Because physicalism (at least the specific form of it that I defend) entails determinism - either strict determinism, or probabilistic. By definition, LFW is not deterministic.

This thread is for a read through of two SEP articles on possibility and actuality. The articles are:

1. Possible Worlds

2. The Possibilism-Actualism Debate — frank

There is a related issue that cuts through this: contingentarianism vs necessatarianism. Contingency entails the assumption that some counterfactuals could have been actual. That may be an unwarranted assumption. Here's an excerpt from Amy Karofsky's "A Case for Necessitarianism":

"One of the most common ways to justify the belief that contingentarianism is true is by appeal to intuition …Granted, most philosophers do share the intuition that things could have been otherwise. However the mere fact that most philosophers think that things could have been different is not adequate proof that there really are ways things could have been. In fact, what may seem to be a belief about a (so-called) unactualized possibility, when carefully examined, could actually turn out to be a mere modal illusion in the sense that it is confused and incomplete thinking and more akin to a figment of the imagination than to a genuine belief.

"Michael Jubien wrote that it is intuitive and evident from ordinary thinking that there is genuine contingency in the world…'We ordinarily think of an object could have been elsewhere because we think that our physical forces acting upon it might have been different. We think a sudden gust of wind might have altered the path of a bird in flight.'

"According to Jubien, we ordinarily think that the direction of a bird’s flight is contingent because we think that the causal series that involves the physical forces could have been different; we think that a sudden gust of wind could have altered the causal series that resulted in the bird’s path. [But] the mere fact that some people think that physical forces can be different is not adequate justification for the claim that the physical forces [i.e. those in effect in a particular instance] can be different.

"Moreover, it is not even evident that we do think the way Jubien thinks we do…We might and sometimes do think that because some actual birds paths are affected by gusts of wind, it is possible that a gust of wind could affect any bird’s path. But this type of reasoning commits the existential quantification, possible instantiation fallacy. The fact that some bird’s paths are affected by wind does not entail that the direction of any particular bird’s path is contingent; it merely indicates that the actual paths of some actual birds are affected by wind. We might and sometimes do think that this bird’s path can be affected by a gust of wind because being a bird’s path is compatible with being affected by a gust of wind. But…the compatibility of abstract properties does not prove that the instantiation of a particular property is contingent. Thus, even if we think that the abstract properties are compatible, that does not mean that we think that the particular property instances are contingently instantiated. And if we do think so, our belief remains unjustified because it presupposes contingentarianism."

She provides a number of examples from the literature wherein philosophers describe events that they claim describe "obvious" cases of contingency (such as a throw of the dice, and deliberative decisions based on future "contingencies"), but points out that these reflect merely epistemic, not metaphysical possibilities. She also reviews some claims about past contingencies, all of which entail circular reasoning: we assume things "could" have been different, and then creatively imagine differences - without actually analyzing the factors that would need to differ in order for the alleged non-actualized possibility to have obtained:

"in general, any contention that an imagined situation is a consideration of a possible, but unactual state of affairs presupposes that what does not happen can, and any suggestion that thinking about the past is an encounter with an unrealized possibility rests upon the assumption that actual past events could have failed to have occurred."

It is mentioned in the SEP article, "the truth conditions for sentences exhibiting modality de re involve in addition a commitment to the meaningfulness of transworld identity". This, as I explained above, is supported ontologically by Platonism, and requires a violation of the law of identity — Metaphysician Undercover

Transworld identity can be accounted for via haecceity: the notion that there is something unanalyzable and immaterial that makes you YOU. It's comparable to a soul. This doesn't depend on Platonism; but it does depend on immaterialism.

You’re treating “the experiment” or “the state of affairs” as the object that perdures, so objecthood on this context is not in question. — Wayfarer

(FWIW: A state of affairs does not perdure. Perdurance applies to individual identities).

Yes, of course "objecthood" (state-of-affairs-hood) is not in question - it's a first principle of the ontological theory. You had alleged that the theory is incompatible with QM. If this were true, it would falsify the theory. But I demonstrated that it IS consistent.

But, as you already acknowledged, the 'true ontology' is unknown. What this means is that there is not some 'actual state of affairs' or 'object with determinate properties' at the fundamental level. — Wayfarer

You're misinterpreting what I said. I was referring to the "true ontology" of QM. As you know, there are a number of interpretations - each of which is an ontological hypothesis. Our lack of knowledge which one is correct does not entail that it is NOT a state of affairs with determinate* properties! See this:

"according to textbook quantum mechanics, there are two different ways that wave functions can behave. When they are not being measured, they obey the Schrödinger equation. That behavior isn’t too much different from what we encountered in classical mechanics: wave functions evolve smoothly, reversibly (information about the state is conserved), and deterministically. But at the moment of measurement, we throw Schrödinger out the window. The wave function collapses suddenly, irreversibly, and indeterministically, in accordance with the Born rule.

The measurement problem is, essentially, “What’s really going on when we measure a quantum system?”
"Quanta and Fields: The Biggest Ideas in the Universe", Sean Carroll, P38

"Indeterminism" arises at the point of measurement. This doesn't entail indeterminate properties of any state of affairs (both the pre-measurement and post measurement states of affairs have deterministic properties); it's consistent with a law of nature with a probabilistic outcome.

