Newsweek just posted this analysis of an exit poll NBC is doing:

Voters in this election were overwhelmingly concerned about the condition of democracy and the economy as they cast ballots. Americans put democracy first, with 35% stating it was the most important factor in selecting how to vote for president, followed by the economy at 31%, an NBC News exit poll revealed. Abortion (14%) and immigration (11%) were the second most important issues for voters, with only 4% naming foreign policy.

This sounds hopeful for Harris supporters.

I saw this cartoon this morning:



Just before 5PM, Trump wrote on Truth Social:

"A lot of talk about massive CHEATING in Philadelphia. Law Enforcement coming!!!"

The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology defines belief this way:

"Belief has often been represented as a state available to introspection with a certain relation to a present image or complex of images. “I believe that P” means that I have an attitude of acceptance toward P."

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines it as:
the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true.

Which seems equivalent (setting aside the fact that the 2nd definition lacks a definition of "true"). You're more detailed definition is subtly different because you conclude:

As such, beliefs need not be complete or absolute but can well be partial. — javra

I think your point is that you can believe X, but not be fully committed to it or completely certain of it. This is the way the word "belief" tends to be used in common conversation. We commonly hear people expressing certainty as "I don't just believe it, I know it", implying that "belief" means something less than certain, and "knowing" = absolute certainty.

But why force this vague concept into a philosophical analysis? It seems to me you can analyze your belief (colloquial sense of the word) and rephrase it to use the more precise definition of belief and still correctly convey the attitude you have toward the proposition. That's what I did when I recast a person's (less than certain) belief in the future outcome of a game.

Am I wrong? Do you think there's something about belief (colloquial sense) that isn't translatable in this way?

Fuzzy logic involves reasoning with imprecise/vague statements. Alternatively, one can cast beliefs in terms of probabilities, and utilize Bayes' Theorem.

IMO, the best thing to do is to transform one's informal statements of belief into something precise, so the formalism can be applied.

"
You may recall Descartes’ famous meditation, cogito ergo sum. This takes the reality of the thinking subject as apodictic, i.e. cannot plausibly be denied. One of Husserl’s books is Cartesian Meditations, and I think the influence is clear. — Wayfarer

Then I would reword it to:
consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a we believe there is a world there for us in the first place.

Whatever it is that kills people would be the explanation here. It doesn't have to be "the world". We call whatever it is, that seems to be not a part of oneself, "the independent world", and we have a conception of what "the world" means, including the intuitions of space and time. If the conception of "the world" is wrong, then it is not the world which kills us but something else. That "a world external to ourselves" kills us would be false. The intuitions are false. — Metaphysician Undercover

Survival also depends on what sustains us (food, water, keeping warm...), and enables us to procreate.

What does "more precise truths" mean? Either a proposition is true or it is false, the idea that one truth is more true than another doesn't make any sense. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm referring to beliefs that are approximations and/or limited in scope. This is why I referred to "functionally accurate": sufficiently close to the truth to enable survival. It's not necessary to understand general relativity to an understanding of gravity sufficient to avoid falling off a cliff. One could have a magical view of the nature of medicinal herbs that are truly efficacious, and what matters for survival is just their efficacy.

It sounds like I had it right: you think physicalism should be rejected if physics doesn't have a complete, verifiable description of reality.
— Relativist

That physicalism should be rejected, if the thesis is that 'everything is ultimately physical' while what is physical can't be defined. — Wayfarer

I gave you a definition.

If it hasn't been falsified by quantum physics, it's not falsifiable. So again, it appeals to science as a model of philosophical authority, but only when it suits. — Wayfarer

I explained that it is consistent with QM. Metaphysical theories generally are not falsiable in a scientific sense. All we can do is examine them for coherence, explanatory scope, and parsimony. It is falsified if it is incoherent or cannot possibly account for some clear fact of the world. It ought to be rejected if an alternate coherent theory provides better explanations and/or is more parsimonious.

I posted this comment some days ago, do you think it has any bearing on the argument?
...
Do you see the point of this criticism of philosophical naturalism? — Wayfarer

I see the point, but it depends on assumptions I find questionable:

"consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place." - what's the basis for this assertion?

"Treating consciousness as part of the world, reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousness’s foundational, disclosive role."
Consciousness IS part of the world at large. If consciousness is immaterial, then the world includes this immaterial sort of thing.

"consciousness is presupposed in all science and knowledge"- consciousness is the vessel of knowledge, and understanding entails relating elements of knowledge.

