Science, having an objective methodology, is not suited to explain the subjective — Marchesk

Yes. As I have said in other threads, natural science begins with a fundamental abstraction that fixes attention on the objects of the physical world to the exclusion of the knowing subject and its correlatives. Those it is bereft of the concepts and data required to related what it knows of the physical world to consciousness and other intentional operations.

Due to the various issues this split tends to raise — Marchesk

I think it is a mistake to think that there is any subject-object split in reality. The only split is mental or logical. Subjectivity and objectivity are invariably linked. There is no knowing subject that is not knowing an objective reality, and no actually known object that is not known by one or more knowing subjects.

Yes, what we experience in dreams and imaginings is not intersubjectively available, but presumably, the content experienced is encoded in objective neural states -- so even here the inseparability of the subjective and the objective is maintained.

Why don't we live in a philosophical zombie universe? Why would there be subjective experience at all? — Marchesk

This is not an answerable question. We might say because God chose to make it so, but we can't reduce the phenomena to more fundamental experiences. From a human perspective, it is simply a contingent fact of experience.

In fact, unless there were subjects in the world, there could be no experiencing subjects and so no experience or consequent knowledge.

How could it spookily emerge from the dance of matter and energy? — Marchesk

Who says it does "emerge from the dance of matter and energy"? This assumes that nature consists only of the phenomena we have chosen to assign to natural science in making the fundamental abstraction. Why should the data natural science has chosen to fix upon explain the data it has chosen to neglect? I can think of no reason it should.

I don't see how this is fundamentally an abuse of language issue. — Marchesk

I agree.

Really, subjectivities (that is the presence of states of experience) are objective in the way assigned to "out there" in split — TheWillowOfDarkness

I agree that our interior experiences are as real as anything in physical reality. So, I don't think the proper dividing line is between "in her" and "out there." It is between the poles of the subject-object relation. Being a knowing subject is distinct from being a known object, even though neither can exist apart from the other.

Btw it speaks to the victory of materialism/atomism/ reductionism that our direct experiences can be considered spooky when they are still our access point to the world. — JupiterJess

I always see "spooky" in this context as a sign of prejudice and closed mindedness. The person asserting it is denigrating a set of solutions before giving them a fair hearing.

Aren't the words "objective" and "subjective" simply being put to use, and insofar that we agree on their usage we have nothing more philosophical to talk about? — Moliere

No. Once we distinguish the subjective and the objective we have to consider their nature. We have to consider whether or not there is an epistic gap between subject and object. We have to consider if any experience/knowledge can be purely subjective or purely objective. The list goes on.

what I think is of disagreement in talking about whether a philosophical issue is substantive or not is over what counts as philosophical. — Moliere

I think that the issue of being substantive was defined in the OP without exploring the nature of philosophy. It is whether the problem is due to an abuse of language or whether it is about the nature of reality.

To me then this whole paragraph adopts not a subjective nor an objective approach, but a sort of mutual approach, and that's often how we are. — mcdoodle

Yes, we need to form a consistent understanding of the full range of human experience.

There are a number of different double-slit experiments, and all of them (or at least, all the ones I know, including several 'delayed choice' and 'quantum eraser' versions) are completely explained by the mathematical analysis, which does not hold any mysteries, — andrewk

Yes. The paradoxes are the result of refusing to let go of Greek atomism and insisting, against all the evidence, that quanta are both particles and waves. The math, which works perfectly, represents quanta as waves.

The name for that is "prejudicial thinking."

Sadly, it is all too common both in society as a whole and in science in particular.

The list of questions is a hodge-podge showing little reflection. Some (such as the existence of God) belong to metaphysics or natural theology. Others belong to Christian theology and the back and forth of apologetics, or to ethics.

The philosophy of religion is reasoned reflection on religious practice. Clearly, it has a place in the spectrum of philosophical thought independently of one's metaphysics, personal beliefs and faith commitments.

If the word phrase "sensory representation" and word "representation" were replaced with "awareness" (perception and cognisance caused by sensation), I could agree with your formulation. Otherwise, I consider the use of the word "representation" in this context to be unnecessarily metaphorical. — Galuchat

I suspect this is simply a matter of defining "representation" differently, and not a difference about fact.

One can have a representation without being aware of the representation. There are many, many unread texts and unviewed pictures. In the same way we can have sensory representations without being intellectually aware of them. In another thread, I gave many examples of complex "automatic" or sensory behavior -- playing musical instruments, bicycle riding, and driving being a few. So, as I use the term, there are sensory representations and intellectual representations. In my view, only the latter require awareness.

There is no "language of thought." Rather thought is what is elicited by language. — Dfpolis

I agree with the first sentence, but disagree with the second. While my own thought is largely verbal, Einstein's thought experiments were, by his own admission, nonverbal. — Galuchat

I was insufficiently precise. I should have said "thought is elicited by language." I did not intend to say that thought is only elicited by by language. I agree that much thought is nonverbal as shown by the experience of knowing what we mean, but not being able to find the right words to express it.

Semioticians Lotman and Sebeok think that language developed as a mental modelling system (an adaptation) in Homo habilis, and that speech is an exaptation derived from language (which emerged in Homo sapiens). — Galuchat

I have no idea what data one could bring to bear to confirm or falsify this hypothesis. So, in my view it is an unscientific speculation.

