It's when reason values you. Duh! — Echarmion

Haha. It's weird he doesn't see the category error there, though. Morality is about specific actions, or at least specific types of actions. A person overall isn't morally valuable or not.

Regarding reason, he seems to either be using that as something like a metonym for God, where he's hoping it will be less controversial, or he's simply positing some sort of platonic form of (unchanging, non-relative) reason (without realizing that to some of us, that's at least as controversial as simply saying "God is responsible"). Although how he's reconciling that idea with the claim that this stuff is subjective, I don't know.

What is free will, if we have one. — lepriçok

Free will obtains via the fact that the world is not strongly deterministic. The standard view in the sciences, by the way, is that the world is not strongly deterministic, where that's been the standard view for over 150 years now, but somehow the message isn't getting through. In online forums like this, everyone still seems to think that it's the early 1800s and they're supporting Laplace for president. (See "Laplace's demon" if you don't know what I'm talking about.)

(The above isn't to suggest that the standard view in the sciences is ever correct because it's the standard view. The idea is rather than the "there is no free will" crowd always wants to appeal to it being a standard view or implication of the sciences that there is no free will. That's wrong, though. The "there is no free will" crowd should have looked at what was going on in the sciences after the mid-1800s.)

So free will is will phenomena--the phenomena of conscious "directedness," decision-making, etc. (consciousness being properties of brains), where we're able to exploit the fact that the world isn't strongly deterministic by biasing probabilities of one option we're considering versus other options, in a dynamic way, until at decision-point, we bias the probability we're going with at 1 (or 100%).

I'm probably not going to understand this, because I'm a physicalist/materialist who doesn't buy any sort of nonphysical stuff, mystical stuff, "transcendental" stuff etc. It all seems incredibly incoherent to me.

With that in mind though, you're positing some sort of "metaphysical" energy?

I don't even buy that there can be energy "on its own," by the way. Energy obtains via the relative motion of physical objects.

(And as another "warning," most "information" talk strikes me as a bunch of gobbledygook.)

So where, in your opinion, these first principles reside? — lepriçok

Personally I don't buy that anything like that obtains extramentally. I'm an antirealist on logic and mathematics, with respect to the standard ways those fields are instantiated. I think there are real relations, and that to some extent is what the foundations of logic and mathematics are based on, but those real relations are not identical to logic and mathematics, which is a mental construction we create.

Has being or existence layers that are beyond physics? — lepriçok

I like to warn against conflation with the discipline of physics per se. What I'd say is that there's nothing beyond the physical. "The physical" is not the same thing as the discipline of physics, although obviously there's a connection there.

. If I am morally valuable — Bartricks

What in the world would it mean for a person to be morally valuable?

Also, it's hard to take someone seriously when they have this hairdo:

Can speech-censoring as a means to mitigate/overcome unnecessary suffering (of those who would take psycho-affective (?) damage from such speech), ultimately achieve such? — Blurrosier

If one is worried about unnecessary suffering, in a situation where we're censoring some speech, what about the unnecessary suffering of people who now can't say what they want to say?

Here's a recent post of mine explaining the standard academic philosophical definition of metaphysics, by the way:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/317325

My usage should be obvious - there is a physical world and a metaphysical one. The physical world is sensory, or empirical, whereas metaphysical is supersensory. Philosophers argue what these two realities are — lepriçok

That's not actually the academic philosophical usage of "metaphysics" by the way.

But okay, so you're using "metaphysics" in some kind of mystical "beyond physics"/"transcendental" sense.

So what does it mean to say that we can "transfer" something like the freedom issue to "the metaphysical level," and what would metaphysical causality be (in other words, what would a specific example of it be)?

Of course. But I haven't said anything about some system to make them be trustworthy. I said it was immoral behavior. You brought in the issue of enforcement. Why does judging someone immoral entail enforcement? while judging someone an asshole does not? I don't think these things should be legislated against. — Coben

You had said, "Well, sure. But I want to be able to trust people." So I thought you were saying that our stances or policies on this stuff was going to have something to do with whether you are able to trust people. So that's why I wrote, "Sure, we want to be able to trust people, but we often can not, and there's no way to enforce that everyone is going to be trustworthy." Or in other words, our stances or policies on this stuff aren't going to have anything to do with whether we can trust people; there's no way to make everyone trustrworthy (even via enforcement).