_____________________________________
* The fact that the unmeasured wavefunction evolves deterministically implies the system's properties are determinate. "Fixed position" is not a property of the wavefunction. It's analogous property is of a non-localized position and momentum:

"the essence of the uncertainty principle isn’t about measurements at all. It has implications for measurements—if we measure either position or momentum precisely, the wave function will collapse and we will have no idea what the other one would be immediately thereafter—but it’s really a feature of quantum states even before we measure them. The point is not that you inevitably bump into a quantum system while measuring it and therefore change it. It’s that there do not exist any states in which both position and momentum are highly localized at the same time. This is hard to internalize if we remain stuck with classical intuition, thinking of position and momentum as things that really exist; it’s easier to swallow if we think of them as sets of possible observational outcomes that we derive from an underlying quantum state." - Carroll, p55

What are you alleging I stipulated?

You had seemed to be suggesting that QM was inconsistent with a state of affairs ontological theory. I showed that it is consistent with it.

I have never claimed the theory is provably true; I merely said one can justifiably judge it an inference to best explanation.

I understand. None of us can avoid the subjectivity of our own judgement.

I would indeed be open to other theories, were they to come my way. I've studied Thomist metaphysics a bit, but judge that it makes a number of assumptions that seem unnecessary, and it centers around a very large assumption - the one it was designed around (God).

But what typically comes my way are hypotheses about some narrow metaphysical issue. Example: libertarian free will. I acknowledge it's possible, but since it's inconsistent with physicalism, I lean strongly away from it.

You’re treating the wavefunction as if it were the state of an object with determinate properties, and then explaining measurement as a change in those properties. — Wayfarer

The wavefunction does define the quantum state of the system, mathematically: it quantifies the probability of each possible measurement outcome; ontologically, the system is in a particular quantum state. The true ontology is unknown, but I'll illustrate it in terms of superposition of eigenstates with wavefunction collapse.

Prior to the measurements, there exists an eigenstate corresponding with each of the possible measurements, all existing in superposition. The measurement entangles with one eigenstate. Let's assume that this reflects a collapse of the wave function - such that the other eigenstates disappear. In this analysis, the classical property (a definite position) did not come into existence ex nihilo- it was present in superposition with all the other eigenstates. But it is now a classical relational property because of the collapse.

The formal role of the wavefunction doesn’t, by itself, supply a foundational ontology. — Wayfarer

Of course! Formally, it is just a mathematical tool for making predictions. But clearly, it reflects the actual (unknown) ontological basis.

I would use the word material rather than physical. That there is a spectrum of material including subtle (mental) materials. With physical material at the more dense, or concrete end of the spectrum. I go further in that I regard within the domain of subtle materials, a transcendent super subtle material for which mind (which is on the spectrum) is the correlate of physical material as seen at the bottom of the spectrum and the super subtle material is a higher, or transcendent mind. — Punshhh

As you noted, naturalism is more open-ended. Materialism is less so, and physicalism is most restrictive. More restrictive= a more parsimonious ontology, which is why I go with it.

The point at issue is what exists prior to the act of measurement. Prior to measurement there’s no determinate object with intrinsic properties. — Wayfarer

Here are 2 aspects of the model you are overlooking:

1. Strict identity means conforming with Leibniz' law. Individual (strict) identity does not endure over time, because from one instant to the next, the world changes - and therefore relations change. What we refer to as an individual identity over time is a perdurance. A perduring identity is something we reference; it is not a fundamental ontological category of existent. So it's necessarily false to say that an object has set of properties s1 at time t1, and that identical object has set of properties s2 at time t2.

We can reference a loose (perduring) identity by pointing to the intersection of s1 and s2. This looslely defined object perdures between t1 and t2.

2. A pure state quantum system has definite properties: it evolves deterministically per a Schroedinger equation. These properties are not classical properties. The act of measurement entails that system becoming entangled with something external to that quantum system- producing classical relations to the measurement device.

Here's a sequence of events:

t0 (prior to measurement) there is a 2 "object" state of affairs consisting of a pure state quantum system and a measurement device.

t1 (point of measurement): the original 2 object state of affairs perdures into a new state of affairs that includes an entanglement between the quantum system and the measurement device. As a consequence of the entanglement, the quantum system has new, classical relations that didn't previously exist. Of course, this is a subjective view, from the perspective of humans; what is physically going on is dependent on whichever interpretation of QM is correct- but I see no reason to think there isn't law-directed behavior going on.

[

I've said before, quantum physics demolishes such a Newtonian conception of reality. At the fundamental level, the properties of sub-atomic primitives are indeterminate until measure. But of course, that can be swept aside, because 'physicalism doesn't depend on physics'. It's more a kind of 'language game'. — Wayfarer

You're referring to complementary properties, like the position & momentum of an electron.

These are not intrinsic properties of an electron (like -1 electic charge, and 0 mass). They are relations (relational properties) to other objects. In a dynamic system, relations are constantly changing; e.g. the distance to your home changes as you drive toward it. At exactly one point in your path, a distance relation of 5km emerged. So the emergence of new relational properties is perfectly consistent with the model.

I agree with this admission and your position on philosophical zombies. It does leave a rather large gap for “non-physical alternatives” to creep in though.
I tend to steer clear of the division between physical and non physical, because I don’t see why there is necessarily such a distinction. The so called non physical mind and physically existing things, though appearing entirely separate, may be part of the same external manifold that we are not aware of, which may be undiscoverable, but in which the two are grounded. — Punshhh

I start with natural: That which exists (has existed, or will exist) starting with oneself, everything that is causally connected to ourselves through laws of nature, and anything not causally connected (such as alternate universes) that is inferred to exist, to have existed, or that will exist, through analysis of the universe. Naturalism= the thesis that the natural world comprises the totality of existencr.

