If I'm mistaken that your agenda is to "prove" God's existence based on the alleged "fine tuning" of these constants, then there's nothing really to discuss. — Relativist

If you've read my posts, you would have seen me state 2 or 3 times that I do not think the FTA proves God's existence. It only makes a strong case in the legal sense.

The FTA is an argumentum singum quia (an argument based on signs). Such arguments are only deductively sound when the signs can only point to one thing. That is not the case with the FTA or design arguments such as Paley's. Nonetheless, the FTA is persuasive, as a number of atheists have admitted -- giving it as a reason for positing a multiverse.

I've also said that a Multiverse is logically possible -- and more, a possibility worth researching. Also, I would be happy to see a theory that would actually allow us to calculate the fundamental physical constants -- even if it showed they could have different values under different circumstances.

The strength of the FTA lies in the fact that when many improbable means coordinate to effect the same end, it is usually the case that they are intelligently directed to that end. This is the kind of reasoning used in court cases. So it's quite rational, even though not airtight.

we don't know what the true fundamental laws of nature actually are. — Relativist

Yes, but we do know that whatever the fundamental laws are, they closely approximate the physics we have in its verified realm of application.

There are many sorts things that exist in THIS world that would not exist had the constants been different. — Relativist

For example? As I read it, some of the constants control times that are important mainly, if not exclusively, to biogenesis.

Thomist metaphyics has the view of essence that I was referring to: — Relativist

No, Aquinas follows Aristotle in his discussion of essences. Aquinas' treatment of existence goes beyond that of Aristotle.

it is an integral part of his metaphysics, and yet it is pure assumption that there is such a thing. — Relativist

Aquinas is quite clear that neither essence nor existence are "things." They are just "principles" -- the foundation in reality (objective basis) for saying that a thing is (existence), and what kind of a thing it is (essence). So, if you think that there's an objective basis for saying something exists, you agree with Aquinas that it has "existence," and if you think there's an objective basis for saying you're human and Fido is a dog, then you agree that you and Fido have essences. There is nothing more to essence and existence than that.

Sounds similar to Thomist metaphysics, and it again sounds like an assumption - not something that we know exists due to evidence, but rather something that is postulated. — Relativist

No, its not an assumption. Its a couple of definitions based on experience. Things have to exist to act. What does't exist, can't do anything, and what can't do anything is indistinguishable from nothing (non-being). Nothing we encounter in nature can do everything, but if we know what it can do (e.g. walk like a duck, quack like a duck, etc), then we can tell what it is. So, the specification of a things possible acts tells us what it is (its essence).

My issue is that if you're going to accept unprovable postulates in your preferred metaphysics — Relativist

We know our fundamental facts directly from experience, not indirectly, via proofs. So, if you know your premises from experience, I'm all for them.

theories are falsifiable, and so are the rigorous multiverse theories — Relativist

What is the specific falsifiable prediction?

Immaterial laws exist in the mind. — Relativist

The approximate descriptions of the laws of nature exist in our minds. You have already admitted that there are fundamental laws and that we do not fully understand them. Without laws of nature operative in the universe, we have no way of explaining the origin of the cosmos or the evolution of life. Our scientific explanations only work because we grant that the laws we observe now were operative in the past.

If you were to claim they exist independent of the things that exhibit the described behavior (e.g. as platonic entities) and they somehow direct or govern that behavior, then you would be making a debatable metaphysical assumption. — Relativist

I am not saying that they can operate independently of the things they operate on. That would be nonsense. I am saying that we can grasp the existence of laws of nature that are logically distinct from, but physically inseparable form, material states.

Let me begin by saying, that while you may define your terms however you wish, definitions that alter, rather than clarify, common usage, lead to philosophic confusion -- especially when no warning is given of their peculiarity. Most people use "truth" to name something they've experienced in their own thought and language, and in that of others. Extremely few (mostly Platonists), would posit Ideal Truth and fewer still say truth resides in God alone.

So, I see no point in attacking your definition and usage. It simply is neither mine nor based on common use.

I think I have a better suggestion, and that is to remove the requirement of "truth" from knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see how anything false can count as knowledge. I wonder if you'd be kind enough to give your definition of "knowledge." Mine is awareness of present intelligibility -- guaranteeing a connection (dynamical presence) with the intelligible object.

We represent knowledge as it really is, and this is something relative, and admitting to degrees of certainty. — Metaphysician Undercover

According to Aristotle, saying what is, is, is speaking the truth. I take it you disagree if you think that we can "represent knowledge as it really is," and yet not have truth..

I have no problem with degrees of certitude. I see them ranging from metaphysical (guarantied by the nature of being), through physical (guarantied by the normal operation of nature), to moral (rational expectations justifying ethical decisions).

How do you see metaphysically certain human propositions as compromising "truth"?

The addition of "approach" suggests less than equal, and less than equal is not equal. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Approach to" is not an addition. It translates the Latin prefix ad- in adaequatio, which you continue to ignore, pretending the text says aequatio. Rather than suggesting "less than" means "equals," It recognizes that human estimates of equality are often approximate.

Also, as I said earlier, the translation is not mine, but Richard McKeon's in the philosophical Latin vocabulary in his Selections From Medieval Philosophers. So, please desist in calling it "bogus" or explain why McKeon erred.

the point is that in order for there to be truth, the proper representation of the real thing must exist within the intellect. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course. I am not disputing that. Instead I am delving into what makes a representation "proper."

we can see that the representation need not be in any way similar to the real thing represented. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, we can.

The symbol 2 is not at all similar to what it represents. However, there must be an equation or equality between the symbol and the thing represented. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes it is not similar. No, equality is not involved. Rather "2" evokes in readers, by convention, the concept <two> -- the same concept concept evoked by counting actual and potential instances of sets of two units. Evocation is not equality.

So, the correct account is that <two> arises by abstraction form our counting experiences of sets of two elements, and we employ the convention of signifying the concept <two> by the symbol "2."

