When you say something is innate, what does that mean? I would say innate means we have them without experience of the external world, or we have it from birth. — Corvus

That's exactly what I mean.

Is past present future innate? — Corvus

That's NOT what I'm suggesting. I'm suggesting that we have some intrinsic sense of temporal priority: we don't confuse a past action with a present one, and we anticipate/ hope for/ dread future acts but not past ones.

These are examples..I don't know the exact nature of this intrinsic sense of "time", but only noting that there must be something.

I suggest that the best explanation for this vague sense of time, is that it is consistent with reality: there's something ontological; it's not just a figment of the imagination.

It's a secondary matter as to how we account for time, and how we analyze it. We first need to accept that there is SOMETHING ontological to it.

Could "present" be being? Being is a concept which needs some explanation too, my friend. Would you agree? — Corvus

I agree, and I think it's worthwhile to construct a framework that helps us analyze time. A framework that makes successful predictions is better than one that doesn't. Would you agree?

Your view is a form of necessitarianism, — Bob Ross

You're equivocating. You had responded to my example in which I treated the result quantum collapse as actually contingent (and I STIPULATED it as such in the example) by asserting:

"If necessitarianism is true, then there are no other possibilities than the causality that occurred because nothing could have been otherwise".

Apply the label "necessitarianism" to my view if you like, but don't draw inferences based on the label. I absolutely believe there MAY BE contingency in the world, and that quantum collapse MAY HAVE a contingent outcome. This view fits the axiom of contingency I gave you.

I was charitably interpreting your idea of a “non-actual possibility”: like I stated before, possibility is coherence of a thing with a mode of thought (e.g., metaphysics, physics, logic, etc.). — Bob Ross

It's not "charitable" to make an assertion that simply contradicts what I've said, especially in light of the fact that I linked you to Yablo's paper in which he demonstrates the disconnect between conceivability and metaphysical possibility.

You apparently believe contingency is the default: if necessity isn't proved (or accounted for), contingency should be assumed. I believe the converse: if contingency can't be proved (or accounted for), then necessity should be the default. I justify my view on the basis that laws of nature exist and that they entail a necessitation. If quantum collapse has a truly indeterminate outcome, it's still a necessitation in that it necessitates a well-defined probability distribution of possible outcomes (David Armstrong refers to this as "probabilistic determinism"). What's your basis? Can you undercut mine?

composition is a kind of causality — Bob Ross

That depends on the metaphysical system you're using to account for it. My impression is that yours depends on a form of essentialism that considers an object's identify to be associated with an essence, to which "accidental" (contingent) properties may attach. That such essences exist is metaphysical dogma, not something that can be demonstrated to exist. My view is that object identity is consistent with identity of the indiscernibles:

A = B iff both have the exact same set of properties (both intrinsic and relational).

Without contingent properties, your argument from composition fails. That's because an object's constituents are an identity to the object itself.

That’s nonsense. That’s never what contingency has been about in the sense I described; and will never exclusively refer to what you mean here. All you did is axiomatically preclude a discussion about contingency in the sense of being caused. — Bob Ross

The axiom I cited was a direct quote from Amy Karofsky's book, "A case for Necessitarianism". She makes a strong case for the past failure of philosophers to provide a metaphysical account of contingency. She convinced me that contingency needs to be accounted for, not just assumed (as you do). I'm confident she would agree with the way I applied it to composition, not that it matters per se. It's coherent and consistent with everything we know about the world. You obviously don't like it because it's inconsistent your Thomist metaphysical framework. But as I've repeatedly reminded you, YOU have the burden of proof, and in my case - that means you would have to undercut the contingency axiom I stated. You can't, and that's why you're just reacting emotionally now.

This shouldn't have been necessary. It was obvious to me from the beginning that your argument depended on Thomist metaphysics. In my first post, I said "Thomism is a theistic metaphysics - Aquinas developed it from Aristotelian metaphysics, in order to make sense of God's existence. So it's unsurprising that it would entail a God. I get the fact that this would appeal to theists, but it has no power to persuade non-theists, unless you succeed in fooling them into treating the metaphysical framework as true."

You didn't accept this THEN, but I've given you a good basis to accept it NOW.

Even if this axiom were granted, then we would just refer to caused beings then instead of contingent beings: this doesn’t help your case. If a chair is caused by, at least in part, the atoms which comprise it; then, boom, we have the same argument taking lift off…

Composition and cause are two different things. Funny that you relied on this difference in your last post, when you argued that an object that was causally necessitated was (ostensibly) contingent upon it's composition. Since I proved you wrong, you're now backtracking.

