we make an ontology out of the phenomenology of the world. Some people then believe that this is identical with an objective truth in the transcendent sense. For me, this idea is naive. — Wolfgang

We make models intended to represent reality (ontology) based on our perceptions and the empirical data we develop. Yes, it's naive to think we necessarily got the models right, but there's no reason to think they are entirely wrong nor that they can't be improved upon to more closely model reality.

Classical and quantum physics are therefore two ontologies that we have made out of two different phenomenologies.

Correction: there's a disconnect in these two models: physicists have only partially described their relationship. Perhaps there's a fatal flaw in one, the other or both- if so, a comprehensive model should be sought. In the meantime, it seems undeniable that each model is telling us something about the way reality actually is.

Whether it is an ontological emergence depends on us, because it is we who epistemically construct the world. — Wolfgang

In your opening post, you used terms ambiguously. Is ontology what is actual, or is it a human-created model, that may or may not correspond to the actual? The same with laws of nature. Actual ontological emergence implies reductive physicalism is false: new (true) laws of nature arise that cannot be fully accounted for by lower level laws and objects. By contrast, epistemological emergence is consistent with reductive physicalism: new laws emerge that we couldn't anticipate, but they reflect nothing ontologically new (in terms of actual ontology).

But regardless of that, it seems that this fine carpet of matter is fundamental at the smallest level and everything macroscopic 'unravels', but then evolves according to its own rules and acts deterministically (gravity through planets).
In any case, we will not be able to describe classical and quantum physics with the same terms and theories.

Clearly, our understanding (our ontological models) unravel. That doesn't imply the actual ontology includes true ontological emergence.

Against this background, a unification of classical and quantum physics is therefore not possible, unless new laws are found on both sides and categorically unified. — Wolfgang

Again, the ambiguity of your terminology makes it challenging to interpret. But I'll try.

The dichotomy in our models has 2 possible causes: 1) there is true ontological emergence. 2) there is no actual ontological emergence; rather, our models are do not adequately represent the true ontology.

Personally, I'm inclined to believe #2. Ontological emergence seems like magic. Even if it's wrong, I think it's the preferable assumption- it just means we need to try and develop a model that accounts for what we see.

Sure there is. Technically we could film or track the entire life of a human being from beginning of his lifecycle to the end, and the identity of that being remains the same. — NOS4A2

You're claiming that this temporal-causal relationship between the stages identify an individual identity. That's a consistent definition, but not objective.

I am a human being: a self-sustaining complex organism, with a functioning brain, capable of thoughts, dreams, and emotions. A zygote is not a human being, per this definition. Rather, it is an entity that has the potential to develop into one or more human beings. Therefore I do not share an identity with the zygote from which I emerged. You will disagree, because of the definition you've chosen. My point is that the definition you choose is subjective.

The differences between you now and you at the beginning of your life are profound, but at each stage you were present and identical to both. — NOS4A2

That depends entirely on how you account for an individual identity. There is no objective basis for doing so.

There are any number of differences between them. The differences/similarities are what is relevant to the debate. You can decide they are sufficiently similar to warrant assessing them as the same kind of thing, and I can judge them sufficiently different to assess them as a different kind of thing. The judgements are subjective; there is no objectively correct answer.

The one on the left is what the one on the right looked like about 9 months earlier. In those 9 months, what changed for you? — NOS4A2

Continuum fallacy.

When Trump blames the bad economy on Biden, that's a false statement that ignores the global reasons for inflation and the work Biden's government has put in to mitigate it. But the bulk of his voters (not the evangelical christo-fascists, but the seemingly normal voters) voted because of the economy, because they wanted Trump to fix "the economy that Biden destroyed". It doesn't matter if experts point out that this is a faulty narrative, it doesn't matter if they try to inform; the people do not value expert's input anymore because they have, through the constant erosion of definitions, lost their ability to spot when something is true, something is an actual fact, or how to check if something is.

It's basically a lynching of the concept of truth, facts, rational reasoning and scientific methods, all in favor of the masses sense of individualism forming an arrogance by making their ego feel like the protagonist who knows better than everyone else, rejecting any ideas that do not fit their world view by bad faith grinding down the defining elements of knowledge into absolute noise.