There is always a direct one to one relation, not an approach. There is no room for "adequacy", in truth otherwise someone might say that 2 represents something between 1.8 and 2.2. — Metaphysician Undercover

As Aristotle notes in Metaphysics Delta, there are two species of quantity: discrete and continuous. Discrete quantities are not numbers, but countable. In counting is is rational to expect exactitude as you suggest. Continuous quantities are not numbers either, but measurable. Measurements are always approximate. So it is irrational to expect an exact value, and no one thinks we're lying when we say that the bolt is 2 cm long if that is a reasonable approximation of its length.

So, what is a reasonable approximation? One adequate to the purpose of the measurement. For example, home building requires less accuracy than grinding telescope mirrors.

That we do not have correspondence in a complete and perfect way does not mean that we ought not strive for it. — Metaphysician Undercover

What we strive for is a practical decision. We have a finite amount of time, and a panoply of human needs -- as noted by Maslow and others. So, it's foolish to spend time on attaining unnecessary precision. This does not mean you shouldn't pursue your passions, only that you need to manage your time wisely.

If we remove the ideal, assuming that we have reached a "truth" which is sufficient for human beings, then there is nothing to inspire us to better ourselves. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think this follows. We have natural desires, including the desire to know (Aristotle), all supporting the desire for self-realization (Maslow). Because these desires are innate, there is no need to hold an abstract (and unattainable) goal before the mind. A loving person will always find good to do.

I think it's nonsense that "truth" would be something different for God than for human beings. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let's review. In God, there is an agreement between what is in His mind and creation because God willing creation to exist is identically creation being willed to exist by God. God in knowing his own act of creatio continuo, of sustaining creation in being, knows all creation. We do not have this relation to creation. Rather than knowing creation because we act on it to maintain it, we know it because it acts on us via our senses. So, it is metaphysically impossible that we could know as God knows or have truth as God has truth. Such omniscient truth can never be a human goal, as it's ontologically incompatible with our finite nature.

the equality of the relation, the one to one relation between God's Forms and reality must be the same equality which the human intellect strives for. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I just pointed out, your goal is ontologically inconsistent with human nature. God can't have created as He has and also intend us to strive for a goal contrary to that very nature.

What you have demonstrated is that human knowledge is deficient. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not "deficient," which would mean intrinsically inadequate to our needs, but limited. We know the world as it relates to us -- and we relate to it.

And such a premise would require that "truth" is defined in two distinct ways, which is contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, It does not require contradictory definitions, but analogous predication, which is the beauty of Aquinas' analysis. Two predications are analogous when the senses of the predicates are partly the same and partly different. Creation conforms God's mind because God willing creation to exist is identically creation being willed to exist by God. What we actually know conforms to reality because we are aware of it acting on us. Thus, the mode by which we know is radically different, but the note of conformity is the same.

Since we have no comprehensive way to exclude the possibility of falsity, then that possibility is a necessary (essential) part of human knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a non sequitur. Possible accidents (in the sense opposed to essence), are no more essential than actual accidents.

What you've described is teaching the concept. But this requires that the concept pre-exists, prior to the student learning it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not in the mind of the student.

Before drawing the triangle, the teacher must know the concept. And the teacher must have learned it from someone else who drew it, and so on, until you have an infinite regress. Such an infinite regress doesn't allow for any coming into being of the concept, so the concept along with human beings teaching it, must exist eternally. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your analysis is inconsistent with the history of ideas, which records the routine advent of new Ideas, e.g. that of dynamis by Aristotle, displacement by Archimedes, impetus and instantaneous velocity by 14th century Scholastics, universal laws by Newton, conservation of mass by Lavoisier, displacement currents by Maxwell, or quantization of action by Planck.

Experience exposes us to the potential for the concept and then the activity of the mind causes it to have actual existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Have i said otherwise? Have I doubted that nature is intelligible? Have i said that concepts arise from nothing? I've said that they result form the actualization of latent intelligibility -- delivered to us by things acting on our senses.

Nothing you've said shows that concepts are not, or cannot be, abstracted from intelligibility delivered via sense data.

An infinite entity (if such a thing is even possible) is not natural. No natural things are infinite. Nor is it possible that something immanent could be infinite because it would be constrained by that which it inheres within. — Metaphysician Undercover

A finite being is one with a limited capacity to act. An infinite being is one that can do any logically possible act. The Immanence of God means that God is present throughout reality in virtue of His continually maintaining it in being. To be immanent, a being need not be limited to that which it is immanent in.

the concepts that are the constituents of intellectual activity are universal while mental images and sensations are always essentially particular.

Agreed.

Second, mental images are always to some extent vague or indeterminate, while concepts are at least often precise and determinate.

Agreed.

Third, we have many concepts that are so abstract that they do not have even the loose sort of connection with mental imagery that concepts like man, triangle, and crowd have.

Agreed.

I interpret Plato's 'mystical intuition' to be referring to the capacity of the intellect to grasp concepts - the very action of reason itself. In order to be able to do that, the intellect represents through abstractions, which are in some sense idealisations, in another sense, possibilities. The sense in which they exist are as potentials or ideals; they don't exist in the manifest domain, but in the domain of possibility, which is, nevertheless, a real domain, insofar as there is a 'domain of real possibility'. — Wayfarer

i think this is an incorrect interpretation of the historical Plato, who believed in innate ideas. In the Meno, for example, he argues that with a little simulation, ideas are "remembered."

I agree that universal concepts are abstractions. I am not sure if you are using this term merely to describe what they are, or if you are also talking about how they come to be. My understanding of ideogenesis is Aristotelian-Thomistic. As a result of sensation we form unified physical (neural) representations Aristotle called "phantasms." (How these are formed is the focus of the so-called "binding problem" in contemporary neuroscience.) The intellect (nous = our power of awareness) makes the information latent in these representations actually known. Every representation has many notes of intelligibility and, under the direction of our will, we can attend to some to the exclusion of others. This selective attention is abstraction and the efficient cause of our universal concepts. (Their formal cause, what provides their informative content, is the phantasm.) So, our universal ideas, while products of intellect, derive their information wholly from sense data. (Aristotle's discussion of this, which is very heavy going, is in De Anima iii.)

As for ideas and possibility, the reason they are universal is not because we have experienced and intend all their instances, as Mill might think, but because each instance is objectively capable of evoking, via abstraction, its corresponding ideas.

