I am writing this thread because I struggle with the 'here and now', especially fearing the future. — Jack Cummins

This strikes me as a psychological issue, or perhaps a personal philosophy of life issue. I question whether you'll find the sort of peace you seem to be seeking, by pursuing it from more generalized philosophy. You might consider asking others how they deal with the sorts of issue that you struggle with. Maybe something will click for you.

Science is not equivalent to what individual scientists say. I'm referring to commonly accepted theory.
— Relativist

And individual scientists do not talk about commonly accepted theory? — unenlightened

Irrelevant to the point I made: you accept some things as true, despite the possibility it is false.

Really, what do you imagine needs your stalwart defence here? Are you having a battle to see who understands science better? Enough already!

Not all all. Up to now, you seem to have been arguing that if a statement is POSSIBLY false, then it cannot be assumed true. That is what I was challenging.

Accepting science means you treat the body of scientific information as true, despite the fact that it is possibly false — Relativist

No it doesn't. — unenlightened

Then explain by what you meant by "I believe in science."

Scientists are not all equally scrupulous, and are subject to peer pressure, the persuasion of big pharma et cetera, and the need to get funding. Some science is biased and some is slapdash, and some is bullshit. It's not supposed to be religion where you just believe what the high priests say. — unenlightened

False equivalence. Science is not equivalent to what individual scientists say. I'm referring to commonly accepted theory. How we deal with the potential for bias by scientists is another matter.

Accepting science means you treat the body of scientific information as true, despite the fact that it is possibly false. IOW, the mere fact that a scientific "fact" is possibly false is not sufficient reason to withhold judgement on it.

To be consistent, apply this more broadly. It's reasonable and rational to draw conclusions based on incomplete information. That's what abductive reasoning is all about. I discussed this in my last 2 replies to Banno (1. Here and 2.here).

Better" - an improvement on "best", but suffering the same ambiguity. If abduction is going to tell us which of the innumerable possible explanatory hypotheses to choose, then we need more than an asterisk and a deference. We need the basis for that choice. Otherwise abduction falls to underdetermination, to the Duhem–Quine problem. — Banno

If a conclusion were "determined" (not underdetermined) it would be a deduction- a conclusion that follows necessarily.

Of course, as you said, deduction would be preferred, but in real life (including science) we rarely have sufficient information to make a deduction. But there is often sufficient information to support some hypotheses more than others.

So it comes down to how you cash out better/superior.

And hence my original point, that whatever criteria you choose, you are subsequently just reinforcing that choice. — Banno

Methodology is indeed key. Some basics: explanatory scope and power, parsimony, more plausible than alternatives (consistent with more facts that are commonly accepted), fewer ad hoc assumptions (ad hoc suppositions are assumptions that are not entailed by the data and other commonly accepted facts). Biases entail ad hoc assumptions. It also entails consideration of other hypotheses.

Ideally, an abductive conclusion ought to be only as specific as the information warrants, otherwise it will include ad hoc assumptions.

Finally, the level of certainty ought to tied to the strength of the case. For example, consider a jury verdict based on a preponderance of evidence vs one based on "beyond reasonable doubt". A chosen "best" explanation may still be (arguably) unlikely. There's always the risk of choosing "the best of a bad lot"- which would tend to be the case when the data is sparse.

It's useful to solicit and receive feedback from others with divergent views. This can help identify overlooked, relevant facts, challenge assumptions that are ad hoc or reflect bias, and identify alternative hypotheses for comparing.

Your claim that abductive reasoning entails "reinforcing that choice" is false. That would be a corruption of abduction, such as occurs with conspiracy theories. The criteria I listed are sufficient to reject conspiracy theories. They depend on biased (ad hoc) assumptions, cherry-pick facts, instead of considering all relevant facts, reject or rationalize facts that are inconsistent with the theory, and a person's conviction toward a theory tends to gain strength by seeking endorsement others with similar biases, while alternative hypotheses are rejected on the basis of bias and/or an unjustified faith in the conspiracy theory.

OK, I'll bite. I'll give a general idea of abduction.

Abduction entails drawing a non-necessary inference from a set of data (intended to be all available, relevant data), that consists of an explanatory hypothesis for that data - one that is deemed to explain the data better* than alternatives.

The inference is defeasible- it can be falsified by new, relevant data (previously overlooked or newly discovered) that is inconsistent with the hypothesis. Alternatively, it can be supplanted by a new hypothesis that demonstrably provides a superior* explanation.

