When you ask me to tell the truth, you are asking me to be honest, to tell you what I truly believe, and not be deceptive. You are not asking me for an account relative to your concern, it is strictly my concern which you are asking for, what I believe. — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually I'm interested in reality. I want to know where my keys really are. So, I'm not at all interested in your beliefs as beliefs However, being charitable, I accept that your knowledge may be limited and will not press you beyond your abilities.

This is being honest with oneself. — Metaphysician Undercover

That doesn't mean we can't truly know what we experienced.

But now you're using "truth in a completely different way, to refer to a relationship between our knowledge and reality. Above, truth is to honestly represent one's own experience — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I started with "truth is the adequacy of what is in the mind to reality" -- as a relation between our representations (primarily knowledge) and reality. You're the one that side-tracked into honesty.

In relation to honesty, I said that an honest statement is one that reflects the reality of what is in our mind -- again a relation between reality and representation.

then reality must be experience — Metaphysician Undercover

You are confused. Experiences are real. That does not mean reality is experience.

This is getting tedious, and we are making no progress. So I am not spending any more time on discussing truth with you.

For the FTA to have any utility, it needs to have some persuasive power. — Relativist

Clearly, it does. To quote mathematician and astronomer Bernard Carr, "If you don't want God, you better have a multiverse!" This shows both the persuasive power of the FTA and the shabby motivation for positing a multiverse.

The fact that you bring up intentionality demonstrates that you aren't judging the FTA apart from your related beliefs. — Relativist

Of course I hold related positions. However, I'm not relying on the fact that i can prove the existence of God in a number of sound ways to judge the FTA. Examine the arguments I gave, and you will find no such dependence. Further, I reject a number of arguments for the existence of God as both unsound and as making bad cases, e.g. the Kalam cosmological argument and Anselm's ontological argument. So, please avoid red herrings and stick to my actual reasoning.

it is also possible that the world is simple a brute fact — Relativist

Only if you reject the fundamental principle of science, viz. that every phenomenon has an adequate, dynamical explanation. If you start allowing exceptions to this principle, science becomes impossible. Imagine Antoine Henri Becquerel presenting his discovery of radiation at a scientific conference. He says that the image of a key appeared on a photographic plate kept in his drawer with a sample of pitchblende, and concludes that it is caused by a new aspect of reality, which he is calling "radiation." Someone in the back of the hall stands up and says, "But, my dear Professor, this may be one of those phenomena that has no explanation -- a brute fact." What is Becquerel to say but, "All phenomena have an adequate cause. The idea of brute facts est tout simplement fou!"

1) How is it not arbitrary to label any state as a "definite end" or "final state", if every state will evolve to another through a potentially infinite future? — Relativist

As I tried to indicate in my original statement, "final state" is a term of art in physics. It need not, and generally does not, name what happens at the "end of time" or infinitely far in the future, but only the state at the end of the process we're considering. In the same way, my arrival at the store is not the end of intentional guidance in my life, but only the end of the segment we're considering.

2) How would one distinguish a non-intentional state from an intentional one? I ask because your claims seem based on the assumption of intentionality ("knowing" that God did it) rather than demonstrating it. — Relativist

I did not use the existence of God as a premise in arguing that the laws of nature exhibit intentionality. If you read what I wrote, I started with Brentano's analysis of intentionality in Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. showing that it is characterized by "aboutness" and then showed that the laws of nature have the same kind of aboutness.

So, we distinguish aspects of reality into those possessing "aboutness" and those not possessing "aboutness." A stone is not about anything. It doesn't "point" to anything beyond itself -- it's just a stone. An idea is about its real and potential instances. A commitment is about what we commit to.

There's also no scientific support for intentionality or God. — Relativist

Right -- if by "scientific" you mean "in the purview natural science." As I said in another post, (1) the fundamental abstraction of natural science leaves it bereft of data on intentionality, and (2) no science proves its own premises. Examining the foundations of physics belongs to metaphysics, just as examining the foundations of arithmetic belongs to metamathematics. It is metaphysics, in examining the foundations of physics, that deduces the existence of God.

You seem to be doing exactly what I anticipated: only considering metaphysical possibility to admit God into consideration, and refusing to admit it for anything else. — Relativist

1. I do not use metaphysical possibility to argue the existence of God. I only use actual being.

2. I do use the logical possibility of a multiverse as one reason to say that the FTA is not a sound proof, only a persuasive case.

3. As I have pointed out a couple of times recently, possibility is not information. Information is the reduction of possibility.

We only have to consider actual evidence

Then this removes God from consideration. — Relativist

No, it does not. The point of discussing the FTA is to consider whether it points to evidence for the existence of God, and if so, how strong that evidence is. To say flatly that there is no evidence is to beg the question under consideration.

More broadly, there are sound, evidence-based deductive arguments for the existence of God. I give one in my video: #15 God & Scientific Explanation - Existence Proof (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XJUIxaSDfU0). I provide a more formal proof in the appendix of my book, God, Science and Mind: The Irrationality of Naturalism.

Possible worlds is just a semantics for discussing modal claims. — Relativist

Yes, it is. Nonetheless, it's ill-defined and lacks an adequate epistemic foundation.

ou are inconsistent in your use of modality. What exactly is the modality you propose to use to "baselessly" (without evidence) propose God as the solution? — Relativist

I can't make sense of this. You don't give any example of my modal errors. You assume that my discussion of God is "baseless." Finally, you speak of a solution without specifying the problem.

For God to be the answer, God must be "possible" and possibility entails a modality. — Relativist

Yes, but since we can show that God existsl, we know that the existence of God must be possible, as nothing impossible can be actual. My philosophical claims about God are categorical, not conditional.

But whatever modality you use, consistency demands using the same modality to consider multiverse. — Relativist

I do. I demand evidence of actual existence to credit a multiverse, just as I do for the existence of God.

Snowflakes depends on a variety of elements — Relativist

The last time I looked, snow is a form of H2O and sand is mostly SiO2. There is nothing about a planet that requires heavier elements for its formation.

it is epistemically possible that a metaphysically necessary God exists. — Relativist

For some people; nonetheless, it is metaphysically certain that God exists and is metaphysically necessary.

The issue is that "essence" is a concept based on a primitive analysis of human-ness and dog-ness (etc). — Relativist

"Primitive" is not an objection, but a term of irrational derision. The relevant question is, is there an objective basis for the fact that you evoke my concept <human>, and Fido evokes my concept <dog>? If there is, then by Aristotle's definition, you have an "essence,"i.e. a foundation in reality for the species concept you evoke. The fact that you also have DNA, a blood type, neural activity, an evolutionary history, etc. does not change the fact that when I see you, I think <human>.

If everything that makes us human or dog is an accident (as genetics and evolution suggest) then there is no reason to think there IS such a thing. — Relativist

Our nature is not "an accident" in the sense of being random. Physics sees all unobserved processes (including the evolution of species) as fully deterministic -- not random.

On the other hand, if you're opposing "accident" to "substance," these are not opposing concepts. Aristotle defines a substance (ousia) as an ostensible unity -- a whole we can point out. Your whole being includes all of your "accidents" -- all of the things that can be said of you -- your height weight, hair color, genetic code, etc., etc.

Finally, whatever our genesis or mode of analysis, it is an experiential fact that billions of individuals have the objective capacity to evoke the concept <human> -- while trillions more do not.

my original issue is that the existence of "essence" is an assumption. — Relativist

It's "an assumption" that the billions of people on earth have the objective capacity to evoke the concept <human>? I can't agree. For me, it is an experiential fact.

Again: every metaphysical theory depends on assumptions. — Relativist

Thank you for sharing your faith.

You denied the concept is related to DNA — Relativist

You seem confused. DNA encodes out physical structure, and that structure goes into evoking the concept <human>. Still, to know that you're human, I don't need to know about your DNA. So, while DNA is a cause of what you are, it's not part of most people's concept <human>.

As I have also said, there is nothing predetermined about our concepts. They arise from our individual and cultural experience. So, it might well be that some people's concept <human> includes having the right DNA. Still, I doubt that anyone would reserve judgement on your humanity until they got your lab results.

Seriously, do you not understand that this is a postulated pardigm? — Relativist

It depends what you mean by "postulated." If you mean fundamental concepts abstracted from reality, I agree that essence and existence, potency and act, substance and accident, etc are such concepts. If you mean put forward as unjustified speculative starting points, then that is far from the case.

Earlier I referenced Armstrong's ontology. He accounts for existents differently, and it's every bit as complete and coherent. — Relativist

I have already agreed that we may project the same reality into different conceptual spaces. So if you want to project reality into the conceptual space of physics, interpersonal dynamics, networks of events, sequences of states of affairs, etc., etc, I say go for it. I don't see that any conceptual space, including those of Aristotle or Aquinas is "complete," i.e. capable of exhaustively spanning human experience.

I do demand, however, that whatever conceptual space we use, it has a foundation in reality. That it's not the result of speculative postulation a la Kant's transcendental idealism.

one can't "prove" any particular "conceptual space" is true. — Relativist

Conceptual spaces are like vocabularies. Vocabularies are not true or false, though they may be more or less adequate to expressing what we know is true or false.

What is properly true or false is judgements we make about reality, and the propositions that express those judgements. Whenever we prove anything, we need unproven premises as starting points. Still, "unproven" need not mean "unknown." We can know some truths directly, by reflecting on experience. And we can show other people their truth by leading them to look at their corresponding experiences in a similar way.

So, we can have a structured knowledge that is not merely possible, but known to be true -- but only if we are open to reality.

When you ask me to tell the truth, you are asking me to be honest, to tell you what I truly believe, and not be deceptive. You are not asking me for an account relative to your concern, it is strictly my concern which you are asking for, what I believe. — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually I'm interested in reality. I want to know where my keys really are. So, I'm not at all interested in your beliefs as beliefs However, being charitable, I accept that your knowledge may be limited and will not press you beyond your abilities.

This is being honest with oneself. — Metaphysician Undercover

That doesn't mean we can't truly know what we experienced.

But now you're using "truth in a completely different way, to refer to a relationship between our knowledge and reality. Above, truth is to honestly represent one's own experience — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I started with "truth is the adequacy of what is in the mind to reality" -- as a relation between our representations (primarily knowledge) and reality. You're the one that side-tracked into honesty.

In relation to honesty, I said that an honest statement is one that reflects the reality of what is in our mind -- again a relation between reality and representation.

then reality must be experience — Metaphysician Undercover

You are confused. Experiences are real. That does not mean reality is experience.

This is getting tedious, and we are making no progress. So I am not wasting any more time on discussing truth with you.

I can't speak for others, but as I understand physicalism, it is the view that all of our experience of reality can ultimately be explained by physics. — Dfpolis


Isn't this more universal mechanism/ reductive materialism/ atomism than physicalism. — JupiterJess

These terms seem not to have universally accepted definitions. I'm giving my use of the term "physicalism" as opposed to "materialism" and "naturalism."

"For example, most people attribute the breaking of the window to a ball striking it. Though taking modern physics as having all the ontological facts would strip the ball of this causal power."

I don't think that is how physics would treat this. It would see that the ball is composed of various constituents bound together, and in virtue of being so bound, able to act as a unit.

a) common sense- if we accept a ball breaking a pane of glass is an illusion. — JupiterJess

As I indicated, I don't think physics would say the ball breaking the window is an illusion. Despite what logical atomists would have you think, physics considers binding to be very real. Describing atomic constituents is not all that physics is about.

b) spooky action at a distance (QM) - this is covered in this thread by Apo and others who say holism is necessary to resolve it. — JupiterJess

There is no spooky action at a distance. The EPRB experiment, conceived by Bohm and discussed by Bell in his famous paper, involves no action at a distance, spooky or otherwise. This can be shown by considering various frames of reference using Special Relativity. An observation is first (and so supposedly causal) in one frame of reference will be second (and supposedly an effect) in another frame. So, neither observation can cause the other. The actual explanation is rotational symmetry, which, according to Noether's theorem, guaranties conservation of angular momentum that is used to make the prediction. It precludes the emergenge of symmetry-violating states of affairs -- guaranteeing the observed result.

the binding problem, consciousness - how things appear together as a connected reality is obviously not reconcilable with reductionism which identifies everything in atomist interactional terms — JupiterJess

I discuss the neural binding problem in my book. It can be resolved by hypothesizing neural indexing mechanisms in the brain. Such indexing alleviates the need to bring all of the encoded information together in a single location in the brain.

