Hence we may say that the alternative possibilities that are genuinely open to the agent, at any given time, are the possibilities that are consistent with her general abilities, and her opportunities, such that it is only the agent's own power of practical reasoning that is responsible for one of them, in preference to another, being pursued. — Pierre-Normand

That is a reasonable clarification of the PAP. But isn't this still consistent with compatibilism? How could the agent have made a counterfactual choice through his own powers of reasoning? What rational factor is indeterminate?

You are basing your hypothetical on some specific interpretation of QM. For example, your view is consistent with the Many Worlds interpretation. This is a different subject. For this thread, I'm stipulating that QM entails ontological interdeterminacy.

That's the problem here: Where shall be the difference? — Heiko

You earlier referred to Schroedinger's cat. A cat is not both alive and dead; it is one or the other - that is the ontological nature of the experiment. Until we open the box to see the cat's state, we're in a state of ignorance - which is epistemological.

Prior to the cat's death, it was indeterminate as to when the cat would be killed. That is ontological indeterminism. It's also epistemologically indeterminate, but that is not due to mere ignorance - it is due to the quantum uncertainty - the time is not predictable in principle.

It is widely recognized that there are two main aspects to free will: alternative possibilities and agent control. Most of those who affirm free will are obliged to account for both of these aspects, and libertarian free will advocates are no exception. — SophistiCat

Refer back to the thought experiment I described in my opening post. If I make a choice based on my prior beliefs and dispositions, isn't that choice under my control? That seems to be the case irrespective of whether our free will is libertarian or compatibilist. The point of divergence is the principle of alternative possibilities, not control.

If you say that the alternative possibility must be under the libertarians control, then what exactly is the libertarian controlling that is not determinative? Why is he choosing Y instead of X? If there's a reason, that reason is determinative. If there's no reason, it's random - and QM indeterminism seems to fit that bill.

By "ontological" - I'm referring to things as the actually ARE (as the exist), not merely what is measured.

All interpretations of QM are consistent with what is measured, but make assumptions about what exists. e.g. many Worlds Interpretation assumes these worlds actually exist, even though it is impossible to access (or measure) them.

Maybe nothing, but I wanted to clarify that quantum indeterminacy is generally regarded as ontologically indeterminate. I gather you do actually accept that. Cool.

How much energy would we need to apply to a human being to actually determine it's indeterminacy at quantum level throughout? — Heiko

Not so much. See this. Of particular relevance is footnote 41, which refers to a 1968 journal article that proposes the energy for neuronal activity is stored at the QM level - which is intrinsically indeterminate.

What I mean by free will is that I can make choices that are like rolling dice (where we assume that the dice outcome really is random), but where I'm also able to bias the roll, so that given four options, I can bias the probabilities to, say, 40%, 30%, 20%, 10%.

In my view this is a completely naturalistic phenomenon. I'm a physicalist. An identity theorist.

And I don't think that the natural mechanism would necessarily have to be quantum. Some macro phenomena could turn out to be random or probabilistic rather than deterministic. — Terrapin Station

Does quantum indeterminacy satisfy your assumption of randomness. It is REALLY random, unlike dice throwing. Do you think this randomness is sufficient to meet the assumptions of Libertarian Free Will?

Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics does seek to explain the indeterminacy. I am aware of only two interpretations that are consistent with strict determinism:
1) Bohmian - which assumes there are non-local variables that determine the discrete state of the system; I don't believe this is well accepted.
2) Many Worlds - which assumes all possible measurements of the system actually exist as a branch of a meta-universe. This has more acceptance (and also vehement rejectors), but even if true - the world we find ourselves in is random (there's a copy of us in each world).

For purposes of the discussion, consider quantum indeterminacy to entail ontological indeterminacy, not just a measurement problem. This is consistent with all interpretations except Bohmian.

