I cannot prove it to you unless you understand the difference between the weak and strong emergence. — MoK

I do know the difference. Proceed with your proof.

Anything that changes is no longer the same thing. And sure, physical are subject to change since they have a set of properties..Please replace experience with awareness. — MoK

Rephrase your argument accordingly.

Then it's true that (MoK's brain at t1) is caused by (Mok's brain at t0 + other factors), because "other factors" includes mind's experience of Mok's brain at t0.
— Relativist
No, MoK's brain is directly caused by the Mind and not by MoK's brain in former time. — MoK

Are you saying the Mind recreates MoK's brain ex nihilo at every instant of time, rather than effecting a change to MoK's brain?!

P is #2 — MoK

P: the physical in the state of S1 cannot know the correct instant to cause the physical in the state of S2.
Q: Therefore, the physical in the state of S1 cannot cause the physical in the state of S2.

I proved that P does not entail Q:
S1= Rock on a ledge at to
S2= Rock on the ground at t1
Cause: tremor (there is no knowledge involved).

You had asked, "How could you accommodate awareness in physicalism?" My answer: "functionally".
— Relativist
I was not talking about the functionality of the brain which in fact can be explained by the laws of physics. I was talking about the awareness that as we agreed is a state of being conscious of perceptions, thoughts, feelings, etc. — MoK

I know you weren't talking about functionalism, but it IS the answer to your question - and to many other objections to physicalism. It means you can't simplistically deny physicalism on the basis that mental phenomena aren't exhibited by simple objects (rocks; particles). You need to consider functional entities.

I think all sorts of physicalism are false — MoK

Then let's agree to disagree. It can neither be proven nor disproven. We each draw our conclusions about it on subjective grounds. Your fundamental error is in thinking your subjective grounds are objective facts.

Then please read on the Hard Problem of consciousness — MoK

No. You're reversing the burden of proof. Provide a formal proof that physicalism is impossible, with clearly stated premises.

Then please read the OP and let me know what you think of it. — MoK

OK.

P1) Physical and experience exist and they are subject to change
Physical THINGS exist and engage in physical ACTIVITIES. Anything that changes is no longer the same thing (including any nonphysical objects that may exist). But your statement makes more sense if we treat objects as having both essential and contingent properties. Change would then entail the object's set of contingent properties changing.

"Experience" can refer to an act, or to the effect of an act. An act occurs; it is not an existent. SoI conclude you're referring to the effect: the memory.

I can't go further in your argument until you confirm or correct my interpretation.

Physicalists are wrong. The fact that the majority of philosophers believe in physicalism does not prove anything. — MoK

It implies that it is highly unlikely that physicalism is provably false.

Physicalism cannot explain the awareness — MoK

Prove it.

But you also made this seemingly contradictory statement:
MoK's brain t1 was not caused by MoK's brain at t0 + other factors.
— Relativist
No, it is not contrary at all. MoK's brain at t1 is due to MoK's brain + other factors at t0 but the MoK's brain at t1 was not caused by MoK's brain + other factors at t0. MoK's brain at t1 was caused by the Mind after experiencing MoK's brain + other factors at t0. — MoK

Then it's true that (MoK's brain at t1) is caused by (Mok's brain at t0 + other factors), because "other factors" includes mind's experience of Mok's brain at t0.

:snicker:

You need to read about the strong and weak emergence to see that the example of the car is a weak emergence whereas consciousness is a strong emergence. — MoK

You had asked, "How could you accommodate awareness in physicalism?" My answer: "functionally". I'm defending physicalism, which can either be reductive physicalism or non-reductive. The former entails epistemological emergence, the latter allows for ontological emergence.

The relevant points are:
1) I answered your question;
2) the burden is on you to prove physicalism is false;
3) an argument from lack of imagination is a fallacy.

Modus Ponens. — MoK

Here's your argument:

1. Physical however is not aware of the passage of time.
2. Therefore, the physical in the state of S1 cannot know the correct instant to cause the physical in the state of S2.
3. Therefore, the physical in the state of S1 cannot cause the physical in the state of S2.
4. Therefore, the change is not possible in physical. Therefore, physical cannot be the cause of its own change.

You said:

#3 follows from #2 only. — MoK

Modus ponens has the form:
p=>q
p
Therefore q

In your argument, what is p and what is q?

#3 follows from #2 only. — MoK

By what rule of logic? See: https://cse.iitk.ac.in/users/cs365/2012/rulesLogic.html

I am arguing that physicalism is false because it cannot explain awareness/experience — MoK

"Cannot" implies it is impossible. That's a strong claim that needs to be supported with a proof. Provide it using only mutually acceptable premises.

The reality is that you simply can't imagine how physicalism could account for awareness and m-experience. You're committing the fallacy argument from incredulity, also referred to as "argument from lack of imagination". This is the underlying problem with what you're doing, and it entails reversing the burden of proof - that I must prove to you that physicalism CAN account for something. I will accept that burden if I choose to try and make a persuasive argument for physicalism. But this is your thread, your argument, and your burden.

If you think that physicalism is not false then you have to deal with the Hard problem of consciousness, epiphenomenalism, and other problems that I discussed in detail but you didn't reply to it. You cannot resolve these problems. Could you? — MoK

I will deal with those if I choose to argue physicalism is true. In this thread, you have the burden of showing you have a coherent theory, since you put forth a proof.

Experience refers to a phenomenon that has a very clear definition in the philosophy of the mind, namely my definition. — MoK

In philosophy, "experiences" correspond to what I've defined as m-experiences. It most certainly does not entail being non-physical. Here's an extract from the definition of experience in the Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy:

Experience: In philosophy,experience is generally what we perceive by the senses (sensory experience), what we learn from others, or whatever comes from external sources or from inner reflection....in philosophy, the relation between experience as a state of consciousness and independent objects of experience becomes a focus of debate. There must be something given
in experience, yet the status of the given is very controversial. Different answers respectively ground
positions such as realism, idealism, and skepticism. The different ways of understanding the given also
involve different ways of understanding the notion of sense-data. There is also debate about the relation between experience and theory.

