Before I respond again, please answer the question I asked:

What is your objective?

--Are you just explaining why you reject physicalism?

-Are you trying to convince me physicalism is false?

There are other possibilities, course. Keeping it open-ended will never get anywhere.

OK, that makes it clear then, You are admitting that you do not believe that physicalism is the best ontology, you believe that it might be the best ontology depending on how reality is understood. — Metaphysician Undercover

We disagree about how the word "belief" should be used.

The problem with saying "physicalism might be the best ontology" is that it fails to communicate that I have made a judgement. Judgements are fallible, and only as good as the basis on which they are made.

You seem to say "I believe X" only if you're certain of X. This suggests either: there are few propostions you "believe" (in your terms) or you have an unjustified certainty in your positions.

I apply the word "belief" to all propositions I have judged to be true, irrespective of how strong my justification is. But, as I said, my attitude toward the proposition is more nuanced: there is a level of certainty attached to it.

And your claim that it is probably the best ontology is very subjective, base on cherry-picked principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

Judgements are always subjective. They are unavoidably based on background beliefs (judgements previously made). But I am always willing to explain why I believe it - thus opening myself to correction. This includes having those principles and background beliefs challenged, so that I can reevaluate. I did this here in this thread. I invite you to challenge the principles I apply (namely: IBE, and the selection criteria).

Do you recognize that the fact that your judgement in this matter is very subjective, is very strong evidence that physicalism is not the best ontology? This is because physicalism does not account for the subjective aspect of judgement, and you are assigning principal position to it? — Metaphysician Undercover

Judgement is unavoidably a subjective process, because it can only be made on the facts at one's disposal (background beliefs, methodology, and cognitive abilities). These aspects (entirely nature + nurture) account for the subjective nature of judgement, consistent with physicalism.

If you really believed in physicalism you would be certain, due to the objectivity of what you believe in, rather than wishy washy as you demonstrate. For analogy, if you claim that you are atheist, then be atheist, rather than agnostic. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't regard it as "wishy washy" to honestly explain the basis of my judgement, and admit fallibility, and be open to reasonable criticism. That's all I'm doing.

I have argued that most of our beliefs (my definition) are based on judgements made on incomplete data. The best we can do, in most cases, is inference to best explanation.

I went for many years self-labelling as an agnostic. It seemed appropriate because I deemed a god's existence to be possible. Over time, I've come to conclude that a creator-god is implausible, so I now label myself as atheist. It's nevertheless logically possible such a being exists. I'd consider it wishy-washy to fail to make a judgement of something that seems so implausible, merely because I'm possibly wrong. (It's of course possible Yahweh will some day reveal himself to me; if convinced my experience were veridical, I would change my mind. Obviously, I judge this won't happen).

With your semantics, I don't see how you could be anything other than agnostic - unless you base your certainty of God on "faith". Neither God's existence nor non-existence can be proven, so both are possible.

When I say "I believe X" it means that I think X is the case, I think it is true. When I think X may be the case I say "I believe that X may be the case", or "X is possible". Do you recognize the difference between these two?

Neither says anything about certainty or uncertainty, — Metaphysician Undercover

You simply haven't been paying attention. I explicitly stated:

Here again, you're treating all beliefs as categorical: that I can only choose to believe a proposition true or false, and these entail absolute commitments. My view is that each belief has a level of certainty. — Relativist

"Degrees of certainty" are key to the "modest Bayesian epistemology*" that I advocate. It is an epistemological approach discussed by philosopher Mark Kaplan in an article in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology ("Decision Theory and Epistemology".

When i want to describe my certainty or uncertainty, I use those words. Do you recognize the difference between "I believe X", and "I believe X is possible", regardless of the degree of certitude? — Metaphysician Undercover

For many propositions you've evaluated, you will have some sense of whether it's certain, highly likely, unlikely, etc. The level of certainty is relevant to how one evaluates other, related information to draw conclusions. Consider a valid deductive argument from premises you considered possible, but unlikely, vs a conclusion drawn from premises that you consider highly likely.

This is the point I have been driving at: the issue of degrees of certainty as attitudes toward propositions, and the effect this has on further epistemic analysis. The distraction was your quibbling about the use of the word "belief" - because your only focus was to tell me I'm wrong, rather than making an effort to understand my point.
_________
*"Modest Bayesian epistemology doesn't suffer from the mathematical fallacy that orthodox Bayesian epistemology suffers from.

Remind me! Everything you've said in this exchange is predicated on equating the model of physics with a philosophy of everything. — Wayfarer

I have never said such a thing - you just assumed it. Multiple times I've said that I judge physicalism to be the metaphysical theory that is "inference to best explanation". An IBE is based on a set of facts, and in this case - the scope is universal: all facts about the world. Speculations are not facts.

Science gives us quite a few facts, so of course a viable metaphysical theory needs to account for them.

But how can you 'set aside' the posit that current physics accounts for 4% of the totality of the universe? And the entrenched controversies around the whole question of the interpretation of physics and what is says about the nature of reality? You really need to read some more in this subject. — Wayfarer

You need to start trying to grasp my reasons for considering physicalism, as I described above, instead of attacking a strawman. There are no facts about dark matter and energy to be accounted for. With regard to QM: there is no fact regarding which interpretation is correct. An interpretation is a metaphysical hypothesis, and physicalism is consistent with most of them.

What I consider 'obvious' is that the observer or subject is implicitly present in physicalism, but has been suppressed for methodological reasons. — Wayfarer

Red herring: it's irrelevant to the question.

So you embrace a the platonic principle that (at least some) abstractions have objective existence — Relativist


‘Transcendental’ is not the same as ‘objective’. Universals are transcendental because they transcend the specific forms in which they are instantiated....’ — Wayfarer

Nevertheless, you reject the account I've given that universals exist immanently.

This raises an important question: what are you trying to achieve in this discussion?

--Are you just explaining why you reject physicalism? All I'm seeing is that you're rejecting a strawman.


--If you're trying to convince me physicalism is false, then you're going about it wrong. You can't prove it false by making a claim that's inconsistent with physicalism. You've done this repeatedly.

I GAVE you an opening, by admitting there's an issue with the "hard problem", so that I was willing to entertain the "negative fact" (actually a negative hypothesis) that there's something about the mind that is non-physical. All you did with this was to suggest some vague possibilities. This led me to reconsider what I'd said about the "hard problem" because there are at least 3 possibilities that are consistent with physicalism (illusionism, Michael Tye's theory, and nonreductive physicalism).

He is saying the exact opposite of what you describe him as saying. He is saying that Churchlands and Dennett are 'clueless' for suggesting that 'there is no good reason to think that the mind will fail to yield to the same sort of reductive explanation in terms of which everything else in nature has been accounted for. — Wayfarer

You don't seem to understand what I was debating with MetaphysicianUndercover: I was simply defending my semantics, that one can believe X despite there being "good reasons" why X might be false. Here's the sentence:

"[these contemporary naturalists] cluelessly suggest that there is no good reason to think that the mind will fail to yield to the same sort of reductive explanation in terms of which everything else in nature has been accounted for."

From this, I infer that Feser thought these guys should admit there ARE good reasons " to think that the mind will fail to yield to the same sort of reductive explanation in terms of which everything else in nature has been accounted for". In the statement, he isn't saying that these reasons should have induced them to abandon reductive naturalism (even if he believes that to be the case); he's just saying they ought to at least acknowledge there are some good reasons to think there's no reductive naturalism.