In the sentence "a is a" "a" is used formally. That is to say that it refers to some (generalized) object beyond itself. In the sentence " a is not a because one a is on the left side of the copula and the other a is on the right side," "a" is used materially. Which is to say that "a" means the symbol "a" and not what "a" indicates. As material and formal predication are different, your argument is uses "a" equivocally, and so is fallacious.

As to Aristotelian vs modern logic, they are not logic in the same sense. Aristotelian (and, more broadly, intentional) logic is defined as the "science of correct thinking (about reality)." Modern logics are not concerned with thought processes per se, but with rules of symbolic manipulation. Since they deal with different subject matter, they are not directly comparable.

For example, in Aristotelian logic universal propositions have existential import. That is because propositions cannot be true unless they are based on our experience of reality. In modern logic, propositions need not be justified by real cases, and so universals need not have existential import.

It signifies the airborne vanilla molecules giving rise to the odor. — hypericin

Smelling vanilla is an existential state. It might indicate the presence of vanilla extract, vanilla beans, good vanilla ice cream, etc. Since it can indicate many things, intrinsically, it indicates no one thing, including the presence of vanilla molecules. For thousands of years, people smelled vanilla and never thought of vanilla molecules. So, intrinsically, the quale of vanilla does not signify the presence of vanilla molecules. (It does not necessarily make us think of them.)

Of course, once we understand that odors are mediated by specific molecules, smelling vanilla is strong evidence for the presence of vanilla molecules. But, even then, it's not an infallible sign of vanilla molecules, because we could have a very vivid olfactory imagination or even be hallucinating.

Evidence is not necessarily, not essentially, a sign. it is something that can be used as a sign, but has an intrinsic reality of its own. Smoke is just combustion products in the air -- whether or not someone uses it as a sign of fire. In the same way, the quale of vanilla, which is identical with smelling vanilla, is simply an existential state, whether or not I use it as a sign that I'm near a vanilla orchid.

On the other hand, an idea is intrinsically a sign and signifies whatever it's about necessarily. My idea <apples> necessarily signifies apples. It's impossible for it to signify anything we don't think is an apple.

We have no access to the reality, only to the symbols representing it: qualia. — hypericin

Yes, that's the kind of pap modern philosophers take on faith. Of course, it is absolutely false. I don't know whose version of this nonsense you believe, so I won't refute them on by one, but simply show you why we do have access to reality.

Anything that can act in any way exists, it real. So, existence is the unspectified ability act. Of course, everything can act in specific ways, and if we knew all the ways it could act, we'd know all the ways it can present itself. So, the essence of a thing is the specification of its ability to act -- what it can and cannot do.

When we sense something, it is acting on us in some way. Perhaps it's emitting vanilla molecules that trigger an olfactory response, scattering light into our eyes or pushing back when we touch it. Whatever it's doing, it modifies our neural state, and that modification of our neural state is our sensory representation of the object. There is an identity and joint ownership here. The object's modification of our sensory state is identically our sensory representation of the object. So, there's no epistic gap here between us and the sensed object. Rather, our representation of the object is the object's existential penetration of us.

When we turn our attention to this sensory representation and become aware of it, we know the object -- not exhaustively but to the degree that we are interacting with it. It is informing us. Recall that Claude Shannon defined information as the reduction of possibility. Of all the ways and unknown object could act on us, it is acting on us in the specific way we are experiencing. Since this is necessarily one of the ways in which it can act, it is informing us about its essence -- about the specification of its possible acts.

So, when we are aware of our sensory encounter with an object, we learn of both its existence (it can act because it is acting on us) and it essence (its specification of possible acts must include the ways it is acting on us.) Again, there is no epistic gap.

So, forget all the nonsense you've heard about epistic gaps, They simply don't exist.

The vanillin molecule has nothing to do with the vanilla smell. The smell is purely symbolic, it points to the molecule. — hypericin

I explained why this is not so. It can be evidence, but it is not intrinsically a sign.

This is an internal language, the body speaking to itself. But the body itself is a multiplicity, and if there is sharing and convention, they exist at that level. — hypericin

There is no "language of thought." Rather thought is what is elicited by language. If there were a language of thought, then it would have to elicit its interpreting thoughts and this would lead to an infinite regress.

The notion of "the body speaking to itself" is a metaphor, not an accurate description. Yes, information is transmitted from point to point neurally and chemically. That information is not a language in the sense of a system of signs that elicit meaning. Rather, neural pulses and hormones effectuate responses without need of mental interpretation. Meaning only enters when we reflect on the process. It is not intrinsic.

The body is not a multiplicity, It is an organic unity with each part depending upon the others. Thinking of parts that we can separate mentally as separate unities is committing Whitehead's fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Regions that are joined physically and dynamically are only potentially separate, not actual units.

So do you think it's correct to say that there are no actual atoms in the original sense of 'indivisible particles'? In that, what is perceived as 'particles' is not something that is actually a particle but for which the term 'particle' is a kind of analogy? — Wayfarer

Exactly

Qualia are symbolic systems. — hypericin

Qualia are contingent forms of awareness. They are not symbols because they have no intrinsic or conventional meaning. The smell of vanilla is the quale of smelling vanilla, not some separate thing indicated by the quale.

Qualia are language, they have the same logical structure as language. — hypericin

Qualia are not language because language is a shared system of conventional signs while (1) qualia are not symbols, (2) qualia are not conventional and (3) we have no idea if they are shared or not. There is no way to compare the form of my experience in smelling vanilla to the form of your experience in smelling it.