As for where Ideas exist, that is an-ill framed question. The phantasms which support ideas exist in the brain, but Ideas themselves are not things but activities. My idea <triangle> is me thinking of triangles, and me thinking of triangles is supported by the brain's neural processing. Still, the idea is not merely the brain's triangle representations, but my intellect being aware of the relevant notes of intelligibility encoded in that representation. Consequently, if the brain is damaged, our ability to think can be compromised -- because we may no longer be able to process contents properly.

a concept of 'degrees of reality' is required, something which has generally been lost in the transition to modernity, in which existence is univocal. — Wayfarer

I follow Aquinas in seeing "being" as an analogous, not a univocal, term. We can discuss the analogy of being when it is more relevant to the thread's topic.

Secondly, on the argument that 'concepts can arise from experience' - I think this is the kind of claim made by empiricists, such as J S Mill, who generally reject the possibility of innate mental capabilities. But only a mind capable of grasping geometric forms could understand that two completely different triangles are instances of the same general kind (although it would be interesting to see if there have been animal trials to determine whether crows or monkeys can pick out triangles from amongst a collection of geometric shapes.) — Wayfarer

I am an empiricist, but of an Aristotelian, rather than a Millian, stripe. I have no problem with "innate mental capabilities" in the sense of abilities. I see no need for any innate abstract knowledge, including so-called "a priori propositions" such as the principle of contradiction.

I don't think the ability to learn and use types, which has been implemented by artificial intelligence, implies intellect. The essential note of intellect is awareness.

Thank you for the kind words.

If you're interested in the difference between Plato's and Aristotle's theories you might want o read my article, "A New Reading of Aristotle's Hyle," The Modern Schoolman LXVIII (1991), 3, pp. 225-244. (https://philpapers.org/rec/POLANR).

Plato needs to explain how multiple individuals can "participate" in a single form. His solution is that a form or ideal is like a seal, and matter (chora, pandeches) is a like the wax into which the seal is impressed. All intelligibility is in the form, while matter is wholly unintelligible. The reason individuals differ is because matter is in some way defective -- giving rise to imperfect copies. Thus, individuality is the result of imperfection.

Aristotle rejects, with about 14 different arguments in his Metaphysics, separate Platonic forms. So, he has no need to relate one form to many instances. His problem is to explain the reality of change. As a result, he sees material objects as having two fundamental aspects: an intrinsic form (which is what the object is now) and an active tendency (he calls it a "desire") to transform into something else, hyle. Hyle means "wood," and reflects the story of a wooden bed that sprouted leaves. Thus, it indicates at a "blossoming" dynamic hidden beneath the present form of things. Unlike Plato's unintelligible chora, hyle can be known by analogy. For example, we can know by analogy with other, similar seeds, that an acorn has an active tendency to become an oak.

This active tendency is not seen as reflecting universal laws of nature, but they are a natural development of the hyle idea

I believe that the word "mind" truly doesn't define anything and is rather a vague term — Llum

I do not find "mind" in the least "vague." "Mind" names our capacity to know and to make decisions. Knowing is being aware of present intelligibility -- typically neurally encoded contents. Deciding is committing to one of a number if mutually incompatible alternatives.

The mind is a construct of the brain. — Llum

Thank you for your faith claim. The mind certainly involves the brain as brain trauma affects out ability to perform neural processing, and hence the contents presented to awareness. However there are no rational grounds for thinking that the brain alone explains what we experience as mind. As there is a vast amount of neural processing that we are unaware of, it is clear that awareness is not a concomitant of neural processing. To know, we need not only neurally encoded and processed contents, but awareness of those contents. Despite almost 3,000 years of naturalist speculation, we have no viable model for how physics can produce awareness -- and there are sound reasons for this.

from an evolutionary perspective, we know that humans have the highest degree of consciousness that allows them to think about these things. — Llum

No, we don't. Evolution might be able to explain superior data processing, but it has absolutely nothing to say about consciousness in the sense of subjective awareness. Further, as far as I can tell conscious in this sense has no "degrees." Either we are aware of some contents, or we are not. We can be aware of more or fewer contents, but that is not a "degree of awareness."

So the idea that the brain and mind can be separated from each other is incorrect — Llum

I agree. Inseparability does not, however, mean that they identical.

Christians choose to love God while their on earth, and yet they continue to sin. — Relativist

Yes. The difference is that few on earth achieve and maintain union with God. It is only in such a union that conflicting desires are resolved.

Thanks for the correction. I copied the citations from Jozef Matula, "Thomas Aguinas [sic] and his Reading of Isaac ben Solomon Israeli" (https://www.academia.edu/10100256/30._Thomas_Aquinas_and_his_Reading_of_Isaac_ben_Solomon_Israeli)

"Has the likeness of the thing known", sounds like correspondence to me. How do you interpret this as "adequacy'? — Metaphysician Undercover

The question is: is the representation in the mind adequate to what exists in reality? If it is, then what is in our mind is true. If not, not. The point I'm trying to make is that our mental representation can never be exhaustive of reality. They will always be projections (dimensionally diminished maps) of reality. (Aquinas explicitly states that we have no direct knowledge of essences -- they are only known via accidents.) This lead one to ask how much of an "approach to equality" (adaequatio) do we need to count as truth? I am suggesting that the answer depends on the context: Our representations must be close enough that we aren't misled in our reflections, i.e. the approximation must be adequate to our needs.

I admit that this is not usually commented on, but it is essential to avoiding what I call the "Omniscience Fallacy" -- using divine omniscience as a paradigm for human knowledge. Doing so leads to the conclusion that we never "really know" anything. I think it's better to take "knowing" to name an activity engaged in by human beings. Doing so allows our mental representations to be true without being exhaustive.

The quote is taken right out of context, by you, and given an unacceptable translation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm sorry, but it's not taken out of context. It's Aquinas' stock definition, as shown by the numerous citations. According to Matula, the same definition, citing ben Israel, is used by Albert the Great, Bonaventura, Alexander of Hales and William de la Marre. So, it's a standard definition.

