Space is not like time. Space exits without measuring anything. Does time exist, if you didn't measure it? Can you tell time without looking at a watch or clock? — Corvus

Both time and space are reference frame dependent. Space isn't an existent; it doesn't have properties. Rather, space (distance; length) is a relation between things that exist.

Time doesn't exist either. It's not a relation between things that exist. Rather, it's a relation between events.

The idea of it being magical just begs the question — Bob Ross

I use the term "magical knowledge" to refer to the existence of knowledge by brute fact in the absence of any sort of medium. Both aspects are grossly implausible. You've presented no metaphysical account of how this could be, you haven't suggested a metaphysical grounding of it.
Question-begging applies to arguments. I'm not the one making an argument. I'm just explaining what I believe, and why I believe it.

it is worth noting that your view depends on physical processes for beings to apprehend the forms of things, and we still to this day have no clue how that would work in the brain — Bob Ross

We don't know how information is stored in the brain, but we have strong evidence that it is stored there: disease and trauma to the brain can destroy memory.

The apparent fact that information entails some form of encoding doesn't entail a physical encoding. Information theory still seems to apply, and information theory takes it for granted that the information exists in some non-simple form.

A composed being is not necessary, and its parts are not necessary unless those parts do not depend on something else to exist. — Bob Ross

Nonsense. A complex being could exist by brute fact. If it does then its existence is a necessary fact. Here's why.

Suppose C is an existing object or past actual event. If C is contingent, this means ~C is a non-actual possibility. What makes ~C truly possible? How do we (metaphysically) account for a non-actual possibility? Here’s how I account for it: suppose E is the metaphysical explanation for C. If C is contingent, then E must account for this contingency. So E explains: C & possibly(~C).

This doesn't imply object C exists eternally (at all times). It just means that when it actually exists, it could not have failed to exist.

So if C is a brute fact, there is no E that accounts for C & possibly(~C). Therefore brute facts are necessary.

Concrete example: suppose determinism is true. This implies every event, and everything that comes to exist, is the necessary consequence of prior conditions. There is contingency only if some prior condition is contingent. Because determinism is assumed, the only possible contingent fact is the initial conditions. If those initial conditions existed by brute fact, then their existence is not contingent.

It's erroneous to conflate conceivability with metaphysical possibility. Stephen Yablo shows this to be the case here: Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility? You do exactly that, as I'll show below.

Contingency is about existing dependently on something else, and necessity is to exist independently of anything.

That is only conceptual contingency, not metaphysical. If the universe is deterministic, then every state of the universe is the necessary consequence of past states. There are relations among objects in the universe (such as distance, gravitational attraction, and the chemical bonds), but all these factors are necessarily present. You're just conceptualizing (say) the solar system existing without (say) Mercury. But it's not truly metaphysically possible.

This does not make the parts necessarily existent: they are necessary for the composed being to exist as that being, and this is just another way of saying the composed being is contingent on its parts. — Bob Ross

Only conceptual contingency. Your conception ignores the overall context that I described.

Autonomy is a bad term for this, as that relates only to agents; — Bob Ross

No, it doesn't. I defined it as something that exists without cause or dependency. The universe (the totality of material reality) exists autonomously if naturalism is true.

Think about it. If the table exists only insofar as the atoms comprising it are in such-and-such arrangement which makes the table contingently existent from the atoms — Bob Ross

The existence of a table at a time and place, within a deterministic universe, has necessarily come to exist. Again,you are conceptualizing by ignoring the broader context.

Firstly, as I said above, that a being would no longer be that being without certain parts does NOT entail that those parts nor the being are nor is necessary. — Bob Ross

What entails it being necessary or contingent is whatever accounts for its existence.

Because if it can’t be infinite then there must be a first cause, and this first cause must not have parts (because, if it did, then it would just be a member of this infinite series of composition—and we just established that that is impossible). — Bob Ross

There must be a first cause because an infinite series of causes is viscious, NOT because an infinite series of compositions is viscious. You're conflating 2 different things.

9. Two beings can only exist separately if they are distinguishable in their parts.
False. Two beings can have identical intrinsic properties. Example: water molecules.

I am not sure we can make headway on this one ): — Bob Ross

The only rational choice is for you to agree with me, and drop your assumption. That's because I gave a real world example that falsifies your assumption.

All I will say is that if the two beings have properties—irregardless if it is intrinsic or extrinsic—then they are not absolutely simple — Bob Ross

Nothing can exist that lacks properties, so no object can exist that meets your definition of "absolutely simple".

