Eh, that’s kind of nonsense. Or one could say the same thing about conservatism, or anything really. Just an east slogan for those who like to talk in generalities— because the actual work of details is too time consuming. — Mikie

What makes you think it's nonsense? Is there some end-point in any liberalism, conservativism, or anything else?

The fact is there were plenty of concrete measures that could have been taken, that were very popular, and that would have helped the majority of Americans. — Mikie

You overestimate the popularity of the things you listed, the ease with which they could be passed, and the negative consequences (real and perceived) of any specific proposal.

I agree on all points.

Biden and democrats could have done a lot more to help the majority of Americans instead of taking baby steps.

True, a lot of things were blocked by the reactionary courts or thwarted by Sinema and Manchin— but that’s only some of the story. He could have pushed as much as Trump is pushing now— and he didn’t. He half-assed it. So he lost. — Mikie

A political problem for social liberalism is that there is no reachable goal. It can only ever be a direction. Biden successfully pushed the US in that liberal direction through his actions. There could always be more. There are a complex set of reasons why there wasn't. Among the reasons: 1) improvements are never universal; some are helped, others aren't (consider the student loan forgiveness program). 2) each positive step typically has some negative consequences for some.

It makes no sense for one quantity of 10 to be bigger than another quantity of 10. 10 is one quantity. Similarly, it makes no sense for one quantity of infinity to be bigger than another quantity of infinity. Infinity is one quantity. — Philosopher19

In the everyday use of the term, a "quantity" is always a fixed, real number (e.g. a number of liters, a number of tomatoes, a number of molecules in a mole...). Infinity is not a real number. Your mistake seems to be that you're treating it as one.

This is where I disagree. I don't believe Cantor's diagonal argument shows anything. Infinity is one cardinality/size, it makes no sense for one infinity to be bigger than another in terms of size. — Philosopher19

What's the basis for your claim that it makes no sense?

Agree with all of the above. But you can't map one infinity to another with one being bigger than another because there isn't more than one. — Philosopher19

Infinity is not a thing that exists. It is a concept, and when it is applied to sets - it can lead to inconsistencies. There are infinitely many integers and infinitely many real numbers, but infinity is not a member of either set. Rather, "infinity" is a property of each of these sets. But is it the same property in both sets?

We can compare sets by defining a mapping between them. There is a 1:1 mapping between the set of even integers and the set of all integers. So although it may seem like there "more" integers than even-integers, that's not the relevant comparison. The comparison that is made is based on abstractly mapping the members of one set to the other. In this example, each integer can be mapped 1:1 to the set of even integers. 1->2, 2->4, 3->6...The mapping applies to all members of both sets; no members are left out.

However, there is no 1:1 mapping between the reals and the integers. Reals map into integers, covering all the integers, but you can't cover all the reals with integers. This is the basis for saying the "size" of the set of reals is greater than the "size" of the set of integers. The formal term for "size" is cardinality: the cardinality of the set of reals is greater that the cardinality of the set of integers. This is the basis for saying there are "more" reals than integers, but this isn't "more" in the everyday sense of the word.

How would a difference in size be established between them when there is no counting involved? And if there is counting involved, how would infinity be reached? — Philosopher19

There are "countably many" integers. That doesn't imply they can all be counted, but one can map a counting process to the set of integers. In the real world, that process would never end.

On the other hand, the real numbers can't be counted. There are infinitely many numbers between 1 and 2. In fact, there are infinitely many real numbers between any 2 real numbers. This is the rationale for stipulating that there are "more" real numbers. It's not "more" in the real-world sense of your intuitions; it's "more" in a mapping sense.

For the first cause, its necessary properties are essential to it. — A Christian Philosophy

Aren't all of its properties essential to it?

I'd say only if its creator designed it with that function in mind. It is the designer that gives the man-made object its identity - that's the reason why it exists. — A Christian Philosophy

First of all, thanks for pointing out my error. Sorry about that.

So at this point, I don't see any logical inconsistency in your position. I don't agree with it, and your view that an object's designed function is intrinsic to the object is non- standard. The only implication is that any arguments you make will not be compelling to many of us.

One question: the first-cause/ontological foundation was not designed. Does this mean it lacks essence?

Sorry for the long delay in respoinding.