:up:

You persist in treating all beliefs as categorical, despite my repeated efforts to describe it to you.

Answer this: when you say "I believe X", does this mean you are certain of X?

If not, then how do you verbally describe your uncertainty, to distinguish it from statements that you do feel certain about?

If yes, then what phrase(s) do you use to convey your attitude toward X, when you lack certainty.

To make the JFK example comparable, you'd have to chose one as the best explanation, as the one you believe, then also claim that there is good reason to believe the other. For example, the best explanation, and the one I believe in, is a single person acting alone, however there is good reason to believe in more than one person — Metaphysician Undercover

I saw no reason to state the obvious. You figured out exactly what I had in mind (your stated example), as I expected you would.

Once you chose one, as the one that you believe in, you cannot claim that there is good reason to believe the other, without contradicting your own belief. — Metaphysician Undercover

Acknowledging there are reasons why I might be wrong is being intellectually honest; that is not a contradiction.

On this particular example, I indeed believe a single person acted alone. But I read awhile back that there was auditory evidence of a second shooter. This evidence is "good reason" to suggest I could be wrong, however it is not a good ENOUGH reason for me to change my mind. Suppose I encountered 5 additional bits of evidence to support a second shooter. THEN I would change my mind. Individually, each bit of evidence is "good" in that it is relevant information and could contribute to drawing a different inference. It is the totality of available evidence that the conclusion should be based on and that totality can change over time as additional facts are learned.

suggest you adjust your claim to "it is possible that physicalism is the best ontology". — Metaphysician Undercover

That might be appropriate for an extreme skeptic, who chooses only to believe things that can be proven to be logically necessary. IBE does not entail logical necessity. I believe Oswald acted alone, but I know I'm possibly wrong. If I merely said it was possible he acted alone, I would not be representing my view as accurrately.

Further, my view on physicalism is strictly subjective judgement. I try to be rational, taking into account all information I'm aware of, but I know I'm fallible, and limited by what I have studied and considered. So I usually don't make bold statements like "physicalism is true". Rather, I say "I believe physicalism is true", and am usually willing to explain why, and interested in hearing valid criticism - "good reasons" why I might be wrong.

*edit*
I ran across the following statement by (Christian, dualist) pholosopher Ed Feser:

"But other contemporary naturalists – Dennett and the Churchlands, for example, not to mention countless lesser lights of the sort who write crude atheist pamphlets and pop neuroscience books – cluelessly suggest that there is no good reason to think that the mind will fail to yield to the same sort of reductive explanation in terms of which everything else in nature has been accounted for."

So he is acknowledging that there can be "good reasons" for a position one disagrees with, since he's complaining that these naturalists won't even acknowledge that.

It’s ontological but not physical - an intellectual act which enables the recognition of abstractions. The property can only be recognised by a mind capable of counting. — Wayfarer

In Armstrong's ontology:
-Everything that exists (every object) is a state of affairs, whose constituents are: the bare particular, a set of properties, and a set of relations to other states of affairs.
-Properties and relations are constituents of the states of affairs that comprise physical reality- hence they are part of the physical world. They are not objects, because they are not states of affairs. They exist immanently as constituents of states of affairs.

I already explained the "way of abstraction".

Nowadays atoms are conceptualised as excitations of fields, and the ontological status of fields is far from settled — Wayfarer

I was giving a simplified account to avoid having to describe quantum fields. I'll rephrase it:

physics theory makes the theoretical claim that everything that exists in the material world (the domain of physics) is composed of elements of the quantum fields (as identified in the standard model) . It's a claim supported by evidence and theory. .

Do you agree there is no good reason to doubt that the standard model identifies the physical composition of everything that exists (setting aside the mystery of dark matter and dark energy)?

Do you understand how this scientific hypothesis is distinct from the metaphysical claim is that an object IS its physical compostion?

Do you deny that this metaphysical claim is true for all nonliving objects? If you do deny it, can you make a compelling case for your view?

I made it perfectloy explicit:

There is something very obvious that it excludes, as I've already said time and again. And you don't notice or acknowledge what it is — Wayfarer

You've brought up a number of mental activities you considered "obvious" that are easily accounted for in physicalism, so your judgement of what is "obvious" is suspect.

What you purport to exclude is what comprises the "negative fact", from which you have not, and can not, derive a positive fact. I've repeatedly pointed out that a negative fact (what something is NOT) tells us almost nothing. An object that is "not a duck" could be anything, and therefore "not a duck" is not a clue as to what the object IS.

It's relevant because you're claiming the negative fact falsifies physicalism. You haven't really flasified it because this "negative fact" is hypothesis and tentative- based solely on the absence of a complete physicalist account of every aspect of mental life. So physicalism is still (at least) possible. You have said nothing stronger about any alternatives, so we simply have a large space of possibilities that includes physicalist and non-physicalist theories.

Truth is not a property that objects have; rather it is a label we apply to some statements. Logic applies to statements. Meaning is a mental association, not a physical property. Intentions are behavioral.
— Relativist

Well your screen name is ‘Relativist’, and you're preaching relativism. — Wayfarer

No, I'm not. There's nothing relative about truth; my point was simply that it's a mental concept, not some platonic object.

As for 'special pleading', it's physicalism that does this. It appeals to physics as the basis of its ontology, but when presented with the inconvenient fact that today's physics seems to undermine physicalism, it will say it is 'not bound by physics'. — Wayfarer

You have an understanding of physicalism that is biased and false. I've explained the actual relationship between science and physicalism, and you choose to ignore what I said and repeat your false understanding.

The irony is that I've tried very hard to see where your negative hypotheses would lead, going so far as to entertain it as a fact. Unlike you, I have been willing to be wrong; willing to entertain other possibilities. In response, you've displayed complete ignorance as to what physicalism actually is by presenting naive objections (that simply display your lack of understanding of physicalism), and insisting on your distorted view of its relation to science. That is an ineffective way to make your case, and it was a blind alley that had virtually nothing to do with the "negative hypothesis" I had been willing to entertain as fact.

It's impossible to falsify something you don't understand. It would have been more effective to concede that physicalism is reasonable in every way EXCEPT the mind, and concentrated on somehow doing something with your negative hypothesis. Instead, you've turned much of this conversation into my refuting your misunderstandings about general physicalism.

Yours does entail contradiction, that's the point, just like my example. Please explain how you think the two differ — Metaphysician Undercover

There are good reasons to believe JFK was killed by a single person, acting alone.

There are good reasons to believe more than one person was involved in the killing of JFK

These assertions are not contradictory. They can both be true.

It accounts for everything known to exist in the universe, except possibly dark matter and dark energy.
— Relativist

And numbers. — Wayfarer

So you embrace a the platonic principle that (at least some) abstractions have objective existence that is independent of the objects that exhibit them. On the other hand, and as you know, I see no reason to believe such things. Immanent universals are considerably more parsimonious.

Explain the ontological relationship between a cluster of two protons (in the nucleus ofva helium atom) and the number 2.

I agree with everything you said, which is why I embrace naturalism/physicalism. But the one thing that gives me pause are qualia. Consistent with physicalism, they are representitive states - they represent something that facilitates pro-survival behaviors. This counters claims that they are epiphenomenol. But what resists a physicalist account is the nature of the experience: for example, the sense of pain.

If the pain sensation exists only in the mind, then it is, in sense, an illusion with a representational character (not epiphenomenal). There needn't be a reason for the sensation to be what it is beyond the fact that it evolved this way because of random mutations that happened to have a positive impact on survival. But the problem remains as to how the firing of neurons creates this sense of pain.

