Oh, OK. That weakens their claim to be real, perhaps, perhaps not. Maybe they are real, but not in the sense of having an independent existence from the systems they govern. I'm not familiar with the view. — bert1

It's not weak at all. It's referred to as existing "immanently". In metaphysics, an immanent property is one that exists within an object itself, as opposed to a transcendent property that would exist beyond or outside it.

The -1 electric charge of an electron exists immanently in an electron. It seems to me that immanent properties make more sense then having properties be independent things because then you'd have to account for how these properties attach, and explain what they're attaching to (are they attaching to a thing lacking any properties at all?!)

The attraction between an electron and proton is a relational property that exists imminently in an electron-proton pair. There's no evidence that their attraction is contingent on anything other than the properties of each of the objects and their proximity.

- is the generation of objects governed by laws, or do the laws only exist once the object exist? — bert1

Yes and no.

The laws exist iff the set of objects exists in the arrangement that exhibits the law. If inflation theory is correct, then there was a time in the universe in which no particles existed - so there were no electron-proton pairs, and thus no laws could be exhibited between them.

However, the fact that such a law would be exhibited when protons and electrons came about would have been baked into the physics of the quantum fields - so ultimately (and assuming reductionism is true) the electron-proton law is just exhibiting more fundamental natural law that would always have been present.

Why does the same type of law always occur with the same type of objects?

Remember that the existence of laws of nature is a hypothesis, one that best explains the empirical evidence. I argue that this hypothesis is an "inference to best explanation" for these regularities. You could counter this claim by presenting an alternative hypothesis that you can show to be a better explanation. The hypothesis seems to be consistent with what we know about the world through physics.

But GIVEN the hypothesis that there are laws of nature, it is the case that a set of objects arranged in a particular way that exhibits a law of nature will do so necessarily. That's simply what it means to be a law: it is a necessary relation that exists between types of things.

Why is there consistency across space and time?

Because the relevant objects in the past are the same sort of objects that exist in the present and future.

But it raises a lot of questions about the details of this objective, but invisible and all-powerful, existence that laws partake of. Are the laws all omnipresent? If so, how does that fit with them being numerically distinct? Or is there really one big law that explains everything? Do laws change? Eternal god(s) without the personality? — bert1

"All powerful"? Whatever gives you that idea?

According to the theory, laws are relations between types of objects. These relations exist when and where these types exist. This removes the mystery associated with a platonic view of laws, by proposing they exist as part of the ontological structure of the world.

There's no reason to think they would change. Bare possibilities are irrelevant, because the theory is an inference to best explanation of regularities we observe in the world. The theory isn't dependent on the tentative current state of the discipline of physics; if an apparent "law of physics" were to change, it would be imply there's more to this "law of physics" than we thought.

Is there one big law? That might be the case if monism is true. But these questions are irrelevant to the theory.

Because laws are descriptive and don't really explain anything. — bert1

That is not the view of law realists. They suggests there to be an ontological basis for the observed regularities.

Example: two objects with opposite electric charge (e.g. electron & proton) have a force of attraction between them. This force is a necessary consequence of their properties. The properties and force are ontological.

That's pretty much correct.

But are laws of nature not codifications of observed invariances? — Janus

No. The hypothesis I discussed is that laws of nature are ontological.

I distinguish laws of nature from so-called "laws of physics". These are, at worst, codifications of these invariances. But they are more than that. when they make predictions that are later confirmed, predictions about things not previously observed. These give us good reasons to think the law of physics may be a true law of nature.

But it still may be they later become falsified by new evidence. This only means the law of physics isn't an accurate description of the ontological law of nature. .

I'm trying to make sense of this in a 2 step process, because it avoids directly leaping from a set of evidence of past things to claims about the future, without any clear reason. Laws of nature provide the reason.

The reasoning I'm conveying is not something I made up. It has been presented as a reasonable answer to Hume by some notable philosophers who call themselves "law realists" (e.g. Michael Tooley, Ernest Sosa, David Armstrong, and many who have built upon their work). Tooley and Sosa edited, and contributed to, a book of essays on causation in the book Causation (the link takes you to a PDF of the book).

It's also pretty well accepted physics that the universe has been expanding since the big bang, and will continue to do so on into the future - consistent with general relativity. Someone would have to be explain why this should be rejected as a good means of predicting aspects of both the past and the future.

That doesn't falsify anything I said. My belief in laws of nature is justified by being the best explanation of observed regularities (if you disagree, provide a BETTER explanation).

The existence of these laws of nature entail aspects of the future.

It seems you are conflating an explanation of facts past and present and a prediction of facts future. So you have arrived at your best explanation, and then you make a prediction based on the idea that there have been these laws in the past, and ...the future will be like the past, because the future will be like the past — unenlightened

This objection falls away when we consider what a law is, and how we arrive at the hypothesis.

What we observe directly (past and present) is causation between particulars. But we also observe that these token acts of causation follow patterns, such that particulars of a certain type and arrangement have an effect of a certain type. This leads to the hypothesis of what a law is: a causal relation between types that has an effect of a certain type. The causal relation is necessitated by the properties associated with each respective type; time is not a factor in the law, other than with respect to the elapse of time associated with the act of causation.

