Scientific realism typically assumes that the world exists just as science describes it, entirely independently of any subject or perspective. — Wayfarer

In one sense, it does exist just as science describes it -when the science is correct. Granted, the descriptions are in human terms and from a human perspective but what other terms could they be? Do you deny that some scientific propositions are true?

If you simply want everyone to be reminded that our analysis and our language means that science is merely giving a human perspective - that's fine. But a human perspective is the only ones that can be meaningful to humans.

The idealist criticism of scientific realism is that it forgets or overlooks the role of the subject — Wayfarer

I'm not convinced that's entirely true, other than in terms of perspective and the need to express science in terms humans understand. But assuming it is true that the role of the subject is completely ignored, how do you propose correcting this?

intelligibility is grounded in relations among representations. To the extent that things appear to us as structured phenomena, it’s those mental structures that make intelligibility possible. — Wayfarer

Sure, but how is that a problem?

This challenges physicalism, not by denying the success of science, but by questioning the metaphysical leap that treats “the physical” as something with inherent, mind-independent reality. — Wayfarer

Any metaphysical system would do the same- that's the object of the game. Obviously, none can be verified or falsified. Should we abandon the game? My principle reason for defending physicalism is NOT because I'm committed to it. Rather, it's to counter arguments from ignorance that I see others make, based on supposed metaphysical "truths". I also jump in to explain components of it, when I see questions or misunderstandings - that' what prompted my first post in this thread. I don't care if anyons believes it, but if they're going to dismiss it- it should be based on a correct understanding.

Scientific models work because of their predictive and explanatory power—but that success doesn't license the conclusion that the world exists exactly as described in itself, independent of the subject’s contribution to its appearance.

How about Structural Realism?

My issue with your position is that you've only stated negatives- what's wrong with physicalism and/or scientific realism. Do you have something superior in mind? If so, I'm curious how it can be immune from the same problems.

The objection I have to materialist theories of mind is that they attempt to ground intelligibility in the physical domain itself—specifically in neurological processes—without acknowledging that the meaning and coherence we attribute to neural data are not in the data; they are read into it by the observing scientist ('this means that', 'from this, we can infer that....'). In other words, it is the mind that interprets the brain, not the brain that explains the mind. — Wayfarer

Explaining the mind is absolutely physicalism's weakness. Does that necessarily mean physicalism is false?

Yes, the mind is doing all the interpreting- whatever the mind is. Do you have a better account of the mind?

we would like to find a reasonable definition of 'what is physical? — boundless

Here's how I address it:
The natural= That which exists (has existed, or will exist) including ourselves, everything that is causally connected to ourselves through laws of nature, and anything not causally connected (such as alternate universes) that may be inferred to exist, to have existed, or that will exist, through analysis of our universe.

It is postulated that everything that is natural, is physical; justified by parsimony.

Although my definition of "the natural" precludes things existing that we can't infer, I don't preclude the possibility of things existing that we can't possibly infer. But if so, they are unknowable and therefore we're unjustified in believing any specifics beyond the basic ackowledgement that are are possibilities.

One way is to try to explain mathematical and logical truths as 'abstractions' that we derive from particulars. The problem, however, is that mathematics and logic seems to be transcendental, i.e. truths that we have to accept to even construct explanations, models and so on. An explanation, for instance, should be logically consistent. If fundamental reality is, indeed, 'physical' how can we explain the laws of logic in purely physical terms? — boundless

The "laws of logic" are nothing more than a formalized, consistent semantics - for example, the meanings of "if...then...else", "or", "and", "not" - all sharply defined by truth tables.

What does it actually mean to be transcendental? Do transcendental things exist - are they part of the furniture of the world? If so, what's the relation between these existents and the things they are about? What's the relation to the our thoughts? Suppose there were no intelligent minds to grasp them - in what sense do these transcendental objects actually exist?

The very assumption that physical reality might be at least in part intelligible seems to be based on the idea that, indeed, logical and mathematical truths are not contingent and eternal. — boundless

From a physicalist's point of view, if some physical phenomenon is describable with mathematics, it is entirely due to the presence of physical relations among the objects involved in the phenomenon. Example: Newton's formula for the force of gravity is F=G*m1*m2/r^2. This describes a physical relation between an object with mass m1 and an object with mass m2, based on the distance between them. The phenomenon is not contingent on a formula; rather, the formula is descriptive - providing a means of prediction and comparisons to other phenomena. Physical reality (outside of human minds) itself doesn't make predictions and comparisons - it just behaves per laws of nature.

