Until you brought it up, I was not familiar with the term "Negative Fact"*1. But the definition below sounds absurd to me. And I don't know anybody who bases a philosophical conclusion on nothing but the Absence*2 of that thing. — Gnomon

Let me clarify. Let's define fact as: a true proposition. The issue I was alluding to was: what's the truthmaker for the fact? I'm assuming truthmaker theory of truth: a truthmaker is some component of the world that corresponds to the proposition. So I misled by saying there are no negative facts (it depends on whether one has an ontology of facts, or an ontology of things). There are negative facts (propositions), but not negative THINGS.

If one accepts truthmaker theory (as I do), then one is committed to truthmakers that actually exist in the world - something ontological. What things exist in the world that constitute a truthmaker for "unicorns don't exist."? Answer: the set of things that DO exist, a set that lacks unicorns.

To say that "possibility is cheap" disparages the basic assumption of this forum — Gnomon

It shouldn't. It's a phrase that I borrowed from Christian Apologist William Lane Craig, although others also use the phrase (google "possibility is cheap"). It's just a succinct way of saying that bare possibilities (as I previously defined) are too numerous to give any credence to - so something more is needed, as I described.

OK. But do you have a Positive Fact that "_____ does fully account for the nature of consciousness". A Materialist worldview might fill-in the blank with something like "Atomic Theory", or Aristotle's "hyle", instead of "morph", as Positive Facts. Yet, in what sense are these theories or views Factual? Are they proven or verified, or are the only open-ended Possibilities? — Gnomon

Fully account? Certainly not, but I have an account that (AFAIK) accounts for more than the alternatives. I'll describe why I accept this as the closest available approximation of the matter.

I take it as a premise that the external world exists and that we have a functionally accurate perception of it (I justify this as being a a properly basic belief: it's innate, and plausibly a consequence of the evolutionary processes that produced us.This is my epistemic foundation).

Science has developed a large body of knowledge about the external world, through quality epistemic process (hypothesis-testing-falsification-revision). The success of physics, in particular, provides good reason to believe that the observable universe is natural and operates in strict accordance with laws of nature. The question remains: does it account for the mind? At the onset of the investigation, I expect that it should - because we're part of the universe, and there's no evidence of anything else existing that is nonphysical or exempt from laws of nature. Exploring further, we know that mental behavior is dependent on the physical: a healthy brain is needed to operate optimally; trauma, disease, hormones, and drugs affect mental activity. Measureable brain activity has been documented to be associated with a variety of mental activities. These facts establish (at minimum) a strong role for the physical brain in mental processes, and this increases my confidence that my going-in assumption is correct.

Guided by introspection, we investigate further - consider aspects of our minds that (at first glance) seem incompatible with matter/laws of nature. Physicalist theory proposes models that account for the functional and behavioral aspects of mind (beliefs,learning, dispositions, the will, perceptions, "mental" causation...). These models don't prove physicalism, but they show that physicalism is logically possible; by failing to falsify physicalism - my going-in assumption that "the mind" is another part of the physical world, albeit with a special complexity.

And yet, there is an explanatory gap: the "hard problem of consciousness" - the nature of the inner, subjective experience. I'm not sure that this falsifies physicalist theory of mind, but it does cast suspicion. And therefore I'm exploring alternatives - but the alternatives still need to account for the very obvious dependencies on the physical I mentioned. It seems to be that this could most simply be accomplished by supplementing a physicalist account with something more (e.g. some sort of ontological emergence). But no one seems to be going in that direction. Rather, they're suggesting starting from scratch - treating the mind (or thoughts) as something fundamental and (it seems) unexplained.

Note --- I am aware that I experience the world from a personal perspective. But I can only infer, rationally, that you have a similar awareness of the non-self world. — Gnomon

Physicalism provides a very good reason to think we have similar "inner-lives": we have a similar physical construction.

philosophy part is to explain "why" consciousness might emerge from a evolutionary process that coasted along for 99% of Time with no signs of Consciousness until the last .001%. — Gnomon

Life itself seems to be low probability - if it were easy, then those biologists engaged in abiogenesis research would have succeeded long ago. But the universe is old, and vast (there's no upper bound on how big the universe actually is). Can life exist without some degree of consciousness? Maybe not. An amoeba becomes "aware" (in a sense) of the presence of nearby nutrients that it proceeds to approach and consume. This process is explainable in terms of receptors on the surface of an amoeba cell. Multicellular organisms would need to replace the unicellular process in order to survive and I would guess this is the evolutionary track that leads to animal consciousness.

Understood. I'm not familiar with his work. I was just responding to what I inferred from Wayfarer's quote - which (I assume) he provided to make HIS point.

Bertrand Russell "argued that negative facts are necessary to explain why true negative propositions are true"*2. But you seem to be wary of exploring unverified "possibilities" and hypotheses. — Gnomon

Yes he did, but I agree with David Armstrong, that they are superfluous and unparsimonious. The world consists of the things that exist. The truthmaker for a negative proposition is the set of all actual existents. The absence of unicorns from that set is the truthmaker of "unicorns don't exist".

you seem to be wary of exploring unverified "possibilities" and hypotheses. Is that because you can't put a statistical Probability under a microscope, to study its structure? Are you fearful of Uncertainty? — Gnomon

I'm not at all wary of exploring possibilities, and I don't require they be verified (proven). Justification doesn't imply proof. Most of our body of beliefs consist of uncertain facts, and we may have varying levels of certainty. I'm primarily distinguishing propositions that are bare possibilities.

Philosophers often distinguish between different degrees of possibility. A bare possibility sits at the bottom of this hierarchy - it's possible in the most minimal sense, without being plausible, probable, or well-supported. If we applied a numerical probability, it would be infinitesimal.

Example: It's possible the sun will go nova overnight, but I don't take that possibility seriously- so, for all intents and purposes, I'm certain the sun will be there tomorrow, although I acknowledge it's possible in a minimalist sense.

So when, there's a large space of mutually exclusive possibilities, none of which has an iota of support, they are all just bare possibilities. That's what seems to be the case with the negative fact* I'm discussing.

