The uncontroversial fact is that the deficit reflects spending more than is taken in. Therefore it can be lowered by decreasing spending, increasing revenues, or both.

2024 spending was $6.9 Trillion; revenues: $4.9 Trillion (deficit: $2 Trillion)

Spending breakdown:

24% Health Insurance (Medicare,Medicaid, CHIP, ACA)
21% Social Security
13% Defense
13% Interest on national debt
8% Federal pensions (govmt & military)
7% Economic security programs (Earned income tax credit, child tax credit, SNAP, SSI)
5% Education
2% Transportation
1% Natural resources & Agriculture
1% Science & Medical research
1% Law enforcement
1% International (embassies/consulates, humanitarian aid)
5% All other

Source

Every year's deficit is added to the national debt. Offset by projected decreases in interest rates.

Decreasing domestic spending will be contactionary (less money going into the economy; lower GDP; lower revenue)

Decreasing taxes is expansionary (more money going into the economy, higher GDP, partly offsets the lost revenue).

Deporting undocumented workers is contractionary (fewer consumers spendin $), and reduces revenue (primarily social security and medicare). Also will raise prices because of higher cost of labor.

New tarriffs will increase revenue, but raise prices so it will be contractionary).
-----------------------------
There's no easy solutions, because all options entail both negative and positive aspects.

Unequivocal corruption:

Order to drop New York Mayor Adams’ case roils Justice Department as high-ranking officials resign

NEW YORK (AP) — Manhattan’s top federal prosecutor, Danielle Sassoon, and five high-ranking Justice Department officials resigned Thursday after she refused an order to drop corruption charges against New York City Mayor Eric Adams — a stunning escalation in a dayslong standoff over the Trump administration prioritizing political aims over criminal culpability.

For years, Trumpists falsely accused the DOJ of being politicized, to provide cover for Trump's criminal behavior. Now they're overtly politicizing it.

Vance had also said Trump would never pardon 1/6 criminals who'd committed violent crimes. What he says is meaningless.

According to Greg, even using conservative assumptions, this fraud SWUNG the election. — hypericin

I object to labelling changes to the law as "fraud".

Changes were made in 2020 because of the pandemic. The changes made it easier to vote. As a consequence, we had record turnout (as a % of eligible voters). A positive consequence of the higher turnout: Trump lost.

The GOP scaled this back, making it harder to vote. Consequently, voter turnout was lower and Trump won.

It's easy to blame the law for the consequence, but I blame voters for not feeling sufficiently motivated to vote in spite of the impediments. I also blame single issue voters who stayed home because they perceived "no difference" on their single issue, and underestimated how bad things would get.

Who's this good for anyway? — jorndoe

There's some good in it for those who will save or make money.

The fundamental problem is that the negative consequences will be: 1) marginal - the majority of people won't suffer directly from failures to find treatment for diseases. 2) not felt in the short term. New treatments that might have otherwise been developed would not have have made a difference during Trump's term.

Sorry, I don’t understand what you are saying then. You seem to keep flip-flopping. First you mentioned that everything exists necessarily such that there is no way they could have failed to exist — Bob Ross

No, I didn't. Here's what I said:

Concrete example:suppose determinism is true. This implies every event, and everything that comes to exist, is the necessary consequence of prior conditions. — Relativist

You correctly noted that I should have said "causal determination", but my meaning is clear. I'm insisting on two things:

• Contingency entails non-actual possibilities
• IF there is contingency, it must have an ontological basis.

Here’s what I am thinking you are attempting to convey, and correct me if I am wrong: saying that a thing could have failed to exist if its parts did not get so arranged (or did not exist) does not demonstrate that it could have failed to exist because it may be the case that there were no other causal possibilities such that it would not have existed. Is that right? — Bob Ross

That's part of it. Also: composition is identity, and contingency implies non-actual possibilities (metaphysically possible).

Consider composed object X. I deny that there are "accidental" properties, so 100% of the properties (intrinsic+relational) are essential to being X. "X" refers to the unique thing that has that particular set of properties. So it's an identity.

