My theory doesn't apply to everyone and it doesn't require anyone to be completely rational, but I don't see how you can deny that self-interest is one motivator. It's more of a challenge to obtain the vote of someone who perceives a candidate's policies will be contrary to his own best interests.

This whole discussion about centrist or left policies totally misses the obvious point that nobody cares about them in respect to elections. — Benkei

They care about policies indirectly: they care about themselves, so they are attracted to policies they perceive will benefit themselves. That means that "liberal" policies that help others don't attract voters (other than a core group of liberals like me), and will actually repel voters because of the perceived cost in taxes or deficits (or even opportunity cost - spending on someone else means you aren't spending for me)

Regarding "speaking truth" - I assume you're referring to subjective truth. Trump appeals to subjective truths all the time: the subjective "truths" of racists.

Anti-Trump fervor among that group will bring votes for any Democrat. We need to get back the working class, who used to be the core of the party. They care less about progressive ideals; they care about their own lives. That was Trump's appeal.

This is basically Biden's strategy. And, it didn't work in 2016, so why would it now? — Wallows

Biden is not Hillary. Lots of people hated Hillary, but everyone likes Joe. Joe is much more popular among blue collar voters than Hillary. There's also mucho lessons learned from the 2016 campaign - in particular, take nothing for granted.

And seriously, do you really think those issues I mentioned could pass? Is it worth taking a chance on them?
— Relativist

When Trump ran on building a wall and demonizing immigrants did anyone ask this? — Maw

I'll clarify my point. Those progressive policies will never be implemented no matter who is elected but people will vote against a candidate espousing them. This is like voting for Nader in 2000, which resulted in W being elected. Re:Trump, some people probably voted against him for his xenophobic positions, but obviously it didn't dissuade enough people. The "socialist" bugaboo may very well turn off swing voters- and that is exactly the strategy the Republicans are already using.

Most polls show that Medicare For All enjoys majority approval. — Maw

It will never get the needed 60 votes in the Senate, and some independents will be afraid to support a "socialist" candidate.

No Democratic candidate is supporting an open border policy so I have no idea why you mention that.

What candidate is talking about stemming illegal immigration? If they do NOT, their position will be defined by Republicans as being for open borders. (Free health care for the folks at the border? When many Americans lack health care? )

Reparations is more of a tertiary proposal rather than a focal one, but it's nevertheless has a split approval rating among Democrats, and notably has increased in popularity since 2014, even among Republicans.

A candidate supporting it it will lose more votes than he gains. This is irrespective of whether it ought to be considered.

This is so fucking funny because the Democrats nominated Clinton who was a centrist and she nevertheless lost, — Maw

Clinton was also....Clinton. who suffered from years of demonization. Lots of people voted against her, or didn't vote. Consider how low Trump's margin of victory was in key states - remove the anti-Hillary factor and you get a win.

And seriously, do you really think those issues I mentioned could pass? Is it worth taking a chance on them?

Here's the problematic issues: Medicare for all, open borders, and reparations. They cannot pass anyway, so steer away from candidates who promise these - they scare some people away.

I do not know what the best strategy is to defeat Trump, but I don't think ignoring what he says is the answer. Drawing attention to them may embolden some section of his followers but surely there are others who are upset by them, and, in addition, there are others who are undecided that may be sickened by what is happening and decide that they must vote for someone who opposes him. — Fooloso4

Have we learned anything new about Trump since being elected? Does anything he's done as President reveal anything about his character that wasn't already well known?

On top of that, we have a good economy, and a lot of people (bizarrely) think that Presidents control the economy.

So here's how to ensure Trump will be reelected: let him (and the Republicans), frame the debate in terms of protecting the country from socialism/communism. Show that the Republicans are right to assert Democrats want open borders, want to do away with private health insurance, want to raise individual's taxes, and are ready to start writing those reparations checks.

If you don't want Trump reelected, push for a centrist Democrat that will appeal to the working class and will not fit the Republican's caricature.