I am, of course, judging this from the perspective of my metaphysical theory. As I said in my first post, your argument depends on metaphysical assumptions that I disagree with. You refused to accept that, and insisted I comment on your premises. In every case, I evaluated them on my metaphysical views, as you should expect because you didn't present an argument for YOUR metaphysical system. I believe I have proven my point.

The label is irrelevant; that's just semantics. What's relevant is the relations between the parts, things like their individual lengths, angles between them, distance between parts, etc. These are ontological.

If you think tables have an essence, tell us what it is. — Banno

To be clear: I do not believe in essences nor "natural kinds".

Yes, there's a "form", in a physicalist (not platonic) sense: the parts exist with relations to the other parts: legs a certain distance apart, with a roughly 90 degree angle to the table top.

So I'm not saying "table" is some ontological category.

Start with a dinner table, then disassemble it. All the parts are still there, but you no longer have a table.

An object is more than the set of parts that compose it. It's the composed parts + the way they are arranged that makes it something more.

what are your opinions about our current relationship with nature? Is it becoming better or worse? — Shawn

It varies by individual, but collectively - humankind is becoming increasingly worse, because there are so many of us

2nd reason: if a table is identical to the atoms that compose it, then if you remove a single atom, you're no longer dealing with the same table, since if you represent both cases using sets, it turns out that the set of n atoms is not identical to the set of n-1 atoms — Arcane Sandwich

I agree with your first reason, but not your second. It's still a table when you remove a few atoms. Not the SAME table but there's still a table there.

A table is an object composed of various physical objects arranged in a way to fit its intended purpose. One could dismantle it, and all the parts would still be there, but you couldn't use it as a table.

Funny how you selectively apply that excuse.

A person becomes a criminal when he commits the crime, not at the point of a criminal conviction. The Caroll lawsuit was based on him having committed a crime. Tax fraud and obstruction of justice are crimes. Conspiring to overturn an election is a crime- an extremely serious one.

ROFL! Apparently amnesia is one of the disorders contributing to the denial of his crimes. We've discussed various of Trump's crimes in the past, and you just deny the evidence and echo whatever nonsense the criminal has said.

A few posts back I mentioned a few of the prominent crimes: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/966696

Thanks for proving my point.

Of course physical objects exist i.e. chairs, desks, cups, trees, folks and cars .... I see them. I can interact with them. They have the concrete existence. Time? I don't see, or sense it. I can hear people talking about it, and asking it. So what is the nature of time? — Corvus

That is a much better question.

I was imagining and meaning some present moment in the future, when said "in due course". Not "at a later time". — Corvus

You acknowledge a future, and I assume you also acknowledge a past. This suggests a ordered relation: past->present->future.
We can label this ordered relation, "time". It's not a complete account, but it's a beginning.

Maybe they think it’s corrupt, therefore can’t be trusted. — Punshhh

They do, but IMO it's because of their faith in Trump. Trump's defense of his crimes entails blaming the system. It's reminiscent of OJ insisting LAPD conspired to get him. The difference is that OJ didn't sell this to the public like Trump does. In his supporters minds, Trump can do no wrong - so they embrace the ridiculous deep state conspiracy theory against him. The GOP assists by pushing the alleged weaponization of the DOJ.

I agree.

And yet it is true that dragons breath fire.

Ergo, fictional creatures can breath. — Banno

The fiction of dragons includes "breathing fire". But fictions still can't engage in the real world activity.

Do you understand my objection to the original statement:

Whether they exist or not, dragons breathe fire.

I'm not saying you can't make sense of it. But strictly speaking, when a noun appears once in a sentence, it has a single referent. Fictional creature and actual creature are 2 different referents.

That would mean 30-40% of Republicans plus a mass of independent voters don't care about rule of law. I think it's actually higher than that. — frank

I see your point.

Why would you think fictional creatures do not breath? — Banno

Breathing is a real world activity by real world creatures. A fiction can't do this.

are you now saying that there are two levels of ontology, stuff that exists and stuff that is actual?

IMO there's one ontology. Dragons are either real-world creatures, or they are concepts residing in minds.

At best you might say that some dragons breath fire. — Banno

This would imply that the set of all dragons includes all the real dragons and all the fictional creatures so-named. Some members of the set are said to breathe fire. We can't really say that "some dragons breathe fire" because fictional things don't actually breathe.

.