In my sense of the term, a table is contingent upon its parts; — Bob Ross

A table is composed of its parts. Contingency implies something that could have been different. What is it that could have been different?

I think you can agree that that particular chair would not exist if its legs, the wood it is made out of, etc. did not exist — Bob Ross

The chair IS the arrangement of parts. So it's equivalent to saying "the chair would not exist if the chair did not exist".

Metaphysical possibility is such that a thing could exist in a manner that does not violate the nature of things; — Bob Ross

I have no problem with this definition, because "the nature of things" means that it's consistent with whatever metaphysical framework is true; in practice, we treat our own metaphysical framework as true.

But this is just definition; it's not an ACCOUNT of possibility: what is the ontological basis for a claim that a non-actual possibility was possible?

It's easy to conceive of non-actual states of affairs, and mistakenly claim it to be contingent. Example: the outcome of a throw of dice seems contingent because we can conceive of a different outcome. But the outcome is actually the deterministic outcome of the physical factors. So, given those factors, the outcome was necessary, not contingent.

contingency is the dependence of one thing on another for its existence; and necessity is the independence of a thing on any other things for its existence. — Bob Ross

Contingency implies something that could have been different. Suppose necessary object A deterministically causes B. B therefore exists necessarily. What is it that could have been different?

Causality is traditionally and widely accepted as explanations of why a thing is the way it is. What you are probably thinking of is physical or material causality. — Bob Ross

The Aristotelean paradigm. The modern physics paradigm is more straightforward, and it omits nothing. Labelling an object's composition its "cause" makes the word "cause" less precise and more ambiguous.
-------------------------

Did you read the whole SEP Article on Divine Simplicity? The section The Question of Coherence brings up a point similar to mine. It references Alvin Plantinga's objection to Divine Simplicity, which is perfectly reasonable under Plantinga's "approach to ontology", but that "Plantinga-style objections will not appear decisive to those who reject his metaphysical framework. "

The same principle applies to me: your argument depends on a metaphysical framework different from mine. You'll never be able to make it fit.

I'll weigh in, starting with this quote from the article:

"What could motivate such a strange and seemingly incoherent doctrine?"

It's motivated by a desire to rationalize an argument for God's existence. I find it ludicrous to purport to "prove" God's existence based on an assumption that is seemingly incoherent. To be persuasive, the premises should be easy to accept.

I consider this good news:

[b]Trump administration sues New York state over immigration[/b]

Attorney General Pam Bondi said Wednesday that the Justice Department is suing the state of New York and its top officials for prioritizing "illegal aliens over American citizens."

"As you know, we sued Illinois and New York didn't listen. So now you're next," Bondi said....

Bondi, in her first news conference since being confirmed, said “millions” of people “with violent records have flooded into our communities, bringing violence and deadly drugs with them,” and that states like New York with permissive immigration policies were contributing to the problem.


I welcome this, because it will lead to a rational analysis of the facts. It's well known that the crime rate among immigrants is lower than the general population. The Trump side can argue that even a single violent act by an immigrant would have not occurred if the particular culprit weren't here.

But there's another relevant factor: undocumented immigrants fearful of being deported are unlikely to report crimes committed against them. That's why police departments have historically refrained from enquiring about this and taking action. Perfect border enforcement is impossible, so my going-in assumption is that this argument will be dispositive.

A trial will constitute a well-moderated debate of the facts. I'll be surpised if Trump wins this, but either way, it will provide a good opportunity for critical thinkers to make an informed, rational judgement.

The task of a metaphysician (including us amateurs) is to provide a metaphysical account of the clear facts. The best you can hope for is an account that is coherent and has sufficient explanatory power to address all the clear facts. If you develop or encounter multiple such metaphysical theories, they can be compared to see which seems (subjectively) superior (e.g. more parsimonious; is consistent with other metaphysical assumptions you may make).

So yeah, it's worth pondering - but don't expect to land on a "proven" paradigm.