To suggest that laws (so defined) come and go over time is ad hoc, because there's no evidence for this. Types of particulars may come into or out of existence, but if they exist - the associated laws will necessarily exist.

The concept of plenary powers isn't new. For example, a President has the plenary power to grant pardons over federal crimes. But you're right, that the Trump administration is trying to expand his powers in many other areas.

Some of these claims will be heard by SCOTUS in this term.

I infer from the success of physics that there exist laws of nature in our world, many of which are (at least) approximated by physics; laws that necessitate the regularities we observe (nomological necessity). Therefore the regularities will necessarily continue into the future.

I suggest there is no better explanation for the success of physics (i.e. it's an IBE), and this is my justification for believing it.

So...she proves something I never disputed. Did you not read the last part of section 1? She says:

"Suppose that claims about the past and the present never entail claims about the future (what we might call “Hume’s 2nd Law.”) Is it reasonable to conclude that we are forced to accept that we have intuitive access to future truths, or instead that we can never have justified beliefs with respect to the future? No, in this case it seems much more likely that we have some non-deductive justification."

Not once have I suggested empirical evidence can ENTAIL universal conclusions. I've consistently been discussing BELIEFS. Russell, at least, acknowledges that we can have justified beliefs with respect to the future,despite the fact that these will be justified non-deductively.

:up: :up: :up: :up:

The “presumption of regularity” is long-standing judicial principle that presumes government officials have acted lawfully, properly, and in good faith unless proven otherwise. It places the burden of proof on the party challenging the government's action to show that it was arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful. It entails a presumption that attorneys representing the government in court will provide truthful information in court, and will make a good faith effort to comply with court orders. It also entails that administrative actions will be made in good faith, rather than in an arbitrary and capricious manner. An analysis posted in the JUSTSECURITY website documents over 400 instances in which the Trump administration has eroded this presumption of regularity. They details 3 categrories of irregularity:

1)Compliance with Court orders. They document 16 instances in which the government failed to fully comply. They contrast this with history over the past 70 years – there’s only one prior instance of the government failing to comply with a court order: in the 1960s, a judge ordered a cessation of bombing in the Cambodian War. In this case, the non-compliance by the DOJ lasted only for a matter of hours.

2) Presenting false or misleading information in Court – 35 cases are described.

3)Arbitrary and capricious administrative action: 50 cases

If anyone is interested, the full report is here.

The lead author is Ryan Goodman, a law professor at New York University, who has worked with the State Department and the National Institute of Military Justice.

I consider this analysis extremely important because it identifies behavior by the Trump administration unrelated to partisanship, but firmly entrenched in the law. No one, of any ideological perspective, should consider this behavior acceptable.

What the heck is wrong with that guy? — jorndoe

He's an effective propagandist - effective at telling like-minded people what they want to here. It's especially appealing to those who are still in shock at the assassination of Mister Kirk.

Your response, pointing to actual analysis that falsifies what he says, seems to me the correct one, but none of his audience would be at all interested in researching it.

Semantics is important, to ensure points are understood as intended.

I notice that the Wikipedia article on justification mentions warrant as "proper" justification for a belief.

Some epistemologists use "warrant" to refer to a justification sufficient for knowledge. The conditions that make it so are open to debate. Nevertheless, I was just treating warrant as synonymous with justification.

Model theory omits a link to ontology. It defines what truth is semantically, but does not relate it to anything in the world.

Truthmaker theory does this: a truthmaker is that aspect of reality to which a true statement corresponds. Tarski agreed that the statement, "snow is white" is true, because snow is white. This is standard deflation, but he omits identifying the italicized phrase with a truthmaker.

In my earlier post, I was referring to a model of reality. You were referring to a language model. But you can't get truth out of language without a connection to reality- an ontological grounding. So what I said about a model of reality stands, and I'll apply it here:

It's not true by definition that the future will, or even likely will, resemble the past because it always has — Janus

I agree. However, we could draw inferences about the nature of reality by examining the past, and apply that analysis (that model of reality) to making predictions. This is, of course, the nature of physics.

In model theory, a model is a structure that makes a formal system’s sentences true — Banno

But they don't, really- unless you embrace a "relativist" theory of truth.

No, not to explain induction. Rather, I'm suggesting that the development of a model is rooted in induction.

I see a 2 step process: 1) infer elements of a model from induction, based on the conjunction of empirical evidence; 2) cast a specific inference (eg "all swans are white") from this element of a model.

This seems consistent with science. When an innovator proposes a hypothesis at odds with the current conventional wisdom, he is setting aside that conventional model and presenting an element of an alternative model.

The “normative” aspect here does not consist in a choice among alternatives, but in adherence to what follows from the model itself. — Banno

If conforming to a model solves the problem, then simply infer a model on the basis of the constant conjunction of the empirical evidence. Under the framework of the model, the (otherwise) inductive inference s necessitated by the model.

I alluded to this earlier.

