I don't mean to do away with language - that is scarcely possible - but to be on guard against being lulled to sleep and into error by casual usage. — tim wood

Glad you don't mean to do away with language, but this "casual usage" is pertinent to a very practical (and seemingly successful) means of interacting with the world. Granted, it's a paradigm- but one that is fleshed out pretty thoroughly.

F=ma defines the physical relationship — Banno

Yes, but there is a physical relationship present that exists irrespective of us putting it into intelligible terms.

Yes, it's a definition of force, but it also identifies a physical relationship among force, mass, and acceleration- so it is predictive.

presupposed. And semper presuppositions. Without them we wouldn't get out of bed in the morning, nor into it at night. The problems arising when the presuppositions, and their nature, what they are, is forgot, and what they provide is taken for a real thing. — tim wood

Fair enough - it's presupposition, but it is POSSIBLY true. By contrast, we agree that mere description (equations) is not causitive - that's not even possible.

I claim F=ma is descriptive only and has no power in itself to make anything happen. — tim wood

I agree, but what does the equation describe? It describes some aspect of reality (if it's true).

Personally, I lean toward law realism: there exist laws of nature, which are causal relations between the properties of things. You had said:

As to QM, the language of description - which is after-the-fact and tentative - seems to be implied to have a causative power, and I do not see how that can be. — tim wood

Under the paradigm of law realism, the causative power within a quantum system is intrinsic to the quantum system: it's evolution is both necessary and deterministic.

The OP's question has to do with possible connection, reified into possible existence. Until the terminology nailed down on four corners, unanswerable in any but speculative terms. As to QM, the language of description - which is after-the-fact and tentative - seems to be implied to have a causative power, and I do not see how that can be. — tim wood

I don't understand what you're saying. Reified? That entails a fallacy. Do you mean actualized?

Under QM, a pure state quantum system evolves deterministically- per the wave function, describable by a Schroedinger equation.

Here's what I was thinking.

The things that lack explanations, are brute facts. So we should always seek explanations, but accept that there are instances where we will hit a brute fact.

Example: assume metaphysical foundationalism is true (i.e. there's a "bottom layer" of reality"). That layer is not explainable in any deeper terms.

If only SOME things have explanations, then there's not much impetus to seek one.

Where I wanted to go with this, is to narrow down the sorts of things that have explanations.

I don't think science strictly needs it to be metaphysically true for EVERYTHING to have an explanation. — flannel jesus

So some things have explanations. Seems so weak, it's irrelevant.

If a non deterministic interpretation of qm is true, then the response isn't necessarily to revise the PSR, it might just be to reject it. — flannel jesus

The PSR can be considered the underpinning of science: the pursuit of answers to why something is the way it is. So I think there's something worth salvaging.

How about grounding? A quantum collapse is grounded in the quantum system, and possibly the entity that it becomes entangled with that results in the collapse.

If that's the case, then quantum indeterminacy would seem to imply the PSR is false. However, the PSR seems generally applicable, except for this one exception, so it would then make sense to revise the PSR to allow for probabilistic determination: asserting that the outcome of a quantum collapse is sufficiently determined by a probability distribution.

As I said in my previous post, if one speaks about 'evolution' and 'evolutionary advantage' as an explanation and, indeed, if one thinks that explanation is true, I don't see how one can escape the conclusion that the 'process' considered is intelligible. — boundless

Sure, but you said you agreed that's an innate belief, reasonable to maintain:

I agree with you here. If we also give credence to the basic belief of the intelligibility of the world would imply that we assume that the world has a 'structure' that can be 'mirrored' by our mental categories. — boundless

how we have to understand that 'order'? Is it something 'physical' — boundless

It seems to me that it makes more sense to believe it IS physical, because otherwise we must make some unparsimonious assumptions about what else exists, besides the physical. I just don't get why so many are embracing idealism- it seems to depend on skepticism about the perceived world, and then makes the unsupported assumption that reality is mind-dependent. I see no good justification for believing that. Sure, our perceptions and understandings are mind dependent, but I see no justification to believe that's all there is to reality. The innate, basic belief has not been defeated, and if we merely apply skepticism- we should also be skeptical of the hypothesis of idealism.