This is consistent with the de facto means by which science advances through theory development, verification, revision, and replacement.

________________
*I'm deferring discussion of what makes an explanation better/superior.
________________

I could go into more details, but this suffices as a general description. Describe what what you disagree with, and provide what you consider a correct description.

Of course not. A rejection of one way that philosophers have claimed science works is not a rejection of science. That scientific theory is developed through abduction is a theory about scientific method. Pointing out the problems with that theory is not pointing out problems with what scientists do, but with what philosophers claim that scientists do. — Banno

OK, then you know what abduction is, and claim that science doesn't actually use abduction. Tell me what science actually does that lends it credibility, that is lacking with abduction.

You didn't answer my question about conspiracy theories- are they credible? If not, why not?

I didn't ignore randomness. I pointed out that (true) randomness is something outside our control. So it could account for a different outcome, but it's not a different outcome due to an act of will- it doesn't entail libertarian free will.

But is there actually true randomness involved? This would be impossible to establish. I mentioned the role of physical and emotional state, conditioned responses, and of subtle factors in the environment. These could constitute subconscious factors that determine the decision. It's impossible to know. .

Abduction is not an answer to Hume. Indeed, at its heart, it remains unclear what abduction amounts to; and as such, it is ineligible as a grounding for rational discourse. — Banno

Do you reject everything science teaches? Scientific theory is developed through abduction, and it has proved successful.

Do you consider conspiracy theories credible? If not, why not?

if they are all nothing more than the resolution of interacting/competing/conflicting bioelectric (autocorrect said "buttercream" the first time :rofl:) currents running around the brain. — Patterner

Assume the mind is not equivalent to the brain. Could you have chosen differently? You still had a set of background beliefs, a set of conditioned responses, a particular emotional state and physical state, were subject to a particular set of stimuli in your immediate environment, and you had a particular series of thoughts that concluded with the specific ice cream order that you made. Given this full context, how could you have made a different choice? You'd have to introduce randomnness. Randomness entails a factor not under our control.

But for the purposes of Philosophy, intention is essential. For example, a pool table with neatly stacked balls is static & causeless, until the intentional act (first cause) of the shooter inputs both Energy (causation) — Gnomon

The fact that humans engage in intentional behavior implies only that some causation is the product of intent. Not that all causation is.

What is objectionable about this, is not just that it fails as any kind of defence of the rationality of induction... — unenlightened

I wasn't addressing induction. I was addressing rationality in general. I addressed induction in another post, and quote it below.

This is the desperation, to attempt to defend one's rationality by projecting one's irrationality. — unenlightened

I gave examples of guidance that most people would consider poor bases for a decision. This was to show that, at least at the extremes, there are sharp contrasts. You sidestepped the point by identifying a possibility that (were it to come to pass) would negate the scenario. My point stands, that there are choices that are clearly irrational. This includes basing any decision on astrology, fortune cookies, or California Psychics.

I addressed the induction problem in another post:

"All swans are white" is a necessary truth if swans are defined as "white aquatic birds with long necks and xyz". But let's suppose someone inferred it a law of nature that whiteness was physically necessary in birds with some set of other characteristics. First, I wonder how that would be justified, but let's just assume there was a good justification. The discovery of a black swan would falsify that theory and lead to theory revision. What exactly is the problem with that? Would you toss out the teaching of science on the basis that every theory is provisional and there's always a chance it will be someday disproven? — Relativist

In short: the answer to the problem of induction is: apply abduction.

"Scientists are now seriously asking if humans were seeded by aliens. Here's why"
https://www.sciencefocus.com/space/humans-seeded-aliens-panspermia — RogueAI

it's obviously possible, but this doesn't seem like the most proposing hypothesis to pursue. If I follow this correctly, they've merely observed the presence of amino acids in asteroids - the same sort of thing that Urey-Miller showed to be feasible in the 1950s, and more recently has been shown to be prone to occur due to natural electrostatic action in water (see this).


It seems to me more attention to panspermia would be justified only if MORE complex prebiotic chemicals is found in extra-terrestrial environments.

If the article is correct, should guided evolution also be taken seriously?

I see no logical relation between the two. What connection are you making?