When you say something is innate, what does that mean? I would say innate means we have them without experience of the external world, or we have it from birth. — Corvus

That's exactly what I mean.

Is past present future innate? — Corvus

That's NOT what I'm suggesting. I'm suggesting that we have some intrinsic sense of temporal priority: we don't confuse a past action with a present one, and we anticipate/ hope for/ dread future acts but not past ones.

These are examples..I don't know the exact nature of this intrinsic sense of "time", but only noting that there must be something.

I suggest that the best explanation for this vague sense of time, is that it is consistent with reality: there's something ontological; it's not just a figment of the imagination.

It's a secondary matter as to how we account for time, and how we analyze it. We first need to accept that there is SOMETHING ontological to it.

Could "present" be being? Being is a concept which needs some explanation too, my friend. Would you agree? — Corvus

I agree, and I think it's worthwhile to construct a framework that helps us analyze time. A framework that makes successful predictions is better than one that doesn't. Would you agree?

Your view is a form of necessitarianism, — Bob Ross

You're equivocating. You had responded to my example in which I treated the result quantum collapse as actually contingent (and I STIPULATED it as such in the example) by asserting:

"If necessitarianism is true, then there are no other possibilities than the causality that occurred because nothing could have been otherwise".

Apply the label "necessitarianism" to my view if you like, but don't draw inferences based on the label. I absolutely believe there MAY BE contingency in the world, and that quantum collapse MAY HAVE a contingent outcome. This view fits the axiom of contingency I gave you.

I was charitably interpreting your idea of a “non-actual possibility”: like I stated before, possibility is coherence of a thing with a mode of thought (e.g., metaphysics, physics, logic, etc.). — Bob Ross

It's not "charitable" to make an assertion that simply contradicts what I've said, especially in light of the fact that I linked you to Yablo's paper in which he demonstrates the disconnect between conceivability and metaphysical possibility.

You apparently believe contingency is the default: if necessity isn't proved (or accounted for), contingency should be assumed. I believe the converse: if contingency can't be proved (or accounted for), then necessity should be the default. I justify my view on the basis that laws of nature exist and that they entail a necessitation. If quantum collapse has a truly indeterminate outcome, it's still a necessitation in that it necessitates a well-defined probability distribution of possible outcomes (David Armstrong refers to this as "probabilistic determinism"). What's your basis? Can you undercut mine?

composition is a kind of causality — Bob Ross

That depends on the metaphysical system you're using to account for it. My impression is that yours depends on a form of essentialism that considers an object's identify to be associated with an essence, to which "accidental" (contingent) properties may attach. That such essences exist is metaphysical dogma, not something that can be demonstrated to exist. My view is that object identity is consistent with identity of the indiscernibles:

A = B iff both have the exact same set of properties (both intrinsic and relational).

Without contingent properties, your argument from composition fails. That's because an object's constituents are an identity to the object itself.

That’s nonsense. That’s never what contingency has been about in the sense I described; and will never exclusively refer to what you mean here. All you did is axiomatically preclude a discussion about contingency in the sense of being caused. — Bob Ross

The axiom I cited was a direct quote from Amy Karofsky's book, "A case for Necessitarianism". She makes a strong case for the past failure of philosophers to provide a metaphysical account of contingency. She convinced me that contingency needs to be accounted for, not just assumed (as you do). I'm confident she would agree with the way I applied it to composition, not that it matters per se. It's coherent and consistent with everything we know about the world. You obviously don't like it because it's inconsistent your Thomist metaphysical framework. But as I've repeatedly reminded you, YOU have the burden of proof, and in my case - that means you would have to undercut the contingency axiom I stated. You can't, and that's why you're just reacting emotionally now.

This shouldn't have been necessary. It was obvious to me from the beginning that your argument depended on Thomist metaphysics. In my first post, I said "Thomism is a theistic metaphysics - Aquinas developed it from Aristotelian metaphysics, in order to make sense of God's existence. So it's unsurprising that it would entail a God. I get the fact that this would appeal to theists, but it has no power to persuade non-theists, unless you succeed in fooling them into treating the metaphysical framework as true."