I further narrow it down to the thesis that everything that exists has a common ontological structure: a particular with intrinsic properties and extrinsic (relational) properties to other existents. This implies everything is the same kind of thing, which I label, "physical".

But if there is no detectable effect, why suspect there is something undetectable present? — Patterner

I started by saying it's possible there is some aspect of reality that accounts for feelings, that is otherwise undetectable. This doesn't justify believing there is some such thing, but it counters the notion that physicalism is impossible if feelings cannot be accounted for by known aspects of reality.

It's a bit like dark matter. There were measureable gravitational effects that were inconsistent with General Relativity. Naively, this might be treated as falsification of GR. But GR explains so much, and it made many verified predictions. So dark matter was proposed to explain those apparent anomalies, despite there being no direct evidence of it.

Similarly, physicalism is successful at accounting for almost everything in the natural world - so it seems more reasonable to assume there's something we're missing than to dispense with the overall theory.

And I only wanted to make it clear that I don't think you have. But, sure, let's take them up elsewhere. — Wayfarer

What part of your original question did I not answer? You had asked:

what you think physicalism explains, other than in its role as a methodological assumption in science. — Wayfarer

I gave you a pretty thorough answer.

Do you REALLY want to get into each of those topics? That would extend this long discussion several more years. I've contributed to threads on all these topics, and am likely to do so again, so lets's not go there now. I only brought these up to answer your question.

And after all these months of conversations, I'm still at a loss to understand what you think physicalism explains, other than in its role as a methodological assumption in science. — Wayfarer

It's a metaphysical underpinning for that methodological assumption: the world is a natural one, evolving entirely due to laws of nature; that everything that exists is an object with properties and relations to other existents. So what it explains is the nature of what exists, and what to expect as new discoveries are made.

It provides a broad, consistent perspective for evaluating philosphical claims. I defend its implications: e. g. compatibilism, a natural (evolutionary) basis of morality, the nature of abstractions (including mathematics), a theory of truth, and quasi-necessitarianism. Any forum topic I comment on will always be based on this position, unless I'm just entertaining other possibilities to see where they lead.

No, and I fully expect that nothing ever will. It’s not the kind of view which is amendable to falsification, as it is a metaphysical belief. — Wayfarer

Yes, but it's a cautious belief - I know it's not necessarily true - it will always ONLY be a best explanation. I don't think you'll admit it, but it's rational to accept best explanations as provisionally true. Compare it to a belief about a historical fact deduced from data too limited to be conclusive.

You will notice, incidentally, that I do not advance a ‘theory of mind’.

I know, and that's why you aren't in position to refute my "best explanation" analysis. I think I said as much, months ago.

The related question that comes to mind is whether you think consciousness is possible absent feelings and whether you equate consciousness with first person experience. Is it possible to have feelings without a sensate body? — Janus

Sorry I overlooked your question. A being that was built,which lacked feelings is generally referred to as a "Zombie." The being would have experiences, that created memories that might affect its future behavior - so in that sense, it would be a sort of first-person experience. It could behave in ways identical to humans - reacting as we do to bodily injury; crying at a funeral, having the outward physical effects of sexual arousal..., and learning to behave differently based on the experiences.

But it wouldn't be the sort of experiences that we have (IMO). It seems to me that feelings are the direct impetus for all our intentional behavior. This seems to be the relevance of the so-called "first-person-ness" of our minds: feelings are exclusively first-perseon experiences. Zombie behavior could be perfectly understood from standard programming. Real human behavior would need something to produce feelings.

:clap:

You say 'feelings are the only thing problematic' as if that's a minor footnote, but feelings - qualia, first-person experience - is the whole point at issue! So, why keep saying I'm the one 'missing the point', when this is the point? — Wayfarer

It's a point I've acknowledged from the very beginning of our conversation, months ago. As I've repeatedly pointed out, every theory of mind has explanatory gaps. I accept physicalism as inference to best explanation - it accounts for all known facts, more parsimoniously than alternatives, with the fewest ad hoc assumptions.

Critically, qualia do not falsify physicalism. I've provided two ways they could be accounted for:

-illusionism (see this): the notion that, although qualia have a causal effect (i.e. they aren't epiphenomenal) the "experience" of a quale is illusion.

-there is some aspect of reality that manifests only as qualia, and is therefore undetectable. As I've mentioned to you before, Michael Tye proposes such a theory in "Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness".

You have neither falsified physicalism nor proposed a theory that is arguably a better explanation, so you have given me no reason to change my view.

I think one could reasonably reject physicalism because of the explanatory gap, but then he should reject any theory of mind that has an explanatory gap - which is all of them (i.e. reserve judgement).

It is a methodological decision to represent our mental processes on the model of the information technology that we already understand. Nothing wrong with that. But it means that feelings can't be represented. They require, it seems to me, a different methodology. — Ludwig V

Fair point, but until we have such a methodology, this comprises an explanatory gap. IMO, it's a narrower explanatory gap than alternative theories - so I justify accepting physicalism as an inference to best explanation.

If a component is physical, why would it be undiscoverable? — Patterner

To be discoverable, there needs to be some measurable influence on known things. So there could be particles, or properties, that have no measureable influence on particles or waves we can detect. String theory may true, but there seems to be no means of verifying that. If it IS true. there could be any number of vibrational states of strings that have no direct measurable affect on anything else.

