You definitely discussed "state of affairs" ontology with me, in your reference to an initial state of affairs. You even defined it for me:

By "state" or "state of affairs", I am referring to the the totality of existence at a point of time — Metaphysician Undercover

I hadn't discussed "state of affairs" ontology with you, so had not used the term that way. — Relativist

Your definition of "state of affairs", as stated in your reply to me, does not support your claim that it is the most fundamental concept in ontology. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your definition can be broken down in analysis into two distinct aspects, objects and their relations. These are two very different concepts, and since "state of affairs" is made up of these two, they are each more fundamental than "state of affairs". — Metaphysician Undercover

I don’t take issue with physicalism because you hold it, but because I believe it’s a mistaken philosophical view. — Wayfarer

I believe I’ve given you many grounds on which I and others believe physicalism to be a mistaken philosophical view, but that you don’t recognize the arguments.

The term "physicalism" is used largely for historical reasons. These are discussed in the SEP article on physicalism. Personally, I make sense of it by considering proper subsets of the sorts of things commonly treated as existing: spiritual/supernatural objects (e.g. angels), abstract objects, and physical objects. Physicalists deny the existence of the first two. — Relativist

The argument is that the reference to "spiritual/supernatural objects" is a category error. That by declaring the 'spiritual or supernatural' to consist of 'objects' you are making it an empty set. — Wayfarer

Although you charge me with vagueness, I can’t help noticing that physicalism itself is equally vague, if not more so. When it defines “physical” as “whatever physics will someday describe,” or as a “state of affairs” (which in practice means “whatever happens to be the case”), how is that not vague? — Wayfarer

Of course it sounds vague when what you want is something very specific, determinable by scientific enquiry, an 'atomic fact'. Questions of this kind are always elusive, that's why the positivists wanted to declare them all meaningless as a matter of principle. They're difficult in a way different to technical and scientific questions. — Wayfarer

The only thing being "transformed" is the mind of the person, not the external world.
— Relativist

There, again, is your belief that the world is a certain way, that it has a determinate existence external to your cognition of it. But this is just what has been called into question by both cognitive science and quantum physics. — Wayfarer

we do not see the phenomenon 'in itself', as it is, independently of our observation of it. We're involved in producing the outcome. — Wayfarer

The fact that you will invariably interpret this as being a causal sequence where consciousness is one thing, the effect another, is the same issue as treating the spiritual or supernatural as 'an object'. As I said, requires perspectival shift to see why. — Wayfarer

[b)You've provided no reason to think this is a false distinction[/b]
— Relativist

I just have! I'm trying to convey a difficult point about the nature and limitations of objective thought, but everything I'm saying is interpolated into an idiom within which only what is considered objective is admissable. — Wayfarer

Vagueness is suspicious: it tends to be both unconvincing and incorrigible. Unconvincing, because of the lack of clarity needed to analyze and evaluate it. Incorrigible because one can twist the vague meanings on the fly in order to counter objections. — Relativist

I understand that - what is physical is defined in contrast with or distinct from what is supernatural or spiritual. That's a part of my point - it is an aspect of the 'Cartesian division' which I've already referred to. I'm trying to explain what is wrong with the expresssion 'spiritual/supernatural objects...' — Wayfarer

There is no objective existent which corresponds with 'spirit' because (again whether it is real or not) it transcends the subject-object division. — Wayfarer

There are four ways of knowing: propositional, perspectival, procedural and participatory (ref.)Participatory knowledge is the knowledge of what it’s like to occupy a role in your environment or relationships. Vervaeke considers this to be the most profound of the four types of knowledge. It involves being in a deep, transformative relationship with the world, participating fully in something that is wider than you. — Wayfarer

Of course, this is all light years away from David Armstrong's physicalism — Wayfarer

it still marks a break from naïve objectivism (where objects are assumed to have definite properties regardless of measurement). — Wayfarer

And then, there's the all-too-obvious point that all such measuring devices and instruments are extensions of human sensory abilities. 'The apparatus has no meaning unless the human observer understands it and interprets its reading,' as Schrödinger put it. — Wayfarer

I'm trying to draw attention to the implied understanding in your framing of the issue, of the separateness of mind and world. Universals, in the medieval account, are the way in which the intelligible features of the world are absorbed by intellect — Wayfarer

Aquinas, building on Aristotle, maintained that true knowledge arises from a real union between knower and known.... Thus, knowledge is not an external mapping of the world but an assimilation, a union that bridges the gap between subject and object through shared intelligibility.