There is no part of this that is inconsistent with physicalism. Further proof that your wrong: over 52% of phillosphers "accept or lean toward" physicalism. See this 2020 survey of philosophers. A 2009 survey had similar results

This should give you some pause in thinking physicalism is so obviously false.

I don't agree that there is p-experience or m-experience — MoK

I defined m-experience as mental experience. If you don't believe there are mental experiences then your entire line of argument is dissolved.

Functionally. Compare it to the function of a car: the parts of the car cannot function individually as a car. It is their arrangement that produces the function.
— Relativist
Now you are confusing weak and strong emergence here. — MoK

Non-sequitur, and you're ignoring that I answered your question. I regret indulging your reversal of your burden of proof.

Our brains hold memories. Beliefs are memories that dispose us to behave a certain way. Awareness is the development of short term beliefs about some state of affairs or activity, caused by our sensory input.
— Relativist
No, we already agreed on the definition of awareness which is a state in which we are conscious of mental activities, — MoK

I was indulging you by giving a physicalist ACCOUNT of awareness. The account is consistent with the defintion of awareness.

I've now concluded that I shall stop indulging you. I've given you enough to know that physicalists can account for things you didn't think possible. If you are reasonable, you'll now understand why I say you're making a fallacious argument from incredulity.

Then what caused MoK's brain at t1? There was no explanation "above". Give me an account of all the causal factors (that's what I was doing with my statement,"MoK's brain t1 was caused by [MoK's brain at t0 + other factors].
— Relativist
I already explained that to you two times if not more. The Mind causes MoK's brain at t1 given the fact that it experiences MoK's brain at t0 plus other factors — MoK

But you also made this seemingly contradictory statement:

MoK's brain t1 was not caused by MoK's brain at t0 + other factors. — MoK

Mind would qualify as "other factors". Explain this apparent contradiction. I'll defer re-asking the other related questions until you reconcile this.

I already discussed what I mean by change in OP whether the change is in a falling rock or the motion of electrons in a brain — MoK

It's an invalid argument! Here it is, with your statements numbered:

1. Physical however is not aware of the passage of time.
2. Therefore, the physical in the state of S1 cannot know the correct instant to cause the physical in the state of S2.
3. Therefore, the physical in the state of S1 cannot cause the physical in the state of S2.
4. Therefore, the change is not possible in physical. Therefore, physical cannot be the cause of its own change.

#3 does not follow from #1 and #2. Neither #1 nor #2 even mentions causation, and yet you claim to draw a conclusion ("therefore") about causation.

Your argument is just blatantly invalid.

Knowledge is not a necessary condition for causation.
— Relativist
It is necessary since a change indicates a going from one state at one point in time to another state later. — MoK

I then gave this example:

A rock dislodged from a high ledge, by a tremor, will fall to the bottom is strict accord with the gravitational law. — Relativist

Prove there is a dependency on knowledge for the rock to fall, and land when it does.

You said:

Knowledge is not a necessary condition for causation. — Relativist
It is necessary since a change indicates a going from one state at one point in time to another state later. So the knowledge of the proper time that the causation is due to, t2 in this case, is necessary. — MoK

If that's not what you meant to say, then acknowledge you were wrong in making such a general statement, and rephrase it in a way you will defend.

I am asking that if you cannot perform that task which requires the awareness of the passage of time then how the physical can do that? — MoK

First you need to acknowledge that Knowledge is not a necessary condition for causation.

You have a habit of making absurd statements, treating them as true even after they have been falsified. Here's where you made it:

Knowledge is not a necessary condition for causation. — Relativist
It is necessary since a change indicates a going from one state at one point in time to another state later. So the knowledge of the proper time that the causation is due to, t2 in this case, is necessary. — MoK

Of course, the knowledge of time is necessary. Could you perform a task that is due to a specific time without knowing the specific time or even worse without having the ability to experience time? If you cannot then how the physical can? — MoK

You gave an example that INVOLVES application of knowledge. Cause-effect due to (for example) laws of motion do not depend on knowledge. A rock dislodged from a high ledge, by a tremor, will fall to the bottom is strict accord with the gravitational law.

It is necessary since a change indicates a going from one state at one point in time to another state later. So the knowledge of the proper time that the causation is due to, t2 in this case, is necessary. — MoK

Non-sequitur. You simply re-asserted that knowledge is necessary. A law of nature necessitates an effect. Causation is temporal.

Therefore, the physical in the state of S1 cannot know the correct instant to cause the physical in the state of S2. Therefore, the physical in the state of S1 cannot cause the physical in the state of S2. — MoK

Knowledge is not a necessary condition for causation.

. I agree that the experience or awareness precludes physicalism given my definition of experience. — MoK

So your "proof" that physicalism is false is based on the assumption that physicalism is false. Circular reasoning.

You may believe physicalism is false because you can't imagine how it can account for some phenomenon, but that is not a proof. I don't care what you believe, so I have no burden to explain or defend physicalism. I know physicalism to be coherent and to be more explanatorially complete than alternatives, and this is sufficient basis for me to reject your argument. I have no burden to prove this to you. You assumed a burden by posting an argument that you presumably think should have the power to persuade. If your argument depends on your unproven assumption that physicalism is false, you should add that as a premise to your argument.

I cannot agree with your definition of np-experience, m-experience, and p-experience since to me there is only one sort of experience that I equate to awareness. — MoK

You asked me this:

Please call a set of processes in the brain another thing — MoK

That's what I did. The definitions refer to concepts. Accepting the definitions doesn't commit you to agreeing the concept applies to anything in reality. The difference among the 3 concepts are the nature of our disagreement. Based on those 3 concepts, our disagreement is about whether m-experiences are np-experiences or p-experiences. The definition you gave entails ASSUMING m-experiences are np-experiences. If you don't accept the burden to prove this, then your argument fails because it is circular.