I will note here my conviction that time has an inextricably subjective element — Wayfarer

Special relativity shows that time is relative to a reference frame. That a sort of subjectivity, but you seem to be suggesting it's mind-dependent. OK, but I see no reason to think so.

This highlights how understanding “what exists” inevitably involves interpreting it through something that only a perspective can provide. — Wayfarer

To understand anything will necessarily entail relating it to our human perspectives. This doesn't preclude expanding our perspectives when it is demonstrably deficient.

I suppose it all depends on how one qualifies belief. Still, in ordinary life, when a guy is asked, "do you believe your team will win?" or, as a different example, "do you believe she'll say 'yes'?", the guy might well honestly answer with a categorical, "Hell yea!" (rather than with a, "well, it depends") ... yet without being foolish enough to presume that this honestly held belief is in a full blown correlation to a not yet actualized future reality. But I get it, this to you would not be a "strictly true belief". — javra

Philosophical analysis requires more precision than ordinary language often delivers.

he’s deeply committed to the empirical success and practical validity of science but questions whether we should interpret scientific theories as giving us a literal account of an objective, mind-independent reality. — Wayfarer

It's a false dichotomy that a scientific model is either literally true, or it is merely empirically valid. Structural realism is a middle ground.

Another basic point in this context is the distinction between reality, as the aggregate or sum total of observable phenomena and the objects of scientific analysis, and being, as a description of the existence as experienced by human beings. This is where I think physicalism over-values scientific method, for which physicalism may be an effective heuristic while being descriptively accurate within its scope. But many of the questions of philosophy may not be amendable to scientific analysis. Unless you're a positivist, that doesn't make them meaningless. — Wayfarer

Reality = everything that exists; observable reality is a subset. Empirical science is limited to the observable; theoretical physics stretches this limit by extrapolating. If there is more to existence than what science can possibly discover or extrapolate, how then can it be discovered? If there exists a God of religion, then perhaps by praying or dying, but I personally see no reason to believe such things exist.

I just don't understand why you think metaphysical physicalism overvalues the scientific method. The scientific method is an epistemological method, and it seems to me to be the best epistemological method possible for developing knowledge about the physical world. If true, that's an objective fact irrespective of whether physicalism is true. A physicalist metaphysics does no more than provide the framework that scientism lacks. What sort of facts do you suppose this omits? What alternative methodology can do better?

which also implies distance from physicalism. — Wayfarer

No, it doesn't. Physicalism is consistent with, but not identical to, scientific realism.

Regarding Armstrong's theory: he explicitly stated that he believed spacetime comprises the totality of existence, that it is governed by laws of nature, and that physics is concerned with discovering what these are. As far as I can tell, he doesn't make assertions about specific laws of physics that he regards as true and real. He accommodates QM, but I don't think he explictly claims it is real. His reference to spacetime suggests he may have been a realistic about general relativity, but given his deference to physics, I can't imagine that he'd deny more exotic theories (eg a "Many Worlds" cosmological theory, that entails multiple space-times) if they became accepted physics.

Then he doesn't have a categorical belief that his team will win. Rather, he believes it probable that his team will win.
— Relativist

I'm not big on that distinction. For starters, as a falliblist, upon analysis all my beliefs are graded (probabilistic or else comparable) - this even though I will typically address them in the categorical "yes/no" format. — javra

Sure, but then you have some loose epistemic probability in mind, and a more precise statement of your belief would identify this. So it is not strictly true that the guy believes his team will win. Rather, he believes it more likely than not that they will win, or that it is a near certainty, or some other probabilistic qualification.

If "Joe believes it more likely than not that the Columbus Spinsters will win on Saturday" then "Joe believes it is true that it is more likely than not that the Columbus Spinsters will win on Saturday". This is the "equivalence theory" in theory of truth.

Intuitions are not formed to be consistent with reality. According to evolutionary theory they are shaped by some sort of survival principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

The "intuitions" in question are relevant to survival. If there is a world external to ourself, it would be necessary to have a functionally accurate view of that world. If there is not such an external world, what would explain this false intuition?

Why think our abstractions about space and time are false?
— Relativist

There is much reason to think that our conceptions of space and time are false, spatial expansion, dark matter, dark energy, quantum weirdness. Anywhere that we run into difficulties understanding what is happening, when applying these abstractions, this is an indication that they are false. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was referring to our primitive (pre-science) abstractions of space and time. As I said, they are valid and true within the context of our direct perceptions.

