There is no way no-thing could cause something. — AmadeusD

The point is that if ever there was no-thing (noting the problem using "was" here) and then some-thing, that's all we need. There is no claim to causality in that, at all. It's an open question of 'how', or whatever. — AmadeusD

We agree there could be no causal relation, but I further argue that it is incoherent to consider a world (the entirety of reality) to include a "nothingness". IOW: there is no logically possible world that includes both nothingness and an existing thing. The presence of an existing thing entails somethingness. Maybe that's what you mean here:

This is bizarre. If no-things is logically possible, then that's the end of that. Our world wouldn't have been involved and I don't posit (and I don't take others) to posit that it is. — AmadeusD

But I can't make sense of this:

The point is that if ever there was no-thing (noting the problem using "was" here) and then some-thing, that's all we need. There is no claim to causality in that, at all. It's an open question of 'how', or whatever. — AmadeusD

This seems to treat no-thing as a thing, a reification. Conceptually, no-thing is an absence of things. It's not even an empty container, because a container is a thing. If there is some-thing, then nothingness does not obtain.

There is no way no-thing could cause something. That's actually where the mystery lies in considering this issue. — AmadeusD

I don't consider it a mystery, because of the entailments I discussed. Rather, it's easy to lose one's way when discussing the concept of nothingness. Because we have a name for it, it's tempting to treat it as a thing; this error leads to apparrent contradictions.

Then you misunderstand. "The world" is the entirety of reality, which would include the supernatural, if it exists.
— Relativist
That statement depends on how you define "reality". Your comments seem to indicate that your "reality" excludes anything beyond the scope or our physical senses. — Gnomon

No. I am referring to everything that exists, including a supernatural (if one exists), or anything else that might exist - including minds, even if they are immaterial things.

the theoretical pre-big-bang First Cause that you would call "supernatural", is in my own speculative worldview, analogous to the Physical Energy and Metaphysical Mind that we experience in the Real world. — Gnomon

Your speculation seems a mere hypothetical possibility. Why take it seriously?

If it is true, how does it impact you? Do you use this hypothesis to explain other things?
Suppose cosmologists develop a testable theory that accounts for the conditions at the big bang? Would you abandon your hypothesis, or revise it?

My view: it's possible that mental activity involves something nonphysical. It's clearly not entirely nonphysical because mental capabilities are impacted by trauma and disease. If there is something immaterial, I see no use for the information because it explains nothing else about the world. I'm open to criticism and suggestions

We're discussing whether "nothing" could have ever obtained. And it could have. — AmadeusD

Absolute nothingness is conceivable and it is logically possible, but it is metaphysically impossible in a world in which things exist.

. I posited that initiation implies something prior. That 'something' is obviously capable of be no-thing — AmadeusD

IMO, time initiated FROM the initial state of affairs. So that state of affairs had the potential to do so, and it is the cause of time/change. But it's not at all clear what time IS, so deeper analysis is on shaky grounds. Anyway, that's my position, and I can't make sense of you claim that "no-thing" could have caused anything.

Are causes not states of affairs? — AmadeusD

Yes, IMO, causes are states of affairs. Also: everything that exists is a thing = a particular with properties= a state of affairs. So the notion that "no-thing" could be a cause makes no sense to me. But you must mean something else.

so you share my position. — AmadeusD

Maybe. I believe there's a better reason to think the past is finite than infinite, but lots of smart people disagree with me.

Cosmology has not concluded our world is dependent on anything. However, cosmologists are working on theory that explains the big bang, in terms of what the prior state was.
— Relativist
You sound confident about the independence of our world — Gnomon

Then you misunderstand. "The world" is the entirety of reality, which would include the supernatural, if it exists. If there exists a supernatural, then it might possibly have caused the natural world, but the broader landscape exists uncaused and without dependencies.

Now suppose there is no supernatural. The same logic applies: it would exist uncaused and without dependency. In either case, the world (the totality of reality) exists without cause or dependency.

Speaking of knowledge, what is the "exact nature" of that prior state, and what is the evidence for it? — Gnomon

We don't know it's exact nature, but it seems to me there's no reason to think it is supernatural, because there is no evidence of a supernatural existing.

Would you agree that the First Law of Thermodynamics implies that the Bang began with an unexplained input of Energy from that mysterious timeless prior state? Can you accept that the Multiverse conjecture is a myth, not a scientific fact? — Gnomon

The origin of the energy is unknown, although some cosmologists have speculated. What I object to is jumping to conclusions - as you seem to have done.

The multiverse hypothesis is not a myth. It's a mathematical inference of an assortment of scientific hypotheses. Nevertheless, it's certainly not settled science, and I would never insist it is necessarily true.

Would you agree that Cosmologists like Sean Carroll*3, when faced with speculating into a state where laws of nature break down, are doing Philosophy instead of Science? — Gnomon

That's often true, but there is also scientific work in progress to develop new theory. At this stage, I'm fine with treating all pre-big bang musings as metaphysical.