But since he was re-elected after what he pulled in Jan 6, it appears that large swaths of Americans don't care about rule of law either. — frank

Not necessarily. 60-70% of Republicans believe the 2020 election was stolen, and therefore Trump was justified in trying to remedy that situation.

I don't have statistics, but it appears to me that few Republicans understand that Trump committed obstruction of Justice during the Mueller investigation and in the documents case. Many also deny that he sexually assaulted E Jeane Carroll, and that it was therefore fine to defame her for her "lies".

It also seems that many are unaware of, or deny his guilt, at his various fraudulent activities (Trump U, Trump foundation, real estate valuations, and election fraud), or they consider the crimes minor.

So...some voters may actually respect rule of law, but are in denial about Trump. Of course, I expect that many believe that "Rule of Trump" is a greater good than rule of law.

Whether they exist or not, dragons breathe fire.
— Relativist
A change of topic. From "Dragons breath fire", you can conclude that something breaths fire. You cannot conclude that there are dragons. — Banno

It would be correct to say:

"the sentence: 'dragons breath fire' is true whether or not dragons exist"

because:

-If dragons exist, then "dragon" refers to these existing animals.
-If dragons don't exist, then "dragon" refers to a fictional creature.

In the original sentence, "Whether they exist or not, dragons breathe fire", there's just one referrent - not 2.

You've identified even more ambiguity. These all higlight the significance of semantics when sharing information.

So far all you have noted is that you find it improbable that a simple being could have knowledge; but yet haven’t contended the premises I have in the argument for why this has to be the case. — Bob Ross

The probability that magical knowledge exists is low, as I discussed. This is sufficient reason to reject your conclusion prima facie that a being with magical knowledge exists. But in principle, it's possible your conclusion is based on premises so likely to be true, that it could raise the a priori probability of the conclusion. I'll go through a first set of them to explain why it doesn't.

1. Composed beings are made up of parts.
Definition. No problem.

2. A composed being exists contingently upon its parts in their specific arrangement.
False. A particular composed being has its parts necessarily. If even one part were added or subtracted, it would not be the same being. (This pertains to the metaphysical question of the persistence of individual identity. Your view is probably based on essentialism, implying an unstated premise. If you choose not to make a case for essentialism, then I simply apply my own view, so I judge it categorically false: probability=0).

3. A part of a composed being is either composed or uncomposed.
Agreed.

4. A part that is a composed being does not, in turn, exist in-itself but, rather, exists contingently upon its parts and their specific arrangement.
"Exist in itself" is a vague term, but I'll take it to mean existing autonomously. Autonomous means being uncaused and without external dependencies. A part of a composed being may, or may not, exist autonomously. You've given no reason to think a composed being cannot exist autonomously.

The second part about existing contingently is a non-sequitur because all beings have their parts and properties necessarily, even if it is composed. Add or subtract even one part, and the being that WAS, no longer exists.

5. An infinite series of composed beings for any given composed being (viz., a composed being of which its parts are also, in turn, composed and so on ad infinitum) would not have the power to exist on their own.
I infer that you're describing a vicious infinite regress. I agree this is an impossibility because although each compositional layer is explained by a deeper layer, nothing accounts for the series as a whole.

6. Therefore, an infinite series of composed beings is impossible.
Agree

7. Therefore, a series of composed beings must have, ultimately, uncomposed parts as its first cause. (6 & 3)
Disagree that a composed being was necessarily caused. See my objection to #4.

8. An uncomposed being (such as an uncomposed part) is purely simple, since it lacks any parts.
Agreed.

9. Two beings can only exist separately if they are distinguishable in their parts.
False. Two beings can have identical intrinsic properties. Example: water molecules.

10. Two purely simple beings do not have any different parts (since they have none).
False (p=0). Two different types of simple being can exist (e.g. up-quarks and electrons).

11. Therefore, only one purely simple being can exist.
Non-sequitur; false (p=0)

No point in proceeding further, since later statements and conclusion depends on the above falsehoods. Perhaps you could nudge me to increase some probabilities from 0, but as I said before, you'd need to push all of them pretty high to have any persuasive power.

The sentence could be read either way.

Here's another that spotlights semantic ambiguity:

Whether they exist or not, dragons breathe fire.

The evening star is the morning star. Isn't it a tautology and also contradiction, but a true statement? — Corvus

It's a semantic issue. The nouns have a referent. The referent could be a concept in your mind, or it could be the actual object that exists in the world.

