I don't see that libertarian free will can do any more: decisions are still based on reasons.
— Relativist
In other words, you are asking how libertarian free will could be compatible with the PSR. — A Christian Philosophy

No. I'm pointing out that because decision making is consistent with determinism (and thus, the PSR)- there is no basis for insisting we have libertarian free will. You choose to believe we have it, but I do not accept that as a premise.

I understand your view of compatibilism but I don't understand why this does not entail fatalism. If all choices are the product of factors (internal or external) and all these factors are caused by something else, then all our choices are caused by something else. — A Christian Philosophy

Here's the logic you may be applying:

Assume A causes B, and B causes C, then:
A causes C (the logic is transitive)- Implying B is irrelevant. This is a fatalist view.

My point is that B is not irrelevant. Logic is transitive, but causation is not. Our acts of will are "B", and the mental processing that we perform is essential for C to occur.

Compare this to a computer: input- processing- output. The processing is a necessary step - essential to producing the output. "A" consists of the physical parts of the computer, the software, electricity running through the circuits, and the specific input it was given. All those components are essential to producing the output ("C").

The underlined sentence is a prescriptive statement, a "should", which implies a freedom to do X or not. If all prescriptive statements were going to occur necessarily, then the prescription is merely an illusion — A Christian Philosophy

If I decide not eat cookies (a "should"), this decision establishes a disposition- a factor that will influence, but not necessitate, my future behavior. The craving induced by the scent may create a disposition that may be stronger. The prior disposition is not an illusion, it was simply ignored and the impulse acted on.

I accept compatibilism- an account of free will that is consistent with determinism. It does not entail fatalism. Fatalism is the view that you have no real choices. Compatibilism is the view that our choices are under our control. Choices are the product of internal factors: knowledge, beliefs, desires, wishes, genetic predispositions, learned conditioned responses, dispositions, impulses, mood...

These factors were all caused, but they are bundled uniquely into each of us. They are what make us who we are.

Under compatibilism, we can still entertain past possibilities - the things one might have done, but it correctly recognizes that something would have had to be different: some missing bit of knowledge, improved impulse control. I don't see that libertarian free will can do any more: decisions are still based on reasons. And new experiences and knowledge change us, so that our future decisions will be made on a different basis.

There are no absurd conclusions at all. It doesn't trivialize modal reasoning, because we can still conceptualize how things might have been in counterfactual conditions. We all make use of this, learn from it. "If I hadn't done X then Y (an unfortunate consequence) would not have occurred." Lesson: in the future, avoid doing X.

Concieiving this way doesn't imply that X was metaphysically contingent. Consider why you made decision to do X. If it was an impulse, then something led to the impulse (e.g. the scent of freshly baked cookies induced an impulse to eat one). If X was a deliberative decision, it was consequence of the factors that came to mind. that you weighed in a certain way. There's no obvious source of contingency, so why believe it was actually contingent? Conceivability can lead to modal illusion.

So I don't think it's reasonable to ever assume contingency, unless one can point to a source of contingency.

I suppose that's true; just like we are able to talk about impossible worlds. Nevertheless, modal collapse should still be avoided when we talk about metaphysically possible worlds. — A Christian Philosophy

I continue to take issue with the notion that "modal collapse" must be avoided. I believe that modal collapse translates to necessitarianism in ontology: the notion that everything that exists could not have failed to exist, and that there are no non-actual possibilities (non-actual possibility= something that could have happened, but did not).

What would prevent necessitarianism from being true is some source(s) of contingency. No proposed source of contingency can be proven. You correctly noted that quantum collapse isn't necessarily contingent, and I pointed out that libertarian free will does not necesarily exist.

Even if it were true the amount of information one would have to have to calculate how many satellites a given planet could have is unknowable in practice, — Wayfarer

We're discussing possibility/impossibility of a state of affairs, not the computability.

And furthermore, natural laws are based on idealisations and abstractions — Wayfarer

That conflates textbook laws of physics with ontological laws of nature. As you know, I am a law realist. The present discussion is an alleged proof of God's existence, and I'm demonstrating that the proof depends on debatable metaphysical assumptions. I'm not trying to prove anything, other than the fact that conclusion is epistemically contingent on unproveable metaphysical assumptions.

Sorry to but in, but surely the number of moons a planet has, and the number of planets a solar system have, is not determined by any laws of nature. — Wayfarer

It's determined by the set of physical steps that led to the existence of the solar system. Each step is necessitated by laws of nature. Laws of nature necessitate their outcome. (We're assuming QM is deterministic). You'd have to assume random things happen for no reason, contrary to the PSR.

. I would then also add free will as another possible way to get contingency....Overall, it seems we are almost in agreement, except for the possibility of inherent existence and quantum. — A Christian Philosophy

I agree that IF libertarian free will exists, then it is a source of contingency. Would you agree that IF quantum collapse is indeterminate, the it is a source of contingency?

If we found out that all outcomes in the actual world occur out of necessity, then conceiving a possible world with some different outcome would necessarily have a logical error in it. — A Christian Philosophy

Conceiving of a counterfactual world does not imply that world is physically or metaphysically possible.

Examples:
1.I can conceive of a possible world in which earth has 2 moons instead of 1. Is that world physically possible? No, because the single moon is present as a result of the deterministic laws of nature. There is no source of contingency in the physical world to account for the counterfactual 2-moon earth. Conceivability doesn't align with what is physically possible. In terms of possible worlds: the set of conceptually possible worlds is not identical to the set of physically possible worlds.

2. Assume the PSR is metaphysically necessary. I can nevertheless conceive of a world in which the PSR is false: so there is a conceptually possible world in which the (metaphysically necessary) PSR is false.

I don't agree with point 2 but I hope this is not critical and that we can leave it alone because I'd rather not venture into any quantum discussion. — A Christian Philosophy

Point 2 defined the ontological basis for contingeny, and it is critical. I referred to quantum collapse only to illustrate how to apply the contingency principle. Notice that I said, "assume" it is not determinate.Point 5, which you agreed with, depends on point 2.

I believe that inherent existence is a sufficient explanation that fulfills the PSR for the OG. You also called that "de re necessity" earlier. — A Christian Philosophy

I reject de re necessity It treats necessity as an ontological property. IMO, an OG is necessary simply because could not have bern otherwise. It could not have been otherwise because there is nothing ontologically prior that accounts for (OG or ~OG) (the principle I explained in #2).

we can entertain the idea that the OG is a designer with free will, which is something the OP points to. With this, we preserve the idea of possible worlds (free will means the OG is free to have chosen otherwise), — A Christian Philosophy

Possible world semantics is just a convenient means of entertaining counterfactuals under some implicit or explicit modality. The "idea of possible worlds" is intact irrespective of whether or not there is metaphysical contingency in the world.

My issue is that IF there is metaphysical contingency in the world, THIS is what needs to be accounted for. @Banno's question (how do we explain why this world is as it is?) has an answer: because it could only have been otherwise if there is metaphysical contingency in the world. But we don't know if there is. It's conceptually possible there's an OG with free will that accounts for contingency. It's also conceptually possible quantum indeterminacy (or perhaps some unknown feature of the world) accounts for indeterminacy.

I'm not OK with jumping to intellectual nihilism.
— Relativist

So, you believe that 'idealism' (or in modern terms 'constructivism') is nihilistic, because it denies the external world? — Wayfarer

No. It's an implication of mistrusting our basic instincts, our senses and our cognitive structure. If those are denied, no beliefs can be justified- that would be intellectual nihilism. Does anyone take idealism that far? I don't know. I was just identifying what I think would be going too far. My point is better understood in the context I wrote it:
"If this just means we should be willing to question everything, I'm OK with it. I'm not OK with jumping to intellectual nihilism."

I was bookending it between a innocuous extreme and a noxious one.

you are conflating the belief with an 'external world' in generale and a 'physical world' in particular. I would say that abandoning the second is certainly counter-intuitive and probably incorrect but not necessarily 'irrational'. — boundless

I'm just suggesting that we innately believe (intuitively, not deductively or verbally) there is an external world. Classifying it as physical, material etc depends on some later learnings.

I would say that if one denies the existence any kind of external reality (solipsism) or affirms that, at most, there might be something else but we do not interact in any way with that is irrational.

I agree. That is contradicted by our basic intuitions.

If knowledge about the 'physical world' is empirical, it is true IMO that, in fact, what is directly known to us are sensations and perceptions (i.e. sensations organised within a conceptual framework). It seems to me that he is right that we can't conceive anything 'physical' with no relation with the 'world of experience'. — boundless

I can accept that there is SOME relation to the world of experience. It's iterative: we start with out innate instincts, then have experiences we interpret through the lens of our instincts, creating a revised lens through which the next tier of experiences are interpretted. Rinse. Repeat.

you would agree that 'the world we experience' is, in fact, a mental construction of sorts. In which case, an external 'physical' world would be somethin we haven't direct access to and we have no way to verify if it is really 'there' or not ( — boundless

Agreed.