I equate experience to awareness. It was your misuse of terms that caused us all trouble. You define experience as the process in physical. The experience as I mentioned is related to another phenomenon that has a clear definition in the philosophy of the mind. — MoK

I didn't misuse terms. I made it clear in my first post that the definition of experience was relevant, and I subsequently rejected your definition because it assumed, not proved, that experiences were non-physical. The discussion did get confusing because we hadn't agreed to a definition. I've addressed this by defining the 3 concepts. If you aren't willing to accept the possibility that m-experiences are p-experiences, then the discussion is at an end because your reasoning is circular.

I'll clarify one point: to say m-experiences are p-experiences means that m-experiences are due to physical processes, and thus consistent with physicalism. I'm not reifying an abstract description. You are greatly mistaken if you think physicalist philosopher's of mind would accept your definition.

How could you accommodate awareness in physicalism considering the basic ingredients of any objects, electrons, quarks, etc. are unaware? — MoK

Functionally. Compare it to the function of a car: the parts of the car cannot function individually as a car. It is their arrangement that produces the function.

Our brains hold memories. Beliefs are memories that dispose us to behave a certain way. Awareness is the development of short term beliefs about some state of affairs or activity, caused by our sensory input.

I am not evading at all. I am talking about problems that cannot be addressed in physicalism — MoK

You're ignoring the context of this part of the discussion. You had given an incoherent account of the mind-body relationship. This is fatal to your argument. You presented this argument in your op, which gives you the burden to defend it. If you can't show that account is coherent, you've failed - irrespective of whether or not physicalism is true.

I anticipate that you're strategy is to make an argument from ignorance: find a reason to reject physicalism, and then conclude "...therefore dualism must be true". No, you have to show you have a superior alternative. An incoherent theory is not superior. You DENY that it's incoherent, but you haven't been able to address my objections.
— Relativist
Please see above. — MoK

So you aren't denying that you're making an argument from ignorance.

You seemed to agree that MoK's brain t1 was caused by (MoK's brain at t0 + other factors). The question is: is the mind one of those other factors. Please answer it. I anticipate that either answer will contradict something you've already said, but we'll see. After you've shown your theory is coherent, then we can further discuss your issues with physicalism.
— Relativist
MoK's brain t1 was not caused by MoK's brain at t0 + other factors. Please see above. — MoK

Then what caused MoK's brain at t1? There was no explanation "above". Give me an account of all the causal factors (that's what I was doing with my statement,"MoK's brain t1 was caused by [MoK's brain at t0 + other factors].

Musk dreams may soon come true. In a 2023 interview by Steve Bannon, soon-to-be FBI director Kash Patel said this; "We’re going to come after the people in the media who lied about American citizens, who helped Joe Biden rig presidential elections. Whether it’s criminally or civilly, we’ll figure that out.”

https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/kash-patel-said-come-journalists-now-hangs-fbi-candidacy-rcna182661

This article goes through Trump's recent lies about Ukraine: Fact check: Trump’s barrage of lies about Zelensky and Ukraine

"[Trump]said Tuesday: “I think Europe has given $100 billion and we’ve given, let’s say, $300-plus (billion).” He wrote Wednesday: “The United States has spent $200 Billion Dollars more than Europe.”
Reality: wartime military, financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine through December:
Europe- $258 billion committed; $148 billion allocated
US- $124 billion committed; $119 billion allocated.

Trump: "Zelensky has a 4% approval rating"
Actual: 52-57%

In the Wednesday social media post, Trump falsely claimed that Zelensky “admits that half of the money we sent him is ‘MISSING.’”
Zelensky has made no such admission...He said in a February 1 interview with the Associated Press that although people talk about Ukraine getting as much as $200 billion in US aid, Ukraine had received about $76 billion, largely in the form of weapons. Zelensky said he doesn’t know where all the professed additional money has gone and that perhaps these higher figures are correct “on paper,”

, I was seven during the Cuban Missile Crisis, — Wayfarer

I had a feeling you were younger than me! I was 8 in Oct 1962.

Subjective judgement, but why don't you start a thread describing your metaphysical theory so we can judge its feasibility.

I was referring to the argument in the Op (I referred to an "alleged proof). Regarding your arguments, you haven't proven physicalism is impossible - and it being POSSIBLE is the only thing I've been defending.

In which case, what are we talking about? I'm arguing against physicalist views that your posts are representing, only for you to say 'well, I'm not really advocating them.' — Wayfarer

I explained several posts ago:

I absolutely am not trying to convince you physicalism is true. This thread was about an alleged proof that physicalism is false. I've been explaining why the argument fails. That doesn't entail proving physicalism is true; it entails establishing that it is possible — Relativist

Nothing I've said contradicts that. — Wayfarer

I was responded to your suggesting I had not demonstrated physicalism was coherent, because I hadn't accounted for things like meaning. You felt my previous comment about semantics was insufficient, so I expanded on that.

The rest of your comments seems to be justification for what you believe, not really showing my theory is incoherent. I already explained I'm not trying to prove either that you are wrong, or that physicalism is true.

Whereas it is commonly believed that the physical basis of mind is understood, when it is not. — Wayfarer

Not one neuroscientist or philosopher of mind makes that claim! Rather, physicalists seek to account for the uncontroversial facts in a way consistent with physicalism. All this can do is show that physicalism is possible. In the context of physicalism, that's sufficient - because every other uncontroversial fact is unarguably a natural fact.

But the fact is, were human minds not able to form and grasp foundational concepts, such as 'equals', it would be impossible for us to learn and practice arithmetic, let alone mathematics. It is an ability the human mind alone has. — Wayfarer

So what? Uniqueness doesn't imply physicalism is false.

That is not an adequate account of the power of reason. Mathematical regularities and symmetries are far more than repetitive patterns. Reason has enabled us to estimate the age and size of the Universe. — Wayfarer

You previously said that referring to "semantics" was inadequate to account for meaning. Then when I went into more detail, it made no difference. I'm not going to indulge you again. I've accounted for basic reason; that's a building block. You seem to expect a complete neurolgical framework, seemingly because "it is commonly believed that the physical basis of mind is understood".

The question is: can you identify any uncontroversial fact about mental activity that you can prove impossible under physicalism?

I have not challenged your view, so there's no need to continue to justify it.