Note that I am not rejecting the formulation you cite. I am merely pointing out that a "likeness" invariably has less content than the original. How much less can still be counted as true?

No translation is prefect. I always get much more out of reading Aquinas' Latin than a translation because his Latin terms have connotations missing in their translations. (I got "approach to equality" from McKeon. I can find the exact citation if you wish.) So, my translation isn't "bogus." It merely emphasizes a different aspect of adaequatio. On the other hand, "equality" is quite deceptive. Aquinas never writes aequatio, but always adaequatio -- rejecting actual equality.

You are saying that since we cannot have correspondence in a complete, and perfect way, then lets just settle for something less than that, and call this "truth" instead. Anything which is adequate for the purpose at hand, we'll just say it's the truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let's parse this out. You seem to agree that "we cannot have correspondence in a complete, and perfect way." If so, we have two options:
(1) We humans are incapable of knowing truth. (The Omniscience Fallacy).
(2) Human truth does not require " correspondence in a complete, and perfect way." (My position.)

I think you agree with (2). So, I'm puzzled as to why you disagree with me. If (2) is so, then
(a) Any incomplete, imperfect degree of correspondence counts as truth, or
(b) There is some requirement beyond an incomplete, imperfect degree of correspondence for a representation to count as truth. (My position.)

We are now faced with the question of what this additional requirement might be? The options are, exhaustively:
(i) A criterion that would allow us to draw false conclusions in our considerations, or
(ii) A criterion that prevents us from drawing false conclusions in our considerations -- I.e. The requirement that the degree of correspondence be adequate to prevent consequent errors in our considerations. (My position).

Please tell me where you disagree with my analysis.

We cannot say that "God's Truth" is different from human truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know if you have not read enough of Aquinas, or if you reject his position. In his analysis, "truth," like "being," is an analogous term, i.e. its meaning is partly the same and partly different in God and in humans. So, yes, God's truth isn't human truth. What is in God's mind corresponds to reality because God's Intellect and Will are the source of reality. On the other hand, any correspondence between human minds and reality results from reality acting on us. While the first is perfect (because God willing creation to exists is, identically, creation being willed to exist by God), the latter is not.

We come to know an object because it has acted on us in some way we're aware of. But, in acting on us in a specific way, an object does not exhaust the potential modes of action specified by its essence. Thus, we do not, and cannot, know objects exhaustively, as God does. Therefore, God's truth differs from our truth.

Valid logic does not necessitate truth, so nothing prevents us from doing logic when it's not necessarily the truth which we are obtaining with that logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course validity is not soundness. But, what is the point of being logical if not thinking salve veritate? Unless we start with the truth, we have no guaranty of ending with truth, so we cant know truth, we might just as well discard logic. Only if we can know truth is there a reason to think logically.

"Suppose I have a universal concept, <triangle>. There is no Platonic Triangle corresponding to it." — Dfpolis

On what basis do you make this assertion? If there is not some independent idea of triangle, which your concept must correspond with, then you could make your concept however you please. — Metaphysician Undercover

On the basis of the 14 or so counter-arguments Aristotle gives in his Metaphysics. Most telling to me, personally, is that I know of no reason to posit Platonic ideals. They do not instantiate triangles -- mostly people do. They are not necessary for us to know what a triangle is -- we teach children what they are by showing them examples and letting them abstract the concept. To apply the concept <triangle> to a new instance, that instance must be able to evoke the concept. But, if that instance can evoke the concept, any instance can. Thus, the concept can arise from experience -- without the need of mystical intuition. All we need to do is to focus on some notes of intelligibility to the exclusion of others.

And, yes, I can make any self-consistent concept I please. For example, the concept <gap triangle> -- like a triangle, but with 2 sides not joined.

when scientists like physicists produce the laws of physics, there is something real, independent, which must be followed when producing these laws. The laws must correspond with reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course there are laws operative in nature that physicists seek to describe with the laws of physics. They are observable aspects of nature, not denizens of an Ideal realm.

Your discussion of universals in Plato and Aristotle is close enough to my view that it is not worth quibbling about the differences.

Because the testimony of sense is inherently unreliable, right? That mathematical and geometric ideas are know-able in a way that objects of perception are not, because they are grasped directly the intellect in a way that material particulars cannot be. Which was to develop, much later, into the basis of Aristotle's hylomorphic dualism. — Wayfarer

Yes, Plato thought that sense knowledge was entirely unreliable. Aristotle did not.

In my article, (Dennis F. Polis, "A New Reading of Aristotle's Hyle," The Modern Schoolman, LXVIII (1991), 3, pp. 225-244), and in my book (God, Science and Mind), I explain that the hylomorphic theory of Plato in the Timaeus is very different from that of Aristotle -- even though they were confused by Neoplatonic commentators and, subsequently, by the Scholastics.

Plato's theory was designed to explain how a single Form or Idea could inform multiple individuals. Aristotle's problem was very different -- he wished to explain how substantial change is possible. As a result Plato's "matter" (chora) is an entirely different concept from Aristotle's "matter" (hyle). The fact that both Greek terms are translated by the English "matter" only adds to the confusion.

Then you have to agree there is a possible state of affairs in which there exist free-willed creatures who do not sin. Why wouldn't an omnibenevolent God just place us in that environment to begin with? — Relativist

On reflection, I decided that my earlier response missed an important point.

The answer is that the only reason that those in heaven do not sin is because they have chosen to love God. To know we must choose to attend to the known object. To attend to God in such a way as to preclude sin we must love God. But, love, to be real must be freely given -- in other words, we can't compel someone to love us. If love can be freely given, it can be freely withheld -- and choosing not to love God (Who is Goodness and Truth) is to sin. So, the final condition we are discussing entails a logically prior condition open to sin. Thus, it is not the counter-example you seek.

A realist view of MWI is based on the ontological commitment that physical reality is a quantum system, and that the classical world of experience is an eigenstate of that QM system. So the "world branching" is (technically) just a classical perspective: each eigenstate is a classical "world." — Relativist

No, in quantum theory, the actual world is always a superposition of states. Eigenstates with respect to one dynamical variable are superpositions of many states with respect to another. So the only "special" thing about being an eigenstate is that the corresponding eigenvalue is one of the possible answers if we try to measure the associated variable.