The (strictly) 'ontological' idealist would say that the 'fact' that we imagine that the 'external physical world' in terms of the 'world of experience' is a reasonable reason to deny that there is something different from either minds and mental contents. The epistemic idealist would say that the same 'fact' leads us to the conclusion that we can't know anything about such a 'world' (note that Kant, in my understanding, rejected traditional metaphysics because he thought that it could not give us true knowledge... not sure about what he would say to someone who asserts that he doesn't claim to have certain knowledge but confident, but not certain, beliefs...). — boundless

Based on your description, I'd consider the strict ontological idealist irrational, because he has no rational basis to defeat his innate belief. The reasoning seems to be: I'm possibly wrong therefore I'm wrong.

The epistemic idealist could be rational, but only if he applies that this skepticism consistently - which entails general extreme skepticism.

Personally, I don't think that Bradley's argument is decisive or anything like that. But, certainly, it is not something to be overlooked. — boundless

If this just means we should be willing to question everything, I'm OK with it. I'm not OK with jumping to intellectual nihilism.

What do you think about this [matrix scenario]?

Excellent analogy. I see your point- it makes perfect sense.

Are you open to attempting to express your ideas in a more standard form? — Banno

No. IMO, that obfuscates the ontology. I did not assert the OG exists necessarily as a premise. Rather, it's necessity follows from my ontological account of contingency and the nature of the OG (here, you could refer to the facts about the OG).

Many philosophers treat contingency as the default: X exists contingently unless provably necessary. I believe this is wrong. Contingency should be accounted for ontologically. What is actually contingent in the world? Classical laws of nature necessitate the outcome, so they don't introduce contingency. If everything in the universe were a consequence of classical laws of nature, where would contingency come in?

Quantum collapse seems to have contingent outcomes (deterministic interpretations notwithstanding). But in these cases, the contingency is accounted for as I described: the thing that accounts for the outcome could have NOT produced that specific outcome. There could be other sources of contingency operating similarly.

By definition, an OG is not accounted for by anything ontologically prior, so it can't fit my assumption that contingency must be accounted for as I described.

When you translate this to facts and apply logic, it risks collapse the reasoning into the entailment of those facts.

But you could cut through all this and focus on the OG: either it is contingent or necessary. Either it's contingency needs to be accounted for or its necessity. Ignore my arguments and its a coin toss. But BECAUSE of my arguments (I have more supporting arguments, BTW). I'm on the side of it being necessary.

First let's look at the idea of ontological grounding. What we want is for an explanation as to why the world is as it is, and not some other way. If something could have been otherwise, it cannot explain why something is necessarily the case. So any ontological grounding must be necessary. But then it would be the same in every possible world. And in that case, it could not explain why this world is as it is. — Banno

Several issues.

1. An OG exists autonomously. This means without dependencies of any kind (causal or otherwise). If it had such a dependency it could not be the OG
2. For an object, X, to be ontologically contingent, there must be some C that accounts for X, but C could have accounted for ~X. Example: assume quantum collapse is not determinate, and C is a quantum collapse in which X emerged. X is contingent because C could have collapsed to Y. I express this as:
C accounts for (X or Y), or more generally: C accounts for (X or ~X).
3. If an object is not contingent (as identified in #2) then it is necessary.
4. Compare this to the outcome of a deterministic law of nature: the law: C causes X. Because it's deterministic, it means: C necessarily causes X. If C is contingent, then there X inherits this contingency (whatever accounts for the contingency of C, also accounts for the contingency of X).
5. An OG is not contingent because there is no C that accounts for the OC (that would entail a dependency - see#1). Therefore it exists necessarily.
You have 2 general choices:
6. If you embrace a version of the PSR that requires everthing to have an explanation, then you are committed to an infinite series of dependencies, and should reject the existence of an OG.
7. If you are committed to an OG, then you should reject any version of a PSR that requires everything to have an explanation. You could accept "necessary" and/or "autonomous" as sufficient explanation.

IMO, possible world semantics can obfuscate the issues. It's valid, but one should avoid conflating conceivability with metaphysical possibility. IOW, you could conceive of possible worlds with OG1, OG2, OG3 as their respective ontological grounds, but per my analysis the actual OG is the only METAPHYSICALLY possible one.

You can, of course, reject my view of contingency. But this is my basis for rejecting the theistic argument that was presented.

What kind of necessity are you referring to? There are only two kinds of necessity: internal and external; that is, logical (or inherent) necessity and causal necessity. — A Christian Philosophy

I'm referring to metaphysical necessity/possibility, which pertains to existence. Logical possibility pertains to the semantics of logic. Conceptual possibility refers to what we can conceive. Epistemic possibility refers to what is logically possible per the logical implication of a body of facts. That's the broad set of modalities.

There is no "internal" possibility - although it may refer to something like (Christian Philosopher) Alvan Plantinga's "de re necessity" -wherein he proposes "necessary" to be an intrinsic property of God. It's a contrivance to "prove" what he already believes: God exists. You're doing the same thing: contriving a metaphysical framework that entails God.

You correctly reject causal necessity because the OG has no cause. It follows that it has existence by logical or inherent necessity. Existence by inherent necessity fulfills the PSR and is not dependent on anything else.

My position is that X exists contingently (meaning it is metaphysically possible for X to have not existed) IFF there exists some C, such that C accounts for (X or ~X)

Laws of nature are typically necessitations; if C causes X, then C necessarily causes X. I.e. there are no exceptions*. Quantum mechanics seems to entail a contingent outcome: Q (a quantum collapse) results in X, but there's a suite of other results (a probability distribution) that it might have collapsed to. In this case, X is contingent; the other results that might have happened are non-actual possibilities..

* C may itself be contingent, but the outcome of its instance of caustion is necessary.
--------------------
Because nothing accounts for the OG, there are no non-actual possibilities.

You don't have to accept my account of metaphysical contingency/possibility - but this demonstrates that your proof depends on a metaphysical framework that you cannot show to be true. Your proof is thus epistemically contingent on that questionable framework.

Tautologies are necessarily true, and truth means conformance to reality. — A Christian Philosophy

The statement "The morning star is the evening star" is a tautology because both the morning star and the evening star refer to the same object. This is semantics, with no ontological implications about necessary or contingent existence. So substituting tautolgy for necessity is misleading, such as your next error:

outcomes described by the laws of nature also occur in reality, but these laws are not tautologies and so these outcomes do not occur in all possible worlds. — A Christian Philosophy

For there to be a "possible world" in which it is not the case that F=ma, there would have to be some C that accounts for the truth of F=ma, and C could have accounted for ~(F=ma) - some non-actual possibility. Here's a case where I think you're conflating metaphysical possibility with conceptual possibility (i.e. you can conceive of F=ma being untrue).

The solution to the QI vs PSR problem is discussed in this post. There is a long and a short answer. The short answer is that quantum experts themselves claim "I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics", and something that nobody understands cannot be used as a valid argument for or against anything. — A Christian Philosophy

Actually, there are multiple coherent interpretations of QM. Some treat quantum outcomes as contingent (as I described). Others treat it as a necessary outcome. My earlier comments are based on the premise the outcome is contingent. My purpose was to illustrate the concept of contingency, not to insists there is true, metaphysical contingency.

It sounds like you believe in the PSR but allow some exceptions. This is problematic because how do we decide when exceptions are made? — A Christian Philosophy

I consider the metaphysical basis of necessity/contingeny that I described to be the correct principle. The PSR generally conforms to it, but it is more vague.

Such findings resonate with philosophical perspectives that consider time not as an absolute backdrop but as emerging from the interplay between observer and system.’

Agree? — Wayfarer

Yes, but how does this differ from confirmation bia?

Your use of 'something ontological' simply means, you believe that time is real in a sense outside of any cognition of it. Even that usage is questionable. 'Ontology' refers to kind of being, or alternatively, a method for categorising types of substance or systems. What I really think you're saying is 'mind-independent'. I might agree that our perception of time reflects something real, but whatever that real is, it might well be outside of time - which we would have no way of knowing without measurement. — Wayfarer

Correct: I think time is mind-independent. From my point of view, calling it "real" is vague. My best guess would be that it's a relation between events, where events are states of affairs. Relations are ontological - constituents of states of affairs. That's why I labelled it ontological. But I didn't want to be this specific because IMO, there's no definitive view I'm willing to even tentatively commit to. But it seems contradictory to think time is "outside of time".

When it comes to the Universe as a whole, time looses its meaning, for there is nothing else relative to which the universe may be said to change. — Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right for Life, p 271

This is consistent with the Page-Wooters mechanism, which I find fascinating (I recommend reading the abstract at the link).

He's making the point that I'm making, and that Bergson makes, and Kant makes - time exists as an inextricable basis of our cognitive apparatus — Wayfarer

Here's an article Linde wrote. He's speculating about a mysterious connection between time and mind. By contrast, the Page-Wooters experiment I linked you to demonstrates an actual passage of time being experienced by the "clock" within the quantum system while externally there's no passage of time. The internal clock isn't conscious, so the passage of time isn't associated with mind - it's just a matter of being within the system.

