist
I'm not big on that distinction. For starters, as a falliblist, upon analysis all my beliefs are graded (probabilistic or else comparable) - this even though I will typically address them in the categorical "yes/no" format. — javra
The "intuitions" in question are relevant to survival. If there is a world external to ourself, it would be necessary to have a functionally accurate view of that world. If there is not such an external world, what would explain this false intuition?Intuitions are not formed to be consistent with reality. According to evolutionary theory they are shaped by some sort of survival principles. — Metaphysician Undercover
I was referring to our primitive (pre-science) abstractions of space and time. As I said, they are valid and true within the context of our direct perceptions.Why think our abstractions about space and time are false?
— Relativist
There is much reason to think that our conceptions of space and time are false, spatial expansion, dark matter, dark energy, quantum weirdness. Anywhere that we run into difficulties understanding what is happening, when applying these abstractions, this is an indication that they are false. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, it's not. Our sensory perceptions aren't oracles that magically know truths beyond what we could possibly perceive. Further, the error has not prevented science from learning more precise truths- such as a more precise understanding of space and time.Well sure, these conceptions are true in the context of our sensory perceptions, that's how we use them, verify them, etc.. But if our sensory perceptions are not providing truth, that's a problem. — Metaphysician Undercover
See my prior comment.I acknowledge that our descriptions (and understandings) are grounded in our perspective, but we have the capacity to correct for that.
— Relativist
How would you propose that we could do that? How do we verify that our sensory perceptions are giving us truth? — Metaphysician Undercover
No.Are you then in search for infallible proof. — javra
Then he doesn't have a categorical belief that his team will win. Rather, he believes it probable that his team will win.This is not always the case in real life applications, most especially when it comes to beliefs regarding future facts. If John believes his team will win the game then he might bet accordingly while nevertheless having a great deal of doubt regarding this same belief. — javra
It's not confrontational. The term "defeater" is just standard epistemology. A defeater=a reason to give up a belief. It's shorthand for what I've previously asked for.You would have to defeat my belief in an external, minds-independent world.
— Relativist
That's a bit confrontational to me. And, as I previously expressed, I'm not interested in so doing. — javra
I was defending physicalism, so I didn't see the need to state that it entails the claim that beliefs are physical. Indeed, establishing a belief would entail a physical change in the brain. More specifically, it is a change that will affect behavior.As to your other replies, they sidestep the questions asked without providing answers. E.g. are non-veridical beliefs of themselves physical? — javra
That's not what it means. A verdical belief is one that is actually true, i.e. it corresponds to an aspect of reality. If a person believes X, then he necessarily believes X is true.BTW, to the person hallucinating X, the physical reality of X will be a veridical belief ... this up until the time reasoning might intervene (it doesn't always).
Physicalism being false does not entail non-solipsistic idealism being true. It just means idealism is logically possible. I already acknowledge it is logically possible.Mind in part consists of thoughts. How are thoughts physical? — javra
Our perception of our physical surroundings establishes a complex belief (a disposition) about those surroundings, which will influence how we behave within those surroundings. An hallucination is a non-veridical belief.we perceive physical realities, but then - given the entailment of physicalism - how is a bona fide hallucination of itself physical? — javra
Sure, but physicalism can be false and idealism still be false. You've provided no reason to think it's true. I'm somewhat agnostic as to a metaphysical theory. I tentatively embrace physicalism because it explains the most and assumes the least. I could switch my allegiance if there were an alternative that bested it. You haven't given one. You would have to defeat my belief in an external, minds-independent world.But if not everything that does or can occur is physical, then physicalism so defined can only be false. — javra
But there IS this unresolved gap in our physics. We really don't know. Therefore one can't claim it's inconsistent with physicalism.The point is, claiming that everything that exists is physical becomes problematic if we can’t definitively say what kind of existence the wave function has, as in quantum mechanics, the wave function is central to predicting physical phenomena. If we take its predictive power seriously, it’s hard to ignore the question of its ontological status without leaving an unresolved gap in the theory. — Wayfarer
It sounds like I had it right: you think physicalism should be rejected if physics doesn't have a complete, verifiable description of reality.I may misunderstand, but it sounds also bit like you're suggesting that we should reject physicalism if physics doesn't have a complete, verifiable description of reality.