Valid deductive arguments are contingent on their premises. The conclusion is only "objectively best" if the argument is sound.

Except for arguments whose premises are necessary truths, it is impossible to prove a deductive conclusion is "objectively best". It's an unattainable goal. So why criticize only abductive reasoning for being unable to attain the unattainable?

You could say the deductive conclusion is "objectively best" given the premises, but we could add premises to an abduction that similarly identifies the contingency.

I'm not denying there's a problem of induction:we can't conclude strict impossibility based on a conjunction of evidence. But neither can we conclude a deductive conclusion is a necessary truth, in most cases. This doesn't imply we should all adopt extreme skepticism.

Maybe I misunderstand, but you seem to be implying that humans have the magical power to select the objectively best explanation from the third realm of abstract objects.

Rather, the "best explanation" has been selected subjectively; the subject has judged it to be the "best" explanation from among the ones he's considered. That is not "any" explanation; it is not arbitrary. But it is subjective, and cannot be otherwise.

The subject may, or may not, have been sufficiently rigorous - he may have overlooked facts; he may have not considered the plausibility of the assumptions he's made or that are entailed; he may have jumped to an unjustified biased conclusion....it's just his judgement.

But surely SOME IBEs, that SOME people make are sufficient to warrant a belief. If not, then nobody has much in the way of warranted beliefs, except for some analytic truths. A corrollary of my claim: a belief can be warranted even if it is possibly false.

The best explanations are the ones which are rationally justified, — Banno

Here's your error. The "best" in an IBE is not necesarily warranted (rationally justified). It just means it was chosen as "best" because it was subjectively judged to be better than alternatives that were considered.

Isn't "warranted" just another way of saying "best"? — Banno

No. Being warranted means to be rationally justified.
A subjective "best" inference may, or may not, be warranted.

Well, I won't disagree, but point out that "the best" remains ill-defined. If we are in agreement as to which explanation is the best, then we should accept it; but here, "the best" might just be "the one we accept"... — Banno

"The best" is always the one we accept. But if the ensuing belief is warranted, that's all that matters. There's isn't a recipe for warrant.

Good. Then we are agreed that abduction, considered as inference to the "best" explanation, does not determine one explanation, and is not itself a rational process. Do we also agree that as a result it doesn't serve to answer Humes Scepticism — Banno

Do you agree that inference to the best explanation can warrant a belief? This of course is only if it was done rationally.

If so, then explain how this doesn't answer Hume's scepticism.

And yes, I am discussing the use of the term, and so its meaning. What I would bring out is that it is not so easy as some might suppose to set out what is a conspiracy theory and what isn't. That the detail is important. — Banno

Are there NO easy cases, in your opinion?

You just seem to be objecting to use of the term. Don't use it, if you don't want to. But when I refer to something as a "conspiracy theory", I have a certain sort of epistemic framework in mind that renders it irrational. We could discuss this further in another thread, but it seems moot to the points I'm trying to make here.

it is more common that there are multiple inferences that satisfy the evidence at hand. — Banno

I agree, but when that is the case - we aren't warranted in choosing only one of them. But we would be warranted in excluding those that don't fit the evidence so well.

And yet we are often obliged to choose. The evidence is insufficient for the choice to be determined, so there are other things at play, including our other beliefs, and the practices we share with those around us. Our epistemic choices are guided by more than evidence; they include the whole form of the life in which we are engaged. — Banno

I agree, and I alluded to that when I mentioned the role of our background beliefs. Because they are beliefs, we are treating them a factual (truths) - at least to the extent that the beliefs are categorical (not expressions of certainty). This is perfectly fine most of the time. We should strive for consistency in our beliefs. There are times when we should question our background beliefs, but it's impractical to do so constantly.

And here Feyerabend's thoughts come in to play. What he shows is that sometimes we infer, not to the best explanation, but to some other explanation - and that this can be a very good thing. You will come across many examples in his book, so I will not list them here. — Banno

Like Galileo? Copernicus? As I see it, they are simply dropping the background assumptions of the then-current conventional wisdom, and developing new hypotheses freed of those constraints. I join Feyerabend in applauding that. The question is: how and when should we apply that? I suggest "the how" is in terms of reconsidering certain background beliefs. The "when" is...I don't know, but it can't be constantly. Similarly, scientists DO often operate within the current conventional wisdom of their field, and I expect this is more often than not.

Now the problem with calling inference to the best explanation, abduction, and listing it alongside deduction and induction, is the air of logical determinism that is given to what is in reality a practice fraught with ambiguity and guesswork. There's a lot going on here that is plainly irrational. — Banno

Either you're misunderstanding me, or I'm misunderstanding you. But you seem to be inferring that IBE determines an answer, just like deduction does. I don't think that at all (see the first point in this post).

Sure, there's ambiguity and guesswork, and we should be honest about when we are guessing and when there is ambiguity.

I have said an IBE is not necessarily rational. But it can be. Again, I'm discussing belief: my position is that most beliefs are established by IBE, but only a subset of these are warranted beliefs. We often draw conclusions based on irrational reasons. The IBE model provides a framework for discussion between people with different views, a discussion that can expose irrationality on either side.