This has to stop. — Christoffer

I agree with most of what you said, except (what I perceive to be) the undercurrent of hopefulness.

Politicians have tended to elected by their electioneering practices. They don't get elected by proposing well thought out policies. They get elected by dumbing it down - distilling it to sound-bites that are directionally congruent with policy choices, while spun to be appealing. So (for most), the voting choice is based on the superficial. The problem: this has created the opportunity for a man to run entirely on the superficial - honing the message to make it more appealing.

The proper solution would be for the population to delve more deeply, to try to understand the impact of what is said - to demand more detailed policy positions, and also to understand that even the best policies will also have some negative consequences. The problem is, this isn't going to happen. People don't take the time, or they lack the skills, to understand. We will perpetually be at risk of being victimized by demagogues.

Interesting chart, particular since it's from 2015. I looked to see what's gone on since then (here): GHG emissions by China and India have increased, while US and EU has gone down.

Media is a business, like any other, giving customers what they want. Anyone searching for information, can find a source that presents it in the most appealing way. So I don't attribute biased reporting and analysis to the rich or elite; it's a consequence of supply/demand.

If people were rational, none of this would matter.

In his first term, Trump circumvented the law by issuing executive orders. This included leveraging Title 42 (restricting entry into the US during an epidemic), and his "Remain in Mexico Policy", which denied entry to the US to prevent triggering asylum law (the law requires keeping asylum seekers in the US until there is a court hearing to either grant or deny asylum. This is the true enabler of immigrants staying here). He also engaged in family separations to discourage people from attempting to immigrate.

Title 42 is no longer available, per court ruling, but I expect he'll come up with some quasi-legal basis to duplicate what he did before. He explicitly said no changes to law were needed; all he needed to do was to exercise his "extreme power to shut down the border" (i.e. skirt the law).

So it sounds like I have a decent understanding of your position. So now I can comment.

I believe these philosophies and religion can definitely be valuable for the individuals that embrace them. I would not try to talk anyone out of them, even if that were possible. Nevertheless, I do not find them personally valuable. What I find valuable is to be grounded in objective facts. I don't just mean grounded in an epistemological sense, but also grounded in my outlook on life and my relations with others.This has worked well for me - it's a perspective that makes it easier for me to accept whatever happens and to make realistic decisions on how to react. It's not for everyone. Nothing is.

Thanks for an interesting discussion.

Here's what I asked:

do you agree that there are no alternatives to science for discovering objective truths about the world? — Relativist

You seem to be tacitly agreeing, since you proposed no alternatives and instead said:

So you're asking, what other 'terms' are there? To which the answer is, practically the whole of philosophy other than science. Ancient and pre-modern philosophy, Eastern philosophy, existentialism, phenomenology. There are many. But if they are looked at through the perspective of 'what is "objectively true" in what they say', then most of what they say will be missed. — Wayfarer

I think you're saying that limiting our perspectives (our world views) to objective facts is too limiting; it leads to rejecting some philosophies that can be valuable.

There are domains other than that of objective fact. I will only say that Armstrong's style of philosophy is to assume that science provides the only valid perspective. — Wayfarer

So then, do you agree that there are no alternatives to science for discovering objective truths about the world?

What I infer is that you are defending or promoting world-views which do not depend exclusively on objective facts. Am I right?

Trump won because he got more votes. That sounds simplistic, but my point is that people did not vote for the principles Trump represents. They didn't vote for fascism, and most don't understand what rule-of-law means. Trump was good at telling them what they wanted to hear: simple explanations and solutions for the perceived negatives in their lives. Trump amplified and leveraged pessimism. Few voters make an effort to understand the impact of policy proposals.

Deporting millions of immigrants sounds appealing to those who buy into scapegoating them for some problems in society, but it ignores the negative consequences. I don't think anything good can possibly come of it, if it actually comes to pass. It will fix no problems, it will just make some people happy that these "others" are out of our midst. It can't solve the real problems - that would require changing the laws, and Trump has told that's not necessary - his "extreme power" is all that's needed.