I don't suggest this is a fatal flaw, but it opens the door to considering alternatives. But my problem with (for example) @Wayfarer's claims is that he only tears down the physicalist account, by suggesting the explanatory gap thoroughly falsifies physicalism. Then he offers no better alternative, so he's simply creating a much larger explanatory gap.

I made up the term. My focus is an effort at seeking truth that is of practical use. This entails things like:
1) setting a practical epistemic bar for accepting a statement as true (but see #3). This is in opposition to extreme skeptics who set a bar so high, they profess to few beliefs.
2)(generally) treating bare possibilites as equivalent to zero probability when making epistemic judgements,
3) recognizing the nature of belief as a psychological state that has degrees of certainty, rather than categorically true and false
4) recognizing that these degrees of certainty tend to be imprecise (thus Bayes' theorem is inapplicable)
5. Trusting beliefs that are likely to be innate (e.g. belief in the existence of a world external to ourselves; default trust in our sensory input - but recognizing it to be fallible).
6. Fearlessly making truth judgements when it's impractical to withhold judgement.

If I gave it more thought, I could probably add a bit more.

BTW, your comment prompted me to ask DEEPSEEK what it meant. There are some parallels, but it's very different. E.g. it mentioned "pragmatic theory of truth", which I reject.

Right, but over and over I have been inquiring into whether there is anything other than IBEs, and over and over you keep shying away from that point. — Leontiskos

Here's where I stated my position on knowledge:

I do believe knowledge is possible (analytic truths, for example), but I also believe it is rare - because Gettier conditions are nearly always present. If one chooses to define knowledge more loosely, with somewhat less deference to Gettier conditions, then he would consider knowledge to be more common. But whether or not the term (knowledge) can be applied to some specific belief seems to me to be of no practical significance. — Relativist

That answered your question about whether there is anything other than IBEs. A deduction from other beliefs is another form of justified belief besides IBE.

These questions were evidently important to you, but they were a tangent to my points about IBEs being of much more practical significance because it pertains to critical thinking in everyday life.

Earlier you gave this as an example of knowledge that is not an IBE, and now it is an IBE and not knowledge — Leontiskos

You had rejected my assertion that my belief that "my name is Fred" constitutes knowledge. I wasn't interested in debating the point (because it's irrelevant to MY issue). So the second time, I was only asserting it to be a justified belief.

How one defines knowledge is a triviality, because it's just semamtics. One can define it with or without considering Gettier conditions, and with varying degrees of applying it - all for the purpose of making claims that one has "knowledge", or not. That's trivial.

My topic is critical thinking, and - because most rational beliefs are IBEs, it is of more practical significance to do a good a job of this. It also provides an approach to debating an issue.

Here's something you said that I'd like you to explain:

If there is no pole of knowledge then I don't see how one IBE can be better than another (because no IBE can better approach that pole). — Leontiskos

Does your "tentpole" comment refer to the mere fact that knowledge exists, are you suggesting IBEs that aren't based on knowledge are all equivalent, or something else entirely?

What did you think of my example? If I have good reasons to believe that some of the world's problems will never be solved, don't you think it's irrational for me to also believe that all the worlds problems will be resolved. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not parallel. Your example entails a contradiction, mine does not.

I think your judgement is unreasonable then. Since you have "good reasons" to believe something which is contrary to the essential nature of a specific principle, it's irrational to maintain that principle. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think you understand IBE. An IBE is unreasonable only if there overlooked facts that would affect the analysis, or if there are overlooked alternative hypotheses that would be better than the selected hypothesis.

You also ignored my explanation of what I meant by "good reasons". You're incorrectly treating "good reasons" as entailing a conclusion that I regard as categorically true.

The "good reasons" indeed give me reason to have some doubt about physicalism, but I have a pragmatic epistemology: practically nothing is certain, and there's always some reason to doubt one's beliefs
— Relativist

That directly contradicts what you said before, when you rejected extreme skepticism. You said there is uncontroversial facts. Now, you take the position of extreme skepticism, claiming "there's always some reason to doubt one's beliefs". If there is reason to doubt all your beliefs, how can you say that any of them represent "uncontroversial facts"? — Metaphysician Undercover

Here again, you're treating all beliefs as categorical: that I can only choose to believe a proposition true or false, and these entail absolute commitments. My view is that each belief has a level of certainty. Believing an analytic truth, or the Pythagorian theory would be an absolute certainty. Same with any belief established by deduction from premises we're certain about. But beliefs established by weighing evidence generally don't deserve the same level of certainty. It's a bit like being on a civil jury, whereca verdict is reached on a preponderance of evidence. This standard is clearly less than absolute certainty.

Extreme skeptics require something close to absolute certainty to hold a belief. Most reasonable people don't have this (rarely attainable) standard. We believe the moon is up there even when we aren't looking at it; we believe man landed on the moon, and that vaccines prevent diseases.

"Reason to doubt" = lower the level of certainty

If you judge something as uncontroversial fact, then you are judging that there is no reason to doubt it.

No. That's not how I use the term. I would have said "all facts", but then you could have brought up some crackpot idea you believe that I had not accounted for. Or a theist would bring up that I overlooked God. My intent was to focus on commonly accepted facts that have good epistemic support. This would include established science, but exclude speculative hypotheses. The term I chose was "uncontroversial facts". The phrase I put in bold may be better.

It is in no way 'a physical property'. One can count the members of a set of concepts, none of which is physical. Counting is an intellectual act which can be applied to both physical and non-physical entities. — Wayfarer

You're conflating the mental act of counting with four-ness. A group of 4 geese has a property in common with a group of 4 pebbles, whereas a group of 3 trees lacks this property. This property of four-ness is ontological. It exists irrespective of human minds or anyone doing a count.

We recognize the pattern of fourness and form the concept of 4 via the way of abstraction: consider multiple objects with common property and mentally subtract all other properties. This forms the basis for the concept of 4. The concept "exists" exclusively in the mind, whereas four-ness exists in certain states of affairs.

We also recognize that adding a pebble to a group of 3 pebbles creates a group of 4 pebbles. This is a logical relation, not a physical one. These logical relations are an epistemological ground for counting.
The intellectual capacity to abstract can be applied to other abstractions, so we can apply counting to abstractions.

can insight be described algorithmically? — Wayfarer

Why not? It's not magic or clairvoyance. Experts have insights - but only within their own field*. a chef's insight will be recipe related; he will not have the insight of a mathematician when it comes to proving theorems. It's pattern recognition, which artificial neural networks perform in rudimentary fashion.
_______________________________
* Conspiracy theorists also have "insights", and the same cognitive faculties are involved: they perceive patterns based on their background beliefs.
_______________________________

Thanks for clarifying. But notice what you’ve said: the “in principle” part of physicalism is a metaphysical claim — that all things are ultimately just arrangements of particles under natural laws. That’s not a finding of science but a philosophical commitment hiding behind the skirts of science. — Wayfarer

Nothing is in hiding, but you're mashing together the physics and metaphysics. Let's be clear: physics theory makes the theoretical claim that everything in the material world (the domain of physics) is made of particles. It's a claim supported by evidence and theory. There's no good reason to doubt that the standard model of particle physics identifies all the elementary particles that account for the physical composition of everything (setting aside the mystery of dark matter and dark energy).