Despite these counter arguments, physicalism fails because of the fundamental abstraction of natural science. While all knowing involves a known object and a knowing subject, at the beginning of natural science we choose to focus on the known object to the exclusion of the knowing subject, For example, we are concerned with what Ptolemy, Galileo, Newton and Hubble saw, not with their personal experience in seeing it. As a result, natural science begins by leaving data on the table -- unexamined. Since it has no data on the knowing subject as such, it cannot draw data-based conclusions about the subjective aspects of reality, e.g. consciousness. Because physics is missing data on subjectivity, it cannot model the intentional aspects of the human mind.

Another limit to physics comes from Aristotle's observation that no science can prove its own premises. Ever since Newton, physics has assumed the existence of universal laws of nature, which it seeks to describe with ever increasing accuracy. Yet, it is outside of the purview of physics to explain the essential nature of these laws, why they they exist and why they continue in operation. Reflecting on the foundations of physics is the province of metaphysics.

Despite the claims of reductionists, physics does not even have the capacity to construct higher level sciences such as biology. In considering electrons, for example, physicists abstract away the context in which the electron is found. We do not care if it is in space, in inanimate matter, or in a living organism. Thus we abstract away the very data that forms the heart of biological science.

Physics may allow organisms as possibilities, but as Claude Shannon pointed out, information is the reduction of possibility. Only biological studies, using biological methods, will inform us as to the actual organisms in nature and their ecological roles.

First, thank you for the kind words.

Platonism in mathematics is the view that abstract objects such as numbers are real independently of any act of thought on our part, but can only be grasped by the mind; ergo, real but immaterial (which is why Platonism poses a conceptual challenge to materialism). — Wayfarer

Yes. This is the view that Aristotle shows to be due to confusion in his definition of "quantity" in Metaphysics Delta. There he notes that there are no numbers in the physical world, only discrete realities, which are countable, and extended realities, which are measurable. So, numbers arise as a result of counting and measuring operations.

We teach children numbers by counting various kinds of things. When they realize that counting does not depend on what is being counted, they have abstracted the concept <number>. This seems very simple, and does not require us to posit unobservable, Platonic numbers with an ill-defined relation to enumerated objects. (Note that which object is #2 depends on the order in which we count the objects.)

This does not make the concept of number material, as the concept is result of a mental act (being aware of counting), and not merely a physical operation.

what Kant called the synthetic a priori - 'a proposition the predicate of which is not logically or analytically contained in the subject—i.e., synthetic—and the truth of which is verifiable independently of experience—i.e., a priori'. — Wayfarer

Kant was trying to avoid Hume's sound analysis of time-ordered causality as having no intrinsic necessity. Hume's conclusion was well-known to Aristotle. to Avicenna (Ibn Sina), and to Scholastic philosophers who called this kind of causality "accidental." Kant appears to have been ignorant of this tradition and thought that the idea that earlier states necessitate later states was universally accepted and so a synthetic a priori. As far as I can tell, everything we know is a posteriori wrt to the experiences underwriting it, even though if it is applied a priori thereafter.

Of course, there is a truly necessary kind of causality, called "essential causality" by the Scholastics. Aristotle's paradigm case of essential causality is: The builder building the house, which is identical with the house being built by the builder. In time-ordered or accidental causality we are dealing with two separate events, which, being separate, can have no necessary connection. in concurrent or essential causality we have a single event (the builder building the house) which can be distinguished into a cause (the builder building) and an effect (the house being built), which are are necessarily linked by identity.

The failure to grasp this led Kant to postulate a speculative structure that continues to distort philosophy. As accidental causality has no necessity, there is no sound argument for determinism in human choice. As essential causality is intrinsically necessity, Kant's critique of the cosmological argument fails when applied to the forms employed by Aristotle and Aquinas.

excellent mathematicians are able to see things that I simply cannot; and I don't think this is a matter of experience but of innate intellectual ability. — Wayfarer

I agree that we have diverse talents, but talents are not innate knowledge -- only an ability to deal with knowledge.

Eliminative materialism, a la Ryle and Dennett, seeks to show that there is no distinct reality corresponding to mental concepts such as <consciousness>. Ryle seeks to do this in his The Concept of Mind by showing that the concept of introspection is incoherent, but fails miserably. In Consciousness Explained, Dennett shows that our experience of awareness cannot be explained on the hypothesis of naturalism, but departs from the scientific method by rejecting the data of consciousness in favor of the theory he has just falsified.

Since eliminativists do not believe in the reality of consciousness, they see no need to show how it could have evolved.

I think it depends on whether your understanding of the physical is mechanistic or organistic. You seem to be thinking exclusively in terms of efficient or mechanical causation. If the experiences of organisms can modify DNA, and the effect of DNA itself is 'contextual', more of a "final" or "formal" kind of causation, than an "efficient" or "material" kind of causation, then consciousness could be "selected for" in a way which is not merely "efficient" and "material", without necessitating anything absolutely beyond the physical. This would be the biosemiotic argument that the physical is not 'brute' but always already informed by a semantic dimension. — Janus

I am considering only mechanical causation because we are talking about the "evolution" of consciousness, and evolution is a well-defined theory, based on three principles: (1) Random variation, (2) selection of variants leading to increased reproductive success, and (3) the inheritance of selected traits.

You are free to advance principles or hypotheses in addition to standard evolutionary mechanisms, but you need to say what they are. If you would like me to agree with them they need evidentiary support. If they are to be classed as scientific, they need to be falsifiable.

You seem to be defining terms in a unique way. I understand "physical" to name the aspect of reality studied in physics, chemistry and ordinary biology (inter alia) -- in which things are seen as developing and interacting mechanically. It is a understanding in which observable states are seen as transforming into later observable states according to fixed, universal laws of nature. i think this is a useful projection of reality, but not exhaustive of what we know from experience.

So, in my view <physical> is an abstract concept, in the formation of which many notes of comprehension are left on the table. It is not synonymous with "being" or "reality," and it does not span any semantic aspects of reality.

I have well-developed views on semiotics and see it as intrinsically intentional/mental.

I do agree that their are intentional aspects of nature -- the laws of nature and human intentionality being prime examples.

So, having sketched my position, I'd like to know first, what you see as the "semantic dimension" of the "physical," and second, what your "biosemiotic argument," for the "evolution" of awareness is. It may well be that we are projecting the same reality into different conceptual spaces.

This would be something like what you have described as Aristotle's view of hyle "desiring" morphe, and would be properly understood as an entirely immanent reality, with no absolutely transcendent being required. This is why I am puzzled by your rejection of naturalism, since, as I see it, naturalism is precisely, in its broadest definition, the rejection of anything supernatural. The idea of the natural is the idea of that which is completely immanent within physical reality — Janus

First, I see "supernatural" in these contexts as an ill-defined term of opprobrium. So, I neither accept nor reject any position because it involves the "supernatural."

Second, as I point out at the beginning of my book, "naturalism" is a vaguely defined term, having different meanings to different proponents -- rather like a group of people who have not quite "got their story straight." The range of positions I find irrational includes thinking that reality is wholly
"material," that physics is adequate to the whole of reality, that philosophical analysis can either eliminate or reduce intentional concepts to physical concepts, that "idea" and "brain state" are convertible terms, that ontological randomness can give rise to order, etc, etc.

Third, for reasons first pointed out by Aristotle, changeable reality (nature) cannot be self-explaining.

the idea of the supernatural is the idea of that which is radically other to physical reality. The problem with the idea of the radically other is the problem of dualism; how would such a purportedly absolutely transcendent being interact with physical nature? — Janus

Being "radically other" does not entail dynamical separation -- only having non-overlapping definitions. So, it is quite possible to be "radically other" and still have a dynamic connection.

I don't think Aristotle ever described matter as having intentionality. — Metaphysician Undercover

He said hyle "desires" form. I quoted the text from Physics i, 9. Desire is certainly intentional.

.... The new form in a substantial change is "in" hyle in a potential or intentional way -- as the "desired" outcome of its striving. Hyle is "such as of its own nature to desire and yearn for [the new form]." — — Metaphysician Undercover

Since all causation is physical... — Dfpolis


But not all causation is physical, that's the point with free will, intention, it's non-physical causation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Dfpolis

You're just making this up, it's not Aristotelian at all, it's fiction.

I'm quoting Aristotle's Physics i, 9 here.

As indefinite is how Aristotle actually describes matter, as potential, what may or may not be — Metaphysician Undercover

You will need to give me a text. Often he is describing the views of others.

"Potential" (dynamis) need not mean "what may or may not be." As I discuss in my paper, "dynamis" had a history of medical usage, referring to the hidden, but determinate, curative power in plants, for example. Even a fully determinate outcome is potential before it happens. So, it is an open question as to whether any particular potential needs further specification.

And intentionality is commonly associated with freewill. — Metaphysician Undercover

Association is not a logical connection. All acts of will are intentional, but not all intentional realities are acts of will.

Fully determinate systems can exhibit intentionality -- clocks, for example -- but they exhibit no intrinsic free will. Their intentionality has an extrinsic source, as noted by Jeremiah.

Since all causation is physical... — Dfpolis

But not all causation is physical, that's the point with free will, intention, it's non-physical causation. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're arguing against a position that is not mine. I do not think all causes are physical. I'm saying that if you are a physicalist, you think all causes are physical.

We have a model of the world in which 'the subjective' is derivative or secondary or the merely personal - we feel as though it is easily explained by evolutionary science. — Wayfarer

Yes, there is a lot of "feeling" in contemporary philosophy -- positions that are "felt" to be true, but not rigorously examined.

When I say "subjective" in philosophical contexts, I most often mean "related to the knowing subject" in a subject-object relationship -- and not something lacking ontological status. It is little reflected upon that all knowing is both objective and subjective. There is invariably a knowing subject and a known object.

I'm still investigating the subject, and am not entirely convinced by Aristotle's arguments contra Platonic realism. — Wayfarer

Fair enough.

This would only hold true on an arguably superseded account of biological evolution that does not allow for any influence from the environmental to the genetic during the life of organisms. — Janus

I am not sure how you see this as rebutting my point. Whether or not environmental factors modify genetic factors, (and I think they do), it is still impossible to physically select a trait that has no physical effects.

I can't speak for others, but as I understand physicalism, it is the view that all of our experience of reality can ultimately be explained by physics.

TOE — Janus

Thanks for the kind word and the references.
— apokrisis

The historical reality looks more like that they both got the essential duality of a formal principle and a material principle as the causal arche. — apokrisis

Yes, they both concentrate on two principles, but Aristotle says he and his opponents have contrasting triads: "For admitting with them that there is something divine, good, and desirable, we hold that there are two other principles, the one contrary to it, the other such as of its own nature to desire and yearn for it." Physics, i, 9.

Form is the "divine, good, and desirable" principle. The contrary principle is the privation of the new form, while the one actively desiring and yearning for it is hyle. ("The truth is that what desires the form is matter.") So, hyle has a determinate intentionality.

ontological atomism — apokrisis

Yes, Russell's views in “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,” seem not to be reflections on our experience of being, but to originate in a desire to avoid the complexities such reflections reveal.

The material principle is that of an Apeiron or the Indefinite - chaotic action. — apokrisis

It is for Plato, but not for Aristotle. Aristotle's hyle is not unintelligible as is Plato's chora. It has a "desire" or intentional relation to a determinate form which can be known by analogy with similar cases. This intentionality makes change orderly and intelligible, echoing Jeremiah's "ordinances of heaven and earth" (33:25) and Thales' reliance on astronomical regularity, and foreshadowing Newton's universal laws of nature.

The formal principle is then the order that regulates this chaos of fluctuation. Tames it, channels it, gives it structure and intent — apokrisis

Again, in Plato.

form is a developmental outcome - the imposition of habits of regularity on a chaos of possibility, which thus always emerges as substantial actuality that is a blend of the necessary and the accidental. — apokrisis

That is the point of Physics i, 9.

I would say that you have a problem in that your reading of hyle leads you to suggest it contains form within it in some sense. — apokrisis

Yes, but that's not a problem. It's the solution of a problem. The new form in a substantial change is "in" hyle in a potential or intentional way -- as the "desired" outcome of its striving. Hyle is "such as of its own nature to desire and yearn for [the new form]."

With regard to vitalism, "life force" was me waxing poetic -- trying to emphasize the active nature of hyle vs. the pure passivity of prima materia. I did not mean to suggest, and do not think, that life is due to a unique vital principle.