I just received an email from Social Security

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Pressure to act immediately, and
A request for an unusual payment like cryptocurrency, gift cards, gold bars, and wire transfers...

@NOS4A2 must be outraged at this censorship of free speech! Surly scammers have a right to say whatever they want.

I didn't mean to insult you at all. I am very sorry if my words hurt your feelings but I didn't intend to do so. When I ask you what is the experience you answer that as a set of processes in the brain. Please call a set of processes in the brain another thing since the experience refers to another phenomenon I tried my best to explain it to you but you constantly denied it. When I discuss whether Rock experience as well, then you changed experience in the case of the brain to mental experience — MoK

In all cases I was simply responding to you. In my very first post, I brought up the issue of how "experience" is defined, noting that one COULD define it in a way that included a boulder rolling down the mountain. You later seemed to want to limit the discussion to MENTAL experiences, so at that time I began focusing solely on mental experiences. But you defined mental experiences as non-physical, which precludes physicalism with a definition.

I'm fine with applying different terms to mental experiences (m-experiences) and non-mental experiences (nm-experiences). Let's also define non-physical experiences (np-experiences), because you are claiming that m-experiences=np-experiences. Your burden is to show this is necessarily the case.

My contention is that there are no np-experiences, because physicalism can account for m-experiences just fine. You put forth an argument that entails physicalism being false, so you have the burden to show that it is impossible for physicalism to be true. You would presumably do that by proving there are np-experiences.

To me, awareness refers to a state in which we are conscious of mental activities, such as perceptions, thoughts, feelings, etc. — MoK

Agreed. I hope you can recognize that it would have been easier if you had simply said that in the first place, instead of asking.

That is true that MoK's brain at time t is related to Mok's brain at time t-1 plus other factors but that does not mean that MoK's brain at time t-1 plus other factors causes MoK's brain at time t. ...
1) The Hard Problem of consciousness, 2) Epiphenomenalism,
...These issues if not more are serious threats to physicalism. — MoK

You're deflecting. This part of the discussion dealt with your theory of mind, which I pointed out seemed incoherent.

I anticipate that you're strategy is to make an argument from ignorance: find a reason to reject physicalism, and then conclude "...therefore dualism must be true". No, you have to show you have a superior alternative. An incoherent theory is not superior. You DENY that it's incoherent, but you haven't been able to address my objections.

You seemed to agree that MoK's brain @t1 was caused by (MoK's brain at t0 + other factors). The question is: is the mind one of those other factors. Please answer it. I anticipate that either answer will contradict something you've already said, but we'll see. After you've shown your theory is coherent, then we can further discuss your issues with physicalism.

You're right, Trump is irrational. A better characterization is that he rationalizes some of the things he does.

Re: Nato, he has already de facto left it. He will never authorize US forces to defend an ally. Violating the NATO treaty is as easy as violating trade treaties. In the meantime, he could draw down US forces stationed in Europe and maintain a facade of membership to avoid much domestic heat.

Re: Trump-Putin, Trump is Putin's useful idiot. I'm not sure what you mean by Putin "crushing" us. He feels he can successfully compete in a world that ignores moral values and in which what is considered "true" is malleable. That's a pretty strong competitive advantage.

Here's the entirety of Trump's post on Tuesday, rationalizing his becoming aligned with Putin:

"Think of it, a modestly successful comedian, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, talked the United States of America into spending $350 Billion Dollars, to go into a War that couldn’t be won, that never had to start, but a War that he, without the U.S. and “TRUMP,” will never be able to settle. The United States has spent $200 Billion Dollars more than Europe, and Europe’s money is guaranteed, while the United States will get nothing back. Why didn’t Sleepy Joe Biden demand Equalization, in that this War is far more important to Europe than it is to us — We have a big, beautiful Ocean as separation. On top of this, Zelenskyy admits that half of the money we sent him is “MISSING.” He refuses to have Elections, is very low in Ukrainian Polls, and the only thing he was good at was playing Biden “like a fiddle.” A Dictator without Elections, Zelenskyy better move fast or he is not going to have a Country left. In the meantime, we are successfully negotiating an end to the War with Russia, something all admit only “TRUMP,” and the Trump Administration, can do. Biden never tried, Europe has failed to bring Peace, and Zelenskyy probably wants to keep the “gravy train” going. I love Ukraine, but Zelenskyy has done a terrible job, his Country is shattered, and MILLIONS have unnecessarily died – And so it continues….."

For the most part, Trump isn't being irrational here, he's simply being amoral, valuing only money. He believes profits will be maximized by supporting Putin. Although blaming Ukraine for failing to give Putin everything he wanted is bonkers.

I didn't ask for your definition of awareness — MoK

Yes, you did:

What is awareness to you? — MoK

Given your insult, I now gather that you weren't asking me for a definition, but that wasn't clear. Communication is a 2-way street. Accept responsibility for conveying what you mean, and that your words may not be interpreted in the way you have in mind.

You need to pay attention to my argument and definition of words — MoK

I just demonstrated that I pay close attention.

So again, why don't your brain's physical processes go in the dark? You are aware of thoughts, sensations, feelings, beliefs, etc. By aware here I mean that the opposite of the dark. You are not living in a dark state. Are you? You are aware of things. You can report what you are aware of too. — MoK

I answered that:

Absolutely things can happen to us, and/or to our brains, without our being aware of it. Examples:
-surgery under general anasthesia
-Developing cancer prior to symptoms
-hair growth
-brain damage caused by sudden trauma. — Relativist

If that wasn't what you meant, then CLARIFY, instead of insulting me for failing to read your mind.

Any physical including the brain does not exist in the immediate future. Phsycail exists at now. The subjective time however changes and this change is due to the Mind (please read my second argument in OP if you are interested). So there is a situation where the immediate future becomes now. Physical however does not exist in the immediate future so it cannot exist in the situation when the immediate future becomes now, therefore the Mind causes/creates the physical at now. — MoK

You're alluding to some particular theory you have about the nature of individual identity, and to a presentist conception of time. That would be fine, but it impedes communication when you make statements that allude to some theory you haven't described. In this case, it seems possible we largely agree, but maybe not -since you haven't explained. I'll nevertheless try, but contain your anger if my basis isn't consistent with yours. Instead, respond by explaining what you mean.