Who knows where any of this will lead. Linde suggests it's possible some link to consciousness will be found, but that remains to be seen. I understand why his speculation appeals to you and Kuhn.

A perspective which includes a number of presuppositions, mainly drawn from science (despite your denials) or at least from natural philosophy. Hence why I say 'metaphysical naturalism' is self-contradictory - naturalism has generally defined itself in opposition to metaphysics. — Wayfarer

Yes, of course there's a number of presuppositions - it's a complete metaphysical system. As I keep telling you, the outline of the system (state of affairs ontology, immanent universals, law realism, truthmaker theory) has no dependency on known science - but it's consistent with science, and indeed it accepts scientific facts as true. How is that a problem, other than the tentative nature of scientific knowledge that scientists and philosophers agree is there? You don't have to accept physicalism. I gather it's because you want there to be more. That's fine. I'm not trying to convince you to settle for it. But personally, I don't need anything more. I'm sufficiently open-minded to know there may very well be more. I expect there IS more to reality than the analyzable portion, but the possibilities are endless -and I see no objective means of picking some to embrace. Phsyicalism is minimalist, but also the most secure BECAUSE it minimizes the speculative leaps. That's its appeal to me. You want more, but accept that not everyone feels that way.

That is exactly what it means. His profession of respect for religion is out of civility. But, he says, understand that it is subjective, comforting for those who believe it, but not true — Wayfarer

I think he was being sincere, but you can think whatever you like. If you're interested, here's the full interview. He says a little more about it, but not much.

The underlying belief is that mind is the product of physical causes - and Armstrong says it! - which I'm saying forgets or fails to realise that mind is the pre-condition of an analysis of causes. — Wayfarer

Armstrong's dead. I'm alive, and I do accept that the mind is a pre-condition for analyzing causes. But that does not falsify the theory that the mind is a product of the physical. You have admitted that physicalism is not falsifiable, so why do you keep treating these notions as if they do falsify it?

Bottom line in all of this is there is no time without mind. I — Wayfarer

You've provided no justification for that claim. Here's an unobjectionable alternative: the human perception of time would not exist if there was no mind. It's something of a tautology, but it's unwarranted to claim that our perception of time does not reflect something ontological. Remind me again how youo view the body of knowledge about natural history: the big bang, planet formation, abiogenesis, evolution, etc - the conventional wisdom is that this reflects a past time in which there were no minds. What do you accept, and what do you deny about this? Cast your answer in a way that's consistent with "there is no time without mind".

I wouldn’t say that space and time are “entirely mind-dependent” in the sense of being subjective or personal. I’m not saying they’re imaginary or arbitrary, nor that they vary from person to person. What I’m proposing is in line with the Kantian (and later phenomenological) insight that space and time are conditions of appearance—they are the framework within which any object can appear to us at all, not features of things as they exist independently of experience. That is the sense in which they're not mind-independent. — Wayfarer

I agree that space and times are conditions of appearance, and the framework within which objects appear to us (through our senses), and establishes the cognitive anchor by which we evaluate the object. But that doesn't imply there is no ontology to time or space. I won't make a rash judgement at to what that ontology is, but my sense is that this ontology applies both to ourselves and to the object we're perceiving: we're on the same moving train of time and space that the objects are. Why think otherwise? Why think this has the potential for introducing additional error? And if it does have that potential, how should it affect our analysis?

we never experience space or time themselves apart from the objects and events that are given in them — Wayfarer

We nevertheless can reason abstractly about this - consider the relation of time to whatever we're analyzing. Once again, my issue is that is that, even though agnosticism about this could be warranted, what's the usefulness - unless it suggests some direction for analysis?

Here, I’d say the value isn’t in treating our foundational perceptual and cognitive framework as "tentative" in the same way we treat scientific hypotheses—after all, as you say, we can't "revise" the basic conditions of human cognition. But acknowledging their conditional or constructed nature serves a different philosophical purpose: it helps us see the limits of objectivity, and opens space for deeper inquiry into the nature of reality and experience. — Wayfarer

This seems like the same tentativeness as any other unverifiable/unfalsifiable aspect of philosophy. That's neither condemnation nor praise. But I agree with everything you said about cultivating humility, but not so much here:

What I’m ultimately taking issue with is the pretense of objectivity in philosophy, especially where it has been co-opted by scientific materialism or physicalism. This worldview treats the human being as simply another object among objects, to be analyzed in the same terms as stars, stones, or synapses: — Wayfarer

What you consider the "pretense of objectivity" is, to me, just applying a consistent perspective from which to evaluate the world. We all have one, with varying degrees of commitment to the assumptions. But because no assumption is necessarily true, we shouldn't apply those assumptions dogmatically - we could be wrong. I think this is close to what you're going for with your call for humility.

Regarding Armstrong suggesting that humans are objects. In his ontology, they are. That doesn't mean they're JUST objects. We value other humans, the artistic creations of humans, and we value animals and the environment - these values don't disappear for those of us who believe humans are objects. (Regarding Armstrong: although he was a committed atheist, he respected religion. He said, "I have the greatest respect for it. I think it may be the thing that many people need, and it enshrines many truths about life. But I do not think it is actually true.")

It’s requirement to recover the truth that human beings are not reducible to what objective methods can say about them, because those methods themselves emerge from the activity of human understanding.

Just because our methods emerge from our understandings doesn't mean we aren't reducible, but this shouldn't be a threatening proposition - because it doesn't erase our values or the feelings we have.

Space and time are not imaginary, but nor are they properties of things in themselves. They are forms of intuition—that is, they belong to the structure of experience, not to things independently of experience. They're part of the conditions under which anything at all can appear to us as an object. In that sense, they are functions of cognition—not invented by the mind, but intrinsic to how the mind makes sense of what it receives. — Wayfarer

So...your view is that space and time are entirely mind-dependent. Is this a premise, or can you provide reasoning that entails this? Needless to say, I don't buy it.

How do you account for the past, before any human-like intelligence existed?

Your objection seems to come from a position that assumes we can somehow stand outside both perception and object, as if we could compare “the thing as it is” with “the thing as it appears.” — Wayfarer

My position (which is not what my objection is) is that we are part of the world, that are sensory perceptions deliver a reflection of that world which is interpreted by our cognitive functions in a way that is congruent to reality. From this foundation, our abstract reasoning has enabled us to identify more aspects to reality than our senses deliver (e.g. composition, relations, laws, natural history). We "make sense" of all of this through these cognitive faculties, and this entails casting these derived facts in a fashion congruent to our noetic structure (which is partly innate and partly learned). So we aren't "standing outside" perception, but we can abstractly grasp aspects of reality that are beyond our perceptions.

I would view "the thing as it is" to be the thing's composition, its intrinsic properties, and its relations to other objects. Among those relations is the way it's related to it's material and efficient causes. What I have just outlined is a "state of affairs". Are we missing something? Possibly, but my position is rational to believe unless it's either rationally defeated or an alternative explanation can be shown to be superior.

We never encounter the object “in itself”; we only ever encounter appearances—ideas, — Wayfarer

Indeed, we are encountering appearances - specifically, what our senses deliver to us, and the sense we make of those appearances (e.g. the colors, angles, etc) - but it is the object itself that appears that way to us - so we are indeed encountering the object itself. Why would you, or Schopenhaurer deny that we are actually encountering the actual object? This seems an unwarranted skepticism. My view is that we are PERCEIVING aspects of the actual object, and if this is being denied, I'd like to understand the justification for denying that.

Of course, our perceptions aren't necessarily delivering the object's intrinsic properties, but some of the actual properties are reflected to us in our perceptions. Example: color is not an intrinsic property of an object, it's a quale that gives us the capacity to discriminate, but it's physically accounted for by the wavelengths of light that are reflected from the surface. Through analysis, we are able to identify aspects of the object that do constitute intrinsic properties. Example: we might identify mass as an intrinsic property of an object. Further analysis reveals that mass may not be fully an intrinsic property, but rather - a consequence of interactions with the Higgs field. I only mention this to point out that much of what we know is tentative and subject to revision. But at each stage, we're identifying a best guess at what the object actually is - at least in some respects. A degree of skepticism is appropriate because all scientific "knowledge" (body of accepted facts) is tentative. Feel free to add an element of skepticism on the basis that our foundational starting point (our perceptions and cognitive faculties) is a step removed, but then I ask: what's the value of doing this, other than as an intellectual nod to possibility? Why treat it as tentative, like we do scientific knowledge, when there is zero chance of correcting it?

This insight—that every object is already shaped by the structures of perception and understanding—later became a stepping-off point for phenomenology which built on this by exploring how the world is always "given to" consciousness, and how even our sense of objectivity is conditioned by the intentional structures of experience.

I agree, and this is 100% consistent with everything I said. It would be absurd to ignore the role of our senses and cognitive apparatus.

