"The FTA is a probability argument that says what is more likely. For life as we know it to exist the odds of all the requirements happening as the did is astronomical on the orde of 52! "

The problem is that it's post hoc reasoning. Here's another post hoc analysis: you would not exist had your parents not gotten together and produced you. Each of your parents wouldn't exist had their parents not gotten together and so on- back through the generations of both your human and nonhuman ancestors. The odds are extemely low that all those specific pairs of indiviuals would have gotten together and produced the line of offspring that resulted in you. Your existence is therefore extremely unlikely.

The existence of life is similar: post hoc analysis show how unlikely it is, but had life not come to exist, other things would have existed. What's so special about life? It's special to us (just like your existence is special to you), but life (nor you) is not objectively special.

It seems to me that "me-ness" is derived from our innate point of view, not something learned or inferred. Same with "other-ness" - that which is not me. If one were to then infer the universe is part of the other, that indeed seems a false inference.

The issue is about probability for created unit of reality to exist.

I assume you're using "created" in the sense of a contingent being that is the product of causation.

With any other potential world, the issue is the same. Was that world created through a process or does that world exist as is in eternity? In any case, though, we exist and we are created. That means that there is practical or an absolute 0% probability that we are created through some random unconscious act of some other prior potential world.

Eternity can simply mean existing at all times, which is consistent with a finite past. A finite past implies an initial state, and cannot have been created: because for a thing to be created, it had to have not existed prior. There is no "prior" to the existence if time.

If something has to exists, as you say, that includes possibility for God to exist, not exclusively some undefined world or worlds. And then, just taking into account randomness in our reality, we can conclude that there is practical or an absolute 100% chance that God, conscious creator of our reality, exists, since there's opposite probability that we exist as a result of randomness.

I agree it is epistemically possible that god exists - this is just another of the "random" possibilities. I see no basis for claiming a god is more probable than a brute fact that results in our coming into existence. In fact, by your reasoning, it seems that "god" is nothing more than this brute fact that entails our existence.

"Based on generally accepted observations we have about our reality, there is either practical or an absolute 0% chance that we exist, ultimately, as a result of randomness. "
The prior probability of any specific world existing is infinitesmal (not strictly zero) and yet some world would have to exist, since SOMETHING has to exist.

You have not convinced me of the cogency of your objections.

For the FTA to have any utility, it needs to have some persuasive power. No belief is held in isolation, and this makes it difficult to judge an argument the same way a non-theist would (even an open-minded agnostic who is open to both God's existence and non-existence). The fact that you bring up intentionality demonstrates that you aren't judging the FTA apart from your related beliefs.

BTW, I haven't mentioned my own position. I call myself an "agnostic deist." This means that I consider it possible that there exists some sort of entity that created the world, but it is also possible that the world is simple a brute fact. My reason for thinking a "deity" is a distinct possibility is the existence of consciousness - which is difficult to account for under materialism. It actually would have bearing on my position if the FTA were at all convincing. I try to look at it as objectively as I can, although I'd never claim I'm better than anyone else at this.

there are definite ends (aka "final states" -- which need not be "final") to which physical processes tend... If we then say that any source of intentionality is, by definition, a mind, then a mind is responsible for the laws of nature

Interesting perspective, but I have two questions about it:
1) How is it not arbitrary to label any state as a "definite end" or "final state", if every state will evolve to another through a potentially infinite future?
2) How would one distinguish a non-intentional state from an intentional one? I ask because your claims seem based on the assumption of intentionality ("knowing" that God did it) rather than demonstrating it.

I agree, that is why there is no scientific support for a multiverse...

There's also no scientific support for intentionality or God. You seem to be doing exactly what I anticipated: only considering metaphysical possibility to admit God into consideration, and refusing to admit it for anything else. This is inconsistent.

Relativist: "if we're including God among the possibilities to consider, we have to consider all metaphysically possible worlds"

No, we don't. We only have to consider actual evidence

Then this removes God from consideration.

Possible worlds talk is just a way of injecting baseless speculation into philosophical discourse.

Possible worlds is just a semantics for discussing modal claims. You are inconsistent in your use of modality. What exactly is the modality you propose to use to "baselessly" (without evidence) propose God as the solution? For God to be the answer, God must be "possible" and possibility entails a modality. You could use epistemic possibility (as far as we know, there might be a God), or conceptual possibility (God is conceivable, and therefore possible), or broadly logical possibility (God's existence entails no broadly logical contradictions). But whatever modality you use, consistency demands using the same modality to consider multiverse. Clearly, God is not physically possible, so you can't use this.