Well sure, these conceptions are true in the context of our sensory perceptions, that's how we use them, verify them, etc.. But if our sensory perceptions are not providing truth, that's a problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it's not. Our sensory perceptions aren't oracles that magically know truths beyond what we could possibly perceive. Further, the error has not prevented science from learning more precise truths- such as a more precise understanding of space and time.

I acknowledge that our descriptions (and understandings) are grounded in our perspective, but we have the capacity to correct for that.
— Relativist

How would you propose that we could do that? How do we verify that our sensory perceptions are giving us truth? — Metaphysician Undercover

See my prior comment.

Are you then in search for infallible proof. — javra

No.

This is not always the case in real life applications, most especially when it comes to beliefs regarding future facts. If John believes his team will win the game then he might bet accordingly while nevertheless having a great deal of doubt regarding this same belief. — javra

Then he doesn't have a categorical belief that his team will win. Rather, he believes it probable that his team will win.

Constructive Empiricism seems to me to go to far, by denying that science tells us anything about reality. I'm more aligned with Structural Realism:

...the most powerful argument in favour of scientific realism is the no-miracles argument, according to which the success of science would be miraculous if scientific theories were not at least approximately true descriptions of the world. While the underdetermination argument is often cited as giving grounds for scepticism about theories of unobservable entities, arguably the most powerful arguments against scientific realism are based on the history of radical theory change in science....
...Structural realism was introduced into current philosophy of science by John Worrall in 1989 as a way to break the impasse that results from taking both arguments seriously, and have “the best of both worlds” in the debate about scientific realism.
...

According to Worrall, we should not accept standard scientific realism, which asserts that the nature of the unobservable objects that cause the phenomena we observe is correctly described by our best theories. However, neither should we be antirealists about science. Rather, we should adopt structural realism and epistemically commit ourselves to the mathematical or structural content of our theories. Since there is (says Worrall) retention of structure across theory change, structural realism both (a) avoids the force of the pessimistic meta-induction (by not committing us to belief in the theory’s description of the furniture of the world) and (b) does not make the success of science (especially the novel predictions of mature physical theories) seem miraculous (by committing us to the claim that the theory’s structure, over and above its empirical content, describes the world).

I believe I've stayed faithful to this approach in all my replies to you.

You would have to defeat my belief in an external, minds-independent world.
— Relativist

That's a bit confrontational to me. And, as I previously expressed, I'm not interested in so doing. — javra

It's not confrontational. The term "defeater" is just standard epistemology. A defeater=a reason to give up a belief. It's shorthand for what I've previously asked for.

I hope you understand why it's relevant. I absolutely believe there is an external world that exists independently of minds. I can't possibly accept idealism unless I drop this belief, and that would require a defeater (not just the mere possibility it is false).

As to your other replies, they sidestep the questions asked without providing answers. E.g. are non-veridical beliefs of themselves physical? — javra

I was defending physicalism, so I didn't see the need to state that it entails the claim that beliefs are physical. Indeed, establishing a belief would entail a physical change in the brain. More specifically, it is a change that will affect behavior.

BTW, to the person hallucinating X, the physical reality of X will be a veridical belief ... this up until the time reasoning might intervene (it doesn't always).

That's not what it means. A verdical belief is one that is actually true, i.e. it corresponds to an aspect of reality. If a person believes X, then he necessarily believes X is true.

If the protagonist in the movie had hallucinations that he believed were false because his psychiatrists convinced him they were false, then the belief in their falsehood was an undercutting defeater of the (seemingly true) hallucination.

Mind in part consists of thoughts. How are thoughts physical? — javra

Physicalism being false does not entail non-solipsistic idealism being true. It just means idealism is logically possible. I already acknowledge it is logically possible.

Regarding your claim, you seem to be reifying an action. Engaging in thought is an activity of the brain- a behavior. It often results in the establishment of a new belief-a disposition. Having a belief makes us apt to behave certain way.

we perceive physical realities, but then - given the entailment of physicalism - how is a bona fide hallucination of itself physical? — javra

Our perception of our physical surroundings establishes a complex belief (a disposition) about those surroundings, which will influence how we behave within those surroundings. An hallucination is a non-veridical belief.

But if not everything that does or can occur is physical, then physicalism so defined can only be false. — javra

Sure, but physicalism can be false and idealism still be false. You've provided no reason to think it's true. I'm somewhat agnostic as to a metaphysical theory. I tentatively embrace physicalism because it explains the most and assumes the least. I could switch my allegiance if there were an alternative that bested it. You haven't given one. You would have to defeat my belief in an external, minds-independent world.