That’s precisely the issue: the category “states of affairs” is elastic enough to accommodate whatever physics happens to throw up. It’s not doing explanatory work so much as retrofitting itself to whatever the latest theory says exists. — Wayfarer

Furthermore, I don’t think it’s helpful to frame this as though my philosophical outlook simply reduces to my personality or my particular “areas of concern” which is essentially a form of ad hominem argument. I — Wayfarer

I have the proof which I believe is irrefutable. You dispute the truth of one of my premises. The burden is on you to demonstrate that the premise is false. — Metaphysician Undercover

What you actually need to do to prove that the premise is untrue, — Metaphysician Undercover

I believe the cosmological argument provides irrefutable proof of God — Metaphysician Undercover

That does not affect the argument. You just switched terminology from the existence of a physical thing, to a "state of affairs". By the inductive principle, the potential for each "state of affairs" is prior in time to that state of affairs. And, it needs an actual cause. Therefore even the proposed "initial state of affairs" has an actual cause which is prior to it. — Metaphysician Undercover

By presenting an alternative you hadn't considered, I conclusively proved your conclusion false.
— Relativist

You haven't presented any alternative. You only irrationally denied the inductive logic as black swan fallacy. However, there is no black swan fallacy here, because all experience and all physical evidence points to the truth of the premise — Metaphysician Undercover

In infinite possibility each must be equally probable to allow that all are possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

However, an initial state is also conceptually possible: we can conceptualize something just existing by brute fact*.
— Relativist

This is false. We have an idea of what "existing" means. And, it is derived from our observations of the physical world. If we move to "conceptualize something existing by brute fact", then we violate, or contradict the meaning of "existing" which is supported by observations of our world. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course one might stipulate, like in the case of mathematical axioms, what "existing" means, and proceed to a conceptualization of something which exists simply because it is posited as existing, but what good would that do? This conceptualized existing thing, which exists because it is posited as existing by brute fact, would be something completely distinct and unrelated to the actual physical existence which we know — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, this is false. Yes, we have two contradictory metaphysical claims. However, mine is proven through reference to the actual physical world, and the strongest inductive principle which we can know — Metaphysician Undercover

Your understanding of the big bang theory is flawed. The theory of the big bang is based on general relativity: the size of the (currently) visible universe approaches zero at increasingly earlier states. So there's a mathematical limit of 0 size and infinite density. This entails a mathematical singularity - from which physicists infer general relativity breaks down. They also note that below a certain radius, quantum effects would dominate. This is currently unanalyzable because there is no accepted theory that reconciles general relativity and quantum mechanics.
— Relativist

i don't see the flaw — Metaphysician Undercover

The actual science is independent of all the metaphysical claims you made.
— Relativist

Utter bollocks. But go ahead and back your assertion up with the argument that might sustain it — apokrisis

The observations you refer to are entirely within a temporal context, such that for any observed object, X, we observed a time (Tp) prior to its existence. So we can conclude that the state of affairs at Tp necessarily had the potential to produce X.

Your inductive inference applies to all cases in which an object comes into existence from a state of affairs in which it did not exist. It does not apply to an initial state of affairs (Si); because there was no prior time at which Si did not exist. There's no objective reason to believe an initial, uncaused, physical state of affairs could not have existed.

I have just conclusively shown that your argument is non-sequitur.
— Relativist

No, you have just presented me with an irrelevant and false proposition, that an initial state of affairs is required. — Metaphysician Undercover

The irrationality of an initial state of affairs, in the absolute sense, with no prior time, demonstrates that any proposed initial state, itself requires a prior cause.

That is exactly the case with the proposed "Big Bang". It must be either reduced to a nonphysical mathematical "singularity" as the initial state (which is irrational because its a mathematical, nonphysical "state"), or else understood as having a prior cause, God or some other sort of universe creating mechanism.

