Okay, so if you're really trying to understand what I'm saying, why didn't you bring this up a handful of posts ago, when I first stressed the difference? It was the first thing I did when you first asked about this.

Phenomenal--in other words, in terms of what appears, what is present at the time in question (so not present period, but present in terms of appearance). If we're talking about appearance to someone, to their awareness or experience, it's what is present in their awareness at the time in question.

So, the idea is that sometimes, to someone, there's no phenomena, no awareness or appearance of self, as well as no awareness or appearance of names, concepts, etc. There's just awareness/appearance of, say a tree (and of course the grass around it, etc.)

Did you understand the phenomenal versus ontological re "what's really going on" distinction?

Also mind does not create matter that exists outside mind, it's still a part of mind. And minds interacting in some way create other minds, which can appear as people. — leo

If only minds exist on your view, then how would you claim that you can ever observe anything, including other people/other minds, aside from your own mind? In other words, how would you establish anything other than solipsism?

Obviously, you have a third- or fourth-hand hearsay acquaintance with Aristotle. — Dfpolis

Being patronizing will surely help the discussion.

I haven't read much Aristotle in about 30 years. So, since you're an expert on him, could you quote some passages about substances and properties that show that (a) he's pretty clearly positing substances as necessarily having properties, and (b) he's clearly not making claims about language use?

You could just reference passages if you like. I have the Barnes complete works at hand, but I haven't read much of it in a long time. (Hence why I'd not be able to point to specific passages without doing a lot of rereading)

That's kind of a derogatory way to look at it, I might as well say so you think matter exists spontaneously and then aggregates in a specific way and then poof mind exists because of that? How does that work ontologically? — leo

So yes, either matter comes to exist spontaneously, or it's always existed (those are the only two options for whatever we're positing ontologically) and we can explain how minds come to exist by explaining stellar and planetary development, explaining how certain materials in certain conditions amount to life, explaining evolution and how it leads to brains, etc.

So what, at least roughly, would you analogously do for an ontology where mind somehow exists first and creates things like planets?

I was explaining the "not separate" comment, which is why I quoted you referencing that.

It seems like you're wanting to argue via creative misunderstandings. I'm not interested in that.

If it is the case that if I go to X-the bakery then I can get Y-apple pie, then if I want Y-apple pie, then I ought to (go to) X-the bakery. — tim wood

You're claiming that this is an implication, that it's a fact that it's a implication.

I'm asking you what makes it a fact that if you want Y, you ought to (go to) X. You can get apple pie by going to the bakery, sure. But what makes it the case that if you want apple pie (which you have to go to the bakery to get, let's say), then you ought to get apple pie (you ought to go to the bakery)?

Or to make that shorter, what makes it the case that if you want something, you ought to achieve it? That's essentially what's being asserted here--that people ought to do what they want, that they ought to achieve/obtain their desires. Well, is that a fact? What is it a fact of? Where does it obtain?

As I said, if it's really an implication that if you want x you ought to get/achieve x (or you ought to do y which achieves x), then when Joe says, "I want apple pie. I can get apple pie by going to the bakery. Therefore I ought to avoid the bakery (because I ought to avoid what I want)," Joe should be saying something not just odd or very unusual, Joe should be saying something incorrect. What makes it incorrect?

Joe's certainty not saying something impossible to understand. Joe has desires, he has things that he wants, but for whatever reason, Joe also feels that he should not achieve his desires/should not obtain the things he wants. (Maybe Joe has this ingrained in him as some sense of deprivational duty, or maybe he's an ascetic, etc.--the reason doesn't matter, really, even if there's no reason aside from it just being the way he feels.) If it's claimed that it's really an implication that "If S wants y, then S should achieve/obtain/do y (perhaps by achieving/obtaining/doing x, which is necessary for y)" then it would have to be the case that Joe is incorrect.

Cardio-vascular fitness? Simple exercise? The lady who gets naked in her window every night at seven o'clock? The ice cream store at the other end? — tim wood

Right, so what makes it the case that you ought to have any of those things?

It's a simple question.

I see no reason why you would make such a claim. — Dfpolis

For example, he separates substance(s) and properties, which is incoherent. Arguably he also seems to conflate ontology and linguistic analysis.

You don't think there are genetic or biological factors in human behavior, including how we treat other people, e.g. mothers and fathers protecting their children? — T Clark

As an extramental normative? No. There's zero evidence of that. Are you keeping in mind that "normative" doesn't refer to statistical norms per se, but shoulds or oughts?

if the benefit is one that I ought to have, — tim wood

What would make it the case that you ought to have some benefit?

If they do, they are confusing logical and physical possibility. This is the whole point of the intelligiblity debate I am having with Terrapin Station. I hold that things have definite forms prior to our knowing then and that those forms are the basis in reality of our knowledge. We may not be able to know the forms exhaustively, but what we do know of things, we know because their forms are at least partly intelligible to us.