IMO you are oscillating between a position that requires some degree of intelligibility (the assumption that there is a physcial reality) and a skeptical position which would require to abandon all attempts to rational understanding of reality.
I would say that the 'order', if we take it seriously, would not be just a 'judgement' but also a property of physcial reality itself. — boundless

No, I'm being consistent with physicalism in terms of what a property is: properties are universals that exist immanently where they are instantiated.

if intelligibility of physical reality is assumed, then, you can't 'conceive' the more elementary parts of physical world independent of anything else. — boundless

In the case of properties (universals) - you can recognize that two or more things have it. It's true that we aren't visualizing redness as a thing- we're visualizing a red surface, but we are intellectually just identifying the sameness that red things have.

But note that this does have implications, after all. If we say, for instance, that logical inference derives from physical causality, we are assuming that physical causality has the same character of 'necessity' that logical inference has. — boundless

I don't agree. Set physicalism aside and just consider the evolutionary advantage of associating effect with "cause" (something preceding) with "effect" - even in nonverbal animals. This mirrors "if....then", the most basic form of inference. This is instinctual and behavioral, and doesn't depend on a law of nature to make it so; it depends on recognizing a pattern. Humans take it a further step because of our ability to think abstractly.

"Why would the 'physical' follow the same 'rules' that make a coherent reasoning 'coherent'?" I think we're just intellectually tracking the observed regularity, and then abstracting.

you are assuming that the world has a structure/order that is amenable to rational description. But here we get the same question that I raised before in the case of causality — boundless

If the world does have structure/order, then it would be amenable to rational description.

Note that Artificial Neural Networks are still, ultimately, our inventions that are programmed by us. So, I am not sure that this can lead us to the conclusion that the world is 'orderly' in the same way as our thoughts are. — boundless

My only point here is that the capability of recognizing patterns is consistent with physicalism, so it doesn't require magic.

if one assumes that the 'order' is an intrinsic property of the world this would mean that reductionism is wrong. Parts can't be understood as 'abstracted' from their context of relations. In fact, parts must be understood as, well, being intrinsically 'parts' and, therefore, wholes are not reducible to them. — boundless

Order is not a property, per se. It is a high-level intellectual judgement. Properties are not parts. "-1 electric charge" is not a part of an electron, it's a property that electrons have. I don't see a problem with identifying an aspect (a property or pseudo-property) that 2 or more distinct objects have and then focusing attention on that aspect. Explain the problem you see.

There is logical inconsistency in both the semantics AND the acceptance of extraordinary claims with no evidence. — Harry Hindu

You're wrong. Consistency is present if a word corresponds to a concept. It's an entirely different matter as to whether or not you (and others) are willing to accept the linguistic shift. But languages evolve all the time.

If gender and sex are separate, then why is changing one's biology an affirmation of one's gender? — Harry Hindu

Physical alteration of one's body is presentation. Is biology being changed? Amputation of a leg isn't a change of biology, nor is cosmetic surgery.

why the need to change the biology and control other's speech?

“The one constant of a vibrant living language is change,” explains Gregory Barlow, President of Merriam-Webster. “We continuously encounter new ways of describing the world around us, and the dictionary is a record of those changes.” (source)

In the present case, it's a matter of having a word to denote a particular concept. If you read the word, it's to your benefit to understand what the word means- there's no control involved. If you get triggered when you see others using the term, that's your problem. If you feel to need to correct others when they use the term in the way you oppose then you are as guilty of trying to control others as anyone.

Why the need to enter female spaces - which are divided by sex, not by gender?

Those are the serious issues! The semantics is trivia. I sense that you lump it all together in your mind.