I embrace presentism, but also recognize that a past existed and that it caused the present, and that there will be a future that will come into being as a consequence of the present. In terms of the identity of objects, I embrace the identity of the indiscernibles: A and B are the SAME object (same individual identity) IFF they have the exact same set of properties (both intrinsic and relational). It follows from this that MoK's brain at time t0 is not identical to Mok's brain at time t-1. Nevertheless, it is also true that MoK's brain at t0 was caused by (MoK's brain at t-1 + other factors). We can identify MoK's brain as a "perduring identity": a temporally connected series of point-in-time MoK's brain. A point-in-time MoK's brain can also be considered a "state" of MoK's brain; hence my issue.

#2 referred to your statement "I am not saying that the brain is caused to do something" Are you saying you were wrong? — Relativist

You need to read the rest of my sentence: "I am not saying that the brain is caused to do something but the brain is caused." This was a response to you that you said the brain is caused to do something.. — MoK

Then your response didn't answer the question I asked. I haven't disputed that "the brain is caused", but I'm pointing out that the brain @t0 was casused by the brain @t-1 + other factors. Was the mind among the "other factors" or not?

The cause and effect in the case of Mind is the experience of physical and causation of physical. — MoK

This is vague. Be specific as to what is both the cause and the effect, and define what you mean by "experience" in this context - including how an unchanging Mind has experiences.

TBy this, I mean that the experience in the Mind is due to the existence of the physical. — MoK

What does "experience in the Mind" MEAN? It's unchanging, unaffected by anything going on in the world.

The existence of the physical is however due to the existence of the Mind since that is the Mind that causes physical in the subjective time. — MoK

Ah! The mind is causing something after all! Be specfic: what is it causing? Just saying "physical" is too vague. So rephrase this in more specific terms. Also explain how something that is unchanging has selective temporal points of interference - and how they are selected -given that the mind isn't learning or anticipating, since it's unchanging.

I question whether you can provide a coherent account, because you may be treating time inconsistently: from both a presentist viewpoint and a block-time viewpoint. But that's just a guess. It's your burden to make sense of it.

So we are dealing with vertical causation by this I mean that the physical in the state S1 causes an experience in the Mind. The Mind then causes physical in the state S2. The Mind then experiences physical in the state of S2 and causes physical in the state S3, etc. — MoK

Suppose there's a rock sitting under my living room sofa. It is present when I sit on the sofa, and when I get up. It has no causal role and isn't changed during my sitting and changing. How does an unchanging mind with no causal role differ from the rock? — Relativist

Any physical changes even those that seem to be unchanging. The rock is on Earth, Earth is moving so the rock. The particles that make an object are in constant motion even if the object is in space and has no motion. The Mind is Omnipresent in spacetime so it is changeless as I argued in my third argument. — MoK

The rock at t1 was caused by (the rock at t0 + other factors). Those other factors did not include my sitting and rising from the sofa. If the mind is existing outside spacetime, it is not "experiencing" events in space time. What exactly is its relation to spacetime? From its perspective, does spacetime exist as a 4-dimensional block? Alternatively, does the mind exist like a photon traveling at the speed of light - from its perspective, it exists simultanously along all spacetime points along its path - but also with no intereractions with anything else along that path (an interaction would entail a termination of the path).

The mind has non-physical properties, such as the ability to infer meaning and interpret symbols such as language and mathematics. These acts are not determined by physical causes in that there is no way to account for or explain the nature of the neural processes that supposedly cause or underlie such processes in physicalist terms, without relying on the very processes of inference and reasoning which we're attempting to explain. — Wayfarer

Inferring meaning is not uncaused. It is caused by our interaction with the world. Meaning entails a "word to world" relationship, where "world" is our internalized world-view, that evolves during our lives.

It begins in our pre-verbal stage, based on our sensory input (including our bodily sensations). Our natural pattern recognition capabilities provides a nascent means of organizing the world that's perceived facilitating interaction with it. Pattern includes appearance and function and associations to other things (eg spoon-food-hunger-taste-smell). These associations are the ground floor of meaning. Associations grow over time, thus gaining additional meaning.

Verbal language entails associating pattern of sounds with prior established visual patterns. Written words are associations with the verbal

Nascent inference is again pattern recognition (if x happens, y will follow). With language, it becomes more developed, and we can recognize patterns in the language - that there is a generalized "if x then y" .

Basic math entails patterns between quantities, leading to counting and then learning the general relations of arithmetic.

Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) are adept at pattern recognition, so that core capability is perfectly consistent with physicalism. More generally, ANNs provide empirical support for the emergence of complex behaviors from simple interactions between units, consistent with the the idea that the mind is an emergent property of neural activity.

this doesn't address the issue that we have to rely on such semantic relations to establish what is ontological - what is, for example, the nature of the physical, and how or if it is separate from the mind. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure I understand the objection, but I'll try to address.

Nature of the physical: We start considering the physical to be anything we can touch, or seems touchable. We only recognize that air (and other gases) are physical after scientific study. By that same token, we don't naturally recognize elements of the mind as physical, but we come to learn of clear physical dependencies - like memories, that can be lost due to disease and trauma. The notion that memories have a physical basis is consistent with information theory. Memory is the basic building block of the mind: recognized patterns entail memories.

Everything in the world outside ourselves is demonstrably physical. We are part of that world, so why we wouldn't be as well?

the mind - reason - is able to peer into the realms beyond the physical and to bring back from it, things that have never before existed — Wayfarer

The pattens in nature existed before us. Our intellect is based on our pattern recognition skills.

It does falsify physicalism, because it reverses the ontological priority that physicalism presumes, namely that the mind is dependent on or derived from the physical. Its saying that the physical is mind-dependent - the opposite of what Armstrong says. Not seeing it is not an argument against it. — Wayfarer

It's falsified on the assumption that the actual world mind-dependent. Similarly, a mind-dependent world is falsified by an assumption of physicalism. IOW, these are mutually exclusive assumptions. That is not what I meant.