(Note that Aristotelian forms always belong to individual things. There are no universal forms except in our thought.) — Dfpolis

So are you basically endorsing Aristotle's metaphysics? (Because in my view Aristotle's metaphysics is a mess that doesn't really make any sense/isn't really coherent.)

If the is--"I want to take a walk" implies an ought--"I ought to take a walk," then Joe is wrong because he's missing an implication, no?

So let's say that Joe wants to take a walk, but he thinks, "I ought not take a walk. I ought not do what I want." And let's say this is simply a foundational view for him. It's not based on mitigating circumstances or anything like that.

Is Joe wrong? What would make him wrong?

Repeating the idea doesn't actually answer this question: "You ought to pursue or achieve what you want per what?"

You like worrying, complaining, being neurotic, etc. basically, then?

Okay, but you know my view is that everything stems from minds in some way, so in my view these rocks/minerals also stem from minds — leo

Which is why I asked why you'd believe something like that. So you think that a mind exists spontaneously (in the history of the universe) and then, what, thinks matter and then--poof--matter exists because of that? How would that work ontologically?

And then the mind also thinks of people and poof they exist, and then those people think if things like rocks, say, and they poof into existence?

. If you want Y, then you ought to do X. — tim wood

Per what? You ought to pursue or achieve what you want per what?

If it's not separate from anything else, then how is it still itself? Identity depends upon separation, no? — bert1

I mean in terms of isolation, so there's no grass, atmosphere, etc.

And the best approaches seem to be in and through reason. — tim wood

There's no way to do moral foundations via reason. That's not to say that no one believes there is, but they have incorrect beliefs.

denial of the possibility of any standard — tim wood

Standards are subjective, and then they can be conventionally agreed upon. Neither gives us any sort of normative facts. And going by convention is an argumentum ad populum.

Here is an expression of a personal view and two claims. Any argument? — tim wood

Re the personal view, an argument doesn't do any good, of course. Re the other claims, it's a matter of there being zero empirical evidence for there being any extramental normative values, any extramental moral stances, etc.

You get from an ought to an is via a hypothetical syllogism. — tim wood

No, you don't, and I've already explained this to you here at least twice in the past. You can state preconditions/prerequisites for something, but those aren't oughts. People typcially just assume "You ought to do/achieve what you desire," but that's not at all a fact.

Really? What confuses you? — Dfpolis

Why wouldn't having or possessing data be knowing it by acquaintance? How would you have or possess data without knowing it by acquaintaice?

Something is possible if it does not contradict a contextualizing set of propositions. So, for example, something is logically possible if it does not contradict what we already know. — Dfpolis

I don't agree with those definitions, and they're certainly not something that can obtain extramentally.

Is there a basis in reality for calling new beetle an insect? — Dfpolis

No, of course not. That only depends on how individuals have created and decided to use concepts.

If not, how do you know it is a beetle and not a cucumber? — Dfpolis

By how you've created and decided to use your concept.

his is nonresponsive and evasive. Either you are present, or you are not. — Dfpolis

The word NOT is right there. NOT (present) phenomenally, which is what I was talking about (and specified tens of times).

You need to have an apparatus capable of distinguishing the tree from the rest of the stuff, don't you? — bert1

No. I'm not talking about making distinctions. When I mention "just the tree" for example, I'm not implying thinking of the term "tree" or a concept of a tree, or separating it from anything else. In order to communicate on a message board, though, I need to use words.

This is going to be a mess for us to sort through, so one thing at a time, and hopefully we won't have to rehash any of this.

I believe that the very concept of 'composition' stems from minds, and that different minds have different experiences, — leo

I believe both of those things, too. So that's not actually what I'm getting at. I'm getting at things that we apparently disagree on.

The concept of "composition" stems from minds because, a fortiori, concepts are mental phenomena period.

It's like saying "Joe's opinion of Britney Spears" stems from Joe's mind. Well, yeah, obviously. Joe's opinion is going to be something that occurs in Joe's mind.

The important point here is that when we're talking about "the composition of Mount Everest," we are not talking about the concept of composition, even though obviously we have such a concept and we need to invoke it in order to talk about the composition. But per the use-mention distinction, that's on the "mention" side. I'm referring to the "use" side. On the "use" side, the composition isn't a concept and doesn't have anything to do with concepts. It has to do with what sorts of rocks/minerals/etc. comprise the mountain.

A lot of these sorts of discussions proceed as if one party has some sort of mention fetish with respect to the use-mention distinction..

I would say I observe a world that depends on my mind and on other minds, I'm not saying that what I observe is totally disconnected from other minds.

Can you answer my questions? — leo

This is getting to the questions. I hate going on and on though, so I want to figure out why we're doing that.

So we don't disagree on whether the world is observable.

But you're claiming that, say, the composition of Mount Everest, say, in some way depends upon other minds.

Why would you believe that?

Reading over that section, it's a major hurdle for me that you seem to be talking about "intelligibililty" (I'm not even a fan of that word, really, because it seems to be used for a wide number of different things in philosophy) as if it's something that occurs objectively. There's no way I'd agree with that.