Why do you think philosophy majors are so enamored with socialism? — Wallows

I'd look at this from the opposite perspective: why are students in other majors less enamored with socialism? They value money and material things, and therefore they choose majors that will lead to well-paying jobs.

OK, but then I'll also make a closing statement.

It is logically impossible to make a decision that is an act of "unrestricted will". Every decision is a result of a set of factors (memories, beliefs, genetic dispositions, environmentally conditioned dispositions, learnings, desires, impulses, etc) that are in place at the time of the decision. Given those factors, there is zero chance an alternative decision could have been made in those exact circumstances. This isn't simply because determinism is true, it's because these factors are all inclusive - there are no other factors that could result in a different decision.

To illustrate, let's assume libertarian free will exists and John has a decision to make at time t1. At t1, Johan has a specific set of memories, beliefs, etc, and he makes decision X. If it is indeed possible to for John to make a decision other than X, why is he making it? The stated set of factors includes everything within John that can influence the decision, so if he could actually make a different decision, it would not be because of any of those fixed, internal factors. In that case, what can an "unrestricted" decision entail? Is it a freedom to ignore one's prior beliefs (etc)? No, because that entails an internal urge to ignore those beliefs (etc) - still internal. At t1, that urge is either present or it isn't - and whichever it is, it's a fixed fact. So I contend that alternative decisions are never possible (irrespective of determinism). Therefore the concept of an unrestricted freely willed decision is incoherent, a logical impossibility.

We can still apply the term "free will" to decisions with the understanding that "free will" entails accountability, and the fact that an alternative decision could have been made - if the person had only had some additional belief. If this doesn't seem free enough, bear in mind that it's as free as is logically possible to be.

Given the subject, shouldn't this be merged with the all-inclusive Donald Trump thread? :wink:

We should draw a distinction between telling an untruth and telling a lie.

When you tell the friend there is a cat, you have lied despite it actually being true. When you mistakenly believe the temperature is 35 degrees (it's actually 34 degrees) and you tell someone this, you have told an untruth but have not lied.

I think accountability rests on a completely different mechanism. It is not on freedom of will that it rests on; but it rests on the persona who is caused by his internal and external motivating factors to commit an accountable act. — god must be atheist

We probably agree with this: If a person is forced into performing a crime he is not responsible or accountable. If he was not forced into performing that act, he is responsible and accountable.

Where we differ is that I would label the latter case an act of free will, and you would not. I'm curious: what would free will look like if it existed? Let's say you make decision that is the product of your genetic and environmental dispositions, your beliefs, your impulses, the external conditions (temperature, humidity,...) how you felt, etc. The choice is consistent with determinism because all those factors have been caused. Now describe what must hypothetically be added or replaced to turn this decision into an act of free will -by your definition of free will.

.

It's nearly three o'clock in the night at my location. I'm turning in. Good night. — god must be atheist

Yikes! It's only an hour earlier here. I guess we both got carried away. Fun conversation.

This was a rhetorical question which I proceeded to answer. Please read my entire post that contained that. The post answers the rhetorical question, including the causation of encouraging good behaviour and creating accountability. — god must be atheist

I would like you to understand that free will is actually consistent with determinism - you too hastily dismissed that. It's as free as it needs to be to hold people accountable (regardless of whether we're talking morality or the law).

I'll add a comment on this:

If they get caught and convicted and sentenced, then it sends a message to many, many other people: do not break the law because you get into big trouble. — god must be atheist

I agree - and therefore we should embrace this process EVEN THOUGH whatever occurs was inevitable. What we do, as a society (in terms of the laws it passes, the enforcement, etc) - are integral to what will occur. Despite the fact that the future is inevitable, we are ignorant of the future and we are part of the process that determines what that future will be.

So my main two points are:
1) the will is sufficiently free to hold people accountable;
2) we are not powerless - we make the future. It's irrelevant that the future that we make is inevitable because what we do (or don't do) will still have contributed to that future.

How can we nail them to their misdeeds if they don't have a free will? — god must be atheist

That's my point: they DO have free will - no one is making them do the wrong thing. Sure, that they would choose to do wrong is a product of outside forces, but encouraging good behavior is also an outside force - so we should engage in it.

