To show you can substitute different words for physical and end up with with the same conclusion... thus not an argument... — DifferentiatingEgg

I noticed that. I however asked you what you mean by mental and experience. You need to define them.

Let's do one even better

P1) Words and Ghost exist and they are subject to change

P2) Ghost are due to existence of words and the change in the state of the words is due to existence of Ghost

C1) Therefore, words and ghost cannot be the cause of their own change because of overdetermination (from P1 and P2)

You can change the argument the way you like. But you are skipping my questions. That is not fruitful. So again what do you mean by mental and experience?

You have no argument is the point...

Take a basic logic class to learn how to construct an actual argument. There are plenty of free courses on logic out there.

You need validity and soundness, you're missing both.

The conclusions of premises necessarily follow from premises...

Not a half assed "could be" or "maybe" ... but absolutely necessarily follows...

You have no argument is the point... — DifferentiatingEgg

I do. By changing the words in the argument you cannot show anything until you define the words that are used in the argument. Are you interested in a fruitful discussion? If yes you need to define what you mean by mental and experience. And yes, I can change the experience by X and physical by Y and my argument still follows, whatever X and Y are.

No you don't have an argument

Your form is shit you cant even detail it...

Such a waste of time. I am done with you and I am not going to discuss this topic with you anymore.

It shouldn't even be a topic. Take it to a university instructor. So you can actually learn something about a logical argument...

This is you stringing words together and saying "Look my words make a sentence and thus it is"

You have such a fragile ego you can't be bothered to learn how to make proper premesis.

It's fine to believe these words. But it's all faith my friend, it's all faith.

I am done with you.

:up:

My request is not a red herring. — MoK

I think we cannot make any progress. — MoK

I agree.

You define experience as a set of processes. That is not what experience is. When you experience something, it feels something in a certain way to you. So experience is not a mere process — MoK

Non-sequitur. As I said:

An experience is a set of perceptions (changes to the brain) and the related changes it leads to (eg the emotional and intellectual reaction; the memories).

Aren't you happy with my definition of experience?... — MoK

Of course not. You defined it in a way that's inconsistent with physicalism. You haven't identified anything that is necessarily non-physical. By contrast, my definition is neutral, and covers all associated, uncontroversial, facts.

...If not, you still need to define the experience since we cannot progress without it. — MoK

This is ridiculous! I already did!

Of course, experience is not an physical thing given my definition. And I don't assume its existence. — MoK

Consider what you're saying: you admit that you define experience as non-physical, then contradict yourself by claiming you don't assume it.

So, a chair is physical to you. What makes you think that the brain is not a physical object? — MoK

????!!!!??? Of course I think the brain is physical!

The brain like any other physical object is subject to change. It goes from one state to another state later. I am not saying that the brain is caused to do something but it is caused when it changes. The mind is Omnipresent in spacetime as I argued in the third part of the argument in OP. — MoK

This is incoherent. If the brain is not caused to do something by the immaterial mind, then the mind has no role in an account of experience, and no role in behavior.

It also has the ability to experience and cause physical. — MoK

You've just contradicted yourself.

The Mind is a substance that exists independently — MoK

If it is independent, there is no causation in either direction.

It causes a change in you because you as a person have a location in spacetime. — MoK

Then there has to be a causal connection between mind and brain. You gloss over this by making vague claims.

I have studied this topic but it seems that the nature of hallucination is not yet known to the best of my knowledge. — MoK

And yet, it makes perfect sense under physicalism. The point of my questions was to demonstrate that every metaphysical theory of mind has some problematic areas. If you were to claim non-physicalism is proven by the "hard problem" of physicalism, you'd be making an argument from ignorance. Such an argument from ignorance seems implied in your claims. The only reasonable approach is to draw an inference to best explanation: compare the strength and weaknesses of the 2 accounts. Among your challenges is the ad hoc nature of assuming a mind just happens to exist by brute fact. It's considerably more plausible to think "minds" are a rare, accidental occurrence in a universe of immense age with a potentially infinite extent.

What you think the 'world at large' is, relies on and is dependent on a great many judgements that you will make when considering its nature. You might gesture at it as if it were obviously something completely separate from you, but the very fact of speaking about it reveals the centrality of your judgement as to what the 'world at large' is. — Wayfarer

Sure, but why shouldn't we trust this judgement? If we don't trust it, then no scientific or metaphysical claims are justified.