I agree that an inherent property must be intrinsic. But I still claim that the function of a designed thing is intrinsic. A paper-cutter, i.e. a thing designed to cut paper, remains a thing designed to cut paper whether we use it to cut paper, use it as a door holder, or don't use it at all. — A Christian Philosophy

I earlier brought up the fact that a paper cutter could be used as a torture device, even though it wasn't designed for that purpose. I believe you said this changed the essence. It seems weird to suggest that the discovery of a new purpose for something constitutes an intrinsic change to it.

Suppose the human race gets wiped out next week. 10 years later, aliens from Tralfamador arrive and discover a paper cutter. They have no idea it was meant to be a paper cutter; they instead use it as a musical instrument. Then the Tralfamadorians all from the common cold, and a time traveler from 2025 arrives and begins cutting paper with it. Did the essence change several times?

Is it even correct to say something's essence can change? That treats the object as something existing independent of its essence, but a variety of essences can become attached to it - even though nothing changes about its physical structure.

Just because a function could be found in natural things, it does not follow that it is not an inherent property of man-made things as well. "3 sides" is an inherent property of triangles, and yet a shape can also have 3 sides and not be a triangle (if the sides are not straight). — A Christian Philosophy

Read about the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic properties here:

"We have some of our properties purely in virtue of the way we are. (Our mass is an example.) We have other properties in virtue of the way we interact with the world. (Our weight is an example.) The former are the intrinsic properties, the latter are the extrinsic properties. "

Function is extrinsic (irrespective of whether natural or man-made): it pertains to the way the object interacts with other objects.

Regarding triangles: they are abstractions; they don't exist. Triangular objects exist, and their shape is indeed an intrinsic property.

The heap of parts is not a paper-cutter because it cannot cut paper in that state. — A Christian Philosophy

Function is not an intrinsic property, but it's shape and structure is.

I don't disagree with the rest of the paragraph; though I find that identifying individual man-made things is not impactful.

Nevertheless, you haven't accounted for individual identity. A microscopic change to an object means it is not identical to what it had been. What makes it the same object? This is important because you earlier said:

Essence is the same as identity, metaphysically speaking. As per the law of identity, everything has an identity. — A Christian Philosophy

So if you're going to use the term essence, and defined it as identity, you need to be able to account for individual identity.

What do you mean by "natural kind"? — A Christian Philosophy

"Natural kind essentialism is a specification of the intuitive idea that there are some mind-independent or objective categories in nature."
(Definition taken from this paper, but it's pretty standard).

I agree that categories are arbitrary. But the function of a man-made thing is more than that. While not everything is designed, a design is a type of identity. — A Christian Philosophy

It's still not a mind-independent category.

And what is designed is always designed with an end goal, or purpose, or function. This is to fulfil the PSR: all voluntary acts (including creating man-made devices) must have an end goal; otherwise, the act would be random which would violate the PSR. Thus, the function is an inherent property of a voluntarily created or designed thing. — A Christian Philosophy

I agree that design entails a goal (by definition).

I do not agree that randomness violates the PSR. The outcome of a quantum collapse is random (within a probability distribution). IMO, having a reason just means it can be accounted for, and in this case - randomness can be accounted for. If one were to rule out the randomness of quantum collapse based on a metaphysical assumption, like the PSR, then one's metaphysics in on shaky grounds.

I also do not agree that a function is an "inherent property" of a designed object. It is a relational (extrinsic) property. A sharp stone can be produced by natural forces, and it can then be used to cut things - so a function can be found for things even without being the product of design.

What individualizes man-made things with the same function, e.g. 2 paper-cutters, is the individual physical parts or molecules they are made of. — A Christian Philosophy

I suggest that it's not just the set of physical parts, it's the way they are configured, down to the molecular level. If you take apart a paper cutter, the heap of parts is not a paper cutter. Even so,
this works only for point-in-time identity, as I've described. If you use the paper cutter even once, there will be a slight change to its physical make-up at the molecular level.

IOW, 100% of the object's properties must be present for it to constitute that particular object.
— Relativist
If I cut my hair, I have changed some of my properties. Does it follow that I have a different identity? I'd say that fundamentally, I am still me. It would also seem that any change that any object encounters, no matter how small, would give them a wholly new identity. Thus there would be no change; only substitutions from one identity to another at any point in time. — A Christian Philosophy

As you said, everything supervenes on the ultimate foundation of physical reality. That doesn't strictly depend on physicalism being true, it just depends on there being an ultimate foundation to physical reality. Every individual identity is just a concept. We can speak of a device, like a paper cutter, and consider it to have an enduring identity- in our minds. We may use it every day, and not notice the microscopic changes that occur with each use. So in our minds, it's the same device. Even if we replace parts on it, we'll still regard it as the same paper cutter (the one we own). Over the years, we could end up replacing 100% of the parts, while meanwhile always considering it the same device from each day to the next. Or we could arbitrarily decide that it has a new identity after X% of the parts are replaced, or X% of the mass has been replaced; or consider the identity to be associated with the serial number that is present on one specific part. There's no intrinsically correct answer, because an enduring identity isjust a concept.