Of course, it turns out that Newton's formula is only valid within specific bounds, and General Relativity is a more accurate description. But is the description eternal? Physicists assume so. Why wouldn't they? There's no empirical evidence that they are NOT, so it's unjustified to assume they're temporary. From time to time, physicists hypothesize that some aspect of a theory may actually not be eternal, and may change over time (consideration of the cosmological constant is an example). Cases like this are based on empirical evidence and/or conflicts between the predictions of theories.

Of course, one might reject the premise that the 'physical world' is at least in part intelligible. But that's hardly a 'physicalism' IMO. It is more likely some kind of radical forms of skepticism (there are more than one) where we have the illusion that 'reality' is intelligible by our reasoning. That it seems like so. But this appearance is a self-deception so to speak and, in fact, the 'ultimate reality' is in fact completely 'beyond knowledge'. — boundless

I suggest that it is justifiable to believe the physical world is at least partly intelligible - justified by the success of science at making predictions. I don't see how anyone could justify being skeptical of this. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind our limitations. The known laws of physics (which I contrast with the ontological laws of nature) may be special cases that apply in the known universe but are contingent upon some symmetry breaking that occurred prior to, or during, the big bang. If so, it's irrelevant to making predictions within our universe.

Personally, I find the problem of 'abstract objects' a very difficult for any physicalist worldview, at least if we mean that 'physicalism' means that 'ultimate reality is physical' in a comprehensible meaning of the term. — boundless

I don't see a problem with abstractions. The "way of abstraction" (see: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/#WayAbst) is a mental exercise associated with pattern recognition. This describes the process by which we isolate our consideration to properties, ignoring all other aspects of the things that have them. The properties don't ACTUALLY exist independently of the things that have them, IMO. And I don't see how one could claim that our abstracting them entails that they exist independently.

I’d suggest that the nature of the electron is itself still an open question — Wayfarer

Regardless, I was just using the traditional understanding of an electron to illustrate the nature of universals: a type of thing, which can exist in multiple instantiations. The "type" is based on the intrinsic properties: multiple, distinct objects can have the same exact property. So irrespective of the true nature of electrons, it's uncontroversial that there exist multiple objects with a specific electric charge.

Right - which is the unique ability of h.sapiens, so far as we can tell, and the ability which underwrites language, maths and science. We can learn the concepts which enable atomic physics and many other things, but those rational abilities are not something explained by science, and certainly not by physics alone. — Wayfarer

I remind you that I'm just explaining what universals are, and defending the reasonableness of the definition. Even if the mind is (wholly or partly) immaterial, I believe Armstrong's model of universals makes sense - and possibly more sense than alternatives.

The -1 charge of a given electron is not “tied” to the universal of negative charge by some cord or hook. Rather, the electron is an instance of a kind, and its negative charge is an instantiation of a universal property. We can only think about this because we already operate with concepts that abstract from particular cases. But the concepts don’t cause or bind the particulars—they are inherent in the intelligible structure. The universal isn’t an entity over here, and the particular over there, waiting to be connected... — Wayfarer

I'm struggling to see a difference between Armstrong's view of a universal and yours. Do you agree that all particulars have properties? And that a property may exist in multiple particulars? It sounds like it.

Rather, the universal is the intelligible content of the particular, grasped by reason. We abstract it in thought, but that doesn’t mean it’s merely mental. It’s real in the particular, just not as a separable object - it is how the object appears to the rational intellect

In another discussion, I believe you said that you agree that there exists a mind independent reality. This implies that, whatever it might be, it is not dependent on intelligibility or reason. Is it that our limitations and failures leads you to believe it is futile to consider the nature of mind-independent reality? That's all Armstrong is doing. In your prior questions, you seemed to be questioning whether or not Armstrong's theory gave an adequate account of universals, and questioned their relation to the related mental objects (our concepts of the universal). Do you now acknowledge that I've addressed those questions?