Contingenct axiom aside, the necessity of composition can only be false if objects have contingent properties. If such were present then individual identity would violate identity of indiscernibles. Of course, you believe there are contingent properties because you embrace Thomism, which assumes there is essence. The existence of essence is axiomatic to Thomism.

This means that the entity’s composition suffices to demonstrate the necessity of that being because, under necessitarianism, causation could not have failed to be exactly what it is.

I am 100% certain I correctly interpreted what Karofsky said. Her wording was intentional, and I applied it correctly.

Suppose cause C indeterminately causes some one member of a set of possibilties to exist. All members of the set are possible, but only one will member will be actualized. The other members of the set are "non-actual possibilities"

No, no, no. If necessitarianism is true, then there are no other possibilities than the causality that occurred because nothing could have been otherwise—... — Bob Ross

Why the heck does it matter what necessitarianism would entail? I've never suggested I'm defending necessitarianism. I was simply answering YOUR QUESTION: "What the heck is a non-actual possibility?", I simply gave you an example in which I STIPULATED that the outcome was indeterminate, to help you understand the concept. Personally, I'm agnostic as to whether quantum indeterminacy entails metaphysical contingency. But if it does, it's consistent with my contingency axiom.

The only cogent interpretation of a ‘non-actual possibility’ would be either A) a possibility which failed to occur or B) something which is conceivable but not currently actual. — Bob Ross

ROFL! I previously called you out for what appeared to be, your conflating conceivability with metaphysical possibility, which you then denied. But now you're being explicit - suggesting that conceivablity is all that's needed to establish that something is contingent. There's no rational basis for this claim, and that's why IMO my axiom of contingency makes perfect sense to me. Contingency entails "non-actual possibilities", and I find it absurd to think that non-actual possibilities don't need to be accounted for metaphysically. I don't care if you accept that, because I'm not defending an argument with the hope of persuading you. I'm just explaining the reasons I reject YOUR argument.

You are not understanding this argument at all. — Bob Ross

You don't appear to be understanding MY argument. I explained why I'm convinced the past is finite. If you think I made a logical error, identify it.

As an aside, I arrived at my view that the past is finite after spending a good bit of time examining the Kalam Cosmological Argument, which depends on the past being finite. Although I didn't find William Lane's Craig's argument for a finite past persuasive, I studied the issue on my own, applying my math background, and landed on the argument I gave you. My only point here is to demonstrate that I don't simply go into denial when seeing an argument I disagree with. You should try to do the same.

1) it is apriori more sensible to believe so - no examples of property-less objects can be cited


This would be a reasonable a posteriori argument if, again, we didn’t have an example now by way of demonstrating that a simple being is required to explain completely the causal chain of composition of an object.

2)it is an ad hoc assumption, that adds no needed explanatory power


It does, because we cannot explain composition otherwise. — Bob Ross

Apparently THOMIST metaphysics can't explain composition otherwise, but that's irrelevant. I can explain composition with MY metaphysical framework just fine.

Time itself doesn't have past present future. It is us who divide time into those categories depending on what point, and what part of time we want to focus on. — Corvus

Do you deny there's some innate sense of past, present, and future? If you agree that there is, WHY do you suppose we have this?

time itself doesn't become anything. — Corvus

Of course not: time isn't a thing. But the present has just come into being

Do all your all imaginings matter?

You clearly have an intuitive understanding of past present and future - because you refer to.them . Those are "imaginings", but they're primary - innate. No one has to train you to distingish events in this way. You just learn words to apply to your innate sense.

That distinguishes it from your other imaginings about past present and future.

The ordered relation: past-present-future refers to the actual, not to the order we choose to contemplate them.
— Relativist
In theory, the ordered relation is true, but in reality they are one. If you think about it, future continuously becomes present, and present becomes past. In this case, is the division actually valid? — Corvus

It does not follow that they are one. The "becoming" needs to be accounted for, and can be - in a way consistent with your intuitive basis.

It is important to note the difference between a necessary being in the sense of being incapable of failing to exist vs. in the sense of being uncaused. The former still allows for contingency of existence on other things, and the latter entails brute facts. I think this is the crux between us, which rides on a conflation between these two. — Bob Ross

Here's my Axiom of Contingency:

A contingent entity requires not merely a explanation for its being or being such as it is, but an explanation for the possibility that it could have been otherwise.

