I believe we could have no knowledge of them or know anything about them. — Noah Te Stroete

We can deal with whether we can have knowledge of them later. I'm asking if you believe that there are properties of things sans conscious observers. I'm not asking you if or how you have knowledge of such properties.

[

The idea that energy, force or potentiality could be a "basic substance" is incoherent, though.
— Terrapin Station

I don’t see why? Please explain. — Noah Te Stroete

Because, for example, energy makes no sense without there being something that's in motion or capable of motion.

What things are like are not inherent properties of matter, but properties of thought. — Noah Te Stroete

Do you believe that there are properties of things without conscious observers?

You’re correct that a frame of reference alone is spatio-temporal, but what the matter is like requires a conscious observer. — Noah Te Stroete

Why would you believe that properties require a conscious observer?

You can call it “energy,” “force,” or “potentiality,” — Noah Te Stroete

The idea that energy, force or potentiality could be the (sole or primary)"basic substance" is incoherent, though.

A point of reference assumes an observer. — Noah Te Stroete

No, not at all--at least not in the sense that you're thinking about it, so that we're referring to a conscious observer.

The idea is simply that there's some way that an existent is, but that's always from some spatio-temporal reference point--basically some location of space and time, because it's incoherent for there to be a way that an existent is from no spatio-temporal reference point. Existents are different from different spatio-temporal reference points (including their own spatio-temporal reference points). This isn't saying anything about conscious observers.

So the question is that why, when you remove a conscious observer from the equation, do you believe that any existent would be different, from that spatio-temporal location, than it is with the conscious observer at that spatio-temporal location?

What would matter even look like without it being perceived? — Noah Te Stroete

Why would lead you to believe that it would look any different than when perceived (re the way it looks at that particular point of reference)?

I am of the persuasion that whatever consciousness really is (I think it’s spirit) is the structuring element or substance of reality. — Noah Te Stroete

Because you believe that God precedes all else, right? If one didn't believe in God, you could see how "consciousness is the structuring element or substance of reality" would make little sense, no?

Now, if we break down matter down to its most fundamental elements, we get energy (kinetic or potential). Some theoretical physicists think the most fundamental elements are vibrating strings (String Theory). This energy or these strings (if these theoretical physicists are correct that strings are the most fundamental elements of reality) — Noah Te Stroete

In my view these ideas are not coherent.

Okay but there is a limit in that being is some ways and not others. We've already gone over and agreed that it's some ways and not others. The ways it's not are the limits.

Then that sounds sort of like object oriented ontology where all objects are in relation to one another which isn't exhaustive, so no object has complete access to another. That would include humans. — Marchesk

I don't really know enough about object-oriented ontology, and the Heidegger it grew out of makes little sense to me, so it's difficult for me to comment on that.

The nature of being and God IS being. — Dfpolis

So that's the same thing as saying "the nature of God" no?

Sounds like youwere saying the object only exists from some perspective. — Marchesk

"Perspective" as in from some reference point or other. I'm not alluding to perception in that. As I said, "Our perception is just another perspective."

LIke I said, Descartes, the "father of modern philosophy" — Pantagruel

Where does Descartes say anything resembling, "I define 'thinking' as follows: if the thoughts in my head were not caused by me, there would be no me to have them"?

Also, I don't agree to disagree. I want to help you make your arguments (or "arguments" as the case may be) not a complete mess. I'm not agreeing to stop that effort.

I think we need to be clear about when we use ‘choice’ as:

- the ACT of choosing,

- the VARIETY or range to choose from OR

- the particular OPTION to be chosen,

otherwise this could get messy. — Possibility

The act of choosing, though that obviously requires options that can be chosen.

NO FREE WILL, as I understand it, says that there is no act of choosing. Regardless of how many possibilities are presented, — Possibility

There couldn't be any real possibilities (aside from one) if no choice is possible (or if no ontological freedom is possible).

A standard argument for FREE WILL, as I understand it, says that the act of choosing is indeed yours to make, and regardless of how constrained the variety or range to choose from may be or how much power, influence or control is apparently exerted on you, the notion of ‘free will’ maintains that you are still ‘free’ to choose from at least two options. — Possibility

Right, which is what I was getting at in the earlier post.