So this is not just a metaphysical musing—it’s part of a serious and ongoing philosophical effort to understand how experience, meaning, and cognition are bound up with the structure of appearance itself. — Wayfarer

Again, I 100% agree. Did you think I'd disagree? Do you think any of this is inconsistent with state-of-affairs ontology, law realism, immanent universals or truthmaker theory? It's not.

Even an OG needs to fulfill the PSR. — A Christian Philosophy

That's logically impossible. There can be no explanation for an OG. It must exist autonomously - not dependent on anything else. But since the OG is not contingent, it exists necessarily, consistent with some versions of the PSR.

Even an OG needs to fulfill the PSR. This is done by the OG having existence inherently, — A Christian Philosophy

Autonomous is a better descriptor.

This self explanation does not apply to the laws of nature because they are not tautologies — A Christian Philosophy

Category error. Tautologies refers to PROPOSITIONS, not to existents.

Quantum indeterminacy (QI): QI is incompatible with the PSR. — A Christian Philosophy

Since quantum indeterminacy is likely to be real, you have a choice: reject the PSR outright, or accept the probabilistic result of a quantum collapse as adequately explained.

Ok, thanks for the clarification. But note, that, however one can still say that we have been proven wrong in our assumptions many times, even by science itself. It's obvious, for instance, the Sun and the stars revolve around us. — boundless

Of course, but it's rational to maintain a belief before it's disproven, and its irrational to reject something just because it's logically possible that it's false. This latter is my issue with idealism, per my understanding of it.

So, I'm not sure if your argument here is compelling. — boundless

It wasn't an argument to show idealism is false. I was just showing that it is rational to deny idealism. I'm struggling to find a rational reason to deny mind-independent reality exists. The only reasons I've seen so far is because it's possible. That's not a good reason. There's loads of possibilities - many of which conflict with one another. Surely it's at least POSSIBLE that mind-independent reality exists - so what's the reasoning that tips the scale away from that?

But note that, however, pragmatism doesn't imply truthfulness....the existence of an external, partially intelligible physical world is a reasonable belief to be mantained. But I do not claim certainty about this. — boundless

I agree that we can't be absolutely certain. And while I also agree that pragmatism doesn't imply truth, my impression is that idealists interact with the world pragmatically (they eat, sleep, piss, work, raise kids...) - and if so, this seems like cognitive dissonance. Why get out of bed, if they truly believe mind-independent reality doesn't exist? If they aren't walking the walk, it makes me think they're just playing an intellectual game (perhaps casting a middle finger at reality, a reality that places relatively little value on a PhD in Philosophy: "F__k you! You don't even exist! Nya Nya!).

IMO it raises interesting questions also about the nature of the 'physical', even when we assume that it is real. — boundless

The issues raised with perception and the role of our cognitive faculties are definitely worth considering. But how should influence our efforts to understand the world beyond acknowledging the role of those cognitive faculties?

note, that 'meaning' seems something that relates to mind. So, if meaning is something that relates to the physical too (and, in fact, it is something fundamental), it would seem that the 'physical' is not that different from the 'mental'. In other words, we land to a physicalism that seems not to far from a panpsychism (or at least quite open to the 'mental').

Exploring the nature of "meaning" is a worthwhile philosophical endeavor, and it seems to me that it's entirely within the scope of the mind. That's because I see its relation to the external word as a matter for truth-theory: what accounts for "truth"? I'm a fan of truthmaker theory, which is just a formalized correspondence theory: a statement is true if it corresponds to something in reality (what it corresponds to, is the truthmaker).

Now, if you consider any material object - the computer you're looking at now, the desk it's sitting on, the keyboard you're typing on: 'all this is given indirectly and in the highest degree determined, and is therefore merely a relatively present object, for it has passed through the machinery and manufactory of the brain, and has thus come under the forms of space, time and causality, by means of which it is first presented to us as extended in space and...active in time.'

You might explain the sense in which this is mistaken. — Wayfarer

Sure. It seems to conflate the object (the existent that we naturally believe we are perceiving) with the perception of the object. It's perfectly fine to draw attention to the perception process, but I object to blurring the distinction. It's unclear what is meant by coming "under the forms of space, time and causality". Is this just a reference to our cognitive interpretation? Is there some reason to think space, time, causality, and spatial extension are all imaginary?

I don't understand what is being referred to as "relatively present". Is it the perception? Is the actual object? I can't tell if this is nit-picking what "the present" is (the act of perception takes a bit of time).

In general, the whole quote appears to be applying hyperskepticism to perception - which I think entails hyperskepticism about everything. Am I misinterpreting that?

You refer to 'facts of science' in defense of metaphysical naturalism, and specifically to reject anything perceived as inconsistent with modern science (teleology, qualia, formal and final causation, to mention a few.) — Wayfarer

Consider a hypothetical metaphysical theory that was inconsistent with the "facts of science". I feel strongly that such a theory has been falsified by those facts. I use the scare-quotes because all facts of science are tentatitve- because they are falsifiable, but they are nevertheless the best available explanation for the phenomena they concern - and it would be foolish to just assume they're false, in order to embrace the metaphysical theory. A metaphysical theory needs to be consistent with everything we "know" about the world ("know" in the sense that we have a body of well-supported information).

You had claimed Metaphysical Naturalism "tries to make a metaphysical principle out of empirical methodology". Aristotelean 4-causes is not methodology, it's an analytical framework - a paradigm. It's a paradigm that modern science doesn't use - although material and efficient causes are consistent. Modern science uses a different paradigm, and its methodologies are based on this - but the paradigm is not methodology. That's a conflation. Why shouldn't MN start with the modern, successful paradigm? Why assume teleology? Why treat the form of something as a "cause", in a sense similar to an efficient or material cause? Is some fact of the world otherwise left unexplained?

You included qualia in your list. Neither science nor MB denies that qualia are something in need of explanation.

You admit that physicalism doesn't really accomodate or explain the nature of mind. ...

What I've said is that there are aspects of mind that physicalism doesn't now adequately explain. That honest assessment doesn't entail the existence of something nonphysical, and besides - you admitted physicalism wasn't falsified.

But then, when pressed about that, you say, that metaphysical naturalism is not science, even though it apparently relies on scientific ontology. Pardon me for so saying, but it seems a little disengenuous

Scientific ontology? Theoretical physics does discover things that exist, and seeks to account for them in terms of something more fundamental, so it's ontology. It's also part of the uncontroversial facts of the world that any metaphysical theory would need to be consistent with (idealist skepticism notwithstanding).

So yes, MN accepts the conclusions of modern science- but it is flexible enough to accommodate the tentative nature of those conclusions. And MN does use a paradigm fully consistent with science. Do you have a better one? I've asked for this, and you've indicated it's both difficult and out of the scope of your interests.

So I don't get why you'd think I was being disingenuous. The space between science and MN is small, but that's a point in its favor - parsimony. You denigrated the relevance of parsimony, but you offered no alternative means of evaluating a metaphysical theory. You seem to be reacting to the fact that MN dispenses with some traditional metaphysics - but this misses the point. That's a main reason why a comprehensive metaphysical theory was needed - much of metaphysical theory was inconsistent with physicalism. That fact is a feature, not a bug.

any claim about reality is necessarily shaped by mental processes of judgment, perception, and understanding. — Wayfarer

I've never disputed that. You haven't answered my question about this: how should that influence our efforts to understand the world?

Contrary to the dominant assumptions of physicalism and metaphysical naturalism, which treat the physical world as ontologically basic and knowable through objective science, this essay argues that all knowledge of the world is always already structured by the perspective of a subject. This does not mean denying the empirical reality of a world independent of any particular mind, but rather recognizing that mind is the condition of the intelligibility of any objective claim. — Wayfarer

Physicalism does assume the world is physical, top to bottom - so it fits "ontologically basic". Provide some reason to think this is false, beyond the mere possibility that our cognitive processes are delivering a false picture.

Sure, our knowledge of the world is shaped by our perspective. So what? What are the relevant implications? I've explained why I believe perceptions of any organism would provide a functional view of the world - survival requires it. And I proposed that the more congruent the worldview is to actual reality, the more adaptible it is. There's good evidence we have a more accurate view of the world than other animals, in certain respects.

You seem skeptical of our perceptions, but provided no reason for it other than by noting the processing involved and that there's a distinction between our cognitive image of the world, and the actual world. I assume that you nevertheless trust your perceptions as you drive home and select your meals. You haven't identified a problem with my "properly basic beliefs" account. So please explain why anyone should reject their perceptual world-view.