Deficit spending is a big concern for many, so slashing $2T from the budget sounds like the right thing to do. That exceeds the total amount spent on discretionary spending, so it would have to entail cuts to "mandatory" spending, including Social Security, Medicare, Veterans benefits, and the military. Wherever the cuts are made, that will negatively impact the recipients. On a macro level, decreased government spending will be contractionary to the economy - there will be less money in circulation, decreasing GDP - thus negatively impacting the economy as a whole.

Huge tarriffs will increase the prices of imported goods - so it will be directly inflationary. It is likely to result in retaliatory tarriffs that will decrease demand for US goods, so that will negatively impact manufacturing jobs - this will be balanced against the increased demand for domestic manufacturing, so there will be this win - but it's an macro balancing, not a micro one: some individual producers will do better (adding jobs) while others will do worse (losing jobs).

Removing taxes on Social Security income will benefit only higher income recipients (this includes me, BTW), and it will deplete the SS Trust fund 2 years earlier (from 10 to 8 years). Deporting undocumented immigrants, who pay into SS but will never receive benefits) will hurt it even more.

I don't know if Trump will actually do the things he promised. I hope not. But if he doesn't, his voters will be pissed. If he does, there will be serious negative impacts. That's the problem with simplistic proposals for complex problems. So it seems to me Trump is in a lose-lose situation. The good news: this bodes well for the next election cycle.

Consciousness IS part of the world at large. If consciousness is immaterial, then the world includes this immaterial sort of thing.
— Relativist

The world contains no immaterial things, according to materialism. An 'immaterial thing' is an oxymoronic expression. — Wayfarer

My statement was not based on a premise of materialism. I was making a semantic claim about the meaning of "the world" in metaphysics: it is the totality of existence.

You responded to this:

If there is more to existence than what science can possibly discover or extrapolate, how then can it be discovered? — Relativist

...by elaborating on objections to this assertion:

all that can be known can be known by means of science

You demonstrated that there are truths that science cannot uncover, which is a point I agree with. But it doesn't answer my question: what truths can be discovered outside of science?

Is it solely negative truths, like "physicalism is false"? I don't have a problem with that, but that statement tells us nothing about the way reality actually IS. Can positive facts about the world be discovered outside the parameters of science? If so, then describe the methodology.

You noted that science cannot discover God. I agree 100%. My question is: is God discoverable through some alternative, objective means? What about other aspects of reality that are beyond the reach of science ?

Maybe I jumped the gun a bit. Do you take a categorical belief to be absolute? Granting no such thing as infallible beliefs, what would an absolute belief then entail? So far, it seems to me that if a belief is not infallible, then one is aware that the belief might be wrong - and this irrespective of how well justified it might be so far. Which in turn seems to me to necessitate that all fallible beliefs are graded beliefs upon analysis, even when staunchly addressed in terms of yes/no. — javra

Do you not consider 2+2=4 a categorical belief? Is it a fallible beliefs? Are you "aware that it might be wrong?"

Regarding beliefs that are clearly not categorical, I agree we have degrees of belief. I'm also fine with a fallibilist saying "I believe X", even though he knows it's at least logically possible he's wrong.

What is our area of disagreement? I think we went down this road because you denied the principle of equivalence:

"I believe X" is equivalent to "I believe X is true"

I don't follow why fallibilism would make these statements unequivalent. It's just a semantic equivalence, a claim related to the meaning of truth.

I'm fallible, so I acknowledge that my belief X could be false, but that doesn't negate the semantic equivalence. My degree of belief in X is equivalent to my degree of belief that X is true.

Epistemology is not directly related to the real world? — javra

Of course it is, but the definition of "belief" and the practices used in the discipline of epistemology doesn't depend on any particular theory of that connection.

I really dislike the idea of "absolute/infallible certainty" being something that anyone can hold. You affirmed that:

implying that "belief" means something less than certain, and "knowing" = absolute certainty.
— Relativist

Which to me is not a position that a fallibililist can hold. — javra

Irrelevant to the point I was making about the terminology, and the problems of using any colloquial definition of belief.

The discussion of what fallibilism is and entails can present itself as one such. — javra

I expect we could agree on a definition of fallibilism, if we could agree on the terms (like belief) that it is based on.