By ackowledging our beliefs are warranted by abduction, a discussion is feasible, and can be productive for both sides. Productive in various ways: undercutting the other guys belief ("proving" him wrong, in an abductive sense); or simply helping both sides to understand the other's point of view - when both positions are defensible. — Relativist

Perhaps it is necessary to bear in mind that it is possible for two incompatible interpretations of data to be right, or at least not wrong. — Ludwig V

Absolutely, and I've acknowledged this in several posts.

Yes, a single, specific real explanation isn't always possible. A more general explanation may still be possible, or at least some may be ruled out. It can be appropriate to reserve judgement. — Relativist

Yes. But we seem to prefer to reach a conclusion, even when we don't need to decide. Perhaps we just don't like the uncertainty of indecision. — Ludwig V

I agree, but it can still be debated as to whether or not one is warranted (rationally justified) in believing that conclusion.

You could give a clear definition of deduction and then persuasively argue that, given the large number of beliefs each person holds, very few of them are arrived at via deduction. But I would say that the same thing holds for inference. If we give a clear definition of inference then we will find that, given the large number of beliefs each person holds, very few of them are arrived at via inference. This includes inference to the best explanation. So as noted earlier, it seems that by "inference to the best explanation" you mean something exceedingly broad and also rather vague. — Leontiskos

I do mean this broadly, and I don't claim that simply being an "IBE" makes it a justifiable belief.

It's reported that Trump has declared Portland Oregon a "war zone". I believe that he did say that. It's been reported in multiple sources, and I saw a video in which he made that statement. I could be wrong: I have not checked the sources, and haven't verified the video wasn't a deepfake. But IMO, the best explanation for the evidence is that he really did say that, despite the fact that the statement itself is implausible. We don't typically think through these things in this detail, but they're implicit in accepting something as fact. So in this case, I'd argue that my belief that Trump made the statement is warranted, despite the fact that it's possibly false. What other basis could there be to claim this is warranted, other than a valid IBE?

By contrast, I heard from one source* that Trump based his "war zone" comment on watching a video of riots in Portland that occurred in 2022. Suppose that's true. He made an IBE, but failed to do any due diligence to validate that what is saw does actually reflect current conditions, so I'd say it's an unwarranted belief on his part.

____
* I'm not fully buying this yet, since it's just one source. So I'm reserving judgement.

If we are talking about the practical way that most people arrive at beliefs, then I think the best work on the subject is John Henry Newman's An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, where he develops his "illative sense" among other things. If we are talking about this practical matter, then I don't think deduction or inference or basic beliefs are the right answer, especially in isolation. — Leontiskos

I found the essay online, and asked Claude (AI) to summarize the chapter on "The Sanction of the Illative Sense". Here's a link to the summary, also pasted below:

Main Argument
Newman introduces the concept of the "Illative Sense" - a natural faculty of judgment that allows us to reach certainty in concrete matters where formal logic alone cannot take us. He argues against both extreme skeptics who deny we can have certitude, and rationalists who believe only formal logic can justify beliefs.
Key Points
1. The Nature of the Illative Sense

It's the mind's ability to judge correctly in concrete, real-world matters
Similar to how we exercise judgment in morality (Aristotle's phronesis), aesthetics, or social conduct
Each person must exercise it individually - it's personal, not mechanical
It operates throughout reasoning: at the start (identifying first principles), during arguments (weighing evidence), and at conclusions (determining when proof is sufficient)

2. Why We Need It

Formal logic deals with abstract propositions, but life requires judgments about concrete realities
The gap between probable evidence and certain conclusions can't be bridged by syllogisms alone
We naturally possess certitude about many things despite lacking mathematically rigorous proofs

3. Its Legitimacy

Newman argues we should accept our mental faculties as we find them, just as we accept physical nature
The widespread human capacity for certitude proves it's not a mistake or weakness
God gave us these faculties, and they're adequate for discovering truth when properly used
4. Practical Applications
Newman illustrates how the Illative Sense works in historical inquiry, showing how respected scholars (Niebuhr, Grote, Lewis, etc.) reach different conclusions from the same evidence because they operate from different assumptions, viewpoints, and judgments about what constitutes reasonable interpretation.
Philosophical Significance
Newman is defending common-sense certainty against both radical skepticism and narrow rationalism, arguing that legitimate knowledge requires personal judgment guided by developed intellectual habits, not just formal proofs. — Claude

Nothing he says conflicts with my claims. He focuses only on deduction, makes vague claims about "common-sense" and asserts that it's fine to accept the product of theses senses. Abduction is consistent with "common sense", but is better positioned for criticism, correction, and debating conflicting views where two individuals' "common sense" leads them to different conclusions. Philosophers of history that came after Newman point to abduction as a key process of historians (see this). Abductive conclusions by historians are sources of debate among them.

But a critical difference is that Newman doesn't discuss warrant - justifying the belief (as far as I can tell). He just assumes the "illiative sense" is reliable.