That’s the point physicalism doesn’t touch. It doesn’t matter how much complexity you add or how programmable the processes may be. A functional specification is not the same thing as the reality of existence — and existence is the philosopher’s concern, not the engineer’s abstraction. — Wayfarer

You miss the point. If the processes can be programmed, then an artificial "mind" could actually be built that had 1st person experiences. You conflating the specification with the actual execution of the program. That's analogous to conflating the bits in a jpg file with the image that it helps convey.

Until that is accounted for, saying physicalism “best explains all the facts” simply assumes what is in question. — Wayfarer

You have identified no facts that can't be explained.

And as a software guy, you must recognise the impossibility of writing a true functional specification for the unconscious and preconscious dimensions of mind — without which consciousness would not be what it is. — Wayfarer

What makes you think the background mental processing couldn't be programmed? It's algorthimically complex, involving multiple parallel paths, and perhaps some self-modifying programs. But in principle, it Seems straightforward. .As I said, feelings are the only thing problematic.

Your response is to concede that consciousness may indeed imply ‘something non-physical’ ... — Wayfarer

I didn't say, "non-physical", I said it may be partly due to "components of world that are otherwise undiscoverable."

....but this also misses the crucial point of phenomenology. This that consciousness in never mething we are outside of or apart from. Until that basic fact of existence is understood we’ll continue to talk past one another.

You haven't established that this is a problem, just that there's something unique about first-person-ness that third-person description cannot capture.

I suggest that this uniqueness is due to there being aspects of consciousness that are not describable in words: there are non-semantic mental attitudes (dispositions, beliefs, feelings...). So it's a "Mary's room" issue: one can't convey redness in words, nor can one convey particular pains, or feelings of anxiety, or many other things.

It's also complicated by the complexity : the brain is doing many things concurrently (processing input from each of the senses, bodily sensations - pains, hunger, triggering of memories, autonomic functions,....), and nearly everything can affect everything else, in a feedback loop that never ends. We're all unique: we start out with physical differences, and we are changed (uniquely) by every experience we have.

All this is enough to explain why I can never know what it's like to be you (or a bat). So this uniqueness of each individual's first-person-ness seems a red herring. What is relevant to judging physicalism is considering whether or not some identifiable mental process is consistent with a plausibly physical functionality. As a former software guy, I look at in terms of whether it is programable. Most things seem to be, but feelings do not- and I freely admit this is a weakness. But it is not sufficient to defeat my judgement that physicalism best explains all facts I'm aware of.

Materialist theory of mind does not entail reifying the process of consciousness- considering it a thing.
— Relativist

That is exactly what this does. and when I posted it, you agreed with it. — Wayfarer

You are misrepresenting what I said. Here it is:

I agree that consciousness is neither a thing nor a property: it is a process. — Relativist

I have consistently said that processes are not things (objects). That's why I agreed consciousness is not a thing

Physicalism entails that mental activity (including consciousness) is produced by physical things.

Reminder: I do not insist that every aspect of the natural world is discoverable through science. It may very well be that there are aspects of mental activity that are partly grounded in components of world that are otherwise undiscoverable. This is worst case, but it is more plausible than non-physical alternatives.

This seems trivially true
— Relativist

Not when consciousness is treated as an object (per Materialist Theory of Mind) :brow: — Wayfarer

Materialist theory of mind does not entail reifying the process of consciousness- considering it a thing.

It’s not about falsifying the third person perspective, but pointing out its implicit limitations — Wayfarer

I brought up the limitation of the 1st person perspective, by asking you:

Other than the fact of one's own existence, what else can one infer? (by deduction, induction, or abduction) — Relativist

I don't see how you can even satisfy yourself that solipsism is false. On the other hand, analysis from a third person perspective has been fruitful.

We can learn more about the nature of consciousness (including accounting for first-person-ness) from this third-person approach than we can by pure, first-person introspection.

If it's a process, then it isn't some "misleading name we give to the precondition for any ascription of existence or inexistence."
— Relativist

Bitbol says it's 'misleading' precisely because it is reifying to designate 'consciousness' as an object of any kind, even an 'objective process'. To 'reify' is to 'make into a thing', when consicousness is not a thing or an object of any kind. — Wayfarer

The quote you asked me to respond to did not mention process. He alleged consciousness isn't "comprehensible". My position is that it IS comprehensible in terms it being a process. A process is not an existent. "Runs" are processes, not things.

He's saying, before we can say anything about 'what exists', we must first be conscious. Or, put another way, consciousness is that in which and for which the experienced world arises. It is the pre-condition for any knowledge whatever. — Wayfarer

This seems trivially true. Only conscious beings "say" anything; What you mean by "the experienced world" is more precisely: conscious experience of the world; so again: trivially true (consciousness is needed to have conscious experiences).

saying that the neural correlate of consciousness (often taken as its “neural basis”) may exist or not exist, amounts to saying that consciousness itself may exist or not exist in the same sense.

"Exist" is the wrong word for process. "Occur" or "take place" are more precise. Neural processes take place, and may very well account for consciousness. IMO, the only real difficulty is accounting for feelings. Given feelings, consciousness entails processes guided by feelings, and producing feelings.

Phenomenology and the existentialism that grew out of it, are not concerned with scientific objectivism, but with lived existence and meaning, as providing the context within which the objective sciences need to be interpreted. — Wayfarer

It's perfectly fine to concern oneself with "lived existence and meaning", but it doesn't falsify a "3rd person" approach.

I agree that consciousness is neither a thing nor a property: it is a process.