Before the Big Bang, the prevailing theory suggests a state of initial singularity.., — Gnomon

The "singularity" has never been considered a literal state of affairs. It just refers to the mathematical consequence of General Relativity as we calculate the density of the universe retrospectively, closer and closer to a radius of 0 (for the visible universe). The consensus of cosmologists is this mathematical singularity implies that General Realtivity isn't applicable, and that instead a quantum gravity theory is needed to understand the dynamics dominate below some density- but this goes beyond established physics.

The universe materialized literally out of nothing — Gnomon

No, that's logically impossible. Nothingness cannot beget somethingness. Nothingness is not even a logically possible state of affairs. If God created the universe, it could have been from a PHYSICAL nothingness, but not an absolute nothingness - because God himself is something. But this is pure speculation, one that assumes there exists a supernatural.

Carroll's notion of creation in time deliberately ignores the traditional creation ex nihilo, since it does not fit with his materialistic worldview. And yet, he slipped-up with the "literally out of nothing" description. — Gnomon

He has also discussed what is meant by nothingness - and noted that there are ambiguities. Laurence Krauss wrote a book about "something from nothing", but he took the existence of quantum fields for granted- so he wasn't considering an absolute nothingness. The author of the article you linked to seems to be unaware of the nuances. Sean Carroll does. In this article, he describes his view:


"It seems natural to ask why the universe exists at all. Modern physics suggests that the universe can exist all by itself as a self-contained system, without anything external to create or sustain it. But there might not be an absolute answer to why it exists. I argue that any attempt to account for the existence of something rather than nothing must ultimately bottom out in a set of brute facts; the universe simply is, without ultimate cause or explanation."

If there was an initial state of affairs, there must have been 'something' from which it was initiated. — AmadeusD

Non-sequitur. If it was initiated, then it wasn't the initial state of affairs.

Either there was an initial state of affairs, or there's an infinite series of causes.

None of the takes trying to avoid the inference of non-existence actually work. — AmadeusD

What does this mean? A state of affairs entails existence. A state of affairs consisting of non-existence is a self-contradictory term.

Something infers nothing. Yes? Yes.
Being infers non-being. Yes? There are things which aren't, outside of the list of things which are. So, Yes. — AmadeusD

Only semantically. We can refer to things that are in or out, but existence = what IS, not what isn't. We can talk about the infinitely many hypothetical things that aren't in, but these absences are not ontological.

Now, can we access them? NO! lol. That is probably why people want to make statements such as yours and Banno's. There is nothing to say, other than to observe the inference. [/quotep
The inference is semantic, not ontological. We're discussing ontology- what exists, and what can be inferred to exist. When we say unicorns don't exist, "unicorn" refers only to a concept- a mental object. It doesn't refer to anything ontological (other than the mental object).

The idea that there has "always been" is just as disconcerting (and unsupported, in the sense outlined above) as that "something always was". Even the use of temporal terms infers something other than the claim.

I don't understand what you consider disconcerting. We can entertain possibilities. Either the past is finite, or it is infinite. There's no in-between. Each has implications that we can consider. An infinite past implies an infinite chain of causes. Is that actually possible? Some people think so, but it seems to imply that infinitely many, finite duration. time periods have been traversed. That's impossible. Consider the future: we traverse it one day at a time; evey new day will be a finite number of days from today- there is no point at which infinity is reached. Future infinity just implies an unending process. Contrast this with the past: the past is completed. This implies an infinity of time periods has been completed. This seems impossible, but I'm not arguing I'm right, I'm just highlighting the possibilities and also explaining why I believe the pastvis finite.

Any conception of a finite past implies an initial state. An initial state cannot have been caused, because that would imply a prior cause.

If a God exists, an initial state of affairs could consist of an uncaused God (and nothing else) - who subsequently created the universe. If no gods exist, there would still be an initial state - something with the potential to subsequently develop one or more universes.

That there are things which "be". That implies non-being and so the question (i.e the question why there is something) is entirely apt. — AmadeusD

I see no such implication. Walk me through it, and do so without treating existence as a property.

Do you not find it mysterious how non-being eventually turned into being? — kindred

What I find mysterious is that anyone would think that there was a prior state of non-being / nonexistence.

What exists today is a consequence of what existed before. Either there is an infinite series of begettings, or there was an initial state of affairs.

LFW or compatibilism are not presupposed — A Christian Philosophy

You had asked me:

Which step in the process is the initial step? — A Christian Philosophy

Why did you ask this, if you don't believe there is an initial step even if LFW is true? What's the relevance?

I've been attempting to get you to examine the mental processes involved in a decision, and to see that this analysis would not yield an answer to the question of whether the process is deterministic.

Irrespective of whether or not we have LFW, I raised my arm because I wanted to.

Irrespective of whether or not we have LFW, my wants were influenced by my history of experiences.