Finally, the logical structure ideas, the contingent forms of some of which are qualia, is not the same as the logical structure of language. For language to signify, first, I must grasp the form of the medium of expression (I must hear you aright, make out your writing, etc.) and second, I must form an idea of what that physical form means. Only then can it indicate some target. So we have a ternary relation (physical sign - thinker - signified). That means that language employs instrumental signs.

For ideas to signify, I do not first have to recognize that I'm dealing with an idea. There is no question of making our its physical form. Rather, ideas signify directly. So, we have a binary relation (thinker - signified). That means that ideas (and qualia are the contingent form of some ideas) are formal, not instrumental signs.

Can you describe how you think the classical world (with apparent particles and large scale structures) emerges from the quantum world (of wave function and superposition)? — Relativist

Sure. As I have said, we need to look at the detailed physics of the measurement process, instead of treating it abstractly. When we do, we see how the transition from the quantum to the classical world occurs. The associated philosophical problem is falling prey to Whitehead's fallacy of misplaced concreteness -- treating an abstraction as though it is a concrete reality.

Detectors are made of bulk matter, which is held together with electron-electron interactions. The two electron problem in quantum field theory involves nonlinear dynamics. It is easy to understand why. Each electron generates an electromagnetic field which affects the other, which, in turn, affects the original electron. Since the E-M field is caused by the charge and current densities, it is quadratic in the wave function. That means that electron-electron interactions are intrinsically nonlinear.

The nonlinearity is easily overlooked, because as soon as it is discovered, it is replaced by a linear perturbative approximation. This is done because we don't know how to solve nonlinear equations, but we can solve the approximating perturbation series.

If the two electron problem is nonlinear and impossible to solve exactly, imagine the complexity and difficulty of solving the interactions of about 10^23 electrons in a detector. Even problems with as few as eight electrons test the capacity of supercomputers. Because the exact quantum treatment of a detector is impossible, they are treated classically, or at best, semi-classically.

So, we have the abstraction of quantum existing in isolation, and therefore subject to linear dynamics, and the abstraction of detector treated classically. In reality, we have a free electron approaching 10^23 or so bound, interacting electrons. As it approaches the detector, its interactions with the detector electrons ceases to be negligible -- meaning that the nonlinear terms in the free electron's wave equation become increasingly important.

Superpositions of solutions of linear equations are also solutions of those equations. Superpositions of solutions of nonlinear equations not solutions of those equations. Thus, once the nonlinear terms in the free electron's wave equation become important, the superposition will become unsustainable, and the wave function must collapse to a single solution of a set of (~10^23) nonlinear equations.

Once we see why the wave function has to collapse on detection, it is clear how the classical world emerges from the quantum world. When we have enough atoms interacting so that their nonlinear interactions cease to be negligible, superpositions will no longer be sustainable, and we will have one well-defined solution at a time -- not a superposition of a live cat and a dead cat.

I'm not talking about the count of decisions, but of possible actions. — Dfpolis

This makes no difference — Pseudonym

This is not a sensible response. So, it is time to end this conversation.

It may give the impression that uncertainty arises only when we lumbering experimenters meddle with things. This is not true. Uncertainty is built into the wave structure of quantum mechanics and exists whether or not we carry out some clumsy measurement.

So it's not as if the act of measurement literally alters the subject - I think if it were that simple, then it would not be regarded as the great mystery that it currently is. — Wayfarer

There is no intrinsic mystery. I talked about both types of uncertainty mentioned by Greene in my response, but perhaps not with sufficient clarity.

There seems to be no argument that observing changes the prior state in an indeterminate way. The problem here is not that quantum dynamics are indeterminate. Orthodox quantum theory tells us that all quantum processes other than measurement ate completely deterministic. The problem is that we know neither the detailed prior state of the system being observed nor that of our measurement/detection apparatus. Without knowing the initial state we cannot apply deterministic laws to calculate deterministic outcomes. So, this type of indeterminism is obviously epistemological, not ontological.

I mentioned a second way in which physical states can be said to be "indeterminate" when I raised Aristotle's observation that, in physical reality, quantity is not an actual number, but countability and measurability. I went on to say that the measure number we actually get depends on the details of the measurement process. This is the explanation of the second kind of indeterminism Greene mentions. As you can see, this is not new either, but has been known in principle since mathematical physics was founded by Aristotle.

So, why is this a problem? Because many people, including physicists, approach quantum phenomena with two misconceptions:
(1) Quanta are, sometimes at least, particles that can be adequately conceived of as point masses. This is a prejudice that goes back to the baseless speculations of the Greek atomist. It has never been adequately supported by observational data. Sometimes we can get away with thinking of quanta as particles, but doing so invariably leads to paradox and contradiction.
(2) Physical quantities have determinate values before being measured. This is a prejudice that goes back to the Pythagorean view that physical things are made of numbers and geometric figures. Even those physicists who haven't read Aristotle should have been disabused of this belief with the advent of special relativity. It showed that the values we measure for physical quantities as basic as space and time depend on the details of the measurement process.

So, if you think that quanta are particles then you are going to think that they ought to have well-defined positions and momenta, in any given frame of reference, anyway. Since quanta are not particles but waves, it is not surprising that this leads to immediate difficulties. We have known since 19th century developments in hydrodynamic wave theory and the acceptance of Maxwell's electrodynamics that the energy and momentum of waves is not localized, but distributed over the entire field. It should also be obvious that waves do not have a well-defined position that can be adequately dealt with by conceiving of them as point masses. So, it should be no surprise that when we try to measure the position and momentum of a quantumconceived of as a particle we get puzzling results.