Assume "Evening star" and "morning star" both refer to an object in the world. In that case, they are referring to the same object - so it's semantically equivalent to saying "The evening star is the evening star."

But "Evening star" and "morning star" could both just refer to your mental concepts "the point of light I see in the evening (or morning)" - the concepts refer to the context of your respective perceptions.

You could even be inconsistent, and treat one as the concept, the other as the object.

The problem is that even if it doesn’t jive well for you, it doesn’t negate the OP: you would have to demonstrate what about my argument for why this simple being has knowledge is false—for it would have to be false if you don’t believe that knowledge can exist in a simple being. — Bob Ross

Why must I do that? I showed you to have a burden based on your expressed purpose of swaying some people. You've sidestepped that entirely, and are back to making the false claim that I have some burden.

If all you want to hear is that your argument is valid, and that you had no desire to defend its soundness, you should have said so.

"On Thursday, at a federal courthouse in Washington state, U.S. District Judge John C. Coughenour—an 84-year-old Ronald Reagan appointee—delivered a striking rebuke to Trump’s assault on birthright citizenship. Speaking from the bench, Coughenour declared: “It has become ever more apparent that to our president, the rule of law is but an impediment to his policy goals. The rule of law is, according to him, something to navigate around or simply ignore, whether that be for political or personal gain. Nevertheless, in this courtroom, and under my watch, the rule of law is a bright beacon which I intend to follow.” He then issued a nationwide injunction prohibiting the administration from denying birthright citizenship to the children of immigrants for the duration of the litigation."
--https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2025/02/federal-judge-birthright-citizenship-donald-trump-ignore-law.html

As a businessman, Trump treated contracts, and laws, as inconveniences. It's no surprise he'd continue this as President.

This will be his best executive order yet: — NOS4A2

I absolutely agree this cannot be topped.

On the other hand, this "Truth" Social post puts his abject stupidity on full display:

"20 years ago, Autism in children was 1 in 10,000. NOW IT’S 1 in 34. WOW! Something’s really wrong. We need BOBBY!!! Thank You! DJT”

[/quote]

Can you prove time exists? — Corvus

No. Do you only believe things that are proven?

Time doesn't exist. — Corvus

Apparently not.

So do you just adopt beliefs arbitrarily?

my point was that you were invalidly implying that my premises in the OP are proven merely as possibilities, which makes no sense. — Bob Ross

Your premises aren't "proven" at all: you made no case for them. We agree they are possibly true (logical possibility), but your propositions (at least the ones I identified) are also possibly false. Therefore the conclusion is possibly true and possibly false. You agreed your purpose is to sway minds, so you need more than possibility.

Think more granularly than possible/impossible. Instead consider there's an epistemic probability (P) to any statement. It's subjective and somewhat vague, but it relates to levels of certainty.

Each premise has a probability: pn is the probability of premise n. C = the conclusion, P(C) is the probability of the conclusion:

P(C)=p1& p2 &p3 &...&pn
Which implies:
P(C)= p1*p2*p3...*pn

Probabilities are <=1, so P(C) is <= the probability of each individual proposition..

Where P(G) = the prior subjective epistemic probability of God's existence (i.e. prior to encountering your argument). You said your propose was to sway a person with your argument, so that means convincing him that P(C) > P(G). Your "burden" is to succeed at that.

I don’t have the burden of proof to demonstrate how knowledge can exist in something absolutely simple: — Bob Ross

Your argument depends on the unstated premise that knowledge can be present without parts. So it's included in the P(C) equation. So you have the burden of convincing someone that P(knowledge can be present without parts) is sufficiently high to produce a conclusion (C) such that P(C)>P(G). "Can be" = metaphysically possible, but we apply epistemic judgement to proposed metaphysical theories and axioms. More on this below.

Think about it, if you are right that a being with knowledge cannot be absolutely simple; then one of my premises in the OP—which does not argue for how it works—must be false; but yet you have never once pointed to what premise or premises that is or are. — Bob Ross

It's the unstated premise I pointed out above. The probability of unstated premises is just as relevant to P(C) as the stated ones.

Relativist: "You need to provide a compelling reason to think it is metaphysically possible".

It is right here:

20. Intelligence is having the ability to apprehend the form of things (and not its copies!).
21. The purely simple and actual being apprehends the forms of things. (19)
22. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being must be an intelligence.

It is physically impossible to store complex data without parts.