If everything is an IBE, then what sense does it make to exhort someone to engage in IBE? Or to argue in favor of IBEs? — Leontiskos

It frames a discussion. Have you never encountered a guy who makes some assertion, then says, "prove me wrong"? This establishes an unreachable goalpost. By ackowledging our beliefs are warranted by abduction, a discussion is feasible, and can be productive for both sides. Productive in various ways: undercutting the other guys belief ("proving" him wrong, in an abductive sense); or simply helping both sides to understand the other's point of view - when both positions are defensible.

Let me put it this way: if some explanations are better and some are worse, then what are they better or worse in relation to? — Leontiskos

In relation to each other, but based on thorough, valid reasoning and more plausible assumptions, that are least ad hoc. Extreme example: misplacing your car keys vs the keys having been sucked into an interdimensional portal. The latter depends on implausible assumptions.

1. If there are better and worse explanations, then they must be better or worse relative to some standard
2. The standard is the true explanation
3. The true explanation is not an IBE
4. Therefore, not everything is an IBE — Leontiskos

The IDEAL is a true explanation, but since we don't have direct access to truth, it can't be the standard(not directly). Rather, we should apply truth directed approaches: valid reasoning (avoiding contradiction; recognizing entailments), meeting the necessary explanatory scope, considering the plausibility of background assumptions, avoid force fitting data to the hypothesis,...

The process is analogous to being on a jury, charged with weighing evidence to reach a verdict. Your vote is your IBE.

If Sherlock Holmes is working a case then he has any number of candidate theses floating around his head. Some are better than others. Also, something actually happened in reality that he is trying to understand. The best explanation will (arguably*) be the one which most closely approximates the thing that happened in reality. That is what his spectrum of worst/worse/better/best is aiming at. — Leontiskos

Again, we don't have access to the truth. It could very well be that the available evidence supports a false conclusion more than (the unknown) true one. But the evidence is all we have to go on, and (more often than not) it will be true (if we use good, consistent standards)

My point is that if you try to make everything an IBE, then IBEs make no sense. An inference to the best explanation presupposes the possibility of the real explanation. Depending on our questions and their level of specificity, a single real explanation may not be possible, but in many cases it is possible, and especially so in a theoretical or conceptual sense. — Leontiskos

Yes, an IBE presupposes there is a true explanation.

Yes, a single, specific real explanation isn't always possible. A more general explanation may still be possible, or at least some may be ruled out. It can be appropriate to reserve judgement.

At issue is how "supported by evidence" is payed out. From Quine-Duhem, we see that there are always ways to question the evidence. So the issue becomes when questioning the evidence is reasonable, and when it isn't. And it seems there is often no clear clean place at which to draw the line. — Banno

I agree. We're discussing IBEs, and doing them rationally. Two reasonable people could reach different conclusions on the same data, because subjective judgement is usually involved. This includes judging what is plausible:

Plausibility is a factor in epistemic judgement.
— Relativist
And not the result of the application of an algorithmic method — Banno

Yes!

Part of that is the issue of demarcation, the separation between science and non-science, which relates to your discussion of conspiracy theories. The idea is that conspiracy theories are not scientific; they do not conform to scientific methods. — Banno

I don't agree with framing it that way - because the issue is epistemology, not science per se. This includes applying epistemology to science, but I'm talking about it more broadly.

Now this is I think pretty much toe right sentiment, but given that we are unable to set out what that scientific method is quite as clearly as some suppose, and hence that the difficulty in setting out what counts as a conspiracy theory and what doesn't, a bit of humility might be needed.

But we could define a "conspiracy theory" using epistemology. But we don't need to, and it could create a red herring - debating both the definition and whether or not it applies in any given case. It's better to just confront a theory directly and demonstrate how the conclusion is unwarranted.

I only brought up conspiracy theories because most of us are aware of what they are, and that there are good reasons to reject them. This was to illustrate the use of an IBE framework to evaluate claims.

It won't help to just tell a conspiracy believer that their theory does not match the evidence, because for them it does.

One can only point out the reasoning flaws. But it becomes a religion for many of them.

If I were teaching a logic class I would ask you to provide an argument for your conclusion, "...Therefore, no conspiracy theory is an IBE."

If you reply that some conspiracy theories are IBEs, but this is rare, I would point out that the conspiracy theorist agrees with you. The conspiracy theorist would not be a conspiracy theorist if they thought that conspiracy theories were common or mundane explanations. It is precisely the rarity that they are attracted to. — Leontiskos

I haven't gotten something across to you guys some of my basic contentions:

1) Most of our beliefs are established as subjective inferences to best explanation. Consider the alternatives: few beliefs are established by deduction, and few are basic. What else is there?

Someone who believes the 9/11 destruction of the twin towers was a false flag operation by the US government believes that this best explains the "facts" that he "knows".

But he's made errors in his analysis: errors we can identify by presenting my own IBE. This could entail identifying additional facts, debunking falsehoods he accepts (through another IBE), identifying implausible background assumptions he's making. This would be MY subjective IBE, but if I've done it correctly, I expect it would persuade any rational person to drop their belief in this conspiracy.