With regard to science: scientists don't explore bare possibilities. They have some reason for exploring some particular possibility - and that means it's more than a bare possibility.

Do you assume, just because my worldview is different from yours, that I am "just making sh*t up". Obviously, you haven't looked at the scientific "justification" --- primarily Quantum Physics & Information Theory --- that I present "for giving it some credibility". — Gnomon

I haven't made that assumption. Rather, I've asked for the justification so I can consider it. The whole point of my discussion with you and @Wayfarer is to hear some justification for treating some specific possibilities (entailed by physicalism's explanatory gap*) as more than a bare possibility. I've been given nothing - and that may be because I haven't been clear on what I'm asking for. I hope I've cleared that up.

______
*

You didn't say which "negative fact" I was using as a quicksand ground from which to "jump to a {unwarranted??} conclusion". — Gnomon

The negative fact that is the topic is: physicalism does not fully account for the nature of consciousness.

Embracing physicalism as an ontological ground* does not entail deferring all questions to science.
— Relativist

That is exactly what David Armstrong and Daniel Dennett do. Where do you differ from them on that score? — Wayfarer

Where did Armstrong say that all questions should be deferred to science? He was a reductionist, and believed that all substance and function was reducible to physics (physical substance and laws), but I don't think he ever suggested the human condition is best analyzed from the bottom up.

Irrespective of what Armstrong or Dennett believed, I believe bottom-up analysis is a practical (if not actual) impossibility- even if reductive physicalism is true. Rather, functional-level analysis is appropriate. Most of the science of Chemistry is practiced at a functional level of chemical bonds between atoms - rather than at the (exceedingly complex) level of quantum mechanics. Biology is best analyzed at the level of functioning organisms. In general, functional truths can be established without needing to consider how, or if, it reduces to quarks.

Similarly, everything about the human condition is best analyzed and contemplated at the "functional" level (an unfortunately cold term for beauty, love, hate, good, evil, wishes, hopes, dreams, fears...). So while we could debate whether or not these things are reducible to quantum field theory, it rarely matters - because we all agree these aspects of humanity are real and worthy of in-depth analysis.

Another point I’ve noticed: that you label a very wide range of philosophies ‘speculative’. You’re inclined to say that, even if physicalism is incomplete, anything other than physicalism is ‘speculative’, simply 'an excuse' to engage in 'wishful thinking'. But isn't it possible that this might be because you’re not willing to entertain any philosophy other than physicalism? That it's a convenient way not to have to engage with anything other than physicalism - label it ‘speculative'? And how is that not also 'wishful thinking'? — Wayfarer

Philosophy necessarily begins with speculation, but a speculation presented to another person is only a bare possibility if there's no additional reason (a justification) to accept it (*edit: I discuss "bare possibility" in my reply to Gnomon, which is below this one). This is a point I've brought up repeatedly: why accept one possibility over another? Re: wishful thinking- it's is a form of bias- not a good reason to accept a possibility, so I'm inclined to dismiss this as a justification to raise a possibility above the status of being "bare".

I try to be consistent with my epistemology. So I consider what's wrong with conspiracy theories: they start with a biased speculation (one that is possible), and then interpret facts on that basis, and treat those interpretations as supporting evidence. Contrary evidence is ignored or rationalized. It is a corrupted version of inference to the best explanation. This is bad epistemology in any context.

In this light, I have argued tha physicalism is a proper inference to the best explanation. 1) it's consistent with all uncontroversial facts of the world; 2) it is parsimonious- it depends on the fewest assumptions. I've brought this up several times- and (contrary to your charge) expressed a willingness to entertain other possibilities. You haven't identified one. You've merely pointed to the negative fact (the explanatory gap in physicalist theory of mind), which does no more than entail a wide space of possibilities. I've said this repeatedly, but you haven't appreciated the significance, which is that possibility alone is useless.

As for the 'unknown immaterial ground' - what if that 'unknown immaterial ground' is simply thought itself? — Wayfarer

Why should I believe that? Why do you believe this to be more than a bare possibility? Thinking is a process - a process that humans engage in. Referring to a "thought" as an object seems like treating a "run" (the process of running) as an object. There's no run unless there's a runner, and there's no thought unless there's a thinker. This is what seems to be the case, so explain how your alternative makes sense.

(Notice also the claim to authority inherent in it becoming 'established scientific doctrine'. The triumphal flourish: 'It's true, because science says it is!') — Wayfarer

Facts established by science have strong epistemological support. It BEGINS as a speculation- an inference to best explanation (in the opinion of the formulator) of empirical evidence. But then It has been subjected to verification testing, sometimes falsified and revised. So why shouldn't more credence be given to established science than (say) the untestable speculation that thoughts are objects? I don't see any reason for your negativity on his (conditional) comment. It might make more sense to be skeptical of his optimistic forecast that this will occur.

This is not speculative but analytic: naturalism and physicalism ignore the foundational, disclosive role of consciousness at the basis of scientific theorising. — Wayfarer

Physicalism doesn't START with the role of consciousness, but it doesn't ignore it. It accounts for consciousness, even if imperfectly.

In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all knowledge, all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all
...

Nothing in the quote constitutes an explanation of what conscious acts are. Asserting consciousness is foundational explains nothing. Rather, it's an assertion that its existence is brute fact

Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place.

I'll rephrase this to: consciousness is precisely the reason why we would perceive a world, and why we perceive it as we do. If that's what he meant, it's tautologically true - because our perceptions, our rationality and our capacity to understand are aspects of our consciousness.

"the world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness...." The world itself is unaffected by our knowledge of it. Knowledge entails meaning; the capacity for knowledge is an aspect of our consciousness.

The world is inconceivable apart from consciousness...because conceiving is something that conscious minds DO, and that's all it is.

consciousness’s foundational, disclosive role... foundational to knowledge not to reality itself.

Since consciousness is presupposed in all science and knowledge, then the proper approach to the study of consciousness itself must be a transcendental one
The case has been made that consciousness is foundational to knowledge, but that doesn't seem paticularly inciteful for the reasons I described.