As previously discussed, an uncaused object exists without explanation, therefore it is not contingent.
Could an uncaused object be contingent upon its composition? Let's see.

First a preliminary point. There is more to a composition than a list of objects. It also includes the arrangement of the objects. Example: A molecule of glucose has the exact same set of atoms as a molecule of fructose, but the atoms are arranged differently (they are termed "isomers").

Now apply the axiom to a composed object, C. C is explained by its composition. C is contingent only if this explanation (the composition) could also explain C's nonexistence. That's obviously false. C IS the specific arrangement of the objects that compose it. It's a strict identity.


Conclusion: an object's composition necessitate the object being what it is; the composition is not contingent. Necessitarian Amy Karofsky puts it this way:

"the necessity of a necessary entity just consists in its being the way that it actually is. Thus, an explanation of the entity’s being as it is will be an account of its necessity. "
(Page 3 of "A Case For Necessitarianism")

What the heck is a non-actual possibility?!? — Bob Ross

This reflects back to the axiom.
Suppose cause C indeterminately causes some one member of a set of possibilties to exist. All members of the set are possible, but only one will member will be actualized. The other members of the set are "non-actual possibilities". Also, if C caused D, then "D's nonexistence" is a non-actual possibility.

There must be a first cause because an infinite series of causes is viscious, NOT because an infinite series of compositions is viscious

This isn’t true, though — Bob Ross

"Viscious" means having a vice; i.e. something objectionable about the account. The vice I identified was that there would be nothing to account for the chain as a whole. You're right, that IF God exists, he could account for it. That might be relevant if it could be shown that the past is infinite. Even if it's a live possibility, it doesn't entail God, it just entails that something must underlie the causal chain. You'd at least have to show that God is the best explanation. Your case would require you to show magical knowledge is plausible, which you obviously can't.

But we don't need to debate that, because there's a worse vice for an infinite past: it entails reaching the present from an infinite past, through a sequence of steps of finite duration. No set of finite duration steps can complete an infinity.

The past process is symmetrical to reaching an infinite future through a day-by-day process. Every step takes you a finite number of days from today. "Infinity" is never reached. The past is a mirror image: it's impossible reach from an infinite past.

Nothing can exist that lacks properties, so no object can exist that meets your definition of "absolutely simple".

Ok, but let’s go back to the composition quick argument I gave you: that demonstrates that your metaphysical theory here is false... — Bob Ross

I showed that your composition theory is inconsistent with my contingency axiom.

so I have not reason to believe that nothing can exist that lacks properties.

It's irrelevant what you believe. You have the burden of proof. But you could try to undercut my belief. I believe objects have properties, because: 1) it is apriori more sensible to believe so - no examples of property-less objects can be cited - 2)it is an ad hoc assumption, that adds no needed explanatory power. 3) it fits a coherent, parsimonious metaphysical theory.

I assume you agree that our imaginings of future and past are not the same as the future and the past.

But when you are reflecting the events in past, present and future, they don't need to always in the order of the past -> present -> future. You could think about the future on what will happen to your project or the world in next year, and then you could go back to the past, when you have started the project, and then think about the present state of the world economy — Corvus

So reflecting on past and future doesn't have bearing on their having actually been a past, nor in there eventually being a future. Right?

The ordered relation: past-present-future refers to the actual, not to the order we choose to contemplate them.

What did you mean by "future" when you said:

I was imagining and meaning some present moment in the future, — Corvus

?

because they're not existent objects, then naturalism is obliged to say that whatever reality they possess is derivative - products of the mind — Wayfarer

This sounds like a denial that they exist immanently. Existing entails them actually existing, but immanently- not as independent objects.

Abstractions are mental attitudes, which are derived by considering multiple objects with common elements, and mentally substracting the aspects that distinguish them. These mental attitudes ("abstractions") have no bearing on the ontology of the objects. They pertain only to how we might think about them.

And I would say, that this relation exists as an intelligible relationship, a regularity that registers as significant for an observing mind. Furthermore that while right angles might exist immanently in particular a carpenter's square they also transcend any specific instantiation. That it is actually a principle, or a form, which can be grasped by an observing mind, and existent in the sense that you and I can both grasp what a right-angle is. — Wayfarer

The right angles don't EXIST transcendently, nor does any "form". That would entail reifying abstractions.