I really don't like to debate semantics, where people argue what a word really means. The objective ought to be to communicate. My reference to a "standard" definition was aimed at trying to avoid potential communication problems. If we use the word "belief" differently, we won't be able to have a meaningful discussion.

:up: :up: :up: :up:

There a rather long enough post in which I explained, to which you did not directly reply. What does philosophical analysis address? The real world or manufactured bubbles? — javra

The philosophical analysis I was referring to was epistemology, so not directly related to "the real world or manufactured bubbles" - which is metaphysics.

We commonly hear people expressing certainty as "I don't just believe it, I know it", implying that "belief" means something less than certain, and "knowing" = absolute certainty. — Relativist


Um, no, not "absolute - hence infallible - certainty". But it does mean that the belief can be justified without inconsistencies, thereby evidencing both its truth and that the knower can thereby confirm the — javra

You're demonstrating that the colloquial use of the term "belief" leads to quibbling about what each individual means. All the more reason to use the formalisms.

Hell, we disagree galore on epistemology then. — javra

Do we? It sounded like you were just defending the use of a definition of belief that differs from that of standard epistemology.. I am a fallibilist: empirical beliefs can't be proven with certainty. That is a separate issue from the definition of belief that is standard in epistemology.

You sound pissed off, like when you (falsely) accused me of making a confrontational statement. I've simply tried to address things you've brought up, as honestly as I can. If my views piss you off, there's no point continuing.

The most serious threat to his freedom will be the trial over his election fraud. I've been following that one closely:

DONALD J. TRUMP, did knowingly combine, conspire, confederate, and agree with co-conspirators, known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to defraud the United States by using dishonesty, fraud, and deceit to impair, obstruct, and defeat the lawful federal government function by which the results of the presidential election are collected, counted, and certified by the federal government.

-full text of the indictment

By comparison, the NY conviction is minor. The fraud he committed is almost on par with treason.

Newsweek just posted this analysis of an exit poll NBC is doing:

Voters in this election were overwhelmingly concerned about the condition of democracy and the economy as they cast ballots. Americans put democracy first, with 35% stating it was the most important factor in selecting how to vote for president, followed by the economy at 31%, an NBC News exit poll revealed. Abortion (14%) and immigration (11%) were the second most important issues for voters, with only 4% naming foreign policy.

This sounds hopeful for Harris supporters.

I saw this cartoon this morning:



Just before 5PM, Trump wrote on Truth Social:

"A lot of talk about massive CHEATING in Philadelphia. Law Enforcement coming!!!"

The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology defines belief this way:

"Belief has often been represented as a state available to introspection with a certain relation to a present image or complex of images. “I believe that P” means that I have an attitude of acceptance toward P."

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines it as:
the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true.

Which seems equivalent (setting aside the fact that the 2nd definition lacks a definition of "true"). You're more detailed definition is subtly different because you conclude:

As such, beliefs need not be complete or absolute but can well be partial. — javra

I think your point is that you can believe X, but not be fully committed to it or completely certain of it. This is the way the word "belief" tends to be used in common conversation. We commonly hear people expressing certainty as "I don't just believe it, I know it", implying that "belief" means something less than certain, and "knowing" = absolute certainty.

But why force this vague concept into a philosophical analysis? It seems to me you can analyze your belief (colloquial sense of the word) and rephrase it to use the more precise definition of belief and still correctly convey the attitude you have toward the proposition. That's what I did when I recast a person's (less than certain) belief in the future outcome of a game.

Am I wrong? Do you think there's something about belief (colloquial sense) that isn't translatable in this way?

Fuzzy logic involves reasoning with imprecise/vague statements. Alternatively, one can cast beliefs in terms of probabilities, and utilize Bayes' Theorem.

IMO, the best thing to do is to transform one's informal statements of belief into something precise, so the formalism can be applied.

"
You may recall Descartes’ famous meditation, cogito ergo sum. This takes the reality of the thinking subject as apodictic, i.e. cannot plausibly be denied. One of Husserl’s books is Cartesian Meditations, and I think the influence is clear. — Wayfarer

Then I would reword it to:
consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a we believe there is a world there for us in the first place.

