‘Putin Is on the Inside’: Shock as U.S. Caves to Russia in Cybersecurity Fight

The White House is reportedly dropping Russia from its list of threats to cybersecurity and is instead honing in on China, part of the Trump administration’s apparent broader effort to curry favor with the Kremlin and push for a peace deal that would end the country’s ongoing war in Ukraine....
...According to The Guardian, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has received a new list of directives that largely omit Russia as a threat to monitor. ...
...A source familiar with the matter who spoke to the outlet on the condition of anonymity said agency analysts were verbally told to not follow or report on Russian threats, adding that a “Russian-related” project was consequently “nixed.”

If you asked Anselm "why do you believe God exists?" he should say, "I don't believe God exists, I know God exists and I can prove it to you." He should say this, because he was trying to convince others of, in his estimation, a logical conclusion based on evidence.

So, hopefully recognizing my general spirit of agreement with the basic point of the OP, I think you guys are throwing the baby of belief out with the bathwater of faith, or at least Banno is more expressly. And to all of our detriment. — Fire Ologist

Anselm, and everyone else who believes they can prove God's existence, "prove" only a generic sort of deity (in Anselm's case, based on "greatness"). None "prove" the Triune God of Christianity, which is the object of their faith. Still, I agree it's more rational than groundless faith (William Lane Craig coined the phrase "reasonable faith"). Where I think amateurs (i.e. people on forums like this one, but more so on apologetic forums) go wrong is to treat their arguments as unarguably sound, and are resistant to understanding why those arguments are unpersuasive.

I've often found that theists place faith in arguments that "prove" God, instead of directly in God. When I've challenged their premises, they reverse the burden of proof- implying the premises should be considered true, unless proven false.

proselytizing on this platform by "believers" runs rampant in the constant defense of fallacious arguments. — DifferentiatingEgg

In many cases, the arguments aren't fallacious, per se. They are usually possibly sound, but as I pointed out to someone recently- God's existence is possible (not provably impossible) even without an argument. A possibly sound argument doesn't make it any more plausible, or epistemically probable.

, I think that we are not the same person to some extent as yesterday since a part of us is subject to change — MoK

You're sidestepping the issue. You need to explain to what extent you are the same person, and how you account for this, given that MoK begins to exist ex nihilo at every instant of time.

The TOE would be the fundamental law.
— Relativist
No, as I explained there is no such thing as universal/fundamental laws. — MoK

You believe in ontological emergence, which I deny. Ontological emergence is contrary to the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The PSR entails reductive physicalism. Reductive physicalism entails a fundamental basis for the laws of physics, and all possible alternative laws of physics.

Let's consider an electron, for example. An electron has some intrinsic properties, such as mass, spin, and charge, and some extrinsic properties, such as location. The intrinsic properties are preserved by time — MoK

You're contradicting yourself again: perpetual creation of everything ex nihilo entails no preservation of properties.

he theory of everything is not universal though since we know from string theory that the laws of physics are one instance among many many other instances. Our universe could be a different universe in the sense that there could be different forces and particles. — MoK

Under a theory of everything (TOE), the hypothetical different forces and particles would be local manifestations of that TOE. The TOE would be the fundamental law.

I think you are talking about personality here. — MoK

No, I'm talking about personal identity over time. It appears you deny that you are the same person you were yesterday.

Your claims about different parts of the brain relating to personality, and the role of genetics are inconsistent with your claim that the brain at t1 was created ex nihilo.

Potentially, one of the many unintended consequences of the willy-nilly staff reductions:

US intel shows Russia and China are attempting to recruit disgruntled federal employees, sources say

He appears to genuinely believe Putin respects him as some kind of great leader, hence he's willing to take Putin's side — Echarmion

Over the years, Putin has showered Trump with complements (e.g. "an intelligent and experienced politician", "He behaved, in my opinion, in a very correct way, courageously, like a real man"), and in January said, "“I couldn't disagree with him that if he had been president, if they hadn't stolen victory from him in 2020, the crisis that emerged in Ukraine in 2022 could have been avoided."

With such insight into Trump's manly brilliance, how could Trump not think highly of Putin?
;

After today's meeting, Trump's approval ratings skyrocketed...in Russia:
"As expected, the Russian government seemed thrilled over the public spat between Trump and Zelensky.