— Relativist
As I said before, as a materialist, D M Armstrong believes that science is paradigmatic for philosophy proper. So you can't have your cake and eat it too - if physics indeed suggests that the nature of the physical eludes precise definition, then so much for appealing to science as a model for philosophy! — Wayfarer
My position is that Armstrong's theory is not necessarily true, but it's superior to other theories in terms of explanatory scope, parsimony, and ad hoc-ness.I wouldn't put it in personal or pejorative terms, but I do believe that philosophical and/or scientific materialism is an erroneous philosophical view. — Wayfarer
No. You expressing your judgement is not a reason for me, even with a vague allusion to some questionable assumption that it seems based on.Reasons such as these?:
That mentioned, I agree that the sometimes tacitly implied notion of physical reality being somehow metaphysically independent of the individual minds which, after all, are aspects of it—such that physical reality could be placed here and minds there without any dependency in-between—is a logical dud. A close second dud is the attempt to describe minds, and all their various aspects, as purely physical (such that, for one example, all ends one can conceive of and intend are all physical in their nature). — javra
I may agree that we're "habituated" to hold the view that there exists a mind-independent reality.Yes, I can provide them, but I don't think reasons will here much help. We are all typically attached to the notions we are habituated to hold, in this case that there was physicality long before there was any type of awareness, ergo physicalism. — javra
You're indicating panpaychism is a logical step beyond the "premise of a non-solipsistic mind awareness-created world." I'm just asking why should entertain that premise.My reply to this will be that of panpsychism - this in the sense that awareness pervaded the cosmos long before life evolved into it (i.e., in the sense that the physical is, was, and will remain dependent of the psychical). This conclusion for me, though, is only a deduction from the premise of a non-solipsistic mind awareness-created world. — javra
If your answer is that this feels right, and/or provides you comfort, I have no objection. I'm not trying to convince you that you're wrong. I'm just seeking my own comfort- I'd like to know if there are good reasons to think I'm deluding myself with what I believe about the world.And I do not claim to have any great insight into how panpsychism works - nor into any metaphysically cogent explanation for how life evolved from non-life (the physicalist explanation that "it must have" doesn't much console me either as far as metaphysical explanations go - I find it just as comforting as the explanation of "God did it"). — javra
You are mistaken. Hillary Clinton conceded defeat and never attempted to overturn the election. To some degree, she was being a sore loser when she labeled Trump's election "illegitimate", but she at least had a rational basis for her claim: Russia helping Trump, and Comey hurting her chances. These things actually occurred, although it's impossible to know their impact.Trump’s opponents never accepted the 2016 election, therefor they had fascists tendencies, like Hitler. — NOS4A2
Replace "heap of sand" with "the physical world" and "individual sand particles" with "individual minds". The same relations will hold. This can thereby lead to the logically valid affirmation that, in a non-solipsistic mind-created world, the physical world occurs independently of me and my own mind, even though it will be dependent on the occurrence of a multiplicity of minds in general. — javra
I believe there exists a world (AKA "reality") independent of minds. I also believe nearly everyone agrees with me. That doesn't mean we're right, of course, but I'd like you or Wayfarer to give me reasons why I should reject, or doubt, my current belief. — Relativist
You're proposing a sufficient condition, but not a necessary one. I reject this as a sufficient condition: we could theoretically produce multiple humans from each stem cell in your body. Each stem cell fits your stated condition.All objects that can produce multiple human beings are individual human beings. A mother, for instance, can do that. But this is also true of asexual reproduction. An individual amoeba, for instance, can produce another amoeba. Unfortunately (and oddly), we may have to think of one zygotic twin as the parent of the other. — NOS4A2
I referred to a "properly functioning human being". This doesn't imply one must be proper functioning to be a human. I wasn't even trying to suggest a necessary condition; I was defining a typical human being, not excluding the atypical.would never deny you or other women your privileges, but your distinctions are completely arbitrary. Worse, they are inapplicable to those with developmental disabilities
You're reading that into what I said. I do happen to think that humans are material; the only alternative is immaterial; it's a well defined dichotomy. Nevertheless, I never said humans are nothing more than material. Being a human is absolutely something in addition to being material.At any rate, the reduction of humanity and dignity to that of “material” is the name of the game for anyone who wants to end such a life.
This is a tangent. I have no problem with identifying an individual identity as a series of causally-connected spatiotemporal stages. The objection I have is in defining the "natural kind" (for lack of a better term) of "individual human being". This would have to be based on a well-defined set of necessary and sufficient properties, that unambiguously identify an object as either being one of these, or not. An object that can produce multiple human beings cannot possible be said to be an individual human being, even though it is commonly in the developmental history of human beings. The same is true of blasotocysts- clusters of cells, that may produce multiple human beings at several stages.It occupies its own unique and distinct position in space and time. A zygote is alive. At no point does a zygote die and get replaced by another living being. If left to live a zygote can continue his life, without interruption, for upwards to one hundred years.