Great. The next question is: what is the ontological status of relations?

Consider 2 straight objects, touching at their ends, and lying at a 90 degree angle to one another (a carpenter's square). I would not say that the 90 degree angle exists (it's not an object in the world), but rather: a state of affairs exists (the carpenter's square), and that the 90 degree relation is a component in this state of affairs. So in this sense, 90-degree angle does exist- immanently, within the state of affairs.

This may, or may not, extrapolate to the time-relation, but it's at least a step in that direction.

Space is not like time. Space exits without measuring anything. Does time exist, if you didn't measure it? Can you tell time without looking at a watch or clock? — Corvus

Both time and space are reference frame dependent. Space isn't an existent; it doesn't have properties. Rather, space (distance; length) is a relation between things that exist.

Time doesn't exist either. It's not a relation between things that exist. Rather, it's a relation between events.

The idea of it being magical just begs the question — Bob Ross

I use the term "magical knowledge" to refer to the existence of knowledge by brute fact in the absence of any sort of medium. Both aspects are grossly implausible. You've presented no metaphysical account of how this could be, you haven't suggested a metaphysical grounding of it.
Question-begging applies to arguments. I'm not the one making an argument. I'm just explaining what I believe, and why I believe it.

it is worth noting that your view depends on physical processes for beings to apprehend the forms of things, and we still to this day have no clue how that would work in the brain — Bob Ross

We don't know how information is stored in the brain, but we have strong evidence that it is stored there: disease and trauma to the brain can destroy memory.

The apparent fact that information entails some form of encoding doesn't entail a physical encoding. Information theory still seems to apply, and information theory takes it for granted that the information exists in some non-simple form.

A composed being is not necessary, and its parts are not necessary unless those parts do not depend on something else to exist. — Bob Ross

Nonsense. A complex being could exist by brute fact. If it does then its existence is a necessary fact. Here's why.

Suppose C is an existing object or past actual event. If C is contingent, this means ~C is a non-actual possibility. What makes ~C truly possible? How do we (metaphysically) account for a non-actual possibility? Here’s how I account for it: suppose E is the metaphysical explanation for C. If C is contingent, then E must account for this contingency. So E explains: C & possibly(~C).

This doesn't imply object C exists eternally (at all times). It just means that when it actually exists, it could not have failed to exist.

So if C is a brute fact, there is no E that accounts for C & possibly(~C). Therefore brute facts are necessary.

Concrete example: suppose determinism is true. This implies every event, and everything that comes to exist, is the necessary consequence of prior conditions. There is contingency only if some prior condition is contingent. Because determinism is assumed, the only possible contingent fact is the initial conditions. If those initial conditions existed by brute fact, then their existence is not contingent.

It's erroneous to conflate conceivability with metaphysical possibility. Stephen Yablo shows this to be the case here: Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility? You do exactly that, as I'll show below.

Contingency is about existing dependently on something else, and necessity is to exist independently of anything.

That is only conceptual contingency, not metaphysical. If the universe is deterministic, then every state of the universe is the necessary consequence of past states. There are relations among objects in the universe (such as distance, gravitational attraction, and the chemical bonds), but all these factors are necessarily present. You're just conceptualizing (say) the solar system existing without (say) Mercury. But it's not truly metaphysically possible.

This does not make the parts necessarily existent: they are necessary for the composed being to exist as that being, and this is just another way of saying the composed being is contingent on its parts. — Bob Ross

Only conceptual contingency. Your conception ignores the overall context that I described.

Autonomy is a bad term for this, as that relates only to agents; — Bob Ross

No, it doesn't. I defined it as something that exists without cause or dependency. The universe (the totality of material reality) exists autonomously if naturalism is true.

Think about it. If the table exists only insofar as the atoms comprising it are in such-and-such arrangement which makes the table contingently existent from the atoms — Bob Ross

The existence of a table at a time and place, within a deterministic universe, has necessarily come to exist. Again,you are conceptualizing by ignoring the broader context.

Firstly, as I said above, that a being would no longer be that being without certain parts does NOT entail that those parts nor the being are nor is necessary. — Bob Ross

What entails it being necessary or contingent is whatever accounts for its existence.

Because if it can’t be infinite then there must be a first cause, and this first cause must not have parts (because, if it did, then it would just be a member of this infinite series of composition—and we just established that that is impossible). — Bob Ross

There must be a first cause because an infinite series of causes is viscious, NOT because an infinite series of compositions is viscious. You're conflating 2 different things.