It seems that Husserl's theory takes consciousness for granted, just as physicalism does. He suggests that consciousness is unanalyzable - a brute fact. That's not explaining anything. Physicalism (in conjunction with neuroscience) attempts to analyze consciousness and explain it. You focus on the gap in that explanation, while implying Husserl's theory is a worthy competitor (or perhaps you think it superior) in spite of it explaining nothing. Rather, it raises even more questions that it can't answer.

If Consciousness was entirely physical*1, there would be no need for Philosophy — Gnomon

That would only be true if we had perfect and complete knowledge of how to reduce everything to fundamental physics, and the capacity to compute human behavior on this basis.

Science has encountered aspects of reality that are "not entirely physical", and can only be analyzed mathematically (mentally ; rationally ; theoretically ; philosophically). — Gnomon

Modern physicalism has no problen dealing with the things you refer to as "not entirely physical". For example, energy is a property that things have. Properties are not objects, per say, but they are aspects of the way physical things are.

Therefore, the need to treat Consciousness, not as a "negative fact", but as more like an invisible Force, or causal Energy, or space-time Field, should come as no surprise. I won't go further in this post. But my thesis & blog treat Consciousness and Life as philosophical subjects, not scientific objects of study. — Gnomon

The negative fact I referred to is "not (entirely) physical." I simply disagree with jumping to any conclusion based solely on this negative fact. Negative facts only entail possibilities - a wealth of them. If you wish to create some hypothetical framework, that's your business, but I won't find it compelling without some justification for giving it some credibility.

I have repeatedly pointed out that that this negative fact explains nothing. It opens up possibilities, but possibility is cheap.
— Relativist

And I have repeatedly pointed out that in this ‘explanatory gap’ dwells the very self that is seeking to understand. — Wayfarer

But "the self" is a mystery before we consider its grounding and a mystery even after we acknowledge there's something immaterial.

deferring every question to science only perpetuates the ignoring of that. — Wayfarer

Embracing physicalism as an ontological ground* does not entail deferring all questions to science. Your objection would be apt for Stephen Hawking, not for me.

* even if that ground includes some unknown immaterial aspect.

To label philosophical spirituality as “wishful thinking” is to close off inquiry too quickly. These aren’t arbitrary insertions into an explanatory gap—they’re attempts to interpret the nature of that gap itself. — Wayfarer

I did not suggest closing off inquiry. Rather, I value truth-seeking, and truth-seeking requires objectivity. Wishful thinking about an afterlife is seductive, not an objective path to truth.

If you agree that methodological naturalism is the appropriate paradigm for the advance of science, where should the negative fact enter into my metaphysical musings?
— Relativist

Methodological naturalism isn’t metaphysical naturalism, which is the attempt to apply the methods of science to the questions of philosophy. That is basically all that Chalmer’s ‘facing up to the problem of consciousness’ is saying: that the physical sciences must by design exclude a fundamental dimension of existence - the nature of being. — Wayfarer

I chose my words carefully, and am highlighting the fact that the "problem of consciousness" only entails the negative fact: consciousness is not entirely physical. I have repeatedly pointed out that that this negative fact explains nothing. It opens up possibilities, but possibility is cheap.

You're quite right that dualism has its own explanatory gaps—especially regarding mind-body interaction. But physicalism's own explanatory impasse around consciousness, intentionality, and meaning suggests that we shouldn't treat it as the default view merely because it's scientifically adjacent. — Wayfarer

Why ISN'T it the appropriate default view for me? Physicalism is consistent with much of mental activity and it explains a lot. You repeatedly point out (and I have accepted) that it can't be the whole truth, but you haven't proposed what more complete truth I ought to embrace. Pointing to the wide space of possibilities, that is entailed by the negative fact, is neither informative nor useful to me. You said "remain open". I am open to differences of opinion. I won't argue "you're wrong because it's contrary to physicalist dogma". I'm not trying to convince anyone to change their view, I'm just trying to decide whether or not I should change mine. Highlighting the negative fact, and the space of possibilities it opens, doesn't give me a reason to change my view of treating a physicalist account (of anything) as the appropriate default for a reductive account. I remind you, this is not some act of faith - it is just the framework I base my philosophical analyses on, and I don't apply it to human behavior or aesthetics.

...So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained. Further, since the mental arises through the development of animal organisms, the nature of those organisms cannot be fully understood through the physical sciences alone...

I have never denied that. Hurricanes.

I think any philosophy that declares a fortiori that the world is irrational unintelligible effectively undermines itself. If reality is, at bottom, unintelligible, — Wayfarer

I disagree, and that's because it is not the WORLD that is rational (or not), it is people.

As for quantum theory, it may well be telling us something not just about particles, but about the limits of a purely material ontology. — Wayfarer

It's not telling us anything other than that there's a set of possibilities, none of which would be inconsistent with materialism (by definition).

the inability of physicalism to account for subjective consciousness—suggests that a purely physical description of the human is incomplete. — Wayfarer

Sure, but that doesn't give epistemic license to fill the gap arbitrarily or with wishful thinking.

if that assumption is undermined, then other domains of explanation become conceptually possible. That doesn’t prove dualism, or an afterlife, or any religious doctrine—but it opens space for something beyond the materialist frame. — Wayfarer

Yes, but it's a wide space of possibility. As I previously said, we've only (at best) established a negative fact.

We cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door." Whether or not one believes in a deity, that phrase betrays the anxiety that if materialism is not all-encompassing, then the coherence of the whole system is threatened. — Wayfarer

I can only give my personal reaction. We've only "established" (too strong, but it will do) that there is some immaterial aspect of mind. I see no relevant entailments - propositions that I should accept because of it. Perhaps it would be relevant to a nihilist.

Remember my hurricane analogy? We don't examine and predict their activities based on quantum field theory. Similarly, we shouldn't examine human behavior or aesthetics in terms of reductive physicalism - even if reductive physicalism is true. So if it's false, with respect to "the mind" - it has no bearing on how I view things. It's just a metaphysical technicality.