I absolutely am not trying to convince you physicalism is true. This thread was about an alleged proof that physicalism is false. I've been explaining why the argument fails. That doesn't entail proving physicalism is true; it entails establishing that it is possible because it is a complete, coherent metaphysical theory. It's a burden of proof issue: the burden is on the proponent of an alleged proof. Otherwise we just agree to disagree.

But we're never in a position to see an actual world apart from or outside of the way the brain/mind construes it. It's not as if you can step outside of it. We know the world as it appears to us, but not as it is outside that. That is the meaning of the 'in-itself' - we don't see the world as it is in itself. — Wayfarer

I think we see reflections of actual reality, and that provides a basis for exploring further. You choose to believe that's hopeless. That's your provilege, but it leaves you with no basis for claiming anything exists outside your own mind. There appear to be other people, but appearances carry no weight with you.

I've presented a philosophical argument as to the circularity of the physicalist view. — Wayfarer

A coherent theory will necessarily have circular entailments. That doesn't falsify it; it's a feature that SHOULD be present. The proper question is: can one justifiably believe the world is 100% physical? Your subjective reasons to reject it do not undercut my justification.

You could develop a metaphysical theory that includes abstract objects, but it's just another unprovable theory.
— Relativist

Not true. What of mathematics? Mathematical physics? — Wayfarer

No; you miss my point. See this post, where I defined a mathematical system.

My point is that mathematical systems are intelligible, but that doesn't imply they have extra-mental existence. Two different systems can have incompatible axioms, which proves they can't both be representative of something in the real world. Intelligibilty is therefore not a reliable guide to what exists. Sometimes unintelligible things may be true (like wave/particle duality), and force us to rethink our paradigm.

The appeal of physicalism is that it is basically an attempt to reach scientific certainty with respect to philosophy — Wayfarer

No, it isn't. Rather, there's a 2-step process:
1) acknowledging that science provides the most trustworthy means of establishing a posteriori knowledge about the world. (Contrast with untestable philosophical reflection- including metaphysical theories). Scientific "facts" are not necessarily true, but the recursive nature of prediction, testing, and revision establishes the superior trustworthiness.

2) Science is not metaphysics; it can't account for itself. For this, we need a metaphysical theory. The objective standards for evaluating s metaphysical theory apply: parsimony and explanatory power. The required explanatory power is that it be able to account for all the uncontroversial facts of the world. Metaphysical naturalism does this more parsimoniously than anything else, because the only uncontroversial facts are analytic and a priori truths, and scientific facts.

Belief in metaphysical naturalism (per se) does not depend on any particular scientific theory being true. (Notwithstanding: scientific realism, which treats current science as true, and is thus falsified along with theories - and then resurrected anew with revised realist theory. I'm not a fan).

the reductionist program was to bring philosophy within the scope of this model and the 'Australian materialists' notably Armstrong and Smart, were advocates for this kind of ambitious scientifically-based reductionism. I think it's a misapplication of the scientific method. — Wayfarer

Non-reductive physicalism entails ontological emergence. Reductive physicalism assumes all high order properties and relations are the necessary consequence of the properties and relations of lower order constituents. Ontological emergence entails novel properties or relations appearing at higher levels that aren't fully accounted for by the lower levels. Philosophers tend to reject this for the same reason scientists do, not BECAUSE scientists do. It violates the PSR and is unparsimonious.

It seems that you don't account for the existence of mind (or mental activities) at all. You just deny physicalism, and offer no alternative.

What I'm arguing is that all such 'reductions' are themselves dependent on intellectual constructs. — Wayfarer

our experience of sense-able reality is still dependent on the brain — Wayfarer

So what? These don't doesn't falsify physicalism, and these don't imply alternatives are in any better position.

the world is not simply given but is also constructed by the brain-mind. What I fault physicalism for is neglecting or failing to take into account this basic fact. — Wayfarer

I disagree with the wording of the 1st sentence: it equivocates on "the world". There is an actual world, and then there is a concept of the world. There is some disconnect, of course. But there is also a connection: we exist within it.

Physicalism accounts for both the actual world and it accounts for the existence of minds within it. It's hypothesis, and skepticism is warranted. But the skepticism should be applied even-handedly, not just as an excuse to shoot down theories that lack some subjective appeal.

If by 'abstractions' you mean formal concepts, like number, arithmetical proofs and logical principles - my view is these are real, but not existent as phenomena. They are intelligible objects. They exist outside our individual minds but can only be grasped by a mind. — Wayfarer

You could develop a metaphysical theory that includes abstract objects, but it's just another unprovable theory. My point is that intelligibility doesn't establish existence. We can form concepts about abstract matematical systems unrelated to extra-mental reality. We can formulate, or learn, details about fictional entities (dragons, wizards, unicorns...) that are intelligible, but they are not part of extra-mental reality.

I pointed out in my first post that "experience" could be defined in a way that includes rocks;
— Relativist
Well, you said that experience is a physical process. That is all I need. Do you think that this physical process or experience in the case of the rock goes in the dark? Yes, or no? If yes, why the physical process in the brain does not go in the dark? Why things are not dark for you instead they have some features that you are aware of. Could you say that you are unaware of things that happen to you? What is awareness to you? — MoK

First I'll note that you're going with a broad definition of experience, one that applies to mindless objects as well as objects with minds. A boulder rolling down a hill experiences changes along the way: pieces are chipped off, and new substances stick to it. Certainly this can happen in the dark of night, and without any mindful beings being aware of it.

Absolutely things can happen to us, and/or to our brains, without our being aware of it. Examples:
-surgery under general anasthesia
-Developing cancer prior to symptoms
-hair growth
-brain damage caused by sudden trauma.

What is awareness? Awareness entails developing beliefs about some activity or state of affairs. This could be from direct perceptions (a perception is a belief), by being told (as when a surgeon describes what he did), or hearing about something indirectly (such as from news sources).