Qualia are a problem, but can be rationalized as illusions.
— Relativist

What is at issue in this rather glib statement? What's hiding behind these words? — Wayfarer

These issues: 1) we have subjective experiences that we label as "qualia". 2) There is no fully satisfactory physical account of them. 3) The absence of a fully satisfactory account of qualia does not falsify physicalism. 4) I have pondered the problem myself, and came up with the idea that qualia (their nature-what they feel like) may simply be mental illusions. Consistent with representationalism, they are still representations of something (e.g. pain represents damage) but the nature of pain- the feeling itself, is otherwise unaccounted for. Their nature seems manufactured by our central nervous system, and manifest as they do in our consciousness. That was my personal hypothesis, and then I later discovered that some physicalist philosophers had developed the same illusionist idea. It's still the best answer I have at present for a physicalist account, and it demonstrates that physicalism is not falsified by qualia. Nevertheless, I doubt any non-physicalist would embrace the theory.

You've now accused me of being "glib" and "disingenuous", both of which are insulting. Please try and be polite.

Why the need for 'interpretations' at all? Why has the problem come up? You can't deny that debates over the meaning of quantum mechanics have been boiling ever since it was discovered. If there was a definitive explanation, then what were the arguments about, and why are they ongoing? Why was this thread created? Why does it ask 'does anyone support mind-independent reality'? Why did Einstein feel obliged to ask the question about the moon existing? You're not addressing any of those questions. — Wayfarer

Do you disagree that explanations are metaphysics and unfalsifiable? An interpretation is needed because the ontological implications of QM conflict with our natural world-view. As I said, the fact that we've been able to grapple with this is a testament to our abilities to consider theory that is inconsistent with our perceptual world-view. I assume asked about the moon to highlight a perceived folly with the notion that consciousness is a factor in measurement. You may not think that notion is folly, but I'm with Einstein on this one - even though I do think "God" throws dice. Why are debates ongoing? because the matter hasn't been settled, and probably can't be - it's a philosophical question, and as you know - philosophers can't settle much of anything. Someone who believes reality is fundamentally mind-dependent can interpret it in a manner consistent with that view (I have no objection to doing this)- but doing so doesn't constitute a reason to believe reality actually IS mind-dependent - it's not a reason to think it likely.

Regarding the question posed by the title of this thread: the question seems to imply that we ought to reject the existence of mind-independent reality. Should we all do that? I certainly don't think so. Should anyone do that? I am still waiting for someone to give a good reason for doing it. You've only identified some reasons for a degree of skepticism, but haven't explained how this is more than mere possibility.

*edit* I overlooked this:

However, if you drill down, the basis of the 'conceptual analysis' turns out to be scientific. If you discarded scientific cosmology, atomic physics, evolutionary theory, and so on, what would be left of 'metaphysical naturalism'? — Wayfarer

State-of-affairs ontology, immanent universals, law realism, truthmaker theory, and the entailments of all these. IOW, it would be 100% intact.

And, for that matter, isn't 'metaphysical naturalism' oxymoronic insofar as naturalism is generally defined in opposition to metaphysics?

I gave you a definition from Blackwell that fits. Other definitions don't fit. If you don't like using the label, we can call it something else, but recognize it stands as a mutually exclusive alternative to theories you would likely label "metaphysics".

Since the laws of nature are not tautologies, they are contingent facts that need an explanation outside of themselves, i.e., a cause. — A Christian Philosophy

Tautologies are statements that are necessarily true. The term doesn't apply to existents, like an OG. The question is whether or not there is an ontological basis for an OG being contingent- meaning that it could have not existed.

If X is caused to exist, then it is contingent on it's cause, if the cause could have failed to produce X. That can't be the case for a first cause, so how else can it be contingent? You can't just assert it, because you are claiming to have a proof.

Additionally, if the OG has necessary existence, it must be the OG in all possible worlds. Thus, if the OG included the laws of nature in its structure, then the same laws of nature would exist in all possible worlds and this would result in a modal collapse. — A Christian Philosophy

Modal collapse pertains to propositions - it means that every true statement is necessarily true. From the perspective of ontology, necessitarianism would entail modal collapse. Necessitarianism means everything that exists, exists necessarily. You seem to think necessitarianism is false. Why? Provide your proof (dismissing it based on the assertion it's "frowned upon" carries no weight).

Regardless, a necessary OG does not entail necessitarianism - other sources of contingency may exist, such as quantum indeterminacy.

what I meant was that the OG is a designer that designs the laws of nature, not that the OG is designed. — A Christian Philosophy

You are claiming to prove there's a designer, so you can't just assume it. A natural OG accounts for laws of nature which exist necessarily. This remains a live possibility (thus defeating your argument) unless you can show this is impossible - or at least, less likely than a being of infinite complexity with magical knowledge (not the product of learning or experience).

Aren't ALL lies (intentional falsehoods) immoral?

So...you're saying fraud and defamation are perfectly fine, because the freedom of speech trumps them.

I had in mind saying a few of the things you discussed , but you said it all.

I brought the issue of fraud and libel to NOS4A2 in another thread, and he never responded to those points. I'm curious in any free-speech absolutist will try and rebut anything you said.

I think I have provided one, but that you're not interested in it, — Wayfarer

You haven't provided an overall metaphysical framework. When I asked, you said: "As to whether I advocate a metaphysics, it’s a notoriously difficult subject."

What is called 'reality' is not merely physical, but always shaped by mind. So, therefore, mind is truly a fundamental constituent of what we understand as reality, but in a transcendental rather than objective sense. — Wayfarer

A word is needed that refers to what actually exists. "Reality" seems the word to use. To claim reality is shaped by the mind, or is a constituent of reality (beyond the beings that have minds) is a rather drastic assumption based on pure conjecture.

Physicalism is not a falsifiable hypothesis. It's a philosophical view of the nature of reality. The central problem with physicalism is, as Schopenhauer says, that it seeks to explain what is the most immediately apparent fact, namely, the fact of one's own conscious experience, in terms of a hypothetical substance namely matter, the real nature of which is conjectural and uncertain. — Wayfarer

To me, it seems absurd to refer to matter as a "hypothetical substance", as if it's worth entertaining that it is unreal. Absurd, because it's unwarranted to believe matter to NOT be an actual substance. It seems a futile attempt to wipe our cognitive slate clean.

Any metaphysical theory - any ontology, will necessarily be "conjectural and uncertain" - it's neither verifiable nor falsifiable. That's a good reason to reserve judgement. But if that's what one is going to do, it's inconsistent to then embrace something wild that is even MORE conjectural and detached from anything we know about the world. MN takes the smallest leaps from the things we know.

As we've discussed, and you acknowledge, physicalism doesn't and probably cannot explain the nature of mind or consciousness, yet when we come to this point, that inconvenient fact is disregarded.

I said this is like trying to explain hurricane behavior using quantum field theory. There's nothing about hurricane behavior that warrants believing there to be some ontologically emergent properties or features that magically appear somewhere in between QFT and meteorology.

That post defends a perspectival form of philosophical idealism, arguing that mind is foundational to reality—not in the sense that the world is “in” the mind, nor that mind is a kind of substance, but that any claim about reality is necessarily shaped by mental processes of judgment, perception, and understanding. — Wayfarer

As I've said, it makes perfect sense to note that our PERCEPTION of reality (our image of the world) is shaped by these mental processes, but it's an unwarranted leap to claim that REALITY ITSELF is shaped in this way.

the world as known arises through the unifying activity of consciousness, which science has yet to fully explain and indeed generally tends to ignore. — Wayfarer

This sounds more reasonable than the claim that "mind is foundational to reality". But the question remains: where does this lead? I have no problem agreeing with what you said here, but how should that influence our efforts to understand the world? Our understanding will NECESSARILY be from our own perspective.

Mind independence is true on an empirical level as a definite matter of fact. But the problem with methodological naturalism, is that it wishes to extend mind independence to reality as a whole, to make a metaphysic out of it. — Wayfarer

You complained about problems with scienticism, which I pointed out is addressed with metaphysical naturalism. Then you choose to dismiss metaphysical naturalism (MN). MN demonstrates that there is no need to propose magic to explain the world. What would be the warrant to propose some UNnatural component (or foundation) of the world?

It tries to make a metaphysical principle out of empirical methodology. — Wayfarer

No, it doesn't. There's nothing empirical about MN. You're conflating scientism with MN.

Of course it does! As you've mentioned John Bell — Wayfarer

Not knowing the context, it sounds like he's referring to strict determinism as being unviable -contrary to Einstein's insistence on determinism. QM is fully deterministic - it conforms exactly according to a Schroedinger equation. The indeterminism arises when interacting with something beyond the quantum system. This is where multiple interpretations of QM step in to explain what is occurring - and these explanations are essentially metaphysical, with the same problems that any metaphysical theory has: unverifiable and unfalsifiable. No interpretation is really inconsistent with MN, unless you choose to treat consciousness as something special and magical to begin with.

As noted in the Nobel Committee's award statement, their findings suggest that "quantum mechanics cannot be replaced by any local hidden-variable theory," implying that the properties of particles are not predetermined but are defined only upon measurement. — Wayfarer

Are you conflating determinism with MN? QM is fundamental science; it is telling us something about the material world, not telling us there's something immaterial or magical.

doesn’t the idea that particles lack definite properties prior to observation strike at the very core of ‘mind-independence’? — Wayfarer

Not in the least. It shows that there are complementary properties, and that this complementarity is fundamental. The recognition that there are complementary properties is a testament to our ability to identify aspects of reality that are inconsistent with our natural prespectives - the perspectives that idealists seem to consider too constraining to grasp reality as it is.