OK, but any factor under the agent's control seems determinative, which falsifies LFW. Refer back to the thought experiment: It seems to be the case that there is such a possible world only if there is no reason for the choice.

x

Compatibilism = a concept of free will that is consistent with determinism. I've described choices that are consistent with determinism. Is the choice "free"? It is free, because it is a product of the agent's mental processes. That's why I stressed the agent's causal role.

Could the agent have decided differently? Yes, if there were some difference in the factors contributing to his decision. This is sufficiently free to be classified as "free will," and sufficiently free to be held morally culpable.

Is that not free enough for you? Do you insist that true freedom entails being sufficiently free to make a different choice given exactly the same set of deciding factors? That seems absurd - because it implies a freedom to make choices for no reason at all.

If they are, then effectively, any decision is predetermined and we're not talking about compatibilism. — Terrapin Station

Sure - and they ARE effectively predetermined. I'm drawing the distinction between entailment and causation. Per determinism, the decision is a truth that is entailed by the truths at the big bang. The logic parallels the causation: Big bang truth ->entails a logical chain of truths->entails the truth of the decision. The transitive property applies to the logic, so it's valid to say: big bang truth ->entails truth of the decision. Although this is valid logic, causation unfolds in a temporal sequence and each step in the sequence is necessary to the next (i.e. the transitive property does not apply to the causal sequence). This means we are warranted in considering the necessary role of the immediate cause of the decision.

I take it, hower, that when Relativist speaks of alternatives, s/he is speaking of a range of options that merely appear open to the agent, for all she knows; since a deliberating agent never (or very seldom) is in an epistemic position where she would know in advance what decision she is being predetermined to make. — Pierre-Normand

I mildly object to saying a decision is predetermined. Saying the decision was "predetermined" can be interpreted to mean the same decision would be made irrespective of the cognitive processes the agent engages in. I stress that the agent's specific cognitive processes were necessary to the reaching of the decision, even though no other decision could have been made given the full set of characteristics of the agent. This is relevant to avoiding fatalism. An agent's role is an active one.

"What situation could you envisage that would offer no alternative courses of action? Unless you have unwillingly and unknowingly been 'possessed' or 'taken over' in some way then there are always alternatives. An unattractive alternative is still an alternative"

Alternative courses of action exist, but only one is selected. Under my compatibilist account, the one selected is determined by the chooser's memories, beliefs, dispositions and impulses. Given those specific memories, beliefs, etc - no other decision could have been made.

It seems reasonable to think those factors determine our choices. If these don't determine our choices, then we're making choices for no reason. But hypothetically, we could make a different choice if we had a different belief, memory, disposition, or impulse.

"Doesn’t free will just mean to a Compatibilist that the actor isn’t being coerced by anyone?"
Yes, but some deny there is moral accountability if choices are the product of determinism. I was addresssing that in my Op.

Multiple options are available, and one is chosen. This is the case irrespective of whether or not compatibilism is true. This is indisputable.

I described what is involved in the selection process (i.e. it is a product of a person's memories, beliefs, dispositions, and impulses), and this is also irrespective of whether or not compatibilism is true. Do you disagree? Am I omitting something?

Then it's not actually a choice and not compatibilist. There's no actual (ontological) freedom involved. — TerrapinStation

It is a choice by definition (a choice is a behavior in which a person has multiple options before them, and selects one), and I explained how it is consistent with determinism, so it is compatibilist.

In your initial post, i don't think that you're describing compatibilism in either 1 or 2. — Terrapin Station

Thanks for the comment. It reminded me that I failed to include a preliminary description of a compatibilist choice. I have added that - it's now the second paragraph of the Op, and I'll repeat it here:

By definition, a choice is a behavior in which a person has multiple options before them, and selects one. Choices are plausibly consistent with compatibilism because they are the product of a person's memories, beliefs, dispositions, and impulses. At a point in time, memories, beliefs and dispositions are fixed. Impulses imply a seemingly random element to the choice, but not actually random. The impulse has a basis in one's attitude at the moment (e.g. optimistic, pessimistic, anger, happiness...) or related to an internal or external factor that triggers a transient memory or feeling. These factors plausibly collectively determine the decision - no alternative decision could have been made given the specific set of memories, beliefs dispositions, and impulses that were present at the time of the decision. For purposes of this discussion, we'll assume that there were deterministic causes of the prior memories, beliefs and dispositions as well (in general, a combination of nature and nurture).