The metaphysical claim is that an object IS its physical compostion, there's nothing more to the object. Do you deny this is true for nonliving objects?

with mind, the issue is different: truths, meanings, logical relations, and intentions are not computationally intractable physical behaviors. They are not physical categories at all. — Wayfarer

Truths, meanings, logical relations aren't ontological-
they reflect patterns of thought. Truth is not a property that objects have; rather it is a label we apply to some statements. Logic applies to statements. Meaning is a mental association, not a physical property. Intentions are behavioral.

You are obviously in the habit of treating these 3 concepts as something more than patterns of thought, and this makes you incredulous to an alternative account. I'm not trying to convince you that this physicalist perspective is correct. I'm just trying to show it is coherent.

Albert Einstein had good reason for asking the rhetorical question 'does the moon continue to exist when nobody is looking at it.' Do you appreciate why he would ask that question?

I don't know enough about his perspective to answer that. I guess it could be viewed as a thought experiment in philosophy. But from my pragmatic perspective, it's a silly question: no sane person would think to doubt the moon exists unless they were presented this as a thought experiment to explain why they believe it so. So I expect Einstein didn't actually have doubts along these lines.

And you don't notice or acknowledge what it is - you basically gloss over it or ignore it. — Wayfarer

I have absolutely not ignored it! I identified it as a "negative fact" - implying a large space of possibilities, and also asked you to suggest how to use this negative fact. You had little to offer: you noted it shouldn't be treated as an object. That, and you seem to insist that the negative fact falsifies physicalism. This led to discussing other aspects of physicalism, and it became clear that you don't understand physicalism (I've identified several errors you made in your characterizations).

And what is that 'something'? Why, it is the subject to whom a theory is meaningful, the mind that provides the definitions and draws the conclusions. — Wayfarer

You're the one insisting physicalism is false on the basis of the "something", but you have no answers as to what it is (other than an additional negative fact: not an object).

Within the space of possibilities is that the "something" is a physical property that some or all objects have, that manifests as consciousness when matter is structured a certain way (like a brain with attached sense organs). This "physical" property is undetectable through scientific study, because it has no measureable effects. It manifests only as conscious states.

This is Michael Tye's theory. This adds a property to matter (inconsistent with traditional physicalism), but maintains the overall physicalist framework.

So if I must explain the negative fact, I can use this. Two questions for you: 1) can you propose a better alternative? 2) Can you think of a reason (on my terms,) I ought to reject it?

So I come back to Armstrong: if physicalism is only “in principle,” then his theory remains more an aspiration than an account. — Wayfarer

Special pleading/double standard. You're trying to hold physicalist metaphysics to a scientific standard, while having no qualms about treating your own unverifiable/unfalsifiable assertions as reasonsble.

I am wondering why you think physicalism, which holds that all is physical, is the best ontology, when you also see good reason to believe that there is something nonphysical. Your beliefs seem self-contradictory to me. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm being consistent, and pragmatic.

Remember I'm making an inference to best explanation (IBE), and that requires taking all information into account. If all else were equal in the analysis of theories, and there were a tie, then this issue would tip the scale. That makes it a "good reason": it's relevant and worthy of consideration.* But this issue is just one factor in my overall IBE exercise, and I judge it insufficient to counter all the virtues of physicalism.

I am also pragmatic. The "good reasons" indeed give me reason to have some doubt about physicalism, but I have a pragmatic epistemology: practically nothing is certain, and there's always some reason to doubt one's beliefs - but it's impractical to withhold judgement on everything that is possibly false. IMO, most of our rational beliefs are the product of (at least rudimentary) IBE, and it would be intellectually crippling to try and muddle through life while withholding judgement on everything that could possibly be false.

________<
* an example something not worthy of consideration would be allegations of miracles.

But isn't it very simple to show that there is 'something nonphysical' involved in, for example, mathematics and rational inference (at the very least) ? — Wayfarer

There are 2 related and relevant aspects of mathematics:
1. The portion that is grounded in the actual world. This includes things like numericity: two-ness, three-ness, four-ness... each is a physical property that is held by certain groups of objects. By applying the "way of abstraction" we discern the natural numbers as abstractions of these physical properties. We then notice various relations between numbers and establish basic arithmetic.
2. Axioms: statements we make to define an abstract mathematical system, and from which we draw inferences using logic.

Rational inference may be epistemologically grounded in cause and effect (observed pattern): If x occurs then y will happen. Then extended by semantics and abstraction. Formal logic is clearly nothing more than semantics: precise meanings attached to words (e.g. "and", "or", "not", "if...then..."). The precise meanings are typically defined in truth tables.

You've already said that computers and calculators, which are physical devices, can perform these operations... — Wayfarer

My point is that any behavior that can be described algorithmically is consistent with the behavior of something physical- hence it's consistent with physicalism.

It's the very fact that logical, mathematical and syntactical operations can be replicated by machines, and also represented in different media types or symbolic forms, that is itself an argument against physicalism. Why? Because it shows that the content of these operations - the symbolic form, what it is that is being described or depicted - is separable from the physical form in which it is encoded. — Wayfarer

You seem to be bundling the easy and hard problems of consciousness together. Easy: Machines can identify patterns, and could utilize those patterns in new ways. Attaching meaning to words or patterns is even straightforward (to a point): words represent memories (learnings, experiences).

The hard part pertains specifically to the elements of consciousness that we can't even envision a means of duplicating in a machine: qualia. This includes the minor thrill of completing a task, the sense memories we attach to words; the way we perceive things.
Example: "red" can be defined to a computer as a range of wavelengths, but we know red as the memory of a particular sensory experience.

Right. So where does Armstrong’s materialist theory of mind stand in relation to this? If physicalism is only “in principle” and never in practice — because the domains of logic, mathematics, and meaning can’t actually be reduced — then isn’t his theory less an account of mind than an aspiration that everything ought to be reducible to the physical? — Wayfarer

To put it simply (and a little imprecisely): "In principle" is a way of expressing the metaphysical claim that everything is composed of the same set of particles, that in each case they have achieved their arrangement as a consequence of laws of nature, and that every action taken by these complex objects is also entirely due to these laws of nature.

The "in practice" problem: we don't have a perfect physics, and even if we did, it would be computationally impossible to describe the behavior of complex objects using only the computstional methodology of fundamental physics. That's all it means. It does not mean it's impossibly difficult for the fundamental particles and forces to do what they do (which is what I think you may be inferring). Analogously: consider the effort needed to calculate the position the moon from a point on earth at some specific time vs the moon simply behaving per gravity.

I think that the underlying aim is to declare that only the objects of the physical sciences can be said to exist - this is why you refer to the ontological side of the debate. — Wayfarer

That's close, but you word it in a way that sounds like it is excluding something. Rather, it's a parsimonious view of what exists: it's unparsimonious to believe things exist that can't be detected or observed to exist + the observation that everything that is observed or inferred to exist is physical.

Consider the early universe: what we know about it is inferred; there is no basis to infer anything existing other than the physical objects we've inferred to have existed.

Science not only provides the paradigm but also the content - hence the ontology — Wayfarer

No. We believe our senses: that the objects we perceive actually do exist. We believe reliable sources, such as historians, archaeologists, and parents who tell us about what existed in the past. Science happens to give us a means to infer additional existents, but any reliable means would be fine.

If you are acquainted with skepticism, you'll understand that there is no such thing as uncontroversial facts of the world. So this proposal is a nonstarter. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not take the objections of extreme skeptics seriously.

If one considers there to be no uncontroversial facts, then one has no basis for selecting a metaphysical theory. I'm an epistemological pragmatist.