“The insolent pig finally got a proper slap down in the Oval Office. And [Donald Trump] is right: The Kiev regime is ‘gambling with WWIII’” wrote Dmitry Medvedev, former Russian president and deputy chairman of the Security Council of Russia. "

-Rolling Stone

I discussed my view (perdurance) earlier. Here's an article in the Stanford encyclopedia of Philosophy.
— Relativist
Accepting that the the brain is made of parts then we say that brain A is identical to brain B IFF their parts have the same intrinsical and relational properties. In this sense, the brain at t0 is not identical to the brain at t1 since the relational properties of the parts of the brain are subject to change all the time. — MoK

Correct, it's not identical, but there is a causal relation between consecutive temporal parts. No other object in spacetime has this unique series of temporal parts.

You agree that object identity does not endure in time, so you need to somehow account for the intuition that are the same person you were yesterday. Perdurance seems the best option, but you lack a causal relation between temporal parts, since you attribute causation to a universal "Mind".

The laws of physics to the best of our understanding are not universal. — MoK

Laws of physics do not necessarily correspond to the actual laws of nature. They can be localized instances of actual law - compare Newton's law of gravity to general relativity.
They may also be approximations (compare standard chemistry to the more fundamental quantum chemistry).

We still don't know, the proper theory that explains our world — MoK

Not knowing what the actual laws of nature ARE, does not imply there aren't actual, immutable laws of nature underlying everything. The sought-after "theory of everything" depends on it.

you need to tell me what you mean by identity — MoK

I discussed my view (perdurance) earlier. Here's an article in the Stanford encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Could you answer why the physical obeys the laws of nature? — MoK

Because they instantiate universals. Laws are relations among universals. (See: this).

Consider a change in the state of something, X to Y, where X and Y are two states that define the change. X and Y cannot lay on the same point since otherwise these states occur simultaneously and there cannot be any change. Therefore, X and Y must lay on different points of a variable, let's call these points tx and ty. ty, however, comes after tx to allow X to come after Y. This variable is called subjective time. — MoK

This seems to be saying time entails an order, but it doesn't answer my question. Is time an existent? Is it a relation? Is it a property?

Why do you call it "subjective? Is it not objectively real? Is this just reference to special relativity?

My view is that time is fundamentally a relation between states of affairs. An event is a state of affairs (a point of time).

Sounds like a typical conspiracy theorist, who constructs an entire scenario in his mind, often in collaboration with others of a like mind. Facts are interpreted through the lens of his conspiracy: if consistent with the theory, it confirms it and may extend it.

Or..."AA" is an alcoholic (former member of AA) who fell off the wagon.

In one of his recent efforts to undermine rule of law, Trump has suspended enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Trade Practices Act.

Americans and American companies are now free to bribe officials in foreign countries. This encourages extortion - representatives of US companies could previously reject demands for bribes by virtue of the fact that they would be breaking US law.

In regards to the OP, I don't need to discuss how the intrinsic properties of the physical are preserved. — MoK

I didn't ask about intrinsic properties being preserved, I asked about how identity is preserved. It's relevant to your first premise:

P1) Physical and experience exist and they are subject to change

You said a brain at t1 has been caused to exist ex nihilo, so nothing has changed, and it appears that NOTHING is actually subject to change in your view. Change is what occurs to an object that persists over time.

I also don't need to discuss the laws of nature here. — MoK

I'm a law-realist: I believe laws of nature exist, and these account for causation. You have not suggested the brain is unique, so I infer that all causation is of the same nature: the mind creates all objects anew at each instant of time. If so, then there are no laws of nature - there's just the practices of this mind. If I'm right, that you deny the existence of actual laws of nature, then that is yet another reason for me to reject your claims.

Now consider your next "P1":

P1) The subjective time exists and changes since there is a change in physical — MoK

This depends on a specific ontology of time. My view is that time is a relation between events; it is not an existent. Only existents change, and they can only change if there's some object that persists across time that CAN change.

So it seems that your arguments depend on some specific assumptions. It fails as a proof because I don't accept your assumptions. So you don't really have a "proof" of anything. The question remains as to whether or not you even have a coherent framework. Since you haven't been able to explain it without contradicting yourself, it appears to me that you do not.