Anyway, you are still asserting that there is intelligility without explaining it. — boundless

Here's where I explained it to Wayfarer:

what we take to be "the external world" is already shaped through our cognitive apparatus.
— Wayfarer

I agree. I've referred to this as innate, basic beliefs that are nonverbal. Arguably, these beliefs are PROPERLY basic: a product of the world as it is. If we are the natural product of the world, then of course it would produce beings with cognitive structures that enable successful interaction - so they would at least be FUNCTIONALLY accurate. The more closely this internal image of the world is to the actual world, the more flexible and adaptable the animal. When we compare ourselves to other animals, that's exactly what we see.

I am borrowing the concept of a PROPERLY basic belief from Alvan Plantinga, who uses the term to argue that theism is rational. He suggests that a God who wants to have beings that know him would instill an innate sensus divinitatus into them, by which they would know him and recognize what is true about him. This innate knowledge of God is basic (not learned), and it is basic "in the proper way" - produced by means that would be expected to produce it. This is not a proof of God (that would be circular reasoning), but rather a defense of the reasonableness of theism - that is contingent on there being such a God. If there is such a God, it means it's perfectly rational to believe in him. If there is not such a God, then belief in God is irrational (the alleged sensus divinitatus doesn't actually exist).

Analagously, if there is a world that produces living beings through natural processes, those beings would require a functionally accurate means of interacting with it - and the MORE accurate the internal picture of that world, the more flexible and adaptable the life forms. Similarly to Plantinga, this is not a proof, but it's a consistent and coherent theory that is rational to believe, even though it might be false.

And if I'm right that this is a basic belief (whether PROPER or not), then it's rational to maintain it unless defeated, and irrational to deny based on the mere possibility that it is false. — Relativist

we can't conceive anything except withing the framework of your experience and the mental faculties that 'make sense' of it. — boundless

This is unarguably true, but it doesn't imply the framework represents a false account. Consistent with evolution, it's plausible that our mental faculties came into being in order to interact with the world that we perceive and "make sense" of. Were these faculties to deceive us, we wouldn't have survived- so it is reasonable to maintain our innate trust in these faculties. Perfectly fine to keep the truism in mind, and adjust our inferences, but extreme skepticism seems unwarranted.

I acknowledge that I'm being speculative about the role of evolution - so (in isolation) this doesn't undercut idealism. But it does support the coherence of realism.

It depends on the 'ontological idealist'. Ontological idealists of this kind, for instance, are generally not solipsists and they would affirm that there is something outside our minds: other minds and their mental contents. So, perhaps, while there is no 'material' world, there is still something external of us and, in fact, there are still other minds with which/whom can interact. — boundless

Sounds like unwarranted skepticism- denying our innate sense of the external world on the basis that it's possibly false. Mere possibility is not a defeater of the innate beliefs the idealist was born with!

Right but this doesn't undermine neither idealism (epistemic or ontological) nor the argument that Bradley makes. There might be some kinds of sentient experience that we can't know but are in principle knowable. — boundless

This still relies on mere possibility. This is like a conspiracy theorist who comes up with some wild claim which he clings to because it can't be proven wrong. Only this is worse because there's no evidence to support the hypothesis.

So, the 'law of non-contradiction' is semantics?

Anyway, I believe that intelligibility also implies meaning ('making sense'). So, that's another reason why I don't understand how to explain (without assuming it from the start and leaving it de fact unexplained) how a purely physical world is intelligible. — boundless

Yes, the law of contradictions is semantics: it applies to propositions, not directly to the actual world.

How can it be that the physical world can produce physical beings that make sense of the world? The survival advantage explains the causal context. Can something physical experience meaning? I can't prove that it can, but it seems plausible to me. If you're inclined to think it cannot, then what would you propose to account for it? The problem you have is that you need to make some wild assumptions about what exists to account for it - and then I'd ask if those assumptions are truly more reasonable than physicalism?

While you distance metaphysical naturalism from scientism, it seems to me that in practice it tends to rely on scientific findings as the principal arbiter of philosophical questions—especially when appealing to parsimony to set aside questions that science cannot easily address — Wayfarer

Science relies on abductive reasoning , which is a general epistemological approach- not exclusive to science. It's explicitly used by historians, and it is the most common form of rational reasoning we engage in every day (the most obvious problem with conspiracy theories is the failure to consider all available data). There's more to abduction than parsimony, but why should it not be a factor?

Any viable metaphysical theory would need to be consistent with all known facts. Science provides a set of facts, so of course it needs to be consistent with these facts - as well as any other facts. Are there non-scientific facts being overlooked? That would certainly be problematic. But 2000 year old philosophical frameworks (e.g. 4-causes; teleology; essentialism...)are not facts, they are alternative theories to be judged against.

you seem prepared to treat the framework as the best available by default. 'Hey, it's a great car! Don't let the fact it doesn't steer bother you! Look at the panel work!' — Wayfarer

I'm open to a better framework. You haven't provided one, and indicated it's outside the scope of your interest. But you exaggerate the problems, it seems to me, because none of the problems truly falsify physicalism. Qualia are a problem, but can be rationalized as illusions. Is there a better, comprehensive explanation that is non-physical? Is there a true defeater- something that unequivocally falsifies physicalism?

That strikes me as an unresolved tension: relying on science to ground metaphysics when it appears fruitful, but retreating to a more minimal philosophical stance when its limits are acknowledged. I think that’s a structural challenge for naturalism.

as a philosophical position. — Wayfarer

I repeat: a complete metaphysics needs to be consistent with all available facts. Consider how absurd it would be to dismiss a well-supported scientific theory on the basis that it's inconsistent with some prior philosophical commitments (have you ever debated a creationist?) Again: what unequivocal facts are inconsistent with, and thus falsify, physicalism? Explanatory challenges are not defeaters, but they could be taken into account in the abductive reasoning.

I would question whether the definition you cite from the Blackwell Dictionary straightforwardly supports metaphysical naturalism per se. Framing metaphysics as “an inquiry by pure reason into a reality beyond perception” seems to align more with rationalist or even idealist traditions than with a naturalism grounded in empirical science — Wayfarer

There's multiple definitions of the term; I just sought a definition consistent with the scope of inquiry I had in mind to describe what I'm interested in, in contrast to your interests.

The point at issue was the supposed mind-independence of the objects of classical physics. — Wayfarer

Of course I believe objects exist independent of minds- and I've discussed that this seems rooted in innate, non-verbal basic beliefs. Do you truly not believe mind-independent objects? If so, why do you believe that?

Furthermore that the laws of physics were understood to be universal and not dependent on the context in which they were applied, operating deterministically in accordance with the mathematical principles discovered by Galileo and Newton (et al). — Wayfarer

I see no reason to think the most fundamental laws of nature are context dependent. When we notice a context dependency in a law of physics, it implies there's deeper law than the physics law. E.g. Newton's law of Gravity is true only within a certain context, whereas General Relativity is the deeper law.

That’s the sense in which I believe quantum theory undermines the assumption of scientific realism—an assumption that, I think, underwrites the metaphysical naturalism you’re defending. — Wayfarer

It doesn't do that, in the least.

the point was, he had to ask! — Wayfarer

I believe he asked because, at the time, the so-called observer problem was being debated.

Werner Heisenberg: "Of course the introduction of the observer must not be misunderstood to imply that some kind of subjective features are to be brought into the description of nature. The observer has, rather, only the function of registering decisions, i.e., processes in space and time, and it does not matter whether the observer is an apparatus or a human being; but the registration, i.e., the transition from the "possible" to the "actual," is absolutely necessary here and cannot be omitted from the interpretation of quantum theory."

John Bell: "Was the wave function waiting to jump for thousands of millions of years until a single-celled living creature appeared? Or did it have to wait a little longer for some highly qualified measurer - with a PhD?"

I disagree with your conclusion. That's because a natural OG, which includes the laws of nature in its structure, would exist necessarily. It's logically impossible for an OG to have been designed.

On your other point: If there is a designer with free will, it could design creatures that lack it, so it seems irrelevant whether not the designer has free will.

don't know. What's an OG? An ontological grounding...?

And wouldn't it be incumbent on those positing an OG to demonstrate the need for one? — Banno

Yes: OG = ontological ground. I don't need to demonstrate there is an OG to someone who already believes there is one.

Why? — Banno

Because he's a Christian, he believes there is an OG. I am arguing that an OG does not entail a God.

Can you show that there is no OG?

if the fundamental laws of nature existed inherently, this would result in a modal collapse, which is usually frowned upon. Therefore, the existence of the fundamental laws of nature are explained by design (type 2), and for a specific purpose. — A Christian Philosophy

Can we agree there's a first cause and an irreducible bottom layer of reality? If we start with that assumption - and call it the "ontolgoical ground" (OG), we can then entertain some possibilities. But first, let's consider whether or not the OG exists contingently or necessarily. (in all cases, I'm referring to metaphysical necessity/contingency, not to confused with conceivability or conceptual modality).