I addressed your issue in a reply to Janus:

The "good reason" to believe there is something nonphysical involved is simply that set of issues that is referred to as the "hard problem of consciousness": fully accounting for all aspects of our subjective experience of consciousness. For example: how do feelings of hunger and pain, arise from the firing of neurons, or accounting for the perceived quality of some specific color.

As a computer guy, I also think about these things in terms of whether or not a machine could be programmed to exhibit the same qualities that our minds exhibit. I'm stumped, and it seems that most physicalist philosophers are, as well.

This does not prove physicalism is false - that would entail an argument from ignorance. It could very well be that in the future, these issues will be resolved - and we'll be able to construct robots that have subjective experiences of qualia. But arguments from ignorance can often be cast as inferences to the best explanation, and I think one could argue that the hard problem is better explained by assuming some non-physical aspect is required. That's what I'm calling the "good reasons". — Relativist

The "good reasons" are not established facts that falsify physicalism, as you seem to be implying. Rather they are reasonable possibilities that SOME might consider strong enough to sway their own abductive analysis (choosing a metaphysical theory that best explains all available uncontroversial facts). I still judge physicalism the best overall metaphysical theory that I've seen.

Reduction would take place if we used, for example, the terms and concepts of physics to derive and explain laws, correlations, principles, theorems and so on from other sciences such as those I have mentioned. — JuanZu

I accurately described what is meant by reductionism. It is a hypothesis in philosophy of science that an idealized, 100% correct, fundamental physics accounts for all things that exist, and how they interact and behave.

It does not entail a discipline-to-disciple translation recipe. The scientific disciplines you refer to are based on fit-for-purpose paradigms, and none are complete or perfect.

Do you acknowledge that everything in the physical world is composed of the same set of fundamental particles? The current best guess is the well-supported [url=http://Standard Model - Wikipedia https://share.google/JK7t11rDJgDJRJZOg]standard model of particle physics[/url]. The standard model accounts for the both the composition of matter, and the forces that result in their behavior. It accounts for everything known to exist in the universe, except possibly dark matter and dark energy. But it does account for everything that exists on earth: all objects are made of atoms; atoms are made of quarks and electrons. No exceptions. So clearly, the composition of everything on earth is reducible to these particles.

In light of this. what do you think would make reductionism false? You mentioned speed, time, energy, mass. The nature of time is controversial in both science and metaphysics, but speed, energy, and mass are accounted for in the physics behind the standard model: quantum field theory. While the nature of time is controversial, whatever it is doesn't have bearing on reductionism - because whatever it IS, is the same for everything- no reduction is needed.

You define physicalism as the thesis that everything that exists is physical, but then you also agree that philosophy has concerns that “lie outside the domain of physics.” That seems to pull in two directions: if philosophy really does deal with realities not derivative from physics, then physicalism can’t capture everything. — Wayfarer

By "outside the domain of physics", I was referring to Physics as a discipline, with a scope of study and research. As I've mentioned several times, Chemists do not directly utilize quantum field theory to do their work, even though this is theoretically possible. They utilize known properties of chemical reactions - aspects of their discipline. That this is done does not imply that chemistry is not reducible to physics

Non-reductive physicalism tries to close this gap with “emergence.” But that makes the view unfalsifiable, since any anomaly can simply be reclassified as “emergent.”

Agreed, but so is the notion that there is something nonphysical involved with mental activities. This is the problem with many theories in philosophy, and it's why I suggest that the only reasonable option is to strive for an inference to best explanation (albeit that this will necessarily entail subjectivity).

So the tension is this: either physicalism covers all that is real, in which case philosophy reduces to physics; or else philosophy genuinely addresses irreducible realities, in which case physicalism does not cover everything that is real. Which is it?

Sure, physicalism implies philosophy is reducible to physics IN PRINCIPLE, but it seems to me that this would be computationally too complex - to the point of being physically impossible.

I'll again refer to the Chemistry-Physics reduction: it's absurdly impractical to do Chemistry on the computational basis of fundamental physics. Biology would be many orders of magnitude more complex. Philosophy would be still more complex.

Again, I have acknowleged that there are good reasons to believe there is something non-physical about mental activity. — Relativist


I asked you before, and you gave no answer, as to what good reasons there are to think there is something non-physical about mental activity? Presuming that you have in mind something other than the obvious notion that "abstractions, concepts, generalities and logic are not physical". — Janus

Sorry I overlooked your question. This was the issue that Wayfarer and I were discussing, so I (erroneously) took it for granted.

The "good reason" to believe there is something nonphysical involved is simply that set of issues that is referred to as the "hard problem of consciousness": fully accounting for all aspects of our subjective experience of consciousness. For example: how do feelings of hunger and pain, arise from the firing of neurons, or accounting for the perceived quality of some specific color.

As a computer guy, I also think about these things in terms of whether or not a machine could be programmed to exhibit the same qualities that our minds exhibit. I'm stumped, and it seems that most physicalist philosophers are, as well.

This does not prove physicalism is false - that would entail an argument from ignorance. It could very well be that in the future, these issues will be resolved - and we'll be able to construct robots that have subjective experiences of qualia. But arguments from ignorance can often be cast as inferences to the best explanation, and I think one could argue that the hard problem is better explained by assuming some non-physical aspect is required. That's what I'm calling the "good reasons".

.

I don't think you fully understand what a reduction means. What do you understand by reduction in any case? — JuanZu

The simplest definition of reductionism is this:

If x reduces to y, then it can in a relevantly strong sense be explained in terms of y.
--source

Example: chemical reactions can (in principle) be explained in terms of fundamental physics. Chemistry is concerned mainly with the structure and reactions of atoms and molecules. These structures and reactions are a consequence of the properties of their components. The study of those components, and their properties, is fundamental physics. I doubt that anyone suggests there's some ontological emergence occurring when molecules interact that is not due to the properties of the components (as studied by physics). This relationship can be described as "Chemistry is reducible to Physics". This relationship between chemistry and physics is uncontroversial.

Is Biology reducible to Chemistry and Physics? No behavior has been observed that is inconsistent with either of these disciplines, so this is a reason to believe it to be reducible. An alternative would be ontological emergence: that novel properties emerge in higher level structures, properties that are not a consequence of the properties of the constituent parts. It seems to me the basis for believing in ontological emergence is weak, but I'll leave it at that because this seems sufficient to describe what I mean by reductionism.

Physicalist causation involves infinite regress, because each effect requires a previous cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Evidence" is a loaded term. What qualifies as "evidence of X" for me does not necessarily qualify as "evidence of X" for you. This is because the proposed piece of evidence, Y, will either be considered as evidence of X, or not considered as evidence of X, depending on the apprehended relation between X and Y. — Metaphysician Undercover

I generally prefer to use "evidence" in the broadest sense: data (excluding nothing). I specifically referred to empirical evidence (data that is obtained by observation). Here, we're dealing with metaphysical "theories", which (I suggest) are best thought of as explanatory hypotheses for the data. The "data" consists of all the uncontroversial facts of the world. The explanatory hypotheses would be the various metaphysical "theories" that endeavor to account for all these facts.

