Maybe not, if you didn’t catch it right away.

Seems like the information we don’t know increases the physical possibilities, not reduces.

Seems like the information we don’t know increases the physical possibilities, not reduces — Mww

The information we do not know is still a specification of reality. The more it is already specified, the fewer its remaining possibilities.

This is going to be a mess for us to sort through, so one thing at a time, and hopefully we won't have to rehash any of this.

I believe that the very concept of 'composition' stems from minds, and that different minds have different experiences, — leo

I believe both of those things, too. So that's not actually what I'm getting at. I'm getting at things that we apparently disagree on.

The concept of "composition" stems from minds because, a fortiori, concepts are mental phenomena period.

It's like saying "Joe's opinion of Britney Spears" stems from Joe's mind. Well, yeah, obviously. Joe's opinion is going to be something that occurs in Joe's mind.

The important point here is that when we're talking about "the composition of Mount Everest," we are not talking about the concept of composition, even though obviously we have such a concept and we need to invoke it in order to talk about the composition. But per the use-mention distinction, that's on the "mention" side. I'm referring to the "use" side. On the "use" side, the composition isn't a concept and doesn't have anything to do with concepts. It has to do with what sorts of rocks/minerals/etc. comprise the mountain.

A lot of these sorts of discussions proceed as if one party has some sort of mention fetish with respect to the use-mention distinction..

You need to have an apparatus capable of distinguishing the tree from the rest of the stuff, don't you? — bert1

No. I'm not talking about making distinctions. When I mention "just the tree" for example, I'm not implying thinking of the term "tree" or a concept of a tree, or separating it from anything else. In order to communicate on a message board, though, I need to use words.

Really? What confuses you? — Dfpolis

Why wouldn't having or possessing data be knowing it by acquaintance? How would you have or possess data without knowing it by acquaintaice?

Something is possible if it does not contradict a contextualizing set of propositions. So, for example, something is logically possible if it does not contradict what we already know. — Dfpolis

I don't agree with those definitions, and they're certainly not something that can obtain extramentally.

Is there a basis in reality for calling new beetle an insect? — Dfpolis

No, of course not. That only depends on how individuals have created and decided to use concepts.

If not, how do you know it is a beetle and not a cucumber? — Dfpolis

By how you've created and decided to use your concept.

his is nonresponsive and evasive. Either you are present, or you are not. — Dfpolis

The word NOT is right there. NOT (present) phenomenally, which is what I was talking about (and specified tens of times).

When I mention "just the tree" for example, I'm not implying thinking of the term "tree" or a concept of a tree, or separating it from anything else. — Terrapin Station

If it's not separate from anything else, then how is it still itself? Identity depends upon separation, no?

Now you’re saying,

The more it is already specified, the fewer its remaining possibilities. — Dfpolis

. To me, “it” in this instance is reality, which gives us the more reality is specified the fewer reality’s remaining possibilities. That is agreeable.

Originally you said

Information is the reduction of possibility. If we do not know it, it reduces physical possiblity. — Dfpolis

. “It” in this instance, the “it” we don’t know, is information. So we end up with...... if we don’t know information, information reduces physical possibilities. Which makes not a lick of sense.

Now, reality can only be specified by the information contained in it. In our Universe, e.g., there is a ton of information we don’t know, and would certainly specify that part of reality to which it pertains. So it stands to reason there is a ton of reality unspecified. It follows that any information we come to know specifies that particular part of reality, thus reducing the physical possibilities remaining to it.

Does an Aristotelian mean to say information reduces possibilities even if we have no idea what that information contains? Let me tell ya....a Kantian, or any reasonable empiricist for that matter, will certainly grant that information reduces possibilities, but only if such information is present to cognition and intelligible. Information could in fact be present to cognition, which makes the presence of the information known, and still be unintelligible, which makes the meaning of the information useless, thus having no warrant whatsoever, including the specification of reality.

What say you?

The important point here is that when we're talking about "the composition of Mount Everest," we are not talking about the concept of composition, even though obviously we have such a concept and we need to invoke it in order to talk about the composition. But per the use-mention distinction, that's on the "mention" side. I'm referring to the "use" side. On the "use" side, the composition isn't a concept and doesn't have anything to do with concepts. It has to do with what sorts of rocks/minerals/etc. comprise the mountain. — Terrapin Station

Okay, but you know my view is that everything stems from minds in some way, so in my view these rocks/minerals also stem from minds, I don't see them as existing independently of minds, so if you're asking me why I believe that rocks/minerals existing independently of minds would depend on other minds, that's already not my belief. I can attempt to tentatively entertain your point of view when needed, but I can't explain why I believe something that I don't believe.

I think it would help if you attempted to answer some of the last questions I asked so I could understand your view more precisely.

For instance it's not clear to me what you mean by "a reference point is a spatio-temporal location" when a person is the reference point.

And considering you say what a person experiences is what the world really is from their reference point, if that person experiences a ghost and says it's real, then from the reference point of that person the ghost is real and not a hallucination; and then would you say that there really was a ghost in the part of the world that was accessible from the spatio-temporal location where the person was?