The attribution of the anthropic principle to a selection effect ("We find the universe fine-tuned because only in a fine-tuned universe could we find ourselves") is logically valid but explanatorily inert - it says nothing but only reaffirms the taken-for-granted nature of existence. — Wayfarer

It's a falsification of invalid reasoning. The question ostensibly answered by this invalid reasoning reflects a contrivance, not a conundrum requiring explanation.

the anxiety that if materialism is not all-encompassing, then the coherence of the whole system is threatened.

So we’re not dealing with a dispassionate assessment of evidence, but with a boundary-defining metaphysical commitment. — Wayfarer

Even religious scientists employ methodological naturalism in their investigations. There is no alternative that bears practical fruit. Consider the work of "creation science" ' which makes virtually no contribution to our understanding of the world. It's mission is to rationalize empirical data to dogma. If you agree that methodological naturalism is the appropriate paradigm for the advance of science, where should the negative fact enter into my metaphysical musings?

How should I revise my personal views on the (meta)nature of mind? Alternatives to physicalism also have explanatory gaps (e.g. the mind-body interaction problem of dualism).

basic assumption of both science and philosophy: that the world is in some sense rational, — Wayfarer

IMO, that's an unwarranted assumption. We can makes sense of the portions of reality we perceive and infer. That is not necessarily the whole of reality. I also argue that quantum mechanics isn't wholly intelligible. Rather, we grasp at it. Consider interpretations: every one of them is possible- what are we to do with that fact? I'm not a proponent of the Many-Worlds interpretation, but it's possibly true- and if so, it has significant metaphysical implications- more specific implications than the negative fact we're discussing.

whether, as Monod would have it, we are the products of blind chance and cosmic indifference. — Wayfarer

There's a fundamental problem with the thesis that our minds should be considered the product of design: it depends on the premise that there exists an uncaused mind that can do designs. That's a considerably more drastic assumption than the gradual, chance development of rational beings over billions of years in a vast universe.

we find ourselves in a position where naturalism must accept that the universe is, at bottom, irrational—that reason is something we impose or invent for pragmatic survival, but that it has no intrinsic connection to the order of things. On this view, reason isn’t a window into the real, but a useful illusion—evolution’s trick to keep the organism alive. And yet, it’s this very reason we’re asked to trust when making that judgment. — Wayfarer

I disagree. "Rational" applies to minds, not to the world at large. We apply our rationality in attempting to understand the world. Intelligibility may be what you're alluding to. There may be uinintelligibility underneath the layers we can understand, but that possibility needn't deter us from striving to understand what we can. We can never know the stuff that's beyond our ability to measure and theorize; we can't even know anything IS beyond these abilities. Here's where I apply parsimony and pragmatism: there's no epistemic basis to assume such things exist, so it's more parsimonious to assume it does not, and the (mere) possibility has no pragmatic significance.

You seem to have smuggled in the word assumption there.
How can it be deemed unjustified if we don’t know if there are ways to go around, or unlock the veils, or not. Or what, or where the veils are? Surely there is justification to enquire, whilst under the realisation that we have reached the limit of empirical enquiry. — Punshhh

Rational belief is justified belief- i.e.having reasons to believe some proposition is true. "X is possible" is not a justification to believe X rather than ~X. Possibilities are endless.

Warrant=justification.

I'm fine with using intuition to develop and justify belief, but it IS subjective. I don't have any problem with anyone following their own intuitions. I also follow mine. I also ask myself: why do I believe this? Intuition plays a role, but IMO we should also be self-critical.

I apologize if I sound like I'm criticizing you or anyone else. I'm actually just exercising some self-criticism to understand if there is something that I should be taking into account that I have been overlooking? Hearing different point of views is interesting.

Do these pragmatic examples of Causal Conceptual Power (practical magic?) have any "impact" on your overall worldview? — Gnomon

No. I acknowledge everything you said about the impact of mind on the world, but it's independent of the (meta)physical nature of mind. The world we interact with (through human action and interaction) is best understood through things like social sciences, and not through quantum field theory. This is true even if reductive physicalism is 100% correct. The possibility of mind having some immaterial aspects also doesn't seem to have any bearing - it's still just a different sort of reduction.

If there's a
possibility that oneself is something other than physical, then there is also a possibility that it is not subject to the same fate as everything physical - which is change and decay. — Wayfarer

I'm conceding there may be some non-physical aspect of mind, because of the explanatory gap that materialism has regarding consciousness. For purposes of this discussion, I'll treat that as a fact. My question continues to be: what does this fact plausibly entail, or at least strongly suggest? It's true that an afterlife entails some sort of immaterial existence, but it's fallaciously affirming the consequent to conclude that the presence of immateriality implies or suggests an afterlife.

The anthropic principle identifies the trivial fact that rational beings would necessarily find themselves in a world that is conducive to their existence. The "structural coherence" in the universe is most simply explained by the existence of laws of nature. The alleged "fine-tuning" is nothing more than an acknowledgement that our existence would have been improbable (a priori).

"Fine tuning arguments" depend on the unstated (egocentric) assumption that life is a design objective, rather than an improbable consequence of the way the world happens to be.

The hope is that we are more than our bodies. The fear is that, if we are, that doesn’t necessarily guarantee a comforting outcome. The eschatological traditions warn us that post-mortem destiny might be varied and not always (n fact, mostly not) pleasant. — Wayfarer

Wishful thinking is a poor guide to truth. It also seems to me this overlooks what we DO know from science: the "mind's" dependency on the physical. Memories are lost due to disease, aging, and trauma. Personality can even be altered from trauma and disease- such that one's preferences, tastes, and even addictions can change. This constitutes stronger evidence of a physical dependency than the indirect inference of immateriality inferred from an explanatory gap around the nature of consciousness. Memories and personality are essential to who we are (IMO). So what, if some immaterial kernal of me lives on, if it lacks my memories, and my passions.

I put zero stock in religious traditions. The promise of an afterlife is emotionally compelling, but it's fundamentally wishful thinking.

Whether or not one believes, I think it's at least worth recognizing that this line of thought is logically valid and not reducible to mere “God of the gaps” reasoning — Wayfarer

It's not "God of the Gaps", per se, but it seems much like conspiracy theory reasoning. These develop through a corrupted "Inference to Best Explanation" (IBE). IBE is a rational basis for justifying beliefs, but only if it's applied correctly: considering all relevant evidence (conspiracy theorists only consider the evidence consistent with their "inference") and entertaining alternatives. The evidence that mind has a strong physical dependency is strong, and this flies in the face of a relevant afterlife. The explanatory gap in a materialist account of mind can be filled with something considerably simpler than intelligent design and heaven.