You didn't accept this THEN, but I've given you a good basis to accept it NOW.

Even if this axiom were granted, then we would just refer to caused beings then instead of contingent beings: this doesn’t help your case. If a chair is caused by, at least in part, the atoms which comprise it; then, boom, we have the same argument taking lift off…

Composition and cause are two different things. Funny that you relied on this difference in your last post, when you argued that an object that was causally necessitated was (ostensibly) contingent upon it's composition. Since I proved you wrong, you're now backtracking.

Contingenct axiom aside, the necessity of composition can only be false if objects have contingent properties. If such were present then individual identity would violate identity of indiscernibles. Of course, you believe there are contingent properties because you embrace Thomism, which assumes there is essence. The existence of essence is axiomatic to Thomism.

This means that the entity’s composition suffices to demonstrate the necessity of that being because, under necessitarianism, causation could not have failed to be exactly what it is.

I am 100% certain I correctly interpreted what Karofsky said. Her wording was intentional, and I applied it correctly.

Suppose cause C indeterminately causes some one member of a set of possibilties to exist. All members of the set are possible, but only one will member will be actualized. The other members of the set are "non-actual possibilities"

No, no, no. If necessitarianism is true, then there are no other possibilities than the causality that occurred because nothing could have been otherwise—... — Bob Ross

Why the heck does it matter what necessitarianism would entail? I've never suggested I'm defending necessitarianism. I was simply answering YOUR QUESTION: "What the heck is a non-actual possibility?", I simply gave you an example in which I STIPULATED that the outcome was indeterminate, to help you understand the concept. Personally, I'm agnostic as to whether quantum indeterminacy entails metaphysical contingency. But if it does, it's consistent with my contingency axiom.

The only cogent interpretation of a ‘non-actual possibility’ would be either A) a possibility which failed to occur or B) something which is conceivable but not currently actual. — Bob Ross

ROFL! I previously called you out for what appeared to be, your conflating conceivability with metaphysical possibility, which you then denied. But now you're being explicit - suggesting that conceivablity is all that's needed to establish that something is contingent. There's no rational basis for this claim, and that's why IMO my axiom of contingency makes perfect sense to me. Contingency entails "non-actual possibilities", and I find it absurd to think that non-actual possibilities don't need to be accounted for metaphysically. I don't care if you accept that, because I'm not defending an argument with the hope of persuading you. I'm just explaining the reasons I reject YOUR argument.

You are not understanding this argument at all. — Bob Ross

You don't appear to be understanding MY argument. I explained why I'm convinced the past is finite. If you think I made a logical error, identify it.

As an aside, I arrived at my view that the past is finite after spending a good bit of time examining the Kalam Cosmological Argument, which depends on the past being finite. Although I didn't find William Lane's Craig's argument for a finite past persuasive, I studied the issue on my own, applying my math background, and landed on the argument I gave you. My only point here is to demonstrate that I don't simply go into denial when seeing an argument I disagree with. You should try to do the same.

1) it is apriori more sensible to believe so - no examples of property-less objects can be cited


This would be a reasonable a posteriori argument if, again, we didn’t have an example now by way of demonstrating that a simple being is required to explain completely the causal chain of composition of an object.

2)it is an ad hoc assumption, that adds no needed explanatory power


It does, because we cannot explain composition otherwise. — Bob Ross

Apparently THOMIST metaphysics can't explain composition otherwise, but that's irrelevant. I can explain composition with MY metaphysical framework just fine.

Time itself doesn't have past present future. It is us who divide time into those categories depending on what point, and what part of time we want to focus on. — Corvus

Do you deny there's some innate sense of past, present, and future? If you agree that there is, WHY do you suppose we have this?

time itself doesn't become anything. — Corvus

Of course not: time isn't a thing. But the present has just come into being

Do all your all imaginings matter?