Don't you think, however, that you are assuming that this 'natural' world is intelligible, though? That is, your model, actually presupposes the validity of inferences, logical explanations and so on? — boundless

We seem to have an innate, basic belief that there's an external world that we're perceiving and interacting with. As we develop from infants, we are making sense of the world. The process continues throughout our lives, and underpins our study of nature. Maintaining a basic belief is perfectly rational, unless there's some undercutting facts. It's of course possible that we're wrong, and it's fare to acknowledge that, but possibility alone is not a rational reason to drop a belief.

If an explanation is incoherent we do not think that it can be true, or convincing. So, you can't ground logic without assuming it in the first place. It's just fundamental. — boundless

As I said, logic is semantics -a formalization, based on assigning sharply defined definitions to terms. You could question the grounding of our semantics, I suppose. But again, the grounding seems to be basic, innate beliefs. Of course we learn a language, but we have a common understanding that depends on our hardwired mechanism for perceiving the world - and similarly, rational to maintain.

IMO one might say that transcendental objects are in some way connected to the regularities of phenomena. But I would assume that it would be somewhat inconvenient for a physicalist to admit that, say, the 'laws of thoughts' are actually an essential aspect of that physical world which is assumed to be totally 'mindless'. — boundless

I've identified the specific way universals are connnected to reality, and how we manage to perceive them. This seems a better account than saying they are "somehow connected".

Regarding "laws of thought": an orderly world producing orderly thoughts, enabling successful interaction with it.

order to even recognize a pattern, you need to assume a basic capacity of recognition of 'sameness' and 'different', which actually means that a capacity of interpretation is assumed. — boundless

It seems a minor step from pattern recognition, which Artificial Neural Networks can do.

Incorrect. You want to discuss the symptom while I want to focus on the cause. If you don't value logical consistency and questioning ALL extraordinary claims that are being made, then what's the use? — Harry Hindu

There is no logical inconsistency in the semantics, if sex is defined as biological and gender is defined as what is presented and (presumably) felt. My sense is that this won't catch on, because many are like you: unwilling to accept the semantics. As I indicated initially, that's the most trivial aspect of the TG issue.

It's not semantics. It's politics. — Harry Hindu

There's a political dispute about semantics. This portion of the dispute is a waste of time- I mentioned some serious issues; this isn't one of them- it's a distraction.

Your post just re-iterates my point - that there is no meaningful distinction between gender and sex. — Harry Hindu

Your assertion is consistent with my view that part of the issue is semantics. Language can drift, and there's no right/wrong to it. So what if we move toward using "sex" in the biological sense, and "gender" to denote some self-described social role?

Accepting such semantics allows us to focus on more serious issues, such as sports (it is unfair to biological women to compete against biological males). A bigger deal would be misrepresentation: if I were young and single, I would not consider having a romantic relationship with a transgender woman (biological male) - so I consider it improper for such a person to present themselves to me in that false way. Other than that, I couldn't care less how they dress, act, or what pronouns they prefer.

A third big issue is the difficult problem parents of transgender have to deal with. Even if (as you said) it's a delusion, it could be a life-long one, and the optimal path forward is not clear.

I was casual friends with a transgender woman a few years ago. My wife and I would hang out with at a wine bar that we frequented. When she committed suicide, we learned that her parents had never accepted her choice and this resulted in some serious emotional problems. I dare say their approach didn't work.

Complexity must evolve from simplicity, Anything else results in a Ponzi scheme — noAxioms

I love this!

Under presentism, yes. But you called all those 'existing', the tense of which implies 'currently existing'. That's what I was commenting on.
Many (most?) presentists don't consider future events to exist since it interferes with their typical assumption of free will. Far be it from me to put words in their mouths; I'm not a presentist. — noAxioms

I agree there's ambiguity in the way I used "exists". Can you suggest a different term? I want to distinguish between the superset of past/present/future existents and hypothetical things that are not in that superset.

For the purpose of taking a piss or shit, yes, people should be separated. — Harry Hindu

Why can't separate stalls, with walls and doors that reach to the floor, suffice? I seen no reason to segregate hand-washing. I've been to bars that have two separate toilet facilities, but a common hand-washing area.