Irrespective of whether or not we have LFW, my unique genetic material led to the unique structure of my central nervous system, and this influences the way I think and thus, the choices I make.

The only real difference is that LFW depends on the assumption that there is some factor present that is outside the natural, deterministic causal chain. No objective analysis can show that this is the case.

Except that modern cosmology forces us to deal with the necessity of a transcendent Cause to explain the Big Bang — Gnomon

No, it doesn't.

Since secular cosmology has concluded that our world is not self-existent --- as Spinoza assumed --- would you agree that "how & why it came into existence" is a reasonable philosophical question? — Gnomon

Cosmology has not concluded our world is dependent on anything. However, cosmologists are working on theory that explains the big bang, in terms of what the prior state was.

I thought we were setting aside any mentions of LFW/compatibilism — A Christian Philosophy

I mentioned it only to remind you that we're establishing a scenario that does not presuppose either LFW or compatibilism. You had said, "I still see no distinction in any of the steps to make one of them the initial step."

Are you thinking there's a first step if LFW is true, but not if compatibilism is true? Or are you saying there's no first step, regardless of which is true? If the former, then you're off the track of establishing common ground. The common-ground scenario is intended to describe how things SEEM to us, so we can then analyze more deeply. We need to do that before we jump into comparing a LFW account vs a Compatilist account of the scenario.

Regarding your assertion that there is no agency if compatibilism is true, this displays a misunderstanding. I'm hoping this becomes clear after we establish some common ground and then hone in on what is the same and what is different. In the meantime, I suggest reading the Compatibilism article, in the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Throughout the article, there's discussion of what an "agent" does. The issue it discusses is whether or not the agent can be said to be freely willing his actions. The fact that there is agency is not at issue.

I still see no distinction in any of the steps to make one of them the initial step. — A Christian Philosophy

So...even if LFW is true, there was no initial step?

It seems to me, the natural thing to label as the first step is the decision, which was produced entirely by my mind.

There were external influences, such as the discussion we're having, but no one else demanded, encouraged, or even suggested I raise my arm at that time.

My decision, (and only my decision) was the direct cause of the arm lifting.

My thought processes (and only my thought processes), was the direct cause of the decision.

Necessitated? You forget that we're trying to establish a common ground scenario, in terms of what we perceive to be happening. I indeed made a decision (this entailed a mental process) at 3:25. The fact that I made the decision is important, because without that - I wouldn't have lifted my arm. Again, set aside LFW/compatibilism and tell me if this sounds right.

3:25PM- I read your response and made the decision to lift my arm at 3:35 PM.

Did you have something else in mind? Remember, this is independent of LFW/compatibilism.

I don't understand your issue. I established the intent, and I acted upon it- which implies I caused my brain to fire the sequence of neurons that stimulated the nerves that trigger the muscles. Obviously, we aren't consciously aware of the neuron activity, but clearly that is happening.

I'll just point out that the arm-lifting was caused by my intent. Therefore the arm-lifting was an intentional act. Acting with intent implies agency.

That's fine, we can say the firing of neurons causes the arm to lift (by sending electrochemical signals to the nerves that activate the muscles).

I omitted one important thing: this neuron firing had an antecedent in the mind.

At 3:25 I had made the decision to lift when the alarm went off. This established a mental intent (to lift when the alarm sounds) that was dormant until triggered by the alarm going off. No conscious thoughts took place between the 3:25 decision and the arm lifting. So there was a direct causal link between this intent and the arm lifting.

OK.


3:25PM- I read your response and made the decision to lift my arm at 3:35 PM. I set an alarm on my phone to notify me the time has been reached.

3:35PM- The alarm is ringing, so I lift my arm.

Some small period of time occurred between the alarm going off and the arm lifting. During this time, my brain unconsciously processed and interpreted the sound - and the fact became part of my conscious awareness. But without giving it further thought, I lift my arm once I realize the alarm is sounding.

We know the arm-lifting action is initiated by the firing of neurons, which stimulate nerves in my arm that cause the muscle to contract.
__________
Is there anything I left out of the process that you think is important? Is there any part of this you disagree with?

As I said in my earlier post, I'm suspicious of using this explanatory gap as an excuse to believe in some sort of spiritualism.
If you remove the word believe from that sentence and replace it with the word consider the word excuse loses it’s relevance. — Punshhh

Why consider any specific spiritual account? I can acknowledge it's possible, but the possibilities are endless, so what's the point?

It's like considering what other forms of life that may exist elsewhere in the the universe, choosing one specific, hypothetical form and then drawing conclusions about the nature of aliens. Indeed, it's possible that there exist Tralfamadorians, who communicate through tap-dancing and farts, but a bare possibility like this has no practical significance to me.

IOW, something more than mere possibility is needed to make it worth giving any serious consideration to.

moral evil is not compatible with determinism. — A Christian Philosophy

You must be making some unstated assumption about the nature of morals. The presence of moral intuitions is perfectly consistent with determinism (and materialism).

moral evil is not compatible with determinism.