This is why physicalism is a very problematic perspective. Mathematical axioms assume the existence of mathematical objects. — Metaphysician Undercover

This indicates that what you state as the approach of physicalism, "physicalism defers to physics the identification of what exists", is mistaken. — Metaphysician Undercover

how anyone portrays the ontology of modern physics is just a matter of personal preference. — Metaphysician Undercover

But again, please understand what I see as the fundamental category error in this formulation. By casting the non-physical in terms of 'spiritual/supernatural objects', you are already framing it within the paradigm of objectivism - the assumption that whatever is real, is, or could be, an object of cognition....empiricist presuppositions ... — Wayfarer

This is a metaphilosophical point concerning questions about how philosophy itself is conceived. — Wayfarer

All that in mind, “the nature of being” can be understood very differently. In phenomenological (and also Indian) philosophy, being is participatory: something we are always already enacting, not a detached object of analysis — Wayfarer

The challenge is that we are so immersed in this orientation that we don’t see it; it provides the spectacles through which questions are viewed. Philosophy, to my mind, means learning to look at those spectacles, not only through them. — Wayfarer

But the upshot is, there are things that are subjectively real, that is, can only be known first-person, but which are as foundational as any purported 'atomic objects of cognition'. This is what we designate Being, which includes the irreducible fact of the subject to whom the objective world is disclosed. — Wayfarer

nothing is said about what is spiritual, that might only be because, with Wittgenstein, there is 'that of which we cannot speak', but which is nevertheless of foundational significance in philosophy. But the upshot is, there are things that are subjectively real, that is, can only be known first-person, but which are as foundational as any purported 'atomic objects of cognition'. This is what we designate Being, which includes the irreducible fact of the subject to whom the objective world is disclosed. — Wayfarer

my take on universals is that they are intrinsic to the way in which the mind assimilates and interprets sensory experience. Intellectual abstractions, the grasp of abstract relations and qualities, are what binds rational conceptions together to form coherent ideas. But these are neither 'in the world' nor mere pyschological constructs, they are universal structures of intelligibility disclosed through consciousness. (As you've mentioned Edward Feser's blog, see his Think, McFly, Think.) — Wayfarer

Even the competing interpretations are trying to account for the fact of observer-dependency, — Wayfarer

What is real, is a range of possibilities expressed by the wave-function (ψ), which are condensed into a single value by registration or measurement (the so-called 'wavefunction collapse' — Wayfarer

So when you write that “particulars are reducible … all the way down to atomic states of affairs,” you’re really invoking a metaphysical picture inherited from classical physics. But precisely that picture is what quantum mechanics has called into question, forcing contemporary physicalism to uncouple itself from physics as such. Which, again, implies that Armstrong's 'atomic facts' are conceptual placeholders. — Wayfarer

, I’m pointing out that this is the world that people like Kimmel built. You want censorship you get censorship. — NOS4A2

Not sure what to make of this yet...

Charlie Kirk and The Hate Speech Algorithm (— Evey Winters · Sep 18, 2025) — jorndoe

if what you mean by “physical” is not fixed by physics itself, then what anchors it? — Wayfarer

If physicalism transcends physics in the sense you describe, then these postulates are not discoveries of physics but metaphysical commitments. In that case, why call the framework ‘physical’ rather than simply metaphysical realism? — Wayfarer

If the claim is that “physical reality = the totality of reality,” then the term “physical” is carrying a great deal of weight. But if what you mean by “physical” is not fixed by physics itself, then what anchors it? Otherwise, “physicalism” looks less like an ontology than a promissory note: asserting that whatever is real must fall under the heading of the physical, even when the meaning of “physical” is left indeterminate. — Wayfarer

Lowe argued this borders on incoherence: how can one and the same entity be wholly present in two places at once? — Wayfarer

He advocates a weak form of immanence, where universals are always instantiated but are not themselves located in space and time. Universals, in Lowe, are not reducible to particulars nor are they spatiotemporal. That’s why he says they are “always instantiated” but not literally in space and time. — Wayfarer

Me, I say that universals can only be recognised by a mind. They are dependent on the mind’s ability to identify likeness etc. They are part of the intellectual apparatus of rational thought. — Wayfarer

every object that is examined is accounted for by simpler and simpler components. The absence of a bottom layer implies the series as a whole isn't accounted for, and it would be impossible for an infinite number of parts to assemble.
— Relativist

That problem is not addressed by the assertion that at bottom, everything must be physical, especially in the absence of any notion of the physical that is stipulated by physics. — Wayfarer

That is really all I have to say on the matter. I am not and will never be persuaded by physicalism. — Wayfarer