These traditions aren't opposed to observation or analysis, but they don’t assume that science alone defines what is real (especially because science in today's sense wasn't even understood in their day). — Wayfarer

a vision of reality informed by reflection on what it means to live and to know. Similarly, Buddhist thought offers an extraordinarily detailed and multi-layered account of mind and its transformations—yet it does so without treating mind as reducible to brain. — Wayfarer

These approaches may be useful in a psychological way (some might say "spriritual")- a potentially helpful way to approach life or reality. But I don't see that it has a superior shot at objective truth. Do you disagree?

Scientific realism typically assumes that the world exists just as science describes it, entirely independently of any subject or perspective. — Wayfarer

In one sense, it does exist just as science describes it -when the science is correct. Granted, the descriptions are in human terms and from a human perspective but what other terms could they be? Do you deny that some scientific propositions are true?

If you simply want everyone to be reminded that our analysis and our language means that science is merely giving a human perspective - that's fine. But a human perspective is the only ones that can be meaningful to humans.

The idealist criticism of scientific realism is that it forgets or overlooks the role of the subject — Wayfarer

I'm not convinced that's entirely true, other than in terms of perspective and the need to express science in terms humans understand. But assuming it is true that the role of the subject is completely ignored, how do you propose correcting this?

intelligibility is grounded in relations among representations. To the extent that things appear to us as structured phenomena, it’s those mental structures that make intelligibility possible. — Wayfarer

Sure, but how is that a problem?

This challenges physicalism, not by denying the success of science, but by questioning the metaphysical leap that treats “the physical” as something with inherent, mind-independent reality. — Wayfarer

Any metaphysical system would do the same- that's the object of the game. Obviously, none can be verified or falsified. Should we abandon the game? My principle reason for defending physicalism is NOT because I'm committed to it. Rather, it's to counter arguments from ignorance that I see others make, based on supposed metaphysical "truths". I also jump in to explain components of it, when I see questions or misunderstandings - that' what prompted my first post in this thread. I don't care if anyons believes it, but if they're going to dismiss it- it should be based on a correct understanding.

Scientific models work because of their predictive and explanatory power—but that success doesn't license the conclusion that the world exists exactly as described in itself, independent of the subject’s contribution to its appearance.

How about Structural Realism?

My issue with your position is that you've only stated negatives- what's wrong with physicalism and/or scientific realism. Do you have something superior in mind? If so, I'm curious how it can be immune from the same problems.

The objection I have to materialist theories of mind is that they attempt to ground intelligibility in the physical domain itself—specifically in neurological processes—without acknowledging that the meaning and coherence we attribute to neural data are not in the data; they are read into it by the observing scientist ('this means that', 'from this, we can infer that....'). In other words, it is the mind that interprets the brain, not the brain that explains the mind. — Wayfarer

Explaining the mind is absolutely physicalism's weakness. Does that necessarily mean physicalism is false?

Yes, the mind is doing all the interpreting- whatever the mind is. Do you have a better account of the mind?

we would like to find a reasonable definition of 'what is physical? — boundless

Here's how I address it:
The natural= That which exists (has existed, or will exist) including ourselves, everything that is causally connected to ourselves through laws of nature, and anything not causally connected (such as alternate universes) that may be inferred to exist, to have existed, or that will exist, through analysis of our universe.

It is postulated that everything that is natural, is physical; justified by parsimony.

Although my definition of "the natural" precludes things existing that we can't infer, I don't preclude the possibility of things existing that we can't possibly infer. But if so, they are unknowable and therefore we're unjustified in believing any specifics beyond the basic ackowledgement that are are possibilities.