The point is, claiming that everything that exists is physical becomes problematic if we can’t definitively say what kind of existence the wave function has, as in quantum mechanics, the wave function is central to predicting physical phenomena. If we take its predictive power seriously, it’s hard to ignore the question of its ontological status without leaving an unresolved gap in the theory. — Wayfarer

But there IS this unresolved gap in our physics. We really don't know. Therefore one can't claim it's inconsistent with physicalism.

Besides this, nothing you said is a refutation of my position as to what I consider physical.

I may misunderstand, but it sounds also bit like you're suggesting that we should reject physicalism if physics doesn't have a complete, verifiable description of reality.
— Relativist

As I said before, as a materialist, D M Armstrong believes that science is paradigmatic for philosophy proper. So you can't have your cake and eat it too - if physics indeed suggests that the nature of the physical eludes precise definition, then so much for appealing to science as a model for philosophy! — Wayfarer

It sounds like I had it right: you think physicalism should be rejected if physics doesn't have a complete, verifiable description of reality.

Armstrong's model is consistent with what we do know, so it's not falsified. A stipulation that the wave function is non-physical would technically falsify physicalism, but if the wave function behaves in a law-like manner, why make that stipulation? It would still be a coherent metaphysical model, save for using "physical" as a qualifier. That's why your objection seems forced: "let's label the wave function as non-physical (or just say it may not be physical) so we can dismiss every physicalist metaphysical theory".

I wouldn't put it in personal or pejorative terms, but I do believe that philosophical and/or scientific materialism is an erroneous philosophical view. — Wayfarer

My position is that Armstrong's theory is not necessarily true, but it's superior to other theories in terms of explanatory scope, parsimony, and ad hoc-ness.

The fact that it's consistent with what we know about physics is a point in its favor, while the fact that there are gaps in our understanding of physics is irrelevant. It's irrelevant because a theory can only be expected to account for what we know: that's the nature of abductive reasoning. Abduction entails comparing explanatory hypotheses - and what needs to be explained are the agreed facts. Unknowns do not constitute facts that need explaining.

Reasons such as these?:

That mentioned, I agree that the sometimes tacitly implied notion of physical reality being somehow metaphysically independent of the individual minds which, after all, are aspects of it—such that physical reality could be placed here and minds there without any dependency in-between—is a logical dud. A close second dud is the attempt to describe minds, and all their various aspects, as purely physical (such that, for one example, all ends one can conceive of and intend are all physical in their nature). — javra

No. You expressing your judgement is not a reason for me, even with a vague allusion to some questionable assumption that it seems based on.

Yes, I can provide them, but I don't think reasons will here much help. We are all typically attached to the notions we are habituated to hold, in this case that there was physicality long before there was any type of awareness, ergo physicalism. — javra

I may agree that we're "habituated" to hold the view that there exists a mind-independent reality.

If we're a consequence of evolutionary tendencies, then we would necessarily have the implicit belief that there exists a world external to ourselves. How we then think about this (e.g. that this external world exists independently of ourselves) could be a cultural habituation. I'm willing to entertain an alternative, if there's a good enough reason.

My reply to this will be that of panpsychism - this in the sense that awareness pervaded the cosmos long before life evolved into it (i.e., in the sense that the physical is, was, and will remain dependent of the psychical). This conclusion for me, though, is only a deduction from the premise of a non-solipsistic mind awareness-created world. — javra

You're indicating panpaychism is a logical step beyond the "premise of a non-solipsistic mind awareness-created world." I'm just asking why should entertain that premise.

And I do not claim to have any great insight into how panpsychism works - nor into any metaphysically cogent explanation for how life evolved from non-life (the physicalist explanation that "it must have" doesn't much console me either as far as metaphysical explanations go - I find it just as comforting as the explanation of "God did it"). — javra

If your answer is that this feels right, and/or provides you comfort, I have no objection. I'm not trying to convince you that you're wrong. I'm just seeking my own comfort- I'd like to know if there are good reasons to think I'm deluding myself with what I believe about the world.

Trump’s opponents never accepted the 2016 election, therefor they had fascists tendencies, like Hitler. — NOS4A2

You are mistaken. Hillary Clinton conceded defeat and never attempted to overturn the election. To some degree, she was being a sore loser when she labeled Trump's election "illegitimate", but she at least had a rational basis for her claim: Russia helping Trump, and Comey hurting her chances. These things actually occurred, although it's impossible to know their impact.