You clearly have an intuitive understanding of past present and future - because you refer to.them . Those are "imaginings", but they're primary - innate. No one has to train you to distingish events in this way. You just learn words to apply to your innate sense.

That distinguishes it from your other imaginings about past present and future.

The ordered relation: past-present-future refers to the actual, not to the order we choose to contemplate them.
— Relativist
In theory, the ordered relation is true, but in reality they are one. If you think about it, future continuously becomes present, and present becomes past. In this case, is the division actually valid? — Corvus

It does not follow that they are one. The "becoming" needs to be accounted for, and can be - in a way consistent with your intuitive basis.

It is important to note the difference between a necessary being in the sense of being incapable of failing to exist vs. in the sense of being uncaused. The former still allows for contingency of existence on other things, and the latter entails brute facts. I think this is the crux between us, which rides on a conflation between these two. — Bob Ross

Here's my Axiom of Contingency:

A contingent entity requires not merely a explanation for its being or being such as it is, but an explanation for the possibility that it could have been otherwise.

As previously discussed, an uncaused object exists without explanation, therefore it is not contingent.
Could an uncaused object be contingent upon its composition? Let's see.

First a preliminary point. There is more to a composition than a list of objects. It also includes the arrangement of the objects. Example: A molecule of glucose has the exact same set of atoms as a molecule of fructose, but the atoms are arranged differently (they are termed "isomers").

Now apply the axiom to a composed object, C. C is explained by its composition. C is contingent only if this explanation (the composition) could also explain C's nonexistence. That's obviously false. C IS the specific arrangement of the objects that compose it. It's a strict identity.


Conclusion: an object's composition necessitate the object being what it is; the composition is not contingent. Necessitarian Amy Karofsky puts it this way:

"the necessity of a necessary entity just consists in its being the way that it actually is. Thus, an explanation of the entity’s being as it is will be an account of its necessity. "
(Page 3 of "A Case For Necessitarianism")

What the heck is a non-actual possibility?!? — Bob Ross

This reflects back to the axiom.
Suppose cause C indeterminately causes some one member of a set of possibilties to exist. All members of the set are possible, but only one will member will be actualized. The other members of the set are "non-actual possibilities". Also, if C caused D, then "D's nonexistence" is a non-actual possibility.

There must be a first cause because an infinite series of causes is viscious, NOT because an infinite series of compositions is viscious

This isn’t true, though — Bob Ross

"Viscious" means having a vice; i.e. something objectionable about the account. The vice I identified was that there would be nothing to account for the chain as a whole. You're right, that IF God exists, he could account for it. That might be relevant if it could be shown that the past is infinite. Even if it's a live possibility, it doesn't entail God, it just entails that something must underlie the causal chain. You'd at least have to show that God is the best explanation. Your case would require you to show magical knowledge is plausible, which you obviously can't.

But we don't need to debate that, because there's a worse vice for an infinite past: it entails reaching the present from an infinite past, through a sequence of steps of finite duration. No set of finite duration steps can complete an infinity.

The past process is symmetrical to reaching an infinite future through a day-by-day process. Every step takes you a finite number of days from today. "Infinity" is never reached. The past is a mirror image: it's impossible reach from an infinite past.

Nothing can exist that lacks properties, so no object can exist that meets your definition of "absolutely simple".

Ok, but let’s go back to the composition quick argument I gave you: that demonstrates that your metaphysical theory here is false... — Bob Ross

I showed that your composition theory is inconsistent with my contingency axiom.

so I have not reason to believe that nothing can exist that lacks properties.

It's irrelevant what you believe. You have the burden of proof. But you could try to undercut my belief. I believe objects have properties, because: 1) it is apriori more sensible to believe so - no examples of property-less objects can be cited - 2)it is an ad hoc assumption, that adds no needed explanatory power. 3) it fits a coherent, parsimonious metaphysical theory.

I assume you agree that our imaginings of future and past are not the same as the future and the past.

