moral value consists in what fosters social harmony and general well-being and happiness. — Janus

First, that would only be the case to an individual who values social harmony, general well-being and happiness. There could be an individual who doesn't value those things and who values something else instead. They wouldn't be wrong about those other things being moral value, because there would be no facts that they're getting wrong. They would just have an unusual disposition.

Your response? You ask what evidence there is that 2 is true. I point out that it is a self-evident truth of reason. — Bartricks

When we're talking about morality, I don't at all agree that it's self-evident that morality isn't ONLY mental dispositions towards actions. I think it rather couldn't be clearer that that's all that morality is. I wouldn't say that it's "self-evident," but it's clear as day that there are no extramental moral assessments to be found anywhere in the world.

If I were to believe that cheese is only a mental phenomenon, then of course, necessarily, if you have that mental phenomenon, then there's cheese in the fridge.

I don't believe that that's the case with cheese. But it couldn't be clearer that it's the case for morality.

You don't seem to understand. If Himmler's values are moral values, then if he values gassing Jews and Homosexuals it will actually be morally good for him to do so. It won't just be that he has the opinion it is good. It will actually be good. — Bartricks

What it is to "actually be good" to someone--and it's always to someone is for that person to have a particular disposition towards the act.

No it isn't. It is self-evident that you cannot make an act right or good by either issuing a prescription to yourself to do it, or by just valuing yourself doing it. — Bartricks

What is is for an act to be morally right or good to someone is for that person to consider the behavior in question permissible to obligatory conduct.

Premise 2 says "If I value something, it is not necessarily morally valuable".

Opinions have not been mentioned. And premise 2 is manifestly true. So the argument is sound.

You're confusing the opinion that something is the case, with it being the case. — Bartricks

Well, if you morally value something, then necessarily it is morally valuable to you. It's not necessarily morally valuable to anyone else.

There is, for instance, little doubt that Himmler fully approved of gassing Jews and homosexuals. Indeed, so much so that he approved of gassing himself should he turn out to be either of those things. But that did not make it right for him to do those things, or good for him to do it. And so on. — Bartricks

Sure, it's only morally okay in his opinion. Other people disagreed with him. So they're not going to allow him to do that.

If you think it's morally okay to hit someone, that does not mean that it's morally okay for you to hit someone in anyone else's opinion. It's only okay in your opinion. But that might only get you a cup of coffee if you've got 25 cents, too. (Well, or a couple bucks or whatever it costs now, depending on where you go.)

So that it's your opinion that it's morally okay to hit someone doesn't imply that it's morally okay or not for you to hit someone independently of anyone's opinion.

It's just that the opinions of those in power, which can be a democratic majority of opinions, determines what's allowed socially and legally. Most people do not feel that it's okay for you to nonconsensually hit someone else (at least not where you do any significant physical damage).

1, If Gold is water, then if Gold is heated it will turn to steam
2. If Gold is heated it will not turn to steam
3. Therefore Gold is not water. — Bartricks

Okay, that is valid in terms of the formal logic of it.

The problem with your argument above is with your second premise. Why should we assign "true" to "If something is morally valuable, then it is morally valuable irrespective of whether I value it"?

Yes, that's fine. I'm writing a different response but I need to get back to it in a minute.

,

.

It seems to me that you are getting hung up on the 'full stop' - that 'full stop' just expresses their categorical nature. That is, when something is morally valuable it is not 'valuable to me', but just 'valuable full stop' - that is, valuable regardless of whether I happen to value it. — Bartricks

So how does that relate to "there's the valuer - who is the one doing the valuing, so the one to whom the thing has value - and then there is the fact the thing is featuring as the object of a valuing relation"? What happened to the valuer?

I'm not sure I understand that comment. You think that there is moral value "full stop" where it's not a particular individual morally valuing something right? Isn't that what the second part of the first premise is saying?

I just don't want you to get banned. Anyway re the first post?

"Right. So it doesn't do any good to look at its conclusion for what I'm asking you, because what I'm asking you is something about the first premise. The first premise is not the same as the conclusion. "

Right. So it doesn't do any good to look at its conclusion for what I'm asking you, because what I'm asking you is something about the first premise. The first premise is not the same as the conclusion.