By contrast, Trump's claim that he was cheated is based entirely on falsehoods - falsehoods that he actively drummed into his supporters. Trump lied about fraud, lied about what people said to him about fraud, and he pressured others to lie - in an active attempt to overturn the legitimate election. So to equate the two is absurd.
.

Replace "heap of sand" with "the physical world" and "individual sand particles" with "individual minds". The same relations will hold. This can thereby lead to the logically valid affirmation that, in a non-solipsistic mind-created world, the physical world occurs independently of me and my own mind, even though it will be dependent on the occurrence of a multiplicity of minds in general. — javra

OK, I think I understand. But as I said before:

I believe there exists a world (AKA "reality") independent of minds. I also believe nearly everyone agrees with me. That doesn't mean we're right, of course, but I'd like you or Wayfarer to give me reasons why I should reject, or doubt, my current belief. — Relativist

When I say "independent of minds", I mean that the world at large exists irrespective of the presence of any minds at all. I believe the universe is about 14B years old, and there were almost certainly no minds within it for quite a long time. Can you give me a reason to reject or doubt this belief of mine?

All objects that can produce multiple human beings are individual human beings. A mother, for instance, can do that. But this is also true of asexual reproduction. An individual amoeba, for instance, can produce another amoeba. Unfortunately (and oddly), we may have to think of one zygotic twin as the parent of the other. — NOS4A2

You're proposing a sufficient condition, but not a necessary one. I reject this as a sufficient condition: we could theoretically produce multiple humans from each stem cell in your body. Each stem cell fits your stated condition.

would never deny you or other women your privileges, but your distinctions are completely arbitrary. Worse, they are inapplicable to those with developmental disabilities

I referred to a "properly functioning human being". This doesn't imply one must be proper functioning to be a human. I wasn't even trying to suggest a necessary condition; I was defining a typical human being, not excluding the atypical.

At any rate, the reduction of humanity and dignity to that of “material” is the name of the game for anyone who wants to end such a life.

You're reading that into what I said. I do happen to think that humans are material; the only alternative is immaterial; it's a well defined dichotomy. Nevertheless, I never said humans are nothing more than material. Being a human is absolutely something in addition to being material.

It occupies its own unique and distinct position in space and time. A zygote is alive. At no point does a zygote die and get replaced by another living being. If left to live a zygote can continue his life, without interruption, for upwards to one hundred years.

Twins are individuated at the zygote level until it reproduces asexually, then there are two individuals. — NOS4A2

This is a tangent. I have no problem with identifying an individual identity as a series of causally-connected spatiotemporal stages. The objection I have is in defining the "natural kind" (for lack of a better term) of "individual human being". This would have to be based on a well-defined set of necessary and sufficient properties, that unambiguously identify an object as either being one of these, or not. An object that can produce multiple human beings cannot possible be said to be an individual human being, even though it is commonly in the developmental history of human beings. The same is true of blasotocysts- clusters of cells, that may produce multiple human beings at several stages.

So my position is that an individual human being (i.e. an object of that type) is something that emerges. gradually during fetal development. I regard a properly functioning individual human being as a self-sustaining organism with certain physical and intellectual capabilities, including a sense of self. You can disagree, because there is no unequivocally correct answer. But you have no rational basis for denying me (or women) the privilege of deciding for ourselves.

If you re-read what was my initial reply to MU, you'll see that I also believe there exists a world independent of individual minds, and so I too agree with you on this count - even if, as the case is, I simultaneously believe this same world is contingent on the occurrence of mind as a generality. — javra

How can an external world exist independently of human minds AND be contingent upon human minds?

Being contingent upon entails a dependence, does it not?

Agreed.

Provide your complete principium individuationis. My issue is that there is no such thing because "individual human being" is a concept with vague boundaries. A zygote isn't a strict boundary because a zygote can produce multiple individuals. If we focus on the histories of a set of twins, they are clearly not individuated at the zygote level.

Sure it does. But what about this requires that the fundamental constituents are actually physical? What does 'physical' mean, when the nature of the so-called fundamental particles is ambiguous, as has been discussed? — Wayfarer

It seems uncontroversial to stipulate that the objects of our ordinary experiences are physical. It seems most reasonable to treat the component parts of physical things as also physical, all the way down to whatever is fundamental.

And as for something non-physical, the wavefunction Ψ is an ideal candidate: — Wayfarer

A "wave function" is a mathematical abstraction. I see no good reason to think abstractions are ontological. So I infer that a wave function is descriptive of something that exists.

My definition of the physical: the ordinary objects of experience, and everything that is causally connected, through law-like behavior, to these ordinary objects of our experience.