But if our concept of a universal corresponds to something real, as you say, then that universal must be real in some way that is not identical with any of its particular instances, nor reducible to the act of thinking about it. — Wayfarer

Consider electrons: each of them has a -1 electric charge. This intrinsic property is identical in every instantiated electron. The charge is real, but it doesn't exist independently of the electrons. The -1 charge is a universal. So is electron: every existing electron has identical intrinsic properties. They are distinguished by extrinsic properties - location, which objects they are bound to, etc.

You say the universal “exists in multiple instantiations in the world.” But that only accounts for the instances of a universal—not the universal as such. If triangularity, for example, is just the set of all actual triangular things, then: — Wayfarer

-1 electric charge (a universal) only exists as a property that some objects have. There is no "universal as such" existing in the world.

Strictly speaking, triangles are concepts that don't exist in the world, because they are (conceptually) 2-dimensional. Objects in the world can have triangularity; by that, we're referring to a set of properties (the relations between the sides). There can obviously be 2 or more triangular objects with the same length sides arranged at the same angles.

If Armstrong’s “immanent realism” holds that universals are just shared properties instantiated in the physical world, then it seems to fall short of explaining the universality we actually grasp in thought—where we reason about the form itself, not its tokens. — Wayfarer

I don't understand why you say this. We grasp the properties that objects have, and apply the way of abstraction to consider just the property. Our minds aren't manipulating the actual property that electrons have, it is entertaining ramifications that we learn about- like the fact that electrons will have a repellent force. There is universality if we each hold true concepts of electrons- concepts that we have to learn, and that we may make an error about - if we don't learn all the actual facts correctly.

I recall you’ve previously said that Armstrong doesn’t define universals or laws in purely physical terms. — Wayfarer

Yes, he does. Properties and relations (laws are relations) are physical, but they exist immanently. Properties and relations are generally measurable, so there's no issue with empiricism.

BTW. I looked thru Armstrong's book on universals, and he raises a problem with transcendental universals: how do you account for instantiations of the universal? Is there an ontological relation between the universal and its instantiation? What's the tie? What about the -1 charge of a specific electron: is there something that connects the charge to that electron?

What is a 'mental object' in the first place? — Wayfarer

Concepts/images/qualia - units of thoughts.

Russell: "Thus universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts."
This seems consistent with Armstrong's view of universals: they are sets of properties that exist where they are instantiated - and they can have multiple instantiations.

This doesn't preclude thinking ABOUT them conceptually. The concept is a mental object that corresponds (as in deflationary truth theory) to the universal. The triangle concept in my mind is distinct from the triangle concept in your mind, but both concepts correspond to the universal.

Feser:"A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once."
Yes, mental objects are private and subjective, but so is a concept - but as I said above, there is (or can be) a correspondence between each of our "triangle" concepts and the universal that exists in multiple instantiations in the world.

coherence of reason depends on universal judgements which are not themselves found in the objective world - they're transcendental in nature. But that, due to the overwhelmingly nominalist and empiricist cast of modern thought, their reality cannot be admitted, as to do so undermines the materialism that it erroneously upholds. — Wayfarer

Neither Armstrong nor I, is a nominalist. Universals exist, and we can form concepts that correspond to them. As long as we each have "true" concepts of the universals, we can can share additional knowledge with each other and make the same "universal" judgements. I therefore see no need to assume there's something transcendental.

There are those that assert this? Seems contradictory for some event to be 'existing' and also 'will exist', which seem to be two different contradictory tenses for the same event, relative to the same 'present' event. — noAxioms

There is a set of things that existed in the past, a set of things existing in the present, and a set of things that will exist in the future. The union of these three sets comprise the set of existents. This doesn't preclude tensed facts, but one must be careful with wording.

Contrast this with possible objects we might conceive of. The conception may or not correspond to a member of the set of existents.

From: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schr%C3%B6dinger_equation --

"Conceptually, the Schrödinger equation is the quantum counterpart of Newton's second law in classical mechanics. Given a set of known initial conditions, Newton's second law makes a mathematical prediction as to what path a given physical system will take over time. The Schrödinger equation gives the evolution over time of the wave function, the quantum-mechanical characterization of an isolated physical system. "

The capacity for abstraction is one thing, but the ontological status of what is abstracted - logical laws, symmetries etc - is the point at issue — Wayfarer

The ontological status of a concept is that it is nothing more than a mental "object". You can apply whatever theory of mind you like to that (not just physicalism). I'm arguing that abstract objects are no more than mental objects- irrespective of what mental objects are. The mental objects that are abstractions are descriptions (e.g. detailing some or all the intrinsic properties that might be held by some objects in the world). Some such mental objects will correspond to something that exists - now, in the past, future, or perhaps in an independent universe (if such things exist). Others will correspond to nothing in the world (anywhere/anywhen).