(re: sandstone and snowflakes) The existence of the required elements (H, O, Si) does not require nuclear fusion in stars and so is far less constrained than the existence of life.

Snowflakes depends on a variety of elements, planet formation, atmosphere, liquid water on the planet surface, evaporation, a narrow range of atmospheric and surface temperatures, dust in the atmosphere.
Sandstone also requires a planet with certain minerals present, water flowing - and thus the presence of sufficient water so that it will pool and flow, a narrow range of temperature on the surface, and in the atmosphere. Silicon only exists because very large stars previously existed that could fused it and later when supernova. Water itself is dependent on the production of oxygen by stars as well.

Snowflakes and sandstone are probably more prevalent than life in the universe, but their existence is still dependent on prior conditions - conditions whose probability is indeterminable.

No, again. God is a metaphysical necessity. The only possibility that can be attributed to God is epistemological -- due to ignorance. The evidence for God's existence is all being. If anything is, we can conclude, with metaphysical certainty, that God is.

More correctly: it is epistemically possible that a metaphysically necessary God exists. The only modality in which the possibilities for both God's existence and non-existence can be evaluated is epistemic modality. But a multiverse is also epistemically possible - you admitted this.

While I don't deny the biological importance of DNA, your genetic coding doesn't enter into my judgement that you're human and Fido is a dog.... What does that have to do with anything?

The issue is that "essence" is a concept based on a primitive analysis of human-ness and dog-ness (etc). If everything that makes us human or dog is an accident (as genetics and evolution suggest) then there is no reason to think there IS such a thing.

I don't see that you've shown that there is no basis in reality for saying that a thing is (existence) or what it is (essence).

You're forgetting that my original issue is that the existence of "essence" is an assumption. I didn't claim it was incoherent. Again: every metaphysical theory depends on assumptions. This seems so trivially true, I can't understand why you'd deny it.

I showed that it is not a postulate, but names something found in reality -- i.e., the objective basis of essential definitions -- what it is about concrete individuals that allows us to apply our species concepts to them.

No you didn't! You denied the concept is related to DNA, even though you earlier claimed species entailed essential kinds. That is contradictory. Now you've claimed it's not just a sortal of accidental properties, and made the vague assertion "what is essential to my concept of humans -- a concept that is largely transcultural". What exactly does essence refer to? Identify something about dogs that set them apart as an essential kind from wolves, that is not simply the accident of DNA variation.

Relativist: " Aquinas paradigm also postulates: act, potency, form, substance, and accident."
All of which we find in our experience of reality and its conceptualization.

Seriously, do you not understand that this is a postulated pardigm? It is a way to account for the things that exist. Earlier I referenced Armstrong's ontology. He accounts for existents differently, and it's every bit as complete and coherent. I'm not going to argue that Armstrong's account is true and Aquinas is false, because they both account for everything - they are simply different, unproveable paradigms.

the fact that we have one reality based conceptual space that can be used to analyze reality does not, by any means preclude the possibility of other, equally reality-based, conceptual spaces that can be used to analyze reality. Given that reality is far too complex to be exhausted by the stupid human trick of abstraction, the more ways we think of reality, the more projections we use, the better.

What you call a "conceptual space" is what I'm calling a "paradigm" - but other than this, I agree completely. But there's an important corollary: one can't "prove" any particular "conceptual space" is true. Thomistic metaphysics is popular with theists because it entails a God, but if someone claims this constitutes an objective proof of God's existence, they are ignoring the epistemically contingent nature of the Thomist paradigm.

I don't think Rudy's going rogue here- Trump wants Cohen painted as a liar. Team Trump considers this the lesser of two evils. The greater evil is that Trump lied about having knowledge of the infamous meeting. It remains to be seen if Cohen's allegation will be corraborated, but this reality show is getting interesting.

Rudy Giulliani said Cohen is a "pathological liar."

“I expected something like this from Cohen, he’s been lying all week. He’s been lying for years,”

Why did our beloved, law-abiding president have a pathological liar working for him? What is the positive spin on it?

These beliefs are consistent with a natural origin. All living beings have to interact with the world to survive and reproduce. I don't even think there's anything special about our intrinsic beliefs vs that of other animals.