I stand by the criticisms I’ve offered and I don’t see them as having been rebutted. — Wayfarer

I too feel that criticism of the idealist ideas I put forward is based on their not being understood. — Wayfarer

Also, so-called “election denial” was verboten. Anti-Trump pressure campaigns even got the president removed from the largest social media platforms, along with vast swaths of his supporters. That’s why I don’t care too much about the victims here, and their cries ring rather hollow. This is what you get. — NOS4A2

how can physicalism transcend physics? If physics is not relevant to physicallsm, then why describe such a foundational ontology as “physical” at all? Physical compared to what? — Wayfarer

And if the irreducible bottom layer of reality cannot, even in principle, be identified by or with the theories of physics, then on what basis is it called "physical"? — Wayfarer

Armstrong’s “atoms” may be a neat philosophical posit but unless they’re tied to some determinate content, why regard them as more than symbolic? And if they’re only symbolic, then the reality they possess is conceptual rather than physical.

And what, for that matter, is the supposed threat of “infinite regress”? — Wayfarer

How convenient! — Wayfarer

The scope of ontology is the totality of existence. Physicalists are philosophers who assert the physical world to BE the totality of existence, but it is not a conclusion derived from physics.
— Relativist

But surely the totality of existence includes human beings. You're not seeing the point of Chalmers critique: — Wayfarer

It (the 'hard problem' is problematic for a physicalism that assumes science can and will answer all questons about the natural world
— Relativist

But it's important to grasp that this is not the meaning of the 'hard problem'. It's not the want of knowledge about the natural world. — Wayfarer

do you recognize any cogency in David Chalmers' argument? That 'the nature of experience' cannot be fully captured by scientific descriptons? If you don't, why not? If you do, how does it fail as argument against physicalism? — Wayfarer

Only in situations where one has a choice of hypotheses is the degree of certainty needed.
— Relativist

In this case, you have what you called good reason to believe that the hypothesis is false. How would this affect the degree of certainty? — Metaphysician Undercover

[I think it is irrational to choose a hypotheses when there is strong evidence (good reason) which indicates that it is false.

If I use your private lexicon, I would not label the point a "good reason" to reject physicalism, but rather that it constitutes relevant information that should be taken into account (as I previously described, and you ignored). — Relativist

However, the issue is really much more complicated than what you describe. What happens often, is that a person will select a hypotheses with incomplete data, as you suggest. The extent of the data which is unknown is itself unknown, so the certainty level may be higher than it ought to be. The relevance of the unknown data cannot be accounted for, because the data is unknown. Therefore the data which is judged is arbitrarily weighted relative to the unknown data. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then, as time passes more data will become available to the individual(s) who made that judgement. The data may actually be directly contrary to the accepted hypotheses, but since the hypotheses is already accepted, and plays an active role in the lives of those who accept it, they simply adjust, make an exception to the rule to allow for the now evident contrary data, and continue to work with the hypotheses, which we now have data that confirms it is faulty. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is actually very common in physics. — Metaphysician Undercover

Physicalism is an ontological grounding thesis. It's a gross caricature to suggest this means physics can replace epistemology.
— Relativist

Yes, physicalism is an ontological grounding thesis. However, epistemology is what ontology grounds. Therefore it is you who speaks nonsense here. — Metaphysician Undercover

You interpreted "good reasons" to entail facts that contradicted my prior judgement. I explained this was not what I meant by the phrase. I have identified no facts that contradict physicalism. If I use your private lexicon, I would not label the point a "good reason" to reject physicalism, but rather that it constitutes relevant information that should be taken into account (as I previously described, and you ignored).
— Relativist

Your use of "facts" here is misplaced. You have talked yourself out of the usefulness of "facts", by insisting that beliefs are judged by degree of certainty. So if there is such a thing as a fact, it is irreleavnt because you do not consider any beliefs to be facts. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I believe the cosmological argument provides irrefutable proof of God. In case your not familiar with it, here is a simplified version.

We observe that it is always the case that the potential for the physical object is prior in time to the actual existence of any physical object... — Metaphysician Undercover

Philosophical differences are always deeply rooted, and unless the difference is very mundane (making it not a real philosophical issue) the differences cannot be resolved without addressing ontological principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

As you yourself admit, ontology provides grounding.