We can also divide these mental objects into subsets: those that are physically possible (which may or may not exist) and those that are physically impossible.

It seems that you're defining as "real" : all the mental objects that are physically possible, irrespective of whether it exists, has existed, or will exist. If that's the extent of it, it's semantics. But I suspect you think it's something more than semantics.

the ability to see via mathematical abstraction is so instrumental in the progress of science itself. — Wayfarer

Sure, but this just suggests that scientists can extrapolate from what they know, to make good guesses as to what sorts of objects may exist. "Sorts of objects"= universals. Either a universal (or physically possible universal) is instantiated or it is not.

The only fallback against that is to try and show that ideas are somehow identical with neural structures — Wayfarer

That's not really necessary. Hebbian learning doesn't entail a structure being created, it entails patterns of neuron firings facilitated by changes to action potentials.

But that's a broader discussion. Let's focus on abstractions for now. I think they're nothing more than mental objects. If you think they are something more than that, then please describe.

And that pure quantum system can be applied to God, right? Or the candidates you were thinking of. — javi2541997

Not sure what you mean. Are you suggesting God could be a quantum system?

The only candidate I had in mind was the hypothesis that the universe is fundamemtally a quantum system. Some refer to this as the "wave function of the universe". But it's just a candidate; my only point is that it's not unreasonable to think a fundamental layer of reality could evolve from an initial state, without an external cause.

A quantum system evolves (from one state to another) in a manner than can be described by a Schroedinger equation. A "pure" state means there are no entanglements (interactions) with anything outside the quantum system.

A (pure state) quantum system evolves without an external cause. It's in the intrinsic nature of the quantum system.

They don't exist, but they're real. That's the point! In the classical vision the rational soul straddles this realm between the phenomenal and the noumenal. It's not an 'unparsimious assumption' but an insight into the nature of a rational mind. — Wayfarer

It sounds like equivocation, or cognitive dissonance.

More evidence of that, is the undeniable fact that man (sorry about the non PC terminology) has the ability to 'peer into the possible' and retrieve from it, many things previously thought impossible. — Wayfarer

The power of abstraction is present irrespective of the metaphysical interpretations we make of the process.

Reality ought also be assigned to certain possibilities, or “potential” realities, that have not yet become “actual.” These potential realities do not exist in spacetime, but nevertheless are “ontological” — Quantum Mysteries Dissolved

This sounds a bit like a presentist who considers as "existing" everything that exists, has existed, or will exist - i.e. a 4-dimensional landscape for identifying existents. We can make predictions about what will exist, but the act of prediction is just an intellectual exercise - epistemoligical. The same seems to apply to the possibilities you reference, but this seems epistemological (educated guesses about possible existents), not ontological.

I do see the utility of having a category for non-actual possibilities, but I don't see how this applies to mathematical abstractions in general. It only seems to apply to abstractions that describe non-actual possible existents- a small subset of all mathematical abstractions.

the philosophical question is whether that assumption is warranted and simply asserting it doesn’t settle it. — Wayfarer

Nothing's settled in metaphysics, but it does seem unparsimonious to consider them part of the furniture of the world.

We don’t derive the idea of “three” from objects; rather, we recognize objects as “three” because we already grasp the concept a priori. In that sense, the number is not a mere feature of things, but something we bring to experience through rational apprehension. (Try explaining 'the concept of prime' to a dog!) — Wayfarer

A priori? That's debatable, but I'll grant that we recognize more stuff vs less stuff, and could probably arrange collections into an order. Once we start counting, we're abstracting- but not until then.

To conceptualize a prime number, we first need to have learned some basics (abstractions).

The fact that 3 + 2 = 5 holds independently of any particular instance—it would be true even if there were no physical groups of five objects anywhere. This suggests that mathematical truths are not dependent on the world, but structure our ability to make sense of it. — Wayfarer

Twoness, threeness (etc) are certainly ontological properties of groups, and there are logical relations between these properties. Is this a truth? Not in my (deflationary) view, because a truth is a proposition. But we can formulate true propostions that correspond to the relations between twoness, threeness etc.