First of all, what is complex data? That suggests that there is a sort of simple data that can be stored without parts (:

Secondly, I agree that it is physically impossible...that just means it cannot happen in accordance with things governed by physics. God is beyond physics — Bob Ross

So another unstated premise is: physicalism is false.

Even if physicalism is false, my intuitions are grounded in what I know about the world- and that includes the intuition that knowledge =organized data, data is encoded, and this entails complexity. I judge it a small probability (<.1) that knowledge can exist without parts. Your defense is just an assertion that my intuitions don't apply because it's not physical. That seems equivalent to saying it's magical, and magic can account for anything. That has no effect on my judgement.

You mentioned "simple data". The simplest data is a bit (value is 0 or 1). Knowing this would require at least one part: the bit. Conceivably, there could exist a being with 1 bit of knowledge. I don't see how a being could know the value without, in some sense, having this encoded as a bit of data.

You asked: "what is complex data"? The data is propositions (more precisely: some metaphysical grounding for those propositions). You refer to each thing's "form", which strikes me as a lot of bits of information. The complexity comes from the logical relations within this information.

that’s too many premises for me to talk in one response! Pick one, and we will dive in. — Bob Ross

I choose your unstated premise that knowledge can be present without parts, If that unstated premise is false, then your step 21 is false. In terms of probability, P(#21) <= P(knowledge can be present without parts).

all existing objects have properties, so it follows from this that it cannot exist. I already demonstrated this is false — Bob Ross

Your "demonstration" depends on Thomist metaphysics being true. You could only possibly show my statement is false by falsifying my metaphysical framework (or at least showing that Thomist metaphysics is superior), because my statement is an axiom of my framework. IMO, my framework is coherent, has sufficient explanatory power to explain all uncontroversial facts, and it's more parsimonious than alternatives. That justifies my belief in it. It's the basis of my epistemic judgement. I'll add that I'm not certain of my metaphysical theory, but I think it's more likely than not (P>.6).

you cannot say that something is impossible because we have no example of it. That’s illogical

Given my metaphysics, it is trivially metaphysically impossible. Here's a snippet of the theory that establishes what I said:

Existence consists of the objects that exist, and the relations between them. I will use these terms interchangeably: object=thing=existent=particular=State of Affairs (SOA)

“State of Affairs” is the most meaningful descriptor because it refers to the structure of objects/things/existents/particulars. A state of affairs has 3 types of constituents: a thin particular, it’s intrinsic properties, and it’s relations (AKA relational properties AKA extrinsic properties).

Objects do not exist without properties, and properties do not exist unattached to objects. Properties exist in their instantiations. Example: the -1 electric charge exists as a property that all electrons have. The -1 electric charge does not exist independently. Now consider an electron: the ‘-1’ charge is intrinsic; any object that lacks a “-1 charge” is necessarily something other than an electron.

You could falsify the theory by identifying an object that can't fit the "state of affairs" model. But as you implied, there are no examples of such things. My theory is coherent, has sufficient explanatory power to account for all uncontroversial facts, and does so parsimoniously. It's unparsimonious to add another sort of existent based solely on it being logically possible. Possibilities are endless.

I said two objects could have the same intrinsic properties

Which, again, makes them non-simple. — Bob Ross

That may be so in your metaphysics, but not in mine. In mine, an atomic state of affairs with 1 intrinsic property is as simple as an object can be. But nothing precludes there existing multiple objects with that same, single intrinsic property. What would distinguish them are their relations (extrinsic properties). I've said this multiple times, but you repeatedly dismiss it. Your basis is Thomism. That's sufficient justification for you, but has no persuasive power for a non-Thomist. You would need to falsify my metaphysical axiom directly, or show my metaphysical system is incoherent.

What makes Iraqi Sesame Street "bullshit"? It's been part of the effort to restore the country to normalcy after the devastation inflicted by Bush's war. Pottery Barn rule.

Regardless, Trump could have ordered review of all the programs and done selective shutdowns. It's a product of executing a simplistic solution with callous disregard for the consequences. That's why I labeled it manslaughter, and not murder.

Add manslaughter to the list of Trump's crimes:

Deaths predicted amid the chaos of Elon Musk’s shutdown of USAid

Critical supplies of life-saving medicines have been blocked and children left without food and battling malnutrition as multiple effects were reported across the globe after Elon Musk resolved to shut down the US government’s pre-eminent international aid agency....

...Analysis confirms that several thousand women and girls are likely to die from complications during pregnancy and childbirth as a direct result of Trump’s order to freeze aid to the agency for 90 days.