The drunk driver chose to drive while drunk, and chose to drive off after hitting the bicyclist. These decisions were plausibly the deterministic result of her beliefs, dispositions, and impulses of the moment. The question I was addressing in #1 and #2 pertained to whether or not a plausible account of moral accountability could be provided.

I still think that argumentum ad populums are fallacies. — Terrapin Station

I'm not making an argumentum ad populum. I'm noting that each of us has a natural reaction to such deeds as I've described, and it is these natural reactions that are the basis for assigning responsibility.

The Op over-generalizes. There are cases in which medication is appropriate and beneficial. Some people are so psychotically impaired that this is their only chance for anything close to a normal life. There are also some who benefit from temporary use of anti-depressants. Many doctors ARE too quick to prescribe and too willing to continue a medication, but I wouldn't demonize the entire profession. Better research, better guidelines, and better training is called for.

"
Well the Guardian is fairly reputable, and two sources is better than one, whereas the Canary is new and 'radical', and that article seemed to be sourced mainly in tweets. Still, the story is un-confirmed elsewhere, and the meetings denied by both parties. "
The important thing is that we ahould not treat the claim of meetings as fact. Even if true, it will only be relevant if there is admissable evidence for it. We have to wait for Mueller's report to know what what facts can be established. In the meantime, we just have these little tidbits, that may or may not pan out.

The Guardian says they were told this by two sources. That is not "fake news". It may be false, but fake news is the spreading of stories that have been thoroughly discredited - like the story about vaccinations causing autism. As far as I can tell, this story hasn't been discredited - it's simply been denied by Assange, which is hardly surprising. Whether it's true or false, no one's going to be convicted on the basis of there being two unnamed source telling a newspaper.

Am I failing to provide the sort of support you think I should give?

For what it's worth, I'm not pulling for Trump to fail. I related this in a post I made awhile back (here).

Sure, there's lots of factors in addition to her mother, but the drunk driving woman deserved to be convicted because she was the direct cause of the bicyclists death, unless someone was forcing her against her will.

One incompatibilist argument is to claim that if LFW is false, then the bicyclists death was entailed by the state of the universe when the big bang occurred: everything that follows is deterministic, so there were no true choices and thus no one to blame. This overlooks the role of the direct cause, and I'm explaining that we naturally cast blame to the direct cause, and that it is reasonable to do so.

Right, IF her past had been different, she would have been raised in such a way as to potentially care and emphasize moral values. However, in the scenario you provide, she was not, in fact, raised that way. — Mentalusion

I was giving one example of a difference in the past that might have made a difference. For example, a near miss where she almost kills someone or herself.

The conclusions of the thought experiment seem to be committed to the view that the only appropriate choice or decision is the one that has a preponderance of reason in its favor. — Mentalusion

No. I mentioned that the choice was a product of beliefs, disposition, and impulse. In impulsive choice is not rational, but the impulse is the reason for it.

Regarding an "executive decision" - I suggest this is due to nonlinear logic/pattern recognition/insight. This is the process where we recognize a solution to a problem without having arrived at it deductively. Depending on the circumstance, it can be subconsciously influenced by desires, false beliefs (like a racist jumping to conclusions about something done by a member of the hated race), or by a positive or negative attitude. Our judgment can be impacted by any number of things - becoming angry due to a perceived slight (getting cut off in traffic, arguing with a spouse about money, grief...). For this reason, I used possible world semantics to conceptually wind back the clock to the point of decision, keeping every possible factor identical.

Understand that I'm not suggesting Libertarian Free Will is impossible or incoherent. I'm just showing that compatibilism is also coherent and plausible, it just depends on a different conceptual framework.