Twins are individuated at the zygote level until it reproduces asexually, then there are two individuals. — NOS4A2
How can an external world exist independently of human minds AND be contingent upon human minds?If you re-read what was my initial reply to MU, you'll see that I also believe there exists a world independent of individual minds, and so I too agree with you on this count - even if, as the case is, I simultaneously believe this same world is contingent on the occurrence of mind as a generality. — javra
It seems uncontroversial to stipulate that the objects of our ordinary experiences are physical. It seems most reasonable to treat the component parts of physical things as also physical, all the way down to whatever is fundamental.Sure it does. But what about this requires that the fundamental constituents are actually physical? What does 'physical' mean, when the nature of the so-called fundamental particles is ambiguous, as has been discussed? — Wayfarer
A "wave function" is a mathematical abstraction. I see no good reason to think abstractions are ontological. So I infer that a wave function is descriptive of something that exists.And as for something non-physical, the wavefunction Ψ is an ideal candidate: — Wayfarer
The difference is this is the one thing in there with its own distinct and unique genetics, occupying its own unique and distinct position in space and time, and will remain as such until the end of its life. — NOS4A2
Why would we have these intuitions, if they aren't consistent with reality (i.e. true within the scope of our perceptions).We obviously perceive space and time...
— Relativist
I don't think so Relativist. Kant names these as intuitions which are the necessary conditions for the possibility of sensory perception. So from that perspective space and time are prior to perception. — Metaphysician Undercover
Why think our abstractions about space and time are false?Another type of ontology would hold that space and time are logical abstractions, posterior to perceptions. We deduce from our perceptions, the conclusion that there must be something which we conceive of as "space", and something we conceive of as "time". But there is no indication that we actually perceive whatever it is which we call "space", or "time".
Physicalism = the thesis that everything that exists is physical. It is false only if there exists something non-physical. It depends only on this being true.But you're making an error if you think materialism requires these scientific models to be correct depictions of reality. The metaphysics does not depend on these models to correspond to reality.
— Relativist
So, what does it depend on, then? — Wayfarer
Absolutely! The fact that we (i.e..Einstein) developed a theory that transcends the "human perspective" of time is a testimony to our ability to transcend our own perspective, and endeavor to be objective.So our time perception is not necessarily an adequate representation of the time that occurs in the actual world. — javra
The fact that models makes successful predictions demonstrates that we know something about the nature of physical reality, and that's really the basic thing I'm defending.It is well known that the nature of the existence of former, in particular, is rather ambiguous, to say the least. Although I don't want to divert this thread too far in this direction, this is where the Copenhagen interpretation of physics is relevant. This says that physics does not reveal what nature is in itself (or herself, some would say) but as how she appears to our methods of questioning. So these 'elementary particles' are not mind-independent in that sense - which is the implication of the observer problem. — Wayfarer
So you aren't denying that genes exist. You're pointing to the fact that there are other factors that influence growth and development. So once again, genetics does tell us something about life: more objective facts.As for genes, and whether these comprise a fundamental explanatory unit, again, the emergence of epigenetics has given rise to an understanding that genes themselves are context-dependent. That is not downplaying the significance of the discovery of genes (or quantum theory, for that matter) but the role they are both assigned by physicalism as being ontologically primary or fundamental. — Wayfarer
Sorry I didn't understand, but that's how it sounded to me. Glad we could clarify that you agree scientific knowledge is efficacious- so I assume you agree that we indeed have some knowledge about the world external to minds.I don't know how you could come to that conclusion. We know all manner of things about the world. I'm not denying that scientific knowledge is efficacious. What I'm questioning is the metaphysics of materialism, which posits that 'Elementary particles, moments in time, genes, the brain – all these things are assumed to be fundamentally real. — Wayfarer
I completely agree with this; it makes perfect sense. My issue has been that these intuitions don't preclude discerning aspects of reality.transcendental idealism still maintains that in a fundamental sense, the mind provides the intuitions of time and space, within which all such empirical judgements are made — Wayfarer
The very notion of a perspective entails having a mind. We are sufficiently aware that we can recognize the fact we even have a perspective.Read the op, and what I said in my last post. Only minds provide a spatial-temporal perspective, and without assuming such a perspective, all these supposed mind independent things, the world, the universe, even "reality" itself, are completely unintelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover
That doesn't address the issue I raised.I've said, I don't deny the reality of there being an objective world, but that on a deeper level, it is not truly mind-independent." - Wayfarer
These two clauses seem to be contradictory. If there is an objective world external to ourselves, then it exists independent of our minds.