Mysticism got there a while back. They realised that mental enquiry alone is blind, there are natural veils in our and the world’s make up, which prevent progress in that direction. That if progress is to be made it requires other avenues of inquiry, to bypass, or see around those veils. — Punshhh

This depends on the unjustified assumption that we actually have the capacity to see around those veils, and it places unwarranted trust in one's intuitions.

we really don’t know anything, this is not to say we are unable know it. It might be veiled from us. — Punshhh

I agree 100%. All we can do is to try and peek back layers of the onion, but sooner or later we'll get to a point beyond which there can be empirical verification, and this would limit our ability to explore even deeper. We may already be there, in some areas.

Thank you for your thoughtful reply, but my question is a bit different. My question, "why take a hypothetical possibility seriously?" was intended to ascertain how you justify believing it as more than a mere possibility. In particular: do you actually believe this to be the case? If so, there must be some justification for the belief. Even if you don't actually believe it, you do seem to give it a level of credibility sufficiently high that you'd bring it up - so you must see something that makes it stand out from the rest.

Related to this: you seem to be treating the current state of scientific knowledge regarding the origin of the big bang as a jumping off point to your hypothesis about causally efficacious mind. How is this not an argument from ignorance? As mentioned, there are various cosmological hypotheses - these are among the possibilities that you are setting aside in favor of you mind-hypothesis.

Regarding the sentiments you shared in your thoughtful post, I share some semblance of this "feeling at one" with the universe, but in my case, I get it by honing my overall world-view. I've embraced physicalism for 10-15 years, because it's consistent with everything we know, with one possible exception: the nature of mind. The question I'm trying to sort out is: what impact does this alleged immateriality of mind have on my overall world view? It doesn't seem to undermine anything, except for the simple (possible) fact that there exists something immaterial. This is why I'm peppering you with questions - I'm not trying to argue you're wrong, I'm just look for things that I ought to take into account.

But there might not be an absolute answer to why it exists. I argue that any attempt to account for the existence of something rather than nothing must ultimately bottom out in a set of brute facts; the universe simply is, without ultimate cause or explanation."
This is just speculation, all we know is that we don’t know and any speculation we do indulge in will be tainted by anthropomorphism. Where the anthropomorphism refers to the the human mind and its contents. Also that the answers we seek may be inconceivable to the human mind, or unintelligible. — Punshhh

This is not speculation, it's inference that there is an ontological foundation to reality. The alternative is an unexplainable infinite series of causes and an infinite series of composition.

It's not much different from the Leibniz cosmological argument - which concludes the ontological foundation is something that exists necessarily. Carroll doesn't accept anything as existing necessarily (although I do).

Of course, metaphysical foundationalism is not necessarily true. But it seems to me that there's more reason to believe this than not.

Regarding intelligibility: I agree the actual ontological foundation may be unintelligible - but that has no bearing on the logic that concludes simply that there IS a foundation. (If we deny logic, this undercuts reason - making it self-defeating.)

There is no way no-thing could cause something. — AmadeusD

The point is that if ever there was no-thing (noting the problem using "was" here) and then some-thing, that's all we need. There is no claim to causality in that, at all. It's an open question of 'how', or whatever. — AmadeusD

We agree there could be no causal relation, but I further argue that it is incoherent to consider a world (the entirety of reality) to include a "nothingness". IOW: there is no logically possible world that includes both nothingness and an existing thing. The presence of an existing thing entails somethingness. Maybe that's what you mean here:

This is bizarre. If no-things is logically possible, then that's the end of that. Our world wouldn't have been involved and I don't posit (and I don't take others) to posit that it is. — AmadeusD

But I can't make sense of this:

The point is that if ever there was no-thing (noting the problem using "was" here) and then some-thing, that's all we need. There is no claim to causality in that, at all. It's an open question of 'how', or whatever. — AmadeusD

This seems to treat no-thing as a thing, a reification. Conceptually, no-thing is an absence of things. It's not even an empty container, because a container is a thing. If there is some-thing, then nothingness does not obtain.

There is no way no-thing could cause something. That's actually where the mystery lies in considering this issue. — AmadeusD

I don't consider it a mystery, because of the entailments I discussed. Rather, it's easy to lose one's way when discussing the concept of nothingness. Because we have a name for it, it's tempting to treat it as a thing; this error leads to apparrent contradictions.

Then you misunderstand. "The world" is the entirety of reality, which would include the supernatural, if it exists.
— Relativist
That statement depends on how you define "reality". Your comments seem to indicate that your "reality" excludes anything beyond the scope or our physical senses. — Gnomon

No. I am referring to everything that exists, including a supernatural (if one exists), or anything else that might exist - including minds, even if they are immaterial things.

the theoretical pre-big-bang First Cause that you would call "supernatural", is in my own speculative worldview, analogous to the Physical Energy and Metaphysical Mind that we experience in the Real world. — Gnomon

Your speculation seems a mere hypothetical possibility. Why take it seriously?

If it is true, how does it impact you? Do you use this hypothesis to explain other things?
Suppose cosmologists develop a testable theory that accounts for the conditions at the big bang? Would you abandon your hypothesis, or revise it?

My view: it's possible that mental activity involves something nonphysical. It's clearly not entirely nonphysical because mental capabilities are impacted by trauma and disease. If there is something immaterial, I see no use for the information because it explains nothing else about the world. I'm open to criticism and suggestions

We're discussing whether "nothing" could have ever obtained. And it could have. — AmadeusD

Absolute nothingness is conceivable and it is logically possible, but it is metaphysically impossible in a world in which things exist.

. I posited that initiation implies something prior. That 'something' is obviously capable of be no-thing — AmadeusD

IMO, time initiated FROM the initial state of affairs. So that state of affairs had the potential to do so, and it is the cause of time/change. But it's not at all clear what time IS, so deeper analysis is on shaky grounds. Anyway, that's my position, and I can't make sense of you claim that "no-thing" could have caused anything.