Of course it exists. It's just that we don't see it as it truly is. Nobody sees it as it truly is. — Wayfarer

Then you should accept agnosticism and extreme skepticism.

You're starting from the assumption that the appearance, the phenomena, the world as it appears, is real independently of you, when your cognitive faculties provide the very basis for how it appears to you. If you want to refute this argument you need to understand what it is saying. It is not positing 'mind' as some objective, if ethereal, substance or thing.

My assumption is that our senses provide us a functionally accurate understanding of that portion of reality that we directly interact with. This is the epistemological ground for studying the world at large, beyond our direct access. This approach has lead to a coherent, and useful understanding of the world. Of course it's not provably true, but it's a rational worldview. It's also rational to be agnostic about the true nature of the world, but that is a dead-end.

I don't think the sense in which the mind is 'the product of reality' is at all well established or understood. — Wayfarer

Of course not. But it's a reasonable inference consistent with a coherent world-view. I don't see how you can defend any of your metaphysical judgements.

Non-sequitur. As I said:

An experience is a set of perceptions (changes to the brain) and the related changes it leads to (eg the emotional and intellectual reaction; the memories). — Relativist

Do you think that a rock experiences as well? There is a physical process within a rock as well. If not, what makes a brain different from a rock?

Of course not. You defined it in a way that's inconsistent with physicalism. You haven't identified anything that is necessarily non-physical. By contrast, my definition is neutral, and covers all associated, uncontroversial, facts. — Relativist

Your definition is at best incoherent. See above.

This is ridiculous! I already did! — Relativist

See above.

This is incoherent. If the brain is not caused to do something by the immaterial mind, then the mind has no role in an account of experience, and no role in behavior. — Relativist

It is not incoherent. You need to read it carefully.

You've just contradicted yourself. — Relativist

There is no contradiction. I argue in favor of it in OP.

If it is independent, there is no causation in either direction. — Relativist

There is vertical causation with the difference that the Mind is not subject to change whereas the physical is subject to change.

Then there has to be a causal connection between mind and brain. You gloss over this by making vague claims. — Relativist

There is vertical causation here. See above.

I agree. — 180 Proof

Cool.

Do you think that a rock experiences as well? There is a physical process within a rock as well. If not, what makes a brain different from a rock? — MoK

I pointed out in my first post that "experience" could be defined in a way that includes rocks;

Define "experience". A boulder rolling down a mountain has "experienced" the roll, and has been altered in the process. Similarly our "minds" are altered by sensory perceptions and by its own inner processes. — Relativist

We subsequently honed in on "mental experiences", which entails mental activity. Rocks do not have a structure that produces mental activity. So the answer is: no, unless we broaden the definition.

Your definition is at best incoherent. — MoK

You obviously forgot we were discussing mental experiences. If you still think there's something incoherent, map it out - like I do, below, with my allegation of incoherence.

This is incoherent. If the brain is not caused to do something by the immaterial mind, then the mind has no role in an account of experience, and no role in behavior.
— Relativist
It is not incoherent. You need to read it carefully. — MoK

I did. Here's a breakdown of what you said:

1. The brain... goes from one state to another state later.
2. I am not saying that the brain is caused to do something
3. it [the brain] is caused when it changes.
4. The mind is Omnipresent in spacetime as I argued in the third part of the argument in OP.

#1 entails a change of states. Change entails a cause for that change. #2 implies there is no cause of the state change. That's incoherent.

#3 makes no sense. What is the cause, and what is the effect?

Your assertion about the mind (#4) is unrelated to 1-3.

There is vertical causation with the difference that the Mind is not subject to change whereas the physical is subject to change. — MoK

This contradicts #2, above. You now seem to be suggesting the mind is causing the brain to change. If that is what you mean, then there must be a causal connection to the brain. Describe the nature of this connection.

If the mind never changes, then why does it interfere with brain function when it does? The mind hasn't learned anything to base it on, because learning entails change.

I don't see how you can defend any of your metaphysical judgements. — Relativist

I defend them with reference to the obvious shortcomings of physicalism, about which you have not answered any of my arguments.

