What the heck is wrong with that guy? — jorndoe
I agree. However, we could draw inferences about the nature of reality by examining the past, and apply that analysis (that model of reality) to making predictions. This is, of course, the nature of physics.It's not true by definition that the future will, or even likely will, resemble the past because it always has — Janus
But they don't, really- unless you embrace a "relativist" theory of truth.In model theory, a model is a structure that makes a formal system’s sentences true — Banno
The “normative” aspect here does not consist in a choice among alternatives, but in adherence to what follows from the model itself. — Banno
Here's your error. The "best" in an IBE is not necesarily warranted (rationally justified). It just means it was chosen as "best" because it was subjectively judged to be better than alternatives that were considered.The best explanations are the ones which are rationally justified, — Banno
No. Being warranted means to be rationally justified.Isn't "warranted" just another way of saying "best"? — Banno
"The best" is always the one we accept. But if the ensuing belief is warranted, that's all that matters. There's isn't a recipe for warrant.Well, I won't disagree, but point out that "the best" remains ill-defined. If we are in agreement as to which explanation is the best, then we should accept it; but here, "the best" might just be "the one we accept"... — Banno
Good. Then we are agreed that abduction, considered as inference to the "best" explanation, does not determine one explanation, and is not itself a rational process. Do we also agree that as a result it doesn't serve to answer Humes Scepticism — Banno
Are there NO easy cases, in your opinion?And yes, I am discussing the use of the term, and so its meaning. What I would bring out is that it is not so easy as some might suppose to set out what is a conspiracy theory and what isn't. That the detail is important. — Banno
I agree, but when that is the case - we aren't warranted in choosing only one of them. But we would be warranted in excluding those that don't fit the evidence so well.it is more common that there are multiple inferences that satisfy the evidence at hand. — Banno
I agree, and I alluded to that when I mentioned the role of our background beliefs. Because they are beliefs, we are treating them a factual (truths) - at least to the extent that the beliefs are categorical (not expressions of certainty). This is perfectly fine most of the time. We should strive for consistency in our beliefs. There are times when we should question our background beliefs, but it's impractical to do so constantly.And yet we are often obliged to choose. The evidence is insufficient for the choice to be determined, so there are other things at play, including our other beliefs, and the practices we share with those around us. Our epistemic choices are guided by more than evidence; they include the whole form of the life in which we are engaged. — Banno
Like Galileo? Copernicus? As I see it, they are simply dropping the background assumptions of the then-current conventional wisdom, and developing new hypotheses freed of those constraints. I join Feyerabend in applauding that. The question is: how and when should we apply that? I suggest "the how" is in terms of reconsidering certain background beliefs. The "when" is...I don't know, but it can't be constantly. Similarly, scientists DO often operate within the current conventional wisdom of their field, and I expect this is more often than not.And here Feyerabend's thoughts come in to play. What he shows is that sometimes we infer, not to the best explanation, but to some other explanation - and that this can be a very good thing. You will come across many examples in his book, so I will not list them here. — Banno
Either you're misunderstanding me, or I'm misunderstanding you. But you seem to be inferring that IBE determines an answer, just like deduction does. I don't think that at all (see the first point in this post).Now the problem with calling inference to the best explanation, abduction, and listing it alongside deduction and induction, is the air of logical determinism that is given to what is in reality a practice fraught with ambiguity and guesswork. There's a lot going on here that is plainly irrational. — Banno
Absolutely, and I've acknowledged this in several posts.By ackowledging our beliefs are warranted by abduction, a discussion is feasible, and can be productive for both sides. Productive in various ways: undercutting the other guys belief ("proving" him wrong, in an abductive sense); or simply helping both sides to understand the other's point of view - when both positions are defensible. — Relativist