If it's a process, then it isn't some "misleading name we give to the precondition for any ascription of existence or inexistence."

"phenomenologists are settled in the first-person standpoint, whereas physicalist researchers explore everything from a third-person standpoint. "
Sure. But the 1st person standpoint is not analyzable. It just treats 1st person-ness as a primitive.

"From a first-person standpoint, anything that exists (thing or property) is given as a phenomenal content of consciousness. Therefore, consciousness de facto comes before any ascription of existence."
OK, but does this lead anywhere? Other than the fact of one's own existence, what else can one infer? (by deduction, induction, or abduction)

Nothingness entails non-existence. The notion that nothingness preceded somethingness is nonsensical: it suggests non-existence existed - which is self-contraductory.

I suggest that a finite past is feasible; it would entail an initial state, not an event - an event is a point in time, which means there were both a prior and a later states.

An initial state would have to be uncaused, because causation entails a temporally prior cause.

An initial state raises the question of what time is. I don't know what it is, but I do know that time is not as it appears to be- special relativity proves that. So does the Page-Wooters* mechanism.

The Page-Wooters* mechanism, suggests the experience of time is localized, and due to quantum entanglement. From the point of view of an external observer, there is no passage of time in an observed quantum system. But observers within that system experience time as a sequence of events. At minimum, this demonstrates that we don't understand the nature of time, so we ought not to draw conclusions based on a traditional view of time.

*
"In this paper we provide an experimental illustration of Page and Wootters' quantum time mechanism that is able to describe two-time quantum correlation functions. This allows us to test a Leggett-Garg inequality, showing a violation from the "internal" observer point of view. The "external" observer sees a time-independent global state. Indeed, the scheme is implemented using a narrow-band single photon where the clock degree of freedom is encoded in the photon's position. Hence, the internal observer that measures the position can track the flow of time, while the external observer sees a delocalized photon that has no time evolution in the experiment time-scale." - https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.00707

Your logic seems reasonable, but a theist will see an escape hatch between these 2 premises:

Premise 3:A world where all sentient beings are equally omniscient and omnipotent would contain no involuntary suffering, no vulnerability, and no inequality, since each being could prevent harm to itself and others.

Premise 4:A perfectly omnibenevolent being necessarily prefers the outcome that maximizes well-being and minimizes suffering.

A theist could reason, that this "god" considers there to be some benefit to having beings who are not omnipotent/omniscient but must actually struggle with their choices. This forces them to have to earn their reward. Compare this to a child who has to do the work to achieve some goal, vs the child whose parents give him everything. Or there's always the old excuse "we mere mortals aren't equipped to understand God's reasons".

The "universe" knows itself? How so?

Man is that part of reality in which and through which the cosmic process has become conscious and has begun to comprehend itself. His supreme task is to increase that conscious comprehension and to apply it as fully as possible to guide the course of events. In other words, his role is to discover his destiny as an agent of the evolutionary process, in order to fulfill it more adequately. — Wayfarer

It's perfectly fine to have such an outlook on humanity, but projecting this onto the universe as a whole is unjustified: After humans inevitably cease to exist, the universe will return to the state it started as: as unconscious as a rock.

Indeed they can, and nothing I've said denies that. But the metaphysical points remain. First, reality is far greater than what we know exists. — Wayfarer

There's certainly much to be discovered, and probably much that isn't discoverable. But this doesn't falsify any metaphysical theories (including, but not limited to, physicalism).

And also that to imagine the universe as it must be, without any subject, still assumes the implicit perspective of a subject, without which nothing could be imagined.

I have not disputed that. What I've noted is that this doesn't preclude making true statements about reality, from a human perspective. The statements would reflect information about reality. For this reason, a metaphysical theory could be possibly true. The notions of perspective and the "world as it is" do not undermine this.

I'm arguing against the attitude which sees humanity as a 'mere blip' (Stephen Hawking's derisive description of man as 'chemical scum'.) We are the 'mere blip' in which the Universe comes to know itself.

The "universe" knows itself? How so? Humans know something about the universe, but humans are not the universe. As we've discussed, knowledge of the universe is distinct from the universe itself. You also agree that the universe existed for billions of years before we existed, which implies there were no minds "knowing" anything. Of course, my observation is based on a human perspective, but it's nevertheless true.

I do value humanity and knowledge, and agree we are more than scum, but the universe doesn't seem dependent on us, or on the existence of knowledge about it.

in no way can this be interpreted as 'a feature of objective reality'. It is the grounding truth of Descartes' first philosophy. — Wayfarer

There are 2 facts that I think you agree with:
1) mind-independent, objective reality exists
2) You (Wayfarer) exist.

I infer that you regard each of these as objective facts. I assumed you would consider #1 a comprehensive fact, and #2 as less comprehensive. I.e : #1 subsumes #2. So I labelled the subsumed, a feature. I don't care about the label. My point is that there is this subsumed relationship of #2 to #1.

Given this relationship, there are 2 possibilites: you are equivalent to objective reality (=solipsism) or you are something less, but included in objective reality. This opens the door for other subsumtions.

The quote from Descartes appears to express an attitude of reserving judgement toward solipsism - not that it's merely a remote possibility, but that there's no epistemic basis to decide yes or no.

Of course, Descartes isn't discussing epistemic bases for beliefs, he's discussing what is provable. If you reject solipsism (believe it likely to be false), as I expect you do, it cannot be because you can prove it, so you must have an epistemic basis. What is the basis? What caused you to believe it? How do you justify the belief?