Quantum systems fit this.

I may misunderstand, but it sounds also bit like you're suggesting that we should reject physicalism if physics doesn't have a complete, verifiable description of reality.

The difference is this is the one thing in there with its own distinct and unique genetics, occupying its own unique and distinct position in space and time, and will remain as such until the end of its life. — NOS4A2

Identical twins begin with the same genetic material, they lack this uniqueness you mention. So unique genetics can't be the basis for identifying an individual human life.

It's true that every adult human's existence can be tracked back to a specific zygote. Similarly, every oak tree can be traced back to a specific acorn - but an acorn is not an oak tree. An acorn merely has the potential to develop into an oak tree, and a zygote merely has the potential to develop into 1 or more human beings.

We obviously perceive space and time...
— Relativist

I don't think so Relativist. Kant names these as intuitions which are the necessary conditions for the possibility of sensory perception. So from that perspective space and time are prior to perception. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why would we have these intuitions, if they aren't consistent with reality (i.e. true within the scope of our perceptions).

Another type of ontology would hold that space and time are logical abstractions, posterior to perceptions. We deduce from our perceptions, the conclusion that there must be something which we conceive of as "space", and something we conceive of as "time". But there is no indication that we actually perceive whatever it is which we call "space", or "time".

Why think our abstractions about space and time are false?

Special relativity demonstrates that our perceptions of space and time aren't universally true, but it also explains how it is true within the context in which our sensory perceptions apply.

I acknowledge that our descriptions (and understandings) are grounded in our perspective, but we have the capacity to correct for that.

But you're making an error if you think materialism requires these scientific models to be correct depictions of reality. The metaphysics does not depend on these models to correspond to reality.
— Relativist

So, what does it depend on, then? — Wayfarer

Physicalism = the thesis that everything that exists is physical. It is false only if there exists something non-physical. It depends only on this being true.

So our time perception is not necessarily an adequate representation of the time that occurs in the actual world. — javra

Absolutely! The fact that we (i.e..Einstein) developed a theory that transcends the "human perspective" of time is a testimony to our ability to transcend our own perspective, and endeavor to be objective.

It is well known that the nature of the existence of former, in particular, is rather ambiguous, to say the least. Although I don't want to divert this thread too far in this direction, this is where the Copenhagen interpretation of physics is relevant. This says that physics does not reveal what nature is in itself (or herself, some would say) but as how she appears to our methods of questioning. So these 'elementary particles' are not mind-independent in that sense - which is the implication of the observer problem. — Wayfarer

The fact that models makes successful predictions demonstrates that we know something about the nature of physical reality, and that's really the basic thing I'm defending.

Quantum mechanics indeed shows that reality is not identical to that which we directly perceive, but this fact is itself a relevant truth about reality. Re: the "observer problem", don't jump to a conclusion consistent with your confirmation bias. No interpretation of QM is verifiably true, but it's a near certainty that reality actually exhibits the predictible law-like behavior that we observe.

As for genes, and whether these comprise a fundamental explanatory unit, again, the emergence of epigenetics has given rise to an understanding that genes themselves are context-dependent. That is not downplaying the significance of the discovery of genes (or quantum theory, for that matter) but the role they are both assigned by physicalism as being ontologically primary or fundamental. — Wayfarer

So you aren't denying that genes exist. You're pointing to the fact that there are other factors that influence growth and development. So once again, genetics does tell us something about life: more objective facts.

I don't know how you could come to that conclusion. We know all manner of things about the world. I'm not denying that scientific knowledge is efficacious. What I'm questioning is the metaphysics of materialism, which posits that 'Elementary particles, moments in time, genes, the brain – all these things are assumed to be fundamentally real. — Wayfarer

Sorry I didn't understand, but that's how it sounded to me. Glad we could clarify that you agree scientific knowledge is efficacious- so I assume you agree that we indeed have some knowledge about the world external to minds.

But you're making an error if you think materialism requires these scientific models to be correct depictions of reality. The metaphysics does not depend on these models to correspond to reality.

transcendental idealism still maintains that in a fundamental sense, the mind provides the intuitions of time and space, within which all such empirical judgements are made — Wayfarer

I completely agree with this; it makes perfect sense. My issue has been that these intuitions don't preclude discerning aspects of reality.

Read the op, and what I said in my last post. Only minds provide a spatial-temporal perspective, and without assuming such a perspective, all these supposed mind independent things, the world, the universe, even "reality" itself, are completely unintelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover

The very notion of a perspective entails having a mind. We are sufficiently aware that we can recognize the fact we even have a perspective.