Are causes not states of affairs? — AmadeusD

Yes, IMO, causes are states of affairs. Also: everything that exists is a thing = a particular with properties= a state of affairs. So the notion that "no-thing" could be a cause makes no sense to me. But you must mean something else.

so you share my position. — AmadeusD

Maybe. I believe there's a better reason to think the past is finite than infinite, but lots of smart people disagree with me.

Cosmology has not concluded our world is dependent on anything. However, cosmologists are working on theory that explains the big bang, in terms of what the prior state was.
— Relativist
You sound confident about the independence of our world — Gnomon

Then you misunderstand. "The world" is the entirety of reality, which would include the supernatural, if it exists. If there exists a supernatural, then it might possibly have caused the natural world, but the broader landscape exists uncaused and without dependencies.

Now suppose there is no supernatural. The same logic applies: it would exist uncaused and without dependency. In either case, the world (the totality of reality) exists without cause or dependency.

Speaking of knowledge, what is the "exact nature" of that prior state, and what is the evidence for it? — Gnomon

We don't know it's exact nature, but it seems to me there's no reason to think it is supernatural, because there is no evidence of a supernatural existing.

Would you agree that the First Law of Thermodynamics implies that the Bang began with an unexplained input of Energy from that mysterious timeless prior state? Can you accept that the Multiverse conjecture is a myth, not a scientific fact? — Gnomon

The origin of the energy is unknown, although some cosmologists have speculated. What I object to is jumping to conclusions - as you seem to have done.

The multiverse hypothesis is not a myth. It's a mathematical inference of an assortment of scientific hypotheses. Nevertheless, it's certainly not settled science, and I would never insist it is necessarily true.

Would you agree that Cosmologists like Sean Carroll*3, when faced with speculating into a state where laws of nature break down, are doing Philosophy instead of Science? — Gnomon

That's often true, but there is also scientific work in progress to develop new theory. At this stage, I'm fine with treating all pre-big bang musings as metaphysical.

Before the Big Bang, the prevailing theory suggests a state of initial singularity.., — Gnomon

The "singularity" has never been considered a literal state of affairs. It just refers to the mathematical consequence of General Relativity as we calculate the density of the universe retrospectively, closer and closer to a radius of 0 (for the visible universe). The consensus of cosmologists is this mathematical singularity implies that General Realtivity isn't applicable, and that instead a quantum gravity theory is needed to understand the dynamics dominate below some density- but this goes beyond established physics.

The universe materialized literally out of nothing — Gnomon

No, that's logically impossible. Nothingness cannot beget somethingness. Nothingness is not even a logically possible state of affairs. If God created the universe, it could have been from a PHYSICAL nothingness, but not an absolute nothingness - because God himself is something. But this is pure speculation, one that assumes there exists a supernatural.

Carroll's notion of creation in time deliberately ignores the traditional creation ex nihilo, since it does not fit with his materialistic worldview. And yet, he slipped-up with the "literally out of nothing" description. — Gnomon

He has also discussed what is meant by nothingness - and noted that there are ambiguities. Laurence Krauss wrote a book about "something from nothing", but he took the existence of quantum fields for granted- so he wasn't considering an absolute nothingness. The author of the article you linked to seems to be unaware of the nuances. Sean Carroll does. In this article, he describes his view:


"It seems natural to ask why the universe exists at all. Modern physics suggests that the universe can exist all by itself as a self-contained system, without anything external to create or sustain it. But there might not be an absolute answer to why it exists. I argue that any attempt to account for the existence of something rather than nothing must ultimately bottom out in a set of brute facts; the universe simply is, without ultimate cause or explanation."

If there was an initial state of affairs, there must have been 'something' from which it was initiated. — AmadeusD

Non-sequitur. If it was initiated, then it wasn't the initial state of affairs.

Either there was an initial state of affairs, or there's an infinite series of causes.

None of the takes trying to avoid the inference of non-existence actually work. — AmadeusD

What does this mean? A state of affairs entails existence. A state of affairs consisting of non-existence is a self-contradictory term.

Something infers nothing. Yes? Yes.
Being infers non-being. Yes? There are things which aren't, outside of the list of things which are. So, Yes. — AmadeusD

Only semantically. We can refer to things that are in or out, but existence = what IS, not what isn't. We can talk about the infinitely many hypothetical things that aren't in, but these absences are not ontological.

Now, can we access them? NO! lol. That is probably why people want to make statements such as yours and Banno's. There is nothing to say, other than to observe the inference. [/quotep
The inference is semantic, not ontological. We're discussing ontology- what exists, and what can be inferred to exist. When we say unicorns don't exist, "unicorn" refers only to a concept- a mental object. It doesn't refer to anything ontological (other than the mental object).

The idea that there has "always been" is just as disconcerting (and unsupported, in the sense outlined above) as that "something always was". Even the use of temporal terms infers something other than the claim.

I don't understand what you consider disconcerting. We can entertain possibilities. Either the past is finite, or it is infinite. There's no in-between. Each has implications that we can consider. An infinite past implies an infinite chain of causes. Is that actually possible? Some people think so, but it seems to imply that infinitely many, finite duration. time periods have been traversed. That's impossible. Consider the future: we traverse it one day at a time; evey new day will be a finite number of days from today- there is no point at which infinity is reached. Future infinity just implies an unending process. Contrast this with the past: the past is completed. This implies an infinity of time periods has been completed. This seems impossible, but I'm not arguing I'm right, I'm just highlighting the possibilities and also explaining why I believe the pastvis finite.

Any conception of a finite past implies an initial state. An initial state cannot have been caused, because that would imply a prior cause.

If a God exists, an initial state of affairs could consist of an uncaused God (and nothing else) - who subsequently created the universe. If no gods exist, there would still be an initial state - something with the potential to subsequently develop one or more universes.

That there are things which "be". That implies non-being and so the question (i.e the question why there is something) is entirely apt. — AmadeusD

I see no such implication. Walk me through it, and do so without treating existence as a property.