I assume Trumpists will dance with joy with each death, because it translates to cost savings.

Trump may think he is anointed by God to Rule, Reign, and Ruin, but Congress actually is the source of program creation and spending. — BC

That's the design, but the GOP leadership is letting Trump do whatever he wants.

I read the entire post. Regretfully.

I'm starting with this point, because it has bearing on whether or not this discussion is worthwhile:

If your premises only seem possible, then your conclusion is still only possible- you won't move the needle of belief one bit.

That’s not how arguments work. Either one agrees with the premise or they don’t. — Bob Ross

The typical purpose of an argument is to change minds. A good argument might lead to someone fully accepting the conclusion, but even if it just results pushing someone in that direction, you've succeeded in making headway that you could potentially amplify with more arguments.

Do you not have such a purpose in mind? If not, why did you bother? I'll address your other issues under the assumption you are hoping to have some success, but if this is incorrect - we won't need to go much further.

[regarding a hypothetical argument for physicalism]That depends on what you mean by “entailments of physicalism”. Every argument comes in with metaphysical assumptions: I don’t think physicalism is any different in this regard. What I would do is provide counter arguments to the premises that I disagree with and perhaps for the assumptions that I disagree with so that I could have a productive conversation with them. — Bob Ross

By presenting an argument, I will have assumed the burden of proof. You would, of course, reject premises that you disagree with, but you wouldn't have the burden to prove me wrong. I would have the burden to prove to you my premises are true.

Someone could come around and offer a rejoinder that we have good reasons to believe that a being which has knowledge must have parts; and I am more than happy to entertain that. However, my problem with you is that the closest argument I have gotten from you for this is essentially: — Bob Ross

You're reversing the burden of proof. You have it because you presented an argument. I explained why I reject your premise, and your response was that it's possible.

There is a problem with the argument I stated: it assumes God exists.

It presupposes that we are talking about an absolutely simple being—that’s it. — Bob Ross

Wrong. The argument I stated explicitly referred to God.

The problem is that you are saying it is impossible; — Bob Ross

My position is that it is most likely metaphysically impossible and I explained why. How is that a problem? You've given me no reason to think otherwise. You embraced the argument I created, suggesting to me that you choose to believe omniscience can be held by a simple being because you "know" God is omniscient and simple. I acknowledged it's logically possible, but possibility is cheap. You need to provide a compelling reason to think it is metaphysically possible. I have no burden to convince you of anything.

my OP’s argument never presupposes God’s existence as a premise—not even in part. — Bob Ross

You presuppose a theistic metaphysics.

You brought up the fact that it's possible knowledge can exist without parts or complexity.

It is logically possible because it violates nothing in logic; it is actually possible because it violates nothing in physics; and it is metaphysically possible because it does not violate the natures of things. — Bob Ross

It is physically impossible to store complex data without parts. It is metaphysically impossible if physicalism is true. To be metaphysically possible would require making some metaphysical assumption that simply ignores the intrinsic complexity of information- making the assumption far-fetched.

First of all, this negates your first point, because you are implying that the OP gives good reasons to believe that is possible (which you said was problematic before)....The OP doesn’t argue for the possibility of God’s existence: it argues that God does exist — Bob Ross

I never suggested you were arguing for the possibility of God, but I'm pointing out that it only does that if it is sound: all the premises need to be true - including the unstated ones. You can't show all the premises are necessarily true. A more realistic goal would be that you could make a compelling case for soundness by supporting each premise.

Give me the premise you are disagreeing with! — Bob Ross

8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17 - not sure of, 18, 20 21, 23, 27, 28, 34. I also disagree with the inferences in 11,14, 19, 24, 29, 31 32, 35, 38,
39, 41, and 42 because they are based on false premises.

In short, I disagree with your entire metaphysical framework. I chose to focus on omniscience and simplicity because it was impractical to discuss everything.

I am explaining to you how this being has no properties proper; and that just because we have no examples of something other than itself, it does not follow that it cannot exist. — Bob Ross

Per my metaphysical framework, all existing objects have properties, so it follows from this that it cannot exist. You have the burden of showing your metaphysical framework is correct, or at least showing it's better than mine. Coincidentally, I've outlined it on another forum. It's in 3 parts:

https://knowwhyyoubelieve.org/groups/reasonable-faith-forum/forum/topic/metaphysical-naturalism-part-i-the-scientific-method/

https://knowwhyyoubelieve.org/groups/reasonable-faith-forum/forum/topic/metaphysical-naturalism-part-2-a-naturalist-metaphysical-theory/

https://knowwhyyoubelieve.org/groups/reasonable-faith-forum/forum/topic/metaphysical-naturalism-part-3-why-its-the-best-answer/

A part is something that makes up the whole; so it cannot be identical to the whole; and your argument here assumes that they can be identical. — Bob Ross

I never said they could be identical. I said two objects could have the same intrinsic properties. The properties that distinguish two electrons are their differing extrinsic properties, such as their location in space, bonds to other particles, etc.