— Relativist
Just say this quibble between you and Wayfarer. As I've just tried to illustrate, the quibble can be resolved by differentiating "mind" as generality (which occurs wherever individual minds occur) and "mind" as one concrete instantiation of the former (such that in concrete form minds are always plural and divided from each other) ... this in the term "mind-independent". Physical reality is not mind-independent in the first sense but is mind-independent in the second sense, this in any system of (non-solipsistic) idealism wherein the world is contingent upon the occurrence of minds. — javra
If you think the idea of a mind-independent reality is incoherent, then you can't believe there exists a mind-independent reality. I believe there is. Can you give me any reasons to change my mind? Understand that I acknowledge that physicalism could be wrong, but the belief in a mind-independent reality isn't dependent on physicalism being true.I think the idea of a mind-independent reality is really incoherent. Reality is something which minds create, as pointed out by the op. If you try to imagine the world as existing without any point-of-view, from no perspective at all, it becomes completely unintelligible, so it cannot be imagined. That's because "reality" as we know it, is point-of-view dependent. So the idea of a mind-independent reality really is incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't understand why you say that. Please elaborate.No, but they're also not understandable outside the scientific context within which they were discovered. — Wayfarer
These two clauses seem to be contradictory. If there is an objective world external to ourselves, then it exists independent of our minds.I've said, I don't deny the reality of there being an objective world, but that on a deeper level, it is not truly mind-independent.
It seems obvious to me that there are objective facts about the world that we know or can come to know. It is objective fact that we live on the third planet from the sun, which we orbit. How is this anything other than an absolute fact?Which is another way of saying objectivity cannot be absolute.
That's fine, and we can discuss it, but do you agree it has no practical significance? That's what I meant.Why does this matter?
— Relativist
As for whether you're defending physicalism, the link to this discussion was made from this post in another thread in which you claimed to be 'representing David Armstrong's metaphysics'. I see the above arguments as a challenge to Armstrong's metaphysics. As I'm opposing Armstrong's metaphysics, this is why I think it matters. — Wayfarer
No, you don't have to be an essentialist to say "beard versus clean-shaven" or "individual human person" or not. As you've noted elsewhere, essentialism is the notion that there are necessary and sufficient properties that define what is the "essence" of a thing (or type of thing). Essence is a metaphysical concept.I happen to think the non-essentialist process is the better process. It is why we rarely find a clear line between anything. It is why Heraclitus was the wisest of them all. It is why Aristotle is easy to dismiss (although he was the second-wisest). It is why Kant's phenomenal veil will always be pulled over our eyes. It is why Hegel may be the third wisest. It is why eastern thinkers who take essence and show how it must implode as it crystalizes are also wise...
But there is no speaking, no significance to any word, if we don't acknowledge gray, fuzzy lines of difference. It is easier to talk in essentialist terms, so essentialism is more like a tool of language.