The first premise of the argument hinges on this. You're not saying that what you're concluding in the argument is the same as what we're stating in the first premise, are you?

Correct. — schopenhauer1

So as I said, that makes no sense to me at all. What makes something morally problematic regardless of anyone's opinion about the thing in question?

I don't understand the question — Bartricks

In other words, you're positing moral values independent of any individuals. As you said, "moral values full stop."

I'm asking what reasons there are to believe there are such things as "moral values full stop."

You said you understand values better than I do. So explain the reasons to believe that there are "moral values full stop."

Sure. But the problem is that that doesn't make any sense to me at all. You're categorizing desire as morally problematic regardless of anyone's opinion of it.

But to for those note meditating and eating a bowl of rice 24/7, I don't believe it. People don't get bored because they are filling the time with stuff that overcomes the baseline boredom they would feel otherwise- TPF, shopping, reading, working, etc. — schopenhauer1

Well, maybe they don't get bored because they're doing whatever, but the point I'm still trying to get at is that we can have someone who doesn't have a negative valuation of phenomenal states such as "I'm hungry." But it seems like you're saying that's irrelevant to it being a moral problem.

By the way, if he thinks that no valuing of ours are moral values, then re the "P" of "If my values are moral values," we have to assign "false" to it. So our conditional truth table. One upshot of this, and I'm not sure how it impacts the formal argument (I'd have to go back and look at the argument again), is that the truth value of Q is irrelevant to our conditional.

If life — the craving for which is the very essence of our being — were possessed of any positive intrinsic value, there would be no such thing as boredom at all: mere existence would satisfy us in itself, and we should want for nothing. But as it is, we take no delight in existence except when we are struggling for something; and then distance and difficulties to be overcome make our goal look as though it would satisfy us — an illusion which vanishes when we reach it; or else when we are occupied with some purely intellectual interest — when in reality we have stepped forth from life to look upon it from the outside, much after the manner of spectators at a play. And even sensual pleasure itself means nothing but a struggle and aspiration, ceasing the moment its aim is attained. Whenever we are not occupied in one of these ways, but cast upon existence itself, its vain and worthless nature is brought home to us; and this is what we mean by boredom. The hankering after what is strange and uncommon — an innate and ineradicable tendency of human nature — shows how glad we are at any interruption of that natural course of affairs which is so very tedious.

I can understand that Schopenhauer felt that way, but why would you think that it's necessarily universal? You're not familiar with people who never feel bored, for example?

Then you are not taking into account how I (and Schopenhuaer) are using "negative in nature" here. — schopenhauer1

Well, the utility of me asking questions and you giving answers is that you can explain it to me better.

Re my earlier post (I'm adding to it in a new post because you might miss it otherwise), the idea is similar to, say, presenting two options for wallpaper to someone, and they say, "I don't have a preference for either. They're just different." You don't have to assign a positive or negative valuation to every different experience. So you can just experience "I'm hungry" without it being negative. It's just different than "I'm not hungry."

The primary level- there is an initial dissatisfaction. — schopenhauer1

What I'm getting at is that there's a difference between "I want food," which you seem to be categorically calling a "dissatisfaction," and having a negative experience in conjunction with wanting food.

In other words, someone can just want food without having an attendant value assessment of that experience, where they assign a negative or "bad" value to it. It can just be an experience without a valuation.

I fixed an important typo after you hit reply by the way. I forgot a "not" initially.



Okay, but I'm saying that there are people who don't feel anything like pain or feel that it's "positive evil" to have to get off of the couch and open the refrigerator, for example (in order to get food because they're hungry).

Are you disagreeing that there are people who don't see this as pain/evil/something experientially negative?

I'm not sure I understand that response. Are you saying that it's impossible for Joe to feel that it's not negative that he has to get off the couch and open the refrigerator, say?

It is the "dealing with" we discussed earlier. That there is an unfulfillment that needs addressing. Dissatisfaction. — schopenhauer1

But you're positing dissatisfaction as a state that's not necessarily negative for Joe, right (that is, in terms of how he feels about it)?

Why is anything more important than the new person's suffering? — schopenhauer1

Personally, I think all sorts of things are more weighty than suffering, and I don't seem to be alone in that. Not that agreement matters, but I guess you're saying that you don't consider anything more important in your life than your suffering?