Do you not find it mysterious how non-being eventually turned into being? — kindred

What I find mysterious is that anyone would think that there was a prior state of non-being / nonexistence.

What exists today is a consequence of what existed before. Either there is an infinite series of begettings, or there was an initial state of affairs.

LFW or compatibilism are not presupposed — A Christian Philosophy

You had asked me:

Which step in the process is the initial step? — A Christian Philosophy

Why did you ask this, if you don't believe there is an initial step even if LFW is true? What's the relevance?

I've been attempting to get you to examine the mental processes involved in a decision, and to see that this analysis would not yield an answer to the question of whether the process is deterministic.

Irrespective of whether or not we have LFW, I raised my arm because I wanted to.

Irrespective of whether or not we have LFW, my wants were influenced by my history of experiences.

Irrespective of whether or not we have LFW, my unique genetic material led to the unique structure of my central nervous system, and this influences the way I think and thus, the choices I make.

The only real difference is that LFW depends on the assumption that there is some factor present that is outside the natural, deterministic causal chain. No objective analysis can show that this is the case.

Except that modern cosmology forces us to deal with the necessity of a transcendent Cause to explain the Big Bang — Gnomon

No, it doesn't.

Since secular cosmology has concluded that our world is not self-existent --- as Spinoza assumed --- would you agree that "how & why it came into existence" is a reasonable philosophical question? — Gnomon

Cosmology has not concluded our world is dependent on anything. However, cosmologists are working on theory that explains the big bang, in terms of what the prior state was.

I thought we were setting aside any mentions of LFW/compatibilism — A Christian Philosophy

I mentioned it only to remind you that we're establishing a scenario that does not presuppose either LFW or compatibilism. You had said, "I still see no distinction in any of the steps to make one of them the initial step."

Are you thinking there's a first step if LFW is true, but not if compatibilism is true? Or are you saying there's no first step, regardless of which is true? If the former, then you're off the track of establishing common ground. The common-ground scenario is intended to describe how things SEEM to us, so we can then analyze more deeply. We need to do that before we jump into comparing a LFW account vs a Compatilist account of the scenario.

Regarding your assertion that there is no agency if compatibilism is true, this displays a misunderstanding. I'm hoping this becomes clear after we establish some common ground and then hone in on what is the same and what is different. In the meantime, I suggest reading the Compatibilism article, in the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Throughout the article, there's discussion of what an "agent" does. The issue it discusses is whether or not the agent can be said to be freely willing his actions. The fact that there is agency is not at issue.

I still see no distinction in any of the steps to make one of them the initial step. — A Christian Philosophy

So...even if LFW is true, there was no initial step?

It seems to me, the natural thing to label as the first step is the decision, which was produced entirely by my mind.

There were external influences, such as the discussion we're having, but no one else demanded, encouraged, or even suggested I raise my arm at that time.

My decision, (and only my decision) was the direct cause of the arm lifting.

My thought processes (and only my thought processes), was the direct cause of the decision.

Necessitated? You forget that we're trying to establish a common ground scenario, in terms of what we perceive to be happening. I indeed made a decision (this entailed a mental process) at 3:25. The fact that I made the decision is important, because without that - I wouldn't have lifted my arm. Again, set aside LFW/compatibilism and tell me if this sounds right.

3:25PM- I read your response and made the decision to lift my arm at 3:35 PM.

Did you have something else in mind? Remember, this is independent of LFW/compatibilism.

I don't understand your issue. I established the intent, and I acted upon it- which implies I caused my brain to fire the sequence of neurons that stimulated the nerves that trigger the muscles. Obviously, we aren't consciously aware of the neuron activity, but clearly that is happening.

I'll just point out that the arm-lifting was caused by my intent. Therefore the arm-lifting was an intentional act. Acting with intent implies agency.

That's fine, we can say the firing of neurons causes the arm to lift (by sending electrochemical signals to the nerves that activate the muscles).

I omitted one important thing: this neuron firing had an antecedent in the mind.

At 3:25 I had made the decision to lift when the alarm went off. This established a mental intent (to lift when the alarm sounds) that was dormant until triggered by the alarm going off. No conscious thoughts took place between the 3:25 decision and the arm lifting. So there was a direct causal link between this intent and the arm lifting.

OK.


3:25PM- I read your response and made the decision to lift my arm at 3:35 PM. I set an alarm on my phone to notify me the time has been reached.

3:35PM- The alarm is ringing, so I lift my arm.

Some small period of time occurred between the alarm going off and the arm lifting. During this time, my brain unconsciously processed and interpreted the sound - and the fact became part of my conscious awareness. But without giving it further thought, I lift my arm once I realize the alarm is sounding.

We know the arm-lifting action is initiated by the firing of neurons, which stimulate nerves in my arm that cause the muscle to contract.
__________
Is there anything I left out of the process that you think is important? Is there any part of this you disagree with?

As I said in my earlier post, I'm suspicious of using this explanatory gap as an excuse to believe in some sort of spiritualism.
If you remove the word believe from that sentence and replace it with the word consider the word excuse loses it’s relevance. — Punshhh

Why consider any specific spiritual account? I can acknowledge it's possible, but the possibilities are endless, so what's the point?

It's like considering what other forms of life that may exist elsewhere in the the universe, choosing one specific, hypothetical form and then drawing conclusions about the nature of aliens. Indeed, it's possible that there exist Tralfamadorians, who communicate through tap-dancing and farts, but a bare possibility like this has no practical significance to me.

IOW, something more than mere possibility is needed to make it worth giving any serious consideration to.

moral evil is not compatible with determinism. — A Christian Philosophy

You must be making some unstated assumption about the nature of morals. The presence of moral intuitions is perfectly consistent with determinism (and materialism).

moral evil is not compatible with determinism.

Yes, I read all your posts. I don't comment on every line because that would take too long, but in general, my view is that adding more determined factors to the explanation does not resolve the issue. — A Christian Philosophy

You misunderstand. I was giving you a GENERAL account of the mental process we all go through IRRESPECTIVE of whether or not LFW is true. Those factors all apply (beliefs, dispositions, moods...). This should be common ground -I see no reason why you shouldn't accept everything I said.