I'm just pointing out that your argument depends on your preferred metaphysical system being true

Literally every argument for anything is guilty of this: that is a trivial note and I never argued to the contrary — Bob Ross

I said essentially the same thing in my first post: every argument depends on questionable metaphysical assumptions. Since you more or less agree, why bother presenting it? (This gets back to my first point of this post). The fundamental disagreement is the metaphysical framework. Everything else is entailment.

I read it. It doesn't have an example of a "should", and in no way addresses my broader issue:

It's fine to define good as "what should be", but this doesn't explain how "should" applies in the absence of minds to make choices. Equating it to "good" doesn't add anything - because that's still a judgment. — Relativist

Matter is not what we experience. Rather, matter is our explanation of what we experience.
We experience only sensations: physical sensations, emotional sensations, and mental sensations.
Other explanations of experience include Descartes' Evil Demon, hard solipsism, brain in a vat, etc.
Matter is a very good explanation of what we experience.
Newtonian Mechanics is a very good explanation of what we experience.
Newtonian Mechanics is not true. Perhaps, the matter explanation is also not true.
Thoughts? — Art48

Matter isn't an explanation; it's an explanatory hypothesis that a particular kind of thing exists.The hypothesis explains all those sensations.

Newtonian mechanics is a hypothesis as well, but in terms of ontology - it just proposes that a law of nature exists. It's actually a pretty good hypothesis, even if it isn't entirely true..

It's logically possible that the "matter hypothesis" is false, but why would we abandon it - unless we had a superior hypothesis? We only abandoned Newtonian mechanics when a better hypothesis came along; even then, it wasn't a complete abandonment. It still works perfectly fine for most applications.

I suppose we could say that ~solipsism is also a hypothesis (albeit an intrinsic one), but there's no reason to abandon it since it hasn't been falsified.

I assumed you meant your second post in this thread. It says nothing about atoms or molecules.

I then went that that other thread you referenced (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15722/the-logic-of-a-universal-origin-and-meaning/p1) , thinking that might be what you mean. The only reference to molecules mentions nothing about atoms.

Why can't you just give me an example of a "should" that doesn't involve minds, as I asked? Seems like a simple request.

It sounds like you might say "an electron should be attracted to a proton"? — Relativist

No, should would denote a more positive state of existence. But for there to be a more positive state of existence, it must be at its base that existence is itself good, versus there being no existence at all. — Philosophim

You had said, "The 'should' is entirely logical." I'm trying to understand what that means. So I gave you an example which you rejected with a reason that I can't understand. What is a "positive state of existence"? What makes one state more positive than another? Give me an example of a "should" that doesn't involve minds.

You referred to your second post. In that post, you said,
"If we are to take that good is, "What should be", then we can take at a base level that there should be existence over nothing. This is because any morality which proposed that existence should not be would contradict itself."

It's fine to define good as "what should be", but this doesn't explain how "should" applies in the absence of minds to make choices. Equating it to "good" doesn't add anything - because that's still a judgment.

Let's focus on this point:

The 'should' is entirely logical. — Philosophim

It sounds like you might say "an electron should be attracted to a proton"?
But clearly the electron has no choice in the matter, so it is more precise to say ""an electron will be attracted to a proton".

This is my issue: "should" typically connotes an outcome that is contingent upon a choice. Broadly speaking (setting aside your premise), this is what is generally meant by moral imperatives: a person may choose to do the right thing, or he may not.

I have several times noted that 'should' does not involve beings. If you are saying it does, and I'm presenting the entire argument that it does not, you need to challenge my point why I say it does not. You have not done that. — Philosophim

That is precisely what I've been challenging! The very point you're responding to is such a challenge! Your response should be to explain how "should" applies to objects that lack minds. Asserting it does not explain it.

For reference, here's how it applies to objects with minds (some of them, at least): If John should do X, then he may or may not do X. The should influences his choice; but other urges and desires may also also influence his choice. His choice is contingent, not determined external to himself.