Here's a related perspective. Christian Philosopher (and epistemologist) Alvin Plantinga has defined "properly basic" as follows:

where "p" is a belief and "S" is a subject holding belief p, and "warrant" = the conditions a belief must satisfy to constitute knowledge if p is true:
1. p is properly basic for S in with respect to warrant if and only if S accepts p in the basic way, and p has warrant for S.
2. A belief has warrant only if the cognitive process that produces it is successfully aimed at truth - that is, only if there is a high objective probability that a belief produced by this process is true (given that the process is functioning properly in the sort of epistemic environment for which it is designed).

Plantinga's purpose is to argue that belief in God constitutes knowledge, but his analysis makes as much (or more) sense in terms of innate beliefs about the world. Our perceptions about the world have been shaped through evolutionary history in a way that is (in a real sense) aimed at truth - where truth is a correspondence between our image of the world and the actual world. Consequently, they satisfy his definition of "properly basic" and arguably, are sufficient for some knowledge of the world.

Here's my theory:

Foundational beliefs are those non-verbal beliefs that are innate, and form the basis for the way we perceive the world. For example, we see before us a red ball and a ripe strawberry. We recognize a commonality: redness. Recognizing this quality is not a product of deduction, nor of semantic analysis. Rather it is hardwired in our brains. Similarly, we naturally perceive a distinction between ourselves and the external world (as well as the existence of distinct objects in that external world). This explains why there are no solipsists.

Your account is plausible, except for your comment "there is no such thing as reason" - that's overly strong. We do have foundational beliefs that are not the product of reason, but we still apply reason to derive additional beliefs, albeit that they are contingent on those foundations.

Just replacing Mark with the Russians doesn't make it a crime.

I believe it would be a crime if Trump encouraged Russia to get information illegally. That would mean he was conspiring with the Russians. He actually did ask Russia to find Hillary's emails, and reportedly this prompted activities to do just that. Had Russia actually delivered the emails, then I think Trump might be held guilty of a crime. They didn't, but it's dancing close to the fire. Also consider the "nothing burger" meeting between Don Jr and the Russians - again, nothing came out of it, but had something come out of it, it would possibly have been a crime.

It would also be a the crime if someone hinted or promised relief on Russian sanctions in return for information.

"Not sure what made you think I'd want to discuss this since I didn't so much as mention it."

Well, I had the impression you were criticizing me for making an "unargued-for assertion", so I was offering to support that assertion. Perhaps I misunderstood

While it's true that the PSR has traditionally been pressed into the service of theistic arguments, that it necessarily entails a 'causally efficacious necessary being' is just another unargued-for assertion. In any case, 'brute fact' plays right into the hands of fideism anyway, so the alignment of the one with theism and the other with atheism is largely a forced and unconvincing one.

Yes, I made an assertion, and I didn't present an argument. My assertion is based on prior discussions I've had on the topic. If you'd like to discuss whether or not the Leibniz' Cosmological Argument makes a good case for God's existence, I'm happy to do that, but this would mean you'd have to show why belief in the PSR is justified (which you previously said you weren't interested in doing) and compelling (because if the argument isn't compelling, it's pointless).

Regarding your comment about playing into the hands of fideism, I really don't understand your point. Are you suggesting an atheist is having faith in atheism, or that this sends theists into expressions of faith?

"No idea what you're talking about. "
Same here. But let me know if you have any specific questions.

"Without the assumption that God must necessarily have all 3 of the characteristics that you list, you don’t have an argument that would be a helpful argument for Atheists arguing for Atheism."
Then you don't understand atheism. Atheism entails the belief that X doesn't exist, and for this to be meaningful - "X" must be well defined. X = an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent being.

As I said, this doesn't preclude something else existing. But it is relevant what that is. Suppose there's an indifferent "God" who is omnipotent and omniscient. This doesn't imply there is an afterlife, or a "reward" for having faith in this being, nor does it means we ought to "worship" this thing. It becomes irrelevant.

I haven't previously mentioned what my position is, so I'll tell you. I am an "agnostic deist." By this, I mean that I think there's a possibilty that there is some sort of "deity" that is responsible for the physical world and the existence of consciousness. It's only a possibliity: I can't prove it true, and I can't prove it false. But I see no good reasons to think there is an afterlife (other than wishful thinking), so the hypothetical existence of this being isn't really very important - except for explaining certain aspects of the world (e.g. why there is consciousness; the nature of a metaphysically necessary first cause).