The thing is, it used to be a necessary truth, "All swans are white." Philosophers dined out on it for years. And then there wasn't 'a black swan event'; that could have been dismissed as a sport, an aberration, the exception that proves the rule or some such. No, there was a whole fucking continent of overtly black swans, unapologetically swanning about like they owned the place and had always been there. Cue much coughing and mumbling into beards. — unenlightened

"All swans are white" is a necessary truth if swans are defined as "white aquatic birds with long necks and xyz". But let's suppose someone inferred it a law of nature that whiteness was physically necessary in birds with some set of other characteristics. First, I wonder how that would be justified, but let's just assume there was a good justification. The discovery of a black swan would falsify that theory and lead to theory revision. What exactly is the problem with that? Would you toss out the teaching of science on the basis that every theory is provisional and there's always a chance it will be someday disproven?

Look chaps, I can claim very little credit for any of this; it is seriously ill advised in my estimation to try and contradict Hume. he is The Man. — unenlightened

Hume's view have been challenged by a number of philosophers. I'm just borrowing from them. A good exposition of this is in Causation (edited by Sosa & Tooley).
(A few years ago, I found a link to a PDF of it, so I have a copy).

Here's a link to an article by Tooley.

Causation without Intent is what we call Accident. — Gnomon

That may be what YOU call it. I just call it causation. You can choose to believe there is intent involved in all causation, but you cannot possibly show that causation requires it.

IS THE CAT DEAD OR ALIVE OR BOTH? — Gnomon

All answers depend on some unverifiable intrepretation of quantum mechanics. Which one is correct seems likely to remain a mystery, even though many are unwilling to accept that.

Nevertheless, "quantum causality" is well represented by a wave function - a Schroedinger equation that depicts the deterministic evolution of a quantum system over time.

So what's the alternative? — Relativist


Attribute regularities to will rather than law, maybe. — bert1

Why think that, other than that it's possible?

That is indeed a fine and attractive explanation for past regularities, and "as a rule" I myself have found that heads and tails come up about equally, and so on. But what leads you to apply this rule of the past to the future? — unenlightened

Same answer: it's a law of nature, and laws entail necessity. I'll clarify what I mean by a law: it is a relation between two TYPES of things (or among several types of things). Electron A repels Electron B because it is a law that "-1 electric charges" induce that repulsion. Any instance of 2 electrons, anywhere in time, would necessarily have that effect.

So what's the alternative? — Relativist


Indeed. And you call this 'rationality'? Not 'desperation'? — unenlightened

Suppose you have a retirement account and you're trying to invest the money to grow large enough to enable you to one day retire. Would you consider taking guidance from astrology, fortune cookies, and California Psychics? If not, why not - if all "rational" choices are simply acts of desperation?

Therefore, rationality is not decisive in this case. — unenlightened

But rationality WAS decisive for both of us. Contrast our rational choices with IRRATIONAL means of making a choice: basing it on the alignment of the planets, consulting a Ouija board, or basing it on an inscription in a fortune cookie.

neither of us is entirely certain in our estimation of the odds, and even if we were, we might still be unlucky. We could do a much more detailed survey — unenlightened

Yes, and that would have been even better, but in our example it's not worth the effort. In other cases, it might be worth the effort, but we don't have the time. But in all cases, we can make a rational choice based on the imperfect set of information that we have.

But what I have not seen in all this pragmatism is any answer to Hume. His claim is that one of our "background beliefs" seems to be that the future will be broadly the same as the past, and this is something we cannot have any evidence of whatsoever because the future is always beyond our experience. — unenlightened

Here's how I approach it: some explanation is needed for the constant conjunction of past regularities. I judge that the "inference to best explanation" for this is that there exist laws of nature that necessitate this behavior. Inferring a best explanation is rational - it's a form of abductive reasoning.

So what's the alternative? Remain agnostic based SOLELY on the possibility that there will be some future "black swan" event? What's wrong with that is that it is no more than a bare possibility (i.e. it's logically possible, but lacks evidence or any other rational basis for considering it more than that). If you're going to withhold judgement on EVERYTHING on the basis that it's logically possible that you're wrong, you'll be completely indecisive about everything in life. If you only apply this extreme skepticism selectively, then you are being inconsistent - which is irrational.

It is therefore plucked out of the total vacuum of unknowability and it is on this literally unreasonable assumption that all this "pragmatic rationality" is founded.