Perhaps it is necessary to bear in mind that it is possible for two incompatible interpretations of data to be right, or at least not wrong. — Ludwig V
I agree, but it can still be debated as to whether or not one is warranted (rationally justified) in believing that conclusion.Yes, a single, specific real explanation isn't always possible. A more general explanation may still be possible, or at least some may be ruled out. It can be appropriate to reserve judgement. — Relativist
Yes. But we seem to prefer to reach a conclusion, even when we don't need to decide. Perhaps we just don't like the uncertainty of indecision. — Ludwig V
I do mean this broadly, and I don't claim that simply being an "IBE" makes it a justifiable belief.You could give a clear definition of deduction and then persuasively argue that, given the large number of beliefs each person holds, very few of them are arrived at via deduction. But I would say that the same thing holds for inference. If we give a clear definition of inference then we will find that, given the large number of beliefs each person holds, very few of them are arrived at via inference. This includes inference to the best explanation. So as noted earlier, it seems that by "inference to the best explanation" you mean something exceedingly broad and also rather vague. — Leontiskos
I found the essay online, and asked Claude (AI) to summarize the chapter on "The Sanction of the Illative Sense". Here's a link to the summary, also pasted below:If we are talking about the practical way that most people arrive at beliefs, then I think the best work on the subject is John Henry Newman's An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, where he develops his "illative sense" among other things. If we are talking about this practical matter, then I don't think deduction or inference or basic beliefs are the right answer, especially in isolation. — Leontiskos
Main Argument
Newman introduces the concept of the "Illative Sense" - a natural faculty of judgment that allows us to reach certainty in concrete matters where formal logic alone cannot take us. He argues against both extreme skeptics who deny we can have certitude, and rationalists who believe only formal logic can justify beliefs.
Key Points
1. The Nature of the Illative Sense
It's the mind's ability to judge correctly in concrete, real-world matters
Similar to how we exercise judgment in morality (Aristotle's phronesis), aesthetics, or social conduct
Each person must exercise it individually - it's personal, not mechanical
It operates throughout reasoning: at the start (identifying first principles), during arguments (weighing evidence), and at conclusions (determining when proof is sufficient)
2. Why We Need It
Formal logic deals with abstract propositions, but life requires judgments about concrete realities
The gap between probable evidence and certain conclusions can't be bridged by syllogisms alone
We naturally possess certitude about many things despite lacking mathematically rigorous proofs
3. Its Legitimacy
Newman argues we should accept our mental faculties as we find them, just as we accept physical nature
The widespread human capacity for certitude proves it's not a mistake or weakness
God gave us these faculties, and they're adequate for discovering truth when properly used
4. Practical Applications
Newman illustrates how the Illative Sense works in historical inquiry, showing how respected scholars (Niebuhr, Grote, Lewis, etc.) reach different conclusions from the same evidence because they operate from different assumptions, viewpoints, and judgments about what constitutes reasonable interpretation.
Philosophical Significance
Newman is defending common-sense certainty against both radical skepticism and narrow rationalism, arguing that legitimate knowledge requires personal judgment guided by developed intellectual habits, not just formal proofs. — Claude
It frames a discussion. Have you never encountered a guy who makes some assertion, then says, "prove me wrong"? This establishes an unreachable goalpost. By ackowledging our beliefs are warranted by abduction, a discussion is feasible, and can be productive for both sides. Productive in various ways: undercutting the other guys belief ("proving" him wrong, in an abductive sense); or simply helping both sides to understand the other's point of view - when both positions are defensible.If everything is an IBE, then what sense does it make to exhort someone to engage in IBE? Or to argue in favor of IBEs? — Leontiskos