There are ZERO CONSTRAINTS on the act, the range or the options of choosing whether or not to be aware, to connect or to collaborate - regardless of what your circumstances are. These are the basic, underlying decisions that I believe no-one can take away from you - your will. — Possibility

That part I don't understand. One constraint on the act of choosing, for example, is a time constraint. You'd have to make the choice while you are able to--while it's available, while you're capable of expressing it, while you're alive, etc.

I dont have to show how every connection leads to birth — schopenhauer1

You do for it to be causally-peggable, because that's what that term refers to.

the definition of thinking. — Pantagruel

Per what source?

I think the short answer, in the context of this argument, is that there'd be no you. Without free will, there can be no attribution (of thoughts, experiences etc.) so there is no self. — Echarmion

We could say, "Without free will, there can be attribution (of thoughts, experiences, etc.), so there is a self."

Or in other words, that's not actually an argument for the position, it's just an arbitrary, unsupported claim. We could do the same thing in either direction.

My argument is that if the thoughts in my head were not caused by me, there would be no me to have them, — Pantagruel

That's a claim. There's no argument for that claim.

Antinatalism simply pegs all forms of suffering to being born. — schopenhauer1

It doesn't causally peg it to that. Since that's not possible.

On a realist account, the object exists whether anyone is perceiving it. — Marchesk

Yes, but what does that have to do with my post?

I'm sure that it does 'mesh' with the deterministic schema within which your evaluations take place, — Pantagruel

Again, I'm not a determinist. I'm addressing whether arguments work logically.

I am asserting that there is such a thing as subjective causation. — Pantagruel

I understand that. I'm addressing whether you have an argument for it that is valid and sound logically.

When I asked you this: "If A is causally forced to do x, must A be able to do x?" I wasn't asking in the context where we're necessarily talking about a person. It includes things like starting automobiles, opening doors, etc., too.

If a door is causally forced to open, must it be able to open? Yes. Of course. That doesn't logically imply ontological freedom. The notion of ontological freedom is something different than things doing whatever they must do causally/deterministically. (Or basically, you were equivocating the word "free(dom).")

The errors come about when we think that the perception is only about the object, and not about both the body and object. — Harry Hindu

And not just perception. There's an error of thinking that an object is some way from a "perspectiveless perspective." There is no such thing. Our perception is just another perspective. That doesn't make it "invalid" in any manner (which is usually what people jump to at this point).

Causes are the forces that necessarily result in property F (of some entity x) obtaining versus some other property. If c is the cause of F, then c can't occur without F occurring.

You can travel to South Africa without breaking your leg. So traveling to South Africa doesn't cause you to break your leg.

Wait wot. What's an example? Wha'ts a cause then? — khaled

For example:

"I broke my leg in South Africa."

Traveling to South Africa was a necessary condition for that to occur, but it certainly wasn't the cause of it. The cause was a motorcycle accident.

Other necessary conditions are that I was alive, that I had a leg to break, that physics and physiology are such that a leg can be broken via a motorcycle accident, and countless other things. Those are not the cause of my broken leg.

If X is a necessary condition for Y to occur and Y occurs was X the cause of Y? — khaled

No, of course not.

So the bomber is innocent until you personally get a chemsitry degree? — khaled

How bombs work is causally-peggable. I was just pointing out above that if they weren't, we wouldn't be able to take that bomb-planter to be the culprit--and that wouldn't help your argument.

In your case, mental states are influenced by all sorts of things, including environmental factors (including foods you eat, things you breathe, etc.), and including experiences and other thoughts that you'd need to eliminate free will for in order to peg them to some particular, long-ago action.

No we KNOW he planted the bomb. But you do not know exacly how it works and that makes him innocent? — khaled

If x didn't cause the event, E, that nonconsensually, physically harmed y (assuming it was a consent issue), then x is innocent of performing E to y, yes. We'd have to blame the actual cause.

I explained all of this already, basically, just in other words. It's why indirect actions must be causally-peggable.

I cannot. Now explain to me chemically how bombs work. Because unless you do that the bomb planter is innocent apparently. Can you do that? If not just admit that — khaled

If we can't do that, then we can't say that the bomb planter violated someone's consent, right? How would that help your argument?

Just because the causal chain is complicated doesn't change the fact that it ultimately started with birth. — khaled

Either you can specify the causal chain or you cannot. If you can, let's get to it. If you cannot, simply admit that.