If I was noting that an objective morality requires a being, you would have a point. But I haven't, I won't, and its not going to change. — Philosophim

My point is that you haven't shown how objective morality applies in the absence of minds that have choices to make.

When thinking upon the fact that the universe was ultimately uncaused by anything else, you realize that anything could have happened. — Philosophim

Here's where you go wrong. A material first cause entails an initial uncaused state, not a "happening". But this is an unnecessary tangent. I'm willing to accept your claim as a premise that the initial state could have been something else. I don't see how this helps your case.

Odds are calculated based on contingencies. There are four jacks in a deck of cards, which is why if we don't know the shuffle order we say pulling a card bling has a 4/52 chance of being a jack.

An uncaused universe has no odds. — Philosophim

There are no discrete odds only because your premise implies there are infinitely many possible initial states. This translates to an infinitesimal probability - but it's still a probability.

How could there be a state of affairs that there is existence at all? The same as a possible state of affairs in which there is no existence at all. There is no contingency for existence. No prior causation. It simply is, and it had no reason to be or not be. We believe something cannot simple 'be' without prior cause in the universe, but logically, its the only conclusion that works. — Philosophim

I'm glad to hear you say "there is no contingency for existence", because it sounds like you're agreeing with me that existence is metaphysically necessary. Is that correct?

However, if existence is metaphysically necessary, how does "should" apply?

An objective morality if it exists is within the universe that is, just like everything else. It does not exist on some outside intention, but would be an existent thing in the universe just like a wavelength of light. — Philosophim

I have accepted your premise that moral imperatives exist, but I've argued that everything in a contingent universe is therefore contingent - including a wavelength of light and any moral imperative that happens to exist. Do you agree? If not, why not?

Your op only claims "existence should be". You haven't explained how that entails the moral imperative "don't steal". — Relativist

Correct. Thus why your point is a straw man. — Philosophim

I wasn't making a strawman argument, I was explaining what I inferred from your statements - to afford you the opportunity to correct my understanding. You asserted that objective morality somehow comes forth from your premise "existence should be". That makes no sense to me,

Secondly, you had referred to moral imperatives being the product of randomness- and THAT is the basis of my claim that each moral imperative could have come out as its converse. If that is not the case, then explain what you mean by "randomness" in your context. Why couldn't this imperative have come out as "do steal"? — Relativist


No, I clearly stated that everything came out of randomness.

If EVERYTHING came out of randomness then this includes all moral imperatives.

Since an objective morality does not require an intention or prior causation, it is a logical part of existence if it exists. I've stated this again and again. — Philosophim

You've repeated it over and over, but you haven't explained how it is reasonable for a random moral imperative is an OBJECTIVE moral imperative.

Having objective EXISTENCE does not entail there being something objective about the moral imperative. I've said that a moral imperative pertains only to choices made by things that can make choices. I don't think you've stated either agreement or disagreement. So tell me now.

Perhaps you just can't comprehend it, it is very different from the normal subjective argument of morals you're likely used to. Bend your mind a bit. And if you still can't understand it, just go with the basic premises of the OP for now and read more.

I've been trying for quite some time, and I've brought to your attention the reasons I think your premises are incoherent. I could have walked away from this discussion on that basis, but I've been willing to hear you correct whatever misunderstandings I have. Instead, you just fall back to repeating the same (seemingly incoherent) premises.

Maybe you'll understand better, have your questions answered, and be able to make a point that demonstrates I'm wrong. Read on to find out why eventually I can make a reasoned conclusion that "do steal" is not an objective moral notion.

I infer that you're saying your basic premise doesn't account for all moral values that most of us accept. I presume that you're only saying that moral values which are entailed by your premise are objective values. Is that correct? It would certainly narrow my objections, but you still need to answer the questions I raised above, and will repeat here:

1) How does "should" applies to objects that lack minds. IOW, explain what it means to say "X should Y" where X is an object lacking a mind.
2) You seemed to agree that existence is metaphysically necessary, so how does "should" apply to the fact of a metaphysically necessary existence?
3) everything in a contingent universe is contingent - including a wavelength of light and any moral imperative that happens to exist. Do you agree?
4. You said, "I clearly stated that everything came out of randomness." So please confirm that you agree that moral imperatives (including your foundational one) came out of randomness.
5) Why should anyone pay heed to a moral imperative that is both contingent (see #3) and random (see #4)?