'We trust our cognitive faculties because they work'.
'Science gives us a useful model, and that’s good enough.'
'Sure, we can’t prove the nature of reality, but agnosticism is a dead-end'

I pointed out in my first post that "experience" could be defined in a way that includes rocks; — Relativist

Well, you said that experience is a physical process. That is all I need. Do you think that this physical process or experience in the case of the rock goes in the dark? Yes, or no? If yes, why the physical process in the brain does not go in the dark? Why things are not dark for you instead they have some features that you are aware of. Could you say that you are unaware of things that happen to you? What is awareness to you?

We subsequently honed in on "mental experiences", which entails mental activity. Rocks do not have a structure that produces mental activity. So the answer is: no, unless we broaden the definition. — Relativist

What do you mean mental here? Experience is a physical process for you and any physical undergoes a physical process so I don't understand what you are going to gain here.

You obviously forgot we were discussing mental experiences. — Relativist

No, we were only discussing experience and not mental experience.

1. The brain... goes from one state to another state later. — Relativist

Correct.

2. I am not saying that the brain is caused to do something — Relativist

The brain is caused since it changes.

3. it [the brain] is caused when it changes. — Relativist

Correct.

4. The mind is Omnipresent in spacetime as I argued in the third part of the argument in OP. — Relativist

Correct.

#1 entails a change of states. Change entails a cause for that change. — Relativist

Correct.

#2 implies there is no cause of the state change. That's incoherent. — Relativist

#2 is incorrect.

#3 makes no sense. What is the cause, and what is the effect? — Relativist

By cause I mean it is created if that is not obvious.

Your assertion about the mind (#4) is unrelated to 1-3. — Relativist

It is not unrelated considering that motion is a change in matter. Please read the third argument.

This contradicts #2, above. You now seem to be suggesting the mind is causing the brain to change. — Relativist

I didn't say #2. I said clearly in OP that physical is caused. By this, I mean that the physical is created.

If that is what you mean, then there must be a causal connection to the brain. Describe the nature of this connection. — Relativist

The Mind experiences and causes physical, whether it is a brain or a stone.

If the mind never changes, then why does it interfere with brain function when it does? — Relativist

Because physical cannot change on their own because of overdetermination.

The mind hasn't learned anything to base it on, because learning entails change. — Relativist

The mind does not learn anything in the sense that we are learning. The Mind just experiences by this I mean it is aware of states of physical. It does not have any memory of things that experienced in the past. It just experiences a state of physical in one state and causes physical in another state immediately.

defend them with reference to the obvious shortcomings of physicalism, about which you have not answered any of my arguments. — Wayfarer

Your theory also has shortcomings. You admitted to a huge one:

how could mind be an uncaused cause? Well, damned if I know — Wayfarer

Further, you note that we don't know that we're seeing the world as it is, but that also applies to our the product of our self-reflection about the mind. For example, abstractions seem to exist, because we can reflect on abstractions. That doesn't establish that they necessarily exist outside our minds. This extends to all the allegedly nonphysical character of mind: it seems correct but can't be established as such.

Your theory also has shortcomings. You admitted to a huge one:

how could mind be an uncaused cause? Well, damned if I know
— Wayfarer — Relativist

That's not a shortcoming. I am not positing 'mind' in the sense implied by the phrase 'uncaused cause' as some entity or power that existed before anything else existed. What I did say was:

we only recognize causal relationships because the mind imposes a framework of intelligibility on experience and so provides the basis on which judgements about causation are intelligible. In that sense, mind is prior to the physical explanations of phenomena, not in the temporal sense of pre-existing those phenomena, but in the ontological sense as being the ground of explanation itself. — Wayfarer

which in essence is the form of argument known as Kant's answer to Hume. The point of this criticism, then, is the physicalist claim that the brain 'causes' the mind, or that physical causes 'give rise to' the mental. It is pointing out that the principle of causation is itself a relationship of ideas, and so dependent on the very thing that it's seeking to explain. A characteristic claim of Armstrong's is 'It seems increasingly likely that biology is completely reducible to chemistry which is, in its turn, completely reducible to physics.' What I'm arguing is that all such 'reductions' are themselves dependent on intellectual constructs. As Schopenhauer remarks, 'the materialist is like Baron Münchausen who, when swimming in water on horseback, drew the horse into the air with his legs.'

Further, you note that we don't know that we're seeing the world as it is, but that also applies to our the product of our self-reflection about the mind. — Relativist

I'm referring to insights that have arisen from cognitive science which lend support to a Kantian style of idealism (indeed Kant has been called the 'godfather of cognitive science'). This is the fact that the brain/mind synthesises data from the senses and combines them with its prior conceptual framework to arrive at judgements in order to derive our understanding of the world. All this is really pointing to, is that what we consider 'objective', that is, what exists independently of us or any observer, is still in that fundamental sense mind-dependent.