- how you account for identity over time: what makes you the same person your were yesterday. — Relativist

Off-topic. I will however answer that later when we agree on the OP. — MoK

It's relevant to the contradiction you demonstrated in this thread and the other:" the brain (or electron) goes from one state at time t0 to another state at time t1"

You treated the brain/electron as a persisting object, but you also indicate it's not the same brain/electron. If an electron and brain lacks a persistent identity, then how can YOU have one? I presume you believe yourself to continue existing day to day, but I doubt you can make sense of that. If you can, it seems that it should apply to electrons and brains.

- how the mind fits into your general account of causation. — Relativist

I already explained that in the case of the Mind. — MoK

You seem to be suggesting that all causation is accounted for by the mind. There are no laws of nature, just the action of an unchanging mind. I wonder how an unchanging (inert) entity experiences anything - it can't learn, it can't react. This is more consistent with a B-theory of time (block time), but you say you're a presentist.

These are the reasons I brought up those "off-topic" issues. If you have these big-picture issues in mind when making your statements, you could avoid contradicting yourself.

No, because it leaves too much to the imagination. You need to describe:
- how you account for identity over time: what makes you the same person your were yesterday.
- what are particulars/existents/objects, in terms consistent with the above.
- how you account for causation, in general.
- how the mind fits into your general account of causation.
- the ontological nature of time.

Your descriptions of all these should not entail any contradictions.

I cannot make sense of your contradictions, because contradictions make no sense.

Illustration: Consider a married bachelor. If he divorces and marries, is he married or a bachelor? He can't be both.

More paragraphs with contradictory statements can't fix the internal inconsistencies.

Why can't you acknowledge that your statement entailed a contradiction?

How do you word it considering that you understand what I said so far? — MoK

You should word all your statements in a way that doesn't entail contradictions.

No, I want you to acknowledge that your statement ("Consider two states of a physical (consider an electron as an example of a physical), S1 to S2, in which the physical exists at time t1 first and t2 later respectively)" ) is incoherent, because a particular electron DOES NOT EXIST IN 2 DIFFERENT STATES. The statement implies we should:

Consider two states of something that cannot exist in two states.

What is the thing that you do not understand? — MoK

What is it that YOU don't understand about what I said previously?:

this statement is worded incorrectly:

the brain goes from one state at time t0 to another state at time t1 but the brain at time t0 is not the same matter as the brain at time t1 — MoK


Nothing goes from one state to another, because that entails existing in both states. — Relativist

Your statement "the brain goes from one state at time t0 to another state at time t1" contradicts your view of identity.

They are not the same things. — MoK

Then this statement of yours is incoherent:

Consider two states of a physical (consider an electron as an example of a physical), S1 to S2, in
which the physical exists at time t1 first and t2 later respectively — MoK

I already elaborated on what I mean by the motion of the brain from one point to another point. That is all that matters. — MoK

It matters that you make contradictory statements. I've been questioning whether or not you have a coherent account at all. Since you justify it with contradictory statements, it appears that you do not. If you want to rescue your theory, you need to present it with a coherent account (i.e. without contradicting yourself).

You seem to be saying the electron at t1 and the electron at t2 have the same identity.

But this can't be an enduring identity, because the t2 electron was created at t2. So you need to account for these 2 disconnected objects having the same identity.
— Relativist
The electron only has the same intrinsic properties, such as mass, spin, and charge at time t1 and t2 but it has different extrinsic properties, such as locations, at time t1 and t2. — MoK

So do they, or don't they, have the same identity?

Do you agree that you've made contradictory statements?

No, the electron is annihilated at time t1 and is created at time t2 later. — MoK

You seem to be saying the electron at t1 and the electron at t2 have the same identity.


But this can't be an enduring identity, because the t2 electron was created at t2. So you need to account for these 2 disconnected objects having the same identity.

Then this statement is worded incorrectly:

the brain goes from one state at time t0 to another state at time t1 but the brain at time t0 is not the same matter as the brain at time t1 — MoK

Nothing goes from one state to another, because that entails existing in both states.

You often word your statements in ways that are contrary to your paradigm, as you did here. This creates contradictions, that you never acknowledge. Instead, you criticize me for misunderstanding, misinterpreting, or ignoring something else.

Consider two states of a physical (consider an electron as an example of a physical), S1 to S2, in
which the physical exists at time t1 first and t2 later respectively — MoK

The electron at t1 has been annihalated at t2, so this is an impossible scenario.