I don’t intend to misrepresent you, but when you define physicalism as the thesis that everything that exists is composed of physical things, governed by physical forces and laws of nature, supported by an argument from 'the scope of physics', then from my point of view it does sound like physics is being taken as the ontological grounding for your metaphysics. How is it not? — Wayfarer

Would I be correct in saying that you believe that 'ontology' comprises 'the set of all actually existing things', — Wayfarer

do you recognize any cogency in David Chalmers' argument? That 'the nature of experience' cannot be fully captured by scientific descriptons? If you don't, why not? If you do, how does it fail as argument against physicalism? — Wayfarer

scientific method assumes at the outset a division between subject and object, and assigns primary reality to the objectively-measurable attributes of objects, while assigning appearances to the so-called 'secondary attributes' of the subjective mind. I'm saying that physicalism overlooks or ignores this methodological division, and this has philosophical consequences. — Wayfarer

Yet they're saying that physics does not describe nature as it is. Do you think that is so? If not, why? — Wayfarer

I can consider most philosophical issues even when framed in terms inconsistent with physicalism. That's because I regard the framing as paradigm, which can be utilized without ontological commitent to the paradigm.
— Relativist

This seems to rest on a misunderstanding of philosophy as such. Scientific models can indeed be treated as paradigms without ontological commitment — Newtonian mechanics still works fine for spacecraft navigation, even if we know relativity is more fundamental. Same with quantum physicists' 'Shut up and calculate'. But philosophy isn’t just a pragmatic use of conceptual models. Its concern is precisely with what is real, and what it means to exist. To treat philosophical frameworks as if they can be referenced without ontological commitment is to miss the point of philosophy. Ontology can't be firewalled of to a specialised sub-division separate from the rest of philosophy, it's intrinsic to it. — Wayfarer

But if there are issues (or solutions to issues) that DO require some (non-physicalist) ontological commitments, why wouldn't you have the burden of making a case for those commitments? If you believe it impossible to meet the burden, then how can you than construe this as an error my part? Sure, you disagree with me on physicalism, but if you haven't truly falsified it to me, then you have no rational basis to complain about my view on the subject. To do so seems similar to a Christian lamenting my failure to experience the joy of Jesus' love for me, because I'm an ignorant atheist. — Relativist

I've given the above arguments repeatedly over the course of this thread, and to my recollection, you haven't engaged with any of them, other than the vague accusation of them being 'category mistakes'. If they are, then how so? — Wayfarer

The general idea here—which will apply to a large number of the epistemological theories on offer—is that if we abandon the possibility or notion of certain knowledge, then the replacement form of uncertain knowledge will cease to make sense. — Leontiskos

My purpose isn’t simply to reject physicalism for the sake of argument, but to show why I think it leaves something crucial out of the picture. — Wayfarer

Physicalism is an ontological grounding thesis, not an effective paradigm for answering all questions about the human condition - your areas of interest and concern.
— Relativist
But surely philosophy is concerned with the whole range of questions about the human condition. The task of science is to explore and explain what exists; philosophy asks what it means to exist. — Wayfarer

Yet you’ve said repeatedly that physics provides the paradigm for metaphysics — that the “ontological grounding” is the ontology of physics. — Wayfarer

Most of mental life is better considered from completely different perspectives. My issue is specifically with ontology: what actually exists. I think ontology can be set aside for the issues you raised. If this is wrong, and there is such a dependency then there's a burden to make an epistemological case for that ontology.
— Relativist

That “burden,” as you phrase it, could only be met by demonstrating the objective existence of some “non-physical thing.” — Wayfarer

↪Relativist
has forwarded a theory where all (or almost all - this is contentious) beliefs are inferences to the best explanation, and are thus probabilistic. — Leontiskos

My purpose isn’t simply to reject physicalism for the sake of argument, but to show why I think it leaves something crucial out of the picture. — Wayfarer

I do not believe that you attach a level of certainty to each judgement you make — Metaphysician Undercover

The reason i say this, is that judgements are made for the purpose of acting, and you are going to act on the judgement, with a healthy respect for fallibility, whether you are 75% certain or 85% certain. In the vast majority of judgements, to figure out the degree of certitude would be a totally useless waste of time, therefore it is not practised. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not believe that the subjective nature of judgement is consistent with physicalism which holds that everything is potentially understandable through the objective science of physics — Metaphysician Undercover