Yes, I read all your posts. I don't comment on every line because that would take too long, but in general, my view is that adding more determined factors to the explanation does not resolve the issue. — A Christian Philosophy

You misunderstand. I was giving you a GENERAL account of the mental process we all go through IRRESPECTIVE of whether or not LFW is true. Those factors all apply (beliefs, dispositions, moods...). This should be common ground -I see no reason why you shouldn't accept everything I said.

You forgot your original point of this topic. — A Christian Philosophy

My original point was that ontological contingency needs to be accounted for ontologically:
If A accounts for B:
then B is contingent iff A could have account for ~B AND this means A is a "source of contingency"
Otherwise A necessitates B

A second point I made very early is that there doesn't seem to be any sources of contingency in the world except for (possibly) quantum indeterminacy. I believe you agreed, although you deny that QM is indeterministic. So why should we believe minds are a source of contingency - an anomaly? You've given no justification for this.

The OG's actions cannot be determined from prior causes, being the first cause. So if its actions are also not free, then what are they? — A Christian Philosophy

Best guess is that it would be a quantum system, so the actions that ensue would be the product of quantum indeterminacy. What that implies is dependent on the actual nature of QM - i.e. which interpretation is correct \

I will assume determinism and not LFW. — A Christian Philosophy

You are missing the point! Make no assumption at all, and just explain what seems to be going in in your mind. We ought to be able to agree on what seems to be going on. The question then becomes: how do we explain this sequence of events with LFW vs compatibilism?

This is the same problem in your description of making a decision: you aren't describing observed behavior; you jump straight to a LFW account and then compare it to some strawman distortion that you claim is compatibilist. This is why you get nowhere: you establish no common ground, and just claim your LFW account is better than your strawman-compatibilist account. I tried to establish common ground with my detailed description of the decision process, and you mistakenly treated this as some compatibilist alternative.

:up:

It does see that way. I'm fine with acknowledging that materialism may not have all the right answers, but no alternatives seem any better - even in the murky area of the mind. As I said in my earlier post, I'm suspicious of using this explanatory gap as an excuse to believe in some sort of spiritualism.

physicalism relies on an abstraction. It then becomes so embedded in that worldview that it can’t see anything outside it, which is precisely the blind spot of physicalism. — Wayfarer

Physicalism is indeed embedded in my worldview. What truths does this blind me to? The only obvious implication is that there may be some non-physical aspects of reality. It provides no clue as to what they may be - what truths it leads me to ignore.

As I explained, I embrace physicalism because (AFAIK) it's the best general answer to the nature of reality. I don't have some undying faith in it, and I know it has its limitations. But I treat it pragmatically as the premise when analyzing everything in the world, and this includes consideration of mental activity. Even if I grant that there are aspects of the mind that are intractable to a materialist paradigm, I see no means of applying this information to any philosophical analysis - because, as I said, it's just a negative fact - and doesn't give me any useful information that I should consider. It just tells me that a materialist analysis doesn't necessarily give a correct answer, but provides no clue to a better answer.

which is as I said. — Wayfarer

No, it isn't. You said this is what Plantinga was saying: "if all mental life—including reason—is understood solely in terms of material and efficient causes, then we’ve undermined the very basis on which we make rational inferences."

My objection to HIS ARGUMENT stands.

I've spelled it out in depth and detail. To recap: physics is based on a useful abstraction, which has yielded enormous physical powers, but at the expense of excluding fundamental aspects of human existence. — Wayfarer

Then explain what you meant by this:

life and consciousness are not anomalies to be explained away—they’re clues to what physicalist ontology has left out. — Wayfarer

Life seems anomolous to me, because it's a very rare, and miniscule part of the universe. What facts am I overlooking?

Elaborate on these "clues". What conclusions do you think I should draw from this? How should it influence my philosophical analysis? Does this somehow entail teleology? The problem (IMO) is that it's a negative fact (what consciousness is NOT), rather than a positive fact that has broader relevance.

What I'm suspicious of is using it as an excuse to embrace some spirituality paradigm. I'm fine with other people doing that, for whatever benefits it gives them, but I see no relevance to me.

This explains our rules on a societal level but it does not explain why we praise or blame people on a personal level. — A Christian Philosophy

Because of our moral sensibilities- the emotions we feel when considering the acts.

In other words, we reward and penalize certain behaviours as a form of conditioning, like training dogs to behave a certain way. — A Christian Philosophy

Do dogs have moral sensibilities? Do they have empathy? Do they have vicarious experiences? Do they have moral beliefs? I don't think so, and this means it's extrememy different.

Conceiving valid thought experiments is not impossible. For one thing, we don't need to simulate every factor.. — A Christian Philosophy

You're making excuses for treating the thought experiments as evidence for ontological contingency. "It seems like we could have chosen differently, therefore we could have chosen differently."