If I succeeded at that, you might characterize my argument as an objective reason to reject the theory. I don't characterize it that way, because I'm viewing this in terms of establishing belief. A sound argument listed in a logic textbook, or on an internet forum, has no relevance to anyone unless they read it, understand it, and accept it - thus establishing a belief.

2) A belief established by IBE is rationally justified if done "correctly". I've discussed some aspects of valid analysis . Example: it takes into account all the relevant information known to the person: (we shouldn't cherry pick; we're not omniscient).

3) a belief that has been rationally justified by abduction can be rationally defeated by another IBE (e.g. one that includes previously unknown or overlooked information; undercutting an assumption on the basis of implausibility).
-

But isn't it just a truism to say that one should prefer the better to the worse? — Leontiskos

No, because we're employing reason to guide the choice, not just what feels "best". We're evaluating the evidence, considering plausibility, reflecting on our personal biases...everything I've talked about.

But again, if nothing is certain—even conceptually—then you can't weigh anything as more or less certain.
— Leontiskos

Suppose you can't find your car keys, one morning...
— Relativist

But how does any of this address the point at stake? — Leontiskos

My point is that we can often make finer distinctions than simply possible/impossible.

I think I previously mentioned "modest Bayesianism" to you. This is the claim that for SOME pairs of propositions, we can justifiably judge one to be more likely than the other. This doesn't entail a commitment to attach a numerical probability to all propositions that could be used in a Bayesian probability calculation.

The examples I gave illustrate this. If you're going to treat all possibilities the same, no matter how remote, you will get nowhere in making epistemic judgements.

The point is that you must do more than beg the question. The label "conspiracy theory" is too broad, bordering on things as broad as "bad" or "irrational." If one wants to engage in rational discourse, then they must offer reasons, and "bad", "irrational", and "conspiracy theory" don't really count as reasons. More generally, one must offer arguments and not assertions. — Leontiskos

Of course! I'll go further: discussing our reasoning with others can help us improve our judgements, by getting additional facts before us, and alternative theories. It forces us to think through our reasoning with more rigor, and to justify the various intermediate judgements that lead to the position we're defending.

Good, but do you also agree that if everything is an IBE then there is no intelligibility given that no differentiation is possible? — Leontiskos

Absolutely not. I can't imagine why you'd suggest no differentiation is possible. Do you worry about losing your keys in an interdimensional portal? Do you worry your spouse might be an extra-terrestrial? If you do not differentiate, how can you ever make ANY decision?

Okay, good. So would we say that, at least in some cases, there is the real explanation and nominal explanations are better or worse depending on how well they approximate the real explanation? If so, then an IBE is presupposing the ontological existence of an aitia/cause/explanation. — Leontiskos

Yes, to the 1st question (I think).

I don't understand the 2nd. What's the ontological status of descriptions of events in the public sphere? What does it matter? The appropriate objective is truth, and this is irrespective of one's preferred theory of truth, theory of mind, or the metaphysical foundation of reality.

So would you say that when someone argues for one particular interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, they are not offering an IBE? — Leontiskos

If they're arguing for it, they are probably explaining why they consider it an IBE. My position today is simply that I reserve judgement, and I could go into a bit more detail as to why. I've read defenses of Many Worlds, of ontological wave function collapse, and of Bohmian "pilot wave" theory. Each is coherent, none are verifaible or falsifiable. Also, while it's interesting, there is no interpretation that will impact my life or the real-world choices I have to make daily.

But that doesn't seem very principled. If there is not more than one explanation, then how can you talk about an inference to the best explanation? — Leontiskos

There's always more than one explanation, in principle. Suppose only one explanation is before us, but I judge it very unlikely to be true. This implies there is some unavailable truth of the matter.

Example. An amateur Christian apologist I used to engage with made the claim we should all accept Jesus's resurrection as true, because there is (at least) some evidence it occurred (e.g. the Gospels, early belief in it, alleged martyrdom) and no evidence of alternatives. He was arguing the Resurrection is the "best explanation" of available evidence. But for other reasons - I regard it as grossly implausible. So I reserved judgement as to how to account for the Gospel stories, early belief, and alleged martyrdom. I still think that was appopriate. This general problem in abduction is called being "the best of a bad lot".

Since then, I've read a good bit about critical Biblical scholarship, so now I could proffer some general alternative hypotheses- but I also judge that no specific theory can have sufficiently strong support to warrant accepting it as true.

The criticism I began with is that if you set out those criteria, if you set out your expectations for a good hypothesis, then what you are in effect doing is choosing only the hypotheses that meet those expectations; I somewhat hyperbolically called that "confirmation bias" - you get what you want, an so perhaps not what you need.

On this approach, is any theory that does not meet one's expectations a conspiracy theory? Seems to be so, unless there is some additional criteria. — Banno

In answer to the question: we could dispense with using the term "conspiracy theory" entirely, and simply apply good epistemic judgement to any theory that comes along. Let's consider some factors that affect this judgement.