But, as I keep repeating, the MWI is not evidence against the FTA because every "world" has the same physical constants. Also, it is based on defective physics.

You also mention there being exactly one set of physical constraints, and I agree - but that doesn't mean we have a complete understanding of what the true constraints are, since we can only see how they manifest in our classical world. — Relativist

As they are determined by how they "manifest" in the classical world, that is all we need to know -- whatever you may think contrasts with "manifesting in the classical world."

The FTA has the unstated assumption that life was a design objective. — Relativist

No, the FTA infers that life was intentional from the fact that the variables have the exact values required to produce life. Suppose you ran a store with only one thing costing $1.59 and a young person plunks $1.59 on the counter, looking at you expectantly. It would be a rational inference to conclude that the child wants the one thing costing $1.59.

Consider any metaphysically possible world W, which contains complex objects of type T. One could argue that W was fine tuned for T. — Relativist

This is simply false. For the argument to be persuasive, you need the additional datum at the core of the FTA, viz., that minute variations of W's constants would preclude the existence of Ts.

with advances in science and analytic philosophy, we can see that the notion of essence has no empirical basis — Relativist

This is nonsense, as shown by my example of biologists making taxonomic decisions. There is a foundation in reality for essential definitions, and that is what Aristotle defines as a thing's "essence:"
"The essence of each thing is what it is said to be propter se" Metaphysics Z, 4 -- and saying what something is, is defining it.

Essence entails the existence of necessary and sufficient properties for individuation and for delineating "kinds." What are your necessary and sufficient properties vs your accidental properties? Would you be YOU had there been a single gene that was different? How about a single day of your life having different experiences? — Relativist

You are confusing my individual characteristics with what allows me to be called a "human." Aristotle's essences are not individual, but specific. So, "Essence entails the existence of necessary and sufficient properties for individuation" is simply false. "Essence entails the existence of necessary and sufficient properties for delineating 'kinds'" is true.

Consider the evolution of horse throughout the evolutionary history of its ancestry — Relativist

Biologists have -- defining different species in the ancestral line of the modern horse.

More fundamentally, you seem to be thinking of essences as something imposed from the outside. What actually happens is that we humans develop conceptual spaces in response to our experiences. Then, when we want to be more precise, we formally define what we mean by various terms, and necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a term are, collectively, the essence of what we have defined.

Since essences are only found in concrete things, they don't pre-exist their instances. As species evolve, so do the properties we use to define them, i.e. their essences.

Remember: Aristotle started by teaching logic. His primary concern is precision in language, not Plato's Ideal World. His discussion of essence and existence is about how what we say reflects our experience of reality.

What are your necessary and sufficient properties vs your accidental properties? — Relativist

Let's take the concept <human>. Every creature that evokes that concept has a human essence because its essence is just a set of properties sufficient to evoke the concept <human>. Said in a different way, the human essence ontological basis for abstracting the concept <human>. Other properties it has -- properties that vary from from one human to another -- are, by definition, "accidental." ("Accidental" in this sense is not to be confused with "accidental" in the sense of random.)

We weren't discussing evidence. You had alleged the multiverse hypothesis was "mythological" and that it was not falsifiable. — Relativist

A theory is mythic if it has no evidentiary basis. It is unfalsifiable if no evidence can falsify it. You did not show I was wrong on either count. ("I admit there is no evidence for a multiverse.")

Multiverse is consistent with what we know, and it is entailed by some reasonable extrapolations — Relativist

Being consistent means it's logically possible. I agree a multiverse is logically possible -- that requires no supporting evidence. One can extrapolate in any way one wishes. Experience shows that "reasonable extrapolations" have no epistic value. "The earth looks pretty flat to me," though true, does not support "The earth is flat." "The stars appear to rotate around the earth," while true, does not entail "The stars are embedded in a crystalline sphere." I require actual evidence and adherence to methodological canons to call a theory "scientific."

Science advances in this way; accepted theory does not arrive in its final form. — Relativist

I quite agree. But, for every accepted theory there are thousands that turn out to be utter rubbish. I'm not saying no one should research multiverses or work out the consequences of alternate hypotheses. If I were refereeing a paper working out a reasonable hypothesis, I wouldn't reject it because it involved a multiverse. This is not a discussion about freedom of thought or the right to discuss various hypotheses, but about what it's rational to think true given what we actually know.

Errors in the analysis are self-correcting - that's what peer review is for. — Relativist

This is a contradiction. Errors don't self-reflect and think themselves wrong. People correct them -- and I'm one of those doing so.

We should be agnostic to the existence of multiverse, not hastily dismissing it for insufficient empirical basis while declaring victory for a deism that also lacks an empirical basis. — Relativist

You seem confused as to my position. I'm open to the possibility of a multiverse. I even think it's a sensible line of inquiry. What I'm discussing is the current epistic value of the multiverse hypothesis as opposed to the FTA. It should be obvious that any hypothesis lacking supporting evidence (as you agree wrt a multiverse) has no epistic value. On the other hand, the FTA is based on evidence and peer-reviewed calculations. I agree that the FTA is not a "proof," but it does have epistic value. So it makes a far stronger case in the legal sense.

That's fine as long as you refrain from arguments from ignorance — Relativist

You've bandied about "arguments from ignorance" for a while I don't recall advancing any -- nor you pointing out any. On the other hand, you're using our ignorance wrt a multiverse as a counter to the FTA. Please be specific as to any arguments from ignorance you think I'm making.

You seem to have some physical/metaphysical framework in mind, — Relativist

My metaphysical framework is dynamic realism -- that "existence" is convertible with "the power to act in some way," and a being's "essence" is a specification of its possible acts. (This isn't Aristotle's definition of "essence,") My epistemological framework is my projection paradigm -- that all we know is a dynamic projection (dimensionally diminished map) of reality, i.e. the result of reality acting on us in some limited way.

Feel free to criticize of my framework.