9. Two beings can only exist separately if they are distinguishable in their parts.
False. Two beings can have identical intrinsic properties. Example: water molecules.

I am not sure we can make headway on this one ): — Bob Ross

The only rational choice is for you to agree with me, and drop your assumption. That's because I gave a real world example that falsifies your assumption.

All I will say is that if the two beings have properties—irregardless if it is intrinsic or extrinsic—then they are not absolutely simple — Bob Ross

Nothing can exist that lacks properties, so no object can exist that meets your definition of "absolutely simple".

I am, of course, judging this from the perspective of my metaphysical theory. As I said in my first post, your argument depends on metaphysical assumptions that I disagree with. You refused to accept that, and insisted I comment on your premises. In every case, I evaluated them on my metaphysical views, as you should expect because you didn't present an argument for YOUR metaphysical system. I believe I have proven my point.

The label is irrelevant; that's just semantics. What's relevant is the relations between the parts, things like their individual lengths, angles between them, distance between parts, etc. These are ontological.

If you think tables have an essence, tell us what it is. — Banno

To be clear: I do not believe in essences nor "natural kinds".

Yes, there's a "form", in a physicalist (not platonic) sense: the parts exist with relations to the other parts: legs a certain distance apart, with a roughly 90 degree angle to the table top.

So I'm not saying "table" is some ontological category.

Start with a dinner table, then disassemble it. All the parts are still there, but you no longer have a table.

An object is more than the set of parts that compose it. It's the composed parts + the way they are arranged that makes it something more.

what are your opinions about our current relationship with nature? Is it becoming better or worse? — Shawn

It varies by individual, but collectively - humankind is becoming increasingly worse, because there are so many of us

2nd reason: if a table is identical to the atoms that compose it, then if you remove a single atom, you're no longer dealing with the same table, since if you represent both cases using sets, it turns out that the set of n atoms is not identical to the set of n-1 atoms — Arcane Sandwich

I agree with your first reason, but not your second. It's still a table when you remove a few atoms. Not the SAME table but there's still a table there.

A table is an object composed of various physical objects arranged in a way to fit its intended purpose. One could dismantle it, and all the parts would still be there, but you couldn't use it as a table.

Funny how you selectively apply that excuse.

A person becomes a criminal when he commits the crime, not at the point of a criminal conviction. The Caroll lawsuit was based on him having committed a crime. Tax fraud and obstruction of justice are crimes. Conspiring to overturn an election is a crime- an extremely serious one.

ROFL! Apparently amnesia is one of the disorders contributing to the denial of his crimes. We've discussed various of Trump's crimes in the past, and you just deny the evidence and echo whatever nonsense the criminal has said.

A few posts back I mentioned a few of the prominent crimes: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/966696

Thanks for proving my point.

Of course physical objects exist i.e. chairs, desks, cups, trees, folks and cars .... I see them. I can interact with them. They have the concrete existence. Time? I don't see, or sense it. I can hear people talking about it, and asking it. So what is the nature of time? — Corvus

That is a much better question.

I was imagining and meaning some present moment in the future, when said "in due course". Not "at a later time". — Corvus

You acknowledge a future, and I assume you also acknowledge a past. This suggests a ordered relation: past->present->future.
We can label this ordered relation, "time". It's not a complete account, but it's a beginning.

Maybe they think it’s corrupt, therefore can’t be trusted. — Punshhh

They do, but IMO it's because of their faith in Trump. Trump's defense of his crimes entails blaming the system. It's reminiscent of OJ insisting LAPD conspired to get him. The difference is that OJ didn't sell this to the public like Trump does. In his supporters minds, Trump can do no wrong - so they embrace the ridiculous deep state conspiracy theory against him. The GOP assists by pushing the alleged weaponization of the DOJ.

I agree.

And yet it is true that dragons breath fire.

Ergo, fictional creatures can breath. — Banno

The fiction of dragons includes "breathing fire". But fictions still can't engage in the real world activity.

Do you understand my objection to the original statement:

Whether they exist or not, dragons breathe fire.

I'm not saying you can't make sense of it. But strictly speaking, when a noun appears once in a sentence, it has a single referent. Fictional creature and actual creature are 2 different referents.