On the other hand, I see physics as completely deterministic in its realm of application -- so that biogenesis and the evolution of species are both fully entailed by the laws of nature and the initial conditions of the universe. The only randomness in evolution is due to human ignorance.

So, I see no ontological role for a principle of "indefiniteness" (an Apeiron), with the possible exception of free will. But, even in free will, I see choices as sufficiently caused -- just not predetermined.

it is so hard to leave behind some notion of the material principle as already some kind of definite stuff - like a space-filling, but formless and passive, chora. — apokrisis

Indeed it is. As a physicist, l'm drawn to this idea. General relativity sees space as having observable properties (the metric tensor.) Quantum theory leads us to conclude that matter has a wave nature, leading to the supposition that waves must be cyclical modifications of some ether or chora. Still if the ether or chora is to be modified, it cannot be completely indeterminate. It must respond in a determinate way, with well-defined properties, or all would be chaos.

Thank you for an interesting discussion.

my position is that the alleged persuasive power is a consequence of people failing to see the inherent problems that I've brought up. — Relativist

Then you can only hope that people will listen. You have not convinced me of the cogency of your objections.

I agree with the approach, but disagree with your claim that there is intelligent direction "to that end." This characterization continues the same flawed reasoning by implicitly assuming there is an end (or goal or objective). — Relativist

As I said, I am a determinist in physics. So, there are definite ends (aka "final states" -- which need not be "final") to which physical processes tend. The question is, is the existence of a determinate end evidence of intentionality? If we accept Brentano's analysis of intentionality, it is. The essential characteristic of intentionality is "aboutness." Just as my intention to go to the store is about achieving a state in which I am at the store, so the laws of nature are about the determinate states they give rise to. That means that the laws of nature are "intentional" by Brentano's definition.

If we then say that any source of intentionality is, by definition, a mind, then a mind is responsible for the laws of nature. That does not mean that it's a mind just like ours. Clearly, it is not. Still, it is rationally classed as a mind.

The "realm of application" is the universe after Planck time. That's problematic for drawing conclusions about a broader scope - and a multiverse, and the possibility of differing "constants" is a broader scope. — Relativist

I agree, that is why there is no scientific support for a multiverse. On the other hand, the verified realm of application does include the calculations showing that small variations in the physical constants would preclude life.

Sandstone and snowflakes, to name two. — Relativist

Really? I think this requires a bit more argument. The existence of the required elements (H, O, Si) does not require nuclear fusion in stars and so is far less constrained than the existence of life.

if we're including God among the possibilities to consider, we have to consider all metaphysically possible worlds — Relativist

No, we don't. We only have to consider actual evidence. No consideration of "possible worlds" can add anything to what we actually know. Possible worlds talk is just a way of injecting baseless speculation into philosophical discourse.
1. As Claude Shannon pointed out, information is not possibility, but the reduction of possibility.
2. We have know way of knowing if any world is metaphysically possible other than the one world we know to be actual -- for nothing impossible can be actual.
3. Imagining that a "world" is possible is not adequate grounds for concluding that it is possible. Russel and Whitehead imagined that the self-consistency of arithmetic was provable. Goedel showed it was not.
4. Possible worlds don't provide a rational basis for representing propositional probabilities because the density of possible states cannot be objectively defined.

a multiverse with differing constants is every bit as metaphysically possible as is a God. — Relativist

No, again. God is a metaphysical necessity. The only possibility that can be attributed to God is epistemological -- due to ignorance. The evidence for God's existence is all being. If anything is, we can conclude, with metaphysical certainty, that God is.

Aquinas distinguishes between essence (necessary and sufficient properties) and accidents (contingent properties). — Relativist

Yes, he is seconding Aristotle on that. Some properties that humans have make no difference in there classification as human. You can be tall or short, fair or dark, have red hair or be bald, and still be human. If you agree with this, then you agree that some properties are "accidental" wrt being human.

Consider humans: there are no necessary and sufficient properties for being human - every portion of human DNA is accident. — Relativist

While I don't deny the biological importance of DNA, your genetic coding doesn't enter into my judgement that you're human and Fido is a dog. All that's necessary is that, as a result of my experiencing you, the concept <human> is properly evoked in me. That happens every day with people who have no real understanding of DNA.

However, try to divide up all living things that have ever lived on earth into human and non-human, and you will unavoidably have to draw an arbitrary boundary. — Relativist

No doubt. What does that have to do with anything? I am not saying that our conceptual spaces are predetermined. I am not a Platonist or a Neoplatonist. I don't think you are a person because you participate in an Ideal or because you reflect an exemplar idea in the mind of God. I'm saying that, as a result of experiencing the world around us, we abstract concepts that allow us to make rational judgements. As abstractions, these concepts leave out many notes of intelligibility (lots of data).

Why do we use abstractions? Because our brains can only represent 5-9 "chunks" of information at a time. So, we can't deal with reality in all its complexity. Thus, abstractions (universal ideas) are a "stupid human" trick for reducing the complexity of reality to our limited representations capacity.

God knows all reality exhaustively, so He has no need of the stupid human trick of abstraction, of universal or exemplar ideas. We humans on the other hand, can have different conceptual spaces. For example, Metaphysician Undercover and I have different, but related, concepts we call "truth." 19th century slave owners typically had a concept they called "human" that did not include blacks, while mine does -- and we all know how Nazis thought and think.

If you treat essence as nothing but a sortal of accidental properties — Relativist

Of course, I don't. I sort by what is essential to my concept of humans -- a concept that is largely transcultural.

... then Aquinas definition of God goes awry (according to Aquinas, God is a being in whom essence and existence are identical). — Relativist

I don't see that you've shown that there is no basis in reality for saying that a thing is (existence) or what it is (essence). So, I can't follow your thinking.

Also, while Aquinas does show that essence and existence are identical in God, I don't recall him using this as a definition.

I brought up essence just as an example of a metaphysical postulate. — Relativist

And I showed that it is not a postulate, but names something found in reality -- i.e., the objective basis of essential definitions -- what it is about concrete individuals that allows us to apply our species concepts to them.

Aquinas paradigm also postulates: act, potency, form, substance, and accident. — Relativist

All of which we find in our experience of reality and its conceptualization.

It's coherent, but it is not the only coherent metaphysical paradigm, so one can't claim to have an objective case for something that is based on any particular metaphysical paradigm. — Relativist

I'm sorry. First, It is more than "coherent" or self-consistent. It is based on reality, so it can be used to analyze reality.

Second, the fact that we have one reality based conceptual space that can be used to analyze reality does not, by any means preclude the possibility of other, equally reality-based, conceptual spaces that can be used to analyze reality. Given that reality is far too complex to be exhausted by the stupid human trick of abstraction, the more ways we think of reality, the more projections we use, the better.

If we have many diverse projections of the same reality, we can recover some of the dimensionality lost in each. Combining them gives us a more complete model than any one alone can give.

The nature of the things that exist (such as whether they consist of form and substance, or whether they are states of affairs) is not a "fundamental fact" that comes from experience - rather, it is a postulated paradigm - an assumption. — Relativist

This is a false dichotomy. We can take the same experience of reality and project it into an Aristotelian conceptual space or one preferred by analytic philosophers. There is nothing about thinking of objects in terms of matter and form, substance and accidents that precludes us thinking of the same experience in terms of sequences of events or states of affairs. This kind of territorial exclusivity is totally irrational -- but typical of modern philosophy.

What is fundamental is our experience of reality in all of its complexity. How we choose to think of it is in no way fundamental. Thinking of it in one way or another makes philosopical problem solving easier or harder in the same way that the choice of coordinate systems makes the mathematics of a physics problem easier or harder.

I asked if you believe the laws of nature EXIST (not operate) independently of the entities that exhibit them. — Relativist

The laws of nature only exist insofar as they operate to produce order in nature -- as producing order is their essence. So, they are physically inseparable from the matter and fields on which they act. They are, however, logically distinct, and so mentally separable.

What "adaequatio" would refer to is an activity, a process, a movement toward equation or equality. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Adaequatio" is not a verb. It names stable a relational state between what is in our mind and reality.

I think the most common use of "truth" is in philosophy, — Metaphysician Undercover

I recall my mother, teachers and others urging me to tell the truth. Not a day goes by without a discussion of Trump and his representatives failing to tell the truth. The news reports that many deny the truth of climate change, others the truth of the holocaust. So, "truth" is very current outside of the narrow confines of philosophy and law.

I do not believe it's used to name something we have experienced in our own thought and language, it is used to make a statement about our own thought and language, or a request toward others' thought and language; statements like "I am telling the truth", "Please tell the truth" — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure what substantive difference there is between me saying "truth" names "something we have experienced in our own thought and language" -- meaning that we have experienced thinking true thoughts and speaking true sentences -- and you saying "it is used to make a statement about our own thought and language." Surely statements we make about about our own thought and language arise out of our experience of our own thought and language.

Suppose I say, "Please tell the truth." Do you think I'm asking you to tell me the state of the world with the detail and accuracy known only to God? I surely do not. I expect you to give me an account adequate to my area of concern -- e.g., to tell me if you took my keys -- without describing the exact shape and alloy of each key, its precise position and orientation, etc, etc.

We can't really say that we experience ourselves to have true beliefs, because we simply believe, and to believe that a belief is true would be redundant. — Metaphysician Undercover

We experience, introspectively, that our experience is reflected in our representation of that experience. In other words, that we have a true representation of our experience.

Beliefs are only true per accidens. So, they are only peripherally relevant here. Truth is primarily a relation between our knowledge and reality. Beliefs are not acts if intellect, but of will -- they are commitments to truth of various propositions.

Knowledge, on the other hand, is awareness of present intelligibility. Intelligible objects make themselves dynamically present by acting, directly or indirectly, on us. Since me knowing the object is (identically) the object being known by me, knowledge is based on an partial identity of knower and known. For example, an apple's action on my neural system is, identically, my neural representation of the apple. If it we not, I would not be seeing the apple.

This is a point which Aquinas makes as well, truth is a judgement which is separate from the thought — Metaphysician Undercover

This is confused. Aquinas position is that truth and falsity pertain to judgements, not concepts. He does not say that there is no truth until we judge that there is truth. And, he surely does not say that judgements are separate from thoughts, for judgements are thoughts that we can express in propositions.

[Aquinas] compares "the truth" to "the good", the good being the object of the appetite and the truth being the object of the intellect. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, he does. It would be absurd, then, if humans had a natural appetite (for truth) that could never be satisfied. No appetite exists merely to be frustrated.

I truly believe that non-philosophical use of "truth" mostly refers to honesty — Metaphysician Undercover

Isn't this circular? How would you define "honesty" other than expressing yourself truly? I understand that you may think something true that isn't. Still, your statement is only honest if it is a adequate reflection of your mental state -- and not of your whole mental state, but of the aspects of interest to your interlocutors

If you agree with " — Metaphysician Undercover

But no matter how you look at it, even that part, that simple truth, is missing a lot from being complete. Any statement about "what is", is always incomplete. You might say it is adequate and therefore truth, I say it's incomplete and therefore only "truth" to a degree. — Metaphysician Undercover

degrees of certitude" then why not "degrees of truth" as well?

I've already said that I see truth as an analogous concept: first, as Aquinas does, by analogy of attribution wrt Divine Truth, and second with an analogy of proportionality wrt contextual requirements. So, in a way I have, but I think "analogy" is a more precise word for this than "degrees."

If we were to say in completion, of what is, that it is, we'd have to state everything which "is" right now. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you were to do this, your use of "what is" would be equivocal wrt Aristotle's. Aristotle is discussing a particular what, you a universal what.

But no matter how you look at it, even that part, that simple truth, is missing a lot from being complete. Any statement about "what is", is always incomplete. You might say it is adequate and therefore truth, I say it's incomplete and therefore only "truth" to a degree. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree. No human knowledge is complete or exhaustive. All human knowledge is a projection (a dimensionally diminished map) of reality. It is the real source of such a projection that Aristotle's "what is" refers to. So, we agree as to the facts.

There is no point in arguing with you over your choice of words when we agree on the relevant facts.

The principal use of "truth" is in relation to honesty, but when honesty is established, and therefore can be taken for granted, we move on to use "truth" to express a high degree of certitude. — Metaphysician Undercover

How often we use "truth" to mean "really so," "honest," or "certain" is a statistical question that I don't know any research on. I think that most people mean "really so" -- not exhaustively, but wrt to the relevant issue.