Mathematics is taught (and utilized) in a way that seems to imply platonism, but that doesn't make it so, and I don't think it justifies the belief that it is so. Why make the unparsimonious assumption that they exist?

What makes you think that?

Not specifically, but it seems more plausible that it be something natural than for it to be some sort of complex intelligence with vast knowledge and power that just happens to exist uncaused.

I question Wayfarer's distinguishing between "existing" and "real". As a physicalist (more or less), I'd simply say that abstractions do not exist as independent entities in the world. We apply the "way of abstraction" - by considering several objects with some feature(s) in common, and mentally ignore all the other features. This process enables us to consider properties independently of the objects that possess these properties - even though those properties don't actually have independent existence; rather: they have immanent existence (they exist within objects). Example: we can consider several groups of objects, each of which has 3 members - and from this, we abstract "3". 3 is a property possessed by each of these groups.

This process is the basis of abstraction, but we can also conceptualize higher order abstractions by applying logic and extrapolating. That's the foundation of mathematics (from a physicalist perspective).

In the strictest sense of "knowledge", you can't "know" what is real. However, we do have an innate belief that we are perceiving and interacting with aspects of reality. My question is: why deny this innate belief? One is justified in maintaining a belief that has not been defeated. I can't see how it is justifiable to believe any specific alternatives. The innate belief is pragmatic, and all alternatives are unpragmatic.

Because our innate belief is POSSIBLY false, it might be reasonable to be agnosticism toward the question, but I'm but I'm skeptical that anyone can truly be agnostic toward this - are they going to stop eating because they are agnostic to what they are seemingly doing?

Fossil fuel companies have caused roughly 28 trillion dollars in damages from 1991 to 2020. — Mikie

I read the article you linked. My problem with the analysis that it fails to cast any blame at those who USE fossil fuels.

In my opinion, our earthly powers of logic and reason are insufficient to answer such a question. — an-salad

Indeed, logic and reason (alone) can't possibly answer the question. Future research and theory may point at an answer, but it seems unlikely that a definitive answer is in reach - because of the limits of available, empirical data.

There's options for Republicans who want a 12-step program away from asslicking stupidity. They don't have to go Democrat, they can just... focus on a better candidate and not back down. But they're too comfortable being in the fringes of the Trump cult. But their children will remember and they will be despised by history..... — Christoffer

While I embrace your sentiments, I think you give voters too much credit. Most voters spend 15 minutes a week paying attention to politics. Plus, the GOP spent 4 years spreading the Trump Gospel (the election was stolen; there was a deep state conspiracy to persecute him). Most people are unaware of the damning facts about Trump and also "know" the MSM lies about him. 1/6 is widely viewed as a tourist event that got out of hand, and that Ashley Babbit was a martyr.

In a facebook exchange with a facebook "friend" last year, I mentioned that 60-70% of Republicans believe the 2020 election was stolen. Not knowing this was a fact supported by multiple surveys over 4 years, he concluded from my comment that I was prejudiced against Republicans! And this guy was a "hold your nose" voter for Trump. Ignorance is rampant, and thrives in the GOP. Maybe you're right about the judgements their children will make,but not if Trumpism lives on - since he's ordered that only "patriotic" history be taught.

I do not blame any of the racist, conspiracy idiots that gained power, they do what the do. I blame the apathetic other people who are so mentally lazy they never believed someone this incompetent and racist would be able to reach office… even as he’s already been in office one term. — Christoffer

Only about 30% of Trump's voters are in the cult, but that was enough to overwhelm all other GOP candidates for the nomination. Beyond that, the problem is party loyalty. Only a handful of Republicans could bring themselves to vote against their party's candidate: a morally bankrupt criminal Republican is more acceptable than any Democrat. Independents were won over by 4-years of demonizing immigrants by the GOP, and by blaming the above average inflation on the incumbent party.

A ground of being would indeed be the source of all the possibilities (i.e. all the contingency) in the world. A ground of being doesn't entail a god at all, it's just an opportunity to assume one. One could assume a minimalist god (deism) or something more - but then it's just more assumptions. So I don't see the point of it all. Even the simplest assumptions are unparsimonious.