But when you are reflecting the events in past, present and future, they don't need to always in the order of the past -> present -> future. You could think about the future on what will happen to your project or the world in next year, and then you could go back to the past, when you have started the project, and then think about the present state of the world economy — Corvus

So reflecting on past and future doesn't have bearing on their having actually been a past, nor in there eventually being a future. Right?

The ordered relation: past-present-future refers to the actual, not to the order we choose to contemplate them.

What did you mean by "future" when you said:

I was imagining and meaning some present moment in the future, — Corvus

?

because they're not existent objects, then naturalism is obliged to say that whatever reality they possess is derivative - products of the mind — Wayfarer

This sounds like a denial that they exist immanently. Existing entails them actually existing, but immanently- not as independent objects.

Abstractions are mental attitudes, which are derived by considering multiple objects with common elements, and mentally substracting the aspects that distinguish them. These mental attitudes ("abstractions") have no bearing on the ontology of the objects. They pertain only to how we might think about them.

And I would say, that this relation exists as an intelligible relationship, a regularity that registers as significant for an observing mind. Furthermore that while right angles might exist immanently in particular a carpenter's square they also transcend any specific instantiation. That it is actually a principle, or a form, which can be grasped by an observing mind, and existent in the sense that you and I can both grasp what a right-angle is. — Wayfarer

The right angles don't EXIST transcendently, nor does any "form". That would entail reifying abstractions.

Great. The next question is: what is the ontological status of relations?

Consider 2 straight objects, touching at their ends, and lying at a 90 degree angle to one another (a carpenter's square). I would not say that the 90 degree angle exists (it's not an object in the world), but rather: a state of affairs exists (the carpenter's square), and that the 90 degree relation is a component in this state of affairs. So in this sense, 90-degree angle does exist- immanently, within the state of affairs.

This may, or may not, extrapolate to the time-relation, but it's at least a step in that direction.

Space is not like time. Space exits without measuring anything. Does time exist, if you didn't measure it? Can you tell time without looking at a watch or clock? — Corvus

Both time and space are reference frame dependent. Space isn't an existent; it doesn't have properties. Rather, space (distance; length) is a relation between things that exist.

Time doesn't exist either. It's not a relation between things that exist. Rather, it's a relation between events.

The idea of it being magical just begs the question — Bob Ross

I use the term "magical knowledge" to refer to the existence of knowledge by brute fact in the absence of any sort of medium. Both aspects are grossly implausible. You've presented no metaphysical account of how this could be, you haven't suggested a metaphysical grounding of it.
Question-begging applies to arguments. I'm not the one making an argument. I'm just explaining what I believe, and why I believe it.

it is worth noting that your view depends on physical processes for beings to apprehend the forms of things, and we still to this day have no clue how that would work in the brain — Bob Ross

We don't know how information is stored in the brain, but we have strong evidence that it is stored there: disease and trauma to the brain can destroy memory.

The apparent fact that information entails some form of encoding doesn't entail a physical encoding. Information theory still seems to apply, and information theory takes it for granted that the information exists in some non-simple form.

A composed being is not necessary, and its parts are not necessary unless those parts do not depend on something else to exist. — Bob Ross

Nonsense. A complex being could exist by brute fact. If it does then its existence is a necessary fact. Here's why.

Suppose C is an existing object or past actual event. If C is contingent, this means ~C is a non-actual possibility. What makes ~C truly possible? How do we (metaphysically) account for a non-actual possibility? Here’s how I account for it: suppose E is the metaphysical explanation for C. If C is contingent, then E must account for this contingency. So E explains: C & possibly(~C).

This doesn't imply object C exists eternally (at all times). It just means that when it actually exists, it could not have failed to exist.

So if C is a brute fact, there is no E that accounts for C & possibly(~C). Therefore brute facts are necessary.

Concrete example: suppose determinism is true. This implies every event, and everything that comes to exist, is the necessary consequence of prior conditions. There is contingency only if some prior condition is contingent. Because determinism is assumed, the only possible contingent fact is the initial conditions. If those initial conditions existed by brute fact, then their existence is not contingent.