The point though, is that you have gone beyond making a judgement with incomplete data, along with a healthy respect for fallibility, to making a judgement when you explicitly state that there are good reasons for the very opposite of what you have concluded in that judgement. This is not a matter of "incomplete data", it is a matter of ignoring evidence which is contrary to your conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

I believe that the reality of God has already long ago been proven, by the cosmological argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

Physicalist causation leads to infinite regress — Metaphysician Undercover

OK, that makes it clear then, You are admitting that you do not believe that physicalism is the best ontology, you believe that it might be the best ontology depending on how reality is understood. — Metaphysician Undercover

And your claim that it is probably the best ontology is very subjective, base on cherry-picked principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you recognize that the fact that your judgement in this matter is very subjective, is very strong evidence that physicalism is not the best ontology? This is because physicalism does not account for the subjective aspect of judgement, and you are assigning principal position to it? — Metaphysician Undercover

If you really believed in physicalism you would be certain, due to the objectivity of what you believe in, rather than wishy washy as you demonstrate. For analogy, if you claim that you are atheist, then be atheist, rather than agnostic. — Metaphysician Undercover

When I say "I believe X" it means that I think X is the case, I think it is true. When I think X may be the case I say "I believe that X may be the case", or "X is possible". Do you recognize the difference between these two?

Neither says anything about certainty or uncertainty, — Metaphysician Undercover

Here again, you're treating all beliefs as categorical: that I can only choose to believe a proposition true or false, and these entail absolute commitments. My view is that each belief has a level of certainty. — Relativist

When i want to describe my certainty or uncertainty, I use those words. Do you recognize the difference between "I believe X", and "I believe X is possible", regardless of the degree of certitude? — Metaphysician Undercover

Remind me! Everything you've said in this exchange is predicated on equating the model of physics with a philosophy of everything. — Wayfarer

But how can you 'set aside' the posit that current physics accounts for 4% of the totality of the universe? And the entrenched controversies around the whole question of the interpretation of physics and what is says about the nature of reality? You really need to read some more in this subject. — Wayfarer

What I consider 'obvious' is that the observer or subject is implicitly present in physicalism, but has been suppressed for methodological reasons. — Wayfarer

So you embrace a the platonic principle that (at least some) abstractions have objective existence — Relativist


‘Transcendental’ is not the same as ‘objective’. Universals are transcendental because they transcend the specific forms in which they are instantiated....’ — Wayfarer

He is saying the exact opposite of what you describe him as saying. He is saying that Churchlands and Dennett are 'clueless' for suggesting that 'there is no good reason to think that the mind will fail to yield to the same sort of reductive explanation in terms of which everything else in nature has been accounted for. — Wayfarer

To make the JFK example comparable, you'd have to chose one as the best explanation, as the one you believe, then also claim that there is good reason to believe the other. For example, the best explanation, and the one I believe in, is a single person acting alone, however there is good reason to believe in more than one person — Metaphysician Undercover

Once you chose one, as the one that you believe in, you cannot claim that there is good reason to believe the other, without contradicting your own belief. — Metaphysician Undercover

suggest you adjust your claim to "it is possible that physicalism is the best ontology". — Metaphysician Undercover

It’s ontological but not physical - an intellectual act which enables the recognition of abstractions. The property can only be recognised by a mind capable of counting. — Wayfarer

Nowadays atoms are conceptualised as excitations of fields, and the ontological status of fields is far from settled — Wayfarer

I made it perfectloy explicit:

There is something very obvious that it excludes, as I've already said time and again. And you don't notice or acknowledge what it is — Wayfarer

Truth is not a property that objects have; rather it is a label we apply to some statements. Logic applies to statements. Meaning is a mental association, not a physical property. Intentions are behavioral.
— Relativist

Well your screen name is ‘Relativist’, and you're preaching relativism. — Wayfarer

As for 'special pleading', it's physicalism that does this. It appeals to physics as the basis of its ontology, but when presented with the inconvenient fact that today's physics seems to undermine physicalism, it will say it is 'not bound by physics'. — Wayfarer

Yours does entail contradiction, that's the point, just like my example. Please explain how you think the two differ — Metaphysician Undercover

It accounts for everything known to exist in the universe, except possibly dark matter and dark energy.
— Relativist

And numbers. — Wayfarer