These results are not due to any mysterious, ontological indeterminacy. We know that when we measure the momentum of a quantum with a narrow range of wave lengths the resulting momentum number is inversely proportional to the wave length. We also know that localizing a wave structure requires a wide range of wave lengths (and hence of "momenta"). This is the basis of Heisenberg's uncertainty relation for position and momentum. Still, the relation between localization and range of wave lengths is not a quantum phenomenon. It applies as much to water waves as to quanta. It is simply a consequence of the Fourier integral theorem in mathematics.

As I understand the conundrum surrounding measurement, the electron exists 'in a super-position' which is described by the wave function. That is literally a description of a range of possibilities. — Wayfarer

There is no reason to think superpositions are not fully actual in themselves. What is potential is the number a measuring process will yield, but, as Aristotle noted, that is potential for all physical quantities.

Prior to it being measured, it can't be said to be in a particular place. — Wayfarer

Right, because waves are intrinsically extended.

Pretty much. I think that so-called particles are quantized wave structures, as modeled by QFT. I think that annihilation and creation operators mask more fundamental nonlinear processes.

the concept or meaning of a contingent state is necessary — TheWillowOfDarkness

I am not sure where you are seeing the necessity. Clearly the concepts come to be in the individuals thinking them. If they were necessary, they would always be. Are you a Platonist?

"The green leaves of the tree in my backyard" is a necessary meaning of that contingent state, until such time as it expresses a different meanings or ceases to be as a state — TheWillowOfDarkness

Meaning is a relation between a sign and what it signifies. Since the sign need not exist and the relation is contingent on the existence of the sign, its meaning is not necessary. I do agree that the judgement <The tree in my back yard has green leaves> can't mean anything other than what it actually means. The problem is simply that the judgement need not exist.

But that has nothing to do with behaviourism, as such. In fact a behaviourist couldn't even comment on it, unless he was able to show how they manifested as behaviour, as by definition the behaviourist does not concern himself with internal states but only with behaviour. — Wayfarer

Yes. My point was that there is no need to invoke the notion of being subjectively aware, as opposed to medically conscious, to explain the kind of complex behavior we see in nonhuman animals. The examples I cited were to point out that complex behavior without subjective awareness is part of the human experience as well. Thus, subjective awareness is something over and above what is required for complex behavior.

I would not call subjective awareness "discursive" because I am not referring to "things which we can bring consciously to mind, or are conscious of being conscious of." "Subjective awareness" does not name things we are aware of (which are on the object side of the subject-object relation), but our act of being aware of such things -- of being a knowing subject.

But that has nothing to do with behaviourism, as such. In fact a behaviourist couldn't even comment on it, unless he was able to show how they manifested as behaviour, as by definition the behaviourist does not concern himself with internal states but only with behaviour. — Wayfarer

Of course. Perhaps "functionalist model" would have been better. My point was and is that we have no need of subjective awareness to explain the kind of complex behavior we see in nonhuman animals -- the same point I was making by pointing to human experiences of automatic behavior.

But the problem then is how to account for the reality of intelligibles in their own right, rather than as derived from a purely material, neurological process. You say that you accept the logical order is real in its own right, but in what sense is it real? How do you ground it? — Wayfarer

In nature intelligibility never stands on its own as some kind of abstract entity.. Substances (ostensible unities) are capable of some acts and incapable of others. So, we can say that each has existence (the indeterminate ability to act) -- everything that is can do something, and if it could not it could never evoke the idea <existent>. It also has an essence, which I define as the specification of its capacity to act -- telling us what it can and cannot do. (Note that this is not the kind of "essence" defined by Aristotle, the kind that defines a species, but can vary between individuals in a species.)

When something acts on our senses is is doing one of the many things specified by its essence and so is providing us with incomplete information on its essence. (Perhaps it's looking like a duck, quacking like a duck and walking like a duck, but not revealing everything it can do.) When we become aware of the object's action on us we are informed by it. (The logical possibility that it could not do what it is doing to us is eliminated -- thus meeting Shannon's definition of information). Thus, our act of awareness raises the physical action of the object on us to the logical order.

So, if it's looking, quacking and walking like a duck its likely eliciting the concept <duck>. Of course it is logically possible that the other acts it can do, the acts it has not revealed to us could give us pause. Perhaps it can also act like a demon, fulfilling Descartes's worst nightmare. So, our knowledge of its essence is incomplete and somewhat conjectural and constructive. Still, we are justified in calling it a "duck," even if it is a very special kind of duck.

But in what you're saying, I can't see anything that evolutionary materialism couldn't account for. — Wayfarer

Of course, I disagree on many grounds that I have argued in detail in my book. Here are a few:

First, there is the fundamental abstraction of natural science which begins by abstracting away all data on the knowing subject as in favor of fixing attention on the known objects of the physical universe. Consequently, natural science is bereft of data on the knowing subject and its correlative intentional operations. As natural science lacks lacks these concepts and data, it cannot possibly connect these concepts to its knowledge of the physical world -- as required to reduce subjectivity to physicality.

Second, as David Chalmers has pointed out, in over 2500 years of materialist reflection, no progress has been made on the "hard problem of consciousness." Indeed, Danial Dennett, a naturalist, has shown at length in Consciousness Explained, a naturalistic model of consciousness is impossible. The relevance of this is that unless one can show what kinds of genetic modifications and consequent physical changes would produce consciousness, any appeal to the mechanisms of evolution is moot.