Accordingly, the evidence, Y, may be empirical, and the thing which it is evidence of, X, may be nonphysical. Therefore there is no need to assume that there cannot be "one bit of empirical evidence" for the nonphysical. For those who understand the relation between the physical and nonphysical, every physical thing is evidence of the nonphysical. And that is why the theologists commonly claim that each material thing is evidence of the immaterial God. But if you do not understand that relation between the physical and the nonphysical, you will not apprehend the physical as evidence of the nonphysical — Metaphysician Undercover

This presupposes that something nonphysical exists. That is hypothesis, not an uncontroversial fact. There are metaphysical theories that assume this, but it's nevertheless a controversial assumption (there are clearly professional philosophers who deny this). That's why I stress that it is the uncontroversial facts of the world that need to be best accounted for.

once you get beyond that mental block, which is preventing you from seeing the physical as evidence of the nonphysical, — Metaphysician Undercover

You should publish a paper that proves there are non-physical objects, so that the physicalist philosophers can learn the errors of their ways and start working on something productive. According to a survey of professional philosophers, over half of them "accept or lean toward" physicalism (source). I'm not suggesting truth is derived by majority vote, but rather that you might want to reconsider your arrogant view that only someone with a "mental block" would deny the existence of non-physical objects.

Physicalist causation involves infinite regress, because each effect requires a previous cause.

Or...there is an uncaused initial, foundational state of affairs that exists by brute fact. This seems to me the preferable alternative to a vicious infinite regress, irrespective of whether or not physicalism is true. My personal theory is that the uncaused, initial state exists out of metaphysical necessity - but this depends no one beliefs about ontological contingency.

Well, unless it can account for every aspect of one thing, any one thing, absolutely, 100%, then it does not account for anything. It would only partially account for things. Since physicalism does not account for any one thing, in any absolute sense, then we can conclude that physicalism cannot account for anything. — Metaphysician Undercover

Non-sequitur. Suppose we take as a premise that there exists something nonphysical. That does not imply that every existing is (at least) partly nonphysical. We only need to account for the things (and their properties) that we know (i.e. have strong reasons to believe) exist.

A "universal" is nonphysical, as are the relations between universals. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are obviously unfamiliar with the concept of immanent universals. Example of this view: a 45 degree angle does not have some independent existence; rather, it exists in its instantiations. It reflects a specific physical relation between two objects.

The relation between a statement and "the world" is nonphysical.. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not an ontological relation; it is semantics: the definition of "truth" expressed as a pseudo-relation between a statement and some aspect of reality.

I didn't answer, because I couldn't believe that someone could seriously be asking such a dimwitted question. Have you never tried introspection? Introspection is by definition, the examination of one's own mental and emotional processes. This is not a physical examination. Do you honestly believe that a person could learn absolutely nothing from such an examination?

Once again, I apologize for the attitude. However, I just cannot take you seriously when you ask questions like this. Then, you top it off with "I was serious that I'm open...". . That's the biggest piece of bullshit I've been hit with today. Your mind is closed tighter than a drum. You've locked yourself out, so that you cannot even get into your own mind. Oh my God! What can we do for you? — Metaphysician Undercover

You have demonstrated that your arrogance is rooted in ignorance - you seemed unaware that there are views that differ from your own, that respected philosophers hold to - not just "dimwits" like me. On the other hand, you've mentioned nothing that I wasn't already aware of.

Physicalism is the theory that everything that exists, is composed of physical things, and that they act and assemble entirely due to physical forces due to laws of nature.

Reductive physicalism implies that complex (or higher level) objects are composed of simpler (lower level) objects, and ultimately reducible to whatever is fundamental. Non-reductive physicalism entails the notion that novel properties ontologically emerge in higher level structures.

That's it's domain, and it is only falsified by identifying some existing thing that doesn't fit the model.

So yes, philosophy does have concerns that lie outside the domain of physics — but those concerns are not derivative from physics. — Wayfarer

Of course! Physicalism does not subsume or supplant all of philosophy, or even all of science. Analogously, it would be absurd for a viticulturist to try and predict the composition of phenolic compounds that result in certain flavors or textures in wine, using quantum field theory.

Even if some useful/meaningful philosophical paradigm is inconsistent with physicalism, it doesn't automatically falsify physicalism. Falsifying it on the basis of paradigm inconsistency would be at least as complex as it would be for a physicalist to try and give a physicalist account of the issue.

Again, I have acknowleged that there are good reasons to believe there is something non-physical about mental activity. You have also acknowledged that there is something physical about mental activity. It seems pointless to debate what portions of the gray area are more, or less, likely to point to something non-physical.

Can any of the physical-chemical sciences explain the intentionality of consciousness or explain what a noema is better than phenomenology? Or the Pythagorean theorem better than geometry? Or what a universal better than philosophy? Or what is beauty better than aesthetics? Or what is a correct argument better than logic? Or how prices functions better than economy? Or what is a morphema better than linguistics? — JuanZu

Chemistry provides a more useful explanation of interactions between atoms and molecules associated with chemical bonds than does quantum field theory. Biology provides the more useful accounts of physiology and disease than quantum chemistry. In all these cases, this does not imply that these sciences are not, in fact, reducible to fundamental physics.

When I've said that (IMO) physicalism is the "best explanation", this is in comparison to other complete metaphysical theories. Physicalism is the theory that all existing things are grounded in physical nature.

I'll address some of the issues you raised.

An intention is a disposition to behave in some general or specific way. It reflects some mediation between stimuli and response.

I think "noema" equate to "mental object". I'd just deny that they are objects (ontological). They reflect a component of thinking, a general or specific pattern (neural networks are adept at pattern recognition), often associated with a memory (e.g. a visual memory).

Sure, assuming we're the only ones in the universe. — Patterner

I think it's unlikely that there are other intelligent life forms near enough to us, for them to impact us. But we clearly have different perspectives.

What I would suggest is dropping the assumption that physicalism is the only viable philosophical framework — Wayfarer

I agree. Most of mental life is better considered from completely different perspectives. My issue is specifically with ontology: what actually exists. I think ontology can be set aside for the issues you raised. If this is wrong, and there is such a dependency then there's a burden to make an epistemological case for that ontology.

So my caution is this: philosophy of mind should not be collapsed into neuroscience. To assume that physical causes are the only real causes is already a philosophical commitment, and a highly contestable one. There are many alternatives to physicalism always being debated, look at the new discipline of ‘consciousness studies’ which encompasses a huge range of different approaches. — Wayfarer

I suggest that the "philosophy of mind" issues that concern you could be dealt with without pinnning it to an ontology. This reminds me of your comments about teleology - which can be treated as a paradigm - an explanatory framework , not requiring an ontological commitment to teleology.

I doubt "consciousness studies" depends on a particular ontology of mind, because that would make it a house of cards.

This is obviously false. Physicalism cannot explain the reality of the nonphysical, which we all experience daily, therefore it is clearly not the most successful metaphysical system. — Metaphysician Undercover

I assume you're referring to philosophy of mind issues. Physicalism can account for a good bit, but (as I've acknowledged) not everything. So what DOES explain the nonphysical aspects of mind? As I said, I'm interested in whatever theory is best explanation- in terms of explanatory scope, parsimony, and ad hoc-ness. I'm open to proposals for additional criteria. What metaphysical theory surpasses physicalism as a better explanation?

This is totally wrong. Physicalism does not account for causation. Physicalist causation leads to infinite regress, — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it doesn't entail infinite regress. I'll refrain from guessing at what you're referring to, so please explain why you think this.

Physicalism does not account for any laws, as they are themselves, nonphysical. — Metaphysician Undercover

Seriously, it sounds like you don't understand physicalism. Law Realists suggest that laws are ontological relations between universals. Every instantiation of the relevant set of universals will necessarily instantiate the same effect.