We would absolutely need to duplicate it with 100% accuracy- an impossibility. No thought experiment is actually winding the clock back to the exact mental conditions at the time the thought processes occurred.

Additionally, as described in the video, we perceive freedom differently between cases with only one type of motive (e.g. ice cream vs ice cream) and cases with multiple types of motives (e.g. ice cream vs charity). In the latter, we perceive to be free, where as in the former, we do not. — A Christian Philosophy

Your scenario is contrived is ridiculously simplistic and it ASSUMES what you're trying to prove: LFW. You erroneously assume moral "motives" can't exist under compatibilism, you ignore the many complex factors involved with developing our various tastes, wants, and even our beliefs about morality. I described some of the details on my last post, and you simply ignored it. Did you even read it?

I can only grant you that LFW came from something other than deterministic laws. — A Christian Philosophy

This is problematic, because there's no evidence of any causally efficacious factors in the world that are NOT deterministic, except for quantum indeterminacy (which you rejected). But if QI is involved with mental processes, it only introduces randomness. So there's no basis to support the claim that we are somehow a source of ontological contingency. This is exactly the reason compatibilism was developed, to show that the perception of free will was compatible with determinism.

As a side note, would you not agree that an OG would necessarily have LFW? — A Christian Philosophy

Of course not. There's no reason to think an OG has the capacity for intentional behavior and to make decisions.

Can you further explain what you mean by "initiate"? — A Christian Philosophy

I don't know what you're looking for, because it seems self-evident. So it would be best if you describe the process as you perceive it during the act, . Needless to say, don't assume LFW in your description, because that's a post-hoc interpretation. IOW, describe what you are thinking, and the relation between your conscious thoughts and your brain stimulating the nerves in your arm that makes it perform the action.

What Plantinga argues is not that evolution couldn’t produce minds, but that if all mental life—including reason—is understood solely in terms of material and efficient causes, then we’ve undermined the very basis on which we make rational inferences. — Wayfarer

That is not Plantinga's EAAN. Plantinga argues that evolution selects for behavior, not reliable belief. The Wikipedia article I linked to summarizes it, or you could read this paper by Plantinga.

I will always reference what previous philosophers have said — Wayfarer

Why are you so reluctant to state what you actually believe? The only thing that's clear is that you believe materialism is false. Please describe what you DO believe. Reference philosophers to explain your position, if necesary - but please describe your position- even if it's open ended (e.g everything except materialisn is a life possibility)

where do you believe the meaning lies? — NOS4A2

Meaning is within minds. By writing this response, my objective is to reproduce the meanings from my mind into yours. Of course, this depends on you reading it - and you may interpret it a bit differently than I intend, because you bring a different interpretive framework to the table.

I am treating eternal as very big so to speak, but not infinite — Punshhh

Is "existing at all times" consistent with your view? This would preclude a caused object from existing eternally.

saying I’m wrong is a bit hasty — Punshhh

This statement was wrong: "There is no escape from infinite regression". I provided the escape- an epistemic reason a person might reject an infinite regress. You apparently aren't persuaded by this, and that's fine - because the "escape" is not a proof of impossibility.

I am suggesting that infinity only exists as a concept, a concept in the mind of humans. — Punshhh

I agree, but it is a useful concept.

as to the question of is there more than this physical world. I would think it highly unlikely that there isn’t. Simply because in the grand scheme of things, we are insignificant and our newly found powers of reason have only worked with what we have found in front of us when we each came to be in this world. It would be rather grandiose for us to conclude — Punshhh

I agree there is likely to be more to reality than we can possibly observe or infer through physics. However, it seems to me that we can't justify believing in anything specific that is beyond that which is accessible - other than the fact you stated.

So - magical? Well, I think not, but something even greater in some respects — Wayfarer

This is what I see as an enormous problem in your position. It depends on uncritically accepting the existence of magic (or "something even greater"). I've seen no justification for this other than arguments from authority (the ancients had this view) and arguments from ignorance (physicalism's explanatory gap). You will disagree with this characterization, so I ask that you (if you choose to respond) that you explain your justification, for whatever it is that you believe, in positive terms- without reference to what philosophers have said.

Obviously organisms must respond adaptively to their environment in order to survive. But that’s a long way from showing that evolution accounts for rationality of the kind required for abstract thought and language or theoretical science — Wayfarer

I wasn't trying show that evolution necessarily accounts for rationality, I was identifying the glaring flaw in Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN). ,

"The EAAN argues that the combined belief in both evolutionary theory and naturalism is epistemically self-defeating. The argument for this is that if both evolution and naturalism are true, then the probability of having reliable cognitive faculties is low, which then destroys any reason to believe in evolution or naturalism in the first place, as the cognitive faculties one used to deduce evolution or naturalism as logically valid are no longer reliable."

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolutionary_argument_against_naturalism

I’m not aware of people claiming the “God” is uncaused. They say God is eternal. — Punshhh

Google "Kalam Cosmological Argument" - a "first cause" argument for God. Yes, they universally believe God is eternal: existing at all times, past and future.