1) I contend that more credence should be given to claims that are supported by evidence, than those that are purely speculation. Often, the evidence is insufficient to establish the claim beyond reasonable doubt (or some other standard we might apply). So it is of course possible the speculation is true, and the one supported by evidence is false. But have we made an error of judgement? Possibilities are endless, so if we dwell on all possibilities, we will never make a judgement - we'll be lost, wandering through a forest of possibilities. We can make a judgement, while remaining open to revising it when we learn more. Maybe evidence supporting the speculation will come out.

2) Plausibility is a factor in epistemic judgement. This will be a function of background beliefs, but it's grossly impractical to start from the ground up when judging every claim. I've said it's implausible that hundreds or thousands of people could maintain a conspiratorial secret for any extended period of time. It would entail unwavering commitment to the cause, and perfect competence by all. I can't claim it's impossible, but I judge it to be grossly implausible. I apply this as a background belief when judging a claim. But because it's possible, I could be missing an exception by ruling it out prematurely,. But again: possibilities are endless, so if we're going to make a judgement, we need to narrow down the possibilities.

Feyerabend,...His argument gets a bit deeper than that, but there's a start, since this is counter to the naive view of abductuion as choosing the best theory. — Banno

His case studies do not entail choosing a best theory. I'll interject Kuhn's "scientific revolutions" concept - these entail a sort of selecting of a better theory. It's a process that is gradual and collective, not an individual sitting down and juxtaposing the respective theories and applying some rules, but the process has the same net effect.

There's another issue that is unique to science:"The history of science, after all, does not just consist of facts and conclusions drawn from facts, problems created by conflicting interpretations, mistakes, and so on. On closer analysis we find that science knows no "bare facts" at all but that the "facts" that enter our knowledge are already viewed in a certain way and are, therefore, essentially ideational. This being the case, the history of science will be as complex, chaotic, full of mistakes..."
[Feyerabend, "Against Method", p 3).

I can't find the quote, but elsewhere he discusses the fact that scientific theories are invariably inconsistent - they entail come contradictions or other clear falsehoods (example: the cosmological constant problem). This provides a strong reason to set aside the commonly accepted theoretical framework, at times (let's not forget that progress is also made within current theoretical frameworks).

These issues don't apply to everyday epistemic judgments. Of course, you COULD point to various metaphysical theories that could call everything into question (e.g. idealism, solipsism), but such an approach is as unpragmatic as you can get. It's hard enough to navigate the world just in the way we commonly view it, so (IMO) it's silly to be paralyzed by these various metaphysical possibilities.

Now some care is needed here. We agree that we do "make judgements based on data too sparse to draw a deductive conclusion". what I am baulking at is calling these judgements "abduction", if what is meant is that they are correct, or true, or worse, necessary. — Banno

I agree, and that's why I'm referring to them as "epistemic judgements". It would be unwarranted to claim a judgement made through abduction constitutes knowledge, in the strictest sense, or that it entails necessity. Even more so than the lip-service we give to the epistemic status of scientific theories: they can only be warranted as provisional. The "best" in "inference to best explanation" isn't an absolute claim that there can be no better explanation. It's simply a judgement that the selected hypothesis is best, among the options considered.

Does that fill the hole you mentioned?

I gave my family member's reasoning, and mind. Don't you agree mine is more reasonable?
— Relativist

Of course. — apokrisis

Then appreciate how this relates to what I'm saying about IBEs. My explanation is "better".

In the modern world, is your anti-conspiratorial stance still the legitimate thing? Can the truth even be secured without accepting a dash of conspiratorial doubt given the fact that even the well intentioned have reason to gloss over or edit the facts as they might exist. — apokrisis

I don't have an "anti-conspiratorial stance". Conspiracies certainly occur. However, large scale conspiracies involving hundreds or thousands of people, particularly over many years, with 100% adherence to maintaining the fiction is implausible. Faking the moon landing would require this. A "false flag" operation by the US government in taking down the WTC on 9/11 would require this. It's an inherent implausibility in many conspiracy theories. Real conspiracies are apt to be exposed when very many are involved- some will screw up; some may have second thoughts.

Anything is possible. So the burden shifts to what - by logical constraint - remains credible.

We can pretend life is a science project or learn to assess situations in more pragmatic fashion. A skill becoming more necessary everyday it seems. — apokrisis

Absolutely! That's exactly what I'm talking about.

But again my point is how even for conspiracy theories, it cuts both ways. We are in a new media era where there is vastly more individual capacity to data mine and fact check. We can find out what is real about public events to a degree that we couldn’t before. That should be a good thing. And couple that power to a general rationality - an ability to step back with a world view that asks, well what are the odds - then conspiracy thinking could morph into something valuable. Producing needed social change. — apokrisis

Absolutely: we have an abundance of easily accessible information. In a perfect world, everyone would apply good epistemic judgement when trying to make sense of the information. In our imperfect world, we can at least strive to do this ourselves. This means trying to avoid being overly influenced by our biases (as in the case of my sister-in-law); it means valuing evidence over pure conjecture; it means considering the plausibility of claims; it means being willing to reevaluate our assumptions instead of tenaciously rationalizing our initial reactions. We can also attempt to persuade and to discuss the need for good epistemic judgement, but we also should be open to being persuaded by good reasoning.