You ... are judging the Armstrong-Tooley framework from that perspective. That is the category error. — Relativist

Do you know what a category error is? If so how am I making one?

from the perspective of Armstrong's metaphysics, it's meaningless to assert "laws of nature lack the defining characteristics of matter". — Relativist

I am willing to grant this is the case. Since my sentence is perfectly meaningful in normal English language discourse, I conclude that Armstrong's metaphysics is inadequate to normal English discourse. You are perfectly free to limit yourself to their framework. I prefer to be open to many complementary projections of reality.

There seems to be a disconnect here between "creating an individual", and, "the intelligibility of the individuals", as these two are quite distinct. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, they are distinct, but they are related. In the Timaeus Plato is trying to explain the existence of multiple instances of the same universal -- say <man>. He thinks that matter is entirely unintelligible, so all intelligibility has to come from Form (Ideals). Still, in some vague way, individual differences arise from "defects of the matter" as different impressions impressions of the same seal in wax might differ due to impurities.

So, in his system, you can't instantiate an intelligible individual with a partially specified form. Nor is it clear how you can instantiate different intelligibilities without different forms. All you can do to explain how individuals differ is to say they are defective images of the Form.

I've read a lot of Aquinas and have yet to see where he defines truth as adequacy. — Metaphysician Undercover

Its kind of hard to miss if you've read much Aquinas in Latin. De Veritate q.1, a.11, resp: "alio modo diffinitur secundum id in quo formaliter ratio veri perficitur, et sic dicit Ysaac quod Veritas est adequatio rei cum intellectus". Q.1.a.1: "Isaac dicit in libro De definitionibus, quod veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus." Summa Theologiae I, q.16., a.2. a.3: "Isaac dicit in libro De definitionibus, quod veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus." In I Sententiarum, d.19, q.5.a.1; Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 59; "Veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei"

As I said, adaequatio means "approach to equality" (according to McKeon) Translators sometimes say "agreement," but the Latin is telling. He does not say aequatio (equality) as would be expected if he meant correspondence, but "approach to equality," which leaves open the question: how close we need to be to be speaking truth? It seems clear that we need to be close enough not to mislead our audience, and that depends both on the audience and the context. So, I have chosen the English cognate of adaequatio, "adequacy," to express this.

So I still don't see how you equate adequacy, which refers to method, with truth, which refers to how things are — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not applying "adequacy" to method, but to the need implicit in the context of discourse. Arguably, we all want to know the truth. As reality is virtually inexhaustible, no amount of abstract thought or verbal discourse is going to give a full account of the reality being considered. So, no "truth" can fully correspond to reality. Nonetheless, we can have an account that is adequate to the needs implicit in our reflection or discourse. I'm saying that such an account qualifies as true.

All I'm doing is defining truth so it can actually be found in finite minds. I fully agree with Aristotle when he said that when we say what is, is, or what is not, is not, we are speaking the truth. The only difference is recognizing the impossibility of grasping "what is" exhaustively. What we know may not be exhaustive, but it can be adequate.

You are trying to lower truth from an ideal, so what remains is adequacy. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have a definition of "truth" which is adequate for you, and your purposes, but it's not acceptable to me because I see that you've compromised the ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree. When I assert "God is Truth," I'm accepting the ideal. I'm not sullying the ideal by recognizing that humans will never have truth as God has truth. Following Aquinas, I recognize "truth" as an analogous, not a univocal term. It is analogous by an analogy of proportionality -- true discourse is proportioned to the needs imposed by its context

Do you not believe that there is a real definition of "triangle", such that if I were to give a definition of triangle, it must correspond to that real definition of triangle in order to be a correct definition? — Metaphysician Undercover

. Human truth is partial, not exhaustive. It approaches (adaequatio) reality -- it is not reality as God's Truth is.

You may define your terms as you wish, but if you set the standard of truth so high that no limited mind can attain it, you rule out logical (salve veritate) discourse amongst humans. I am unwilling to do that.

Do you not believe that there is a real definition of "triangle", such that if I were to give a definition of triangle, it must correspond to that real definition of triangle in order to be a correct definition? Isn't this the case with all universals? Any definition or description of the universal must correspond with the real concept in order that it be a true definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

I know that we have a concept <triangle> that is evoked when we encounter actual triangles. I also know that the term "triangle" is a linguistic convention for expressing the concept <triangle>. So, if we want people to understand us when we utter "triangle," we need to define the term so it reflects the concept. Is that what you mean by the "real definition"?

In discussing truth I'm primarily considering what is in the mind and how it relates to reality. I'm only considering language to the extent that it expresses what is in our minds. Suppose I have a universal concept, <triangle>. There is no Platonic Triangle corresponding to it. There are many real and potential objects that have three straight, joined sides and so the objective capacity to evoke the concept <triangle>. The concept does not "correspond" to these real and potential objects -- there is no one-to-one mapping. Some of these objects don't even have actual existence. Still, my <triangle> concept is perfectly adequate to my needs in thinking about triangles.

this would allow anyone to make a logical argument proving any conclusion they desired, simply by designing the definitions which are adequate for the purpose of proving the conclusion they desired. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're forgetting the terms joined by "adequacy": "Veritas est adaequatio] intellectus et rei" -- truth is the adequacy of intellect to reality. I'm not talking about what's adequate to win an argument, but what's an adequate to reality (rei).

The best of luck to you.

Irrespective of whether Everett himself was a realist or an instrumentalist, a realist perspective on his interpretation is absolutely ontological . — Relativist

When I say that Everett's interpretation is more epistemological than ontological, I am speaking about the "manyness" of the worlds envisioned. I agree that he is speaking of real brainstates in real observers; nonetheless, these brainstates image different mathematical projections of one and the same world.

To understand this, you need to understand what a superposition of states is. It is not many worlds on top of each other, but a mathematical means of representing a single state in as a sum of mathematical forms called "eigenfunctions." Any state represented by one set of eigenfunctions can be mathematically transformed into representation in terms of any other complete set of functions. So, the mathematical structure (representation) of a particular superposition is not a natural property, but a reflection of how someone has chosen to represent nature. Thus, however we choose to represent a natural state by alternate sets of functions, it remains one and the same state. It is never many states, and certainly never many states with different physical constants as would be required to rebut the fine-tuning argument.