Whatever it is that kills people would be the explanation here. It doesn't have to be "the world". We call whatever it is, that seems to be not a part of oneself, "the independent world", and we have a conception of what "the world" means, including the intuitions of space and time. If the conception of "the world" is wrong, then it is not the world which kills us but something else. That "a world external to ourselves" kills us would be false. The intuitions are false. — Metaphysician Undercover

Survival also depends on what sustains us (food, water, keeping warm...), and enables us to procreate.

What does "more precise truths" mean? Either a proposition is true or it is false, the idea that one truth is more true than another doesn't make any sense. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm referring to beliefs that are approximations and/or limited in scope. This is why I referred to "functionally accurate": sufficiently close to the truth to enable survival. It's not necessary to understand general relativity to an understanding of gravity sufficient to avoid falling off a cliff. One could have a magical view of the nature of medicinal herbs that are truly efficacious, and what matters for survival is just their efficacy.

It sounds like I had it right: you think physicalism should be rejected if physics doesn't have a complete, verifiable description of reality.
— Relativist

That physicalism should be rejected, if the thesis is that 'everything is ultimately physical' while what is physical can't be defined. — Wayfarer

I gave you a definition.

If it hasn't been falsified by quantum physics, it's not falsifiable. So again, it appeals to science as a model of philosophical authority, but only when it suits. — Wayfarer

I explained that it is consistent with QM. Metaphysical theories generally are not falsiable in a scientific sense. All we can do is examine them for coherence, explanatory scope, and parsimony. It is falsified if it is incoherent or cannot possibly account for some clear fact of the world. It ought to be rejected if an alternate coherent theory provides better explanations and/or is more parsimonious.

I posted this comment some days ago, do you think it has any bearing on the argument?
...
Do you see the point of this criticism of philosophical naturalism? — Wayfarer

I see the point, but it depends on assumptions I find questionable:

"consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place." - what's the basis for this assertion?

"Treating consciousness as part of the world, reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousness’s foundational, disclosive role."
Consciousness IS part of the world at large. If consciousness is immaterial, then the world includes this immaterial sort of thing.

"consciousness is presupposed in all science and knowledge"- consciousness is the vessel of knowledge, and understanding entails relating elements of knowledge.

I will note here my conviction that time has an inextricably subjective element — Wayfarer

Special relativity shows that time is relative to a reference frame. That a sort of subjectivity, but you seem to be suggesting it's mind-dependent. OK, but I see no reason to think so.

This highlights how understanding “what exists” inevitably involves interpreting it through something that only a perspective can provide. — Wayfarer

To understand anything will necessarily entail relating it to our human perspectives. This doesn't preclude expanding our perspectives when it is demonstrably deficient.

I suppose it all depends on how one qualifies belief. Still, in ordinary life, when a guy is asked, "do you believe your team will win?" or, as a different example, "do you believe she'll say 'yes'?", the guy might well honestly answer with a categorical, "Hell yea!" (rather than with a, "well, it depends") ... yet without being foolish enough to presume that this honestly held belief is in a full blown correlation to a not yet actualized future reality. But I get it, this to you would not be a "strictly true belief". — javra

Philosophical analysis requires more precision than ordinary language often delivers.

he’s deeply committed to the empirical success and practical validity of science but questions whether we should interpret scientific theories as giving us a literal account of an objective, mind-independent reality. — Wayfarer

It's a false dichotomy that a scientific model is either literally true, or it is merely empirically valid. Structural realism is a middle ground.

Another basic point in this context is the distinction between reality, as the aggregate or sum total of observable phenomena and the objects of scientific analysis, and being, as a description of the existence as experienced by human beings. This is where I think physicalism over-values scientific method, for which physicalism may be an effective heuristic while being descriptively accurate within its scope. But many of the questions of philosophy may not be amendable to scientific analysis. Unless you're a positivist, that doesn't make them meaningless. — Wayfarer

Reality = everything that exists; observable reality is a subset. Empirical science is limited to the observable; theoretical physics stretches this limit by extrapolating. If there is more to existence than what science can possibly discover or extrapolate, how then can it be discovered? If there exists a God of religion, then perhaps by praying or dying, but I personally see no reason to believe such things exist.