"I am still waiting for an account of responsibility that works if we have no free will and all acts are determined. "
Here's two compatibilist accounts of responsibility:

1.The natural reaction to hearing about the drunk driver killing the bicyclist is a reactive attitude that the driver is guilty. In most cases, a perpetrator has a feeling of guilt after recognizing a consequence of a bad choice (e.g. the girl expressed this to friends, and it was these friends who reported the crime).These morally reactive attitudes are the basis of our moral responsibility practices. They are natural responses, not mere social convention.They are an aspect of interpersonal relations and expectations, and of our internal feelings. It is inconceivable that we would stop holding such people morally accountable, or stop feeling guilty, even if it were somehow proven that determinism is true. Indeed, the fact that we have these attitudes contributes to our behavior, because we generally prefer to avoid guilt and social approbation, and enjoy pride and respect.

2. Could the drunk driver have done differently? Yes she could have, if she had held the strong belief that the risk of driving drunk was so great that it outweighed her impulse to do so. This could only have occurred had there been something different about the past (formation of that belief), but that's reasonable. If our choices aren't the result of our personal beliefs, dispositions, and impulses - what are they? Random?

When she is released from prison, let’s hope she will actually have learned this, and doesn’t repeat the risky behavior. Our beliefs and dispositions are part of what we are - we own the results, and this makes us accountable. We can learn new beliefs, and these will influence our behavior.

#1 and #2 are more or less independent, but in tandem they provide not only a coherent account of moral responsibility, they also explain why normal functioning people strive for generally moral behavior. We want to avoid guilt, fit in, and we want to avoid approbation by others. We CAN always do better, but it requires learning things. Social consequences (positive and negative) and internal guilt/pride provide incentives to learn what is needed to behave morally. Calvinists believe our lives are fully determined and we can't really change what we are destined to do. However, each Calvinist strives to prove to everyone, including themselves, that they are among the saved - they prove this by their behavior.

I am going to post this in a new thread, to solicit input from more than the one or two that will read this buried in the current thread.

", it is not a choice at all. Unless there is more than one possibility open, there is nothing to choose. "
People engage in a behavior we call "choosing", this is indisputable. Even if a different choice could not have been made, it is still the case that the choice has been made and it is is a direct result of the choosers deliberation. The choice is in the causal chain.

I strongly disagree that we should support policies we disagree with. That is beyond absurd- no President has ever received that kind of support.

Trump makes no attempt to achieve consensus or compromise. He bullies, makes threats, and denigrates those who disagree with him daily. Much of his behavior is inexcusable, and what I think is absurd is that people defend his behavior just because they like his policies. Everyone should recognize bad behavior and call it out, even if that behavior results in policies they desire.

During the campaign, supporters extolled his willingness to be "politically incorrect." They didn't seem to realize that this guaranteed he would piss people off and they would react.

Two wrongs don't make a right. We should not respond to bad behavior with more bad behavior. But we should still call out that bad behavior.

I would be happy if Trump's policies have a positive impact, even if they are policies I disagree with. I'm doubtful, but I will give him his due if it works out. But it will never be OK to be a jerk.

If I voted in a Chimp for President, I would not defend his throwing his shit at people despite that being Chimp-normal. Trump supporters should not defend Trump's shit-throwing either, even though it is Trump-normal.

What is entailed by supporting Trump?

It's normal to have policy disagreements. Surely you aren't expecting us to support his nasty rhetoric, like name calling, or his labelling unflattering news as "fake", or proclaiming the press the "enemy of the people." You can't expect us to support his disdain for the rule of law.

Respect the office? Sure. The office is bigger than the man. What else?

The limit is synonymous to asymptote in the case in question, and an asymptote is never reached. That's why "=" is appropriate.