That would mean 30-40% of Republicans plus a mass of independent voters don't care about rule of law. I think it's actually higher than that. — frank

I see your point.

Why would you think fictional creatures do not breath? — Banno

Breathing is a real world activity by real world creatures. A fiction can't do this.

are you now saying that there are two levels of ontology, stuff that exists and stuff that is actual?

IMO there's one ontology. Dragons are either real-world creatures, or they are concepts residing in minds.

At best you might say that some dragons breath fire. — Banno

This would imply that the set of all dragons includes all the real dragons and all the fictional creatures so-named. Some members of the set are said to breathe fire. We can't really say that "some dragons breathe fire" because fictional things don't actually breathe.

.

But since he was re-elected after what he pulled in Jan 6, it appears that large swaths of Americans don't care about rule of law either. — frank

Not necessarily. 60-70% of Republicans believe the 2020 election was stolen, and therefore Trump was justified in trying to remedy that situation.

I don't have statistics, but it appears to me that few Republicans understand that Trump committed obstruction of Justice during the Mueller investigation and in the documents case. Many also deny that he sexually assaulted E Jeane Carroll, and that it was therefore fine to defame her for her "lies".

It also seems that many are unaware of, or deny his guilt, at his various fraudulent activities (Trump U, Trump foundation, real estate valuations, and election fraud), or they consider the crimes minor.

So...some voters may actually respect rule of law, but are in denial about Trump. Of course, I expect that many believe that "Rule of Trump" is a greater good than rule of law.

Whether they exist or not, dragons breathe fire.
— Relativist
A change of topic. From "Dragons breath fire", you can conclude that something breaths fire. You cannot conclude that there are dragons. — Banno

It would be correct to say:

"the sentence: 'dragons breath fire' is true whether or not dragons exist"

because:

-If dragons exist, then "dragon" refers to these existing animals.
-If dragons don't exist, then "dragon" refers to a fictional creature.

In the original sentence, "Whether they exist or not, dragons breathe fire", there's just one referrent - not 2.

You've identified even more ambiguity. These all higlight the significance of semantics when sharing information.

So far all you have noted is that you find it improbable that a simple being could have knowledge; but yet haven’t contended the premises I have in the argument for why this has to be the case. — Bob Ross

The probability that magical knowledge exists is low, as I discussed. This is sufficient reason to reject your conclusion prima facie that a being with magical knowledge exists. But in principle, it's possible your conclusion is based on premises so likely to be true, that it could raise the a priori probability of the conclusion. I'll go through a first set of them to explain why it doesn't.

1. Composed beings are made up of parts.
Definition. No problem.

2. A composed being exists contingently upon its parts in their specific arrangement.
False. A particular composed being has its parts necessarily. If even one part were added or subtracted, it would not be the same being. (This pertains to the metaphysical question of the persistence of individual identity. Your view is probably based on essentialism, implying an unstated premise. If you choose not to make a case for essentialism, then I simply apply my own view, so I judge it categorically false: probability=0).

3. A part of a composed being is either composed or uncomposed.
Agreed.

4. A part that is a composed being does not, in turn, exist in-itself but, rather, exists contingently upon its parts and their specific arrangement.
"Exist in itself" is a vague term, but I'll take it to mean existing autonomously. Autonomous means being uncaused and without external dependencies. A part of a composed being may, or may not, exist autonomously. You've given no reason to think a composed being cannot exist autonomously.

The second part about existing contingently is a non-sequitur because all beings have their parts and properties necessarily, even if it is composed. Add or subtract even one part, and the being that WAS, no longer exists.

5. An infinite series of composed beings for any given composed being (viz., a composed being of which its parts are also, in turn, composed and so on ad infinitum) would not have the power to exist on their own.
I infer that you're describing a vicious infinite regress. I agree this is an impossibility because although each compositional layer is explained by a deeper layer, nothing accounts for the series as a whole.

6. Therefore, an infinite series of composed beings is impossible.
Agree

7. Therefore, a series of composed beings must have, ultimately, uncomposed parts as its first cause. (6 & 3)
Disagree that a composed being was necessarily caused. See my objection to #4.

8. An uncomposed being (such as an uncomposed part) is purely simple, since it lacks any parts.
Agreed.

9. Two beings can only exist separately if they are distinguishable in their parts.
False. Two beings can have identical intrinsic properties. Example: water molecules.

10. Two purely simple beings do not have any different parts (since they have none).
False (p=0). Two different types of simple being can exist (e.g. up-quarks and electrons).