There is no escape from infinite regression, this is a peculiarity of human thought, there is no plausible likelihood that infinity can be considered external to the human mind. So this whole preoccupation with infinity is a human preoccupation around this peculiarity. It’s turtles all the way down remember — Punshhh

You're wrong. An infinite series of causes is avoided by assuming a first cause. An infinite series of layers of reality is avoided by assuming a bottom layer. These are what metaphysical foundationalism is all about.

It seems more plausible that there are no ultimate grounds out there, only relatively ultimate grounds. That this also recedes into eternity, seems much more plausible to me. — Punshhh

That's a personal choice. But here's the issue: an infinite series exists without explanation: each individual cause is explained by a prior cause, but the series as a whole is unexplained.

where you say plausible, presumably this is plausible to our limited minds which are designed to operate in this physical world we find ourselves in. So there is a kind of implicit bias there. — Punshhh

Our limited minds are the only minds we know exist, and we are utilizing these minds to speculate and judge the nature of existence. Is there more than this physical world? It's possible, but there's no way to know. So we speculate and apply reason. Different people accept different answers. No one can be proven right or wrong.

Because we are the phenomenon. — Wayfarer

We are one phenomenon. The other 99.99999999...% of the universe needs to fit into the ontology.

meaning, value, and purpose... are... constitutive of [life]. So when physicalism tries to "explain" life, it ends up trying to reconstruct the very things it had to exclude to get started. — Wayfarer

Chemistry brackets out quantum field theory. Meteorology brackets out fluid dynamics. Functional entities interact with their functional environments. The fact that the study of science is divided into disciplines doesn't imply reductionism is false, so I don't consider your point to be at all problematic.

life and consciousness are not anomalies to be explained away—they’re clues to what physicalist ontology has left out. — Wayfarer

Explained away? Explanatory gaps are...gaps. Indeed, they are rationalized, but that isn't explaining them away. The gap isn't a "clue" to anything other than possibilities. You can plug in some explanation - even immaterial ones, and you can't be proven wrong, but I'm skeptical you can justify embracing anything specific - there's no basis to exclude anything.

Start with ... taking the phenomena of life seriously,... as real indications of the nature of reality. The burden of proof doesn't rest solely with those who insist that life exhibits intrinsic purposiveness. The burden also falls on those who deny it—especially when their models can’t account for meaning, agency, or value except by explaining them away. — Wayfarer

"Burden of proof" applies to efforts to sway opinion. The only objective "burden" is to justify one's beliefs. There' a lot of room for people with contrary justified beliefs to disagree,

I believe materialism is justified on the basis that it provides the best explation for all the uncontroversial facts of the world. Best in terms of answering more questions, and in terms of parsimony. Parsimony is a good reason to deny what is superfluous.

Accounting for meaning, agency, and value isn't that problematic, other than the complexity of a reductive account. Qualia are more problematic, but because they are causally efficacious, the only real issue with them is the nature of their presentation to the mind. I acknowlege this as an explanatory gap.

If physicalism treats intelligibility as an accidental byproduct of blind processes, then it risks undermining the rational basis of its own claims. This concern is related to what some have called the argument from reason (C.S. Lewis) or the evolutionary argument against naturalism (Alvin Plantinga): namely, that if our minds are solely the product of non-rational forces, we have little reason to trust their capacity for reason—including our belief in physicalism itself. — Wayfarer

I strongly disagree. Plantinga's argument is fatally flawed. In order to survive, every organism needs a functionally accurate perception of its environment to successfully interact with it. Primitive rationality is exhibited when animals adapt there hunting behavior when necessary, doing things that work instead of those that don't. The evolution of abstract reasoning would have been an evolutionary dead end leading to extinction, if it worsened our ability to interact with the environment.

Yes, it’s vague when stated like that—but vagueness here may be appropriate considering the scale and subtlety of the question. What matters is that it opens a conceptual space between mechanistic materialism and supernatural intervention. — Wayfarer

Vagueness is an explanatory gap. The conceptual space you allude to is extremely wide - and it therefore suggests that no one conceptual guess is better than another, so no specific choice can be justified.

Materialism's narrower explanatory gap could similarly be treated as a conceptual space into which one could insert some more limited immaterial elements, if one is inclined. Similarly, nothing specific can be justified. So I'm fine with the narrow gap materialism provides.

It suggests that intentionality and consciousness may be expressions of something deeper in the fabric of reality, not inexplicable anomalies.

It's a gap, and it opens up a large space of possibilities. Something "deeper" is possible. Something in addition is also possible. How do you justify any specific assumption in the possibility space? I'm suspicious of jumping to egocentric/anthropocentric conclusions, whereas it sounds like you consider this a virtue.

[.