We obviously perceive space and time, so why doubt that this is an aspect of the actual world? The mere fact that we have a perspective does not entail that this perspective is an illusion.

You're ignoring my point: a zygote is not identical with an individual human being. Rather, they are a material that have the potential for developing human being(s).

In theory, your skin cells (which contain a complete set of your DNA) could be manipulated into developing into human beings.

I've said, I don't deny the reality of there being an objective world, but that on a deeper level, it is not truly mind-independent." - Wayfarer

These two clauses seem to be contradictory. If there is an objective world external to ourselves, then it exists independent of our minds.
— Relativist

Just say this quibble between you and Wayfarer. As I've just tried to illustrate, the quibble can be resolved by differentiating "mind" as generality (which occurs wherever individual minds occur) and "mind" as one concrete instantiation of the former (such that in concrete form minds are always plural and divided from each other) ... this in the term "mind-independent". Physical reality is not mind-independent in the first sense but is mind-independent in the second sense, this in any system of (non-solipsistic) idealism wherein the world is contingent upon the occurrence of minds. — javra

That doesn't address the issue I raised.

I believe there exists a world (AKA "reality") independent of minds. I also believe nearly everyone agrees with me. That doesn't mean we're right, of course, but I'd like you or Wayfarer to give me reasons why I should reject, or doubt, my current belief.

I think the idea of a mind-independent reality is really incoherent. Reality is something which minds create, as pointed out by the op. If you try to imagine the world as existing without any point-of-view, from no perspective at all, it becomes completely unintelligible, so it cannot be imagined. That's because "reality" as we know it, is point-of-view dependent. So the idea of a mind-independent reality really is incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you think the idea of a mind-independent reality is incoherent, then you can't believe there exists a mind-independent reality. I believe there is. Can you give me any reasons to change my mind? Understand that I acknowledge that physicalism could be wrong, but the belief in a mind-independent reality isn't dependent on physicalism being true.

No, but they're also not understandable outside the scientific context within which they were discovered. — Wayfarer

I don't understand why you say that. Please elaborate.

I've said, I don't deny the reality of there being an objective world, but that on a deeper level, it is not truly mind-independent.

These two clauses seem to be contradictory. If there is an objective world external to ourselves, then it exists independent of our minds.

Which is another way of saying objectivity cannot be absolute.

It seems obvious to me that there are objective facts about the world that we know or can come to know. It is objective fact that we live on the third planet from the sun, which we orbit. How is this anything other than an absolute fact?

Why does this matter?
— Relativist

As for whether you're defending physicalism, the link to this discussion was made from this post in another thread in which you claimed to be 'representing David Armstrong's metaphysics'. I see the above arguments as a challenge to Armstrong's metaphysics. As I'm opposing Armstrong's metaphysics, this is why I think it matters. — Wayfarer

That's fine, and we can discuss it, but do you agree it has no practical significance? That's what I meant.

I'm willing to defend Armstrong's metaphysical theory against alternatives, so I need to understand what alternative you propose. I don't claim it's necessarily true; I simply think it's the best explanation for what we know about the world -broadly. It's conceivable that everything in the world is physical, except for minds.

Is his theory of mind the only thing you object to, or do you think there are flaws that are unrelated to his account of mind?

FYI, when we get to specifics of Armstrong's theory of mind, I won't be limiting myself to Armstrong's specifics, but I will stick with physicalism in general.

In the meantime, I need to better understand your position. If you don't believe we can know truths about the world, that seems more significant than whether or not the mind can be adequately accounted for through physicalism. I don't see how you could propose a superior alternative with such a background assumption.

I happen to think the non-essentialist process is the better process. It is why we rarely find a clear line between anything. It is why Heraclitus was the wisest of them all. It is why Aristotle is easy to dismiss (although he was the second-wisest). It is why Kant's phenomenal veil will always be pulled over our eyes. It is why Hegel may be the third wisest. It is why eastern thinkers who take essence and show how it must implode as it crystalizes are also wise...

But there is no speaking, no significance to any word, if we don't acknowledge gray, fuzzy lines of difference. It is easier to talk in essentialist terms, so essentialism is more like a tool of language.

You have to sound like an essentialist to say "beard versus clean-shaven" at all. To avoid essentialist speak is to conduct tiresome linguistic acrobatics to bring us to the same place anyway - the difference between this and that. — Fire Ologist

No, you don't have to be an essentialist to say "beard versus clean-shaven" or "individual human person" or not. As you've noted elsewhere, essentialism is the notion that there are necessary and sufficient properties that define what is the "essence" of a thing (or type of thing). Essence is a metaphysical concept.