I have no idea what type of "truth" you'd be talking about her — Metaphysician Undercover

Indeed, you don't have any idea. You are pontificating about something you know nothing about. I'm referring to truthmaker theory. A truthmaker is something that exists in the world, to which a true statement corresponds.

I'm making an effort to have a discussion that is reasonable and polite. You're making it difficult by making judgements based on your own lack of understanding. You COULD ask, instead of pontificating.

I was serious that I'm open hearing better theories, and particularly interested in understanding how you think we could actually learn something about the presumably nonphysical aspect of mind. Why have you not addressed this?

It is you who has made the definitive judgement, that the nonphysical is unknowable. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, with the qualifications I described. If you believe I'm wrong, then please disabuse me. How can we know anything about aspects of reality that cannot give us one bit of empirical evidence?

I'm not insisting that we can only obtain knowledge through empirical evidence - there are, for example, analytical truths. I'm open to other means if you can propose some.

That seems very significant to me. Mental activity has done extraordinary things than would never happen without it. — Patterner

Our activities are concentrated around one out of the 10^23 stars in the observable universe, during a period of maybe 1 million years, in a universe 13.7 billion years old. Of course our activities are significant to ourselves, but I see no basis to consider them of cosmic significance.

Let's see. You admit that the mind is not 100% physical. Then you state that the nonphysical part "seems unknowable". But instead of trying to get beyond the way that things "seem" to be, and actually develop some knowledge about the nonphysical, you conclude that any such approach would merely be "guesses". — Metaphysician Undercover

I'll clarify. I think one could justifiably claim there is something "nonphysical" involved, but I also think one could justifiably deny it.

Philosopher Michael Tye proposes one way to deny it: he proposes that there is some aspect or property that exists in all things that is undetectable by any objective means available to science, but manifests only when there exists the physical structure (like a brain) that can produce consciousness. I don't personally embrace it, but it's an interesting theory and I infer that one could develop other hypotheses along these lines (e.g. a broader view of what is "physical"). Of course, none can be verified - so this direction entails a space of possibilities, not a definitive answer.

How does this validate physicalism? You blatantly admit that physicalism is wrong, by accepting the reality of the nonphysical. Then instead of progressing toward where this leads, making an effort to understand the nonphysical, you steadfastly cling to physicalism in a hypocritical way, as if the nonphysical, which you clearly recognize, yet fail to understand, is irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

What I suspect you're considering hypocritical is that I would hold onto physicalism despite it being falsified by the presence of something nonphysical. As I told Wayfarer, if we treat a metaphysical theory as a conjunction of axioms, then that makes sense: the conjunction is false if any one axiom is false.

But this falsification is narrow: it applies exclusively to mind (mental activity). Physicalism is still the most successful metaphysical system there is; successful because it depends on the fewest ad hoc assumptions, it primarily depends on things we know about the world through direct experience and through science, coupled to the most parsimonous ontology. It accounts for causation, universals, laws of nature, and a theory of truth. Should I abandon these virtues simply because there may be some unknowable/ unanalyzable aspect of the mind that doesn't fit? I could rationalize physicalism with ad hoc assumptions, as Michael Tye did, but that seems unjustifiable. It's more intellectually honest to acknowledge that we don't know, and should leave open the space of possibility. At worst, I'm in a position similar to physicists regarding Newton's gravity theory, in the period before general relativity was published; Newton's formula generally worked (orbit of Mercury notwithstanding), and it was the best they had.

Nevertheless, I'm pragmatic. If one is going to embrace a metahphysical theory, I suggest it should be the one that is arguably an "inference to best explanation" among available theories, while remaining open to new information. I wrote about this awhile back on a Christian apologetics forum, and I recently heard Graham Oppy express a similar sentiment. No metaphysical theory is perfect, but if I judge one to fit reality better than any other, then it's the one I will apply in nearly all cases. I will not apply it to the "explanatory gap", because it's truly an unknown - and I don't think any speculative hypothesis is better than any other.

Clearly, your problem is in the assumption that the unphysical is unknowable. What justifies this assumption? You recognize the reality of the unphysical, so by that very fact, you know it to some extent. How is it possible for you to recognize something then proceed to the conclusion that the thing you recognize is unknowable? That conclusion is completely unsupported. Even if you have tried, and failed in attempts to understand it, that would not produce the conclusion that the thing is unknowable.

I suggest that you are proceeding from a faulty assumption about what constitutes "knowable"... — Metaphysician Undercover

First of all, I'll respond to "How is it possible for you to recognize something...". All I've recognized is that there is a good reason to believe there is something about consciousness that may be impossible to account for with a physicalist paradigm. What that actually IS is unknown to me.

"Even if you have tried, and failed in attempts to understand it, that would not produce the conclusion that the thing is unknowable."

That's only part of it, but I'll try to be more precise. It is my (fallible) epistemic judgement that it is unknowable. The basis of my judgement is:

1) it is currently unknown to me.
2) If the question had been definitively answered, there would be no controversy about it among professional philosophers (& philosophers rarely settle anything).
3) I can conceive of no means to draw a definitive conclusion about it.

If you have the answer, and can make a compelling case for it, please share it.

If you have an idea about how a definitive conclusion could be drawn, please share it.

If you simply object to the strong wording I used, I'll acknowledge that I wasn't asserting it to be impossible that a definitive answer can be found. Rather- given the absence of any means to settle the matter at hand, nor any hint about how to proceed to do so, then for all practical purposes, it is impossible. Nevertheless, I will be forever in your debt if you can show that it is more than a bare possibility that the answer can be determined.

I think the point you’re not seeing is that the question of ‘the nature of the mind’ is not an objective question, in the way that physics is. The subject matter of physics are measurable objects, energy, and so on, from the sub-atomic to the cosmological scales. But the mind is not an object at all, in the sense understood by physics. So why should the methods of physics be regarded as applicable to the question of the nature of mind at all? It’s not that the mind is a ‘non-physical thing’ or even that it ‘has a non-physical aspect’. Both of those ways of thinking about it are still based on the approach of treating the mind as possible object among other objects, when the question is categorically of a different kind. Can you see the point of that argument, or explain why it is wrong — Wayfarer

I actually prefer to avoid referring to "the mind" as an object. But it seems uncontroversial to acknowledge that we engage in a set of processes/behaviors that we identify as mental activity. Those activities occur, and it's worthwhile to understand their basis, as much as possible. As discussed, we know the brain is essential to these processes, and (more specifically) the claustrum may be essential to consciousness. It's worthwhile to understand the physical processes involved with mental activity as much as possible. So what is it that you suggest we NOT do, other than objectifying/reifying "the mind"?

It is actually well-documented that neuroscience has identified no specific, functional area of the brain which can account for the subjective unity of perception. — Wayfarer

No argument, except to ask: where do we go from here? I anticipate you'll agree that relevant physical mechanisms are appropriate areas to investigate. If indeed the claustrum is essential to having that "subjective unity of perception", then it's worthwhile to further investigate specifically what it does.

We also can't set aside the philosophical questions. How does the "negative fact" impact philosophical theories of mind? Does it falsify any theories? Does it favor any?

They are unanalyzable by our physical sciences. But if enough people decide it's worth thinking about, some people might come up with some good ideas. It is not an established fact that the only way we can learn of anything is through our physical sciences. — Patterner

A variety of ideas HAVE been proposed (panpsychism, dualism, property dualism...),so how can we learn which is correct? How do we know the correct answer has even been proposed yet? The space of possibilities is large, and there's no methodology for narrowing it down, except perhaps for plausibility and consistency with an individual's other commitments.