Consider the well-known anecdotes of neurologist Oliver Sachs, in 'The Man who Mistook his Wife for a Hat'. That story, and other stories in that book, show how neurological disorders can lead to radical misjudgements about the nature of reality. Of course the normal functioning brain doesn't make those mistakes - but the point remains, our experience of sense-able reality is still dependent on the brain in that sense, and some of the disorders that Sachs relates, completely alter the subject's world. The normal subject's world is still brain- or mind-dependent in that sense, but operating within expected parameters.

So - 'not seeing the world as it is' reflects the insight that the world is not simply given but is also constructed by the brain-mind. What I fault physicalism for is neglecting or failing to take into account this basic fact. It takes what is apparently given - the objective or apparently independently existing object - as being truly existent, without taking into account the interpretive role of the mind in construing what that object is. This happens every minute, moment by moment, in the stream of experience we designate 'consciousness'. Hence my reference to Schopenhuaer: 'But we have shown that all this (i.e. the sensory domain) is given indirectly and in the highest degree determined, and is therefore merely a relatively present object, for it has passed through the machinery and manufactory of the brain, and has thus come under the forms of space, time and causality, by means of which it is first presented to us as extended in space and ever active in time.' Schopenhauer says materialism - and it just as well applies to physicalism - is the philosophy of 'the subject who forgets himself', i.e. overlooks the role of his own mind in interpreting what he takes to be independently existent. Furthermore that philosophy consists of gaining insight into the way the mind does this. (Hence 'man know thyself'.) Physicalism forgets all of that.

For example, abstractions seem to exist, because we can reflect on abstractions. That doesn't establish that they necessarily exist outside our minds. This extends to all the allegedly nonphysical character of mind: it seems correct but can't be established as such. — Relativist

If by 'abstractions' you mean formal concepts, like number, arithmetical proofs and logical principles - my view is these are real, but not existent as phenomena. They are intelligible objects. They exist outside our individual minds but can only be grasped by a mind. And they're foundational to the enterprise of science, which is kind of an embarassment to physicalism. Physicalists will try to accomodate them by saying they're 'products of' or 'caused by' the material brain, but we've already shown the circularity of this reasoning.

I pointed out in my first post that "experience" could be defined in a way that includes rocks;
— Relativist
Well, you said that experience is a physical process. That is all I need. Do you think that this physical process or experience in the case of the rock goes in the dark? Yes, or no? If yes, why the physical process in the brain does not go in the dark? Why things are not dark for you instead they have some features that you are aware of. Could you say that you are unaware of things that happen to you? What is awareness to you? — MoK

First I'll note that you're going with a broad definition of experience, one that applies to mindless objects as well as objects with minds. A boulder rolling down a hill experiences changes along the way: pieces are chipped off, and new substances stick to it. Certainly this can happen in the dark of night, and without any mindful beings being aware of it.

Absolutely things can happen to us, and/or to our brains, without our being aware of it. Examples:
-surgery under general anasthesia
-Developing cancer prior to symptoms
-hair growth
-brain damage caused by sudden trauma.

What is awareness? Awareness entails developing beliefs about some activity or state of affairs. This could be from direct perceptions (a perception is a belief), by being told (as when a surgeon describes what he did), or hearing about something indirectly (such as from news sources).

What do you mean mental here? Experience is a physical process for you and any physical undergoes a physical process so I don't understand what you are going to gain here. — MoK

Mental activity is brain activity associated with a revision of intentional states.

1. The brain... goes from one state to another state later.
2. I am not saying that the brain is caused to do something
3. it [the brain] is caused when it changes.
4. The mind is Omnipresent in spacetime as I argued in the third part of the argument in OP.

#1 entails a change of states. Change entails a cause for that change. #2 implies there is no cause of the state change. That's incoherent.

#3 makes no sense. What is the cause, and what is the effect?

Your assertion about the mind (#4) is unrelated to 1-3. — Relativist

Xxxxxx

2. I am not saying that the brain is caused to do something
— Relativist
The brain is caused since it changes. — MoK

The brain already existed. Do you mean a new brain state was caused? If so, what caused the brain to change states?