It's subjective how one identifies responsibility. Consider this scenario: a parent raises a child with a lack of discipline, essentially letting the child do whatever she pleases while shielding the child from any negative consequences. The child reaches adulthood and behaves irresponsibly, drinking to excess and driving. One day, the adult child is driving drunk and hits bicyclist; the adult child drives away leaving the bicyclist on the road to die. Is this adult child responsible, or is the parent who failed to teach the child discipline and responsibility? This actually happened in Houston a few years ago. The driver's sister testified that it was their mother's fault for the way she was raised. I'll bet you agree with me that the adult child is responsible.

One can always find someone else to blame, but as a society we hold the actor responsible. By so doing, we impress upon others the need to take responsibility for his actions. Some will learn this and be less likely to behave recklessly. Others won't. Both will be exhibiting behavior that can plausibly considered to have been determined by their beliefs, dispositions, and impulses.

Trump's view on this implies he doesn't think justice is possible, because it all comes down to the judge being antagonistic or sympathetic to the person or position. Trump doesn't accept, or doesn't understand, rule of law.

" If whatever I do is fully immanent, fully determined, in the state of the world before we are conceived, then our actual existence can play no role in determining how we act. "
If A causes B, and B causes C it is still the case that B's existence caused C. If we did not exist, we could not act.

It's consistent with determinism either way.

Making a seemingly random choice is an impulse.

Sure. Pseudorandom numbers are epistemically random. They're still deterministic. Making choices that seem free is what compatibilism is all about.

There is no such thing as a random number generator*. There are pseudo random number generators. Rolls of dice and coin flops are deterministic. You may think you are picking a number randomly, but it could be due to something in the environment triggering it. It is impossible to judge. Statistical tests can be done, just like those used to assess the quality of pseudorandom generators. I've seen some studies, and it doesn't look good for randomness (I'll try to find a paper).

*(It would theoretically be possible to create one based on quantum indeterminacy, but our minds are probably not uncollapsed quantum systems).

Although the argument in the Op fails because of the equivocal use of "responsibility", premise 1 seems true and constitutes a good reason to believe that our choices are not the product of libertarian free will (LFW).

The choices we make are the product of our beliefs, dispositions, and impulses. These seem to be the cause of the choice. Each belief, disposition, and impulse seem to have been caused. Hence, our choices could not have been different.

As a thought experiment: In the actual world, you are presented with a choice between X and Y. You deliberate on the options, weighing pros &cons consistent with your background beliefs and desires, and you ultimately choose X (possibly influenced by some sudden impulse). Is there a possible world with an identical history to this one, so that you have exactly the same background beliefs, desires and impulses at the point at which the choice is presented - but you instead choose Y?

If yes, then your choice is made for no reason.
If no, then your choice has been caused (consistent with determinism).

Consequently, LFW entails making choices for no reason. I don't think it's reasonable to believe we make choices for no reason, which suggests LFW is false.

Why not just edit the post, and enter what you wanted to say?

This is an ontological, not an epistemological question about ethics. I am aware atheists can be very moral beings.
- This is a question for non-theists who hold to objectivity in ethics (moral realists) - e.g. it is always true that murdering someone for no reason is morally wrong, etc.
- Grounding morality in: evolution (naturalistic fallacy), sentiment (subjectivity), or human reason (ultimately subjective, for whose reason are we speaking of? And human reason, limited as it is, cannot construct moral laws) seems incoherent. Short of Platonism, are these all the options a non-theist has at his disposal? — Modern Conviviality

Humans have the capacity to make moral judgments. These judgments are rooted in empathy, the feeling invoked when considering the condition of others. We don't have to be taught that it's"wrong" to cause another pain and suffering; we literally feel it to be so - if we function properly (sociopaths do not function properly). That act x is wrong is a semantic description of our natural empathy-based sensation of wrongness. It is a properly basic belief, and not mere opinion because we have the belief innately. The belief/feeling is analyzable and seen to be consistent with the survival and thriving of our species. So the ontic fact to which the proposition "x is wrong" corresponds is: the ingrained empathetic feeling in conjunction with the objective benefit to the species of a proper moral judgment.