I just don't understand why you think metaphysical physicalism overvalues the scientific method. The scientific method is an epistemological method, and it seems to me to be the best epistemological method possible for developing knowledge about the physical world. If true, that's an objective fact irrespective of whether physicalism is true. A physicalist metaphysics does no more than provide the framework that scientism lacks. What sort of facts do you suppose this omits? What alternative methodology can do better?

which also implies distance from physicalism. — Wayfarer

No, it doesn't. Physicalism is consistent with, but not identical to, scientific realism.

Regarding Armstrong's theory: he explicitly stated that he believed spacetime comprises the totality of existence, that it is governed by laws of nature, and that physics is concerned with discovering what these are. As far as I can tell, he doesn't make assertions about specific laws of physics that he regards as true and real. He accommodates QM, but I don't think he explictly claims it is real. His reference to spacetime suggests he may have been a realistic about general relativity, but given his deference to physics, I can't imagine that he'd deny more exotic theories (eg a "Many Worlds" cosmological theory, that entails multiple space-times) if they became accepted physics.

Then he doesn't have a categorical belief that his team will win. Rather, he believes it probable that his team will win.
— Relativist

I'm not big on that distinction. For starters, as a falliblist, upon analysis all my beliefs are graded (probabilistic or else comparable) - this even though I will typically address them in the categorical "yes/no" format. — javra

Sure, but then you have some loose epistemic probability in mind, and a more precise statement of your belief would identify this. So it is not strictly true that the guy believes his team will win. Rather, he believes it more likely than not that they will win, or that it is a near certainty, or some other probabilistic qualification.

If "Joe believes it more likely than not that the Columbus Spinsters will win on Saturday" then "Joe believes it is true that it is more likely than not that the Columbus Spinsters will win on Saturday". This is the "equivalence theory" in theory of truth.

Intuitions are not formed to be consistent with reality. According to evolutionary theory they are shaped by some sort of survival principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

The "intuitions" in question are relevant to survival. If there is a world external to ourself, it would be necessary to have a functionally accurate view of that world. If there is not such an external world, what would explain this false intuition?

Why think our abstractions about space and time are false?
— Relativist

There is much reason to think that our conceptions of space and time are false, spatial expansion, dark matter, dark energy, quantum weirdness. Anywhere that we run into difficulties understanding what is happening, when applying these abstractions, this is an indication that they are false. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was referring to our primitive (pre-science) abstractions of space and time. As I said, they are valid and true within the context of our direct perceptions.

Well sure, these conceptions are true in the context of our sensory perceptions, that's how we use them, verify them, etc.. But if our sensory perceptions are not providing truth, that's a problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it's not. Our sensory perceptions aren't oracles that magically know truths beyond what we could possibly perceive. Further, the error has not prevented science from learning more precise truths- such as a more precise understanding of space and time.

I acknowledge that our descriptions (and understandings) are grounded in our perspective, but we have the capacity to correct for that.
— Relativist

How would you propose that we could do that? How do we verify that our sensory perceptions are giving us truth? — Metaphysician Undercover

See my prior comment.

Are you then in search for infallible proof. — javra

No.

This is not always the case in real life applications, most especially when it comes to beliefs regarding future facts. If John believes his team will win the game then he might bet accordingly while nevertheless having a great deal of doubt regarding this same belief. — javra

Then he doesn't have a categorical belief that his team will win. Rather, he believes it probable that his team will win.

Constructive Empiricism seems to me to go to far, by denying that science tells us anything about reality. I'm more aligned with Structural Realism:

...the most powerful argument in favour of scientific realism is the no-miracles argument, according to which the success of science would be miraculous if scientific theories were not at least approximately true descriptions of the world. While the underdetermination argument is often cited as giving grounds for scepticism about theories of unobservable entities, arguably the most powerful arguments against scientific realism are based on the history of radical theory change in science....
...Structural realism was introduced into current philosophy of science by John Worrall in 1989 as a way to break the impasse that results from taking both arguments seriously, and have “the best of both worlds” in the debate about scientific realism.
...