Give me a few examples of recent Democratic Presidents flouting or undermining rule of law. I don't recall any court orders being violated, nor anyone's due process rights being denied.

There are close to 400 cases against the Trump administration, and a majority are pending. He's likely to lose a large number. I'll mention a few.

His coercion of law firms who support liberal causes (like Perkins Coie) is unprecedented, and will not survive the court challenges.

His multiple violations of the Impoundment Act.

His executive order on "Birthright Citizenship", in direct defiance of prior SCOTUS rulings.

The issue is broader than violating the law. He may have the legal authority to punish career DOJ lawyers for prosecuting cases against Jan 6 criminals, while treating the criminals as heroes - but it certainly is inconsistent with rule of law.

His politicization of the DOJ is unprecedented. They have lost much of the independence they've had since Watergate. It's appalling that his "former" defense attorney (Todd Blanche) has the role of deputy AG, but is still actively working to protect Trump, as in his sham (quid pro quo) interview of Gislaine Maxwell. The DOJ also filed a frivolous lawsuit against Maryland Judges, because Trump didn't like some rulings.

The DOJ's treatment of the Epstein files seems largely based on protecting Trump, including the performative request to release the irrelevant Grand Jury Testimony - which the judge called them out on.

These are just a few things off the top of my head. I eagerly await your damning facts that demonstrate similar or worse behavior by Democratic administrations.

It might not help "science", if science can only be physical. But I would say coming to a better understanding of our nature, and possibly a better understanding of the nature of the universe, is relevant and fruitful. and if such understanding cannot be complete using science only, then it is even more relevant and fruitful. — Patterner

How does a mysterious/unknowable unphysical aspect of mind help us understand our nature or that of the universe?

Certainly, it opens up possibilities - but they are unanalyzable possibilities.

You’re right that simply pointing out what the mind is not (i.e., “not entirely physical”) doesn’t in itself establish what it is. But that doesn’t make it irrelevant to science. And in fact Armstrong’s materialist account shows why the question is unavoidable. — Wayfarer

As you said:" it is indispensable for the very possibility of inquiry". But given that there is mind and inquiry is possible, we can set this background fact aside and engage in productive inquiry.

How is any non-physical aspect of mind relevant to the advance of science? It's irrelevant to physics, so what aspects of science will be improved by acknowledging there's some unknown aspect of mind that is not consistent with the physical, and therefore beyond its own boundaries? It would be a mistake to assume where the boundary is; progress is best made by pushing forward from a physicalist/scientific perspective. To whatever extent something beyond science is involved, it will simply prove to be an unfruitful avenue.

Physics, by definition, begins with the object—and not just any object, but the ideal object, something exhaustively describable in terms of quantifiable attributes. That is why attempts to treat the mind “scientifically” fall at the first hurdle: — Wayfarer

What sort of failure are you talking about? You acknowledge the dependency on a brain. Neurology and psychiatry are fruitful endeavors. So where exactly is science failing? Here's a quote from Michael Tye, that is pertinent:

"Francis Crick and Christoph Koch (2005) have speculated that the claustrum, a thin, irregular sheet of neurons attached to the underside of the neocortex, which receives inputs from nearly all regions of the cortex and projects back to nearly all such regions, is the place where information underlying conscious perceptions is integrated into an harmonious conscious whole."

Tye, Michael. Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness: Through the Looking Glass (p. 100). OUP Oxford. Kindle Edition.

I'm not proclaiming this to be true, but it is a least a hypothesis with some empirical support (unlike a philosophical speculation unsupported by any evidence). It doesn't entail physicalism, but it demonstrates the usefulness of investigating the "the mind" from a physical/scientific perspective. And there has been some advance in science based on their hypothesis (see this).

So the point is not that “mind is mysterious and therefore irrelevant,” but that mind is real, though not reducible to either physical object or philosophical substance. This marks a genuine boundary condition: any adequate science of mind must reckon with the fact that mind cannot be objectified, even though it is the very condition of objectivity itself. — Wayfarer

In terms of understanding the mind, and advancing science - the mysterious portion seems irrelevant. Still, OF COURSE, the mind as a whole is relevant - to self-reflection, to finding meaning and purpose in life, to finding and expressing love, perceiving beauty... Those aspects of mind are not subject to scientific investigation - and they wouldn't be even if the mind were entirely grounded in the physical.

I’m still waiting for people to ignite some actual rage in opposition to all of this. There still not enough of anti-fascist rage going around. Instead, people, even on the side of criticizing Trump and his followers, treat them as a sort of legitimate political side. — Christoffer

The majority of the population doesn't care about (what can be characterized as) legal technicalities, they simply want action that achieves the results they desire. For this reason, I truly wish the center and left would focus on the aspects of Trump's actions that are illegal and unconstitutional, and remind everyone on why the "technicalities" matter - rule of law is critical to our system of government.

I'll give one blatant example. The administration has been denying due process rights to individuals it chooses to deport. Abrego Garcia is the most stark example. He was arrested and deported (in defiance of a court order) based on flimsy evidence he's a gang member. They have consistently claimed he's a horrible criminal, and attacked the left for coddling him. When they finally acceded to court intervention, they fished for what other charges they could pin on him. They took the unprecedented, and absurd, action of working a plea deal with a man who accused Garcia of human trafficking (bringing undocumented workers into the US). Plea deals are typically made with low level guys in a criminal organization to make a case against the higher-ups. In this case, the plea deal was made with a higher up to get Garcia - the lowest level guy in the (alleged) activity.

There's many more instances. Generally, reporting (on the left and center) mentions the illegality, but indirectly trivialize it by criticizing the policy, the morality, and painting a sympathetic view of the victim. Reporting on the right typically ignores the illegality (often criticizing the judges who rule this way) and stresses how great it is to get rid of illegals.

The importance of rule of law is a non-partisan issue, and more stress on Trump's attack on rule of law should be placed. His die-hard supporters will never care, but the other 20% of Republicans would probably care if it were made clear to them.

Computers operate with logic, so our ability to think logically is consistent with a mechanistic aspect of mind.
— Relativist

Computers are created and programmed by us, to perform operations that we intend. They greatly amplify human abilities, but they would not exist were it not for having been constructed by us. And any AI system will tell you that it is not a mind. — Wayfarer

My point was simply that our applying "syllogistic logic" is consistent with physical mechanism, as you seemed to be suggesting. I have not argued that every aspect of the mind is purely mechanical. The question is: where should we draw the line?

In that context, rational inference is epistemologically basic to anything we surmise about the brain. — Wayfarer

Absolutely, but this is true irrespective of how mind is ontologically grounded.

Focus on the negative fact: the mind is not entirely physical.
- What (if anything) can we discern about this nonphysical aspect?

Unconstrained speculation leads nowhere. It merely raises possibilities.

Intentional acts are able to influence the physical configuration of the brain. — Wayfarer

Yes, but the process of developing an intention is consistent with physical activity. Peter Tse has proposed a model ("criterial causation") of neuronal activity that accounts for mental causation. This would also mean the mind is not epiphenomenol. A mental state corresponds to a physical state, and causes subsequent physical/mental states. Of course, this still doesn't account for the subjective nature of a conscious state.

the mind undeniably depends on the brain, — Wayfarer

Then there's no reason to think mind (or a thought) is an ontological ground. Thinking (including formulating intent) requires something analogous to a physical brain.