The symbol "2" must, of necessity, equal the concept "two" or else there is no "concept". — Metaphysician Undercover

This is complete nonsense. First, concepts are prior to words, as shown when we know what we mean, but can't find the word for it. So, concepts in no way depend on their linguistic expression.

Second, strictly speaking, <equality> is a mathematical concept, describing the relation between two or more quantities. Its use here is a suggestive analogy, not to be taken literally. Neither linguistic symbols nor concepts are quantities, so they can't be "equal" in any literal way.

Third, two things equal to the same thing are equal to each other, but that is not the case here. "Dos", "zwei," and "two" all express the concept <two> when uttered and evoke it when heard by native speakers. Still, they aren't the same word, because they don't function interchangeably. (A person knowing English, but not German, will not think <two> when she hears "zwei." A person unfamiliar with Arabic numerals will not think <two> when he sees "2.")

Lastly, causal sufficiency is not equality. Reading "2" can be causally sufficient to evoke <two>, but that does not make them any more "equal" than a match and a forest fire.

You even indicate this by saying "the same concept". What you mean by "same" here is equivalence — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I mean identity. If different instances of sets of two objects evoked different concepts, I would be equivocating when I said, "These both have two units." All universal predication would fail as the first instance would instantiate <two-1>, the second <two-2>, etc., not the same concept, <two>.

If the symbol "2" means something slightly different for you than it does for me — Metaphysician Undercover

That is not my claim, nor is it relevant to your claim that the symbol and concept are equal. We are not discussing the relation between the concept <two> in me and the concept <two> in you, but the relation between a physical sign, "2," and an intentional concept, <two> -- which are of different kinds and so not interchangeable.

Your concept <two> and mine have identical information, but aren't identical because my concept <two> is me thinking of two, while your concept <two> is you thinking of two and I am not you. The information is identical because there is no individuating difference, not because the information is the same substantial object -- for information is not a substantial object.

I ask you for a 2 cm bolt and you hand me a 2.5, and say that's close enough? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not saying that 2.5 cm is always, or even usually, "close enough." I'm saying that what is "close enough" depends on your purpose. As a teen, I worked in my dad's machine shop making aircraft parts. What was "close enough" was spelled out on the blueprints -- typically +/- 0.003".

This is why truth consists of the proper relation between the symbol and the thing — Metaphysician Undercover

I find this hard to reconcile this with your view that truth is found only in God. God knows directly, not via symbols.

I agree that this is a reasonable statement about the truth of expressions; however, expressions are true only derivatively -- as giving voice to true judgements in our minds -- which are true or false in the primary sense.

According to Aquinas, human beings know artificial things in the same way that God knows His creation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I know of no such text. As this is a claim incompatible with Aquinas's most fundamental views, you need to supply a citation.

what we know is the result of us acting in the world, not it acting on us. — Metaphysician Undercover

Us acting in the world and the world acting on us are not incompatible operations. I may go looking for gold, but if the metal did not scatter light into our eyes, sink to the bottom of my pan and resist normal reagents, I wouldn't know I've found it. As you say, " We poke and prod the reality and see how it reacts." It's reacting is acting on us.

Are you familiar with the concepts of active and passive intellect? — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course. The active intellect is our awareness of information encoded in neural representations. Neural representations are the result of objects acting on our senses.

The active intellect acts, and passes what is created to the passive intellect which receives — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a distortion. The active intellect does not "create" information. (Creation is making something ex nihilo.) The active intellect merely actualizes intelligibility (information) encoded in the phantasm (a neural sensory representation).

the point I'm making is that humans possess an essential requirement for rationality, which is the ability to form concepts and understand abstractions; it's also fundamental to language. — Wayfarer

I agree. Still, I have no difficulty in accepting Aristotle's empiricist account in De Anima iii. The senses provide us with intelligible data about the beings we encounter. The agent intellect (nous poiêtikos = subjective awareness) makes this intelligibility actually known, giving us ideas (awareness of intelligible data). Abstraction is awareness fixing on some notes of intelligibility to the exclusion of others. I wonder what in this account you find inadequate to your experience?

it is assumed that these capabilities have evolved — Wayfarer

I see no reason to believe they, as opposed to the brain, have. You have to be some type of physicalist to think consciousness evolved. Unfortunately, evolution fails you. Since all causation is physical, physicalists must hold that consciousness is epiphenomenal -- along for the ride, but without causal power. If so, no random, initial spark of consciousness could have a physical effect. Without a physical effect, it could not benefit survival. So, evolution couldn't select it. In sum, while you may continue to think that awareness has a physical explanation, it cannot have originated by Darwinian selection.

my view is that rationality transcends a purely biological account of human faculties — Wayfarer

I agree again. Biology can explain neural data processing. It has nothing to say about the specifically intentional operations of ideogenesis and volition, because the required data has been left behind by the fundamental abstraction of natural science -- in which we choose to focus on the known object to the exclusion of the knowing subject.

I still don't understand why you think that we need more than our interaction with reality to know what we know. After all, what better way can there be to learn about reality than for reality to inform us?

Thanks for the kind word and the references.
— apokrisis

The historical reality looks more like that they both got the essential duality of a formal principle and a material principle as the causal arche. — apokrisis

Yes, they both concentrate on two principles, but Aristotle says he and his opponents have contrasting triads: "For admitting with them that there is something divine, good, and desirable, we hold that there are two other principles, the one contrary to it, the other such as of its own nature to desire and yearn for it." Physics, i, 9.

Form is the "divine, good, and desirable" principle. The contrary principle is the privation of the new form, while the one actively desiring and yearning for it is hyle. ("The truth is that what desires the form is matter.") So, hyle has a determinate intentionality.

ontological atomism — apokrisis

Yes, Russell's views in “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,” seem not to be reflections on our experience of being, but to originate in a desire to avoid the complexities such reflections reveal.

The material principle is that of an Apeiron or the Indefinite - chaotic action. — apokrisis

It is for Plato, but not for Aristotle. Aristotle's hyle is not unintelligible as is Plato's chora. It has a "desire" or intentional relation to a determinate form which can be known by analogy with similar cases. This intentionality makes change orderly and intelligible, echoing Jeremiah's "ordinances of heaven and earth" (33:25) and Thales' reliance on astronomical regularity, and foreshadowing Newton's universal laws of nature.

The formal principle is then the order that regulates this chaos of fluctuation. Tames it, channels it, gives it structure and intent — apokrisis

Again, in Plato.

form is a developmental outcome - the imposition of habits of regularity on a chaos of possibility, which thus always emerges as substantial actuality that is a blend of the necessary and the accidental. — apokrisis

That is the point of Physics i, 9.

I would say that you have a problem in that your reading of hyle leads you to suggest it contains form within it in some sense. — apokrisis

Yes, but that's not a problem. It's the solution of a problem. The new form in a substantial change is "in" hyle in a potential or intentional way -- as the "desired" outcome of its striving. Hyle is "such as of its own nature to desire and yearn for [the new form]."

With regard to vitalism, "life force" was me waxing poetic -- trying to emphasize the active nature of hyle vs. the pure passivity of prima materia. I did not mean to suggest, and do not think, that life is due to a unique vital principle.

On the other hand, I see physics as completely deterministic in its realm of application -- so that biogenesis and the evolution of species are both fully entailed by the laws of nature and the initial conditions of the universe. The only randomness in evolution is due to human ignorance.

So, I see no ontological role for a principle of "indefiniteness" (an Apeiron), with the possible exception of free will. But, even in free will, I see choices as sufficiently caused -- just not predetermined.

it is so hard to leave behind some notion of the material principle as already some kind of definite stuff - like a space-filling, but formless and passive, chora. — apokrisis

Indeed it is. As a physicist, l'm drawn to this idea. General relativity sees space as having observable properties (the metric tensor.) Quantum theory leads us to conclude that matter has a wave nature, leading to the supposition that waves must be cyclical modifications of some ether or chora. Still if the ether or chora is to be modified, it cannot be completely indeterminate. It must respond in a determinate way, with well-defined properties, or all would be chaos.

Thank you for an interesting discussion.

The essential note of intellect is awareness. — Dfpolis

However, creatures generally are aware — Wayfarer

Animals have medical consciousness, i.e. an observable state of responsiveness. We have no evidence they thy have subjective awareness. The only evidence that people have such awareness is reports of subjective experience.

If I'm mistaken that your agenda is to "prove" God's existence based on the alleged "fine tuning" of these constants, then there's nothing really to discuss. — Relativist

If you've read my posts, you would have seen me state 2 or 3 times that I do not think the FTA proves God's existence. It only makes a strong case in the legal sense.

The FTA is an argumentum singum quia (an argument based on signs). Such arguments are only deductively sound when the signs can only point to one thing. That is not the case with the FTA or design arguments such as Paley's. Nonetheless, the FTA is persuasive, as a number of atheists have admitted -- giving it as a reason for positing a multiverse.

I've also said that a Multiverse is logically possible -- and more, a possibility worth researching. Also, I would be happy to see a theory that would actually allow us to calculate the fundamental physical constants -- even if it showed they could have different values under different circumstances.

The strength of the FTA lies in the fact that when many improbable means coordinate to effect the same end, it is usually the case that they are intelligently directed to that end. This is the kind of reasoning used in court cases. So it's quite rational, even though not airtight.

we don't know what the true fundamental laws of nature actually are. — Relativist

Yes, but we do know that whatever the fundamental laws are, they closely approximate the physics we have in its verified realm of application.

There are many sorts things that exist in THIS world that would not exist had the constants been different. — Relativist

For example? As I read it, some of the constants control times that are important mainly, if not exclusively, to biogenesis.

Thomist metaphyics has the view of essence that I was referring to: — Relativist

No, Aquinas follows Aristotle in his discussion of essences. Aquinas' treatment of existence goes beyond that of Aristotle.

it is an integral part of his metaphysics, and yet it is pure assumption that there is such a thing. — Relativist

Aquinas is quite clear that neither essence nor existence are "things." They are just "principles" -- the foundation in reality (objective basis) for saying that a thing is (existence), and what kind of a thing it is (essence). So, if you think that there's an objective basis for saying something exists, you agree with Aquinas that it has "existence," and if you think there's an objective basis for saying you're human and Fido is a dog, then you agree that you and Fido have essences. There is nothing more to essence and existence than that.

Sounds similar to Thomist metaphysics, and it again sounds like an assumption - not something that we know exists due to evidence, but rather something that is postulated. — Relativist

No, its not an assumption. Its a couple of definitions based on experience. Things have to exist to act. What does't exist, can't do anything, and what can't do anything is indistinguishable from nothing (non-being). Nothing we encounter in nature can do everything, but if we know what it can do (e.g. walk like a duck, quack like a duck, etc), then we can tell what it is. So, the specification of a things possible acts tells us what it is (its essence).

My issue is that if you're going to accept unprovable postulates in your preferred metaphysics — Relativist

We know our fundamental facts directly from experience, not indirectly, via proofs. So, if you know your premises from experience, I'm all for them.

theories are falsifiable, and so are the rigorous multiverse theories — Relativist

What is the specific falsifiable prediction?

Immaterial laws exist in the mind. — Relativist

The approximate descriptions of the laws of nature exist in our minds. You have already admitted that there are fundamental laws and that we do not fully understand them. Without laws of nature operative in the universe, we have no way of explaining the origin of the cosmos or the evolution of life. Our scientific explanations only work because we grant that the laws we observe now were operative in the past.

If you were to claim they exist independent of the things that exhibit the described behavior (e.g. as platonic entities) and they somehow direct or govern that behavior, then you would be making a debatable metaphysical assumption. — Relativist

I am not saying that they can operate independently of the things they operate on. That would be nonsense. I am saying that we can grasp the existence of laws of nature that are logically distinct from, but physically inseparable form, material states.

Let me begin by saying, that while you may define your terms however you wish, definitions that alter, rather than clarify, common usage, lead to philosophic confusion -- especially when no warning is given of their peculiarity. Most people use "truth" to name something they've experienced in their own thought and language, and in that of others. Extremely few (mostly Platonists), would posit Ideal Truth and fewer still say truth resides in God alone.

So, I see no point in attacking your definition and usage. It simply is neither mine nor based on common use.

I think I have a better suggestion, and that is to remove the requirement of "truth" from knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see how anything false can count as knowledge. I wonder if you'd be kind enough to give your definition of "knowledge." Mine is awareness of present intelligibility -- guaranteeing a connection (dynamical presence) with the intelligible object.