With the strictest definition of knowledge (belief that's true, and justified so strongly as to eliminate the possibility of being wrong), almost nothing is truly knowable - so it's a pointless goal. It's perfectly reasonable to commit on our judgments. Surely you do this in everyday life.

I agree that it is impossible to know with 100% certainty. — Truth Seeker

Yes, and this implies determinism can neither be proven, nor disproven, by appealing to free will.

:up:


You can only employ your own rationality, and I can only employ mine.

Your rationality is more likely to lead you to conclusions that are consistent with your background beliefs. If those background beliefs are true, they will be directed toward truth. The same applies to me.

Suppose you and I reach different conclusions. We could then both profit from having a discussion to identify differences in background beliefs and the reasoning we each employed. We may then adjust our beliefs and/or revise the sort of reasoning we employ.

So rationality doesn't work as a decision guide. — unenlightened

That does not follow. Rationality is not an oracle guaranteed to lead to a truth. But rationality is more likely to lead to truth than irrationality.

We rarely have enough information to prove something true beyond all doubt, so navigating through life entails making informed, rational predictions and decisions. Occasionally, wild guesses work out, but informed, rational decisions are more apt to do so. Example: for any given vaccine, it's possible it will do more harm than good, but we can look at studies (or trust those who've done so) to weight the good vs the bad.

When we say that water freezes at 0 °C, it seems like an objective fact about the universe. But from my perspective, this predictability arises perhaps because we have structured reality with concepts like temperature, phase, and measurement. The water itself doesn’t carry the law of freezing; it only behaves in ways we can recognize once we impose these distinctions. What we call a ‘law of nature’ is therefore not an independent feature of the universe, but a pattern we have stabilized within an otherwise indeterminate reality.. — Tom Storm

My position is that there are laws of nature that account for the order in the universe, and that these exist independently of us. I acknowledge I could be wrong, so I'm interested in exploring the perspective you offer.

My perspective is consistent with everything we "know" about the universe. The alternative, the "mind-created order" that you suggest seems to lack all explanatory value - it raises more questions than it answers. It does seem possible, but that's about it - there's no other reason to think it's true, as far as I can tell. Surely, it's at least possible that our traditional view is correct.

Is it really just a coin toss between these two possibilities? I don't think it is, but I'd like to hear what others think. What am I overlooking?

I have already explained why it would not have been rational, viz. that your offering the bet in circumstances where you had expertise that I lacked, especially when you had been plying me with alcohol made me suspect a scam. Thus I had legitimate Wittgensteinian reasons for doubt in the particular circumstances. — unenlightened

You provided rational reasons not take the bet. But another person might very well take the bet, on the basis of the probability and some good reasons to be confident he wasn't being scammed - that would be rational also.

Not for me. I feel many choices as I'm making them. I struggle with them, looking for a reason too give one option a leg up. — Patterner

Fair point, the choice-making process also gives us reason to believe we could have chosen differently. The choice was ours, not something imposed upon us.

But still, there were pre-existing predilections - flavors you know you like. There was a series of sights, sounds, and smells; a series of thoughts. The choice was a direct consequence. Something would need to have been different for a different choice to have been made.

. I find the notion that I am an automoton, unable to do more than act out the resolution of all the bioelectric signals jumping around in my brain, and the specifics of (in this example) how I go about eating my dessert determined in the same way, to be preposterous. — Patterner

Why? Isn't it just because you know the choices were yours to make, that you went through the process and you are solely responsible for the choices?

Even though it seems like you could have chosen differently, it is impossible to know you could have.

Hume concluded that fundamental beliefs, such as the existence of an external world or the existence of the self, are not rationally justifiable but are legitimate because they are the result of experience and custom.

However, I wonder: what makes them legitimate if they are not justified by reason? — JuanZu

If the natural world produced life, and evolved a consciousness that mediated interaction with the world, it seems that this would entail an innate sense that this world is external to the organism. This would make it a a properly basic belief - which are rational to have and maintain, unless defeated. This entails a non-doxastic justification.

Get

your inexperienced prosecutor convinced a grand jury that there was enough to indict. — NOS4A2

Getting an indictment is a low bar, and she only succeeded on 2 of the 3 charges.

It also remains to be seen if she followed the proper procedures with the grand jury. The judge will get a transcript of the proceeding and could kick it out if she failed to follow the rules.

it’s Comey’s word versus McCabe’s — NOS4A2

And the IG judged that Comey's was credible, so how does this make him a hack? And you're ignoring the implications on the current DOJ.