If it's not separate from anything else, then how is it still itself? Identity depends upon separation, no? — bert1

I mean in terms of isolation, so there's no grass, atmosphere, etc.

Okay, but you know my view is that everything stems from minds in some way, so in my view these rocks/minerals also stem from minds — leo

Which is why I asked why you'd believe something like that. So you think that a mind exists spontaneously (in the history of the universe) and then, what, thinks matter and then--poof--matter exists because of that? How would that work ontologically?

And then the mind also thinks of people and poof they exist, and then those people think if things like rocks, say, and they poof into existence?

Information is the reduction of possibility. If we do not know it, it reduces physical possiblity. — Dfpolis

. “It” in this instance, the “it” we don’t know, is information. So we end up with...... if we don’t know information, information reduces physical possibilities. Which makes not a lick of sense — Mww

I meant "even if we do not know it, it reduces physical possibility." The reduction of physical possiblity is not conditioned on our knowing or not knowing it, despite the talk about Schrodinger's cat. I think you agree, as you said, " the more reality is specified the fewer reality’s remaining possibilities."

it stands to reason there is a ton of reality unspecified. — Mww

Agreed.

It follows that any information we come to know specifies that particular part of reality, thus reducing the physical possibilities remaining to it. — Mww

The physical possibilities are already reduced by the way it is. What is reduced in coming to know is what we see as possible, which is logical possibility.

Does an Aristotelian mean to say information reduces possibilities even if we have no idea what that information contains? — Mww

Yes, Aristotle sees the forms of things as making the possibilities latent in their matter actual. Matter is open to many possible forms, but only one actual form at a time. That is true independently of our knowing the form matter has taken.

Let me tell ya....a Kantian, or any reasonable empiricist for that matter, will certainly grant that information reduces possibilities, but only if such information is present to cognition and intelligible. — Mww

If they do, they are confusing logical and physical possibility. This is the whole point of the intelligiblity debate I am having with @Terrapin Station. I hold that things have definite forms prior to our knowing then and that those forms are the basis in reality of our knowledge. We may not be able to know the forms exhaustively, but what we do know of things, we know because their forms are at least partly intelligible to us.

(Note that Aristotelian forms always belong to individual things. There are no universal forms except in our thought.)

Information could in fact be present to cognition, which makes the presence of the information known, and still be unintelligible — Mww

The is a contradiction in terms. To be known, something has to be knowable (aka intelligible) which means it can't be unintelligible. We could however, know something and realize that we do not, and cannot, know all there is to that thing.

The reason we know that there is information is because we see open possibilities being closed by experience.

If they do, they are confusing logical and physical possibility. This is the whole point of the intelligiblity debate I am having with Terrapin Station. I hold that things have definite forms prior to our knowing then and that those forms are the basis in reality of our knowledge. We may not be able to know the forms exhaustively, but what we do know of things, we know because their forms are at least partly intelligible to us.

(Note that Aristotelian forms always belong to individual things. There are no universal forms except in our thought.) — Dfpolis

So are you basically endorsing Aristotle's metaphysics? (Because in my view Aristotle's metaphysics is a mess that doesn't really make any sense/isn't really coherent.)

in my view Aristotle's metaphysics is a mess that doesn't really make any sense/isn't really coherent — Terrapin Station

I see no reason why you would make such a claim. There are some things he missed, but the framework is quite solid.

If you don't realise how far ahead of Aristotle Terrapin Station is, well, you haven't been paying attention. :wink:

I see no reason why you would make such a claim. — Dfpolis

For example, he separates substance(s) and properties, which is incoherent. Arguably he also seems to conflate ontology and linguistic analysis.

Which is why I asked why you'd believe something like that. So you think that a mind exists spontaneously (in the history of the universe) and then, what, thinks matter and then--poof--matter exists because of that? How would that work ontologically?

And then the mind also thinks of people and poof they exist, and then those people think if things like rocks, say, and they poof into existence? — Terrapin Station

That's kind of a derogatory way to look at it, I might as well say so you think matter exists spontaneously and then aggregates in a specific way and then poof mind exists because of that? How does that work ontologically?

In my view it's not just a matter of thinking, it's a matter of believing, what we believe shapes what we experience and what we think and what we desire, which shapes what we experience and what we believe, in an interacting whole. Also mind does not create matter that exists outside mind, it's still a part of mind. And minds interacting in some way create other minds, which can appear as people.

But you don't even need to know why I believe that everything stems from minds to answer the questions I asked. Like I said I am willing to tentatively let go of that belief. Here I have let go of it, I'm listening to you, I'm willing to do my best to entertain and understand your point of view. So you say there is a real way the world is from a particular spatio-temporal location, and that it's meaningless to talk about how the world is without reference to a spatio-temporal location.

So it means that from your spatio-temporal location "there is a real way the world is from a particular spatio-temporal location" is true, whereas that might not be true from another spatio-temporal location? Or is the statement "there is a real way the world is from a particular spatio-temporal location" made without reference to a spatio-temporal location?

Then, from your spatio-temporal location, if you see someone say that they have seen a ghost who was as real as a tree and that they weren't hallucinating, does it mean to you that they really saw a ghost from their spatio-temporal location, or that they hallucinated a ghost, and how do you reach that conclusion?