That's what I mean by an 'implicit perspective'. Take that out, and we can't make sense of anything, as there is no perspective. So the empirical view is not truly 'mind-independent'. — Wayfarer

Making sense of something necessarily entails a perspective. The notion of a "thing as it is" does not imply that there can be no true statements about the thing.

What 'mind independence' is, is an extrapolation based on the scientific principle of bracketing out the subjective view, but mis-applied to reality as a whole. — Wayfarer

It's conceptual analysis, not science. "I think, therefore I am" is a statement of existence- and provides a ground for the concept of existence. If you believe you exist, then you believe there is existence. Reality is existence - so it's not a mis-application.

It mistakes the methodological step of 'bracketing the subjective' for a metaphysical principle 'the world we see is the same as would exist were we not in it.'

I think you're equivocating.
We have a mental world model, and it includes ourselves. We can mentally subtract our presence and envision the revised world, unproblematically.
In the comparison, we are never contemplating "the world as it is" much less "the world as it would be", because it is devoid of information. It's analgous to drawing conclusions based on objects: P1. Marble P2. Water C. Therefore ???


A point I've been trying to make is that "the world as it is" ="objective reality"= "mind-independent reality" can be referenced. I just referred to it 3 ways, and they entail some true statements about it. Same with the point I made at the beginning of this post.

You have an inherent existence, do you not? You know this because you think, but your existence is surely not merely a phenonenol truth.
— Relativist

Any being does, but already said you think cogito ergo sum proves nothing. The point, which I return to, is that the fact of one's own being is apodictic, cannot plausibly be denied. For to doubt it, one must first exist. — Wayfarer

Yes, but I was using this as an example of "feature": this one indisputable fact is a feature of objective reality (not merely phenomenal reality). Are there other features? If solipsism is false, then it is logically necessary that there are other features. Not(solipsism) is disputable, but do you actually reserve judgement on solipsism?

— Wayfarer

But suppose we simply say that physicalism's model applies specifically to phenomenal reality. Your objection vanishes, does it not? I have much more to say about this, but I first want your reaction. — Relativist

So: phenomena already imply subjectivity, and the physical already presupposes form, as if it has no form, it has no identity. The error of physicalism is to say that the physical has determinate reality sans any act of observation or form - that's what I mean by 'inherent reality'....
The context of my question was Kant's view of TRUTH as a correspondence with phenomenal reality. You said you accepted this. So I'm asking you to assess whether or not physicalism is possibly true, in terms of it possibly corresponding to phenomenal reality, in this Kantian sense. This has nothing to do with "inherent reality". It only has to do with the theory of truth you accepted.

The whole point of my argument is the refutation of the idea that an object has an inherent existence absent any mind. — Wayfarer

You have an inherent existence, do you not? You know this because you think, but your existence is surely not merely a phenonenol truth.

Not quite. Absent cognition, the universe is featureless, because features map against the capacities of the ‘animal sensorium’. Again, that what we see as shapes and features has an inextricably subjective basis. — Wayfarer

I used the word "features" in an attempt to generalize beyond our framework. It's non-specific, except it is clear that one feature you can't deny is your own existence. This cannot be the only feature, unless solipsism is true.

If “physical” just means “whatever exists,” then physicalism is no longer a metaphysical thesis but simply another way of talking about ontology. — Wayfarer

In another thread, you challenged what is meant by "physical". I acknowledge that the term is ambiguous (is a gas "physical"? Is a quantum field? What if a "many worlds" interpretation is true?- are the inaccessible worlds physical? )

I embrace reductionism, and reductionism entails the notion that everything that exists is composed of the same kinds of things. Not monism (one thing), but (at least potentially) a set of things. That set of things is what I'm referring to, to avoid a semantics debate about what it means to be "physical".

I'd really like you to respond to this:

But suppose we simply say that physicalism's model applies specifically to phenomenal reality. Your objection vanishes, does it not? I have much more to say about this, but I first want your reaction. — Relativist

What I’m denying is that object-hood itself—given as discrete, bounded, enduring units—is something we are entitled to project into reality as it is in itself. — Wayfarer

You are damning knowledge for being what it is. Knowledge can only be a reflection, or interpretation of what exists. It's logically impossible for knowledge to be what reality "is in itself". Propositional knowledge can only be descriptive. Perceptual knowledge (e.g. familiarity with visual appearance, sound, smell) can only be a sensory memory. The proper questions are: is the description accurate, and complete - these are the ideals to strive for with propositional knowledge. (We can never know that a description is complete, of course, that's why I call it an ideal).

You skipped a key point I made:

You're assuming, without support, that the actual world lacks objects, or any aspects that a human perspective might consistently identify as an object. — Relativist

If we can consistly identify something as an object, then we are warranted in applying the label to represent the concept and use it as a reference. The concept is useful for studying the world- it is a component of our perspective that has led to fruitful exploration, and discovery.

Let’s begin with a thought-experiment: Imagine that all life has vanished from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed. Matter is scattered about in space in the same way as it is now, there is sunlight, there are stars, planets and galaxies — Mind and the Cosmic Order, Chap 1

The universe we are imagining DOES have the same shapes, there is sunlight, stars, etc- because we're imagining this world from our perspective, and as we understand it, simply unoccupied by us. And this understanding is not false, it's simply a description in human terms - as a description must be.

So what he seems to be saying is there would be no humans to describe the universe this way. This reiterates my point that descriptions are not the object described. The only question we should be asking is: is the description accurate and complete?