What I am taking about is knowing data as opposed to having and/or processing data. — Dfpolis

You'd have to make the difference clear.

Information is the reduction of possiblity. — Dfpolis

? That's just introducing more confusion. Now we'd need to get into the ontology of possibility, too.

Fine. Look at the section beginning with "Ah ha!" and see if that does not resolve our differences. — Dfpolis

Okay, I'll go back there. (although it might take me a few hours--I've got to leave in a few minutes)

Again, there's a difference between what's present for one phenomenally and what's really the case ontologically.

Of course there's a reference point if there always is.

Keep in mind that I am NOT necessarily referring to persons, perceptions etc. by "reference point." I'm referring to spatio-temporal locations.

The reference point would be whatever your spatio-temporal location is. That doesn't imply that there's a "you" in the equation in terms of what's phenomenally occurring.

There's you isn't there? — bert1

On the occasions in question, no. Not phenomenally.

If you can't observe the world, how would you observe what other people say to know what the consensus is?

Yea "contingent statistical norms" is what I mean when I say "what society dictates". — khaled

It's clearly not what I mean by that phrase. Otherwise it wouldn't have made sense that I was apparently making a distinction, right?

If you say so.

My concept <apple> is not a thing to be constructed, — Dfpolis

Right, so I say so, because concepts ARE something that you construct personally. If you don't agree with this, then we disagree on what concepts are and how they work. I already explained how consequent applications of a concept work.

As I have said before, we can sense without awareness, — Dfpolis

The examples you're using for this are not examples where I'd say that you're sensing without awareness. It's rather that there are different "levels" or "degrees" of awareness. Awareness isn't simply off or on, full or nothing. There's a continuum. Is it possible to sense without awareness? Maybe, but such as the driving examples wouldn't work for that.

So specific information is present in sensation — Dfpolis

I'm not a fan of the word "information" in discussions like this. I'd need to clarify the definition you're using.

I hate cutting this off, but I can't stand ever-lengthening posts in reply. My goal is to settle things and move on so that we don't have to talk about them any longer. Ever-lengthening posts don't seem to do that. Let's keep things short. Your last post was longer than the previous, then if I respond to everything in it, the next post will be even longer, etc.

Let's do one point at a time.

We could change what we are asserting and interpret it as discovering that we were wrong. — leo

We don't just do that arbitrarily. We do it because we observe the world to be different than how longwe thought it was.

Re that other comment, again, part of what the world is like is physical "laws." You seem to be misinterpreting my views as saying that no on can be wrong re their perceptions relative to what they believe those perceptions peg ontologically. That's not what I'm saying at all. What I'm saying is that we can be right re our perceptions relative to what we believe those perceptions peg ontologically. And that fact is the only way that we can say that any perception doesn't get the world right in the first place.

Nice to know people have opinions. I have some myself. But the last time I looked - even just now - this is called The Philosophy Forum. Not "The Opinion Forum." — tim wood

There are no normative value facts. How do you not understand this yet?

The etymology of "metaphysics," by the way, is simply that it was an untitled book placed after the book entitled "Physics" in Aristotle anthologies (this is going back to the first century CE or even the last century BCE). The subject matter was conventionally the subject matter of that book, the bulk of which was what we know call ontology, as well as "first principles."

In my experience in school, science and mathematics contexts often had no time for philosophy because a common approach was to simply not care about those sorts of issues. There was a purely pragmatic, instrumental approach most of the time--they were merely concerned with whatever worked, whatever accounted for data/observations, and whatever produced results in applied settings. Focusing on what was "really the case ontologically," how we could know certain things, etc. was seen as a waste of time that had no practical upshot.

It's not immoral in my view. No consensual actions are immoral. We just need to make sure that assisted suicides are occurring consensually, so there would need to be procedures to verify this, moreso than most consent, because obviously the deceased party would no longer be around to confirm whether it was consensual should there be any reason to doubt it.

It's not determined by minds, but by what the world is like. We couldn't just decide to assert that P, where P would then be the case.

No one is saying that we can't be wrong. When we're wrong, we change what we're asserting.

If things we're determined by minds, by what we're asserting, then we couldn't discover that we're wrong.

That's the sort of weird, anxious/neurotic dialogue I imagine most antinatalists going through frequently. Maybe try just try chilling out, not worrying so much, and just experience and enjoy everything for what it is?

That's nonsense. How do you account for the difference between past and future with a definition of time like that? — Metaphysician Undercover

The past is changes/motion that happened but that are no longer happening per some frame of reference. The future will be changes/motion that haven't happened yet per some frame of reference. Pretty simple, really.

And you defined abnormal as whatever society dictates — khaled

So, we just went over this a handful of posts ago. Here's what we said:

========================================================

Cool and you define "abnormal" in a culturally evolved sense? As in whatever society decides is abnormal?
— khaled
— khaled

Not per a decision. Per contingent statistical norms.

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Did you not read that? Why can't you remember it?