#2 implies there is no cause of the state change. That's incoherent.
— Relativist
#2 is incorrect. — MoK

#2 referred to your statement "I am not saying that the brain is caused to do something"
Are you saying you were wrong?

#3 makes no sense. What is the cause, and what is the effect?
— Relativist
By cause I mean it is created if that is not obvious. — MoK

Then your ignoring the cause-effect. What I challenged you to do was to explain the cause-effect relationship between mind and brain. On the one hand, you seem to deny there is one, but in that case, the mind isn't involved at all with what we do, nor with our experiences.

Here's what I mean by involvement: 1) a causal involvement, in which the mind causes something to take place in the brain. You deny this causal role; 2) the mind is impacted by something in the brain (e.g. by sensory perceptions), but this would entail a change to the mind - which you say is changeless.

The mind does not learn anything in the sense that we are learning. The Mind just experiences by this I mean it is aware of states of physical. It does not have any memory of things that experienced in the past. It just experiences a state of physical in one state and causes physical in another state immediately. — MoK

You said the mind is unchanging. Any sort of learning entails change, and it entails some sort of memory. So you're saying the mind does not learn in any sense at all, right?

Suppose there's a rock sitting under my living room sofa. It is present when I sit on the sofa, and when I get up. It has no causal role and isn't changed during my sitting and changing. How does an unchanging mind with no causal role differ from the rock?

It seems that you don't account for the existence of mind (or mental activities) at all. You just deny physicalism, and offer no alternative.

What I'm arguing is that all such 'reductions' are themselves dependent on intellectual constructs. — Wayfarer

our experience of sense-able reality is still dependent on the brain — Wayfarer

So what? These don't doesn't falsify physicalism, and these don't imply alternatives are in any better position.

the world is not simply given but is also constructed by the brain-mind. What I fault physicalism for is neglecting or failing to take into account this basic fact. — Wayfarer

I disagree with the wording of the 1st sentence: it equivocates on "the world". There is an actual world, and then there is a concept of the world. There is some disconnect, of course. But there is also a connection: we exist within it.

Physicalism accounts for both the actual world and it accounts for the existence of minds within it. It's hypothesis, and skepticism is warranted. But the skepticism should be applied even-handedly, not just as an excuse to shoot down theories that lack some subjective appeal.

If by 'abstractions' you mean formal concepts, like number, arithmetical proofs and logical principles - my view is these are real, but not existent as phenomena. They are intelligible objects. They exist outside our individual minds but can only be grasped by a mind. — Wayfarer

You could develop a metaphysical theory that includes abstract objects, but it's just another unprovable theory. My point is that intelligibility doesn't establish existence. We can form concepts about abstract matematical systems unrelated to extra-mental reality. We can formulate, or learn, details about fictional entities (dragons, wizards, unicorns...) that are intelligible, but they are not part of extra-mental reality.

What I'm arguing is that all such 'reductions' are themselves dependent on intellectual constructs.
— Wayfarer
our experience of sense-able reality is still dependent on the brain
— Wayfarer

So what? These don't doesn't falsify physicalism, and these don't imply alternatives are in any better position. — Relativist

It does falsify physicalism, because it reverses the ontological priority that physicalism presumes, namely that the mind is dependent on or derived from the physical. Its saying that the physical is mind-dependent - the opposite of what Armstrong says. Not seeing it is not an argument against it.

the world is not simply given but is also constructed by the brain-mind. What I fault physicalism for is neglecting or failing to take into account this basic fact.
— Wayfarer
I disagree with the wording of the 1st sentence: it equivocates on "the world". There is an actual world, and then there is a concept of the world. There is some disconnect, of course. But there is also a connection: we exist within it. — Relativist

But we're never in a position to see an actual world apart from or outside of the way the brain/mind construes it. It's not as if you can step outside of it. We know the world as it appears to us, but not as it is outside that. That is the meaning of the 'in-itself' - we don't see the world as it is in itself.

Physicalism accounts for both the actual world and it accounts for the existence of minds within it — Relativist

I've presented a philosophical argument as to the circularity of the physicalist view. That argument hasn't been addressed.

You could develop a metaphysical theory that includes abstract objects, but it's just another unprovable theory. — Relativist

Not true. What of mathematics? Mathematical physics? Strictly speaking, the term 'proof' only applies to arithmetic. The whole human intellectual capacity relies on abstraction. It is fundamental to language.