If the actual OG is contingent, then an alternative OG could have existed instead - or perhaps there could have been no OG at all.

Whatever it is, the OG cannot have been caused, because it's a first cause. Can an uncaused thing be contingent? To be contingent, something must account for that contingency - such as its cause (whatever caused it, might have not caused it). But if it exists uncaused then I suggest it must exist necessarily - any OG must exist necessarily.

You believe God is the OG, and probably agree it's existence is necessary, but there's no reason why it couldn't be something natural that includes the fundamental laws of nature in its structure. You alleged this entails "modal collapse", and dismiss this because it's "frowned upon". But how is it any different from a God existing necessarily? The only difference I see, is that a God is infinitely more complex (possessing infinite knowledge that is not the product of learning or experience) than an natural OG - which is a good reason to think it's natural.

Believing that the methods of science can be applied to the questions of philosophy is what is described as ‘scientism’. — Wayfarer

Yes, but I'm not doing that. Metaphysical naturalism (MN) provides a metaphysical context for what we know about the world. Of course, any metaphysical theory should be consistent with what we know, but the strength of naturalism is that it depends the fewest assumptions. The basic assumptions of MN are not derived scientifically (as scientism would require)- they are a product of conceptual analysis - just like any other metaphysical system must do.

My area of focus is philosophy, as I’ve outlined above. The problem with physicalism is that it begins with exclusions and abstractions. — Wayfarer

Indeed, we have different areas of focus. Mine is to seek to understand reality as a whole. I have not suggested your approach is wrong.
Physicalism doesn't exclude anything we know about the world. It "excludes" some past metaphysical assumptions - hypotheses, not established facts, but provides alternative hypotheses.

But physics... brackets out questions of meaning. Its power lies in its ability to isolate variables and describe systems independently of context... excludes is the nature of the observer — Wayfarer

Don't conflate physics with MN, or physicalism. Physics, as a discipline, does not entail the study of biological organisms, much less the way the brain and mind work.

Physicalism can't find any mind in the world it studies, because it begins by excluding it, and then tries to patch it back in as a 'result' or 'consequence' of the mindless interactions which are its subject matter and from which it seeks to explain everything about life and mind.

I would characterize it differently. MN/physicalism provides a metaphysical framework for explaining what we know about the world- the relatively secure knowledge that science provides. It subsequently applies the model to the mind. It succeeds to a degree, but it certainly has some explanatory gaps. The methodology and framework are not suitable for examining the philosophical issues most important to you. Its unsuitability is not a falsification, anymore than does the meteorological study of hurricanes falsify fluid dynamics or quantum field theory.

This exclusion could not be sustained in quantum physics, where the so-called observer problem brought the role of measurement and observation back into focus. Since then, physics has no longer provided the idealized model of mind-independent reality — Wayfarer

That's simply not true. That was a claim some made, based on a basic Copenhagen interpretation. Most today would say that an observation is just one example of an entanglement, and that the entanglement results in a collapse of the wave function (some claim there's no collapse at all, but a world branching - but that's too unparsimonious for me).

As to whether I advocate a metaphysics... — Wayfarer

Fair enough, but bear in mind that I do advocate a metaphysics - defined as "In the rationalist tradition, [in which] metaphysics was seen to be an inquiry conducted by pure reason into the nature of an underlying reality that is beyond perception," (from the Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy article on "metaphysics"). As I've said, I'm not a committed physicalist - in that I do not have faith that everything is necessarily reducible to the physical. But I consider it a default assumption because of its parsimonous ontology. Some of the most appealing aspects are: its denial of essentialism, its dispensing with a "third realm" to account for the supposed existence of abstractions, the account of laws of nature, and truthmaker theory of truth. I am interested in knowing the limits of its explanatory scope (e.g. it doesn't seem possible to explain qualia), and for that reason - I like to explore the various issues with theory of mind.

I say that part of this world-model is 'the self in the world'. We see ourselves as individual subjects in a domain of other subjects, as well as impersonal objects and forces. But that too is a model, indeed the dominant model in scientific-secular culture. But philosophy demands us to look deeper, to understand the way that even such an obvious and common-sense view is itself a construct. — Wayfarer

Agreed: it's a construct and a model. But does the model reflect truth, at least in part? Is its truth not possible? Unlikely? Untrustworthy?
Is there an alternative- with equivalent explanatory power? Most of whay I'm seeing, including the above quote, is providing a reason why it might be false. And I raise my objection again: mere possibility is not a defeater.

what we take to be "the external world" is already shaped through our cognitive apparatus. — Wayfarer

I agree. I've referred to this as innate, basic beliefs that are nonverbal. Arguably, these beliefs are PROPERLY basic: a product of the world as it is. If we are the natural product of the world, then of course it would produce beings with cognitive structures that enable successful interaction - so they would at least be FUNCTIONALLY accurate. The more closely this internal image of the world is to the actual world, the more flexible and adaptable the animal. When we compare ourselves to other animals, that's exactly what we see.

I am borrowing the concept of a PROPERLY basic belief from Alvan Plantinga, who uses the term to argue that theism is rational. He suggests that a God who wants to have beings that know him would instill an innate sensus divinitatus into them, by which they would know him and recognize what is true about him. This innate knowledge of God is basic (not learned), and it is basic "in the proper way" - produced by means that would be expected to produce it. This is not a proof of God (that would be circular reasoning), but rather a defense of the reasonableness of theism - that is contingent on there being such a God. If there is such a God, it means it's perfectly rational to believe in him. If there is not such a God, then belief in God is irrational (the alleged sensus divinitatus doesn't actually exist).

Analagously, if there is a world that produces living beings through natural processes, those beings would require a functionally accurate means of interacting with it - and the MORE accurate the internal picture of that world, the more flexible and adaptable the life forms. Similarly to Plantinga, this is not a proof, but it's a consistent and coherent theory that is rational to believe, even though it might be false.

And if I'm right that this is a basic belief (whether PROPER or not), then it's rational to maintain it unless defeated, and irrational to deny based on the mere possibility that it is false. This is irrespective of physicalism, per se.

One does not need to deny the empirical facts of science (indeed, the originator of this kind of philosophy, Immanuel Kant, did not) . But the philosophical question is about the nature of existence, of reality as lived - not the composition and activities of those impersonal objects and forces which science takes as the ground of its analysis. — Wayfarer

Different starting points: a materialist is seeking to make sense of the world at large, a world that we've mostly learned about through science. You accept that there's an external world, and that science has provided some true information about it; the physicalist metaphysics just proposes a metaphysical framework for this what we know. It seems quite successful at this. However, when extending the model to the minds, there's some problems.

Your starting point seems to be the mind itself. It appears the metaphysics of mind is what you consider of paramount importance. You focus on the deficiencies of physicalism at accounting for the mind, and it seems you therefore dismiss physicalist metaphysics because it inadequately accounts for your area of focus. From my point of view, this is throwing the baby out with the bathwater: you have no general metaphysical framework for accounting for the world at large - despite the fact that you accept the existence of the external world and that science give us some true information about it (in the vein for structural realism). You seem uninterested in such an overall metaphysical framework, whereas that is what I'm most interested in.

I'm not a committed physicalist, but I do think physicalism is the best explanation for the available facts of the world - among metaphysical systems. That doesn't means it can answer every question, but it answer more than others.

But we’re not talking about science. We’re discussing philosophy, which is crucially concerned with the human condition, with questions of meaning. — Wayfarer

YOU aren't talking about science, and it's account of the natural world, but I am. The expanse of human existence is a speck in this vast, old universe.

The human condition is worthwhile and interesting to contemplate, and we probably agree that physicalism is a poor vehicle for doing so. But similarly, from what I've seen of idealism, it seems a poor vehicle for understanding the world at large.

here’s no conflict between idealism and science: the conflict is between idealism and scientific materialism, — Wayfarer

Much of what I've seen written in this thread suggest there IS a conflict between idealism and science - the disconnect between the perceive world and the actual world. I guess there are varying degrees. The title of the thread suggests a high degree of skepticism about the external world.

I say that part of this world-model is 'the self in the world'. We see ourselves as individual subjects in a domain of other subjects, as well as impersonal objects and forces. But that too is a model, indeed the dominant model in scientific-secular culture. But philosophy demands us to look deeper, to understand the way that even such an obvious and common-sense view is itself a construct. — Wayfarer

Agreed: it's a construct and a model. But does the model reflect reality, at least in part? The model formation process does not entail falsehood. If it's a product of natural forces (however one describes this: no necessarily physicalist), I think congruence with reality is likely. If the product of something outside the scope of natural, something with intentionality, why would it produce a false model?