We represent knowledge as it really is, and this is something relative, and admitting to degrees of certainty. — Metaphysician Undercover

According to Aristotle, saying what is, is, is speaking the truth. I take it you disagree if you think that we can "represent knowledge as it really is," and yet not have truth..

I have no problem with degrees of certitude. I see them ranging from metaphysical (guarantied by the nature of being), through physical (guarantied by the normal operation of nature), to moral (rational expectations justifying ethical decisions).

How do you see metaphysically certain human propositions as compromising "truth"?

The addition of "approach" suggests less than equal, and less than equal is not equal. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Approach to" is not an addition. It translates the Latin prefix ad- in adaequatio, which you continue to ignore, pretending the text says aequatio. Rather than suggesting "less than" means "equals," It recognizes that human estimates of equality are often approximate.

Also, as I said earlier, the translation is not mine, but Richard McKeon's in the philosophical Latin vocabulary in his Selections From Medieval Philosophers. So, please desist in calling it "bogus" or explain why McKeon erred.

the point is that in order for there to be truth, the proper representation of the real thing must exist within the intellect. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course. I am not disputing that. Instead I am delving into what makes a representation "proper."

we can see that the representation need not be in any way similar to the real thing represented. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, we can.

The symbol 2 is not at all similar to what it represents. However, there must be an equation or equality between the symbol and the thing represented. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes it is not similar. No, equality is not involved. Rather "2" evokes in readers, by convention, the concept <two> -- the same concept concept evoked by counting actual and potential instances of sets of two units. Evocation is not equality.

So, the correct account is that <two> arises by abstraction form our counting experiences of sets of two elements, and we employ the convention of signifying the concept <two> by the symbol "2."

There is always a direct one to one relation, not an approach. There is no room for "adequacy", in truth otherwise someone might say that 2 represents something between 1.8 and 2.2. — Metaphysician Undercover

As Aristotle notes in Metaphysics Delta, there are two species of quantity: discrete and continuous. Discrete quantities are not numbers, but countable. In counting is is rational to expect exactitude as you suggest. Continuous quantities are not numbers either, but measurable. Measurements are always approximate. So it is irrational to expect an exact value, and no one thinks we're lying when we say that the bolt is 2 cm long if that is a reasonable approximation of its length.

So, what is a reasonable approximation? One adequate to the purpose of the measurement. For example, home building requires less accuracy than grinding telescope mirrors.

That we do not have correspondence in a complete and perfect way does not mean that we ought not strive for it. — Metaphysician Undercover

What we strive for is a practical decision. We have a finite amount of time, and a panoply of human needs -- as noted by Maslow and others. So, it's foolish to spend time on attaining unnecessary precision. This does not mean you shouldn't pursue your passions, only that you need to manage your time wisely.

If we remove the ideal, assuming that we have reached a "truth" which is sufficient for human beings, then there is nothing to inspire us to better ourselves. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think this follows. We have natural desires, including the desire to know (Aristotle), all supporting the desire for self-realization (Maslow). Because these desires are innate, there is no need to hold an abstract (and unattainable) goal before the mind. A loving person will always find good to do.

I think it's nonsense that "truth" would be something different for God than for human beings. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let's review. In God, there is an agreement between what is in His mind and creation because God willing creation to exist is identically creation being willed to exist by God. God in knowing his own act of creatio continuo, of sustaining creation in being, knows all creation. We do not have this relation to creation. Rather than knowing creation because we act on it to maintain it, we know it because it acts on us via our senses. So, it is metaphysically impossible that we could know as God knows or have truth as God has truth. Such omniscient truth can never be a human goal, as it's ontologically incompatible with our finite nature.

the equality of the relation, the one to one relation between God's Forms and reality must be the same equality which the human intellect strives for. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I just pointed out, your goal is ontologically inconsistent with human nature. God can't have created as He has and also intend us to strive for a goal contrary to that very nature.

What you have demonstrated is that human knowledge is deficient. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not "deficient," which would mean intrinsically inadequate to our needs, but limited. We know the world as it relates to us -- and we relate to it.

And such a premise would require that "truth" is defined in two distinct ways, which is contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, It does not require contradictory definitions, but analogous predication, which is the beauty of Aquinas' analysis. Two predications are analogous when the senses of the predicates are partly the same and partly different. Creation conforms God's mind because God willing creation to exist is identically creation being willed to exist by God. What we actually know conforms to reality because we are aware of it acting on us. Thus, the mode by which we know is radically different, but the note of conformity is the same.

Since we have no comprehensive way to exclude the possibility of falsity, then that possibility is a necessary (essential) part of human knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a non sequitur. Possible accidents (in the sense opposed to essence), are no more essential than actual accidents.

What you've described is teaching the concept. But this requires that the concept pre-exists, prior to the student learning it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not in the mind of the student.

Before drawing the triangle, the teacher must know the concept. And the teacher must have learned it from someone else who drew it, and so on, until you have an infinite regress. Such an infinite regress doesn't allow for any coming into being of the concept, so the concept along with human beings teaching it, must exist eternally. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your analysis is inconsistent with the history of ideas, which records the routine advent of new Ideas, e.g. that of dynamis by Aristotle, displacement by Archimedes, impetus and instantaneous velocity by 14th century Scholastics, universal laws by Newton, conservation of mass by Lavoisier, displacement currents by Maxwell, or quantization of action by Planck.

Experience exposes us to the potential for the concept and then the activity of the mind causes it to have actual existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Have i said otherwise? Have I doubted that nature is intelligible? Have i said that concepts arise from nothing? I've said that they result form the actualization of latent intelligibility -- delivered to us by things acting on our senses.

Nothing you've said shows that concepts are not, or cannot be, abstracted from intelligibility delivered via sense data.

An infinite entity (if such a thing is even possible) is not natural. No natural things are infinite. Nor is it possible that something immanent could be infinite because it would be constrained by that which it inheres within. — Metaphysician Undercover

A finite being is one with a limited capacity to act. An infinite being is one that can do any logically possible act. The Immanence of God means that God is present throughout reality in virtue of His continually maintaining it in being. To be immanent, a being need not be limited to that which it is immanent in.

the concepts that are the constituents of intellectual activity are universal while mental images and sensations are always essentially particular.

Agreed.

Second, mental images are always to some extent vague or indeterminate, while concepts are at least often precise and determinate.

Agreed.

Third, we have many concepts that are so abstract that they do not have even the loose sort of connection with mental imagery that concepts like man, triangle, and crowd have.

Agreed.

I interpret Plato's 'mystical intuition' to be referring to the capacity of the intellect to grasp concepts - the very action of reason itself. In order to be able to do that, the intellect represents through abstractions, which are in some sense idealisations, in another sense, possibilities. The sense in which they exist are as potentials or ideals; they don't exist in the manifest domain, but in the domain of possibility, which is, nevertheless, a real domain, insofar as there is a 'domain of real possibility'. — Wayfarer

i think this is an incorrect interpretation of the historical Plato, who believed in innate ideas. In the Meno, for example, he argues that with a little simulation, ideas are "remembered."

I agree that universal concepts are abstractions. I am not sure if you are using this term merely to describe what they are, or if you are also talking about how they come to be. My understanding of ideogenesis is Aristotelian-Thomistic. As a result of sensation we form unified physical (neural) representations Aristotle called "phantasms." (How these are formed is the focus of the so-called "binding problem" in contemporary neuroscience.) The intellect (nous = our power of awareness) makes the information latent in these representations actually known. Every representation has many notes of intelligibility and, under the direction of our will, we can attend to some to the exclusion of others. This selective attention is abstraction and the efficient cause of our universal concepts. (Their formal cause, what provides their informative content, is the phantasm.) So, our universal ideas, while products of intellect, derive their information wholly from sense data. (Aristotle's discussion of this, which is very heavy going, is in De Anima iii.)

As for ideas and possibility, the reason they are universal is not because we have experienced and intend all their instances, as Mill might think, but because each instance is objectively capable of evoking, via abstraction, its corresponding ideas.

As for where Ideas exist, that is an-ill framed question. The phantasms which support ideas exist in the brain, but Ideas themselves are not things but activities. My idea <triangle> is me thinking of triangles, and me thinking of triangles is supported by the brain's neural processing. Still, the idea is not merely the brain's triangle representations, but my intellect being aware of the relevant notes of intelligibility encoded in that representation. Consequently, if the brain is damaged, our ability to think can be compromised -- because we may no longer be able to process contents properly.

a concept of 'degrees of reality' is required, something which has generally been lost in the transition to modernity, in which existence is univocal. — Wayfarer

I follow Aquinas in seeing "being" as an analogous, not a univocal, term. We can discuss the analogy of being when it is more relevant to the thread's topic.

Secondly, on the argument that 'concepts can arise from experience' - I think this is the kind of claim made by empiricists, such as J S Mill, who generally reject the possibility of innate mental capabilities. But only a mind capable of grasping geometric forms could understand that two completely different triangles are instances of the same general kind (although it would be interesting to see if there have been animal trials to determine whether crows or monkeys can pick out triangles from amongst a collection of geometric shapes.) — Wayfarer

I am an empiricist, but of an Aristotelian, rather than a Millian, stripe. I have no problem with "innate mental capabilities" in the sense of abilities. I see no need for any innate abstract knowledge, including so-called "a priori propositions" such as the principle of contradiction.

I don't think the ability to learn and use types, which has been implemented by artificial intelligence, implies intellect. The essential note of intellect is awareness.

Thank you for the kind words.

If you're interested in the difference between Plato's and Aristotle's theories you might want o read my article, "A New Reading of Aristotle's Hyle," The Modern Schoolman LXVIII (1991), 3, pp. 225-244. (https://philpapers.org/rec/POLANR).

Plato needs to explain how multiple individuals can "participate" in a single form. His solution is that a form or ideal is like a seal, and matter (chora, pandeches) is a like the wax into which the seal is impressed. All intelligibility is in the form, while matter is wholly unintelligible. The reason individuals differ is because matter is in some way defective -- giving rise to imperfect copies. Thus, individuality is the result of imperfection.

Aristotle rejects, with about 14 different arguments in his Metaphysics, separate Platonic forms. So, he has no need to relate one form to many instances. His problem is to explain the reality of change. As a result, he sees material objects as having two fundamental aspects: an intrinsic form (which is what the object is now) and an active tendency (he calls it a "desire") to transform into something else, hyle. Hyle means "wood," and reflects the story of a wooden bed that sprouted leaves. Thus, it indicates at a "blossoming" dynamic hidden beneath the present form of things. Unlike Plato's unintelligible chora, hyle can be known by analogy. For example, we can know by analogy with other, similar seeds, that an acorn has an active tendency to become an oak.

This active tendency is not seen as reflecting universal laws of nature, but they are a natural development of the hyle idea

I believe that the word "mind" truly doesn't define anything and is rather a vague term — Llum

I do not find "mind" in the least "vague." "Mind" names our capacity to know and to make decisions. Knowing is being aware of present intelligibility -- typically neurally encoded contents. Deciding is committing to one of a number if mutually incompatible alternatives.

The mind is a construct of the brain. — Llum

Thank you for your faith claim. The mind certainly involves the brain as brain trauma affects out ability to perform neural processing, and hence the contents presented to awareness. However there are no rational grounds for thinking that the brain alone explains what we experience as mind. As there is a vast amount of neural processing that we are unaware of, it is clear that awareness is not a concomitant of neural processing. To know, we need not only neurally encoded and processed contents, but awareness of those contents. Despite almost 3,000 years of naturalist speculation, we have no viable model for how physics can produce awareness -- and there are sound reasons for this.

from an evolutionary perspective, we know that humans have the highest degree of consciousness that allows them to think about these things. — Llum

No, we don't. Evolution might be able to explain superior data processing, but it has absolutely nothing to say about consciousness in the sense of subjective awareness. Further, as far as I can tell conscious in this sense has no "degrees." Either we are aware of some contents, or we are not. We can be aware of more or fewer contents, but that is not a "degree of awareness."

So the idea that the brain and mind can be separated from each other is incorrect — Llum

I agree. Inseparability does not, however, mean that they identical.

Christians choose to love God while their on earth, and yet they continue to sin. — Relativist

Yes. The difference is that few on earth achieve and maintain union with God. It is only in such a union that conflicting desires are resolved.