With living organisms, we can avoid arbitrariness by defining an identity in a way that is unique from everything else that exists. IMO, perdurance is the best way to do that: your identity is associated with the temporal-causal chain that is associated with "you" from one instant to the next. There is exactly one such "you" associated with "your" unique temporal-causal chain. This definition satisfies Leibniz' law, and I don't think any other definition can do so. Still, there's no metaphysical mandate to use this definition - it's still fundamentally conceptual, but I don't think there's a better one - unless you make metaphysical assumptions.

It certainly doesn't uniquely identify a specific object, so this isn't an individual identity. — Relativist

True; there are many paper-cutters. But they are all identified as paper-cutters; that's why we call all these unique devices "paper-cutters", — A Christian Philosophy

In terms of essentialism, you're treating function as something like a natural kind, although you're not basing it on anything natural. My problem with natural kinds also applies to your definition: all you've done is identify a set of objects (paper cutters). This is a conceptual compartmentalizing out of the full set of objects of existence, so it's arbitrary. You could have categorized it in many different ways (office tools, manufactured devices, sharp objects, objects you own...). But the biggest problem is that you haven't addressed the issue of individual identity.. You haven't touched on that at all.

There is also anything that is man-made if man has free will. E.g. a paper-cutter. It is a man-made device designed to cut paper. "Being able to cut paper" is its identity because this is how we identify a thing as being a paper-cutter. — A Christian Philosophy

This contradicts what you said earlier:

if physicalism is true, then everything is nothing but strings. — A Christian Philosophy

It's also absurd to claim that a function that an object can perform is its identity. It certainly doesn't uniquely identify a specific object, so this isn't an individual identity. It sounds more like a sortal, for identifying a set (the set of all objects which can cut paper; this would include box cutters, scizzors, knives...).

Yes. Take the paper-cutter example again. Since its identity is to cut paper, then any property that enables it to cut paper (e.g. a blade) is an essential property, and any property it has that does not serve to cut paper (e.g. its color) is a non-essential property. — A Christian Philosophy

So if I have a paper cutter whose blade has become too dull to cut paper, it has lost its identity?! Is this identity lost suddenly at some particular level of sharpness? What if a second function is found for a functional paper cutter (e.g. it can function as a torture device to cut off fingers). Does possessing this newly discovered function give it a new identity?

That's what I meant by properties "sticking to an object". In other words, there must be a reason why a particular set of properties belongs to an object. — A Christian Philosophy

In my view, an object has its properties necessarily, per Leibniz' law (identity of the indiscernibles). IOW, 100% of the object's properties must be present for it to constitute that particular object. An essentialist might point to a subset of the objects properties that are necessary and sufficient for being that object - so that sunset of properties are present necessarily. But you've claimed it is an object's function, rather than its properties, that give it an identity.

Frankly, I think you've gone down a blind alley.

Even if physicalism is true, it still means that strings have their own identity or essence, and thus their own essential properties. Since strings would exist necessarily, it means that their existence is an essential property. — A Christian Philosophy

You implied that, in this physicalist scenario, ONLY strings have an identity (and only strings have an essence). If only one thing has an identity and essence, why bother with considering identity and essence at all?

Although the bottom layer of reality (strings, in this scenario) exists necessarily, this is de dicto necessity - not an intrinsic property. My impression is that essentialists consider essence to be intrinsic.

You also referred to "essential properties". Doesn't this imply there are also UNessential properties?

I thought I'd chime in on this. The First Cause is traditionally seen to be without parts or without multiple properties. This is because, if a being is composed of multiple properties, then there must be a sufficient reason for the properties to "stick together" in the same being. But the First Cause has no prior causes, by definition. So, the only explanation for the supposed multiple properties to stick together is that they do so inherently, that is, all properties are in fact one and the same. Thus, the First Cause is not composed of multiple parts or properties. — A Christian Philosophy

A first cause exists as a brute fact: without cause or reason, because there is nothing causally prior, nor is it ontologically dependent upon something else. This does not imply it lacks multiple properties - it has whatever properties it happens to have. Intrinsic properties are inseparable from the objects that have them - not something that "sticks" onto the object (unless you stipulate that in an ontology). So it doesn't follow that it lacks multiple properties.