You have to sound like an essentialist to say "beard versus clean-shaven" at all. To avoid essentialist speak is to conduct tiresome linguistic acrobatics to bring us to the same place anyway - the difference between this and that. — Fire Ologist
A zygote can develop into multiple persons.If that is an human zygote, every person who has ever existed goes through this stage in their lifecycle. What leads you to believe it is not a person? — NOS4A2
No, it doesn't. Hurricane behavior is not best understood in terms of particle physics, but there's no reason to doubt that it is fundamentally due to the behavior of particles.I acknowledge that we'll never understand much about the mind through a physical analysis of brain structure. — Relativist
It matters for materialist theories of mind, such as D M Armstrong's and others, surely. They all proclaim the identity of brain and mind. — Wayfarer
I'm not defending physicalism here, I'm defending the existence of the external world and that we are able to determine some truths about it.Dualism could be true. We could be descended from ancestors who were directly created by a God, and it doesn't change anything: there is still an external world and our senses deliver a functionally accurate understanding of it. Why doubt that? You seem to either deny it, or at least doubt it. Why? It's not dependent on physicalism. — Relativist
My issue with dualism, in the Cartesian sense, is that it tends to reify consciousness, treat it as a spiritual 'substance', which is an oxymoronic term in my view. I think some form of revised hylomorphic dualism (matter-form dualism) is quite feasble, one of the reasons I'm impressed with Feser's 'A-T' philosophy. I'm impressed by many of his arguments about the nature and primacy of reason, such as Think, McFly, Think. But he is critical of Cartesian dualism, at least as it has come down to us, and I think the 'Cartesian divide' is the source of many of the intellectual ailments of modernity. — Wayfarer
Do you deny that science can tell us much about the real, mind-independent world? Are elementary particles and genes pure fiction?Behind the Blind Spot sits the belief that physical reality has absolute primacy in human knowledge, a view that can be called scientific materialism. In philosophical terms, it combines scientific objectivism (science tells us about the real, mind-independent world) and physicalism (science tells us that physical reality is all there is). Elementary particles, moments in time, genes, the brain – all these things are assumed to be fundamentally real. By contrast, experience, awareness and consciousness are taken to be secondary. The scientific task becomes about figuring out how to reduce them to something physical, such as the behaviour of neural networks, the architecture of computational systems, or some measure of information. — The Blind Spot
Why does this matter? No metaphysical account of the mind is without flaws, and none can be proven as true. A person could practice psychology without a metaphysical account of the mind. On the other hand, neurology depends mostly on the physical - but often relating it to the "magic" of behavior (both physical and mental). But even here, a metaphysical account doesn't contribute to the practice of the discipline.To put it bluntly, the claim that there’s nothing but physical reality is either false or empty. If ‘physical reality’ means reality as physics describes it, then the assertion that only physical phenomena exist is false. Why? Because physical science – including biology and computational neuroscience – doesn’t include an account of consciousness. — The Blind Spot
Quantum fields can be considered ontological, although you aren't compelled to do so.The field is not an ontological concept, but a phenomenological one. If we were as small as a photon, we could formulate an ontology of the very smallest. And only then would there be a unified physical theory. — Wolfgang
Quantum effects have an impact on the macroscopic world, so it can't be ignored.it makes no sense to try to apply quantum mechanics to the macroscopic world — and this also applies to philosophical conclusions. — Wolfgang
There's only one world, and it seems to be fundamentally quantum mechanical (subatomic particles do not behave like classical objects). But there is clearly a disconnect in our ability to describe the macro world in quantum terms. That doesn't disprove reductive physicalism, but it does leave room for one to deny it-perhaps there is ontological emergence.Why don’t classical and quantum physics go together? Are we dealing with two different worlds or are they just two different descriptions? — Wolfgang
"Supposedly" a mind-independent reality?! Do you really doubt there exists a mind-independent reality? I read the following statement as indicating you agree there is a mind-independent reality:Where I take issue with physicalism is that it accords the objective world with an inherent or supposedly mind-independent reality, so that it would remain just so, regardless of whether any being perceives it or not. Within that framework, the mind is considered a consequent fact, a faculty which owes its existence to the vast prior period of material and biological evolution that preceeded it. But this is dependent on viewing the mind as an object among other objects, so it is a judgement that is implicitly made from a perspective outside of the mind. Which is, of course, an impossibility - the inherent contradiction of materialist theories of mind... — Wayfarer
though we know that prior to the evolution of life there must have been a Universe with no intelligent beings in it, or that there are empty rooms with no inhabitants, or objects unseen by any eye — Wayfarer
I know that, but I was explaining why I believe there is an external world: it is necessarily the case that our perceptions provide some access to this world that is at least functionally accurate.. So, even though your are rejecting solipsism, you seem overly skeptical that we can know something about the external world. I fully accept that our image of the world is rooted in our human perspective, but that fact doesn't imply our understanding is false or even suspect. I think it just means we need to take ourselves, and our perspective, into account when seeking objective facts about the world.I have taken pains to word the essay we're discussing in such a way as to avoid solipsism and subjectivism. — Wayfarer
Taken literally, I think this is absurd - it contradicts my view that there is an external world, that we have a functionally accurate image of it through our senses, and that this provides a foundation for learning objective facts about the world.Thus we see, on the one hand, the existence of the whole world necessarily dependent upon the first conscious being, — Schopenhaurer
Why think this is not an existential fact? Why think our inherent belief in a world external to ourselves is false or completely inscrutable?For heuristic purposes, we can behave as if the external world is mind-independent and exists just it would without us. But that is a methodolical axiom, not an existential fact. The error arises from regarding the contingent facts of scientific inquiry as possessing a form of absolute veracity which they don't have. — Wayfarer
I completely agree with this statement, because "meaning" is a term that pertains specifically to conscious beings.the world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. — Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology, p144
Dualism could be true. We could be descended from ancestors who were directly created by a God, and it doesn't change anything: there is still an external world and our senses deliver a functionally accurate understanding of it. Why doubt that? You seem to either deny it, or at least doubt it. Why? It's not dependent on physicalism.Treating consciousness as part of the world, reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousness’s foundational, disclosive role. — Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology, p144
I acknowledge that we'll never understand much about the mind through a physical analysis of brain structure. Does this quoted statement have broader implications?Since consciousness is presupposed in all science and knowledge, then the proper approach to the study of consciousness itself must be a transcendental one — Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology, p144
Trump has leveraged the perception that US society is "failing" by permitting things like same-sex marriage, sensitivity to LGBTQ concerns, and ostensibly permitting non-white immigrant to enter the country illegally, "poison our blood", commit crimes, and take jobs.Trump hasn't done shit other than having a perfect sense of the direction in which US democracy is falling. — Benkei
Moral intuitions that are often rooted in ignorance and prejudice.Distrust informed by their moral intuition that something simply isn't right and most things are unfair.