Third, unless you give subjective awareness and its correlatives independent ontological status, the only rational position is epiphenomenalism, which is to say that, while we have awareness, it has no physical consequences. But, if epiphenomenalism is true, then no mutation that gave us a glimmer of awareness could have a physical effect. Without a physical effect, it cannot impact reproductive fitness. If it does not impact reproductive fitness, the mechanisms of evolution cannot select it. So, evolution cannot explain the advent of awareness.

One response to this is that awareness could be the accidental concomitant of the evolution of some other, selectable feature. That is simply to admit that evolution does not explain the advent of awareness -- that it is an accident of unexplained origin.

Finally, no physical process can separate what is physically inseparable, but distinct in thought. For example, how could a purely physical process form separate representations of action and passion (acting and being acted upon) when they never occur separately?

I am trying to argue that the mind, when it comprehends meaning, sees something which can't be accounted for in neurological terms. — Wayfarer

I agree. My example of the distinction of action and passion forms a prime example.

I am trying to develop an argument for how it can be considered real apart from the in-principle account provided by science. — Wayfarer

I suggest that you look at the difference between formal and instrumental signs in Henry Veatch, Intentional Logic. It shows that physical representations are not the same kind of signs as ideas.

That is very close to the point that I'm trying to get it - that h. sapiens possesses a faculty which is of a higher order to sense-knowledge, but which is occluded or ignored in a lot of modern thinking. — Wayfarer

Again we agree. I am suggesting that awareness is the sine qua non of reason.

No, observations all involve action. In seeing, for example, the object is illuminated (light acting on it), scatters light (the object reacting), and our eye receives some of the scattered light (reacting to it) and sending off a neural pulse which involves complex interactions in and between neurons. So there are all kinds of actions going on.

And this does not even touch upon the act of will directing our attention and the sequence of acts that initiates.

Sure, I have a few videos on my YouTube channel on quantum theory if you care to know more.

I assume that we are discussing the quantum version of the experiment. As with Young's optical version and the water version, the observed interference pattern confirms the wave theory and definitively falsifies the particle theory.

So, what about the "dots" in the screen? Don't they show that we are dealing with particles? No, not at all. We have to remember that all detectors are made of bull matter, all bulk matter is made of atoms, and all atoms have quantized energy levels occupied by their shell electrons. Detection events all involve electrons transitioning to higher energy states. This happens in atoms that are localized by the electric potential well of the nucleus, and it happens in individual electrons.

So, when a wave impinges on a detector, it excites the electrons in a number of atoms' electrons and those electrons interact, exchanging energy, just as they do in thermal energy exchange. These interactions are non-linear and so chaotic in the mathematical sense. Eventually one electron accumulates enough energy to effect what we interpret as a detection event. Since the atoms of the detector are localized, so are the detection events -- giving us the dot pattern we observe.

Because electron-electron interactions are nonlinear, they cannot sustain a linear superposition of states, and so the wave function (which previously did not involve nonlinear electron-electron interaction terms) collapses.

How does this reflect my philosophical approach? Just as I look at sensation and knowledge by considering the interaction of the object with the sense or the intellect, so I consider quantum observations by giving equal weight to the physics of the system being observed and of the detection process.

Also, as Aristotle noted, physical states do not involve numbers. At most they are countable and measurable. The measure number that we obtain, then, depends on the details of the measurement process and does not pre-exist in nature. Only a potential to be measured is found in nature. The actual measure depends jointly on the system state and the detector state.

All observations are actions. Not all actions are observations.

You're saying that a count of one (actual possibility) and a count of more than one (actual possibility) are simply different ways talking about the same cardinality? — Dfpolis

Yes, because it's 'one' decision. — Pseudonym

I'm not talking about the count of decisions, but of possible actions.

But don't you see how your 'experience' is not the same as others? — Pseudonym

Of course I see that every individual has different life-experiences. That is not the issue. The issue is that no one has an experience base that can justify the determinist's view of causal necessity against the critique of Hume. Just as we can abstract away the details of what we are counting to come to an understanding of numbers, so we can abstract away the details of individual experiences of event succession to see the soundness of Hume's critique.

No, it can't possibly tell you that because you only did one or the other — Pseudonym

I am talking about what we know before the decision, not what we know after (as you are here). We know what is in our power by seeing (1) what were were able to do in the past and (2) knowing that we have suffered no debilitation or other impediment since then.

You can't possibly say whether it was in your power to take the other choice because you didn't try it. — Pseudonym

This is a nonsensical claim. It misunderstands the nature of potential. Many contradictory outcomes may be possible, not withstanding the fact that only once can be actual.

Do you realise how arrogant this sounds? Like anyone who doesn't agree with you just isn't trying hard enough. — Pseudonym

It is not in the least arrogant. It is how I approach texts. I stand beside the author, trying to see what he or she saw and wants me to see. If you can't bring yourself to do the same, you're not entering into the spirit of dialog, only looking for sniping opportunities.

he question, lest we lose track of it, is how linguistic analysis will resolve my difference with a determinist? — Dfpolis

It won't. What it might do is get you to see that there is nothing further to be resolved. It's like one person describing the field as 'emerald green' and another describing is as 'like a sea of grass' and then you arguing with them assuming they therefore think the grass is blue. Both of you are describing grass, you're just picking out different aspects of it in your language. — Pseudonym

This is the most absurd claim I've read from someone serious in a long while. You're saying that a count of one (actual possibility) and a count of more than one (actual possibility) are simply different ways talking about the same cardinality? Your proposal rejects the Principle of Contradiction as well as basic arithmetic.