And the main issue that I am trying to drive in, is that your will is CAUSED by your inner world, but it is CAUSED and these causes are themselves caused in turn. Since a cause can have only one effect, or a conglomeration of causes can only have one effect, it follows that the effect is restricted.That is my point. The effect is not free. And the causes that cause that effect are not free, either, they are restricted, by the causes that caused them in turn. — god must be atheist

I agree with this, but it ignores moral accountability.

Engaging in bad acts (murder, stealing...) is (and should be) discouraged by holding people accountable for their actions. They are responsible because they COULD have refrained from committing the act - and they WOULD have done so if they better understood the consequences (both the punishment, and the internal feelings of shame and guilt). I want to encourage good behavior, and if my desires are realized - then there will be more good behavior. It will have been inevitable, but my contribution (and that of others who are like minded) will have been important contributors to making this happen.

x

Things of different complexity still obey determinism. It makes no difference how complex one mechanism is and how simple another one is. They both obey the cause-effect chain to be not broken by some supernatural intervention. — god must be atheist

Agreed.

Would you deny any one of the intervening steps of causation as a true step of cause and effect between the Big Bang and your eating Corn Flakes for breakfast? In other words, do you maintain that some of the events in the chain of events between the Big Bang and your eating breakfast was NOT caused? — god must be atheist

Of course not.

If your breakfast choice was not predictable by the time of the Big Bang, then there had to be an event that was not caused. Because as long as all causes had effects, and all events had causes, then the choice of your eating breakfast had a direct line of cause-effect chain to the big bang.

It was predictable, but that doesn't change the fact that the choice was a product of my internal processing - and I ate what I wanted. If you eat what you want, why would you not consider that your own free choice? Sure, your wants were caused, but they're still YOUR wants.

I am sorry, Relativist, but your own simile or parallel is lame. On one hand you say the Grand Canyon has been predictable by the events in the Big Bang; you equated the development of the Will to the development of the Grand Canyon; then you say that the will was not predictable at the time of the Big Bang. — god must be atheist

The Grand Canyon's shape and our choices have this in common: they are inevitable. What is unique about ourselves is that we are complex decision-making machines, while the Colorado River is not. The output of a computer program is inevitable, but the computer is still needed to perform the computing that produces that output. Our choices are inevitable, but the workings of our brains are still necessary to reach that inevitable outcome.

how can you call this freely willed, when it's completely determined previously? — god must be atheist

Because the big bang did not decide that I would eat corn flakes for breakfast. I made the choice, based on my own desires at the time. If I do what I want, why wouldn't I consider that a freely willed choice?

What I freely choose was inevitable because there's a long causal chain that leads to it, but don't forget that the causal chain includes the processes internal to our brains that comprise our thought processes.

it was caused to be one way only — god must be atheist

Yes, but the cause lacked intentionality. The shape of the grand canyon was not chosen, rather - it was a consequence of the conditions being what they were. Same with our choices - the choices (as choices) were not determined at the big bang; rather, the factors that led to those choices were inevitable.

Compatibilism is an invention by some peace-maker-to-be, who decided to invent this notion, in order to appease people who would be otherwise on the verge of total ego hull breach if they had to finally concede under tremendous pressure of evidence that there is no free will. — god must be atheist

Not at all. We believe we have free will, because it seems like we do. How can we explain that, if determinism is true? It turns out that freely-willed choices are perfectly consistent with determinism: we make choices because of a variety of factors within ourselves, factors that were caused by things outside ourselves (what we're taught, genetics,desires...). Rather, it seems to me that Libertarian Free will is the invention - it's free will with the added assumption that determinism is false. What's so great about libertarian free will? How does this make our choices any better than making a choice that is a product of our own beliefs?

Yes, the choice is ours; but it has been predicated. Whether by internal or outside factors, the choice is always pre-predictable. — god must be atheist

The choice has been determined, and it was predictable - but only in principle. In principle, the shape of the grand canyon was predictable at the big bang, the shaping process still required a long series of prior steps to get there.