According to Worrall, we should not accept standard scientific realism, which asserts that the nature of the unobservable objects that cause the phenomena we observe is correctly described by our best theories. However, neither should we be antirealists about science. Rather, we should adopt structural realism and epistemically commit ourselves to the mathematical or structural content of our theories. Since there is (says Worrall) retention of structure across theory change, structural realism both (a) avoids the force of the pessimistic meta-induction (by not committing us to belief in the theory’s description of the furniture of the world) and (b) does not make the success of science (especially the novel predictions of mature physical theories) seem miraculous (by committing us to the claim that the theory’s structure, over and above its empirical content, describes the world).

I believe I've stayed faithful to this approach in all my replies to you.

You would have to defeat my belief in an external, minds-independent world.
— Relativist

That's a bit confrontational to me. And, as I previously expressed, I'm not interested in so doing. — javra

It's not confrontational. The term "defeater" is just standard epistemology. A defeater=a reason to give up a belief. It's shorthand for what I've previously asked for.

I hope you understand why it's relevant. I absolutely believe there is an external world that exists independently of minds. I can't possibly accept idealism unless I drop this belief, and that would require a defeater (not just the mere possibility it is false).

As to your other replies, they sidestep the questions asked without providing answers. E.g. are non-veridical beliefs of themselves physical? — javra

I was defending physicalism, so I didn't see the need to state that it entails the claim that beliefs are physical. Indeed, establishing a belief would entail a physical change in the brain. More specifically, it is a change that will affect behavior.

BTW, to the person hallucinating X, the physical reality of X will be a veridical belief ... this up until the time reasoning might intervene (it doesn't always).

That's not what it means. A verdical belief is one that is actually true, i.e. it corresponds to an aspect of reality. If a person believes X, then he necessarily believes X is true.

If the protagonist in the movie had hallucinations that he believed were false because his psychiatrists convinced him they were false, then the belief in their falsehood was an undercutting defeater of the (seemingly true) hallucination.

Mind in part consists of thoughts. How are thoughts physical? — javra

Physicalism being false does not entail non-solipsistic idealism being true. It just means idealism is logically possible. I already acknowledge it is logically possible.

Regarding your claim, you seem to be reifying an action. Engaging in thought is an activity of the brain- a behavior. It often results in the establishment of a new belief-a disposition. Having a belief makes us apt to behave certain way.

we perceive physical realities, but then - given the entailment of physicalism - how is a bona fide hallucination of itself physical? — javra

Our perception of our physical surroundings establishes a complex belief (a disposition) about those surroundings, which will influence how we behave within those surroundings. An hallucination is a non-veridical belief.

But if not everything that does or can occur is physical, then physicalism so defined can only be false. — javra

Sure, but physicalism can be false and idealism still be false. You've provided no reason to think it's true. I'm somewhat agnostic as to a metaphysical theory. I tentatively embrace physicalism because it explains the most and assumes the least. I could switch my allegiance if there were an alternative that bested it. You haven't given one. You would have to defeat my belief in an external, minds-independent world.

The point is, claiming that everything that exists is physical becomes problematic if we can’t definitively say what kind of existence the wave function has, as in quantum mechanics, the wave function is central to predicting physical phenomena. If we take its predictive power seriously, it’s hard to ignore the question of its ontological status without leaving an unresolved gap in the theory. — Wayfarer

But there IS this unresolved gap in our physics. We really don't know. Therefore one can't claim it's inconsistent with physicalism.

Besides this, nothing you said is a refutation of my position as to what I consider physical.

I may misunderstand, but it sounds also bit like you're suggesting that we should reject physicalism if physics doesn't have a complete, verifiable description of reality.
— Relativist

As I said before, as a materialist, D M Armstrong believes that science is paradigmatic for philosophy proper. So you can't have your cake and eat it too - if physics indeed suggests that the nature of the physical eludes precise definition, then so much for appealing to science as a model for philosophy! — Wayfarer

It sounds like I had it right: you think physicalism should be rejected if physics doesn't have a complete, verifiable description of reality.

Armstrong's model is consistent with what we do know, so it's not falsified. A stipulation that the wave function is non-physical would technically falsify physicalism, but if the wave function behaves in a law-like manner, why make that stipulation? It would still be a coherent metaphysical model, save for using "physical" as a qualifier. That's why your objection seems forced: "let's label the wave function as non-physical (or just say it may not be physical) so we can dismiss every physicalist metaphysical theory".