You forgot your original point of this topic. — A Christian Philosophy

My original point was that ontological contingency needs to be accounted for ontologically:
If A accounts for B:
then B is contingent iff A could have account for ~B AND this means A is a "source of contingency"
Otherwise A necessitates B

A second point I made very early is that there doesn't seem to be any sources of contingency in the world except for (possibly) quantum indeterminacy. I believe you agreed, although you deny that QM is indeterministic. So why should we believe minds are a source of contingency - an anomaly? You've given no justification for this.

The OG's actions cannot be determined from prior causes, being the first cause. So if its actions are also not free, then what are they? — A Christian Philosophy

Best guess is that it would be a quantum system, so the actions that ensue would be the product of quantum indeterminacy. What that implies is dependent on the actual nature of QM - i.e. which interpretation is correct \

I will assume determinism and not LFW. — A Christian Philosophy

You are missing the point! Make no assumption at all, and just explain what seems to be going in in your mind. We ought to be able to agree on what seems to be going on. The question then becomes: how do we explain this sequence of events with LFW vs compatibilism?

This is the same problem in your description of making a decision: you aren't describing observed behavior; you jump straight to a LFW account and then compare it to some strawman distortion that you claim is compatibilist. This is why you get nowhere: you establish no common ground, and just claim your LFW account is better than your strawman-compatibilist account. I tried to establish common ground with my detailed description of the decision process, and you mistakenly treated this as some compatibilist alternative.

:up:

It does see that way. I'm fine with acknowledging that materialism may not have all the right answers, but no alternatives seem any better - even in the murky area of the mind. As I said in my earlier post, I'm suspicious of using this explanatory gap as an excuse to believe in some sort of spiritualism.

physicalism relies on an abstraction. It then becomes so embedded in that worldview that it can’t see anything outside it, which is precisely the blind spot of physicalism. — Wayfarer

Physicalism is indeed embedded in my worldview. What truths does this blind me to? The only obvious implication is that there may be some non-physical aspects of reality. It provides no clue as to what they may be - what truths it leads me to ignore.

As I explained, I embrace physicalism because (AFAIK) it's the best general answer to the nature of reality. I don't have some undying faith in it, and I know it has its limitations. But I treat it pragmatically as the premise when analyzing everything in the world, and this includes consideration of mental activity. Even if I grant that there are aspects of the mind that are intractable to a materialist paradigm, I see no means of applying this information to any philosophical analysis - because, as I said, it's just a negative fact - and doesn't give me any useful information that I should consider. It just tells me that a materialist analysis doesn't necessarily give a correct answer, but provides no clue to a better answer.

which is as I said. — Wayfarer

No, it isn't. You said this is what Plantinga was saying: "if all mental life—including reason—is understood solely in terms of material and efficient causes, then we’ve undermined the very basis on which we make rational inferences."

My objection to HIS ARGUMENT stands.

I've spelled it out in depth and detail. To recap: physics is based on a useful abstraction, which has yielded enormous physical powers, but at the expense of excluding fundamental aspects of human existence. — Wayfarer

Then explain what you meant by this:

life and consciousness are not anomalies to be explained away—they’re clues to what physicalist ontology has left out. — Wayfarer

Life seems anomolous to me, because it's a very rare, and miniscule part of the universe. What facts am I overlooking?

Elaborate on these "clues". What conclusions do you think I should draw from this? How should it influence my philosophical analysis? Does this somehow entail teleology? The problem (IMO) is that it's a negative fact (what consciousness is NOT), rather than a positive fact that has broader relevance.

What I'm suspicious of is using it as an excuse to embrace some spirituality paradigm. I'm fine with other people doing that, for whatever benefits it gives them, but I see no relevance to me.

This explains our rules on a societal level but it does not explain why we praise or blame people on a personal level. — A Christian Philosophy

Because of our moral sensibilities- the emotions we feel when considering the acts.

In other words, we reward and penalize certain behaviours as a form of conditioning, like training dogs to behave a certain way. — A Christian Philosophy

Do dogs have moral sensibilities? Do they have empathy? Do they have vicarious experiences? Do they have moral beliefs? I don't think so, and this means it's extrememy different.

Conceiving valid thought experiments is not impossible. For one thing, we don't need to simulate every factor.. — A Christian Philosophy

You're making excuses for treating the thought experiments as evidence for ontological contingency. "It seems like we could have chosen differently, therefore we could have chosen differently."

We would absolutely need to duplicate it with 100% accuracy- an impossibility. No thought experiment is actually winding the clock back to the exact mental conditions at the time the thought processes occurred.

Additionally, as described in the video, we perceive freedom differently between cases with only one type of motive (e.g. ice cream vs ice cream) and cases with multiple types of motives (e.g. ice cream vs charity). In the latter, we perceive to be free, where as in the former, we do not. — A Christian Philosophy

Your scenario is contrived is ridiculously simplistic and it ASSUMES what you're trying to prove: LFW. You erroneously assume moral "motives" can't exist under compatibilism, you ignore the many complex factors involved with developing our various tastes, wants, and even our beliefs about morality. I described some of the details on my last post, and you simply ignored it. Did you even read it?

I can only grant you that LFW came from something other than deterministic laws. — A Christian Philosophy

This is problematic, because there's no evidence of any causally efficacious factors in the world that are NOT deterministic, except for quantum indeterminacy (which you rejected). But if QI is involved with mental processes, it only introduces randomness. So there's no basis to support the claim that we are somehow a source of ontological contingency. This is exactly the reason compatibilism was developed, to show that the perception of free will was compatible with determinism.

As a side note, would you not agree that an OG would necessarily have LFW? — A Christian Philosophy

Of course not. There's no reason to think an OG has the capacity for intentional behavior and to make decisions.

Can you further explain what you mean by "initiate"? — A Christian Philosophy

I don't know what you're looking for, because it seems self-evident. So it would be best if you describe the process as you perceive it during the act, . Needless to say, don't assume LFW in your description, because that's a post-hoc interpretation. IOW, describe what you are thinking, and the relation between your conscious thoughts and your brain stimulating the nerves in your arm that makes it perform the action.