Also, not all things that influence your choices are internal. Not that that matters, but still.

Take any example. Describe it to me, and I respond how the choice eventually made was not possible to be different than what it eventually was.

The process of making a choice is entirely yours, and the factors that led you to make that choice were entirely within you. Each of those factors was caused - something caused you to hold a belief, or to have a desire or predilection, but the choice itself was a product of you - just like the Grand Canyon was a product of the Colorado river.

Mirage?

Compatibilism is the notion that our choices are indeed freely willed, because they are OUR choices: all the factors that influence the choice are internal to ourselves: beliefs, feelings, impulses, etc.

Determinism doesn't mean there is no free will, it means there is no Libertarian Free Will. Compatibilists account for a free will that is consistent with determinism:

The choices you make are still YOUR choices, not someone else's.
You could have made a different choice, for example:

• had you better understood the consequences
• had you placed more weight on the long term vs the short term

You are accountable for those choices - you made it based on your own beliefs, desires, impulses, etc, and you could have and would have made a better choice if you had been less selfish (accountability encourages everyone to understand there are consequences to ones actions and to weigh this knowledge into their choices).

Old age has its merits, one being a strange sense of discipline one follows. — god must be atheist

I'm old too. Some of us old folks feel that we make better decisions than we did when we were young, and this is because we know more (and are somewhat less driven by hormones). This too is consistent with a compatibilist account of free will.

If you're referring to Quantum Mechanics, it's still (at least) probabilistic determinism - when there is quantum uncertainty.

The success of science. Empirical evidence shows the world to behave in regular, predictable ways, which supports the hypothesis that there are inviolable laws of nature. Scientific efforts to uncover those laws of nature (or at least approximations of those actual laws) have been extremely successful.

While it's true that determinism can neither be proven nor disproven, I suggest that determinism should be the default assumption in the physical world. This leaves room to debate the nature of mind - if mental activities are entirely physical, then we should assume determinism. If mental activities are at least partly the product of something non-physical, only then should we consider the possibility that determinism might be false.

I'm fine as long as you're not claiming these seemingly random factors "prove" determinism is false. Whims, impulses, etc are just as consistent with determinism as are dice throws.

I think creating another existence is special responsibility and an endorsement of life but simply existing isn't. — Andrew4Handel

I agree, but what particular duties are entailed by this special responsibility?

Sorry. Sure, I make seemingly random choices. e.g. I lay in bed for some random number of minutes after the alarm goes off.

Don't you make any decisions that seem random, where you have two or more options you like equally, so you do the mental equivalent of "rolling dice" (where we're assuming that dice-rolling gives us random results)? — Terrapin Station

Rolling dice seems random, but we know the outcome is actually determined by the physical factors involved in the roll. Do you really think that there's some sort of truly random process in our brains (or in our spiritual minds, if you are a dualist)? It may SEEM that way, but there's no way to know if that's the case. But if we do produce randomness, why is that such a wonderful thing to have as part of our decision making?

if determinism is to be true then what would make up said hopes, dreams etc. would also be the result of previous experiences, the genetic traits and the environment that surrounds me. — AwazawA

All of that is true REGARDLESS of whether or not we have libertarian free will. What factors lead to a decision BESIDES these things, if libertarian free will is true?

free will would mean that out of options a) b) c) & d) I would be able to pick c) knowing it was possible for me to pick any other option. free will is the embodiment of wishful thinking in relation to past, present and future, it is like saying I could have chosen differently when the results are that I didn't choose any differently out of the options...

Even if determinism is true you could have chosen differently - if you knew something more, felt more strongly about something, were more (or less) willing to take risks... There are factors in any decision, even if the decision is based purely on whim.

Imagine two identical, possible worlds -with identical versions of you in both worlds. In both worlds, you reach a decision point. In both worlds, you have identical genetics, identical experiences up to the decision point, etc. Wouldn't both versions of you make the same decision, even if free will is true? If not, why not? I can think of no reason to think the decision would be different unless there is some randomness to the decision - and adding randomness hardly seems like something to hope is present.