"There is no "free will" so your argument is wrong in premises 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Maybe 6 is technically true but since it would be detrimental to reality, as I understand it, if God created beings with free will, I don't think that God even weighs the option of creating free will beings."

That is a reasonable objection to my argument, but it has another problematic implication: why would God bother to create people on earth who have a capacity to sin? Why not just create "slaves" in heaven, and avoid the pains he causes in this life - a life that is extremely brief, compared to spending eternity as a slave.

Right, but I'm inclined to go with more of a sure thing than to hope for another anomaly.

I greatly admire Barrack Obama as a person, and for what he tried to do. But his progressive agenda resulted in the conservative backlash that led to Trump getting elected. A moderate Democrat has a better chance of having a lasting, positive, and beneficial legacy.

I'm with you on the insider/outsider thing being a detriment for Clinton vs Trump, but that was irrespective of being a moderate or progressive. Perhaps Bernie would have beaten Trump had he been nominated, but we'll never know. Regardless, we've now seen what being an outsider gets you, so I don't think that can work again.

That is an interesting observation, but it not quite the same thing. To get elected, one needs to be well known. It can be very expensive to become well known. Michelle (as well as Bushes, Kennedy's, and Clintons) get notoriety for free. Trump also got it for free. There's been controversy about Hillary since Bill's presidency (I remember Rush Limbaugh accuse her of orchestrating Vince Fosters killing). There's no controversy about Michelle, and - given her impressive speech about "going high" - she would be the perfect person to go against him.

That's an interesting observation. There was definitely been a realignment of the parties in the 60s. There used to be "liberal Republicans" (remember Rockefeller? for that matter, Nixon was a liberal in many respects). And consider what happened to the segregationist Democrats- they left because of the Civil Rights legislation under LBJ. I will forever remember my red-neck cousins, former Democrats, saying they would no longer vote Democrat because they said the "Democrats did too much for the ni___rs".

I don't think Clinton lost because she was a moderate, but I'd be interested in hearing why you think so.

The only people that I can imagine that were put of by her being a moderate were Bernie supporters. I doubt many of them voted for Trump, although I'm sure some of them just stayed home (I know some who did this). I bet the vast majority of them now regret their decision, so I don't see this as a factor in the next election.

Elections are usually won by getting the votes of those in the middle. Trump is certainly an anomoly, but it would be good to consider why so many found him appealing. Fewer will find him appealing this time, and I'm confident that his opposition will be extremely energized.

BTW, there's one progressive that I think could beat Trump in a landslide, but there's zero chance she will run: Michelle Obama. Nevertheless, she's my dream candidate.

It's an assumption that entails a causally efficacious necessary being, which is unique (all other necessary "beings" are abstractions, which are not causally efficacious). The alternative is an assumption of an uncaused brute fact - one whose nature entails the potential for change (and thus does tell us what causality is), and is also unique.

As an example of the latter, consider a quantum system in an initial state that deterministically evolves per a Schroedinger equation. That it will evolve is instrinsic to what it is.

Theists are drawn to the assumption of a causally efficacious necessary being, while atheists would propose the brute fact. Consequently there's no persuasive power in this line of enquiry - contrary to devotees of Leibniz' argument.

I would say the reason I don't know what it is like to be a bat is because I am not a bat — Moliere

You're also not a girl (I assume). There certainly are more differences between bats and humans than there are between boys and girls, but they're still different. The differences are physical as well as social. There certainly is a "girl role" that is "imposed" on girls, but that role is part of their identity. A boy who'd like to live in that role will not have had the same experiences as the girl.

Of course, we could chose to define the "girl role" in a way that people of either genetic sex could fit - but there will be arbitrariness to it. I'm actually OK with doing that, but this doesn't make it something more than it is (arbitrary).

I know what it is like to be poor because I have been poor.

Same here. I wonder if we experienced it the same way, though. Everyone experiences things based on who and what they are, and on their environment.

Thanks for the link - the analysis is very plausible. It is also disheartening because it has the corrollary "lies don't matter" to the public, and probably also that the public is short-sighted. There are consequences to unsustainable budget deficits, protectionism, and ambiguous relations with other countries where the distinction between ally and enemy are blurred.