Another animal, or another kind of intelligence altogether, could inhabit the same underlying reality while carving it up into entirely different unities, boundaries, and saliencies. In that case it would still be “the same reality,” but not the same objects — Wayfarer

Of course! But that does not invalidate our descriptions. It's analogous to comparing Newton's gravity theory to General Relativity: they are both correct, within a certain context. More extreme: pre-Copernican descriptions of the motions of stars and planets-they could correctly predict the motions. Neither Newton's nor pre-Copernican methods were entirely correct, but they had a degree of accuracy. Even if modern physics isn't precisely correct, it's clearly closer to correctness than its predecessors.

Right! But don’t loose sight of where this all started - with the argument over physicalism. And acknowledging this surely undermines physicalism. Physicalism isn’t just the claim that physics is successful or that scientific models work (which incidentally is not in question); it’s the stronger metaphysical claim that the fundamental constituents of reality are physical. But if we also say (as you’ve just done) that science doesn't, in principle, establish a final ontology, that its models don’t guarantee true ontology, and that all description is perspectival, then the core physicalist claim has been abandoned. — Wayfarer

I have not been defending physicalism in this thread, I have been defending the discipline of ontology, of which physicalism is but one example. You haven't undermined any ontological theory at all, you've simply shown that an ontology can only be described from a human perspective. The fact "the thing itself" is distinct from a complete description of the thing doesn't matter, because no one would claim a description IS the thing. You've provided a reason to be skeptical of any ontolological theory, but you haven't falsified any.

Regarding physicalism: it's a tautology to say everything is physical, because its just a label for the things that exist- objects, or states of affairs: the theory that everything that exists is an object, with intrinsic properties and relations to other things that exist. The labels are descriptive.

But suppose we simply say that physicalism's model applies specifically to phenomenal reality. Your objection vanishes, does it not? I have much more to say about this, but I first want your reaction.

(I don’t think the notion of the in-itself is incoherent at all. It is, by definition, what lies outside any perspective — that’s what the term is doing — Wayfarer

The notion of something existing without there being a description of it is coherent. The notion that we can conceive something that way is incoherent, in that there's nothing to make sense of; it can't be a topic of discussion beyond the point of referring to "the thing in-itself". Our conceptions are necessarily descriptive. I suggest that we capture the same point by simply acknowledging that there's a distinction between an existent and a description of that existent. Then we can discuss it's attributes in the usual manner.

The “model” is not a representation standing over against a separately existing world. The modeling activity and the world it yields are the same process viewed from two aspects. There is no second, independently formed object for the model to correspond to. The very features by which something counts as an object—extension, mass, persistence, causal interaction—already belong to the structured field of appearance itself. We can test and refine the model and develop new mathematical terminology and even new paradigms (as physics has since Galileo), but this testing takes place entirely within the same field of appearances, through coherence, predictive stability, and intersubjective invariance—not by comparison with a mind-independent reality as it is in itself. — Wayfarer

You're assuming, without support, that the actual world lacks objects, or any aspects that a human perspective might consistently identify as an object.

I have argued that our senses, and the mental image of the actual world, is a reflection of the actual world- because it's caused by that world and because we necessarily interact in that world to survive. These are reasons to believe these reflections have a degree of accuracy. You rule this out even as a possibility. That is unwarranted. It is making too much of a mere possibility.

You are right that we can't compare the phenomenal world to the mind-independent reality, but that follows from the observation you made that we necessarily have a perspective. The mental act of understanding necessarily entails a human perspective, but perspective does not entail falsehood. I suggest that the success of science validates our perspective as being fairly accurate.

We have previously discussed the fact that the smallest particles (in the standard model of particle physics) do not have certain definite properties, such as position and momentum. This is not an indictment of our perspective, because we have been able to make this detemination FROM our human perspective. I could easily agree that there's much we don't know, and that the models we've created (such as the standard model, which is a particle perespective of QFT) are not necessarily correct. I have never argued that science gets everything right, nor that science is somehow destined to eventually figure everything out. I merely argue that successful science is giving us some true information about actual reality- and I can't imagine how you could deny that.

Nothing about scientific method demands that it concerns 'things in themselves' — Wayfarer

How could it? You have defined '"things in themselves" in terms of an absence of perspective, which strikes me as incoherent. Descriptions are necessarily in terms of a perspective. Successful science entails accurate predictions. It does not entail accurate ontology. Consider Quantum Field Theory, a model that theorizes that all material objects are composed of quanta of quantum fields. The math and heuristics are successful, but that doesn't necessarily mean it is a true ontology. It will never be possible to establish a fundamental ontology through science - the best we can hope for is a model that is successful at making predictions. If it does that, then it is giving us some true facts - facts that correspond to reality.

Your implicit perspective is from outside both your mind and the world you live in, as if you were seeing it from above - but we really can't do that. — Wayfarer

I have never said that our perspectives are from "outside our minds". Rather, I embrace our perspectives and argue that we can develop true beliefs about aspects of objective reality. This includes scientific models, like QFT - but they should be considered in terms of what they are, and what they are not.

I'll go further: we are also justified in proposing ontological models, for the same reason it's justifiable to propose scientific models: prediction, analysis, and discourse. The true, fundamental ontology is not accessible, but we can still utilize a hypothetical model that is coherent and has all necessary explanatory power. Different models can be compared, and we can justifiably choose one that we judge to be the "best explanation".