The PSR implies there are no brute facts. But I infer the first cause has to be a brute fact, because it is uncaused and autonomous (no ontological dependency). Making more stipulations about the ontology in order to force fit it to the PSR makes the ontology more ad hoc, and therefore less credible.

Yes, if physicalism is true, then everything is nothing but strings. But I don't think it would be absurd. Take a pile of sand for example. Most people would agree this is not an object in itself, but rather it is just grains of sand piled together due to laws of nature like the wind. If so, we could say the same for a rock: a bunch of molecules piled together due to laws of nature. Then the word "rock" only refers to the structure as a whole. — A Christian Philosophy

You previously asked:

Would a horse count as an ontological object? If so, then we can still say that before horses existed, then they did not have existence. If not, then what do you consider as objects? — A Christian Philosophy

Per your paradigm, if physicalism is true, then horses are just strings not ontological objects in their own right. There is no point in time at which the strings didn't exist.

Doesn't this mean that your view of essence is contingent upon physicalism being false? Understand that I don't claim to prove physicalism is true. I'm just pointing out that "proving" a God exists based on essentialism entails circular reasoning.

Sure, God can be subject to the same metaphysical investigation of where it came from as much as the laws of nature themselves yet equating god with the laws of nature vis-a-vis divine simplicity solves this problem. — kindred

It seems to me that "solving the problem" entails rationalizing - showing it possible, not showing it's plausible, or better yet- that it's the best explanation.

I'm perfectly fine with someone believing in a God for the personal benefits they get from it. No one can prove you wrong.But don't fool yourself into thinking there's an objective, rational basis that can prove you right.

And where did these laws of nature come from? Just chance that they happen to be so as to allow life to emerge in the world? — kindred

The best explanation for laws of nature is law-realism: a law reflects a relation between universals. In simpler terms: they are part of the fabric of material reality.

Where does anything come from, ultimately? Answer: a metaphysically necessary, autonomous brute fact. That's true of any metaphysical foundation of existence, even a God.

Just chance that they happen to be so as to allow life to emerge in the world?

"Allow?" I assume you mean: why did it happen to be possible for life to develop? The answer is: because that is the way the world happens to be. Why think life is anything other than an unintended consequence of the way the world happens to be? This points to the fundamental error that fine-tuning enthusiasts make: they treat life as a design objective, such that the universe had to be finely tuned to achieve it. Drop that unstated premise, and there's no argument.

I think this is equally implausible as that of an eternal omnipotent, omniscient being which could explain why there are laws of nature in the first place.

That makes sense if and only if you consider omniscience plausible. You are taking it for granted (as I expect any theist would), rather than explaining why it is perfectly reasonable to accept the existence of infinite knowledge that is unencoded and not a product of learning over time. Why is THAT brute fact more reasonable to assume than a brute fact material foundation wherein laws of nature are present because there exists universals with causal relations between them? It seems pretty clear that the material world exists, that laws of nature exist, and that they seem to fully account for the evolution of the universe- including the development of intelligent life. Why think there is magic in the world, when there's no empirical evidence of it?

yet here we are existing as intelligent beings and this to me constitutes proof that there are probably other intelligent beings out there even as far as the ultimate being who embodies or is identical to omniscience as per my earlier article on divine simplicity attested to. That such a being has always existed is what is implausible to you — kindred

Omniscience is implausible to me. Yoy don't seem to agree, so why don't you explain why you find it plausible - addressing the objections I raised. On a possibly related note, I believe the past is finite.

We are intelligent creatures, and there may indeed b⁷e others in this vast universe - but in all these cases, I expect they developed over the course of billions of years through a series of events that led to their existence; their knowledge is acquired over time, and it exists in some form of physical encoding.

However because the world, the universe or this reality exhibits order, complexity and purpose it’s not too far fetched to attribute the cause to a designer or omnipotent being. — kindred

I disagree. The overwhelmingly simpler explanation for order is the existence of laws of nature. Again, you're just treating omniscience as no big deal, when it's an enormously big assumption.