The biggest mistake of Comey's career was to discuss the Clinton investigation- contrary to DOJ standards. This has become common, under the current leadership. Comey acted alone, on his own poor judgement, not under orders. The current DOJ prosecutes who Trump tells them to prosecute.

A lot of religious people infer there is libertarian free will to account for being held accountable for their choices. So they aren't really inferring free will on an objective basis. Rather, it's entailed by faith.

Andrew McCabe testified to the inspector general that Comey authorized leaks. — NOS4A2

LOL! Here's what the IG said:

"While the only direct evidence regarding this McCabe-Comey conversation were the recollections of the two participants, there is considerable circumstantial evidence and we concluded that the overwhelming weight of that evidence supported Comey’s version of the conversation. Indeed, none of the circumstantial evidence provided support for McCabe’s account of the discussion; rather, we found that much of the available evidence undercut McCabe’s claim."


And even if they had a chance for a conviction, Trump flushed it down the toilet with his comments and actions. In addition to his public comments that I quoted, he had also fired Comey's daughter from the DOJ without cause, and likely got the IRS to audit him.

Incidentally, no one gets convicted of perjury for saying they don't remember.

Could anyone have made a different choice in the past than the ones they made? — Truth Seeker

There is no objective basis for anyone to say, "yes" - even if it is true that we could have.

Consider why it seems like we could have: it's entirely in retrospect. But we're reevaluating it from our now-current mindset - not the mindset at the time of the choice.

Mindset includes one's emotional state, physical state, state of knowledge, immediate surroundings, most recent experiences. and the sequence of thoughts that led to the choice. Given all that, could we really have chosen differently? Maybe, but it is impossible to know. Hindsight doesn't establish it. We can't recreate the mindset.

Relating legends is not lying. Inventing legends, to convey some (supposed) greater truth isn't lying either. Bart Ehrman compares this to the apochryphal story of young George Washington admitting chopping down a cherry tree ("I cannot tell a lie"). The (supposed) greater truth was that George was honest.

The political advantage of RFK for T is that he pulled in the people who believe those kind of stories. That is it. — Paine

You're referring to conspiracy theorists - a large segment of Trump's base. Had RFK stayed in the race, he could have pulled some of them away from Trump.

Trump appointee, Erik Siebert was US Attorney for the eastern district of Virginia. He had assessed the case was too weak to merit prosecution, so Trump fired him and installed one of his low-level personal attorneys to do his bidding.

Former AG Barr had reported that Trump wanted Comey prosecuted in his 1st term, but he pushed back.

Trump showed his hand on his "truth" social post:

“We can’t delay any longer,” Trump posted on Truth Social in a message directed to “Pam.” “JUSTICE MUST BE SERVED, NOW!!!” He specifically lamented the lack of criminal charges against Sen. Adam Schiff (D-Calif.), former FBI Director James Comey and New York Attorney General Letitia James, three of his most prominent political antagonists.[

...Trump amplified his post in a brief gaggle with reporters on Saturday night, saying the post was not meant as a criticism of Bondi but that “we have to act fast.”
https://www.politico.com/news/2025/09/20/trump-bondi-truth-social-00574380


Siebert's replacement, Lindsey Halligan, has never prosecuted a case in her life. She was an insurance lawyer. She was 3rd runner up in the 2010 Miss Colorado pageant.

Comey has a good case for "vindictive and selection prosecution". I'm skeptical this will go to trial.

Sure, how does that mean that what I said makes no sense? — Metaphysician Undercover

What made no sense is why you disagreed with my statement:

The evidence implies either an infinite series or something unique to initiate the series. — Relativist

You responded, "This is not true".

And yet, you now actually seem to agree (you said, "sure").

The argument demonstrates that the "thing" you refer to as prior to all the physical states, is explicitly not a state.That is why God is understood as immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have only established that the "thing" is unique, in that it differs from the series of transitional universe states you regard as the evidence. Now you're using the terms "physical" and "immaterial" but haven't defined them. I infer that "physical" applies to each of those transitional universe states, "immaterial" applies to the unique thing. So applying these labels adds no information. I don't see how you could justifiably add information, because the evidence only points them being different. This is already captured with "unique".

To characterize it as a state is to demonstrate that you are either failing to understand it, or refusing to accept it.