11. Therefore, only one purely simple being can exist.
Non-sequitur; false (p=0)

No point in proceeding further, since later statements and conclusion depends on the above falsehoods. Perhaps you could nudge me to increase some probabilities from 0, but as I said before, you'd need to push all of them pretty high to have any persuasive power.

The sentence could be read either way.

Here's another that spotlights semantic ambiguity:

Whether they exist or not, dragons breathe fire.

The evening star is the morning star. Isn't it a tautology and also contradiction, but a true statement? — Corvus

It's a semantic issue. The nouns have a referent. The referent could be a concept in your mind, or it could be the actual object that exists in the world.

Assume "Evening star" and "morning star" both refer to an object in the world. In that case, they are referring to the same object - so it's semantically equivalent to saying "The evening star is the evening star."

But "Evening star" and "morning star" could both just refer to your mental concepts "the point of light I see in the evening (or morning)" - the concepts refer to the context of your respective perceptions.

You could even be inconsistent, and treat one as the concept, the other as the object.

The problem is that even if it doesn’t jive well for you, it doesn’t negate the OP: you would have to demonstrate what about my argument for why this simple being has knowledge is false—for it would have to be false if you don’t believe that knowledge can exist in a simple being. — Bob Ross

Why must I do that? I showed you to have a burden based on your expressed purpose of swaying some people. You've sidestepped that entirely, and are back to making the false claim that I have some burden.

If all you want to hear is that your argument is valid, and that you had no desire to defend its soundness, you should have said so.

"On Thursday, at a federal courthouse in Washington state, U.S. District Judge John C. Coughenour—an 84-year-old Ronald Reagan appointee—delivered a striking rebuke to Trump’s assault on birthright citizenship. Speaking from the bench, Coughenour declared: “It has become ever more apparent that to our president, the rule of law is but an impediment to his policy goals. The rule of law is, according to him, something to navigate around or simply ignore, whether that be for political or personal gain. Nevertheless, in this courtroom, and under my watch, the rule of law is a bright beacon which I intend to follow.” He then issued a nationwide injunction prohibiting the administration from denying birthright citizenship to the children of immigrants for the duration of the litigation."
--https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2025/02/federal-judge-birthright-citizenship-donald-trump-ignore-law.html

As a businessman, Trump treated contracts, and laws, as inconveniences. It's no surprise he'd continue this as President.

This will be his best executive order yet: — NOS4A2

I absolutely agree this cannot be topped.

On the other hand, this "Truth" Social post puts his abject stupidity on full display:

"20 years ago, Autism in children was 1 in 10,000. NOW IT’S 1 in 34. WOW! Something’s really wrong. We need BOBBY!!! Thank You! DJT”

[/quote]

Can you prove time exists? — Corvus

No. Do you only believe things that are proven?

Time doesn't exist. — Corvus

Apparently not.

So do you just adopt beliefs arbitrarily?

my point was that you were invalidly implying that my premises in the OP are proven merely as possibilities, which makes no sense. — Bob Ross

Your premises aren't "proven" at all: you made no case for them. We agree they are possibly true (logical possibility), but your propositions (at least the ones I identified) are also possibly false. Therefore the conclusion is possibly true and possibly false. You agreed your purpose is to sway minds, so you need more than possibility.

Think more granularly than possible/impossible. Instead consider there's an epistemic probability (P) to any statement. It's subjective and somewhat vague, but it relates to levels of certainty.

Each premise has a probability: pn is the probability of premise n. C = the conclusion, P(C) is the probability of the conclusion:

P(C)=p1& p2 &p3 &...&pn
Which implies:
P(C)= p1*p2*p3...*pn

Probabilities are <=1, so P(C) is <= the probability of each individual proposition..

Where P(G) = the prior subjective epistemic probability of God's existence (i.e. prior to encountering your argument). You said your propose was to sway a person with your argument, so that means convincing him that P(C) > P(G). Your "burden" is to succeed at that.

I don’t have the burden of proof to demonstrate how knowledge can exist in something absolutely simple: — Bob Ross

Your argument depends on the unstated premise that knowledge can be present without parts. So it's included in the P(C) equation. So you have the burden of convincing someone that P(knowledge can be present without parts) is sufficiently high to produce a conclusion (C) such that P(C)>P(G). "Can be" = metaphysically possible, but we apply epistemic judgement to proposed metaphysical theories and axioms. More on this below.