The appeal of physicalism is that it is basically an attempt to reach scientific certainty with respect to philosophy. The reason physics was chosen as a paradigm, is because its methods and predictions are (or at least were) definite and unambiguous, and its predictions were applicable across an enormous range of phenomena. After all mathematical physics is behind many of the great breakthroughs in science, well beyond physics itself. Physics in that sense became paradigmatic for scientific knowledge generally. So the reductionist program was to bring philosophy within the scope of this model and the 'Australian materialists' notably Armstrong and Smart, were advocates for this kind of ambitious scientifically-based reductionism. I think it's a misapplication of the scientific method.

It does falsify physicalism, because it reverses the ontological priority that physicalism presumes, namely that the mind is dependent on or derived from the physical. Its saying that the physical is mind-dependent - the opposite of what Armstrong says. Not seeing it is not an argument against it. — Wayfarer

It's falsified on the assumption that the actual world mind-dependent. Similarly, a mind-dependent world is falsified by an assumption of physicalism. IOW, these are mutually exclusive assumptions. That is not what I meant.

I absolutely am not trying to convince you physicalism is true. This thread was about an alleged proof that physicalism is false. I've been explaining why the argument fails. That doesn't entail proving physicalism is true; it entails establishing that it is possible because it is a complete, coherent metaphysical theory. It's a burden of proof issue: the burden is on the proponent of an alleged proof. Otherwise we just agree to disagree.

But we're never in a position to see an actual world apart from or outside of the way the brain/mind construes it. It's not as if you can step outside of it. We know the world as it appears to us, but not as it is outside that. That is the meaning of the 'in-itself' - we don't see the world as it is in itself. — Wayfarer

I think we see reflections of actual reality, and that provides a basis for exploring further. You choose to believe that's hopeless. That's your provilege, but it leaves you with no basis for claiming anything exists outside your own mind. There appear to be other people, but appearances carry no weight with you.

I've presented a philosophical argument as to the circularity of the physicalist view. — Wayfarer

A coherent theory will necessarily have circular entailments. That doesn't falsify it; it's a feature that SHOULD be present. The proper question is: can one justifiably believe the world is 100% physical? Your subjective reasons to reject it do not undercut my justification.

You could develop a metaphysical theory that includes abstract objects, but it's just another unprovable theory.
— Relativist

Not true. What of mathematics? Mathematical physics? — Wayfarer

No; you miss my point. See this post, where I defined a mathematical system.

My point is that mathematical systems are intelligible, but that doesn't imply they have extra-mental existence. Two different systems can have incompatible axioms, which proves they can't both be representative of something in the real world. Intelligibilty is therefore not a reliable guide to what exists. Sometimes unintelligible things may be true (like wave/particle duality), and force us to rethink our paradigm.

The appeal of physicalism is that it is basically an attempt to reach scientific certainty with respect to philosophy — Wayfarer

No, it isn't. Rather, there's a 2-step process:
1) acknowledging that science provides the most trustworthy means of establishing a posteriori knowledge about the world. (Contrast with untestable philosophical reflection- including metaphysical theories). Scientific "facts" are not necessarily true, but the recursive nature of prediction, testing, and revision establishes the superior trustworthiness.

2) Science is not metaphysics; it can't account for itself. For this, we need a metaphysical theory. The objective standards for evaluating s metaphysical theory apply: parsimony and explanatory power. The required explanatory power is that it be able to account for all the uncontroversial facts of the world. Metaphysical naturalism does this more parsimoniously than anything else, because the only uncontroversial facts are analytic and a priori truths, and scientific facts.

Belief in metaphysical naturalism (per se) does not depend on any particular scientific theory being true. (Notwithstanding: scientific realism, which treats current science as true, and is thus falsified along with theories - and then resurrected anew with revised realist theory. I'm not a fan).

the reductionist program was to bring philosophy within the scope of this model and the 'Australian materialists' notably Armstrong and Smart, were advocates for this kind of ambitious scientifically-based reductionism. I think it's a misapplication of the scientific method. — Wayfarer

Non-reductive physicalism entails ontological emergence. Reductive physicalism assumes all high order properties and relations are the necessary consequence of the properties and relations of lower order constituents. Ontological emergence entails novel properties or relations appearing at higher levels that aren't fully accounted for by the lower levels. Philosophers tend to reject this for the same reason scientists do, not BECAUSE scientists do. It violates the PSR and is unparsimonious.