I mean in terms of isolation, so there's no grass, atmosphere, etc. — Terrapin Station

So there are just trees in empty space, or maybe there are just tress with no space around them at all?

I was explaining the "not separate" comment, which is why I quoted you referencing that.

It seems like you're wanting to argue via creative misunderstandings. I'm not interested in that.

That's kind of a derogatory way to look at it, I might as well say so you think matter exists spontaneously and then aggregates in a specific way and then poof mind exists because of that? How does that work ontologically? — leo

So yes, either matter comes to exist spontaneously, or it's always existed (those are the only two options for whatever we're positing ontologically) and we can explain how minds come to exist by explaining stellar and planetary development, explaining how certain materials in certain conditions amount to life, explaining evolution and how it leads to brains, etc.

So what, at least roughly, would you analogously do for an ontology where mind somehow exists first and creates things like planets?

I see no reason why you would make such a claim. — Dfpolis

For example, he [Aristotle] separates substance(s) and properties, which is incoherent. — Terrapin Station

Obviously, you have a third- or fourth-hand hearsay acquaintance with Aristotle. I know of no text in which he separates (as opposed to mentally distinguishing) substance(s) and properties. He does distinguish ostensible unities (tode ti = "this something") from the aspects we predicate of them,(symbebecon [if memory serves] = things that "stand together" aka "accidents"), He states clearly that the things that stand together have no separate existence, but inhere in the substances that we predicate them of. So, you are spouting prejudicial nonsense.

Arguably he also seems to conflate ontology and linguistic analysis. — Terrapin Station

Really? Then why haven't you argued it -- starting with an actual text?

If you don't realise how far ahead of Aristotle Terrapin Station is, well, you haven't been paying attention. — Wayfarer

Of course.

Obviously, you have a third- or fourth-hand hearsay acquaintance with Aristotle. — Dfpolis

Being patronizing will surely help the discussion.

I haven't read much Aristotle in about 30 years. So, since you're an expert on him, could you quote some passages about substances and properties that show that (a) he's pretty clearly positing substances as necessarily having properties, and (b) he's clearly not making claims about language use?

You could just reference passages if you like. I have the Barnes complete works at hand, but I haven't read much of it in a long time. (Hence why I'd not be able to point to specific passages without doing a lot of rereading)

Also mind does not create matter that exists outside mind, it's still a part of mind. And minds interacting in some way create other minds, which can appear as people. — leo

If only minds exist on your view, then how would you claim that you can ever observe anything, including other people/other minds, aside from your own mind? In other words, how would you establish anything other than solipsism?

It seems like you're wanting to argue via creative misunderstandings. I'm not interested in that. — Terrapin Station

TP, I want to understand you. However, I am struggling to do so, as apparently others are also struggling. Misunderstandings are generally the fault of the writer, not the reader.

I mean in terms of isolation, so there's no grass, atmosphere, etc. — Terrapin Station

This is too brief. I have no idea at all what point you are making, I really don't.

Did you understand the phenomenal versus ontological re "what's really going on" distinction?

I'm not sure. I don't think I understand what you mean by it, and I have read all your posts in this thread. Typically 'ontological' is contrasted with 'epistemological'. For some thinkers the phenomenal is the clearest case of the ontological.

Okay, so if you're really trying to understand what I'm saying, why didn't you bring this up a handful of posts ago, when I first stressed the difference? It was the first thing I did when you first asked about this.

Phenomenal--in other words, in terms of what appears, what is present at the time in question (so not present period, but present in terms of appearance). If we're talking about appearance to someone, to their awareness or experience, it's what is present in their awareness at the time in question.

So, the idea is that sometimes, to someone, there's no phenomena, no awareness or appearance of self, as well as no awareness or appearance of names, concepts, etc. There's just awareness/appearance of, say a tree (and of course the grass around it, etc.)

OK, thanks TP for explaining it again. To my mind, the following is a straightforward contradiction:

So, the idea is that sometimes, to someone, there's no phenomena, no awareness or appearance of self, as well as no awareness or appearance of names, concepts, etc. There's just awareness/appearance of, say a tree (and of course the grass around it, etc.) — Terrapin Station

The bolded bits contradict each other. There are no phenomena, AND there is the phenomenon of a tree.

Where am I going wrong?

Being patronizing will surely help the discussion. — Terrapin Station

When people make absurd claims categorically, they need to be called out.

I haven't read much Aristotle in about 30 years. So, since you're an expert on him, could you quote some passages about substances and properties that show that (a) he's pretty clearly positing substances as necessarily having properties, and (b) he's clearly not making claims about language use? — Terrapin Station

Try Categories i, 2: "By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts are present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the said subject [italics mine]." It is clear from the context that he is speaking of accidents as present in a subject.

With regard to linguistic analysis and ontology, it is you who are confused. His discussion of substance and accidents occurs in the Categories, which is not an ontological work, but one of linguistic analysis -- part of the Organon, which is a collection laying the logical and linguistic foundations for more specific investigations. If you want ontology, read the Metaphysics.