How ironic. Encouraging racism, Christian nationalism, undermining rule of law, and embracing a demagogue isn't likely to "repair" the US government.This will not go away unless the US government repairs and regains trust by - I don't know - actually improving the material conditions of all its citizens instead of those that are already rich enough to lobby for favours.
Amplifying inappropriately worded comments to incite outrage in one's followers doesn't contribute to good voting choices. Truly demonizing "the other side" is more pervasive among the Trump cult.And that distrust is fueled by selfrighteous pricks decrying they are deplorables, garbage or aren't voting in their self-interest, thereby really only affirming that they don't trust "the other side" and therefore aren't to be trusted by "the other side".
And yet, that's exactly what Trump does- and his followers find it appealing. "Are you an Democrat or an American?" was posted on the Trump campaign website, and repeated by many on social media. A person on my neighborhood's facebook page said we need Trump because the Democrats want to "sexualize children". “These are horrible people,” said Trump at a North Carolina rally, referring to Democrats. “Oops, we should get along with everybody. They’re horrible people. Some people you just can’t get along with.”The best way to win someone's trust, after all, has always been to call the other side "dumb shits".
suppose there was a breakthrough in cosmology that showed strong evidence that the universe was cyclical, that the Big Bang would be followed by an infinite series of other Big Bangs. Would you still want to push the brute fact line? — Count Timothy von Icarus
This makes perfect sense. But the following does not:I am making clear the sense in which perspective is essential for any judgement about what exists — even if what we’re discussing is understood to exist in the absence of an observer, be that an alpine meadow, or the Universe prior to the evolution of h. sapiens. The mind brings an order to any such imaginary scene, even while you attempt to describe it or picture it as it appears to exist independently of the observer. — Wayfarer
This seems to contradict the bolded portion of the first quote. I could grant that a subjective perception of some aspect of reality exists only if it is perceived, but this doesn't account for your statement of neither existing nor not existing".In reality, the supposed ‘unperceived object’ neither exists nor does not exist. Nothing whatever can be said about it. — Wayfarer
Fair point. We do need to take our subjectivity into account. But this doesn't preclude our determining some objective truths about reality. You seem to acknowledge that the universe exists. This is an objective truth, even though the words in the statement rely on minds to give them meaning.What I’m calling attention to is the tendency to take for granted the reality of the world as it appears to us, without taking into account the role the mind plays in its constitution. — Wayfarer
I don't understand this. Truth is not subjective, although there are truths about subjective things. Objective truth: "The universe exists". Truth about something subjective: "The images of the 'Pillars of Creation' produced by the Webb telescope are beautiful".This oversight imbues the phenomenal world — the world as it appears to us — with a kind of inherent reality that it doesn’t possess. This in turn leads to the over-valuation of objectivity as the sole criterion for truth.
I can accept this if "unseen realities"=The subjective perspective of something in the world.the existence of all such supposedly unseen realities still relies on an implicit perspective. — Wayfarer
Thanks. I'll read it, and respond in that thread.It's a philosophical claim in support of idealism. It is developed in more detail in The Mind-Created World OP and its linked essay. — Wayfarer
The review suggests that she doesn't actually make a case for God's existence.
— Relativist
Curious, then, that the title of the book is The Case for God. — Wayfarer