It's erroneous to conflate conceivability with metaphysical possibility. Stephen Yablo shows this to be the case here: Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility? You do exactly that, as I'll show below.

Contingency is about existing dependently on something else, and necessity is to exist independently of anything.

That is only conceptual contingency, not metaphysical. If the universe is deterministic, then every state of the universe is the necessary consequence of past states. There are relations among objects in the universe (such as distance, gravitational attraction, and the chemical bonds), but all these factors are necessarily present. You're just conceptualizing (say) the solar system existing without (say) Mercury. But it's not truly metaphysically possible.

This does not make the parts necessarily existent: they are necessary for the composed being to exist as that being, and this is just another way of saying the composed being is contingent on its parts. — Bob Ross

Only conceptual contingency. Your conception ignores the overall context that I described.

Autonomy is a bad term for this, as that relates only to agents; — Bob Ross

No, it doesn't. I defined it as something that exists without cause or dependency. The universe (the totality of material reality) exists autonomously if naturalism is true.

Think about it. If the table exists only insofar as the atoms comprising it are in such-and-such arrangement which makes the table contingently existent from the atoms — Bob Ross

The existence of a table at a time and place, within a deterministic universe, has necessarily come to exist. Again,you are conceptualizing by ignoring the broader context.

Firstly, as I said above, that a being would no longer be that being without certain parts does NOT entail that those parts nor the being are nor is necessary. — Bob Ross

What entails it being necessary or contingent is whatever accounts for its existence.

Because if it can’t be infinite then there must be a first cause, and this first cause must not have parts (because, if it did, then it would just be a member of this infinite series of composition—and we just established that that is impossible). — Bob Ross

There must be a first cause because an infinite series of causes is viscious, NOT because an infinite series of compositions is viscious. You're conflating 2 different things.

9. Two beings can only exist separately if they are distinguishable in their parts.
False. Two beings can have identical intrinsic properties. Example: water molecules.

I am not sure we can make headway on this one ): — Bob Ross

The only rational choice is for you to agree with me, and drop your assumption. That's because I gave a real world example that falsifies your assumption.

All I will say is that if the two beings have properties—irregardless if it is intrinsic or extrinsic—then they are not absolutely simple — Bob Ross

Nothing can exist that lacks properties, so no object can exist that meets your definition of "absolutely simple".

I am, of course, judging this from the perspective of my metaphysical theory. As I said in my first post, your argument depends on metaphysical assumptions that I disagree with. You refused to accept that, and insisted I comment on your premises. In every case, I evaluated them on my metaphysical views, as you should expect because you didn't present an argument for YOUR metaphysical system. I believe I have proven my point.

The label is irrelevant; that's just semantics. What's relevant is the relations between the parts, things like their individual lengths, angles between them, distance between parts, etc. These are ontological.

If you think tables have an essence, tell us what it is. — Banno

To be clear: I do not believe in essences nor "natural kinds".

Yes, there's a "form", in a physicalist (not platonic) sense: the parts exist with relations to the other parts: legs a certain distance apart, with a roughly 90 degree angle to the table top.

So I'm not saying "table" is some ontological category.

Start with a dinner table, then disassemble it. All the parts are still there, but you no longer have a table.

An object is more than the set of parts that compose it. It's the composed parts + the way they are arranged that makes it something more.

what are your opinions about our current relationship with nature? Is it becoming better or worse? — Shawn

It varies by individual, but collectively - humankind is becoming increasingly worse, because there are so many of us

2nd reason: if a table is identical to the atoms that compose it, then if you remove a single atom, you're no longer dealing with the same table, since if you represent both cases using sets, it turns out that the set of n atoms is not identical to the set of n-1 atoms — Arcane Sandwich

I agree with your first reason, but not your second. It's still a table when you remove a few atoms. Not the SAME table but there's still a table there.

A table is an object composed of various physical objects arranged in a way to fit its intended purpose. One could dismantle it, and all the parts would still be there, but you couldn't use it as a table.

Funny how you selectively apply that excuse.