In relation to each other, but based on thorough, valid reasoning and more plausible assumptions, that are least ad hoc. Extreme example: misplacing your car keys vs the keys having been sucked into an interdimensional portal. The latter depends on implausible assumptions.Let me put it this way: if some explanations are better and some are worse, then what are they better or worse in relation to? — Leontiskos
1. If there are better and worse explanations, then they must be better or worse relative to some standard
2. The standard is the true explanation
3. The true explanation is not an IBE
4. Therefore, not everything is an IBE — Leontiskos
Again, we don't have access to the truth. It could very well be that the available evidence supports a false conclusion more than (the unknown) true one. But the evidence is all we have to go on, and (more often than not) it will be true (if we use good, consistent standards)If Sherlock Holmes is working a case then he has any number of candidate theses floating around his head. Some are better than others. Also, something actually happened in reality that he is trying to understand. The best explanation will (arguably*) be the one which most closely approximates the thing that happened in reality. That is what his spectrum of worst/worse/better/best is aiming at. — Leontiskos
Yes, an IBE presupposes there is a true explanation.My point is that if you try to make everything an IBE, then IBEs make no sense. An inference to the best explanation presupposes the possibility of the real explanation. Depending on our questions and their level of specificity, a single real explanation may not be possible, but in many cases it is possible, and especially so in a theoretical or conceptual sense. — Leontiskos
I agree. We're discussing IBEs, and doing them rationally. Two reasonable people could reach different conclusions on the same data, because subjective judgement is usually involved. This includes judging what is plausible:At issue is how "supported by evidence" is payed out. From Quine-Duhem, we see that there are always ways to question the evidence. So the issue becomes when questioning the evidence is reasonable, and when it isn't. And it seems there is often no clear clean place at which to draw the line. — Banno
Yes!Plausibility is a factor in epistemic judgement.
— Relativist
And not the result of the application of an algorithmic method — Banno
I don't agree with framing it that way - because the issue is epistemology, not science per se. This includes applying epistemology to science, but I'm talking about it more broadly.Part of that is the issue of demarcation, the separation between science and non-science, which relates to your discussion of conspiracy theories. The idea is that conspiracy theories are not scientific; they do not conform to scientific methods. — Banno
But we could define a "conspiracy theory" using epistemology. But we don't need to, and it could create a red herring - debating both the definition and whether or not it applies in any given case. It's better to just confront a theory directly and demonstrate how the conclusion is unwarranted.Now this is I think pretty much toe right sentiment, but given that we are unable to set out what that scientific method is quite as clearly as some suppose, and hence that the difficulty in setting out what counts as a conspiracy theory and what doesn't, a bit of humility might be needed.
One can only point out the reasoning flaws. But it becomes a religion for many of them.It won't help to just tell a conspiracy believer that their theory does not match the evidence, because for them it does.
I haven't gotten something across to you guys some of my basic contentions:If I were teaching a logic class I would ask you to provide an argument for your conclusion, "...Therefore, no conspiracy theory is an IBE."
If you reply that some conspiracy theories are IBEs, but this is rare, I would point out that the conspiracy theorist agrees with you. The conspiracy theorist would not be a conspiracy theorist if they thought that conspiracy theories were common or mundane explanations. It is precisely the rarity that they are attracted to. — Leontiskos
No, because we're employing reason to guide the choice, not just what feels "best". We're evaluating the evidence, considering plausibility, reflecting on our personal biases...everything I've talked about.But isn't it just a truism to say that one should prefer the better to the worse? — Leontiskos
But again, if nothing is certain—even conceptually—then you can't weigh anything as more or less certain.
— Leontiskos
Suppose you can't find your car keys, one morning...