The point they disagree on is exactly the point at which actual experience ceases to provide any further data. — Pseudonym

No, this is not the case. The determinist is claiming, against Hume's analysis of necessity in time-sequenced causality, that the temporal sequence of my acts is necessary. I am pointing out that this claim is unjustified by experience, and so we have no reason to believe that my decision is necessitated.

This is neither a linguistic problem, nor one for which there is inadequate experiential data.

It 'feels like' we have choices, but that's as far as we can examine it by self-reflection. — Pseudonym

No, again. "Feels" do not enter into consideration. Experience tells me that it is in my power to go to the store and it is equally in my power to stay home. So, based on experience, two (actually many more) possibilities are equally in my power -- which is my claim.

Like any story, different people will pick out different aspects, and like any description it is contained entirely in language, and is entirely a social act to communicate to another. — Pseudonym

No, it is not like a story. Stories are fictions, which means that they are not tied to our actual experience as philosophical analysis is. Yes, people project different aspects of reality into their conceptual space, but those aspects cannot contradict each other 9they cannot tell us that one is more than one).

How we communicate is indeed a social act. What we communicate need not be culturally or socially determined. The problem of free will, like most philosophical problems, is not about how we communicate, but about the adequacy of the thoughts we communicate to our experience of reality.

The point in highlighting the circularity of definition was not to undermine the concept of defining a word at all, but to emphasise how blunt a tool it is — Pseudonym

Definition is only blunt if one is unwilling to look beyond the words to the reality they point to. If, instead of standing beside me, looking in the same direction as me, and trying to see what I see -- if, instead of that, one remains fixated on the words, seeing language not as a means of indicating intelligibility, but as a closed system, then yes, definitions are a very blunt tool indeed. When to stop is when the dialog partner is unwilling to try to see what one sees.

The slit experiment seems to be reviving idealism given that we supposedly change the universe by observing it. — Martin Krumins

Of course we change the universe by observing it. We are part of the universe and our observations change both us and the objects we observe.

The idea that we somehow stand apart, that what we do, including our observations, doesn't matter is, and always was, simply wrong. Our observations on the human scale may not change things much, and so we can often neglect the changes we make. But, on the quantum scale, the interactions necessary to make an observations cannot be neglected. So, there is no difference in principle between the observations we make in everyday life and those we make at the quantum level -- it is simply a matter of when it becomes impossible to ignore the disturbance our observations invariably make.

This does not mean that we must become idealists. We are observing physical reality, and its intelligible features inform us -- reducing what is logically possible to what is actually the case.

The problem is that before we observe reality is sensible, intelligible and perhaps measurable, but not sensed, known and a set of measure numbers. Thus, in physics, the actual measure number depends not only on what we are measuring, but also on the process we employ to measure it. None of this should be surprising, or make us reject realism.

To be a realist is to hold that what we observe informs us, but it informs us in a way that is limited by our perspective, senses and so on. It does not inform us exhaustively.

When Dfpolis says we don't need anything more than for an explanation, they are saying we need is experience of the right concept itself-- e.g. the crispness of the apple, the triangularity of various triangles, etc. There is no higher or more foundational order than these necessary concepts. The existence (or non-existence) of human reason/experience has no impact upon these. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Thank you.

I don't think I would say that concepts have an intrinsic necessity. They result from an subject-object interaction between say, a human and a tree. Since both are contingent beings, the concept resulting from their interaction must also be contingent.

Animals can learn, and even display problem-solving, along with empathy, aggression, compassion, and many other abilities. — Wayfarer

The brain processes most data without a hint of consciousness. Philosophers have long noted that even complex sensory processing can be automatic, absent awareness. Aquinas cites Ibn Sina's observation that citara players don't pause between chords since they're predetermined.  William James notes Rudolph Lotze pointing tof writing and piano playing as similar activities.  Roger Penrose remarks that people can carry on conversations without paying attention.  Reductionist J. J. C. Smart proffers bicycle riding as his example.  Psychologist Graham Reed studied time-gap experiences in which we become aware of the passage of time after being lost in thought. In my own case, I've found that I've been driving safely (on automatic pilot as it were) while thinking about some issue. By the time I realize this, I may have missed my exit. Thus, complex sensory processing and response need involve no awareness.

So, it's not merely the fact that a behaviorist model works for animals, but also that we ourselves experience complex sensory processing without subjective awareness.

That is a very basic form of generalisation, and 'crispness' hardly a stand-in for the scope of universal judgements generally. — Wayfarer

This is not a generalization on the Hume-Mill model of induction. I'm not starting with one or a few cases and then hypothesizing that all others are like those I've examined. Instead, it is an abstraction in which we see that the structure of a judgement is independent of what is being judged -- just as we come to arithmetic by seeing that the act of counting is independent of what is being counted.

The example is simple, but the model is quite general. How can the judgement <A is B> be true if the object(s) that evoke <A> are not Identically the object(s) that evoke <B>? Suppose I'm unaware that object(s) that evoke <A> also evoke <B>. How would my judgement be justified? Or, if I judge <A is not B>, isn't it because I'm aware that the object that evokes <A> doesn't evoke <B>? So, a judgement is simply my act of awareness of identity (or lack of identity, for negative judgements) of source for the subject and predicate concepts.

Maritain calls this "dividing to unite." We distinguish notes of intelligibility in abstraction and then reunite them in judgement.

For Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and other ancients and medievals, the main reason why the mind has to be immaterial concerns its affinity to its primary objects of knowledge, namely universals, which are themselves immaterial.

Am I saying that intelligibility, information is material? Not at all. It belongs to the logical order.

My rejecting Descartes's misguided notion that we're composed of two things or two kinds of "stuff," Isn't rejecting the difference between the physical and logical orders, or between materiality and intentionality. I see both material and immaterial aspects of reality.

How can we judge that a particular is a universal if particulars and universals are never found in the same theater of operation? — Dfpolis

I did address that - this is a question of the 'synthetic unity of consciousness' - 'synthetic' in the sense of there being a faculty which draws together (synthesises) the differing elements of sensation, perception and judgement into a united whole. — Wayfarer

This sounds like you are agreeing with me and rejecting Aquinas view that the intellect can't know particulars -- for that is what it means to say there is "a faculty which draws together (synthesises) the differing elements of sensation, perception and judgement into a united whole." This faculty has to be able to recognize particulars ("the differing elements of sensation") and universals ("the ... elements of ... judgement). So, it cannot be sense, nor can it be an intellect that can only deal with universals.

It is an experiential fact that we are aware of both particulars and universal concepts, so awareness meets all of your criteria for your synthetic faculty. It is also an experiential fact (noted by Ibn Sina, Aquinas, Lotze, James, Penrose, Smart and Reed among others) that we can sense, and respond to sense in complex ways, without a shred of subjective awareness. Thus, subjective awareness is not an aspect of our sensory faculties. It can only be what Aristotle called nous (noos = vision), i.e. intellect.

And actually the faculty is involved in doing that is still somewhat mysterious to neuro-science - that is an aspect of the 'neural binding' problem (as I think we discussed). — Wayfarer

Yes -- the question of how Aristotle's phantasm is formed. I have a hypothesis on that in my book.

That amounts to much more than simply a judgement about a quality. — Wayfarer

I am not restricting judgements to qualities.

“Abstraction, which is the proper task of active intellect, is essentially a liberating function in which the essence of the sensible object, potentially understandable as it lies beneath its accidents, is liberated from the elements that individualize it and is thus made actually understandable — Wayfarer

This is a rejection of Aquinas' explicit doctrine. He is clear that we have no direct knowledge of essences, but only glimpse them by reflecting on sensible accidents.

I do maintain that central to them is the acceptance of the 'reality of intelligible objects', which is that these forms and ideas are real in their own right i.e. their reality is not derived from their being in individual minds or brains. — Wayfarer

I accept the reality of intelligibility. Still, as an Aristotelian Thomist, I reject the notion that universals are actual outside of the minds thinking them. What exists in individuals is potential universals (aka notes of intelligibility) -- not actual universals.

Again, animals have awareness — Wayfarer

We know that animals have what we might call "medical consciousness," which can be defined in terms of physiological responsiveness. We do not know that animals are aware in the sense of being knowing (as opposed to sensing) subjects. On the principle of parsimony we have no reason to suppose that they do.

That ability is partially pre-conscious, i.e. it operates partially below the threshold of discursive consciousness — Wayfarer

All that we know animals to do can be explained without assuming that they are conscious of what they are doing. We can explain it at an entirely physical level. We cannot do that with human intentional operations such as knowing and willing.

Don’t you see a link between this faculty - intellect - and what enables humans to think, reason, calculate and speak? — Wayfarer

Of course I do. It is the same faculty.

So I don't find 'awareness' a sufficient explanatory principle. — Wayfarer

But it is. All we need to judge <This apple is crisp> is to be aware that the same object that evokes the concept <this apple> is the object that evokes <crisp>. What more do we need? You can easily extend this analysis to the syllogism in Barbara -- following the identity through the premises to the conclusion. So, awareness explains ideogenesis, judgement and deduction. We do not need more.

Hence in the Ockham essay I referred to above — Wayfarer

I'm reading it. I note that it misconstrues Aquinas by leaving out the role of intelligibility in the instances of a universal.

I think you've failed to answer my question: How can we judge that a particular is a universal if particulars and universals are never found in the same theater of operation?

Thank you.

I still do not see the connection between Wittgenstein and therapy.

For a while, I was involved in the philosophical counseling movement, and have an article published in a collection on the subject. I was able to help a few people with severe problems by directing their attention to things that gave them self worth. Without going into detail, the result was transformative. Clearly, this did not depend on my knowledge of Wittgenstein, which is minimal at best.

Thank you for your response.

Well, if you adopt a therapeutic stance towards speech and philosophical problems, then yes it is pertinent to the philosophy of language. — Posty McPostface

I did not mean to challenge your insight, I just do not appreciate the connection.

Surely, we use language to direct attention in ways that will result in desirable emotional states. But does one have to be steeped in the philosophy of language to do that?

Depression, anxiety, OCD, self-identity, death.

All of these influence what conclusions we arrive at. Reason itself is limited by what the emotive aspect of our beings tells us about a situation or issue. — Posty McPostface

While I agree that our emotional state can affect what we look at our admit is real, I don't see that this has much to do with the philosophy of language.

And yes -- self realization is hard.

Could you provide an example?

When I hear some of the interpretations of Wittgenstein, they seem to be of those who have only read some of Wittgenstein, but have not really studied Wittgenstein in depth. — Sam26

I am one of those who have read some Wittgenstein and was not unduly impressed. I take responsibility for that. As a student of Aristotle, who is also a genius and often difficult to grasp, I appreciate the need to study a philosopher in depth to fully appreciate his/her genius. So, as I see it, it is a matter of resource allocation. We have limited time, and so we have to judge, after minimal exposure, where to spend it.