I read many statements like "I want x" as a problem to be solved, if possible. I don't think this is a solvable problem aside from sort of radical bio-engineering which might not be possible.

How does my labeling such meanness immoral stop them from expressing themselves? — Coben

It doesn't. What I was saying is that it's not undesirable to me for people to express themselves. It's rather desirable.

The classical theory of freedom views it as free will which further on is the ability/right to freely choose. This principle can be transferred to the metaphysical level, discussing if there are metaphysical causes adverse to free choice. Metaphysical entities are not obvious and we can only speculate if they have or don't have real effect on our choices. Empirical causes are obvious and our free or forced choice is evident to every person. So my question is, which point of view is more important in libertarianism. Should libertarianism be metaphysical or empirical. How this distinction is related to the question of religion, and is it necessary for libertarians to be atheists. The opposite to freedom empirically is dependence, slavery. Are we slaves to God as well? Is it good or we should rebel? — lepriçok

I don't understand how you're using the terms "metaphysical" and "empirical." It doesn't seem to resemble how I use those terms or what I'd say conventional usage is in an academic context.

The latter. I had lengthy first hand experience. The cadres "induce" the subalterns to transfer their "affections" from the previous authority to them instead. It can be cloaked in all sorts of sentimentality, dynamism or superior-looking mystique but beware. The cadres will select individuals who are pliable enough "material" to represent a privileged element within the subalterns, initially making very sure to imply that it is the rest of us subalterns that are electing those. Hence the pretence at democracy. Further "elections" will be more contrived if they don't become less frequent. Dumbing down the system, and relying on the prevalence of a forelock-tugging mentality in the first place, are features.

These operatives and ringleaders wear the aura of semi “rehabilitated” IRA, or Italian revolutionaries, or Yaxley-Cummings “people” types. And they embed themselves everywhere. I mean everywhere. Religions, commerce. They render what we thought was hitherto proper authority, completely ineffective, no matter if there are still a few old-style seniors of attempted goodwill around. There is no recourse and there are no channels of responsibility-taking. — Fine Doubter

Strikes me as a very elaborate conspiracy theory.

Exactly. "Sexual essence/essentialist about sex" is a good way to put it. It's weird to me that the whole thing seems to be based on kowtowing to "sexual essentialism," since sexual essentialism is a mythical cultural construct. Folks should be combating the cultural construct, not bowing to it while claiming to be trying to buck it.

Now go away or I shall taunt you a second time.

Who said anything about enforcing? — Coben

It's certainly not going to be the case that everyone's trustworthy of their own accord.

In what sense. That seems like a moral judgment via an expressive label. He's an asshole, he does asshole things, but he's not immoral seems odd to me. — Coben

I don't know how to answer that, because I don't know what "senses of not considering that a moral issue" would be. Maybe it would be helpful to bring up my short definition of morality again: "morality is dispositions about interpersonal behavior that one considers to be more significant than mere etiquette." So morality involves scale or degree. Not all behavior that one makes a judgment about is a moral issue.

I don't think that holds. 'a bit' is a vague term — Coben

Intentionally yes, because (a) it's a subjective issue, and (b) it's also going to vary from situation to situation.

my argument refutes all rival positions. You genuinely don't have the first idea how arguments work, do you? Yet you're confident you do, and confident I'm wrong. It's an all too common combination. — Bartricks

If an argument is stated by Bartricks, then it refutes no rival positions.
The argument in the first post of this thread was stated by Bartricks.
Therefore, the argument in the first post of this thread refutes no rival positions.

(The premises above are self-evident, by the way.)

Progressive reality is what all aspects of nature presents to us. — True Point

No idea why you're calling that "progressive," but okay.

Observational reality is what an individual presents to us, which is subject to personal interpretation. — True Point

Basically you're describing hearsay there, right?

The question is; if truth is a native of our ideology and not an accurate representation of REALITY, why do we rely on people for the truth, when their truth is based on observation? — True Point

A lot of things about this question seem confused to me.

First, I don't know what "a native of our ideology" is supposed to amount to.