Please contemplate how your decision making processes if you actually had free will. If the decision were important, you would try to think of all the consequences, some would be good some would be bad. You might weigh these against one another. You might give greater weight to long term consequences, or perhaps you'd be more inclined to receive a sure short term benefit instead of a possible long term detriment that may or may not occur. All of the factors you would consider would come from you, your mind - your knowledge of the world, your hopes, your dreams, your desires as well as your worries and fears.

Now suppose determinism is true, and thus your will is not truly free. What would actually be different? The decision still comes from within, it is still produced by deliberation with all the same factors. Your knowledge of the world would not be any differerent; you'd have the same hopes, dreams, desires, worries, and fears. Would you choose differently? Why? All the factors that lead to a choice are there. If truly free will leads to the same decision, then what is the difference? If truly free will were to lead to a DIFFERENT decision - what would be the reason for that decision - since the factors that lead to the decision are identical?

That's not being free in any interesting sense. Somebody acting on their intentions doesn't make them blameworthy and praiseworthy for their actions — GodlessGirl

Yes it does.

We act in accordance with our beliefs, feelings, dispositions, desires, whims, etc. An act earns public praise or condemnation based on societal values, values that most of us internalize so that they become beliefs (about what is right/wrong) and dispose us to act accordingly.

Also they aren't making a "choice" if the actions is determined. If it's determined then they couldn't have done otherwise and choice implies their was more than one option. — GodlessGirl

Specific choices are not predetermined as choices. Rather, a choice is determined by the factors I mentioned (beliefs, feelings, dispositions...). No, you couldn't have chosen different given the set of beliefs, feelings, dispositions you hold. However, you WOULD have chosen differently had those factors differed. If you come to believe in moral nihilism, because "free will" isn't as free as you'd like, this itself will influence your behavior.

You are answering the hard question with easy question answers. The question is WHY is it that there is such thing as a subjective feeling of quale in the first place? Or rather WHAT is this subjective feeling of color? If we say it is X, Y, Z physical phenomena, how is it that a physical phenomena IS this quale feeling.. The easy questions deal with simply causal explanations... neural architecture, evolution, correlates of consciousness.. that is not what I am asking though.. — schopenhauer1

I don't have a complete answer, but see my above response to Marchesk for a partial answer. The hard question is....HARD, no doubt. But Michael Tye at least chips away at it, I think.

Does Type support an identity theory of mind? — Marchesk

Yes.. See below.

Okay, but the hard problem is showing how a brain state of seeing red is a red experience, or results in a red experience. Saying they're identical is one way to go that would fit with physicalism. But it doesn't explain why some brain states are experiential and others are not. — Marchesk

Here's Tye's basic answer (partly copied, partly paraphrased, from his book, "Consciousness Revisited"):

1. Red = physical property R (e.g. so-and-so reflectance of light wavelengths)
2. Experiencing red = standing in physical relation M to physical property R

Tye then asks, "why, once so-and-so physical facts are in place, am I experiencing anything? His answer is the following identity:

3. Having an experience = having physical property P

Next he asks, "How could phenomenal consciousness just be a certain physical property? Surely if something SEEMS phenomenally conscious, it IS phenomenally conscious. "

His answer: we are not aware OF phenomenal consciousness at all. What we are aware of are the qualities (like redness) of which phenomenally conscious states make us aware.

Since the bearers of phenomenal consciousness are experiences of which they are composed, this means that nothing SEEMS phenomenally conscious to us. hence, the idea that if something seems phenomenally conscious it IS phenomenally conscious, rests on a false presupposition.

The quale "green" is not ontologically identical to the scientific concept of green (e.g. the range of wavelengths), but the two are related to one another: objects that we perceive as matching the green quale of experience are also known (through science) to reflect light in a specific range of wavelengths. — Relativist


Right, but this presents an ontological problem. For physicalists, anyway. — Marchesk

I showed how qualia fit into a physicalist account (I did not originate this; I'm relating Michael Tye). I realize this isn't a complete account, but it's a piece of the puzzle.