Yes, I would have an emotional reaction to the news. I am disgusted and angry even considering your example. But it is I who evokes the emotion, drawn as they are from my own body and actions, influenced entirely by what I know, think, understand, believe etc. The words are not responsible in any way for what I feel. — NOS4A2

I wasn't proposing any responsibility, I was trying to demonstrate that there can be more to the meaning of words than a dictionary can convey. In this case, the full meaning of "child rape" includes the emotion. This is analogous to the full meaning of "red", which includes the qualitative experience of reddness - that cannot be conveyed with words.

I get it, that you don't accept this framework. I hope you can better understand why I do.

So this indicates to me that a ground of being is “ the very source and foundation of all existence.”(wiki)
Or the role played by a god (in an Abrahamic religion), ie created everything, creating the ground on which we walk. Not a metaphysical ground. — Punshhh

The Bible doesn't depict its God in this way, but modern Christian philosophers accept the "ground of being" of philosophy, because there is just one God (Yahweh).

The post you linked to here seemed to be discussing things about infinite regression. — Punshhh

Right. There's either an infinite regression of ever-smaller parts/of causes/ of explanations - or there is a foundation of all these - the ultimate ground.

I’m only using ground in the terms you used it in the post I replied to. — Punshhh

Then you misunderstood something I said.

These mental processes are not ignored in LFW. They are part of the decision mechanism but they only serve to inform, not compel. — A Christian Philosophy

My point is that the process is identical whether its LFW or Compatibilist. The only difference is that you assume the mind is an actual source of ontological contingency. But you have not established this to be the case through any stated reasoning. You've described your opinion, but not stated an argument that shows why I should accept it.

The mental process serves to predict the end goal of the choice, called motive. If there is no conflict between two types of motive, then the decision mechanism is very much as you described under compatibilism, i.e., the strongest motive wins. But if there a conflict between two types of motive, i.e. pleasure vs moral duty, then the agent is free to choose between the two motives. — A Christian Philosophy

That's totally unconvincing. I take exception with both your terminology and your assumptions.

The mental process I described applies whether or not LFW is true, and you've ignored it in your account and simply repeated your overly simplistic description.

A choice can be before us for a variety of reasons, such as the pursuit of a goal, or entering a forced choice situation that requires choosing an option. The end result of the process isn't a "prediction", it's the decision - and I'm referring to the final decision, often immediately preceding the act. There are often many motivations, not just 1 or 2 "motives". I prefer to call them "dispositions", as a more general term than motive. There are conscious dispositions and subconscious ones. A few examples: a preference of color, a pleasant scent, a sense of pride, a desire for pleasure (sexual, aesthetic, comradery...), and even a disposition to do good, among countless many others. Beliefs are closely tied to dispositions, and are critical to the process because they are essential to the thought process.

Some dispositions are stronger than others, and the relative strengths will fluctuate over even short periods of time (example: mood swings). Same with beliefs: some are more strongly held (more certain) than others, and they also vary in relative importance. Some dispositions and beliefs have emotive qualities, meaning that they may trigger happiness, anger, affection, hatred, pleasure, etc. Every emotion is connected to beliefs and dispositions.

Morals are both dispositions and beliefs. One may be disposed to do good things in general, or specific good things in particular. But what we consider to be "good" entails a belief.

Your description omits all these factors, and I think it's self-evident that something like this is going on.

I'll now interject the compatibilist view of moral accountability that I had deferred.

It is appropriate to hold oneself (or another person) accountable for a bad act because we know he could have chosen not to do it. Here's how he could have: if he had a stronger disposition to do good, a stronger belief that the act is bad, had he considered the consequences, been more empathetic, or if he more strongly believed the "sin" could have eternal consequences, he would not have done it (my list is illustrative, not exhaustive). With oneself, there are lessons learned (new, or strenthened beliefs) from the consequences of the act, so future choices may improve.

With regard to misbehavior by others. social approbation is added- public shame or even punishment. To the degree this is public, the observed process influences members of the public to gain similar lessons learned, vicariously.

So why do we tend to think we could have chosen differently? Because we are reflecting on a past choice based on our new mental context - different state of mind, the benefit of lesson learned, gaining additional knowledge, or considering additional impacts that were previously overlooked. Entertaining these counterfactuals creates an illusion of contingency.
— Relativist

This would explain why we might choose differently after a change of factors, but not why we perceive that we are free to choose for a given set of factors.

Yes it does! It's PRECISELY why we perceive that we could have made a different choice.

To deny this, you would have to assume that fantasizing about a past choice entails a perfect duplication of the mental conditions that led to the decision. If it is NOT perfect, then it is not a valid basis for claiming this is a good reason to believe a different choice was actually possible.

To actually prove free will exists, you would assume the burden to prove God exists.
— Relativist
This is not necessary. The current topic is only to determine whether LFW exists; and we can know that something exists without knowing where it comes from, which is a different topic. Also, many people who believe in LFW do not believe in God. — A Christian Philosophy

OK, let's not assume God. Early in the discussion, you agreed that ontological contingency requires a source of contingency. If there's no God, then human life came to exist as a product of deterministic laws of nature. A deteministic law cannot be a source of ontological contingency. Case closed. This is why I said you needed a God who could create beings that behave with true contingency.