I wouldn't put it in personal or pejorative terms, but I do believe that philosophical and/or scientific materialism is an erroneous philosophical view. — Wayfarer

My position is that Armstrong's theory is not necessarily true, but it's superior to other theories in terms of explanatory scope, parsimony, and ad hoc-ness.

The fact that it's consistent with what we know about physics is a point in its favor, while the fact that there are gaps in our understanding of physics is irrelevant. It's irrelevant because a theory can only be expected to account for what we know: that's the nature of abductive reasoning. Abduction entails comparing explanatory hypotheses - and what needs to be explained are the agreed facts. Unknowns do not constitute facts that need explaining.

Reasons such as these?:

That mentioned, I agree that the sometimes tacitly implied notion of physical reality being somehow metaphysically independent of the individual minds which, after all, are aspects of it—such that physical reality could be placed here and minds there without any dependency in-between—is a logical dud. A close second dud is the attempt to describe minds, and all their various aspects, as purely physical (such that, for one example, all ends one can conceive of and intend are all physical in their nature). — javra

No. You expressing your judgement is not a reason for me, even with a vague allusion to some questionable assumption that it seems based on.

Yes, I can provide them, but I don't think reasons will here much help. We are all typically attached to the notions we are habituated to hold, in this case that there was physicality long before there was any type of awareness, ergo physicalism. — javra

I may agree that we're "habituated" to hold the view that there exists a mind-independent reality.

If we're a consequence of evolutionary tendencies, then we would necessarily have the implicit belief that there exists a world external to ourselves. How we then think about this (e.g. that this external world exists independently of ourselves) could be a cultural habituation. I'm willing to entertain an alternative, if there's a good enough reason.

My reply to this will be that of panpsychism - this in the sense that awareness pervaded the cosmos long before life evolved into it (i.e., in the sense that the physical is, was, and will remain dependent of the psychical). This conclusion for me, though, is only a deduction from the premise of a non-solipsistic mind awareness-created world. — javra

You're indicating panpaychism is a logical step beyond the "premise of a non-solipsistic mind awareness-created world." I'm just asking why should entertain that premise.

And I do not claim to have any great insight into how panpsychism works - nor into any metaphysically cogent explanation for how life evolved from non-life (the physicalist explanation that "it must have" doesn't much console me either as far as metaphysical explanations go - I find it just as comforting as the explanation of "God did it"). — javra

If your answer is that this feels right, and/or provides you comfort, I have no objection. I'm not trying to convince you that you're wrong. I'm just seeking my own comfort- I'd like to know if there are good reasons to think I'm deluding myself with what I believe about the world.

Trump’s opponents never accepted the 2016 election, therefor they had fascists tendencies, like Hitler. — NOS4A2

You are mistaken. Hillary Clinton conceded defeat and never attempted to overturn the election. To some degree, she was being a sore loser when she labeled Trump's election "illegitimate", but she at least had a rational basis for her claim: Russia helping Trump, and Comey hurting her chances. These things actually occurred, although it's impossible to know their impact.

By contrast, Trump's claim that he was cheated is based entirely on falsehoods - falsehoods that he actively drummed into his supporters. Trump lied about fraud, lied about what people said to him about fraud, and he pressured others to lie - in an active attempt to overturn the legitimate election. So to equate the two is absurd.
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Replace "heap of sand" with "the physical world" and "individual sand particles" with "individual minds". The same relations will hold. This can thereby lead to the logically valid affirmation that, in a non-solipsistic mind-created world, the physical world occurs independently of me and my own mind, even though it will be dependent on the occurrence of a multiplicity of minds in general. — javra

OK, I think I understand. But as I said before:

I believe there exists a world (AKA "reality") independent of minds. I also believe nearly everyone agrees with me. That doesn't mean we're right, of course, but I'd like you or Wayfarer to give me reasons why I should reject, or doubt, my current belief. — Relativist

When I say "independent of minds", I mean that the world at large exists irrespective of the presence of any minds at all. I believe the universe is about 14B years old, and there were almost certainly no minds within it for quite a long time. Can you give me a reason to reject or doubt this belief of mine?