What do you mean mental here? Experience is a physical process for you and any physical undergoes a physical process so I don't understand what you are going to gain here. — MoK

Mental activity is brain activity associated with a revision of intentional states.

1. The brain... goes from one state to another state later.
2. I am not saying that the brain is caused to do something
3. it [the brain] is caused when it changes.
4. The mind is Omnipresent in spacetime as I argued in the third part of the argument in OP.

#1 entails a change of states. Change entails a cause for that change. #2 implies there is no cause of the state change. That's incoherent.

#3 makes no sense. What is the cause, and what is the effect?

Your assertion about the mind (#4) is unrelated to 1-3. — Relativist

Xxxxxx

2. I am not saying that the brain is caused to do something
— Relativist
The brain is caused since it changes. — MoK

The brain already existed. Do you mean a new brain state was caused? If so, what caused the brain to change states?

#2 implies there is no cause of the state change. That's incoherent.
— Relativist
#2 is incorrect. — MoK

#2 referred to your statement "I am not saying that the brain is caused to do something"
Are you saying you were wrong?

#3 makes no sense. What is the cause, and what is the effect?
— Relativist
By cause I mean it is created if that is not obvious. — MoK

Then your ignoring the cause-effect. What I challenged you to do was to explain the cause-effect relationship between mind and brain. On the one hand, you seem to deny there is one, but in that case, the mind isn't involved at all with what we do, nor with our experiences.

Here's what I mean by involvement: 1) a causal involvement, in which the mind causes something to take place in the brain. You deny this causal role; 2) the mind is impacted by something in the brain (e.g. by sensory perceptions), but this would entail a change to the mind - which you say is changeless.

The mind does not learn anything in the sense that we are learning. The Mind just experiences by this I mean it is aware of states of physical. It does not have any memory of things that experienced in the past. It just experiences a state of physical in one state and causes physical in another state immediately. — MoK

You said the mind is unchanging. Any sort of learning entails change, and it entails some sort of memory. So you're saying the mind does not learn in any sense at all, right?

Suppose there's a rock sitting under my living room sofa. It is present when I sit on the sofa, and when I get up. It has no causal role and isn't changed during my sitting and changing. How does an unchanging mind with no causal role differ from the rock?

defend them with reference to the obvious shortcomings of physicalism, about which you have not answered any of my arguments. — Wayfarer

Your theory also has shortcomings. You admitted to a huge one:

how could mind be an uncaused cause? Well, damned if I know — Wayfarer

Further, you note that we don't know that we're seeing the world as it is, but that also applies to our the product of our self-reflection about the mind. For example, abstractions seem to exist, because we can reflect on abstractions. That doesn't establish that they necessarily exist outside our minds. This extends to all the allegedly nonphysical character of mind: it seems correct but can't be established as such.

Do you think that a rock experiences as well? There is a physical process within a rock as well. If not, what makes a brain different from a rock? — MoK

I pointed out in my first post that "experience" could be defined in a way that includes rocks;

Define "experience". A boulder rolling down a mountain has "experienced" the roll, and has been altered in the process. Similarly our "minds" are altered by sensory perceptions and by its own inner processes. — Relativist

We subsequently honed in on "mental experiences", which entails mental activity. Rocks do not have a structure that produces mental activity. So the answer is: no, unless we broaden the definition.

Your definition is at best incoherent. — MoK

You obviously forgot we were discussing mental experiences. If you still think there's something incoherent, map it out - like I do, below, with my allegation of incoherence.

This is incoherent. If the brain is not caused to do something by the immaterial mind, then the mind has no role in an account of experience, and no role in behavior.
— Relativist
It is not incoherent. You need to read it carefully. — MoK

I did. Here's a breakdown of what you said:

1. The brain... goes from one state to another state later.
2. I am not saying that the brain is caused to do something
3. it [the brain] is caused when it changes.
4. The mind is Omnipresent in spacetime as I argued in the third part of the argument in OP.

#1 entails a change of states. Change entails a cause for that change. #2 implies there is no cause of the state change. That's incoherent.

#3 makes no sense. What is the cause, and what is the effect?

Your assertion about the mind (#4) is unrelated to 1-3.

There is vertical causation with the difference that the Mind is not subject to change whereas the physical is subject to change. — MoK

This contradicts #2, above. You now seem to be suggesting the mind is causing the brain to change. If that is what you mean, then there must be a causal connection to the brain. Describe the nature of this connection.

If the mind never changes, then why does it interfere with brain function when it does? The mind hasn't learned anything to base it on, because learning entails change.

What you think the 'world at large' is, relies on and is dependent on a great many judgements that you will make when considering its nature. You might gesture at it as if it were obviously something completely separate from you, but the very fact of speaking about it reveals the centrality of your judgement as to what the 'world at large' is. — Wayfarer

Sure, but why shouldn't we trust this judgement? If we don't trust it, then no scientific or metaphysical claims are justified.

Of course it exists. It's just that we don't see it as it truly is. Nobody sees it as it truly is. — Wayfarer

Then you should accept agnosticism and extreme skepticism.

You're starting from the assumption that the appearance, the phenomena, the world as it appears, is real independently of you, when your cognitive faculties provide the very basis for how it appears to you. If you want to refute this argument you need to understand what it is saying. It is not positing 'mind' as some objective, if ethereal, substance or thing.

My assumption is that our senses provide us a functionally accurate understanding of that portion of reality that we directly interact with. This is the epistemological ground for studying the world at large, beyond our direct access. This approach has lead to a coherent, and useful understanding of the world. Of course it's not provably true, but it's a rational worldview. It's also rational to be agnostic about the true nature of the world, but that is a dead-end.

I don't think the sense in which the mind is 'the product of reality' is at all well established or understood. — Wayfarer

Of course not. But it's a reasonable inference consistent with a coherent world-view. I don't see how you can defend any of your metaphysical judgements.

You define experience as a set of processes. That is not what experience is. When you experience something, it feels something in a certain way to you. So experience is not a mere process — MoK

Non-sequitur. As I said:

An experience is a set of perceptions (changes to the brain) and the related changes it leads to (eg the emotional and intellectual reaction; the memories).