I can't understand a claim of yours that you haven't adequately explained. You seem to be using the word, "state" different from the way I defined it.

I gave you a hypothetical scenario involving the hypothetical deity, Yahweh, which entailed an initial state of Yahweh (sans universe). I'll add detail so you can identify what you disagree with:

Yahweh (sans universe) causes the series of transitional states of the universe; causation entails a temporally prior cause and temporally posterior effect. Hence there is a series of states, sequenced in time, that begins with Yahweh (sans universe).

In this scenario, Yahweh sans universe is indeed a state, per my definition of state. You haven't provided an alternate definition.

That's an unjustified conclusion. The evidence implies either an infinite series or something unique to initiate the series.
— Relativist

This is not true. Evidence indicates that becoming, or change, is a process of transition. Therefore the series ends, but it does not end abruptly at a point, it transitions to something else. This is neither an infinite series nor a unique point which initiates the series, it is a process of change. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your reply makes no sense. You agree there wasn't an infinite series, and you had asserted that this entails a "God" initiating it- which is something unique.

This inference has no implication at all as to the characteristics of this (so called) God. All we know is that this "God" is some thing that kicked off the sequence of universe states.

I explained the rationale behind ruling out the "initial state". An "initial state" is an ideal which is arbitrarily assigned in the application of systems theory. As an "ideal" it has nothing which directly corresponds with it in the physical world. — Metaphysician Undercover

Non-sequitur. Even if the universe was created by Yahweh, it entails an initial state of Yahweh (and nothing else). So it's self-defeating to rule out an initial state.

Kimmel is kind of back. The 25% of network affiliates owned by Nexstar and Sinclair are not airing him. Nexstar is seeking govenment approval to acquire Tegna, which requires FCC and FTC approval.

We just found out the other day from Google that the Biden admin pressured them to remove accounts for misinformation, many of whom were Trumpists like Tucker Carlson and Steve Bannon. Terrible isn’t it? — NOS4A2

It depends on what the Biden administration actually did. If they "coerced or significantly encouraged" their protected speech, then it was unconstitutional (per the standard set by 5th circuit in Murthy v Missouri). If all they did was flag content that was contrary to Google's policy, they did no wrong.

Despite Kimmel's reinstatement, it is Trump's threats that are problematic. They are continuing, and they clearly cross the 5th circuit line:

"(Kimmel) is yet another arm of the DNC and, to the best of my knowledge, that would be a major Illegal Campaign Contribution," Trump said. "I think we’re going to test ABC out on this. Let’s see how we do. Last time I went after them, they gave me $16 Million Dollars. "

But this is precisely the meaning of 'relativism'. It is 'what is right for me' and 'what is right for you.' You have your reasons, and I mine. It is kind of obligatory in a pluralist culture but it needs to be seen for what it is. — Wayfarer

You are mischaracterising what I said. I said I was giving you the benefit of the doubt. That doesn't mean I think we're both right. Of course I think you're wrong.

I previously told you I do not consider truth relative. It was irrational (and rude) to ignore this. If you didn't understand, you should have asked.

There is only one set of truths, but there are no oracles to reveal it. All we have are our rational faculties, and the limited set of facts available to us. As I've also argued, most rational choices are inferences to best explanation (IBE) made on the evidence we have considered. Unlike deduction, IBE is not sufficient to prove conclusively that we're correct. Another's opinion may be equally rational, but based a different set of evidence and background beliefs*. This is sufficient reason to reserve judgement. I expressed this in a positive way, out of politeness.
_________
*This is the only "relativism" I have in mind with my screen name: we make our epistemic judgements relative to our background beliefs. This statement is neutral to the one set of actual truths, and doesn't entail making background beliefs beyond questioning. This may seem trivially true, but we often overlook it when having a discussion on controversial topics.

_____

Furthermore, my arguments against physicalism have been mainly metacognitive (based on arguments from the structure of cognition) and transcendental (in a neo-kantian sense) rather than objective. — Wayfarer

"Mainly"? My perception is that you've mainly asked questions that demonstrated you don't understand physicalism, and have reacted in ways that suggest you aren't interested in understanding it. You certainly don't grasp my perspective, so you aren't positioned to cast a rational judgement on it.

Our approaches are different: I start with the general facts about the world, whereas you start with some assumed framework on the structure of cognition: a framework that is untethered to any clear facts about the world- it's just about the way things seem to you after having considered various other mind-centric approaches. My problem with this approach is that your starting point is on shaky grounds - introspection, speculation, and rationalization. You have yet to acknoweldge any facts about the extra-mental world.