I’m not giving Candace Owen high marks as yet. — apokrisis

I don't know much about her, so I checked Wikipedia. Apparently she promotes a variety of conspiracy theories. From this, I infer she has poor epistemic judgement, and thus I would'nt gain much but listening to her. It would be foolish for anyone to uncritically accept the claims of anyone with that track record.

There's a reason the term "conspiracy theory" has evolved to entail being irrational: they entail a set of common errors of epistemic judgement. Don't take my word* for it, but do examine the basis for any theory you find intriguing.

* The wikipedia article on conspiracy theories is worth a read.

What's your point? Are you just acknowledging what I said about background beliefs being involved in our epistemic judgements?

But again, if nothing is certain—even conceptually—then you can't weigh anything as more or less certain. — Leontiskos

Suppose you can't find your car keys, one morning. What possibly happened to them? Did it fall into an interdimensional portal; did a poltergeist hide them? Did a monkey come through an unlocked window and take them? Was there a glitch in the matrix? The possibilities are endless. But only a few are truly worth consideration, like - maybe you. left them in the pants you were wearing, you dropped them, left them on the kitchen table, or in the car.

More generally, it is often the case that we would consider some possibilities more credible/plausible/likely than others. Examples:

-It's quite plausible for one person to keep a secret, but less plausible that hundreds can keep the same secret for decades with no noticeable slip-ups (this is one common problem with conspiracy theories).

-Suppose you have 2 alternative possibilities, but there is supporting evidence for only one. Evidence gives a good reason to treat it more credibly.

If someone's theory is bad, then you should say why it is bad in a way that would be convincing even to them. — Leontiskos

That assumes the other person is reasonable. I actually did explain to my sister-in-law why her belief that Trump staged his assassination attempt was flawed, and she just responded that I give Trump too much credit.

Another factor: background beliefs. They are factors that influence our judgements. Of course, they can be challenged, but how deep do we ever go? People are apt to get frustrated or pissed off before a meeting of the minds is reached.

Yet another factor: Some people are more apt to make clear epistemic judgements, and some are more apt to reserve judgement. There's no objectively correct point at which judgement is deemed appropriate, although one ought to try an be consistent. This is a factor in past judgements that are within our background beliefs - so there's an abundance of reasons why 2 reasonable people may disagree.

if you have a number of different explanatory kinds in your belt, and one of them is IBE, then labeling one of your explanations an IBE is intelligible vis-a-vis the differentiation it provides. — Leontiskos

Agreed.

Or riffing on my parasitic idea from earlier, you can't talk about an "inference to the best explanation" if you aren't able to tell us what an explanation is. — Leontiskos

In this context, an explanation is a conclusion someone is drawing from some set of evidence and background facts.

There are a number of folk on this forum who reject all substantive approaches to causality and explanation, substitute in their term "inference to the best explanation," and think they have won the day. But this is a rather confused move. If there are no real explanations, can there really be any best explanations? If I don't have even a conceptual understanding of what counts as an explanation, then how am I to know how to identify better or lesser explanations? — Leontiskos

I don't know what your talking about regarding "causality and explanation". But I'd say that an IBE is always a conclusion, but it may simply be a conclusion to reserve judgement. For example: is there a "best" interpretation of Quantum Mechanics? IMO, no- because they are all consistent with the measurements- there's no objective basis to choose one, so I think we should reserve judgement.

We often don't have multiple, distinct "explanations" to choose from; we're just assessing whether or not there's sufficient justification to support an assertion. We examine this justification and decide whether to affirm it, deny it, or reserve judgement. It's the same process, whether or not we choose to label it abduction.

Is the argument that abduction can be used to pick out which theories are conspiracy theories? — Banno

No. Rather, abduction would tend to rule out theories that are commonly called conspiracy theories, but it's irrelevant whether they've been labelled as that.


As far as I'm concerned, anything goes when it comes to proposing an explanatory hypothesis. Brainstorming works best when unconstrained. But applying abduction results in sorting out from consideration those hypotheses that have the weakest support.

a conspiracy theorist may just insist that the conspiracy is the more reasonable conclusion. — Banno

You can lead a horse to water....

But not really relevant. I argue that we think abductively all the time: we make epistemic judgements based on data too sparse to draw a deductive conclusion. This isn't about trying to convince anybody, it's about ourselves thinking critically.

Of course, it does help to review one's hypothesis with others, to invite criticism - hearing different perspectives on the body of facts (adding, removing, revising), exposing our biases, and hearing alternative interpretations. But ultimately, we all make our own epistemic judgements.

If our case IS sound (in an abductive sense), then it probably would convince others, but that's a byproduct.
.

My point is that: 1) we can draw some conclusions based on the information that IS available; 2) some conclusions are more reasonable than others; 3) (obviously) it's contingent upon the information being correct.

I gave my family member's reasoning, and mine. Don't you agree mine is more reasonable?