Thanks for the correction. I copied the citations from Jozef Matula, "Thomas Aguinas [sic] and his Reading of Isaac ben Solomon Israeli" (https://www.academia.edu/10100256/30._Thomas_Aquinas_and_his_Reading_of_Isaac_ben_Solomon_Israeli)

"Has the likeness of the thing known", sounds like correspondence to me. How do you interpret this as "adequacy'? — Metaphysician Undercover

The question is: is the representation in the mind adequate to what exists in reality? If it is, then what is in our mind is true. If not, not. The point I'm trying to make is that our mental representation can never be exhaustive of reality. They will always be projections (dimensionally diminished maps) of reality. (Aquinas explicitly states that we have no direct knowledge of essences -- they are only known via accidents.) This lead one to ask how much of an "approach to equality" (adaequatio) do we need to count as truth? I am suggesting that the answer depends on the context: Our representations must be close enough that we aren't misled in our reflections, i.e. the approximation must be adequate to our needs.

I admit that this is not usually commented on, but it is essential to avoiding what I call the "Omniscience Fallacy" -- using divine omniscience as a paradigm for human knowledge. Doing so leads to the conclusion that we never "really know" anything. I think it's better to take "knowing" to name an activity engaged in by human beings. Doing so allows our mental representations to be true without being exhaustive.

The quote is taken right out of context, by you, and given an unacceptable translation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm sorry, but it's not taken out of context. It's Aquinas' stock definition, as shown by the numerous citations. According to Matula, the same definition, citing ben Israel, is used by Albert the Great, Bonaventura, Alexander of Hales and William de la Marre. So, it's a standard definition.

Note that I am not rejecting the formulation you cite. I am merely pointing out that a "likeness" invariably has less content than the original. How much less can still be counted as true?

No translation is prefect. I always get much more out of reading Aquinas' Latin than a translation because his Latin terms have connotations missing in their translations. (I got "approach to equality" from McKeon. I can find the exact citation if you wish.) So, my translation isn't "bogus." It merely emphasizes a different aspect of adaequatio. On the other hand, "equality" is quite deceptive. Aquinas never writes aequatio, but always adaequatio -- rejecting actual equality.

You are saying that since we cannot have correspondence in a complete, and perfect way, then lets just settle for something less than that, and call this "truth" instead. Anything which is adequate for the purpose at hand, we'll just say it's the truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let's parse this out. You seem to agree that "we cannot have correspondence in a complete, and perfect way." If so, we have two options:
(1) We humans are incapable of knowing truth. (The Omniscience Fallacy).
(2) Human truth does not require " correspondence in a complete, and perfect way." (My position.)

I think you agree with (2). So, I'm puzzled as to why you disagree with me. If (2) is so, then
(a) Any incomplete, imperfect degree of correspondence counts as truth, or
(b) There is some requirement beyond an incomplete, imperfect degree of correspondence for a representation to count as truth. (My position.)

We are now faced with the question of what this additional requirement might be? The options are, exhaustively:
(i) A criterion that would allow us to draw false conclusions in our considerations, or
(ii) A criterion that prevents us from drawing false conclusions in our considerations -- I.e. The requirement that the degree of correspondence be adequate to prevent consequent errors in our considerations. (My position).

Please tell me where you disagree with my analysis.

We cannot say that "God's Truth" is different from human truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know if you have not read enough of Aquinas, or if you reject his position. In his analysis, "truth," like "being," is an analogous term, i.e. its meaning is partly the same and partly different in God and in humans. So, yes, God's truth isn't human truth. What is in God's mind corresponds to reality because God's Intellect and Will are the source of reality. On the other hand, any correspondence between human minds and reality results from reality acting on us. While the first is perfect (because God willing creation to exists is, identically, creation being willed to exist by God), the latter is not.

We come to know an object because it has acted on us in some way we're aware of. But, in acting on us in a specific way, an object does not exhaust the potential modes of action specified by its essence. Thus, we do not, and cannot, know objects exhaustively, as God does. Therefore, God's truth differs from our truth.

Valid logic does not necessitate truth, so nothing prevents us from doing logic when it's not necessarily the truth which we are obtaining with that logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course validity is not soundness. But, what is the point of being logical if not thinking salve veritate? Unless we start with the truth, we have no guaranty of ending with truth, so we cant know truth, we might just as well discard logic. Only if we can know truth is there a reason to think logically.

"Suppose I have a universal concept, <triangle>. There is no Platonic Triangle corresponding to it." — Dfpolis

On what basis do you make this assertion? If there is not some independent idea of triangle, which your concept must correspond with, then you could make your concept however you please. — Metaphysician Undercover

On the basis of the 14 or so counter-arguments Aristotle gives in his Metaphysics. Most telling to me, personally, is that I know of no reason to posit Platonic ideals. They do not instantiate triangles -- mostly people do. They are not necessary for us to know what a triangle is -- we teach children what they are by showing them examples and letting them abstract the concept. To apply the concept <triangle> to a new instance, that instance must be able to evoke the concept. But, if that instance can evoke the concept, any instance can. Thus, the concept can arise from experience -- without the need of mystical intuition. All we need to do is to focus on some notes of intelligibility to the exclusion of others.

And, yes, I can make any self-consistent concept I please. For example, the concept <gap triangle> -- like a triangle, but with 2 sides not joined.

when scientists like physicists produce the laws of physics, there is something real, independent, which must be followed when producing these laws. The laws must correspond with reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course there are laws operative in nature that physicists seek to describe with the laws of physics. They are observable aspects of nature, not denizens of an Ideal realm.

Your discussion of universals in Plato and Aristotle is close enough to my view that it is not worth quibbling about the differences.

Because the testimony of sense is inherently unreliable, right? That mathematical and geometric ideas are know-able in a way that objects of perception are not, because they are grasped directly the intellect in a way that material particulars cannot be. Which was to develop, much later, into the basis of Aristotle's hylomorphic dualism. — Wayfarer

Yes, Plato thought that sense knowledge was entirely unreliable. Aristotle did not.

In my article, (Dennis F. Polis, "A New Reading of Aristotle's Hyle," The Modern Schoolman, LXVIII (1991), 3, pp. 225-244), and in my book (God, Science and Mind), I explain that the hylomorphic theory of Plato in the Timaeus is very different from that of Aristotle -- even though they were confused by Neoplatonic commentators and, subsequently, by the Scholastics.

Plato's theory was designed to explain how a single Form or Idea could inform multiple individuals. Aristotle's problem was very different -- he wished to explain how substantial change is possible. As a result Plato's "matter" (chora) is an entirely different concept from Aristotle's "matter" (hyle). The fact that both Greek terms are translated by the English "matter" only adds to the confusion.

Then you have to agree there is a possible state of affairs in which there exist free-willed creatures who do not sin. Why wouldn't an omnibenevolent God just place us in that environment to begin with? — Relativist

On reflection, I decided that my earlier response missed an important point.

The answer is that the only reason that those in heaven do not sin is because they have chosen to love God. To know we must choose to attend to the known object. To attend to God in such a way as to preclude sin we must love God. But, love, to be real must be freely given -- in other words, we can't compel someone to love us. If love can be freely given, it can be freely withheld -- and choosing not to love God (Who is Goodness and Truth) is to sin. So, the final condition we are discussing entails a logically prior condition open to sin. Thus, it is not the counter-example you seek.

A realist view of MWI is based on the ontological commitment that physical reality is a quantum system, and that the classical world of experience is an eigenstate of that QM system. So the "world branching" is (technically) just a classical perspective: each eigenstate is a classical "world." — Relativist

No, in quantum theory, the actual world is always a superposition of states. Eigenstates with respect to one dynamical variable are superpositions of many states with respect to another. So the only "special" thing about being an eigenstate is that the corresponding eigenvalue is one of the possible answers if we try to measure the associated variable.

But, as I keep repeating, the MWI is not evidence against the FTA because every "world" has the same physical constants. Also, it is based on defective physics.

You also mention there being exactly one set of physical constraints, and I agree - but that doesn't mean we have a complete understanding of what the true constraints are, since we can only see how they manifest in our classical world. — Relativist

As they are determined by how they "manifest" in the classical world, that is all we need to know -- whatever you may think contrasts with "manifesting in the classical world."

The FTA has the unstated assumption that life was a design objective. — Relativist

No, the FTA infers that life was intentional from the fact that the variables have the exact values required to produce life. Suppose you ran a store with only one thing costing $1.59 and a young person plunks $1.59 on the counter, looking at you expectantly. It would be a rational inference to conclude that the child wants the one thing costing $1.59.

Consider any metaphysically possible world W, which contains complex objects of type T. One could argue that W was fine tuned for T. — Relativist

This is simply false. For the argument to be persuasive, you need the additional datum at the core of the FTA, viz., that minute variations of W's constants would preclude the existence of Ts.

with advances in science and analytic philosophy, we can see that the notion of essence has no empirical basis — Relativist

This is nonsense, as shown by my example of biologists making taxonomic decisions. There is a foundation in reality for essential definitions, and that is what Aristotle defines as a thing's "essence:"
"The essence of each thing is what it is said to be propter se" Metaphysics Z, 4 -- and saying what something is, is defining it.

Essence entails the existence of necessary and sufficient properties for individuation and for delineating "kinds." What are your necessary and sufficient properties vs your accidental properties? Would you be YOU had there been a single gene that was different? How about a single day of your life having different experiences? — Relativist

You are confusing my individual characteristics with what allows me to be called a "human." Aristotle's essences are not individual, but specific. So, "Essence entails the existence of necessary and sufficient properties for individuation" is simply false. "Essence entails the existence of necessary and sufficient properties for delineating 'kinds'" is true.

Consider the evolution of horse throughout the evolutionary history of its ancestry — Relativist

Biologists have -- defining different species in the ancestral line of the modern horse.

More fundamentally, you seem to be thinking of essences as something imposed from the outside. What actually happens is that we humans develop conceptual spaces in response to our experiences. Then, when we want to be more precise, we formally define what we mean by various terms, and necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a term are, collectively, the essence of what we have defined.

Since essences are only found in concrete things, they don't pre-exist their instances. As species evolve, so do the properties we use to define them, i.e. their essences.

Remember: Aristotle started by teaching logic. His primary concern is precision in language, not Plato's Ideal World. His discussion of essence and existence is about how what we say reflects our experience of reality.

What are your necessary and sufficient properties vs your accidental properties? — Relativist

Let's take the concept <human>. Every creature that evokes that concept has a human essence because its essence is just a set of properties sufficient to evoke the concept <human>. Said in a different way, the human essence ontological basis for abstracting the concept <human>. Other properties it has -- properties that vary from from one human to another -- are, by definition, "accidental." ("Accidental" in this sense is not to be confused with "accidental" in the sense of random.)

We weren't discussing evidence. You had alleged the multiverse hypothesis was "mythological" and that it was not falsifiable. — Relativist

A theory is mythic if it has no evidentiary basis. It is unfalsifiable if no evidence can falsify it. You did not show I was wrong on either count. ("I admit there is no evidence for a multiverse.")

Multiverse is consistent with what we know, and it is entailed by some reasonable extrapolations — Relativist

Being consistent means it's logically possible. I agree a multiverse is logically possible -- that requires no supporting evidence. One can extrapolate in any way one wishes. Experience shows that "reasonable extrapolations" have no epistic value. "The earth looks pretty flat to me," though true, does not support "The earth is flat." "The stars appear to rotate around the earth," while true, does not entail "The stars are embedded in a crystalline sphere." I require actual evidence and adherence to methodological canons to call a theory "scientific."

Science advances in this way; accepted theory does not arrive in its final form. — Relativist

I quite agree. But, for every accepted theory there are thousands that turn out to be utter rubbish. I'm not saying no one should research multiverses or work out the consequences of alternate hypotheses. If I were refereeing a paper working out a reasonable hypothesis, I wouldn't reject it because it involved a multiverse. This is not a discussion about freedom of thought or the right to discuss various hypotheses, but about what it's rational to think true given what we actually know.

Errors in the analysis are self-correcting - that's what peer review is for. — Relativist

This is a contradiction. Errors don't self-reflect and think themselves wrong. People correct them -- and I'm one of those doing so.