When I read Everett's paper I was truly impressed by the clarity and consistency of his thinking. Still, it is based on bad physics. It is not necessary to criticize his thinking here because, as I said, Everett's "many worlds" are all one and the same world with one and the same set of physical constants.

Of course it doesn't rebut the FTA on its own, but in conjunction with the potential for more fundamental physics it constitutes a mechanism for actualizing alternative realizations of localized physics. — Relativist

If it does not rebut the FTA on its own, it does not rebut the FTA. As I explained in another post, just as the advances of 20th century physics left Newtonian physics in tact with respect to phenomena in its verified realm of application, so any further advances, however fundamental, will leave 20th century physics in tact in its verified realm of application. Nothing will make a description of one world with one set of constants suddenly become a description of many worlds with many different constants.

The MWI interpretation has a variety of post-Everett flavors. — Relativist

Indeed it does. That is why we need to examine notthe "interpretations," but the logic Everett used to justify his proposal.

There is no good argument for the "fine-tuning" of the constants! - they all depend on the presumption of design. — Relativist

So, the physics showing that minute variations in the constants leads to conditions unsuited to life depends on the assumption of design? Would you care to provide an example showing how this assumption changed the calculations? Or even how it could change the calculations? The vast literature generated by naturalists to support the possibility of a multiverse as an explicit alternative to fine-tuning shows that some very prominent physicists and cosmologists take the calculations quite seriously.

A multiverse metaphysics has as much standing as an Aristotelian metaphysics (consider Aristotle's hypothesis that "essence" exists). — Relativist

No, it does not. Aristotle was an empiricist. He did not "hypothesize that 'essence' exists." He said that our definitions of universal terms reflect common elements in their instances, and that we may name those common elements the object's "essence." In other words, essences are the foundation in reality for essential definitions. I do not see how any empiricist could deny that there are real differences, found in individuals, that allow us to say this is human and this a canary. Biologists do that every time they determine what species an organism is.

So, while Aristotle's account of essences is entirely empirical, no account of multiverses is. Thus, multiverses are not "metaphysical" -- they derive from no adequate empirical foundation and are rightly classed as mythic.

Each specific multiverse is actually derivable from an (incomplete) scientific theory, so your objection has no merit. — Relativist

Really? "Incomplete" theories now have evidentiary standing? This merits no further discussion.

The problem arises because string theory is formulated most naturally in 10 or 11
spacetime dimensions ...

String theory is indeed "incomplete." So incomplete that it has made no falsifiable prediction and its supporters mix results from logically inconsistent versions. I will not repeat the harsher and less charitable criticisms. I merely note that dressing ignorance in mathematical lace doesn't make it a thing of beauty.

Sure, but its "verified realm of application" is limited to this universe. It's premature to declare that the quest for more fundamental physics, and the possible implications of it, are doomed. — Relativist

I have no problem with physics that only works for empirical reality. I am not sure why anyone would -- accept to rationalize a faith position.

I have never said or implied "that the quest for more fundamental physics, and the possible implications of it, are doomed." It is not something I believe, and so it seems a bit underhanded to suggest that I do. I will say until we actually have empirically verified advances in fundamental physics, it is irrational to pretend to know its implications.

why should we think our portion of the universe is representative of the whole? — Relativist

Because it exhausts our knowledge base. Either we base science on actual data, or we admit baseless speculation. Natural science, with its hypothetico-deductive method, will never achieve metaphysical certitude. Logically, there will always be other possibilities -- but we can't base science on possibility alone. Science needs to explain our actual experience of nature -- not possible mythic realms.

The fact that we can think abstractly about some properties of physical states of affairs doesn't imply there is anything immaterial about those physical states of affairs. — Relativist

You're arguing skew to the point here. It is not a question of whether we think abstractly or not. The question is: what are the properties of the object of thought. We think abstractly of quanta and fields, yet we know they are material because they have mass-energy and parts outside of parts (extension). We think abstractly of works of art, but we know they are composed of atoms. When we think of the laws of nature, our concept does not involve parts outside of parts -- they are not spatially divisible -- or the possession of mass-energy. Thus, laws of nature lack the defining characteristics of matter -- not because our thoughts are abstract, but because what we are thinking about falls into a different category.

"It is confusing to call laws "properties."
Get used to it, I didn't make it up. Physicalist philosophers like D.M. Armstrong and Michael Tooley have been using this terminology for years. — Relativist

It is no defense that Armstrong and Tooley are equally confused. Properties are logical "accidents" -- aspects of individuals. Some apples have the property being red or sweet. Others do not. The laws of nature operate universally. Of course you can take a word and extend its meaning. But, when you fail to see that it means different things in different sentences, you open yourself to the fallacy of equivocation. Precise thinking requires sensitivity to variations in meaning. Lumping equivocal meanings together is a sign of confusion.

under this account, laws of nature are relational properties that exist between states of affairs types. — Relativist

Indeed. The conceptual space you are projecting reality into does not span the available data. When you employ a projection that is not one-to-one, you leave data on the table. Other projections, into different conceptual spaces, are better suited to the data you have abstracted away. Your projection ignores intentionality. Intentions, while real, need not be reflected in physical states of affairs.

The role of the ideal is to identify an essence of an individual thing, separating it from other, inessential qualities, but what that essence is in any particular case is arguable. — SophistiCat

I agree that this is a possible version of Platonism, even though it is not that of Plato in the Timaeus. Clearly, this version can avoid my criticism of making some people more fully human than others. Still, depending on the imagined nature of the Ideal, it may remain subject to that criticism.

Still, I can see no reason to support the existence of Platonic ideals of this or any type. They are not needed to explain the existence of universal ideas in individual minds, as the ability to abstract (to focus on certain notes of comprehension to the exclusion of others) is adequate for ideogenesis. Nor are ideals required to explain how many individuals can instantiate the same universal. Shared dynamics and/or common ancestry suffice for that. The old problem of how many individuals can participate in one Ideal remains unsolved.

I was not claiming that there are multiple universes. I was simply stating it as a possibility, given the limits of what we know. — jajsfaye

I agree, it is a possibility. That is why the fine-tuning argument is not a proof, but merely a convincing argument on the model of a court case.