IMO, the Democrats best hope is to nominate a moderate. Left-wingers certainly feel energized, but their favorite candidates (Sanders and Warren) have lower chances of getting elected than does a real moderate. They can only win if something pretty bad happens during the next 2 years. The best counter to an a-hole like Trump is an even tempered, well-spoken person. e.g. if Mitt Romney became a Democrat, I think he could be Trump.

The laws of logic are not contingent laws like man-made laws or even the laws of physics, which are what they are but could have been different. Logic is an essential part of reality: not everything that is logical is real, but everything that is real is logical. I+I=II because you can see II in I+I (just remove the + sign). It does not "appear" from it, like an effect appears from its cause. — Samuel Lacrampe

You're reifying logic. Logic is not part of "reality" it is a truth-preserving guide to reasoning. It "exists" only as abstractions exist - within the mind. Outside of the mind, there is no such thing as logic. Logic guides us to understanding the world based on limited "knowledge" (as a set of beliefs) about the world; it applies to propositions not directly to reality.

" To those who don't regard causation as such though, to those who think causation itself must be explained, something other must be doing that work. "
That's circular reasoning: why assume causation must be explained, unless one first believes everything has an explanation?

By contrast, we have an empirical basis for believing causation. It may not be ontologically primitive, but it seems an epistemologically justifiable belief that is not circular.

Consider why we can't know what it's like to be a bat. Among the reasons: our perceptions are based on our world-view, and our world-view is a product of hard-wiring, and layers of experience. Each layer of experience is a product of the lower (earlier) layers.

Males and females are hardwired differently. Among other differences are the hormonal - these influence our perceptions. A boy may empathize with girls rather than boys (and vice versa), and conceptualize an opposite gender-role, but it will not be identical to being that opposite sex. (Don't construe this to imply I'm opposed to trans-rights. I'm socially liberal on this, but that doesn't mean I can set aside reasonable analysis.)

"Then my answer is yes -- one can know what it is like to be such and such. "
You should let Thomas Nagel know.

A state of affairs is something that exists, so it entails the "existence of non-existence." This is (broadly) logically impossible.

Alternatively, to suggest there could have been nothingness implies the proposition "there is nothing" is true in some metaphysically possible world. "Is" is a statement of being (existence), so this again reduces to the self-contradictory term, "non-existence exists".

I used "if" to avoid asserting a negative ( "there is no justification..."). I acknowledge there may be justification of which I am unaware.

A belief in X is rational only if it is justified. What is the justification for believing there are necessarily reasons for everything? The only justification I'm aware of is causation, and that is not sufficient because that only establishes the necessity of causal reasons.

I was alluding to Leibniz's cosmological argument. — frank

I know, and I was relating an objection: it depends on the assumption that nothingness should somehow be expected in the absence of a reason. A state of affairs of "nonexistence" is incoherent.

"Why should we think reasons can only be causes? "

I didn't suggest there can't be non-causal reasons, I questioned the justification for believing there are necessarily reasons. If I'm right that the justification is based on the presence on causal reasons, then it is unjustified to claim there are necessarily reasons when there are no causes.

Western philosophy is steeped in a theistic world view, so the mere fact of a rich literature carries no weight. That's not to suggest there might not be good justifications imbedded therein, but what are they?

(BTW, your link didn't work)

Why expect nothingness in the absence of a reason?

Please elaborate. Why should we think there are reasons without basing the reasoning on causation?

That is my sense as well, but then the second clause of Leibniz' formulation is unjustified: that a first cause has a reason (necessity of its existence).

Leibniz formulation implies brute facts can't exist, but that seems unjustified.

I
Why think that time does not require change?

I suggest that time is inherent in the objects that experience them, down to the qunantum level. If there were no "atomist" time inherent in the object, then time would not exist for that object. I read of this hypothesis in a speculative physics paper awhile ago. I'll hunt for it and post a link.

The alternative is that time is transcendent: a river in which we ride and in which events occur. But why should we believe this?

The causality principle states that everything has a cause, which is very different from every thing has a reason.

But it seems reasonable to believe everything has a cause. Only by considering causes to be reasons can the PSR be justified. I see no justification to believe there are necessarily non-causal reasons.

Free will is consistent with determinism. Libertarian free will is not (by definition).

One is exercising free will by making decisions based solely on one's personal factors (prior beliefs, dispositions, impulses, emotions, likes, dislikes...), and not being coerced into some choice. This is consistent with determinism because those internal factors determine the decision we will make. This is a compatibilist account of free will.