We should be agnostic to the existence of multiverse, not hastily dismissing it for insufficient empirical basis while declaring victory for a deism that also lacks an empirical basis. — Relativist

You seem confused as to my position. I'm open to the possibility of a multiverse. I even think it's a sensible line of inquiry. What I'm discussing is the current epistic value of the multiverse hypothesis as opposed to the FTA. It should be obvious that any hypothesis lacking supporting evidence (as you agree wrt a multiverse) has no epistic value. On the other hand, the FTA is based on evidence and peer-reviewed calculations. I agree that the FTA is not a "proof," but it does have epistic value. So it makes a far stronger case in the legal sense.

That's fine as long as you refrain from arguments from ignorance — Relativist

You've bandied about "arguments from ignorance" for a while I don't recall advancing any -- nor you pointing out any. On the other hand, you're using our ignorance wrt a multiverse as a counter to the FTA. Please be specific as to any arguments from ignorance you think I'm making.

You seem to have some physical/metaphysical framework in mind, — Relativist

My metaphysical framework is dynamic realism -- that "existence" is convertible with "the power to act in some way," and a being's "essence" is a specification of its possible acts. (This isn't Aristotle's definition of "essence,") My epistemological framework is my projection paradigm -- that all we know is a dynamic projection (dimensionally diminished map) of reality, i.e. the result of reality acting on us in some limited way.

Feel free to criticize of my framework.

You ... are judging the Armstrong-Tooley framework from that perspective. That is the category error. — Relativist

Do you know what a category error is? If so how am I making one?

from the perspective of Armstrong's metaphysics, it's meaningless to assert "laws of nature lack the defining characteristics of matter". — Relativist

I am willing to grant this is the case. Since my sentence is perfectly meaningful in normal English language discourse, I conclude that Armstrong's metaphysics is inadequate to normal English discourse. You are perfectly free to limit yourself to their framework. I prefer to be open to many complementary projections of reality.

There seems to be a disconnect here between "creating an individual", and, "the intelligibility of the individuals", as these two are quite distinct. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, they are distinct, but they are related. In the Timaeus Plato is trying to explain the existence of multiple instances of the same universal -- say <man>. He thinks that matter is entirely unintelligible, so all intelligibility has to come from Form (Ideals). Still, in some vague way, individual differences arise from "defects of the matter" as different impressions impressions of the same seal in wax might differ due to impurities.

So, in his system, you can't instantiate an intelligible individual with a partially specified form. Nor is it clear how you can instantiate different intelligibilities without different forms. All you can do to explain how individuals differ is to say they are defective images of the Form.

I've read a lot of Aquinas and have yet to see where he defines truth as adequacy. — Metaphysician Undercover

Its kind of hard to miss if you've read much Aquinas in Latin. De Veritate q.1, a.11, resp: "alio modo diffinitur secundum id in quo formaliter ratio veri perficitur, et sic dicit Ysaac quod Veritas est adequatio rei cum intellectus". Q.1.a.1: "Isaac dicit in libro De definitionibus, quod veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus." Summa Theologiae I, q.16., a.2. a.3: "Isaac dicit in libro De definitionibus, quod veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus." In I Sententiarum, d.19, q.5.a.1; Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 59; "Veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei"

As I said, adaequatio means "approach to equality" (according to McKeon) Translators sometimes say "agreement," but the Latin is telling. He does not say aequatio (equality) as would be expected if he meant correspondence, but "approach to equality," which leaves open the question: how close we need to be to be speaking truth? It seems clear that we need to be close enough not to mislead our audience, and that depends both on the audience and the context. So, I have chosen the English cognate of adaequatio, "adequacy," to express this.

So I still don't see how you equate adequacy, which refers to method, with truth, which refers to how things are — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not applying "adequacy" to method, but to the need implicit in the context of discourse. Arguably, we all want to know the truth. As reality is virtually inexhaustible, no amount of abstract thought or verbal discourse is going to give a full account of the reality being considered. So, no "truth" can fully correspond to reality. Nonetheless, we can have an account that is adequate to the needs implicit in our reflection or discourse. I'm saying that such an account qualifies as true.

All I'm doing is defining truth so it can actually be found in finite minds. I fully agree with Aristotle when he said that when we say what is, is, or what is not, is not, we are speaking the truth. The only difference is recognizing the impossibility of grasping "what is" exhaustively. What we know may not be exhaustive, but it can be adequate.

You are trying to lower truth from an ideal, so what remains is adequacy. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have a definition of "truth" which is adequate for you, and your purposes, but it's not acceptable to me because I see that you've compromised the ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree. When I assert "God is Truth," I'm accepting the ideal. I'm not sullying the ideal by recognizing that humans will never have truth as God has truth. Following Aquinas, I recognize "truth" as an analogous, not a univocal term. It is analogous by an analogy of proportionality -- true discourse is proportioned to the needs imposed by its context

Do you not believe that there is a real definition of "triangle", such that if I were to give a definition of triangle, it must correspond to that real definition of triangle in order to be a correct definition? — Metaphysician Undercover

. Human truth is partial, not exhaustive. It approaches (adaequatio) reality -- it is not reality as God's Truth is.

You may define your terms as you wish, but if you set the standard of truth so high that no limited mind can attain it, you rule out logical (salve veritate) discourse amongst humans. I am unwilling to do that.

Do you not believe that there is a real definition of "triangle", such that if I were to give a definition of triangle, it must correspond to that real definition of triangle in order to be a correct definition? Isn't this the case with all universals? Any definition or description of the universal must correspond with the real concept in order that it be a true definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

I know that we have a concept <triangle> that is evoked when we encounter actual triangles. I also know that the term "triangle" is a linguistic convention for expressing the concept <triangle>. So, if we want people to understand us when we utter "triangle," we need to define the term so it reflects the concept. Is that what you mean by the "real definition"?

In discussing truth I'm primarily considering what is in the mind and how it relates to reality. I'm only considering language to the extent that it expresses what is in our minds. Suppose I have a universal concept, <triangle>. There is no Platonic Triangle corresponding to it. There are many real and potential objects that have three straight, joined sides and so the objective capacity to evoke the concept <triangle>. The concept does not "correspond" to these real and potential objects -- there is no one-to-one mapping. Some of these objects don't even have actual existence. Still, my <triangle> concept is perfectly adequate to my needs in thinking about triangles.

this would allow anyone to make a logical argument proving any conclusion they desired, simply by designing the definitions which are adequate for the purpose of proving the conclusion they desired. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're forgetting the terms joined by "adequacy": "Veritas est adaequatio] intellectus et rei" -- truth is the adequacy of intellect to reality. I'm not talking about what's adequate to win an argument, but what's an adequate to reality (rei).

The best of luck to you.

Irrespective of whether Everett himself was a realist or an instrumentalist, a realist perspective on his interpretation is absolutely ontological . — Relativist

When I say that Everett's interpretation is more epistemological than ontological, I am speaking about the "manyness" of the worlds envisioned. I agree that he is speaking of real brainstates in real observers; nonetheless, these brainstates image different mathematical projections of one and the same world.

To understand this, you need to understand what a superposition of states is. It is not many worlds on top of each other, but a mathematical means of representing a single state in as a sum of mathematical forms called "eigenfunctions." Any state represented by one set of eigenfunctions can be mathematically transformed into representation in terms of any other complete set of functions. So, the mathematical structure (representation) of a particular superposition is not a natural property, but a reflection of how someone has chosen to represent nature. Thus, however we choose to represent a natural state by alternate sets of functions, it remains one and the same state. It is never many states, and certainly never many states with different physical constants as would be required to rebut the fine-tuning argument.

When I read Everett's paper I was truly impressed by the clarity and consistency of his thinking. Still, it is based on bad physics. It is not necessary to criticize his thinking here because, as I said, Everett's "many worlds" are all one and the same world with one and the same set of physical constants.

Of course it doesn't rebut the FTA on its own, but in conjunction with the potential for more fundamental physics it constitutes a mechanism for actualizing alternative realizations of localized physics. — Relativist

If it does not rebut the FTA on its own, it does not rebut the FTA. As I explained in another post, just as the advances of 20th century physics left Newtonian physics in tact with respect to phenomena in its verified realm of application, so any further advances, however fundamental, will leave 20th century physics in tact in its verified realm of application. Nothing will make a description of one world with one set of constants suddenly become a description of many worlds with many different constants.

The MWI interpretation has a variety of post-Everett flavors. — Relativist

Indeed it does. That is why we need to examine notthe "interpretations," but the logic Everett used to justify his proposal.

There is no good argument for the "fine-tuning" of the constants! - they all depend on the presumption of design. — Relativist

So, the physics showing that minute variations in the constants leads to conditions unsuited to life depends on the assumption of design? Would you care to provide an example showing how this assumption changed the calculations? Or even how it could change the calculations? The vast literature generated by naturalists to support the possibility of a multiverse as an explicit alternative to fine-tuning shows that some very prominent physicists and cosmologists take the calculations quite seriously.

A multiverse metaphysics has as much standing as an Aristotelian metaphysics (consider Aristotle's hypothesis that "essence" exists). — Relativist

No, it does not. Aristotle was an empiricist. He did not "hypothesize that 'essence' exists." He said that our definitions of universal terms reflect common elements in their instances, and that we may name those common elements the object's "essence." In other words, essences are the foundation in reality for essential definitions. I do not see how any empiricist could deny that there are real differences, found in individuals, that allow us to say this is human and this a canary. Biologists do that every time they determine what species an organism is.

So, while Aristotle's account of essences is entirely empirical, no account of multiverses is. Thus, multiverses are not "metaphysical" -- they derive from no adequate empirical foundation and are rightly classed as mythic.

Each specific multiverse is actually derivable from an (incomplete) scientific theory, so your objection has no merit. — Relativist

Really? "Incomplete" theories now have evidentiary standing? This merits no further discussion.

The problem arises because string theory is formulated most naturally in 10 or 11
spacetime dimensions ...

String theory is indeed "incomplete." So incomplete that it has made no falsifiable prediction and its supporters mix results from logically inconsistent versions. I will not repeat the harsher and less charitable criticisms. I merely note that dressing ignorance in mathematical lace doesn't make it a thing of beauty.

Sure, but its "verified realm of application" is limited to this universe. It's premature to declare that the quest for more fundamental physics, and the possible implications of it, are doomed. — Relativist

I have no problem with physics that only works for empirical reality. I am not sure why anyone would -- accept to rationalize a faith position.

I have never said or implied "that the quest for more fundamental physics, and the possible implications of it, are doomed." It is not something I believe, and so it seems a bit underhanded to suggest that I do. I will say until we actually have empirically verified advances in fundamental physics, it is irrational to pretend to know its implications.

why should we think our portion of the universe is representative of the whole? — Relativist

Because it exhausts our knowledge base. Either we base science on actual data, or we admit baseless speculation. Natural science, with its hypothetico-deductive method, will never achieve metaphysical certitude. Logically, there will always be other possibilities -- but we can't base science on possibility alone. Science needs to explain our actual experience of nature -- not possible mythic realms.

The fact that we can think abstractly about some properties of physical states of affairs doesn't imply there is anything immaterial about those physical states of affairs. — Relativist

You're arguing skew to the point here. It is not a question of whether we think abstractly or not. The question is: what are the properties of the object of thought. We think abstractly of quanta and fields, yet we know they are material because they have mass-energy and parts outside of parts (extension). We think abstractly of works of art, but we know they are composed of atoms. When we think of the laws of nature, our concept does not involve parts outside of parts -- they are not spatially divisible -- or the possession of mass-energy. Thus, laws of nature lack the defining characteristics of matter -- not because our thoughts are abstract, but because what we are thinking about falls into a different category.

"It is confusing to call laws "properties."
Get used to it, I didn't make it up. Physicalist philosophers like D.M. Armstrong and Michael Tooley have been using this terminology for years. — Relativist

It is no defense that Armstrong and Tooley are equally confused. Properties are logical "accidents" -- aspects of individuals. Some apples have the property being red or sweet. Others do not. The laws of nature operate universally. Of course you can take a word and extend its meaning. But, when you fail to see that it means different things in different sentences, you open yourself to the fallacy of equivocation. Precise thinking requires sensitivity to variations in meaning. Lumping equivocal meanings together is a sign of confusion.

under this account, laws of nature are relational properties that exist between states of affairs types. — Relativist

Indeed. The conceptual space you are projecting reality into does not span the available data. When you employ a projection that is not one-to-one, you leave data on the table. Other projections, into different conceptual spaces, are better suited to the data you have abstracted away. Your projection ignores intentionality. Intentions, while real, need not be reflected in physical states of affairs.