— Relativist
But how does any of this address the point at stake? — Leontiskos
Of course! I'll go further: discussing our reasoning with others can help us improve our judgements, by getting additional facts before us, and alternative theories. It forces us to think through our reasoning with more rigor, and to justify the various intermediate judgements that lead to the position we're defending.The point is that you must do more than beg the question. The label "conspiracy theory" is too broad, bordering on things as broad as "bad" or "irrational." If one wants to engage in rational discourse, then they must offer reasons, and "bad", "irrational", and "conspiracy theory" don't really count as reasons. More generally, one must offer arguments and not assertions. — Leontiskos
Absolutely not. I can't imagine why you'd suggest no differentiation is possible. Do you worry about losing your keys in an interdimensional portal? Do you worry your spouse might be an extra-terrestrial? If you do not differentiate, how can you ever make ANY decision?Good, but do you also agree that if everything is an IBE then there is no intelligibility given that no differentiation is possible? — Leontiskos
Yes, to the 1st question (I think).Okay, good. So would we say that, at least in some cases, there is the real explanation and nominal explanations are better or worse depending on how well they approximate the real explanation? If so, then an IBE is presupposing the ontological existence of an aitia/cause/explanation. — Leontiskos
If they're arguing for it, they are probably explaining why they consider it an IBE. My position today is simply that I reserve judgement, and I could go into a bit more detail as to why. I've read defenses of Many Worlds, of ontological wave function collapse, and of Bohmian "pilot wave" theory. Each is coherent, none are verifaible or falsifiable. Also, while it's interesting, there is no interpretation that will impact my life or the real-world choices I have to make daily.So would you say that when someone argues for one particular interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, they are not offering an IBE? — Leontiskos
There's always more than one explanation, in principle. Suppose only one explanation is before us, but I judge it very unlikely to be true. This implies there is some unavailable truth of the matter.But that doesn't seem very principled. If there is not more than one explanation, then how can you talk about an inference to the best explanation? — Leontiskos
In answer to the question: we could dispense with using the term "conspiracy theory" entirely, and simply apply good epistemic judgement to any theory that comes along. Let's consider some factors that affect this judgement.The criticism I began with is that if you set out those criteria, if you set out your expectations for a good hypothesis, then what you are in effect doing is choosing only the hypotheses that meet those expectations; I somewhat hyperbolically called that "confirmation bias" - you get what you want, an so perhaps not what you need.
On this approach, is any theory that does not meet one's expectations a conspiracy theory? Seems to be so, unless there is some additional criteria. — Banno
His case studies do not entail choosing a best theory. I'll interject Kuhn's "scientific revolutions" concept - these entail a sort of selecting of a better theory. It's a process that is gradual and collective, not an individual sitting down and juxtaposing the respective theories and applying some rules, but the process has the same net effect.Feyerabend,...His argument gets a bit deeper than that, but there's a start, since this is counter to the naive view of abductuion as choosing the best theory. — Banno
I agree, and that's why I'm referring to them as "epistemic judgements". It would be unwarranted to claim a judgement made through abduction constitutes knowledge, in the strictest sense, or that it entails necessity. Even more so than the lip-service we give to the epistemic status of scientific theories: they can only be warranted as provisional. The "best" in "inference to best explanation" isn't an absolute claim that there can be no better explanation. It's simply a judgement that the selected hypothesis is best, among the options considered.Now some care is needed here. We agree that we do "make judgements based on data too sparse to draw a deductive conclusion". what I am baulking at is calling these judgements "abduction", if what is meant is that they are correct, or true, or worse, necessary. — Banno
I gave my family member's reasoning, and mind. Don't you agree mine is more reasonable?
— Relativist
Of course. — apokrisis
I don't have an "anti-conspiratorial stance". Conspiracies certainly occur. However, large scale conspiracies involving hundreds or thousands of people, particularly over many years, with 100% adherence to maintaining the fiction is implausible. Faking the moon landing would require this. A "false flag" operation by the US government in taking down the WTC on 9/11 would require this. It's an inherent implausibility in many conspiracy theories. Real conspiracies are apt to be exposed when very many are involved- some will screw up; some may have second thoughts.In the modern world, is your anti-conspiratorial stance still the legitimate thing? Can the truth even be secured without accepting a dash of conspiratorial doubt given the fact that even the well intentioned have reason to gloss over or edit the facts as they might exist. — apokrisis
Absolutely! That's exactly what I'm talking about.Anything is possible. So the burden shifts to what - by logical constraint - remains credible.