Second, why wouldn't "progressive reality," if that's a type of truth, be accurate? (Granted, I don't know why you'd be saying it's a representation of reality. Wouldn't what nature presents to us, a la "progressive reality," be reality and not a representation of it? Unless you're assuming representationalism with respect to philosophy of perception, but you're not making that explicit.)

Then you asked why we rely on people for the truth. Where is that conclusion coming from? You're saying that we only rely on hearsay for truth?

Next, if "observational reality" is the name of "what an individual presents to us," it seems odd to say that what an individual presents to us is based on observation. Observation is what it is, not what it's based on.

On a slow day, yeah.

I usually prefer to not explain jokes, but in other words, if we read "trolling research" as saying "research that is trolling" rather than "research into trolling"

Cats might say the opposite.

Trolling research lists contagion as one of the problematic results of online nastiness. Everyone acting out their PTSD, thereby triggering someone else's PTSD, and so on. Meanness metastasizes, like cancer. — uncanni

On the other hand, trolling research is trolling.

How about this for a background?

I'm waiting for the tie-dye pattern.

Or at least some paisley.

So emotional pain is not a real thing? — schopenhauer1

I think emotional pain is a real thing, sure.

But, there's no need to be offended by anything anyone says. I see being offended as a flaw with the person who is offended. Not a flaw with the offendee.

I would say you have the higher burden of proof. — ZhouBoTong

Note that I'm not making the claim that "most Americans were not racist." Rather I'm skeptical about the claim that most were.

Based on your quote above (yes taken to extremes), there is not ONE SINGLE HUMAN that we can call racist. — ZhouBoTong

That's not what I'm getting at. (And I'm not sure why you'd read it that way. The quote that's a response to is me simply saying that I don't know/don't remember enough about what Jefferson or Washington said.)

All I'd require is statements that reflect beliefs re some common definitions of racism, such as:

"a belief that race is the primary determinant of human traits and capacities and that racial differences produce an inherent superiority of a particular race"

(I'm not saying it strictly has to be that particular definition--that's just an example)

I wasn't saying anything about sincerity, by the way. I literally don't know, if I ever knew (and just don't recall), racist things that Jefferson, Washington etc. said--not because I'm denying they ever said anything. I'm claiming a lack of sufficient familiarity and/or memory with what they said.

Thomas Jefferson wrote "all men are created equal". He owned slaves that did nothing wrong other than being born black. What possible justification is MORE likely than racism? — ZhouBoTong

I had just explained the monetary motivations, for example. (The comments about cheap labor.)

If I can provide a letter from FDR referring to "white supremacy", is that evidence of racism? — ZhouBoTong

If he's claiming something like white supremacy, sure.

I wouldn't at all doubt that some presidents were racist, by the way.

Right. Which we can never know for sure. But we can make some pretty solid assumptions based on their words and deeds. — ZhouBoTong

Yeah, I wasn't making a point about knowing that for sure. Things people say are good enough. But it would have to be something that we're not just interpreting as racist. For example, William Shockley, a Nobel laureate who was the co-inventor of semiconductors, supposedly said that whites have superior intelligence. That would be sufficient to count as racist (of course).

Well, sure. But I want to be able to trust people. — Coben

Sure, we want to be able to trust people, but we often can not, and there's no way to enforce that everyone is going to be trustworthy.

Keep in mind, by the way, that re some stuff you're bringing up, I would still have contractual law much as it is now. People could still be liable for contractual fraud/breech of contract.

Many situations of a doctor misleading you are going to be contractual fraud, because there's an implied contract in that scenario that they're not going to give you intentional misdiagnoses, and especially not intentionally contraindicated prescriptions and so on.

Other than that, sure, I might say someone is being an asshole, too, but to me, "immoral" is stronger than just "he's being an asshole."

Simply saying that better educated people would not agree with me — Isaac

??

Not what I said. It's more that you wouldn't agree with you at a stage of development in your thought about this stuff that didn't resemble a high school kid who "thinks he might be interested in philosophy" and who just smoked a joint.

It's like if you were to say, "I'm going to only eat bubblegum!" I might point out that you seem like you're four years old. That has nothing to do with what other people say. It has to do with the fact that that's the stage of development where people typically think something like "I'm going to only eat bubblegum!"

Well, the stage of development where people have a lot of problems separating concepts from what concepts are about is around the time of either "stoned high school student with some interest in (at least what he thinks is) philosophy" or the "freshman taking a Phil 101 course for the first time."