The role of the ideal is to identify an essence of an individual thing, separating it from other, inessential qualities, but what that essence is in any particular case is arguable. — SophistiCat

I agree that this is a possible version of Platonism, even though it is not that of Plato in the Timaeus. Clearly, this version can avoid my criticism of making some people more fully human than others. Still, depending on the imagined nature of the Ideal, it may remain subject to that criticism.

Still, I can see no reason to support the existence of Platonic ideals of this or any type. They are not needed to explain the existence of universal ideas in individual minds, as the ability to abstract (to focus on certain notes of comprehension to the exclusion of others) is adequate for ideogenesis. Nor are ideals required to explain how many individuals can instantiate the same universal. Shared dynamics and/or common ancestry suffice for that. The old problem of how many individuals can participate in one Ideal remains unsolved.

I was not claiming that there are multiple universes. I was simply stating it as a possibility, given the limits of what we know. — jajsfaye

I agree, it is a possibility. That is why the fine-tuning argument is not a proof, but merely a convincing argument on the model of a court case.

I will use random broadly here for the sake of simplicity, to mean anything that varies over a range of options — jajsfaye

That's fine, but this definition of random does not exclude the idea of intentionality.

You seem to be assuming they do not exist until we know otherwise — jajsfaye

No, I am not assuming that the multiverse hypothesis is wrong. I am merely pointing out that while it is logically possible, it does not rise to the level of a scientific hypothesis, because the only support there is for it is the argument that if there is no God, there must be a multiverse.

Your concluding sentence was:

"Thus, physics reveals that our universe is fundamentally intentional, both in its laws and in the values of its constants." — jajsfaye

Let me be clear. I have already said that the fine tuning argument is not a proof. It merely presents us with evidence of Intelligence. (By "evidence," I mean rational grounds inclining us to a conclusion, as legal evidence does.) On the one side, we have physics telling us, in a way unlikely to change with further advances, that the cosmos is fine-tuned for life. On the other hand, we have an unfalsifiable logical possibility, unsupported by a shred of evidence and in violation of the principle of parsimony, that there may be a myriad of other universes -- and that those other universes might just have different physical constants -- then again, they might not. I think any rational evaluation would see the fine-tuning argument (revealed by physics) as the stronger case.

That said, I don't rely on the fine tuning argument because there are unrefuted deductive arguments (aka actual proofs) for the existence of God as the ongoing sustainer of the cosmos.

You have not commented on my analysis showing that the laws of nature are intentional. That is my main argument for intelligence, with fine-tuning playing only a supporting role. If the laws of nature are intentional in character, then we must call their source a mind -- not a mind like ours, but still, a mind.

given these two possibilities:

A: There are multiverses and these have a range of parameters such that there is reasonable probability that at least one of them is finely tuned to support us being here.

B: There is either one universe or they are all set to the same parameters, but there is also a designer with the intelligence and capability to set the universe to be finely tuned to support us being here.

You seem to assume that B is more parsimonious and, thus, must be assumed to be true. It is hard for me to agree with that. — jajsfaye

This mis-states the case. Most of B is known fact, not assumption. We know that this universe exists and is fine tuned. So, the only hypothesis in B is that there is a single intelligence at work.

On the other hand, A posits (1) a myriad of other, complex, universes and (2) that each of these has (for reasons unknown) independent values of its physical constants.

Clearly, the hypothesis of a single intelligent Being is simpler than the dual hypotheses of a myriad of other universes and that physical constants vary between universes.

Finally, I do not think that God "designed" the universe. If God exists, He is necessarily changeless. So there can be no sequence of design and implementation in God. There can only be intentional implementation.

Then you have to agree there is a possible state of affairs in which there exist free-willed creatures who do not sin. Why wouldn't an omnibenevolent God just place us in that environment to begin with? — Relativist

That is a very good question. I can only point to reality, and say that is not how God chose to create.

As I also know, with metaphysical certitude, that God exists, I'll just have to accept that I do not have all the answers.

Not necessarily. One can abstract all these details, leaving only essentials. — SophistiCat

One may, but then one has no adequate plan for creating an individual. Where does the other information (the things you wish to abstract away) come from? Remember, the role of the ideal is to explain the intelligibility of the individuals we observe.

In the Timaeus Plato is quite explicit about the relation of the Ideal to individuals, saying that individualization is the result of the Ideal making an imperfect impression in matter, as a seal makes an impression in wax. Thus, explicitly, all individuality is imperfection.

I've never heard "truth" defined in this pragmatic way, such that "truth' is reduced to adequacy. The following statement, "I take truth to be the adequacy of what is in the mind to reality." is nonsensical. You are denying correspondence, so "adequate correspondence to reality" is denied. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am sorry that you've never heard of the definition used by the most prominent medieval metaphysician.

I fail to see why adequacy is in the least "nonsensical."

You seem confused. If we are discussing metaphysics, only the most precise statements are adequate. If we are discussing singulars, then adequacy and correspondence come to the same thing. However, while correspondence does not work for negations or universal propositions, adequacy does. It also works for teaching. When we begin teaching a subject, we can't possibly teach all the complexities we know, Instead, we teach the students something suitable to their level of understanding -- something adequate. Doing so is not lying, but advancing them in true knowledge. Teaching Newtonian physics is not teaching falsehoods. Nor does teaching relativistic quantum field theory give students an understanding fully corresponding to reality.

It is only if you take "truth" as naming something unattainable by humans that one can avoid the notion of adequacy. I see "truth" as applying to what humans actually know, not a Platonic ideal. What we actually know is always limited, not exhaustive, but generally adequate to the needs of the lived world.

The problem with pragmatism is that it works in some cases, but not for the whole range of cases. If I don't know how to shoe a horse, I can't shoe a horse. Thus, true knowledge of horseshoeing is knowledge adequate to shoeing a horse. In the same way, true knowledge with respect to God's existence is adequate to deciding the reality of God's existence -- something that may have no pragmatic consequences. So, if our need is practical (to control being), adequacy approximates pragmatism. If our need is theoretical (to know being), adequacy is unrelated to pragmatism, being closer to correspondence.

The judgement of "most adequate", in the sense of a representation, is a judgement of correspondence. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure what you are thinking of as corresponding to what in the discussion of frames of reference. It is the case (correspondence) that if the universe has an overall curvature, a Euclidean frame of reference would be inadequate to represent it. Is that what you are thinking of?

Let me say again, I'm not rejecting correspondence when it works. I'm saying that it only works in a limited number of cases (e.g., not for negations or universals as no real thing corresponds to either) while adequacy works in all the cases I know and becomes correspondence in some cases.

As "phenomena" is how we perceive the cosmos through means of our senses. We cannot jump across the gap between how we perceive the cosmos, and what is acting on us, to assume that phenomena is what is acting on us. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not saying that a phenomenon is acting on us. I am saying that a phenomenon is some aspect of the cosmos acting on us. How can we perceive an apple unless it scatters light into our eyes, pushes back when we touch it, or emits a scent? Clearly, if an object can't act on us, it can't change our neural state to form a sensory representation. The object's action on the subject informs the subject's representation of the object.

We, as sensing human beings have already inherent within us a perspective form which we observe — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, we have a perspective -- a standpoint from which we observe. But, a standpoint is not a frame of reference. We may be on a train and yet chose a frame that is anchored in the world (so we see ourselves as moving) or we may anchor our frame in ourselves as resting, and see the world as moving. Neither is predetermined by what we observe (the phenomena).

The duality has been "solved" with quantum field theory, which considers fields as fundamental and particles as quantized ripples in fields. — Relativist

While I agree that quantum field theory, with its second quantization, provides us with consistent theory adequate to its purposes, it does not provide us with "particles" in the classical sense of point masses. Physics has no need of the particle construct or of the concept of wave-particle duality. Quantized fields are waves, not the point masses of atomists.

Sean Carroll, for example, has proposed that the heat death results in conditions from which a quantum fluctuation can occur which results in inflation — Relativist

And is a quantum fluctuation resulting in inflation "cycling" in the old sense of collapse? My choice not to say everything in a finite post does not mean what I do say is wrong.

It is entailed by the many worlds interpretation of Quantum Theory, so in that respect it is entailed by accepted theory. — Relativist

No, actually, it is not so entailed. If you actually read Everett's paper, as I have, he does not propose many worlds in any ontological sense, but only in an epistemic sense. What he argues is that as the measured quantum system is represented as a superposition of states, so we should model the brain of the observer as a corresponding superposition of states (a sort of Schrodinger cat). Each sub-state of the brain then represents one possible outcome of the quantum observation. So, we do not have many worlds, but many representations of one world.

Even if true, Everett's interpretation is entirely useless in rebutting the fine tuning argument, as each supposed representation has exactly the same physics, with exactly the same (fine-tuned) constants, as every other representation.

I have strong reasons, based on accepted physics, for rejecting both Schrodinger's cat and Everett's interpretation. As they are not germane to this thread, I will not offer them here.

a multiverse hypothesis is metaphysical, not mythological — Relativist

A metaphysical conclusion is one based on our experience of being (existence). A mythological claim lacks an adequate experiential basis -- as does the multiverse hypothesis.

multiverse hypotheses are tied to broader hypotheses (incomplete scientific theories) that are falsifiable. — Relativist

"Tied to" does not mean "derived from." When there is no logical implication, a hypothesis must be judged on its independent merits.

The true fundamental physics would almost certainly have different expressions. — Relativist

I agree. Nonetheless, the physics we have now is more than adequate to many purposes -- just as Newtonian physics continues to be more than adequate in its verified realm of application. So, while we can and should expect further, fundamental, revisions in our present physics, there is no reason to expect that the conclusions of a revised physics would overturn the conclusions of our present physics in its verified realm of application.

As the arguments for the fine-tuning of the various constants are sound applications of present physics in its verified realm of application, there is no rational reason to think that advances in physics would lead to their rejection.

The "laws" of physics are abstract descriptions of the physical relations among the things that exist in the universe. The relations are due to the properties of the existents. Properties and relations of physical things do not exist independently of the things that have them. — Relativist

First, as I explained, when I say "laws of nature" I mean the aspects of reality physics seeks to describe with its laws ("the laws of physics"), and not the descriptions themselves. Now either physics is describing (in a limited and approximate way), some aspect of reality ("the laws of nature"), or physics is a species of fiction. So, we may conclude that there are actual laws of nature -- which is to say that they are an aspect of reality.

Of course, the laws are co-extensive with the particles and fields they control, but not because they have parts outside of parts (are extended). They are not. Rather they are co-extensive because that is their domain of operation.

Nor can they be physically separated. Still, they can be separated in thought, so they are a different aspect of the universe than its matter and fields -- an aspect which is immaterial in the sense of lacking parts outside of parts and material constituents.

It is confusing to call laws "properties." "Property" usually means an aspect of a thing that may or may not be found in other things and that can vary between various tokens of the same type. Clearly, universal laws are not "properties" in this (usual) sense. If you are merely saying that we can have no operative laws without matter or fields for them to operate on, I am happy to stipulate that.

I am not a Platonist by any stretch, but this is unfair — SophistiCat

If there is an ideal, an exemplar human being, then that exemplar is male or female, of some particular race, introverted or extroverted, attracted to men or women, masculine or feminine in demeanor, etc. Those who lack one or more of these qualities are less than the ideal -- defective with respect to it. That can only be a basis for prejudice. We saw this kind of prejudice in 19th century slave holders who posited that blacks we not fully human; in Nazis who thought Jews, Poles and homosexuals sub-human; and in those contemporary Americans who seek to deny human rights and entry to the "inferior races" who come to the southern border -- even going so far as to steal their children.

So, no, this is not "unfair."

Do you agree this means that the souls in heaven do not sin? Don't they have free will, or does God remove our free will when we die? — Relativist

This is a good question -- one that has been resolved by Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae. When we choose, we always choose some good -- something that will satisfy a natural desire. Motivational psychology agrees on this, differing, perhaps, on the number and kinds of motivating factors. So, a sinner does not choose evil per se, but a defective good. (E.g. I want money or a dopamine rush, so I kill someone to get it.) In life, each option before us satisfies some of our desires while leaving others unsatisfied. So, we are free to select one set of partial satisfactions over another -- leaving us open to choosing evil (under the guise of good).

Once we are in the presence of God, we are in the presence of the highest good, fulfilling all our desires. So, there is no reason to choose a partial and incomplete good, and so sin. That need not mean that we have no choices. We could still have many different completely good lines of action open to us.