Fine. I get it that every physical objects are composed of sets of elementary particles, each of which which is a quantum of a quantum field at a point of time. Now reword your argument to be consistent with this:

D1) Consider two states of a physical, S1 to S2, in which the physical exists at time t1 and t2 respectively
D2) Now consider a change by which I mean that physical moves from the state S1 at time t1 to the state of S2 at time t2
A) Assume that the physical in the state of S1 has the cause power to cause the physical in the state of S2
P1) Physical however does not experience time
P2) If so, then the physical in the state of S1 cannot know the correct instant to cause the physical in the state of S2
P3) If so, then the physical in the state of S1 cannot cause the physical in the state of S2
C) So, physical cannot be the cause of its own change — MoK

1. Is the electron at t1 the SAME electron that exists at t2?
— Relativist
I assume so for the sake of the argument. — MoK

That's a false assumption, isn't it?

the brain goes from one state at time t0 to another state at time t1 but the brain at time t0 is not the same matter as the brain at time t1 — MoK

.

In this statement:
"The brain goes from one state at time t0 to another state at time t1"
"The brain" is a particular that exists at both t0 and t1, but in a different state.

But this statement:
"the brain at time t0 is not the same matter as the brain at time t1"
suggests the brain at t0 is a different particular than the brain at t1.

Which is it? Is it a different particular or the same particular?

If it's the same one, what makes it the same, given that it is made of different matter?

When I say that an electron exists in time t1 and t2, I mean that the electron exists at t1 first and later exists at t2. — MoK

2 questions:
1. Is the electron at t1 the SAME electron that exists at t2?
2. Are there intermediate points, between t1 and t2, at which this electron does not exist?

The Mind causes/creates physical. — MoK

The explain what this means:

Yes, the brain continues — MoK

Your so-called "vertical causation" is an "efficient cause", not a material cause, is it not?

Think of an electron as an example of a physical. By state, I mean that the electron has a specific location in space at time t0. It then moves from that location to another one at time t1 so its state changes. — MoK

Per your claim below. it is impossible for an electron to exist at t0 and t1. This invalidates your entire argument, at least in its present form.

No, it is not the same object and the object exists at time t0 and t1 respectively. — MoK

You said you agreed that

"The brain at t0 is composed of a set of matter arranged in a particular way. Nearly everyone would agree that this material continues to exist at t1, possibly in a different arrangement, and this constitutes the brain at t1."

Did you change your mind?

If the matter composing the brain at t0 is the same matter that composes the brain at t1, then that matter is, by definition, the material cause of the brain at t1. You said you understood what is meant by "material cause", so you should agree. Please confirm.

D1) Consider two states of a physical, S1 to S2, in which the physical exists at time t1 and t2 respectively — MoK

States of a physical what? If you mean a "physical object" then you are implying this same object exists at both points t1 and t2, and thus it has "experienced" (persisted across ) time.

Physical however does not experience time — MoK

Seems to contradict D1, unless you define "experience time" differently than "persisting across time".

The brain at time t0 does not cause the brain at t1. — MoK

The brain at t0 is composed of a set of matter arranged in a particular way. Nearly everyone would agree that this material continues to exist at t1, possibly in a different arrangement, and this constitutes the brain at t1.

Do you agree?

I guess what he's saying is:

If the physical in the state of S1 cannot know the correct instant to cause the physical in the state of S2, then the physical in the state of S1 cannot cause the physical in the state of S2. — flannel jesus

The problem with filling in the missing premises is that if you then challenge it, he'll respond "I didn't say that".

PS are you comfortable with this wording of "the physical"? Do you know what he means by that? — flannel jesus

No. He tends to be vague a lot. He also uses idiosyncratic definitions without explicitly defining them, and appears to contradict himself. In another active thread, he referred to "mind" creating a brain at a point of time "from nothing," but denied this was creation "ex nihilo" (latin for "from nothing") but also agreed the brain at the prior state was a material cause. So...it's best to pin him down.

P is P2 and Q is P3 where P2 and P3 are as following:
P2) Therefore, the physical in the state of S1 cannot know the correct instant to cause the physical in the state of S2
P3) Therefore, the physical in the state of S1 cannot cause the physical in the state of S2 — MoK

Modus Ponens has to start with a material implication. This is classically stated as "if A then B". You have no "if .... then ...." in your argument.