The laws of physics seem to be very finely tuned in order to support life and again it could be that it is by pure fluke and chance but then again it could easily be explained in terms of a higher being who set the conditions for life to emerge rather than not emerge. — kindred

A fine-tuning argument depends on circular reasoning. The unstated premise is that life was some sort of teleological goal. That assumption entails a designer. A materialist would consider our existence as simply a consequence of the way the world happens to be. Plus: if intelligence requires a designer, then God requires one.

existence is created everyday. — alleybear

There is a Totality of Existence (TOE), and that is what I was treating as "existence". It's the TOE that could not have been created.

The material world could have been created only if TOE encompasses more than the material world (such as an immaterial God). But it's possible TOE=the material world, in which case it was not created.

Omniscience+omniscience has infinite explanatory scope - so it's certainly a convenient assumption. But it's an enormous assumption that's as implausible as it is convenient. All evidence points to knowledge being something that is accumulated over time, that it consists of organized data, and data is encoded. So the notion that a being just happens to exist who happens to have infinite knowledge, that has neither been developed over time nor is encoded, is grossly implausible: it's magic. Theists are conditioned to unquestionably accept omniscience on faith. Believe what you like, but accept the fact that there's no rational reason to believe omniscience exists.

The question again: can you stipulate some thing which is neither temporally delimited nor composed of parts? I suggest not. — Wayfarer

Even a God is temporally delimited if the past is finite. He simply exists at all times. The same is true of a material foundation. Regarding parts:why assume something exists without parts? I gave a good reason to believe the past is finite and there's a bottom layer of reality. I've never encountered a reason to assume the foundation of existence lacks parts. If there is, then it would be easy to stipulate that, and then build an ontology based on it.

So you acknowledge that science can’t say what the foundation is, but you nevertheless claim, presumably as an act of faith, that if there is a foundation, then it must be material in nature. — Wayfarer

Not an act of faith: an inference to best explanation. I see no reason to think anything immaterial exists. An immaterial foundation adds no explanatory power, so it's unparsimonious. A 3-omni God is unparsimonious to the extreme.

At some stage in history materialism might have been able to claim that the atom was imperishable and eternal - which was, after all, the basis of materialism in Greek philosophy - but that is no longer considered feasible. Fundamental particles, so-called, have an intrinsically ambiguous nature, and they seem to be at bottom to be best conceived as an excitation of fields, however fields might be conceived. — Wayfarer

Sure. Quantum field theory proposes that quantum fields (perhaps a single quantum field- in a sense, one "part") may constitute the bottom layer of reality.

Regardless, there are good reasons to believe the world is fundamentally quantum mechanical, and an implication is that our intuitions (which are the primary tool of metaphysics) are problematic for developing a reliable metaphysical theory.

That’s a Richard Dawkins argument - that whatever constructs must be more complex than what is constructed by it. But in the classical tradition, God is not complex at all, but is simple. — Wayfarer

I didn't assert there to be some metaphysical rule that, "whatever constructs must be more complex than what is constructed by it". Rather, I pointed to the complexity of God's knowledge. Divine simplicity seems a rationalization, one that depends on treating knowledge as a magical property. Every verifiable fact points to knowledge being composed of data, and data being encoded. The assumption of a 3-omni God is treated as a carte blanche magical answer to any question, and theists never address the prima facie implausibility of omniscience.

the brain is the most complex natural phenomenon known to science with more neural connections than stars in the sky (or so I once read). And yet, you yourself are a simple unity. — Wayfarer

When we look at a picture of a triangle, how many things do we see? We see 4 things: the sides, and the triangle. The triangle is a "unity" (a single thing) but is more than just 3 lines (contrast it with 3 unconnected lines on a page). So a triangle is more complex than the individual lines that composed it, just like I am more complex than the particles that comprise me. So I accept calling me a "unity", but not simple.

The only unsolved problem that could truly be blamed on a god is the problem of how existence was created. — alleybear

It's logically impossible for existence to be created.

All other "unsolved problems" are just detritus from the opening act. And perhaps it's the job of philosophers to figure out why there's an imbalance between particles and antiparticles.

Philosophers can only speculate. Physicists engage in speculations too, but then they test them.

Subjects of experience are not things — Wayfarer

They are "things" as I defined, and used, the term ("existent").