One way is to try to explain mathematical and logical truths as 'abstractions' that we derive from particulars. The problem, however, is that mathematics and logic seems to be transcendental, i.e. truths that we have to accept to even construct explanations, models and so on. An explanation, for instance, should be logically consistent. If fundamental reality is, indeed, 'physical' how can we explain the laws of logic in purely physical terms? — boundless

The "laws of logic" are nothing more than a formalized, consistent semantics - for example, the meanings of "if...then...else", "or", "and", "not" - all sharply defined by truth tables.

What does it actually mean to be transcendental? Do transcendental things exist - are they part of the furniture of the world? If so, what's the relation between these existents and the things they are about? What's the relation to the our thoughts? Suppose there were no intelligent minds to grasp them - in what sense do these transcendental objects actually exist?

The very assumption that physical reality might be at least in part intelligible seems to be based on the idea that, indeed, logical and mathematical truths are not contingent and eternal. — boundless

From a physicalist's point of view, if some physical phenomenon is describable with mathematics, it is entirely due to the presence of physical relations among the objects involved in the phenomenon. Example: Newton's formula for the force of gravity is F=G*m1*m2/r^2. This describes a physical relation between an object with mass m1 and an object with mass m2, based on the distance between them. The phenomenon is not contingent on a formula; rather, the formula is descriptive - providing a means of prediction and comparisons to other phenomena. Physical reality (outside of human minds) itself doesn't make predictions and comparisons - it just behaves per laws of nature.

Of course, it turns out that Newton's formula is only valid within specific bounds, and General Relativity is a more accurate description. But is the description eternal? Physicists assume so. Why wouldn't they? There's no empirical evidence that they are NOT, so it's unjustified to assume they're temporary. From time to time, physicists hypothesize that some aspect of a theory may actually not be eternal, and may change over time (consideration of the cosmological constant is an example). Cases like this are based on empirical evidence and/or conflicts between the predictions of theories.

Of course, one might reject the premise that the 'physical world' is at least in part intelligible. But that's hardly a 'physicalism' IMO. It is more likely some kind of radical forms of skepticism (there are more than one) where we have the illusion that 'reality' is intelligible by our reasoning. That it seems like so. But this appearance is a self-deception so to speak and, in fact, the 'ultimate reality' is in fact completely 'beyond knowledge'. — boundless

I suggest that it is justifiable to believe the physical world is at least partly intelligible - justified by the success of science at making predictions. I don't see how anyone could justify being skeptical of this. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind our limitations. The known laws of physics (which I contrast with the ontological laws of nature) may be special cases that apply in the known universe but are contingent upon some symmetry breaking that occurred prior to, or during, the big bang. If so, it's irrelevant to making predictions within our universe.

Personally, I find the problem of 'abstract objects' a very difficult for any physicalist worldview, at least if we mean that 'physicalism' means that 'ultimate reality is physical' in a comprehensible meaning of the term. — boundless

I don't see a problem with abstractions. The "way of abstraction" (see: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/#WayAbst) is a mental exercise associated with pattern recognition. This describes the process by which we isolate our consideration to properties, ignoring all other aspects of the things that have them. The properties don't ACTUALLY exist independently of the things that have them, IMO. And I don't see how one could claim that our abstracting them entails that they exist independently.

I’d suggest that the nature of the electron is itself still an open question — Wayfarer

Regardless, I was just using the traditional understanding of an electron to illustrate the nature of universals: a type of thing, which can exist in multiple instantiations. The "type" is based on the intrinsic properties: multiple, distinct objects can have the same exact property. So irrespective of the true nature of electrons, it's uncontroversial that there exist multiple objects with a specific electric charge.

Right - which is the unique ability of h.sapiens, so far as we can tell, and the ability which underwrites language, maths and science. We can learn the concepts which enable atomic physics and many other things, but those rational abilities are not something explained by science, and certainly not by physics alone. — Wayfarer

I remind you that I'm just explaining what universals are, and defending the reasonableness of the definition. Even if the mind is (wholly or partly) immaterial, I believe Armstrong's model of universals makes sense - and possibly more sense than alternatives.