We can pretend life is a science project or learn to assess situations in more pragmatic fashion. A skill becoming more necessary everyday it seems. — apokrisis
Absolutely: we have an abundance of easily accessible information. In a perfect world, everyone would apply good epistemic judgement when trying to make sense of the information. In our imperfect world, we can at least strive to do this ourselves. This means trying to avoid being overly influenced by our biases (as in the case of my sister-in-law); it means valuing evidence over pure conjecture; it means considering the plausibility of claims; it means being willing to reevaluate our assumptions instead of tenaciously rationalizing our initial reactions. We can also attempt to persuade and to discuss the need for good epistemic judgement, but we also should be open to being persuaded by good reasoning.But again my point is how even for conspiracy theories, it cuts both ways. We are in a new media era where there is vastly more individual capacity to data mine and fact check. We can find out what is real about public events to a degree that we couldn’t before. That should be a good thing. And couple that power to a general rationality - an ability to step back with a world view that asks, well what are the odds - then conspiracy thinking could morph into something valuable. Producing needed social change. — apokrisis
I don't know much about her, so I checked Wikipedia. Apparently she promotes a variety of conspiracy theories. From this, I infer she has poor epistemic judgement, and thus I would'nt gain much but listening to her. It would be foolish for anyone to uncritically accept the claims of anyone with that track record.I’m not giving Candace Owen high marks as yet. — apokrisis
Suppose you can't find your car keys, one morning. What possibly happened to them? Did it fall into an interdimensional portal; did a poltergeist hide them? Did a monkey come through an unlocked window and take them? Was there a glitch in the matrix? The possibilities are endless. But only a few are truly worth consideration, like - maybe you. left them in the pants you were wearing, you dropped them, left them on the kitchen table, or in the car.But again, if nothing is certain—even conceptually—then you can't weigh anything as more or less certain. — Leontiskos
If someone's theory is bad, then you should say why it is bad in a way that would be convincing even to them. — Leontiskos
Agreed.if you have a number of different explanatory kinds in your belt, and one of them is IBE, then labeling one of your explanations an IBE is intelligible vis-a-vis the differentiation it provides. — Leontiskos
Or riffing on my parasitic idea from earlier, you can't talk about an "inference to the best explanation" if you aren't able to tell us what an explanation is. — Leontiskos
There are a number of folk on this forum who reject all substantive approaches to causality and explanation, substitute in their term "inference to the best explanation," and think they have won the day. But this is a rather confused move. If there are no real explanations, can there really be any best explanations? If I don't have even a conceptual understanding of what counts as an explanation, then how am I to know how to identify better or lesser explanations? — Leontiskos
No. Rather, abduction would tend to rule out theories that are commonly called conspiracy theories, but it's irrelevant whether they've been labelled as that.Is the argument that abduction can be used to pick out which theories are conspiracy theories? — Banno
You can lead a horse to water....a conspiracy theorist may just insist that the conspiracy is the more reasonable conclusion. — Banno
I’m watching this happen in real time after Charlie Kirk’s shooting. And the process is not so simple.
The problem is that we do live in a world where everyone is telling self-interested stories. Governments - even when their intentions are good - will edit the facts to make them palatable for public consumption. — apokrisis
And some will rationalize the evidence that doesn't fit. For example, by claiming it's contrived by the conspirators. "This is what they want you to think." So it becomes further "proof" of the conspiracy, in their minds.Any citizen who starts to dig into the facts as they are presented will always seem to find more and more that does not fit the narrative.