Libertarian free will is simply the doctrine that our freely willed choices are not determined.

As to which is true (compatibilist or libertarian free will) - it is impossible to know one way or another. Consequently, the concept of free will doesn't really provide a clue into the nature of the mind.

I think it's interesting to ask: why are there actually no solipsists?

IMO, it's because to be a solipsist, one has to abandon hardwired beliefs. Belief in a proposition is not simply a bit being turned on, it entails a psychological state. We are hardwired to perceive the world as we do. Beliefs don't drop away because we can't rationally justify them based on priors, they only drop away if we become convinced they are false.

the FTA is persuasive, as a number of atheists have admitted -- giving it as a reason for positing a multiverse.

That is all anyone could hope for, but my position is that the alleged persuasive power is a consequence of people failing to see the inherent problems that I've brought up.

The strength of the FTA lies in the fact that when many improbable means coordinate to effect the same end, it is usually the case that they are intelligently directed to that end. This is the kind of reasoning used in court cases. So it's quite rational, even though not airtight.

I agree with the approach, but disagree with your claim that there is intelligent direction "to that end." This characterization continues the same flawed reasoning by implicitly assuming there is an end (or goal or objective). That is one of my most important points.

we do know that whatever the fundamental laws are, they closely approximate the physics we have in its verified realm of application.

Which sidesteps the important issue. The "realm of application" is the universe after Planck time. That's problematic for drawing conclusions about a broader scope - and a multiverse, and the possibility of differing "constants" is a broader scope.

Relativist: There are many sorts things that exist in THIS world that would not exist had the constants been different

For example?

Sandstone and snowflakes, to name two. But keep in mind that if we're including God among the possibilities to consider, we have to consider all metaphysically possible worlds - and a multiverse with differing constants is every bit as metaphysically possible as is a God. You can't dismiss multiverse for lack of evidence and then propose a God which also has no evidence.

Aquinas is quite clear that neither essence nor existence are "things." They are just "principles" -- the foundation in reality (objective basis) for saying that a thing is (existence), and what kind of a thing it is (essence). So, if you think that there's an objective basis for saying something exists, you agree with Aquinas that it has "existence," and if you think there's an objective basis for saying you're human and Fido is a dog, then you agree that you and Fido have essences. There is nothing more to essence and existence than that.

Aquinas distinguishes between essence (necessary and sufficient properties) and accidents (contingent properties). Consider humans: there are no necessary and sufficient properties for being human - every portion of human DNA is accident. You can define a sortal - i.e. a set of properties that divides up all beings into two sets: human and non-human, and if you only did that with the set of people alive today, you'd have no difficulty. However, try to divide up all living things that have ever lived on earth into human and non-human, and you will unavoidably have to draw an arbitrary boundary. Among the ways one identifies a species is that members of that species can breed and produce another of that species. Consider an ordered set of all your ancestors through the evolutionary past: each generation was the same "species" as the prior generation - able to interbreed. And yet, you are not the same species as your Australopithecus ancestors (as well as a great many other ancestors in the evolutionary chain.

If you treat essence as nothing but a sortal of accidental properties, then Aquinas definition of God goes awry (according to Aquinas, God is a being in whom essence and existence are identical).

I brought up essence just as an example of a metaphysical postulate. Aquinas paradigm also postulates: act, potency, form, substance, and accident. It's coherent, but it is not the only coherent metaphysical paradigm, so one can't claim to have an objective case for something that is based on any particular metaphysical paradigm.

Relativist: My issue is that if you're going to accept unprovable postulates in your preferred metaphysics you must accept them in alternative metaphysics to avoid a double standard.

We know our fundamental facts directly from experience, not indirectly, via proofs.

The nature of the things that exist (such as whether they consist of form and substance, or whether they are states of affairs) is not a "fundamental fact" that comes from experience - rather, it is a postulated paradigm - an assumption.

What is the specific falsifiable prediction [in a rigorous mulitiverse hypothesis]?

The Loop Quantum Gravity cosmological model is dependent on Loop Quantum Gravity theory being true, which is testable in principle (see this). The Cosmology also predicts observable remnants in the CMB, but will require more precise measurement.

I am not saying that they can operate independently of the things they operate on. That would be nonsense.

That's not what I asked. I asked if you believe the laws of nature EXIST (not operate) independently of the entities that exhibit them.