Think about it, if you are right that a being with knowledge cannot be absolutely simple; then one of my premises in the OP—which does not argue for how it works—must be false; but yet you have never once pointed to what premise or premises that is or are. — Bob Ross

It's the unstated premise I pointed out above. The probability of unstated premises is just as relevant to P(C) as the stated ones.

Relativist: "You need to provide a compelling reason to think it is metaphysically possible".

It is right here:

20. Intelligence is having the ability to apprehend the form of things (and not its copies!).
21. The purely simple and actual being apprehends the forms of things. (19)
22. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being must be an intelligence.

It is physically impossible to store complex data without parts.

First of all, what is complex data? That suggests that there is a sort of simple data that can be stored without parts (:

Secondly, I agree that it is physically impossible...that just means it cannot happen in accordance with things governed by physics. God is beyond physics — Bob Ross

So another unstated premise is: physicalism is false.

Even if physicalism is false, my intuitions are grounded in what I know about the world- and that includes the intuition that knowledge =organized data, data is encoded, and this entails complexity. I judge it a small probability (<.1) that knowledge can exist without parts. Your defense is just an assertion that my intuitions don't apply because it's not physical. That seems equivalent to saying it's magical, and magic can account for anything. That has no effect on my judgement.

You mentioned "simple data". The simplest data is a bit (value is 0 or 1). Knowing this would require at least one part: the bit. Conceivably, there could exist a being with 1 bit of knowledge. I don't see how a being could know the value without, in some sense, having this encoded as a bit of data.

You asked: "what is complex data"? The data is propositions (more precisely: some metaphysical grounding for those propositions). You refer to each thing's "form", which strikes me as a lot of bits of information. The complexity comes from the logical relations within this information.

that’s too many premises for me to talk in one response! Pick one, and we will dive in. — Bob Ross

I choose your unstated premise that knowledge can be present without parts, If that unstated premise is false, then your step 21 is false. In terms of probability, P(#21) <= P(knowledge can be present without parts).

all existing objects have properties, so it follows from this that it cannot exist. I already demonstrated this is false — Bob Ross

Your "demonstration" depends on Thomist metaphysics being true. You could only possibly show my statement is false by falsifying my metaphysical framework (or at least showing that Thomist metaphysics is superior), because my statement is an axiom of my framework. IMO, my framework is coherent, has sufficient explanatory power to explain all uncontroversial facts, and it's more parsimonious than alternatives. That justifies my belief in it. It's the basis of my epistemic judgement. I'll add that I'm not certain of my metaphysical theory, but I think it's more likely than not (P>.6).

you cannot say that something is impossible because we have no example of it. That’s illogical

Given my metaphysics, it is trivially metaphysically impossible. Here's a snippet of the theory that establishes what I said:

Existence consists of the objects that exist, and the relations between them. I will use these terms interchangeably: object=thing=existent=particular=State of Affairs (SOA)

“State of Affairs” is the most meaningful descriptor because it refers to the structure of objects/things/existents/particulars. A state of affairs has 3 types of constituents: a thin particular, it’s intrinsic properties, and it’s relations (AKA relational properties AKA extrinsic properties).

Objects do not exist without properties, and properties do not exist unattached to objects. Properties exist in their instantiations. Example: the -1 electric charge exists as a property that all electrons have. The -1 electric charge does not exist independently. Now consider an electron: the ‘-1’ charge is intrinsic; any object that lacks a “-1 charge” is necessarily something other than an electron.

You could falsify the theory by identifying an object that can't fit the "state of affairs" model. But as you implied, there are no examples of such things. My theory is coherent, has sufficient explanatory power to account for all uncontroversial facts, and does so parsimoniously. It's unparsimonious to add another sort of existent based solely on it being logically possible. Possibilities are endless.

I said two objects could have the same intrinsic properties

Which, again, makes them non-simple. — Bob Ross

That may be so in your metaphysics, but not in mine. In mine, an atomic state of affairs with 1 intrinsic property is as simple as an object can be. But nothing precludes there existing multiple objects with that same, single intrinsic property. What would distinguish them are their relations (extrinsic properties). I've said this multiple times, but you repeatedly dismiss it. Your basis is Thomism. That's sufficient justification for you, but has no persuasive power for a non-Thomist. You would need to falsify my metaphysical axiom directly, or show my metaphysical system is incoherent.