Your hypothetical material ontological foundation is also something that science had not been able to show exists albeit on different grounds. What would be an example of a thing which has no beginning and end in time and is not composed of parts? — Wayfarer

I don't think it's possible for science to establish anything as an ontological foundation. By its nature, science would be compelled to always seek something deeper, even if they reached a foundation. My view is entirely based on conceptual analysis (the tolof metaphysicians): either there is a foundation, or there's a vicious infinite regress of ever-deeper layers of reality - which I reject.

I never claimed a foundation necessarily was not composed of parts, but I believe the past is finite - because it is logically impossible for an infinite past to be completed - but the past IS complete.

I don't claim to disprove deism/theism. My views on metaphysical foundationalism and a finite past are consistent with deism. I personally reject deism because it depends on an infinitely complex intelligence, with magical knowledge, just happening to exist by brute fact.

I’ve not been arguing for God. At issue was your remark that at least one thing existed before Creation. I objected that God is not a thing - for that matter, nor are you - and does not exist in the sense that things exist. — Wayfarer

"Thing" = an existent. A God would be a very different sort of thing, but it would still be an existent (a "thing"). It would have some characteristics in common with a hypothetical material ontological foundation (e.g. uncaused, autonomous, not composed of other things).

What part of this do you disagree with?

This is a very limited conception of existence. — Wayfarer

The relevance is that God sans universe is not equivalent to nothingness. My point is that there's an implicit false dichotomy between a universe from nothingness and divine creation.

A materialist ontological foundation would also exist at all times- it being the basis for everything else that exists.
— Relativist

That's because, as I explained in a previous conversation, materialist ontologies such as D M Armstrong's, are essentially derived from the theistic ontology which preceded them..., — Wayfarer

Irrelevant to my point, which is that the reasoning you put forth does not ENTAIL a God. It's consistent with materialism.

I'm not endeavoring to prove materialism is true. I'm just showing that the arguments and reasoning that purport to prove a God actually do nothing of the sort.

You’re making an assumption about the nature of god, instead I would argue for divine simplicity instead of complexity. — kindred

Omniscience entails an infinitely complex set of knowledge, existing by brute fact. Divine simplicity doesn't deal with this.

But that is not so. God is not some thing, or for that matter any thing. — Wayfarer

If there is a God, then it exists. I believe the claim is that God is the foundation of reality - everything else is ontologically dependent on God, so clearly God isn't an object within his own creation. But "God" is a referent to something, even if it encompasses everything that exists

More to the point, God-sans-universe is a coherent concept, and it is certainly not equivalent to a state of nothingness. A state of nothingness is incoherent.

, whatever exists has a beginning and an end in time, and is composed of parts. This applies to every phenomenal existent. However, God has no beginning and end in time, and is not composed of parts, and so does not exist, but is the reality which grounds existence. — Wayfarer

A materialist ontological foundation would also exist at all times- it being the basis for everything else that exists.

The claim that God doesn't have parts has always seemed to me a special pleading. An omniscient God possesses an infinitely complex mind. That is at odds with being simple, and the notion of omniscience is prima facie implausible -I'm not aware of anyone arguing for it to be plausible.

Here's the problems. We know that knowledge is acquired, but apologists claim God just happens to possess it (magically:without having been developed). Further, knowledge entails data, and data is encoded (entailing parts). But God manages to possess knowledge with no such encoding- it just exists magically.

It's the job of physicists to figure out why there's an imbalance between particles and antiparticles. It doesn't make much sense to attribute every unsolved problem to God; it certainly doesn't "prove" Goddidit- that would be an argument from ignorance.

Here is an argument for the existence of God:

1. If anything exists, then there must be something that exists.
2. If something depends on another for its existence and the second thing exists, then so must the first.
3. If everything depended on another for its existence, then nothing would exist.
4. Therefore, if anything exists, and there exist things that depend on another for their existence, or not, there must exist something that does not depend on another for its existence.
5. Consequently, if anything exists, there must exist something that does not depend on another.
6. Something does exist.
7. So, there must exist something that does not depend on another. — NotAristotle

The argument doesn't prove a "God" exists. It proves there is an autonomous, bottom layer of reality. This is metaphysical foundationalism.

Those who try and use the PSR to show that God exists do not deny this, for if something can come from nothing then there is no need to posit God. — Clearbury

On the contrary, according to Christian doctrine, only God can create something from nothing. — Wayfarer

Divine creation is not "something from nothing". It assumes God pre-exists matter, but God is something. If there is no God, then there was no state of affairs prior to the existence of matter.