The -1 charge of a given electron is not “tied” to the universal of negative charge by some cord or hook. Rather, the electron is an instance of a kind, and its negative charge is an instantiation of a universal property. We can only think about this because we already operate with concepts that abstract from particular cases. But the concepts don’t cause or bind the particulars—they are inherent in the intelligible structure. The universal isn’t an entity over here, and the particular over there, waiting to be connected... — Wayfarer

I'm struggling to see a difference between Armstrong's view of a universal and yours. Do you agree that all particulars have properties? And that a property may exist in multiple particulars? It sounds like it.

Rather, the universal is the intelligible content of the particular, grasped by reason. We abstract it in thought, but that doesn’t mean it’s merely mental. It’s real in the particular, just not as a separable object - it is how the object appears to the rational intellect

In another discussion, I believe you said that you agree that there exists a mind independent reality. This implies that, whatever it might be, it is not dependent on intelligibility or reason. Is it that our limitations and failures leads you to believe it is futile to consider the nature of mind-independent reality? That's all Armstrong is doing. In your prior questions, you seemed to be questioning whether or not Armstrong's theory gave an adequate account of universals, and questioned their relation to the related mental objects (our concepts of the universal). Do you now acknowledge that I've addressed those questions?

But if our concept of a universal corresponds to something real, as you say, then that universal must be real in some way that is not identical with any of its particular instances, nor reducible to the act of thinking about it. — Wayfarer

Consider electrons: each of them has a -1 electric charge. This intrinsic property is identical in every instantiated electron. The charge is real, but it doesn't exist independently of the electrons. The -1 charge is a universal. So is electron: every existing electron has identical intrinsic properties. They are distinguished by extrinsic properties - location, which objects they are bound to, etc.

You say the universal “exists in multiple instantiations in the world.” But that only accounts for the instances of a universal—not the universal as such. If triangularity, for example, is just the set of all actual triangular things, then: — Wayfarer

-1 electric charge (a universal) only exists as a property that some objects have. There is no "universal as such" existing in the world.

Strictly speaking, triangles are concepts that don't exist in the world, because they are (conceptually) 2-dimensional. Objects in the world can have triangularity; by that, we're referring to a set of properties (the relations between the sides). There can obviously be 2 or more triangular objects with the same length sides arranged at the same angles.

If Armstrong’s “immanent realism” holds that universals are just shared properties instantiated in the physical world, then it seems to fall short of explaining the universality we actually grasp in thought—where we reason about the form itself, not its tokens. — Wayfarer

I don't understand why you say this. We grasp the properties that objects have, and apply the way of abstraction to consider just the property. Our minds aren't manipulating the actual property that electrons have, it is entertaining ramifications that we learn about- like the fact that electrons will have a repellent force. There is universality if we each hold true concepts of electrons- concepts that we have to learn, and that we may make an error about - if we don't learn all the actual facts correctly.

I recall you’ve previously said that Armstrong doesn’t define universals or laws in purely physical terms. — Wayfarer

Yes, he does. Properties and relations (laws are relations) are physical, but they exist immanently. Properties and relations are generally measurable, so there's no issue with empiricism.

BTW. I looked thru Armstrong's book on universals, and he raises a problem with transcendental universals: how do you account for instantiations of the universal? Is there an ontological relation between the universal and its instantiation? What's the tie? What about the -1 charge of a specific electron: is there something that connects the charge to that electron?

What is a 'mental object' in the first place? — Wayfarer

Concepts/images/qualia - units of thoughts.

Russell: "Thus universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts."
This seems consistent with Armstrong's view of universals: they are sets of properties that exist where they are instantiated - and they can have multiple instantiations.

This doesn't preclude thinking ABOUT them conceptually. The concept is a mental object that corresponds (as in deflationary truth theory) to the universal. The triangle concept in my mind is distinct from the triangle concept in your mind, but both concepts correspond to the universal.