Without appealing to essences, we can define SORTALS - a set of properties that we use to segregate objects into sets. It is conceptual, like set theory, not metaphysical. So we could define "having a beard" as "facial hair growth with a mean length of 5cm", and thus sort men into the bearded and unbearded in this way. My point is that there's no objective basis for defining a sortal in this way, when there is vagueness in the concept of what we're trying to distinguish.

We could define "individual human being" in such a way that we could sort the objects of the world on this basis. But there will be some degree of arbitrariness to it, at the boundaries. For most purposes, the boundary conditions don't matter. For abortion, it does.

If that is an human zygote, every person who has ever existed goes through this stage in their lifecycle. What leads you to believe it is not a person? — NOS4A2

A zygote can develop into multiple persons.

I acknowledge that we'll never understand much about the mind through a physical analysis of brain structure. — Relativist


It matters for materialist theories of mind, such as D M Armstrong's and others, surely. They all proclaim the identity of brain and mind. — Wayfarer

No, it doesn't. Hurricane behavior is not best understood in terms of particle physics, but there's no reason to doubt that it is fundamentally due to the behavior of particles.

Dualism could be true. We could be descended from ancestors who were directly created by a God, and it doesn't change anything: there is still an external world and our senses deliver a functionally accurate understanding of it. Why doubt that? You seem to either deny it, or at least doubt it. Why? It's not dependent on physicalism. — Relativist


My issue with dualism, in the Cartesian sense, is that it tends to reify consciousness, treat it as a spiritual 'substance', which is an oxymoronic term in my view. I think some form of revised hylomorphic dualism (matter-form dualism) is quite feasble, one of the reasons I'm impressed with Feser's 'A-T' philosophy. I'm impressed by many of his arguments about the nature and primacy of reason, such as Think, McFly, Think. But he is critical of Cartesian dualism, at least as it has come down to us, and I think the 'Cartesian divide' is the source of many of the intellectual ailments of modernity. — Wayfarer

I'm not defending physicalism here, I'm defending the existence of the external world and that we are able to determine some truths about it.

Behind the Blind Spot sits the belief that physical reality has absolute primacy in human knowledge, a view that can be called scientific materialism. In philosophical terms, it combines scientific objectivism (science tells us about the real, mind-independent world) and physicalism (science tells us that physical reality is all there is). Elementary particles, moments in time, genes, the brain – all these things are assumed to be fundamentally real. By contrast, experience, awareness and consciousness are taken to be secondary. The scientific task becomes about figuring out how to reduce them to something physical, such as the behaviour of neural networks, the architecture of computational systems, or some measure of information. — The Blind Spot

Do you deny that science can tell us much about the real, mind-independent world? Are elementary particles and genes pure fiction?

Is the mind your sole focus? I'm happy to discuss that further, but I need to understand your perspective of everything in the world BESIDES minds.

To put it bluntly, the claim that there’s nothing but physical reality is either false or empty. If ‘physical reality’ means reality as physics describes it, then the assertion that only physical phenomena exist is false. Why? Because physical science – including biology and computational neuroscience – doesn’t include an account of consciousness. — The Blind Spot

Why does this matter? No metaphysical account of the mind is without flaws, and none can be proven as true. A person could practice psychology without a metaphysical account of the mind. On the other hand, neurology depends mostly on the physical - but often relating it to the "magic" of behavior (both physical and mental). But even here, a metaphysical account doesn't contribute to the practice of the discipline.

The field is not an ontological concept, but a phenomenological one. If we were as small as a photon, we could formulate an ontology of the very smallest. And only then would there be a unified physical theory. — Wolfgang

Quantum fields can be considered ontological, although you aren't compelled to do so.

it makes no sense to try to apply quantum mechanics to the macroscopic world — and this also applies to philosophical conclusions. — Wolfgang

Quantum effects have an impact on the macroscopic world, so it can't be ignored.

Why don’t classical and quantum physics go together? Are we dealing with two different worlds or are they just two different descriptions? — Wolfgang

There's only one world, and it seems to be fundamentally quantum mechanical (subatomic particles do not behave like classical objects). But there is clearly a disconnect in our ability to describe the macro world in quantum terms. That doesn't disprove reductive physicalism, but it does leave room for one to deny it-perhaps there is ontological emergence.