That's nothing to do with agreeing with other people.

So, ad populum arguments are fair use when they suit you? — Isaac

Can you explain this question?

A measurement is a concept. — Isaac

No. That's not even a sophormoric conflation. It's a freshman-level conflation. Or a high school kid getting high and thinking that he might be interested in philosophy-level conflation.

There is a concept of measurement. But measurements themselves are not concepts.

You can't conflate concepts and what they're concepts of. That's one of the most naive philosophical mistakes.

Now, you can make a sort of "guesstimation measurement" in your head at times, but that's not what we're talking about.

We're still working on you understanding how measurements are objective. You keep bringing up thinking about measurements --concepts, applying particular terms and all sorts of things, but we're trying to reach understanding that the claim isn't about concepts etc.

the division by which we name it and think of it as one thing (as opposed to another) is not. — Isaac

I'm not asking about naming and thinking about.

Where does the stuff stop being 'air' and start being 'plastic'? That's subjective — Isaac

That's talking about the concepts. That's not what I'm asking about.

but feeling (dis)comfort with specific bodily features generally correlated with males and females, right? Feeling (dis)comfort about having a penis/vag, breasts, body hair, etc? This is not about "identification as a" whatever, internal or external. It's about feelings about external sex features. — Pfhorrest

That's exactly what I'm talking about. You apparently aren't understanding my comments.

I wrote above "being a female or male biologically would have ZERO connotations about . . . what you want to look like, what you want your body to be like . . . If you're a biological male, then any conceivable way your body is shaped, or any possible way that you shape it via modifications, is a way that biological males can be." Modifications can involve adding larger breasts, removing one's penis, etc. --again, anything conceivable.

Yes, because the concept of "gender" is used both to refer to the social stuff and to the feelings about your physical sex, and I want to disambiguate that, so that we can talk about one without having to talk about the other. — Pfhorrest

No matter what your feelings, how could you be born a biological male and not feel like a biological male? Any way you feel is a way that a biological male can feel, as a biological male.

this is about having the language to talk about how people feel about their bodies without referencing all that social stuff. — Pfhorrest

Meanwhile the title of the thread is "Disambiguating the concept of gender"??

No. I think it's independent of my brain — Isaac

So then you don't think that it's subjective.

No, I think the device is an artificial division of the stuff reality is made of. — Isaac

I wasn't asking you anything like that. I'm asking you if you think it's literally mental content and not a piece of plastic etc. that's independent of your brain

Yes. As I said all there can really be (if there's anything at all) is a sea of heterogeneous stuff. The device (as opposed to its immediate surroundings) is an artificial division of that stuff I've made up, the readings are more artificial divisions of that stuff I made up. — Isaac

Huh? So you think the device is just something you're imagining, and it's an artificial division of something you're imagining?

it's just about wanting to have a body shaped like a woman's body. — Pfhorrest

This, for example: If you're a biological male, then any conceivable way your body is shaped, or any possible way that you shape it via modifications, is a way that biological males can be. If you're a biological male, then you can't be some way that's not a biological male. However you are is a way that biological males can be. Otherwise one is just kowtowing to some bs stereotypes.

What I've never understood is the fact that all of this "gender fluidity" stuff seems to be buying into stereotypes about biological sex hook, line and sinker, and in that, it seems to be identifying gender and sex after all.

If one is NOT buying into those stereotypes, then being a female or male biologically would have ZERO connotations about who you're attracted to, what you want to look like, what you want your body to be like, how you behave. If you're a biological male, then the answers to all of those questions for you would be something that a biological male is like. Likewise if you're a biological female.

The only reason there would be any need to create a separate concept of gender would be that one is going to kowtow to stereotypes, so that if you're a biological female, but you feel certain ways about your body, etc., you're "no longer a biological female in terms of gender." But that seems nonsensical to me.

I'm guessing you'd say that "access consciousness" is amenable to scientific study? (Also, it seems like on the page you're linking to, you define "access consciousness" differently than Ned Block does . . . which doesn't have to be a problem, of course, but Block's distinction is the one I'm familiar with, even if I'm not sure it holds much water.)

In what way would you say that "access consciousness" is amenable to scientific study if other types or aspects of consciousness are not?