Does consideration of phenomenology lead you to reserve judgement on the inferences of science? Because if you were as confident of those facts as most people are, you would acknowledge the reasonableness of starting with those facts and seeking meta-explanations of them. Those facts have stronger epistemic support than any speculative theory on the structure of cognition.

Are persons objects? When you interact with your loved ones, are you interacting with objects? Persons can be treated as objects for some purposes — demographics, epidemiology, or even grammar — but ordinarily we relate to them as beings, with an “I–Thou” relation rather than an “I–It.” If divine beings are real, they would be real in the same way — as beings, not as objects. — Wayfarer

Everything that exists is an object. "Object" is synonymous with "existent". This doesn't imply we don't relate also to them as fellow human beings. They still exist.

So when you define “physical” in contrast with “spiritual/supernatural objects,” you are already working within that modern boundary — one which is itself the result of a particular history, not an inevitable metaphysical truth. — Wayfarer

Read more carefully. I didn't "define" it this way, I said I "made sense of it" this way. Sure, this was because of my background framework (Catholic education). But you seem to agree there are no "spiritual/supernatual objects" - so you have no basis for claiming I'm wrong to rule this out. Doing so does not preclude the spiritual/supernatural being manifested in different ways. I can entertain this - if you can make a good case for it.

Our sense of what is real is often defined within the bounds of what is scientifically verifiable in principle. That’s why we tend to assume that if something is to be considered real, it must be an object. But that’s very much a feature of our culture, shaped by the scientific revolution. Other philosophical traditions don’t take objectivity as the sole criterion. — Wayfarer

The perception of objects is innate (perhaps also influenced by culture), not shaped by science education. Science objectifies additional perceived aspects of realty, but cognitively grounded in our innate sense.

That's great that there are alternative philosophical traditions that would have a different framework. That vague fact doesn't falsify our natural framework. You'd have to present a specific framework and show how it is superior.

As for abstract objects... My heuristic is that they don't exist, but they're real, in that they're the same for any rational intellect. — Wayfarer

What you wrote seems consistent with what I've said.

The SEP Article on the Philosophy of Mathematics would be worth a read. I particularly liked this observation:

"Bernays observed that when a mathematician is at work she “naively” treats the objects she is dealing with in a platonistic way. Every working mathematician, he says, is a platonist (Bernays 1935). But when the mathematician is caught off duty by a philosopher who quizzes her about her ontological commitments, she is apt to shuffle her feet and withdraw to a vaguely non-platonistic position. This has been taken by some to indicate that there is something wrong with philosophical questions about the nature of mathematical objects and of mathematical knowledge."

But the article gives a variety of perspectives.

Oh, please. I gave reference to an article on it. There is plenty that is 'vague about the ontology', which can be summed up in one word: uncertainty. — Wayfarer

There are 2 relevant senses of uncertainty:
1) fallibilism: we can't be certain of many facts
2) quantum uncertainty.

Neither of these favors or disfavors my ontology vs others. These uncertainties apply to ANY theory: And yet, you seem to think the associated "vagueness" only applies to physicalism! No ontological theory can be established with certainty, and all viable theories have to be consistent with quantum mechanics - if it's to be treated as factual, rather some misguided consequence of our cultural history.

The irony is that you're treating the science of quantum mechanics as factual, while simultaneously criticizing the scientific framework as "speculative". Which is it? Do you accept facts established by science?

In your mind, it's a nice, neat system, where 'states of affairs' can be used to label the shifting sands of scientific speculation for the purposes of argument. — Wayfarer

Nice and neat = not vague. Indeed, the metaphysical theory is a nice neat system, that's robust enough to be consistent with science despite theory falsification/revision/replacement.

Now you're revealing your attitude toward science as "speculative". So...you regard the claims of physics as speculations on par with pseudo-science and conspiracy theories?

Many posts ago I mentioned that my metaphysical theory goes hand in hand with my epistemology. My epistemology respects IBEs. This provides an idealized basis for evaluating conspiracy theories, opinions on current events, historical theories, and nearly every aspect of everyday judgement. I believe that, when applied properly, it leads to more rational judgements- as well as decisiveness. It also leads me to be open-minded, willing to challenge my beliefs based on new information. Of course, because my beliefs form a "nice and neat" package, some of my views aren't easily changed- many logically related beliefs are involved, forming a coherent world view. My ontological theory comprises a portion of this world view; I adopted it as an IBE, finding it consistent with all the rest of my beliefs.