Is there an alternative- with equivalent explanatory power? Most of what I'm seeing, including the above quote, is providing a reason why it might be false. And I raise my objection again: mere possibility is not a defeater.

nothing comes to the human intellect already named...these philosophical pioneers agreed on this major premise: that which is first given to the senses is undetermined. — Mww

I agree language helps shape how we think about the world, I think there's something more basic in us that is pre-verbal. No one has to be taught there's an external world, and that there are individual objects. The words have to become attached to perceptions. Animals learn things without ever attaching words. Gorillas and chimps can learn to attach words (sign language) to types of things.

The appeal to 'brute fact' seems convenient but is ultimately uninformative. — Wayfarer

Appeal? It's an inference. I believe the past is finite, which implies an initial state which exists by brute fact. Likewise, I believe there is a "bottom layer" of reality, not composed of anything simpler. Whatever it may be, it exists by brute fact. I don't see how any comprehensive metaphysics can avoid brute facts (and labeling it "necessary doesn't remove bruteness").

No. He's saying - and he says it very clearly - that the world, objects, and things, ARE ideas. — Wayfarer

That sounds absurd to me. Does he provide some epistemological assumption for this claim?

Look at it from the perspective of cognitive science: cognitive sciences knows that what we instintively understand as the external world is generated by the h.sapiens brain. — Wayfarer

Agreed.

Materialism as a philosophy, fails to take this into account, or ignores it.

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I disagree. Rather, physicalism's account of mental activity is deficient. Even it if justifies rejecting physicalism, it doesn't justify rejecting our innate basic beliefs that there is an external world that we perceive, and interact with. We naturally belief our perceptions of the world are true. What defeats these beliefs?

Whatever presents itself to our senses 'has passed through the machinery and manufactory of the brain, and has thus come under the forms of space, time and causality, by means of which it is first presented to us as extended in space and...active in time.' Space and time likewise are foundational neurological senses which allow us to orient ourselves and move around. They are real, but they also are built on an ineliminably (can't be eliminated) subjective basis.

I don't see a problem. Making sense of the world is necessarily going to be rooted in our nature. If bats were capable of abstract reasoning, the explanations they would generate would be rooted in their unique nature. These are perspectives, not falsehoods.

Physicalism attributes to the objects of perception an inherent reality which they don't possess.

Set physicalism aside, and focus specifically on what we perceive in the world. We naturally believe what perceive is real, including all the details delivered by our senses (the colors, smells, sounds, shapes, etc). Certainly the qualia are subjective, but they provide true information. A turd's stench is not an objective property of a turd, but it gives the true information that the turd is a turd, not a flower or food.

Hence, Schopenhauer's saying 'materialism is the philosophy of the subject who forgets herself.'

Materialism is an account of the world that is consistent with our perceptions and with science. What is his account of the world? How does its usefulness compare? Criticizing the deficiencies of materialism is not a justification for an alternative. It's useful only if we're seeking a "best explanation", in which case we need a real alternative to compare it to. If it's starting point is extreme skepticism about the external world, I see no utility to it.

Relativist: "Our perceptions entail only a reflection of reality, not reality itself. It is a perspective, but a perspective on what is actually there."
Bradley and Berkeley aside, I will take issue with what you say is 'actually there'. In line with what I've said above, your 'actually there' remains a conceptual construction or a sign. But physicalist philosophy overlooks this by regarding the 'testimony of sense' as indubitable. — Wayfarer

The statement of my you refer to was discussing a physicalist point of view, and acknowledging that perceptions are not identical to reality (what is actually there). My point being that, although I do not buy into idealism, I do not insist we perceive reality as it is.

It's not clear to me what Schopenhauer is addressing here:

"From such an indirectly given object, materialism seeks to explain what is immediately given, the idea (in which alone the object that materialism starts with exists), and finally even the will from which all those fundamental forces, that manifest themselves, under the guidance of causes, and therefore according to law, are in truth to be explained. To the assertion that thought is a modification of matter we may always, with equal right, oppose the contrary assertion that all matter is merely the modification of the knowing subject, as its idea."
He seems to be criticizing physicalism's inadequate account ofthoughts and ideas Is that it?

You might protest that the object is not an idea, but an actuality. But this overlooks, or rather, takes for granted, the fact that any object you refer to is identified as such, named and thereby brought into the domain of name and form, otherwise it would not constitute an object. You and I both know what it is - look, it's a hammer. It's a chair. It's a qasar. It's a neuron - but the point stands. — Wayfarer

My objection is more basic: what is the big picture of reality under this theory? Does it actually account for anything? Does it just assume it's futile to consider a broad metaphysical theory? Physicalism offers an explanation for almost everything. Does idealism explain ANYTHING?

Imagine 'how the world looks like' without any kind of sensations. — boundless

There were no sensations in the universe before life came into being.

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Feeling, thought, and volition (any groups under which we class psychical phenomena) are all the material of existence, and there is no other material, actual or even possible... — Berkeley

This seems to entail abandoning our innate sense of a world external to ourselves. If one really believed this, why wouldn't one stop interacting with the world we're allegedly imagining? Why eat? Why work?

Try to discover any sense in which you can still continue to speak of it, when all perception and feeling have been removed; or point out any fragment of its matter, any aspect of its being, which is not derived from and is not still relative to this source. When the experiment is made strictly, I can myself conceive of nothing else than the experienced. Anything, in no sense felt or perceived, becomes to me quite unmeaning. — Berkeley

I can infer something reasonable from this: making sense of the world will necessarily be in our own subjective terms. Our perceptions entail only a reflection of reality, not reality itself. It is a perspective, but a perspective on what is actually there. Understanding can only be from our perspective (it's like a non-verbal language - a set of concepts tied directly to our perceptions), but that doesn't mean it's a false understanding. And it has proven to be productive

physicalism seems content to claim that intelligibility (which you assume here) is just a 'brute fact' that doesn't need to be explained. I disagree. So, for me, it isn't enough. — boundless

It is a necessary fact that survival entails successful interaction with the external world. Our species happened to develop abstract reasoning, which provided a "language" for making sense of the world- a useful adaptation. There may very well be aspects of the world that are not intelligible to us. Quantum mechanics is not entirely intelligible -we have to make some mental leaps to accept it. If there's something deeper, it could worse.

do you believe that universals/structure can be considered 'physical' because their 'existence' is immanent in the physical world? — boundless

Exactly. We can consider a universal by employing the way of abstraction: consider multiple objects with a property in common, and mentally subtract the non-common features. This abstraction is a mental "object", not the universal itself.

I do not deny the existence of a 'physical world', independent from our minds (i.e. which is not just mental content), but IMO it isn't ontologically fundamental.

What IS ontologically fundamental? Isn't it a brute fact? Even if it is mathematical, it's a brute fact that it's mathematical, and a brute fact as to the specific mathematical system that happens to exist.

the ontological status of math/logic is actually important in this discussion.

A physicalist perspective is that we abstract mathematical relations which exist immanently. There are logical relations between the pseudo-objects (abstractions) in mathematics, and logic itself is nothing more than semantics.

I don't think you are an anti-realist about universals....do you believe that universals/structure can be considered 'physical' because their 'existence' is immanent in the physical world?

Correct on both points.

only some idealists would claim that the physical world is reduced to perceptions and understandings — boundless

How do they justify believing this?

Physicalism is epistemically grounded in our perceptions of the world - presumably our senses deliver us a reflection of reality (so there is a bit of distinction between perceived reality and actual reality) and the success of science. It's logically possible for these assumptions to be false, but the grounding beliefs are innate - basic beliefs. Possibility alone doesn't justify abandoning them.

This specific type of idealism, however, makes no claim about how the world is 'outside' of experience. — boundless

This seems to entail denying the reality we experience and interact with, denying the basic beliefs we're born with- and isn't it solely based on the possibility these innate beliefs are wrong?

. I said that reductionism cannot explain a structured world because 'structure' is a property (if it even can be considered a 'property') of the whole, not of the parts.
It was something separate from universals. — boundless

Your view is inconsistent with physicalism. Under the physicalist paradigm, reality has a structure, and physical structures have ontological properties, but the structure (i.e. having structure vs being unstructured) is itself not an ontological property.

Particulars have properties and relations to other particulars. Properties and relations exist immanently. Two (or more) particulars can have the same property and/or relation (or sets of these) - these are universals.

Laws of nature are relations between universals; they are universals. Laws of nature entail necessitation, and they account for causation.


This framework reflects, and accounts for, the structure that we see in the world. It's not a causal account, it's a structural account.

do you believe that formal causes exist? — boundless

No. It doesn't fit into a physicalist paradigm, ontologically.

I just don't understand why many physicalists are so sure that using the term 'physical' is appropriate for the 'structure'/'order'. To me it's just equivocating the term. — boundless

"Physical" is just the label attached to the things that exists that is causally connected to everything else. Causally disconnected things are logically possible, but because of an absence of causal connections, their existence is moot and there is no epistemological justification to believe such things exist.

If you still believe there's an equivocation, please describe it.