. That doesn't entail proving physicalism is true; it entails establishing that it is possible because it is a complete, coherent metaphysical theory. — Relativist

You haven't established that. Where I joined was to challenge this statement of yours:

how can a brain (with all the various properties of material objects), be caused to do something by something that lacks all material properties (no mass, no energy, no charge, and no location in space)? — Relativist

To which I responded:

The mind has non-physical properties, such as the ability to infer meaning and interpret symbols such as language and mathematics. These acts are not determined by physical causes in that there is no way to account for or explain the nature of the neural processes that supposedly cause or underlie such processes in physicalist terms, without relying on the very processes of inference and reasoning which we're attempting to explain. — Wayfarer

Your response was: we can lift our arms. How does that indicate a 'complete, coherent metaphysical theory'? You further said the ability to infer meanings are 'semantic relations' and 'not ontological'. But this doesn't address the issue that we have to rely on such semantic relations to establish what is ontological - what is, for example, the nature of the physical, and how or if it is separate from the mind.

I think we see reflections of actual reality, and that provides a basis for exploring further. You choose to believe that's hopeless. — Relativist

I've never said it's hopeless nor do I believe it is. I'm a scientific realist, but not a metaphysical realist. I believe scientific observations describe a real world that is independent of any particular observer, but it is not independent of all observation - otherwise what world are we talking about? Taking into account the way the mind shapes the understanding is part of cognitive science, but it also has philosophical implications. I don’t think you’re seeing the point I’m trying to make, which is not so radical as it seems.

the way the mind shapes the understanding — Wayfarer

Yes, and reality is not real since it is a representation, although a useful model, the same model used in those night dreams that seem so real.

The unreal representation is as the messenger; but, perhaps it is the message that is real.

Phenomena is the false or deficint way we see the world. Everything is a sign pointing to noumena. Phenomena is maya, and what noumena is, in substance, is impossible to know

how can a brain (with all the various properties of material objects), be caused to do something by something that lacks all material properties (no mass, no energy, no charge, and no location in space)? — Relativist

Through mathematics, humans are able to discover, predict and control events that would otherwise never occur or be observed in nature. So while it's true that numbers have 'no material properties, no mass, no energy, no change, and no location in space' the ability to grasp mathematics has many demonstrable material consequences. Abstract mathematical models are used to design rockets, build bridges, and develop quantum computing—things that would never occur spontaneously in nature and could never be discerned in nature without mathematics. Purely formal relationships (e.g., Einstein’s field equations, Schrödinger’s wave equation) appear to govern physical reality, yet they are not themselves physical. Another example: The discovery of Maxwell’s equations (which are purely formal) led to the creation of radio waves, television, and modern telecommunications—none of which would have "just happened" without conceptual reasoning. Notice also that these discoveries have lead to continual changes of the ‘idea of the physical’ (a perfect illustration of Hempel’s Dilemma).

So - the mind - reason - is able to peer into the realms beyond the physical and to bring back from it, things that have never before existed. Sure, those things are physical - but are the principles which lead to their invention?

What is awareness? Awareness entails developing beliefs about some activity or state of affairs. This could be from direct perceptions (a perception is a belief), by being told (as when a surgeon describes what he did), or hearing about something indirectly (such as from news sources). — Relativist

I didn't ask for your definition of awareness which as usual is unrelated and unnecessary. You need to pay attention to my argument and definition of words. So again, why don't your brain's physical processes go in the dark? You are aware of thoughts, sensations, feelings, beliefs, etc. By aware here I mean that the opposite of the dark. You are not living in a dark state. Are you? You are aware of things. You can report what you are aware of too.

The brain already existed. Do you mean a new brain state was caused? If so, what caused the brain to change states? — Relativist

Any physical including the brain does not exist in the immediate future. Phsycail exists at now. The subjective time however changes and this change is due to the Mind (please read my second argument in OP if you are interested). So there is a situation where the immediate future becomes now. Physical however does not exist in the immediate future so it cannot exist in the situation when the immediate future becomes now, therefore the Mind causes/creates the physical at now.

#2 referred to your statement "I am not saying that the brain is caused to do something" Are you saying you were wrong? — Relativist

You need to read the rest of my sentence: "I am not saying that the brain is caused to do something but the brain is caused." This was a response to you that you said the brain is caused to do something...