What about the mathematical and analytical tools that are used to determine what in the world exists, especially on the scales of the atomic or cosmological. Are they themselves also things that exist? — Wayfarer

Abstractions do not exist independently in the world. They reflect relations between things that do exist; so they exist immanently.

If we can say "A is nothing but B", then A does not have its own identity and it supervenes on B. E.g. "A rock is nothing but molecules put together", and therefore a rock does not have its own identity. — A Christian Philosophy

But this means, that if physicalism is true, and strings are the bottom layer, then everything is "nothing but" strings - so nothing has an identity other than the strings. This makes no sense. Composite objects, such as rocks and horses, exist.

Would a horse count as an ontological object? If so, then we can still say that before horses existed, then they did not have existence. If not, then what do you consider as objects? — A Christian Philosophy

Sure, horses are ontological objects. No objects that we define as horses existed prior to some earlier specific point of time. Although we can say "horses didn't have existence prior to that point of time", it doesn't mean there's a metaphysical object "horse" that sometimes exists and sometimes doesn't.

All objects exist at points of time, irrespective of whether anyone has defined, or categorized, them. What we typically refer to as an "individual identity" is a unique category of causally-temporally connected point-in-time objects. IOW, I'm a perdurantist.

That’s false, he allowed the access Hollywood tape into evidence. — NOS4A2

This is supposed to be evidence of corruption!? Such evidence is admissible, per
Federal Rule of evidence 415:

In a civil case involving a claim for relief based on a party’s alleged sexual assault or child molestation, the court may admit evidence that the party committed any other sexual assault or child molestation.

In the recording, Trump states that he ‘moved on’ a woman named Nancy ‘like a bitch,’ that he ‘tried to fuck her.’” As summarized by the district court, Trump also says “that he just starts kissing beautiful women, he does not first obtain consent, that the women just let one do it when one is a ‘star,’ and that a ‘star’ can ‘grab’ beautiful women by their genitals or do anything the ‘star’ wants.”

You obviously make no attempt at objectivity, and instead just parrot whatever the defense says, and treat it as evidence of corruption.

It's bizarre that you ignore the fact that Trump sexually abused Carol and defamed her, and deflect by obsessing on a crime that Trump was not found liable for. Unable to face the facts about your idol?

That seems the most plausible explanation.

It makes sense then to attribute intelligent laws to an intelligent agent or lawmaker hence my argument. — kindred

It makes sense to you because you believe God created everything. Here's a more general metaphysical perspective.

Unless one accepts an infinite series of causes, there is a first cause - that exists without explanation. This could be a God, but it could also be an initial state of material reality. There's no objective basis to exempt God from requiring an explanation while insisting a natural first cause requires one.

A natural first-cause would be comprised of the fundamental material of reality (physicists think quantum fields may be the fundamental material, but it doesn't matter to the metaphysical analysis). Natural laws would be part of the fabric of this fundamental material, and would be the ultimate ground of all laws that we see manifested.

So the question is: which is more plausible? A being of infinite complexity, with magical knowledge of everything it could do and it's consequences OR a natural state of affairs that evolves due to its internal characteristics? Each is uncaused and exists without deeper explanation. Which is the more parsimonious, and thus better, explanation?

So you think processes such as cell replication or photosynthesis come to be by pure chance? A designer would have better explanatory power here. — kindred

So you think intelligence, and knowledge just happens to exist uncaused?

To your question: entropy is a measure of the number of different ways that a set of objects can be arranged. One of the ways fundamental particles can be arranged is in the configuration of a self-replicating molecule. That is sufficient to start evolution. It is very low probability that this would occur by pure chance in any one suitable event, but in a vast, old, universe - it becomes likely to occur at least once. Evolution has all the explanatory power needed to explain everything that life develops into.

Without a designer matter would just remain stagnant and nothing would have happened or emerged, no life and certainly no intelligence. — kindred

Whatever gives you that silly idea? It's clear the universe evolves per laws of nature, and it's
reasonable to view these as part of the fabric of reality.

why has it produced something useful like a plant alongside the innate rock? — kindred

As I said, because it's possible - and sufficiently probable to occur at least once in a vast, old universe in which a enormous number of (individually) improbable things occur.

There are many factors which need to combine to create even the simplest life and although they could have come to be through chance to me it implies that there are intelligent rules or laws which enables such life to form. — kindred

Non-sequitur. The probability is extremely low in any specific time or place, but again- a vast, old universe provides a sufficient number of chances for it to occur at least once.