Feser:"A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once."
Yes, mental objects are private and subjective, but so is a concept - but as I said above, there is (or can be) a correspondence between each of our "triangle" concepts and the universal that exists in multiple instantiations in the world.

coherence of reason depends on universal judgements which are not themselves found in the objective world - they're transcendental in nature. But that, due to the overwhelmingly nominalist and empiricist cast of modern thought, their reality cannot be admitted, as to do so undermines the materialism that it erroneously upholds. — Wayfarer

Neither Armstrong nor I, is a nominalist. Universals exist, and we can form concepts that correspond to them. As long as we each have "true" concepts of the universals, we can can share additional knowledge with each other and make the same "universal" judgements. I therefore see no need to assume there's something transcendental.

There are those that assert this? Seems contradictory for some event to be 'existing' and also 'will exist', which seem to be two different contradictory tenses for the same event, relative to the same 'present' event. — noAxioms

There is a set of things that existed in the past, a set of things existing in the present, and a set of things that will exist in the future. The union of these three sets comprise the set of existents. This doesn't preclude tensed facts, but one must be careful with wording.

Contrast this with possible objects we might conceive of. The conception may or not correspond to a member of the set of existents.

From: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schr%C3%B6dinger_equation --

"Conceptually, the Schrödinger equation is the quantum counterpart of Newton's second law in classical mechanics. Given a set of known initial conditions, Newton's second law makes a mathematical prediction as to what path a given physical system will take over time. The Schrödinger equation gives the evolution over time of the wave function, the quantum-mechanical characterization of an isolated physical system. "

The capacity for abstraction is one thing, but the ontological status of what is abstracted - logical laws, symmetries etc - is the point at issue — Wayfarer

The ontological status of a concept is that it is nothing more than a mental "object". You can apply whatever theory of mind you like to that (not just physicalism). I'm arguing that abstract objects are no more than mental objects- irrespective of what mental objects are. The mental objects that are abstractions are descriptions (e.g. detailing some or all the intrinsic properties that might be held by some objects in the world). Some such mental objects will correspond to something that exists - now, in the past, future, or perhaps in an independent universe (if such things exist). Others will correspond to nothing in the world (anywhere/anywhen).

We can also divide these mental objects into subsets: those that are physically possible (which may or may not exist) and those that are physically impossible.

It seems that you're defining as "real" : all the mental objects that are physically possible, irrespective of whether it exists, has existed, or will exist. If that's the extent of it, it's semantics. But I suspect you think it's something more than semantics.

the ability to see via mathematical abstraction is so instrumental in the progress of science itself. — Wayfarer

Sure, but this just suggests that scientists can extrapolate from what they know, to make good guesses as to what sorts of objects may exist. "Sorts of objects"= universals. Either a universal (or physically possible universal) is instantiated or it is not.

The only fallback against that is to try and show that ideas are somehow identical with neural structures — Wayfarer

That's not really necessary. Hebbian learning doesn't entail a structure being created, it entails patterns of neuron firings facilitated by changes to action potentials.

But that's a broader discussion. Let's focus on abstractions for now. I think they're nothing more than mental objects. If you think they are something more than that, then please describe.

And that pure quantum system can be applied to God, right? Or the candidates you were thinking of. — javi2541997

Not sure what you mean. Are you suggesting God could be a quantum system?

The only candidate I had in mind was the hypothesis that the universe is fundamemtally a quantum system. Some refer to this as the "wave function of the universe". But it's just a candidate; my only point is that it's not unreasonable to think a fundamental layer of reality could evolve from an initial state, without an external cause.

A quantum system evolves (from one state to another) in a manner than can be described by a Schroedinger equation. A "pure" state means there are no entanglements (interactions) with anything outside the quantum system.

A (pure state) quantum system evolves without an external cause. It's in the intrinsic nature of the quantum system.

They don't exist, but they're real. That's the point! In the classical vision the rational soul straddles this realm between the phenomenal and the noumenal. It's not an 'unparsimious assumption' but an insight into the nature of a rational mind. — Wayfarer

It sounds like equivocation, or cognitive dissonance.