The claims of science are IBEs with strong support. That seems undeniable. They are about as rock-solid as an IBE can be, because they have been tested and verified. Even these can be wrong, but that gives us even more reason to be suspicious of speculations with a less secure epistemic basis. So WHY should I NOT embrace the metaphysical theory that best accounts for these scientific "facts"?

On the other hand, if your skepticism is so extreme that you can't accept the claims of science, you're left with very little that you can claim as belief, since little is as strongly supported. That's not irrational, but it's a dead end. So when I asked this:

So again, this expresses only how I make sense of it. That's apparently inadequate for you because you have different view - but it's a view you haven't explained. You seem to be implying we should treat "spiritual or supernatural" differently - not as objects, but as -------what? You haven't said. Don't leave it "indeterminate" and vague. — Relativist

Rather than answer, you responded with:

The very division between “natural” and “supernatural” is a historical artifact.. . — Wayfarer

A non-answer. Here's more questions you haven't answered:

we do not see the phenomenon 'in itself', as it is, independently of our observation of it. We're involved in producing the outcome.
— Wayfarer
We're only involved in producing the contents of our minds. And we have employed our minds to get an understanding of what exists outside of it. Are you suggesting this is futile? I don't think you are, but it's consistent with your vague claims. If you agree it's not futile, then what IS your point? — Relativist

Why would I think this "transformative relationship" involves something more than a change to the mind that is involved, and the impact we have through our actions? — Relativist

. You suggested that maybe the moon doesn't exist when we aren't looking at it! I get the phenomonolgy point, but we're talking ontology- are you not willing to commit to the existence of the objects of ordinary experience? Do you deny the existence of astronomical objects? Do you propose skepticism on everything other than your mind? — Relativist

ALL you've done is to point to reasons to think various claims may be wrong: they're framework dependent; shaped by culture or history; or it's simply that other possibilities can't be ruled out. But you haven't provided an alternative that could produce a "better explanation", and you haven't proposed an alternative to IBE in theory choice.

Returning to the first point, about me giving you the benefit of the doubt on having rational views, I'll add this. It appears you have almost no beliefs about ontology; you are mired in skepticism. That's not irrational, per se, but I can't see how you can apply this level of skepticism consistently across all aspects of the world that you deal with.

Naturalism is a metaphysical system that assumes as a first principle that the natural world comprises the totality of reality. The natural world consists of ourselves, the world that is reflected in our senses, and everything that is causally connected through laws of nature.
— Relativist

Where 'the natural world' is what can be detected by the senses (augmented by instruments) or hypothesised on the mathematical analysis of such data. But already, this excludes the observer. — Wayfarer

You omitted the relevant portion of the quote. I highlighted it in bold.

We are part of the natural world; we were produced by it, and we interact with it constantly (cause-effect relationships). The question is: how do we not fit the definition? Support your answer with evidence, and don't give it in terms of some framework that you can't fully defend as complete and coherent.

All the empirical evidence is for states that were preceded in time by another state, so this pattern would not apply to a hypothetical initial state
— Relativist

Then obviously, the concept of "initial state" is not consistent with physical reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's an unjustified conclusion. The evidence implies either an infinite series or something unique to initiate the series.

Why do i need to present you with a theory about this? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because an initial state (a unique thing) with potential to produce a subsequent state is also consistent with the evidence. So you need a rational reason to rule this out.

All empirical evidence indicates that any, and every, "physical state of affairs" is posterior in time, to the potential for that state. — Metaphysician Undercover

All the empirical evidence is for states that were preceded in time by another state, so this pattern would not apply to a hypothetical initial state.

You also fail to account for this pattern. I suggest it's because of deterministic* laws of nature that cause the prior state to become the next state. Do you agree? If not, then give me your theory.

* at least probabilistic determinism.

You definitely discussed "state of affairs" ontology with me, in your reference to an initial state of affairs. You even defined it for me:

By "state" or "state of affairs", I am referring to the the totality of existence at a point of time — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes I did, and this is not the definition used by Armstrong. That's why I said:

I hadn't discussed "state of affairs" ontology with you, so had not used the term that way. — Relativist