Then your ignoring the cause-effect. What I challenged you to do was to explain the cause-effect relationship between mind and brain. On the one hand, you seem to deny there is one, but in that case, the mind isn't involved at all with what we do, nor with our experiences. — Relativist

The cause and effect in the case of Mind is the experience of physical and causation of physical. By this, I mean that the experience in the Mind is due to the existence of the physical. The existence of the physical is however due to the existence of the Mind since that is the Mind that causes physical in the subjective time. So we are dealing with vertical causation by this I mean that the physical in the state S1 causes an experience in the Mind. The Mind then causes physical in the state S2. The Mind then experiences physical in the state of S2 and causes physical in the state S3, etc.

Here's what I mean by involvement: 1) a causal involvement, in which the mind causes something to take place in the brain. — Relativist

No, the Mind causes the brain. It doesn't cause something to take place in the brain.

You deny this causal role; 2) the mind is impacted by something in the brain (e.g. by sensory perceptions), but this would entail a change to the mind - which you say is changeless. — Relativist

The Mind experiences physical. This however does not mean that the Mind changes. The Mind does not have any memory of what has experienced in the past. It just experiences and causes physical immediately.

You said the mind is unchanging. Any sort of learning entails change, and it entails some sort of memory. So you're saying the mind does not learn in any sense at all, right? — Relativist

Yes. Please see the last comment.

Suppose there's a rock sitting under my living room sofa. It is present when I sit on the sofa, and when I get up. It has no causal role and isn't changed during my sitting and changing. How does an unchanging mind with no causal role differ from the rock? — Relativist

Any physical changes even those that seem to be unchanging. The rock is on Earth, Earth is moving so the rock. The particles that make an object are in constant motion even if the object is in space and has no motion. The Mind is Omnipresent in spacetime so it is changeless as I argued in my third argument.

The mind has non-physical properties, such as the ability to infer meaning and interpret symbols such as language and mathematics. These acts are not determined by physical causes in that there is no way to account for or explain the nature of the neural processes that supposedly cause or underlie such processes in physicalist terms, without relying on the very processes of inference and reasoning which we're attempting to explain. — Wayfarer

Inferring meaning is not uncaused. It is caused by our interaction with the world. Meaning entails a "word to world" relationship, where "world" is our internalized world-view, that evolves during our lives.

It begins in our pre-verbal stage, based on our sensory input (including our bodily sensations). Our natural pattern recognition capabilities provides a nascent means of organizing the world that's perceived facilitating interaction with it. Pattern includes appearance and function and associations to other things (eg spoon-food-hunger-taste-smell). These associations are the ground floor of meaning. Associations grow over time, thus gaining additional meaning.

Verbal language entails associating pattern of sounds with prior established visual patterns. Written words are associations with the verbal

Nascent inference is again pattern recognition (if x happens, y will follow). With language, it becomes more developed, and we can recognize patterns in the language - that there is a generalized "if x then y" .

Basic math entails patterns between quantities, leading to counting and then learning the general relations of arithmetic.

Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) are adept at pattern recognition, so that core capability is perfectly consistent with physicalism. More generally, ANNs provide empirical support for the emergence of complex behaviors from simple interactions between units, consistent with the the idea that the mind is an emergent property of neural activity.

this doesn't address the issue that we have to rely on such semantic relations to establish what is ontological - what is, for example, the nature of the physical, and how or if it is separate from the mind. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure I understand the objection, but I'll try to address.

Nature of the physical: We start considering the physical to be anything we can touch, or seems touchable. We only recognize that air (and other gases) are physical after scientific study. By that same token, we don't naturally recognize elements of the mind as physical, but we come to learn of clear physical dependencies - like memories, that can be lost due to disease and trauma. The notion that memories have a physical basis is consistent with information theory. Memory is the basic building block of the mind: recognized patterns entail memories.

Everything in the world outside ourselves is demonstrably physical. We are part of that world, so why we wouldn't be as well?

the mind - reason - is able to peer into the realms beyond the physical and to bring back from it, things that have never before existed — Wayfarer

The pattens in nature existed before us. Our intellect is based on our pattern recognition skills.

MoK, the problem with your argument is that it ignores basic science about the brain. Your mind is caused by your brain. That's a pretty well established fact at this point in history. Philosophy has to be constructed on the science and current understanding of the day or else its just logical fiction.