Which is ludicrous — S

Well, it's certainly not something I agree with . . . and it's difficult for me to imagine why or how anyone would feel that way. But I can buy that maybe some people do. I've known plenty of weirdos, as you can imagine. ;-)

However, what is not usually recognized is the structural suffering inherent in existence- built into the human affair. Structural means that it is not based on contingent circumstances like genetics, place of birth, circumstances in time/place, or fortune. Structural suffering can be seen in things like the inherent "lack" that pervades the animal/human psyche. We are lacking at almost all times. The need for food and shelter, the need for mates, the need for friends, the need for interesting projects, the need for flow states, the need for comfortable environments. These "goods" represents things WE DO NOT HAVE (aka lack). We are constantly STRIVING for what is hoped to be fulfilling, but at the end, only temporarily fills the lack state, and for short duration. Structural suffering can also be seen in the psychological state of boredom. I don't see boredom as just another state, I see it as an almost baseline- state. It is a "proof" of existence's own unfulfilled state. This leads again, striving for what we lack. There is a certain burden of being- the burdens of making do- of getting by, of surviving, of filling the lack, of dealing with existence. That we have to deal in the first place is suspect. That not everyone is committing suicide is not a "pro" for the "post facto, people being born is justified" stance. Rather, suicide and being born in the first place are incommensurable. — schopenhauer1

That sounds like you're saying the following for example:

Joe has a desire for food, so Joe has to get food however he gets it (maybe as a baby it's opening his mouth for a nipple, and then maybe later in his life it's getting off the couch and opening the refrigerator, and so on), and even though Joe doesn't have a problem with any of this, it's something that needs to be avoided on moral grounds.

But maybe I'm misunderstanding it (partially because it's difficult to believe that the above is something you'd be arguing)

You aren't addressing the problem. The problem is that life consists of a lot more than suffering. And given that life consists of a lot more than suffering, you aren't warranted to talk only about the prevention of suffering. Suffering is a part of life just like all of the other emotions are a part of life. You haven't justified talking about the prevention of suffering alone. Do you understand that or not? If so, please produce a valid response in your next reply. — S

From previous discussions, the answer to that seemed to be a stance that prevention of suffering was all that mattered.

Antinatalism is essentially about not having children to prevent a future person from either contingent or structural suffering. — schopenhauer1

Structural suffering? What is that?

How about answering "What would be any reason to believe that value could obtain independent of an individual valuing something?"

Whether that's the case or not, I wasn't saying anything like that.

He was talking about exceptions to supposed universals. I said that the problem is that people claim that x is a universal when it isn't at all.

For example, if someone were to claim that "No tuba players can sing." That would be claiming a universal that's not at all a universal.

This is a paradox because how is it that the laws of nature, universal in scope produces humans whose interactions, necessarily derived from the universal laws of nature, have exceptions? — TheMadFool

People claim things to be universal that are no such thing. That's the simple problem there.

I call it the "realism fetish" and I hate it.

The realism fetish has become more prominent in the last couple decades.

I'm a fan of fiction, of fantasy in its broadest sense. I want to see what people can imagine. If I want realism I can just walk outside and observe.

Re the answers so far, it seems like we're overlooking things like hating particular TV commercials, songs, etc.

I wouldn't say that there's just one type of hate or just one thing that triggers it.

I also wouldn't say that it's something to be neurotic about when you feel hatred towards something. Acknowledge it, analyze it, express your thoughts about it.

What I have a problem with is certain negative actions connected to hate, such as the initiation of nonconsensual violence.

hat is exactly what "isomorphic" refers to. It does not mean that two things are identical.

It just means that the mapping is structure preserving with regards to particular operations on both sides. For example, a Google map is isomorphic with the territory that it depicts, with regards to connecting points on both sides and measuring distances. If a one-inch line on the map corresponds to one mile in the territory, then a two-inch line will correspond to two miles.

So, a language expression is meant to be isomorphic with a belief with regards to logical operations that you could perform on both sides. — alcontali

So are you now saying that beliefs aren't literally a part of expressed language?

I know more than you do about how value works. — Bartricks

What would be any reason to believe that value could obtain independent of an individual valuing something?