Aren't you happy with my definition of experience?... — MoK

Of course not. You defined it in a way that's inconsistent with physicalism. You haven't identified anything that is necessarily non-physical. By contrast, my definition is neutral, and covers all associated, uncontroversial, facts.

...If not, you still need to define the experience since we cannot progress without it. — MoK

This is ridiculous! I already did!

Of course, experience is not an physical thing given my definition. And I don't assume its existence. — MoK

Consider what you're saying: you admit that you define experience as non-physical, then contradict yourself by claiming you don't assume it.

So, a chair is physical to you. What makes you think that the brain is not a physical object? — MoK

????!!!!??? Of course I think the brain is physical!

The brain like any other physical object is subject to change. It goes from one state to another state later. I am not saying that the brain is caused to do something but it is caused when it changes. The mind is Omnipresent in spacetime as I argued in the third part of the argument in OP. — MoK

This is incoherent. If the brain is not caused to do something by the immaterial mind, then the mind has no role in an account of experience, and no role in behavior.

It also has the ability to experience and cause physical. — MoK

You've just contradicted yourself.

The Mind is a substance that exists independently — MoK

If it is independent, there is no causation in either direction.

It causes a change in you because you as a person have a location in spacetime. — MoK

Then there has to be a causal connection between mind and brain. You gloss over this by making vague claims.

I have studied this topic but it seems that the nature of hallucination is not yet known to the best of my knowledge. — MoK

And yet, it makes perfect sense under physicalism. The point of my questions was to demonstrate that every metaphysical theory of mind has some problematic areas. If you were to claim non-physicalism is proven by the "hard problem" of physicalism, you'd be making an argument from ignorance. Such an argument from ignorance seems implied in your claims. The only reasonable approach is to draw an inference to best explanation: compare the strength and weaknesses of the 2 accounts. Among your challenges is the ad hoc nature of assuming a mind just happens to exist by brute fact. It's considerably more plausible to think "minds" are a rare, accidental occurrence in a universe of immense age with a potentially infinite extent.

And where is that 'external world' grounded, if not in the mind? — Wayfarer

It's grounded In the actual world. Don't you agree one exists?

The whole problem with physicalism, and the reason I'm criticizing it, is because it forget, omits, or excludes the role of the mind in the construction of what we understand 'the physical' to be. — Wayfarer

No, it doesn't. It just doesn't treat mind as the center of attention in metaphysics, like it appears you do. That's not a criticism, it's just an observation.

Physicalism accounts for the world at large first, and after that focuses on whether the mind can fit that paradigm. It can account for the mind, but it's not in the terms we generally apply to mental processes.

how could mind be an uncaused cause? Well, damned if I know, but I think agree with Kant: we only recognize causal relationships because the mind imposes a framework of intelligibility on experience. — Wayfarer

Naturalism (physicalism or physicalism+) accounts for minds coming to exist as a rare sort of thing in a 14B year old universe of potentially infinite size. That seems a superior account than a mind just happening to exist uncaused. Mind isn't a metaphysical ground. Our minds ground knowledge, but that's because knowledge is an aspect of minds. That our minds would reflect the reality that IS, seems reasonable because we are products of that reality.

the 'interaction problem' that bedevils Cartesian philosophy, but is only exists because of the idealised abstraction that gave rise to it. — Wayfarer

Agreed.

The mind and body is actually a body-mind with physical and psychic aspects that are inter-related.

What you regard as psychic aspects are a product of the abstract framework. It doesn't entail something nonphysical (in the broadest sense).

Notice the contradictory nature of 'making sense using physical brains' - you deploy the word 'physical' because you think it 'makes sense', but that all depends on what is meant by 'physical'. — Wayfarer

I don't see anything contradictory, other than uncareful semantics. "Making sense" of a word means a mental connection to its referent(s). Making sense of a proposition entails applying a learned pattern to the construction. This calls into question the grounding, but I think this can be plausibly accounted for in terms of the connection to the external world through our senses.

Much of our cognitive activity depends on sub- and unconscious processes, which by definition are not experienced (otherwise they'd be conscious). — Wayfarer

I disagree; all the processes are experienced - changes to the brain take place, but these changes are not connected directly to the portions that exhibit consciousness. Of course, there could be indirect connections - where the subconscious triggers emotions that affect conscious thoughts.

The mind has non-physical properties, such as the ability to infer meaning and interpret symbols such as language and mathematics. These acts are not determined by physical causes in that there is no way to account for or explain the nature of the neural processes that supposedly cause or underlie such processes. — Wayfarer

When an arm is raised, electrochemical signals are passed from brain to nerves that activate muscles that result in the activity. If mind decides to raise the arm, that intent has to somehow connect to the brain to cause it to occur. This suggests that either the mind has some physical properties, or the brain has some non-physical properties. Which is it? Either way, it seems problematic.

Logical relationships exist without being physical (e.g., modus ponens or the law of the excluded middle in logic). Arguably, so-called 'physical laws' are themselves not physical, in that they rely heavily on idealisation (perfect objects and contexts) and abstraction.

Meanings are real, yet they are not physical objects, and furthermore, to arrive at any concept of what physical objects are, requires the use of definitions, rules of inference, and so on, which cannot themselves be regarded as objects. — Wayfarer

Meanings and logic are semantic relations, not ontological (except insofar as we make sense of things using our physical brains).

the experience of "redness" is not itself a property of neural firings, even if those firings correlate with it. You cannot ascertain what it is like to see something red on the basis of the examination of neural data. — Wayfarer

The perception of redness is a representational brain state - it enables discrimination among objects. The "what it's like" seems to me to be imaginary, because the sense of it is not actually real.

A brain state may be correlated with an experience, but it does not contain meaning in the way that a sentence does. — Wayfarer

Meaning implies neural connections, connecting past learnings to current perceptions.

Then there's the various forms of the argument from reason, which says that if thoughts and decisions were physically determined, there would be no room for rational inference — Wayfarer

Rational inference is semantics applied to learnings.