Existence is eternal therefore it’s possible that such a being could have emerged with capabilities to express his will through his creation as he sees fit. ... — kindred

Emerged from what? You claim the conditions needed for intelligence to emerge in the universe imply an intelligence behind it. So you'd have to assume the same thing for a God-like intelligence to emerge- thus an vicious, infinite regress.

Or another explanation which you might not like is that such a being has always existed and is uncreated.

Explain how this is more plausible than intelligence gradually emerging. It entails magical knowledge- knowing without a process of developing knowledge.

What special prosecutor will take up a case brought by a corrupt political prosecutor? An idiot would, no doubt. — NOS4A2

Has a judge or jury judged Willis as corrupt? The appellate court merely judged there was an "appearance of impropriety", and removed her because this could affect public confidence. Nothing about this has any bearing on the merits of the case. The only bearing this might have on another prosecutor is knowledge that the job would entail having a target on their back from members of the Trump cult and defense team.

I don’t care what the anti-Trump judge said. It’s right there in the verdict form., — NOS4A2

You're quick to judgement on the judge, who did nothing wrong and displayed no blatant bias even in the context of daily attacks by Trump during the trial. Do you just accept everything Trump says?

It matters because it's relevant to what Stephanopolous said. ABC would probably have won the case, although it would have raised Trump's ire and led to his retaliation.

Carrol couldn’t prove her one accusation.

You're ignoring reality. She proved Trump sexually abused her and defamed her on multiple occasions. The jury felt that rape (as defined in NY criminal code) was not proven, but neither did they judge that it was DISproven.

My beliefs are based on observation of the natural world which as I’ve stated before shows signs of intelligence, design whatever you wanna call it. This to me constitutes evidence of God. — kindred

There is no evidence that entails God.

Your observations of the world are seen through the prism of your belief in God. The signs you see of intelligence are explainable by natural means. If you haven't given serious consideration to the alternative, you haven't "proven" anything - you've just rationalize what you believe.

The non god alternative is that these manifestations of intelligence occurred through dumb luck, which is not possible. — kindred

What occurs, including what comes to exist, could very well be the product of chance. We exist as a consequence of the way the world happens to be. If it is actually possible for the world to have differred, other sorts of things might have existed. How does low probability consequence imply luck? Luck generally entails a contestant happening to be the beneficiary of chance. There is no set of contestants who participated in a contest to pick a winner. You could conjecture that our existence is low probability, but that gets you nowhere- low probability things happen all the time.

If you think intelligence is something special that requires design to produce it, then how do you account for an intelligent creator to produce the design? That's why I previously pointed out that it seems much more likely that intelligence is the product of chance events in a universe of vast size and age, rather than just happening to exist in an uncaused being (a "god"). So this line of reasoning seems self-defeating.

Essence is the same as identity, metaphysically speaking. — A Christian Philosophy

It's not a synonym. I think you're saying that an identity has a unique essence. But that still leaves "essence" undefined. You later said, "a being, whose essence is to have existence". This suggests "existing" is an essence (part of an essence?).

Suppose there is a fundamental layer of reality, for example: 20-dimensional strings. Everything is composed of them, and they are not composed of anything deeper. These strings exist at all times and locations. Does this fit your paradigm of having "existence" as part of its "essence"?

Some objects lack existence. Otherwise, the following propositions would not make sense, but they do.
Before I existed, I did not exist; and after death, I might cease to exist.
Horses exist but unicorns do not.
There will be a solar eclipse during this date in the future; but the event does not exist yet. — A Christian Philosophy

Events aren't objects; they are points (or intervals) in time. By "object", I'm refering to ontological objects- things that exist. You're conflating concepts (or definitions) with "objects".

We can refer to objects in the past, present, or future. But when we refer to unicorns, we aren't refering to objects that ever have, or ever will, exist - they are merely concepts -words with no referents to anything in time or space. You again seem to be treating a definition as a thing's essence (as you did with triangles).

You said. "a rock supervenes on fundamental physical elements like matter and energy, and so the rock does not have its own identity but gets its from its fundamental physical elements. "
If physicalism is true, the same thing can be said about you and me, as you say about the rock. This suggests you're assuming physicalism is false. Is that correct? If so, then your paradigm can't be used to show some form of immaterialism is true- because that's a premise.