In the relevant cases, the "outside the box" means going in directions that are contradicted by current theory. In terms of abduction, the hypothesis is falsified before it's investigated. Even if this can be rationalized to abduction, the broader point is that they aren't being guided at all by abduction - but by something on the spectrum of idiotic wild-guess to brilliant insight.We may have different notions of abduction. My conception of abduction certainly doesn't preclude novel thinking or "thinking outside the box". — Janus
Kuhn came up with the "paradigm shift" view, and he discussed some historical examples that made sense to me when I read his book 40+ years ago. Examples I recall are Newtonian Gravity to General Relativity, and geo-centrism to helio-centrism. But I think you're right that these are rare.I often hear it said that science doesn't progress through cumulative knowledge and understanding, but through paradigm shifts. I don't think it's entirely one or the other and I don't think the 'paradigm shift' paradigm is an accurate picture except at the broadest scales. How many historical scientific paradigm shifts can you think of ? — Janus
Yes, pattern recognition is our strength, but it can also lead us astray at times. Just because we see the shape of a puppy in the clouds, doesn't imply there's anything truly dog-like up there. Just because we see a pattern of dice throws, doesn't imply the next throws are predictable. Just because some particular alignment of planets coincided with the nature of some type of event , doesn't imply there's truly a cause-effect relationship.Our brains are thankfully just rather good at such pattern processing. They are evolved to separate signal from noise. — apokrisis
I didn't do that. I brought up creativity to distinguish it from abduction.Of course scientists are creative. Calling there creativity "abduction" and locking it down to Peirce's simplistic schema is denigrating that creativity. Positing abduction as a response to Hume's scepticism is piling obfuscation on top of misunderstanding. — Banno
The hypothesis of alien landings is not an inference to the best explanation of all available facts. It could be a reasonable initial reaction to some report, but further analysis ought to expose problems with the theory. Are alternative explanations sought? Has the feasibility of long-distance space travel been considered? Should technologically intelligent life be deemed sufficiently common in our sector of the galaxy to consider their presence plausible?Let's look at an example. The government is hiding evidence of alien landings. This asserts the existence of some thing - alien landings - but nothing is said here about where or when. However the government responds, it is open to the believer to maintain their position. If they open area 51 to inspection, the theorist can say that the evidence has been moved elsewhere. If they deny that there is any evidence, that reinforces the idea of a conspiracy.
Where is abduction here? — Banno
Agreed.Science doesn't progress solely via abduction, but it certainly could not progress at all, or even get off the ground, without it. — Janus
I never said that abduction PROVIDES explanations. I said it entails process for SELECTING an explanation.Leaving aside why there must be such an explanation, a careful look will show that "abduction" doesn't provide such an explanation. "Inference to best explanation" is utterly hollow, until one sets out what a best explanation is.
— Banno
This is right, as I was trying to point out to Relativist elsewhere. — Leontiskos
Abduction entails drawing a non-necessary inference from a set of data (intended to be all available, relevant data), that consists of an explanatory hypothesis for that data - one that is deemed to explain the data better* than alternatives.
The inference is defeasible- it can be falsified by new, relevant data (previously overlooked or newly discovered) that is inconsistent with the hypothesis. Alternatively, it can be supplanted by a new hypothesis that demonstrably provides a superior* explanation.
________________
*[see next quote ]
________________ — Relativist
Methodology is indeed key. Some basics: explanatory scope and power, parsimony, more plausible than alternatives (consistent with more facts that are commonly accepted), fewer ad hoc assumptions (ad hoc suppositions are assumptions that are not entailed by the data and other commonly accepted facts). Biases entail ad hoc assumptions. It also entails consideration of other hypotheses.
Ideally, an abductive conclusion ought to be only as specific as the information warrants, otherwise it will include ad hoc assumptions.
Finally, the level of certainty ought to tied to the strength of the case. For example, consider a jury verdict based on a preponderance of evidence vs one based on "beyond reasonable doubt". A chosen "best" explanation may still be (arguably) unlikely. There's always the risk of choosing "the best of a bad lot"- which would tend to be the case when the data is sparse.
It's useful to solicit and receive feedback from others with divergent views. This can help identify overlooked, relevant facts, challenge assumptions that are ad hoc or reflect bias, and identify alternative hypotheses for comparing. — Relativist
False equivalence.It is not irrational to believe in conspiracies. — Banno
You haven't provided one. You've argued that science does not progress through abduction, which is a fair point, but that doesn't imply abduction is not truth directed.So there's good reason to question the use of abduction hereabouts.
1h — Banno
Abduction doesn't provide explanations, it COMPARES explanations. I've brought up conspiracy theories, and argued that it is irrational to embrace them - based on abdduction.Leaving aside why there must be such an explanation, a careful look will show that "abduction" doesn't provide such an explanation. — Banno