When God is described as the Ground of Being, this typically means that God is the fundamental reality or underlying source from which all things emerge. God is not seen as a being within the universe, but rather as the condition for existence itself. The implications of such a view are interesting. — Tom Storm

A "ground of being" is a deistic god (an indifferent creator), not a theistic god (a god of religion) worth either worshipping or worrying about. While I don't think it's truly justifiable to believe such a god exists, it also seems irrelevant if it does.

What I mean is, why aren’t anyone doing something when he breaks constitutional laws and regulations? — Christoffer

In many cases, he is breaking the law in order to fulfill his camaign promises/threats. Many think it's great to deport alleged gang members, and don't give a damn if it violates Constitutional due process.

Decreased government spending and tax cuts will certainly offset the cost of tariffs to the American public. Whether they can pass the tax bills is the problem. — NOS4A2

Tax cuts can offset the impact of tarriffs only for those families that pay a sufficient amount of taxes. It keeps the wealthy whole.

According to this, 40% of households pay no income tax. This article shows the average tax rate by income level.

The other big problem: if tarriffs are in place for the long term, it will drive more domestic manufacturing - which is great for the manufacturers and for employment, but this will reduce imports, and thus reduce tarriff revenue.

The latest corruption: Trump has pardoned a campaign donor, who's represented by AG Pam Bondi's brother:

Trump pardons Nikola founder Trevor Milton

Milton and his wife together made contributions last October to President Trump's reelection effort totaling over $1.8 million, federal records show.


CNBC reported that the pardon came two weeks after federal prosecutors urged U.S. District Judge Edgardo Ramos to order Milton to pay restitution of $680 million to Nikola shareholders, and another $15.2 million to Peter Hicks, a victim of his wire fraud.

Because of the pardon, Ramos could not order restitution of any kind.

They screwed up. How big a deal this was is unclear. If this was the first and only time they used Signal to convey classified info, then it's minor. It behooves the administration to tell us that. In either case, their lies - and attacking Goldberg, have made the story bigger.


.

You are unable to face reality. The administration screwed up.

Relativist

You're inconsistent. In the past, you supported the release of newswothy information:

I still do.

Regarding embarrassment: the officials committed the embarassing behavior. Goldberg was doing his job reporting it.

He was spying. — NOS4A2

In neither case did the journalist do anything illegal. In both cases, journalists were given information. In Goldberg's case, he revealed none of the sensitive information until the administration lied about it - and accused HIM of lying.

It's an unequivocal fact that the administration screwed up, they lied about it, and attacked the journalist who did nothing wrong.

A responsible administration would admit error, investigate how pervasive it was, and put processes in place to avoid repeating it. Blaming the innocent journalist is deflection.

Rather than remove himself from the situation or notify other members of the error, he surreptitiously took screenshots and used them to embarrass all involved — NOS4A2

You're inconsistent. In the past, you supported the release of newswothy information:

I do think it’s appropriate because it’s newsworthy. The duty of a journalist is to publish it. — NOS4A2

Regarding embarrassment: the officials committed the embarassing behavior. Goldberg was doing his job reporting it.

Trump learned about about the Signal screw-up on Monday afternoon, when a reporter told him.

Reporter (audio voiceover): Your reaction to the story from The Atlantic that said that some of your top Cabinet officials and aides had been discussing very sensitive material through Signal and they included in an Atlantic reporter for that? What is your response to that?

Donald Trump (audio voiceover): I don’t know anything about it. I’m not a big fan of The Atlantic. To me, it’s a magazine that’s going out of business. I think it’s not much of a magazine. But I know nothing about it. You’re saying that they had what?

Reporter (audio voiceover): They were using Signal to coordinate on sensitive materials—

Trump (audio voiceover): Having to do with what? Having to do with what? What were they talking about?

Reporter (audio voiceover): —with the Houthis.

Trump (audio voiceover): The Houthis, you mean the attack on the Houthis?

Reporter (audio voiceover): That’s correct.

Trump (audio voiceover): Well, it couldn’t have been very effective because the attack was very effective, I can tell you that. I don’t know anything about it. You’re telling me about it for the first time.

How could he have been unaware? Because he appointed incompetent people to important posts.

Clearly you read it. Why did you deliberately leave the rest out?