I did. Whatever caused the depressive thoughts was ultimately caused by being born — khaled

Lol, no, you didn't. "Causally-peggable" isn't satisfied by saying "whatever caused it." It's only satisfied by pegging--that is, specifying and being able to demonstrate--each step of a supposed causal chain.

So you need to actually list, and be able to demonstrate, the specifics of the causal chain you'd be claiming.

A is not free to do x; A does x - is self contradictory. To do something I must be able to do it. To be able to do it, I must be free to do it. I cannot throw a switch if my hands are tied. — Pantagruel

If A is causally forced to do x, must A be able to do x?

That causally peggable specific action is giving birth to them. — khaled

Wow. Okay, so take me through the causal chain.

Ok. When you have a child and he experiences pain. How is that different from the bomb situation. Let's compare analogies here. I'm comparing having a bomb implanted in someone whcih explodes harming him without his consent with having children then them experiencing depressive thoughts which harms them without their consent: — khaled

So, the reason I went into some detail about consent criteria wasn't so that I'd have to keep repeating it. So the first point here (I'll get to the rest of the post after we settle this--one thing at a time so that I don't have to keep repeating stuff), is what specific action are we talking about re whatever pain you're referring to? And re "experiencing depressive thoughts" you're claiming a causally-peggable specific action that gives someone a particular type of thought?

You are aware that people commit suicide aren't you? — Andrew4Handel

I've had five, maybe six (there's one that's not clear), people who were close to me commit suicide, and I dated a woman who had tried unsuccessfully a few times.

Not doing something is respecting consent. — Andrew4Handel

I hadn't made any comments about "respecting consent."

oops. Only one choice is possible, no matter how many possibilities are presented. — god must be atheist

??? I'm not following you.

There is more than one choice in that I can choose what album to listen to, I can choose which ice cream to eat, I can choose which film to watch, etc., and I can choose among many albums, flavors, etc.

It is my opinion that, if my mind were constrained in the way you describe, I would not be capable of having the fundamental experience of consciousness. Cogito ergo sum. This was the exact point at the heart of Descartes' philosophy. 1. Doubt everything (a very rigorous way to conduct yourself epistemically). 2. What cannot possibly be doubted? That I am having this experience now.

Consciousness is the experience which is by its very nature necessarily free from compulsion. — Pantagruel

The idea of determinism isn't that it seems like there are no choices, that there is no freedom phenomenally. The idea is that the reality behind the phenomena is deterministic, where part of what's deterministically occurring is just the phenomenal character in question (of seeming to have choices, freedom, etc.)

So you'd need an argument (if you're going to claim an argument for this), not just an opinion, as to why determinism couldn't produce consciousness with the phenomenal illusion of freedom. If determinism were the case, you couldn't have (conscious) experiences, you couldn't doubt things, etc. because?

"I have not had a single happy day in my life. I have always worked hard, digging in the garden. I am tired," Istambulova told the Daily Mail. When asked about her secrets for longevity, she said, "It was God's will. I did nothing to make it happen.... Long life is not at all God's gift for me—but a punishment." — Andrew4Handel

I don't believe her. I can believe that was her attitude when she was interviewed, but I know plenty of people who will say things in that vein at times and things completely inconsistent with it at other times.

It does because you can respect consent without an action — Andrew4Handel

?? No idea what you're saying there.

Again, I am effecting a definition of the domain which for which this assertion is fundamental. Consistent with the reality that most people, including myself, experience every day.

John Searle remarked in an interview that 'the average man on the street is a Cartesian.' There's a reason for that.

I'm certain that in our day to day experience of the executive function we are definitely not as free as we believe ourselves to be. It's well established that our minds are subject to numerous 'cognitive biases' that preformat our perceptions and decisions. As well experiments have shown that a supposedly free choice can be anticipated in the brain by as much as several seconds.

However I believe consciousness is more akin to a cybernetic system in its role as mediator of input and output. It's behaviours are essentially rule-governed and these rules are cognitive habits. So in my view, the most powerful form of conscious freedom consists in one's ability to modify one's own cognitive habits. — Pantagruel

Do you understand, though, that it could (logically) be the case that you're determined to do x? So A doing x implies nothing about freedom/free will.

Remember that I'm not trying to convince you that there is no free will--I buy free will myself; I'm not a determinist. I'm simply addressing whether the arguments you're forwarding work as arguments.