More evidence of that, is the undeniable fact that man (sorry about the non PC terminology) has the ability to 'peer into the possible' and retrieve from it, many things previously thought impossible. — Wayfarer

The power of abstraction is present irrespective of the metaphysical interpretations we make of the process.

Reality ought also be assigned to certain possibilities, or “potential” realities, that have not yet become “actual.” These potential realities do not exist in spacetime, but nevertheless are “ontological” — Quantum Mysteries Dissolved

This sounds a bit like a presentist who considers as "existing" everything that exists, has existed, or will exist - i.e. a 4-dimensional landscape for identifying existents. We can make predictions about what will exist, but the act of prediction is just an intellectual exercise - epistemoligical. The same seems to apply to the possibilities you reference, but this seems epistemological (educated guesses about possible existents), not ontological.

I do see the utility of having a category for non-actual possibilities, but I don't see how this applies to mathematical abstractions in general. It only seems to apply to abstractions that describe non-actual possible existents- a small subset of all mathematical abstractions.

the philosophical question is whether that assumption is warranted and simply asserting it doesn’t settle it. — Wayfarer

Nothing's settled in metaphysics, but it does seem unparsimonious to consider them part of the furniture of the world.

We don’t derive the idea of “three” from objects; rather, we recognize objects as “three” because we already grasp the concept a priori. In that sense, the number is not a mere feature of things, but something we bring to experience through rational apprehension. (Try explaining 'the concept of prime' to a dog!) — Wayfarer

A priori? That's debatable, but I'll grant that we recognize more stuff vs less stuff, and could probably arrange collections into an order. Once we start counting, we're abstracting- but not until then.

To conceptualize a prime number, we first need to have learned some basics (abstractions).

The fact that 3 + 2 = 5 holds independently of any particular instance—it would be true even if there were no physical groups of five objects anywhere. This suggests that mathematical truths are not dependent on the world, but structure our ability to make sense of it. — Wayfarer

Twoness, threeness (etc) are certainly ontological properties of groups, and there are logical relations between these properties. Is this a truth? Not in my (deflationary) view, because a truth is a proposition. But we can formulate true propostions that correspond to the relations between twoness, threeness etc.

Mathematics is taught (and utilized) in a way that seems to imply platonism, but that doesn't make it so, and I don't think it justifies the belief that it is so. Why make the unparsimonious assumption that they exist?

What makes you think that?

Not specifically, but it seems more plausible that it be something natural than for it to be some sort of complex intelligence with vast knowledge and power that just happens to exist uncaused.

I question Wayfarer's distinguishing between "existing" and "real". As a physicalist (more or less), I'd simply say that abstractions do not exist as independent entities in the world. We apply the "way of abstraction" - by considering several objects with some feature(s) in common, and mentally ignore all the other features. This process enables us to consider properties independently of the objects that possess these properties - even though those properties don't actually have independent existence; rather: they have immanent existence (they exist within objects). Example: we can consider several groups of objects, each of which has 3 members - and from this, we abstract "3". 3 is a property possessed by each of these groups.

This process is the basis of abstraction, but we can also conceptualize higher order abstractions by applying logic and extrapolating. That's the foundation of mathematics (from a physicalist perspective).

In the strictest sense of "knowledge", you can't "know" what is real. However, we do have an innate belief that we are perceiving and interacting with aspects of reality. My question is: why deny this innate belief? One is justified in maintaining a belief that has not been defeated. I can't see how it is justifiable to believe any specific alternatives. The innate belief is pragmatic, and all alternatives are unpragmatic.

Because our innate belief is POSSIBLY false, it might be reasonable to be agnosticism toward the question, but I'm but I'm skeptical that anyone can truly be agnostic toward this - are they going to stop eating because they are agnostic to what they are seemingly doing?

Fossil fuel companies have caused roughly 28 trillion dollars in damages from 1991 to 2020. — Mikie

I read the article you linked. My problem with the analysis that it fails to cast any blame at those who USE fossil fuels.