“Of course I didn’t see this loser in the group. It looked like someone else. Whether he did it deliberately or it happened in some other technical mean is something we’re trying to figure out.” — NOS4A2

Waltz' childish attack on Goldberg has zero bearing on the serious error Waltz committed. It just shows how dishonorable he is. He ought to be grateful that Goldberg didn't publish what he'd learned. Imagine if Goldberg had published this (allegedly) unclassified information immediately.

Your irrational loyalty to the Trump administration is truly pathetic. You were unwilling to believe Waltz even committed the error and jumped to the conclusion (without evidence) that it was the "deep state". Waltz played you, and you don't even realize it: he's deflected your attention from his error to the irrelevant fact that the recipient is a liberal.

Though it is possible that Waltz invited one of the worst, rabid, anti-Trump journalists, from one of the worst, rabid, anti-Trump publications to read in on a chat with the vice-president, and the highest cabinet positions, the sheer unlikelihood of it demands consideration of other possibilities. — NOS4A2

ROFL!
"When the Fox host asked [Waltz]how Goldberg’s number ended up in the group, Waltz responded: “Have you ever had somebody’s contact that shows their name and then you have somebody else’s number there? " -- source

Sound familiar? (See my prior post)

I don’t consider the words of Jeffry Goldberg to be evidence. — NOS4A2

Of course you don't. You trust your biases:

Smells to me like deep-state sabotage. — NOS4A2

This is why know one should take you seriously.

the sheer unlikelihood of it — NOS4A2

Did anyone think the invite was intentional? The implication is that it was careless. Waltz may have had Goldberg's number misidentified, or it was in his computer's clipboard. As I noted, the app may have been hacked. Use of this app was probably inappropriate.

But it turns out, there was no classified information conveyed in the chat. See: this.

Silly Goldberg should have posted the info as soon as he received it.

You're right - whether or was a typo or hackers, they should have heeded to prior warnimg about using Signal.

It's possible hackers were involved. See: https://www.npr.org/2025/03/25/nx-s1-5339801/pentagon-email-signal-vulnerability

If true, then they were derelict in using Signal.

You're "supposed" to believe things based on evidence, not based on biased speculation. There IS evidence of Waltz' involvement - the invite came from his account. There are other possibilities, but it's irrational to jump to conclusions without evidence.

*edit*
https://www.npr.org/2025/03/25/nx-s1-5339801/pentagon-email-signal-vulnerability

Michael Waltz screwed up. There's no evidence of anyone else doing anything nefarious. The jounalist (Jeffrey Goldberg) did not release plans, in fact he asked to be removed from the chat group. He published his article after the planned actions were executed- he wasn't even sure it was real until he read of the events unfolding.

How do you feel about them in women's locker rooms? Or restrooms? Maybe it would matter how long they've been transitioning and what their results are? There's no easy answers. It's not Trump's fault. It's the difficulties inherent in trans life. Some people will transition for years and still not be passable. — BitconnectCarlos

There ARE easy answers: gender-neutral restrooms, single occupant restrooms. Single occupant shower/changing rooms in gyms are also feasible.

Trump is absolutely at fault. He has
-ordered the removal of TGs from the military and denyed them the ability to serve.
-blocked gender-affirming care from health-care providers
-forbade counselling in schools for students with gender identity problems.

This problem is intractable. You'd honestly want Trump to legislate on this? It's too thorny. — BitconnectCarlos

Of COURSE I don't want Trump to legislate on it, and his executive orders have created more problems.

Too thorny for what? Too thorny to be solved? There are difficult areas, and I expect it would take time- as did the evolution toward gays in the military and same-sex marriage. Both those "problems" are solved, notwithstanding the objections of those who are intolerant. The wholesale discrimination that Trump has ordered only appeals to the intolerant, as far as I can tell. Some aspects may be OK, but what's problematic is the process- a royal decree and bullying by Trump, with no consideration of consequences.

A judged blocked it. — BitconnectCarlos

It shouldn't have been issued in the first place, and it will be appealed.

The transgendered have historically been treated unfairly and been publicly ridiculed. It behooves us to redress this. I'm not claiming to have the answers, but I am confident the problems can be addressed. IMO, the general principles should include avoiding discrimination, making reasonable accommodations, but also avoiding hurting others. I would have no problem telling TG girls (who have had the prior physical benefit of testosterone) they weren't allowed to participate in girls sports, because this is unfair to biological girls. So they may not get everything they want, but they deserve to be listened to, and to receive sensible accommodation.