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I had asked you to define truth. You replied:

I do not disagree with Kant on this point. It IS the point! Nothing about scientific method demands that it concerns 'things in themselves'. — Wayfarer

So...you do accept correspondence theory, where the correspondence is limited to phenomenal reality. What you haven't done is to account for phenomenal reality. I argue that phenomenal reality is a direct consequence of objective reality. Do you deny that?

You do seem to accept that there is an intersubjective human perspective - a view that depends on a 3rd person point of view. I explain this in terms of our common machinery - our brains and sensory apparatus are similar, we have commonslity in languages (translation is generally feasible), so I infer that we all have similarities in our perspectives about the world at large. How do you reconcile it? It seems inconsistent with your 1st-person view of perspective? You think, therefore you are- but you can't say that about anyone else except by indirect evidence.

You are applying a different definition of "belief" than I.
— Relativist

I use the regular definition. — Wayfarer

You seem to have not read this part:

The mental construct I have labeled "belief" is present, irrespective of any definition you may use for belief. I don't want to debate semantics (what is the proper definition of belief?), I simply ask that you accept that this is what I mean when I use the term. I'd be happy to clarify any issues you see. — Relativist

The "mind created world (model)" is a mental construct that fits my definition. You argue that this construct is distinct from objective reality (I agree), but raise doubts that it is an accurate image of objective reality. The implication: it is (strictly speaking) a false image of reality. If it were a true image, your theory would be moot. You also agreed that it is possible to make true statements about objective reality. So true/false is applicable to this construct, just as it is with beliefs (in a typical definition). It is this fact that the truth-condition applies that is relevant; I simply choose to apply the word "belief" to any intra-mind construct that can be considered true/false. I'm open to an alternative term, but not to simply brushing it away due to a semantics dispute.

The flaws in the definition arise when we ask what is meant by “agreement” or “correspondence” of ideas and objects, beliefs and facts, thought and reality. In order to test the truth of an idea or belief we must presumably compare it with the reality in some sense. — Randall, J. & Buchler, J. Philosophy: An Introduction, 1957, p133

I

Truth, it is said, consists in the agreement of cognition with its object..... For since the object is outside me, the cognition in me, all I can ever pass judgement on is whether my cognition of the object agrees with my cognition of the object. — Kant, 1801. in Lectures on Logic.

You're quoting Kant out of context. He accepted correspondence theory, but noted an implication. I rebutted that point earlier, you must have skipped over it. What I said was that "testing" or "judging" a truth is an act of truth verification, and is thus irrelevant to the concept.

My understanding is that Kant believed that we only can have genuine knowledge and truth about the phenomenal world, but not about things-in-themselves (noumena) as they exist independently of our experience. However, you acknowledged the possibility of making true statements about the actual mind-independent world, so you must disagree with him on this point.

I also had asked that if you reject correspondence theory that you identify which truth theory you DO embrace. You use the term, "truth", but you reject correspondence theory - so how do you define the term?

The 'mind created world' thesis is a rational and defensible argument based on philosophy and cognitive science. It's is not appropriate to describe it as a belief, as the subject is a factual matter. — Wayfarer

It's unclear what you mean by a "factual matter", since I regard facts as true beliefs. I'll elaborate of "facts" later, but first discuss "belief".

You are applying a different definition of "belief" than I. Here's a rough outline of my definition:


Belief: a mental state that encompanses an intentional stance - it makes one apt to behave or think in a way that is consistent with the belief; it entails an assumed correspondence with reality.

It includes, but is not limited to, propositional beliefs - which are intentional stances toward the meaning of the proposition. Many, but not all, non-propositional beliefs can be expressed as propositions.

Even the meaning of a word would constitute a belief, because it is the meaning that influences the thoughts or behavior. Adopt a different definition of the word, and the subsequent behaviors and thoughts will shift.

A sensory perception is a belief: it produces behavioral reactions consistent with whatever it is the perception represents. Your driving along a road and you see a person in your path, and you react by slowing or stopping your car. You implicitly believe a person is in your (believed) path, and you implicitly believe you will injure this person if you maintain your path and speed.

From this point of view, a "mind created world (model) is a belief - a complex one.
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The mental construct I have labeled "belief" is present, irrespective of any definition you may use for belief. I don't want to debate semantics (what is the proper definition of belief?), I simply ask that you accept that this is what I mean when I use the term. I'd be happy to clarify any issues you see.

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This is the last time that I'll say it, but I don't deny the reality of the external world nor the validity of objective facts — Wayfarer

What is a "fact"? Is it mind-independent? I define it as a true proposition. Scientific facts are propositions that describe some aspect of physical reality (if the proposition is true). "God created the universe" is considered a fact by theists. So what a person regards as "fact" is, actually a belief. You and I could intersubjectively agree to certain facts.

Some philosophers (e.g. Wittgenstein) treat "facts" as elements of reality, rather than as descriptions of (what is assumed to be) reality. And yet, we often refer to a scientific discipline as embodying a set of "facts", even though these alleged "facts" are falsifiable and possibly false. That makes it cumbersome. Clarity is needed when using the term.

Yet another semantic issue. I asked you, "whether or not there exists objective, mind-independent reality." You responded with different words: "I don't deny the reality of the external world nor the validity of objective facts".

I shall interpret your answer as "yes" - that you agree there exists objective, mind independent reality. No need to respond if you agree.

But please answer my other question about the meaning of "true". In particular, do you accept my definition - that "true" = corresponds to objective, mind-independent reality? If not, then provide your definition.

All of this has bearing on your acceptance of "scientific facts", and whether or not you can justify belief in those facts.