You assume that if A causes B, and B causes C, then B lacks causal efficacy. This is absurd.
— Relativist
I don't dispute that B has causal efficacy. I dispute that B has agency, as agency requires the capacity to initiate an action, and B does not initiate the action. — A Christian Philosophy

It sounds ludicrous to claim I do not initiate the raising of my arm. You've given me no reason to doubt that I am initiating the action. You just seem to make a personal judgement based on a framework you invented.

That framework simply describes what you believe; you've provided no reason for me to accept it. To do that, you would need to show it's superior to other frameworks.

a cosmogony in which the ground of being for an individual being is the body of a greater being and the body of that individual is the ground of being for a lesser being. — Punshhh

This is the opposite of what is meant by a metaphysical ground. See this. A complex object is grounded in its composition, not the reverse.

They're pointing out that organisms actually behave in ways that cannot be made intelligible in purely mechanistic terms. As soon as you describe a cell as regulating its internal state, or an animal as foraging, you're already invoking purpose-laden language—language that tracks something real in the nature of life.
...They're pointing out that organisms actually behave in ways that cannot be made intelligible in purely mechanistic terms. — Wayfarer

Intelligibility means making sense of things, so it still seems to be (just) an epistemological paradigm.

Is it plausible to treat teleological concepts as mere heuristics or metaphors, while denying their ontological basis? — Wayfarer

My questions:
Why assume an ontological basis for the epistemological paradigm?
How do you account for it without a "God" (a being who acts with intent)?

...language that tracks something real in the nature of life. — Wayfarer

But it's "real" only in the sense of it being an accurate description of phenomena in terms we can understand given our capacities and limitations.

Should intelligibility be assumed? Surely the world isn't necessarily intelligible.

perhaps the modern exclusion of telos (and with it, qualities like value, intention, or meaning) from our ontology is not just a simplifying abstraction, but a serious (even catastrophic) omission. — Wayfarer

It's catastrophic only if it's false. Teleonomy accounts for much of the perceived teleology. What I haven't seen is a justification for believing there is ontological teleology. It seems a guess, just like physicalism is a guess - but physicalism strays very little from the known. You deny it entails a God, but it seems to entail something nearly as far-fetched.

Such a God would not be the ground of being.

false dichotomy: either accepting the naturalist, mechanistic account or holding to a creationist or 'intelligent design' cosmology. — Wayfarer

I would suggest looking at telos differently, rather than in terms of a Grand Design presided over by a cosmic architect/engineer (which seems to me like God created in the image of man). — Wayfarer

I don't see that the dichitomy I described is a false one. Even after reading your post, and a good bit of the Talbot article, I could see nothing that implies this to be false. Rather, you and Talbot seem to be arguing for using "teleology" as an epistemological paradigm for describing living things and their interactions. Sure, I see the utility for better understanding biological systems. But this wouldn't negate what I said, in terms of a metaphysical teleology.

Am I misunderstanding ?

What is overlooked in all this, is the sense in which the Galilean-Newtonian view is a useful abstraction, within which life itself now appears as an anomaly, an oddity, something which has to be ‘explained’ in terms which have already intrinsically excluded it. That’s the plight of modern materialism in a nutshell. — Wayfarer

What's a better alternative, and how exactly is it better?

If there is actual teleology in the world, how do you account for it? AFAIK, it entails prior intent; Intent entails a a being with the capacity to formulate and act upon intent. Whether we call this a "God", a trascendental oversoul, or anything else, it strikes me as a rather extreme assumption to think that such a being just happens to exist uncaused. By contrast, the gradual development of beings, somewhere in an old. vast universe, with the capacity for intentional behavior, but considerably more limited powers to act, seems considerably more plausible. As you often note, there are explanatory gaps to this materialist view, but the alternative appear to me to have even more explanatory gaps.

This is what I mean. There are no such magnetic effects, forces, dimensions nor tendencies in the words. They do not carry anything. We can devise any number of instruments in order to detect such forces, and will never be able to measure it. Such descriptions of words are invariably figurative. — NOS4A2

I agree words do not carry a physical force - this is not in dispute. But you didn't respond to my comments about emotive language. Do you reject the view that there is such thing as emotive language?

Before you answer, consider a scenario in which you hear about a 5 year old girl getting raped. Of course, the plain facts of the event will enter your mental memory bank ("Sally G. age 5, raped on day x in town y...). But don't you think you would also have an emotional reaction to the news? This extreme example is just to establish that words CAN sometimes evoke emotions. It's not because sounds are being made and heard, but it's because there is information content, and the information (not the sounds) can trigger emotions.

Understand I'm trying to set aside arguing who's right, I'm just trying to understand your point of view.