One way to overcome this barrier is to have someone show you an instance of the philosopher's genius.

This sounds like universal as phenomenon rather than thing — tim wood

It it is neither a thing, nor a phenomenon (an experiential appearance). Universality is a attribute of a concept, and, by extension, of words expressing that concept.

By phenomenon I have in mind that my instantiated idea of a strong arm and yours, while both entirely different — tim wood

I would say, not entirely different (equivocal), but analogical.

may, by a third person both be adjudged to correspond in the sense of referring to strong arms. If that, then of what, exactly, is the universal comprised — tim wood

may, by a third person both be adjudged to correspond in the sense of referring to strong arms. If that, then of what, exactly, is the universal comprised — tim wood

Universality is not about communication. What a third person does or does not understand is irrelevant to the intrinsic nature of our concepts. All that is required is that multiple instances have the objective capacity to evoke my concept and (possibly other) multiple instances have the objective capacity to evoke your concept. Of course this can lead to difficulties in communication, because when I say "strong arms" the idea the words evoke in you may differ from the idea I have. Such is life. It is important, we can work out the differences and communicate more effectively.

In any culture, it is likely that our concepts will be very similar, having prety much the same set of instances. Differences will have to do with marginal cases.

I agree with much of what you're saying, but they're are many definitions (I would say uses) of the word time, that cause confusion. — Sam26

Yes, but is it really necessary to study Wittgenstein to spot an equivocal use of terms? Clearly not, for Aristotle discusses different types of equivocation (multiple uses = pollakhos legetai or dikhos legetai). (See, e.g. G. E. L. Owen, "Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology" in R. Bambrough, New Essays on Plato and Aristotle (London, 1965), pp. 69-95; Jaakko Hintikka, ""Aristotle and the Ambiguity of Ambiguity," Inquiry 2 (1959). pp 137-151 and "Different Kinds of Equivocation in Aristotle.," J. Hist. Phil. 9:3, (July 1971) pp. 368-372.)

Don't you think that depending on how you define the word creates many philosophical and maybe even scientific confusion? — Sam26

No. I think failing to adequately reflect on its meaning (the reality it indicates, which I take to be a measure of change), is the source of problems involving time. Once you have a clear meaning, applying it consistently resolves any confusion. Then all that is left is different beliefs about the facts.

You've just replaced 'decision' with 'commitment', how do the two terms differ in this context? — Pseudonym

The question, lest we lose track of it, is how linguistic analysis will resolve my difference with a determinist? It is not whether linguistic definitions are ultimately circular. I can easily prove that in any finite language, definitions must be ultimately circular. The point of definitions is not to provide replacement words, but to cause the reader to recreate in his or her own mind the concept the word expresses.

Where does one event end and the next one start. This is important because if you can define a single event then you can't say that existence is not one single event which undermines the argument against determinism somewhat. — Pseudonym

I don't agree. The fact that I can define a point without reference to a line does not mean that a line is not a continuous sequence of points. The concept of <continuity> changes the context both of points and events. So if I were to define an event in a way that made no reference to other events, that would not mean that actual events were not part of a continuous flow of events. Thinking otherwise would be an instance of Whitehead's fallacy of misplaced concreteness.

As I said, in any closed language, any series of definitions will ultimately close on itself. So, I make no apology for defining "possible" in terns of "necessary." In fact, it is precisely because language in isolation is closed that we must transcend language and turn our intellectual gaze to being. It is only in relation to being that language has any ultimate meaning.

You have yet to indicate how linguistic analysis will resolve the issue between me and a determinist. The determinist thinks there is one possibility. I think there is more than one. That is a difference as to the nature of reality, not a verbal misunderstanding.

Talking about that goes even further away from poor Sam26's thread topic — fdrake

I suppose it may.

All tending, once filtered, to the same idea and the same expression of that idea in language, "strong arms." This is how the world works. But is there any such thing as a strong arm? — tim wood

Note that I did not say we all have the same idea <strong arms>. What qualifies as strong for me may not qualify as strong for you. That is why I talk about the fact that different people have different conceptual spaces. So, the universality is in the relation of one person's concept to its instances, not in the equivalence of concepts among different people. Of course some concepts, say <triangle>, are simple and well-defined enough to fairly universal in the population, but that is not a requirement for any one person to have a universal concept. It may be his or hers alone.

Aristotle was quite aware of people reifying concepts (he had Plato as a teacher). That's why he discusses the difference between things (ousia = substance) and features or accidents.

Philosophy is the study of how stuff hangs together. — fdrake

Well, that is close to what I said about building a consistent framework for understanding our experience of reality -- however, I see "our experience of reality" as an essential note.

If you could provide an example of some philosophical terms whose meaning you think is widely agreed on (with a rough idea of what that agreed meaning is), that might help. — Pseudonym

This is not a central issue. Of course, equivocation has been a recognized problem since the ancient Greeks. However, most open minded people are not wed to specific definitions and are willing to use those of a dialog partner to facilitate communication. The real problem is that even when we agree to use terms in the same way, we may still have very different visions of the nature of reality. Thus, linguistic differences are a side issue, like clearing weeds before starting a building project.

It seems to me that the analysis of most problems don't turn on the analysis of language. — fdrake

Agreed.