A person becomes a criminal when he commits the crime, not at the point of a criminal conviction. The Caroll lawsuit was based on him having committed a crime. Tax fraud and obstruction of justice are crimes. Conspiring to overturn an election is a crime- an extremely serious one.

ROFL! Apparently amnesia is one of the disorders contributing to the denial of his crimes. We've discussed various of Trump's crimes in the past, and you just deny the evidence and echo whatever nonsense the criminal has said.

A few posts back I mentioned a few of the prominent crimes: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/966696

Thanks for proving my point.

Of course physical objects exist i.e. chairs, desks, cups, trees, folks and cars .... I see them. I can interact with them. They have the concrete existence. Time? I don't see, or sense it. I can hear people talking about it, and asking it. So what is the nature of time? — Corvus

That is a much better question.

I was imagining and meaning some present moment in the future, when said "in due course". Not "at a later time". — Corvus

You acknowledge a future, and I assume you also acknowledge a past. This suggests a ordered relation: past->present->future.
We can label this ordered relation, "time". It's not a complete account, but it's a beginning.

Maybe they think it’s corrupt, therefore can’t be trusted. — Punshhh

They do, but IMO it's because of their faith in Trump. Trump's defense of his crimes entails blaming the system. It's reminiscent of OJ insisting LAPD conspired to get him. The difference is that OJ didn't sell this to the public like Trump does. In his supporters minds, Trump can do no wrong - so they embrace the ridiculous deep state conspiracy theory against him. The GOP assists by pushing the alleged weaponization of the DOJ.

I agree.

And yet it is true that dragons breath fire.

Ergo, fictional creatures can breath. — Banno

The fiction of dragons includes "breathing fire". But fictions still can't engage in the real world activity.

Do you understand my objection to the original statement:

Whether they exist or not, dragons breathe fire.

I'm not saying you can't make sense of it. But strictly speaking, when a noun appears once in a sentence, it has a single referent. Fictional creature and actual creature are 2 different referents.

That would mean 30-40% of Republicans plus a mass of independent voters don't care about rule of law. I think it's actually higher than that. — frank

I see your point.

Why would you think fictional creatures do not breath? — Banno

Breathing is a real world activity by real world creatures. A fiction can't do this.

are you now saying that there are two levels of ontology, stuff that exists and stuff that is actual?

IMO there's one ontology. Dragons are either real-world creatures, or they are concepts residing in minds.

At best you might say that some dragons breath fire. — Banno

This would imply that the set of all dragons includes all the real dragons and all the fictional creatures so-named. Some members of the set are said to breathe fire. We can't really say that "some dragons breathe fire" because fictional things don't actually breathe.

.

But since he was re-elected after what he pulled in Jan 6, it appears that large swaths of Americans don't care about rule of law either. — frank

Not necessarily. 60-70% of Republicans believe the 2020 election was stolen, and therefore Trump was justified in trying to remedy that situation.

I don't have statistics, but it appears to me that few Republicans understand that Trump committed obstruction of Justice during the Mueller investigation and in the documents case. Many also deny that he sexually assaulted E Jeane Carroll, and that it was therefore fine to defame her for her "lies".

It also seems that many are unaware of, or deny his guilt, at his various fraudulent activities (Trump U, Trump foundation, real estate valuations, and election fraud), or they consider the crimes minor.

So...some voters may actually respect rule of law, but are in denial about Trump. Of course, I expect that many believe that "Rule of Trump" is a greater good than rule of law.

Whether they exist or not, dragons breathe fire.
— Relativist
A change of topic. From "Dragons breath fire", you can conclude that something breaths fire. You cannot conclude that there are dragons. — Banno

It would be correct to say:

"the sentence: 'dragons breath fire' is true whether or not dragons exist"

because:

-If dragons exist, then "dragon" refers to these existing animals.
-If dragons don't exist, then "dragon" refers to a fictional creature.

In the original sentence, "Whether they exist or not, dragons breathe fire", there's just one referrent - not 2.