I will use random broadly here for the sake of simplicity, to mean anything that varies over a range of options — jajsfaye

That's fine, but this definition of random does not exclude the idea of intentionality.

You seem to be assuming they do not exist until we know otherwise — jajsfaye

No, I am not assuming that the multiverse hypothesis is wrong. I am merely pointing out that while it is logically possible, it does not rise to the level of a scientific hypothesis, because the only support there is for it is the argument that if there is no God, there must be a multiverse.

Your concluding sentence was:

"Thus, physics reveals that our universe is fundamentally intentional, both in its laws and in the values of its constants." — jajsfaye

Let me be clear. I have already said that the fine tuning argument is not a proof. It merely presents us with evidence of Intelligence. (By "evidence," I mean rational grounds inclining us to a conclusion, as legal evidence does.) On the one side, we have physics telling us, in a way unlikely to change with further advances, that the cosmos is fine-tuned for life. On the other hand, we have an unfalsifiable logical possibility, unsupported by a shred of evidence and in violation of the principle of parsimony, that there may be a myriad of other universes -- and that those other universes might just have different physical constants -- then again, they might not. I think any rational evaluation would see the fine-tuning argument (revealed by physics) as the stronger case.

That said, I don't rely on the fine tuning argument because there are unrefuted deductive arguments (aka actual proofs) for the existence of God as the ongoing sustainer of the cosmos.

You have not commented on my analysis showing that the laws of nature are intentional. That is my main argument for intelligence, with fine-tuning playing only a supporting role. If the laws of nature are intentional in character, then we must call their source a mind -- not a mind like ours, but still, a mind.

given these two possibilities:

A: There are multiverses and these have a range of parameters such that there is reasonable probability that at least one of them is finely tuned to support us being here.

B: There is either one universe or they are all set to the same parameters, but there is also a designer with the intelligence and capability to set the universe to be finely tuned to support us being here.

You seem to assume that B is more parsimonious and, thus, must be assumed to be true. It is hard for me to agree with that. — jajsfaye

This mis-states the case. Most of B is known fact, not assumption. We know that this universe exists and is fine tuned. So, the only hypothesis in B is that there is a single intelligence at work.

On the other hand, A posits (1) a myriad of other, complex, universes and (2) that each of these has (for reasons unknown) independent values of its physical constants.

Clearly, the hypothesis of a single intelligent Being is simpler than the dual hypotheses of a myriad of other universes and that physical constants vary between universes.

Finally, I do not think that God "designed" the universe. If God exists, He is necessarily changeless. So there can be no sequence of design and implementation in God. There can only be intentional implementation.

Then you have to agree there is a possible state of affairs in which there exist free-willed creatures who do not sin. Why wouldn't an omnibenevolent God just place us in that environment to begin with? — Relativist

That is a very good question. I can only point to reality, and say that is not how God chose to create.

As I also know, with metaphysical certitude, that God exists, I'll just have to accept that I do not have all the answers.

Not necessarily. One can abstract all these details, leaving only essentials. — SophistiCat

One may, but then one has no adequate plan for creating an individual. Where does the other information (the things you wish to abstract away) come from? Remember, the role of the ideal is to explain the intelligibility of the individuals we observe.

In the Timaeus Plato is quite explicit about the relation of the Ideal to individuals, saying that individualization is the result of the Ideal making an imperfect impression in matter, as a seal makes an impression in wax. Thus, explicitly, all individuality is imperfection.

I've never heard "truth" defined in this pragmatic way, such that "truth' is reduced to adequacy. The following statement, "I take truth to be the adequacy of what is in the mind to reality." is nonsensical. You are denying correspondence, so "adequate correspondence to reality" is denied. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am sorry that you've never heard of the definition used by the most prominent medieval metaphysician.

I fail to see why adequacy is in the least "nonsensical."

You seem confused. If we are discussing metaphysics, only the most precise statements are adequate. If we are discussing singulars, then adequacy and correspondence come to the same thing. However, while correspondence does not work for negations or universal propositions, adequacy does. It also works for teaching. When we begin teaching a subject, we can't possibly teach all the complexities we know, Instead, we teach the students something suitable to their level of understanding -- something adequate. Doing so is not lying, but advancing them in true knowledge. Teaching Newtonian physics is not teaching falsehoods. Nor does teaching relativistic quantum field theory give students an understanding fully corresponding to reality.

It is only if you take "truth" as naming something unattainable by humans that one can avoid the notion of adequacy. I see "truth" as applying to what humans actually know, not a Platonic ideal. What we actually know is always limited, not exhaustive, but generally adequate to the needs of the lived world.

The problem with pragmatism is that it works in some cases, but not for the whole range of cases. If I don't know how to shoe a horse, I can't shoe a horse. Thus, true knowledge of horseshoeing is knowledge adequate to shoeing a horse. In the same way, true knowledge with respect to God's existence is adequate to deciding the reality of God's existence -- something that may have no pragmatic consequences. So, if our need is practical (to control being), adequacy approximates pragmatism. If our need is theoretical (to know being), adequacy is unrelated to pragmatism, being closer to correspondence.

The judgement of "most adequate", in the sense of a representation, is a judgement of correspondence. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure what you are thinking of as corresponding to what in the discussion of frames of reference. It is the case (correspondence) that if the universe has an overall curvature, a Euclidean frame of reference would be inadequate to represent it. Is that what you are thinking of?

Let me say again, I'm not rejecting correspondence when it works. I'm saying that it only works in a limited number of cases (e.g., not for negations or universals as no real thing corresponds to either) while adequacy works in all the cases I know and becomes correspondence in some cases.

As "phenomena" is how we perceive the cosmos through means of our senses. We cannot jump across the gap between how we perceive the cosmos, and what is acting on us, to assume that phenomena is what is acting on us. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not saying that a phenomenon is acting on us. I am saying that a phenomenon is some aspect of the cosmos acting on us. How can we perceive an apple unless it scatters light into our eyes, pushes back when we touch it, or emits a scent? Clearly, if an object can't act on us, it can't change our neural state to form a sensory representation. The object's action on the subject informs the subject's representation of the object.

We, as sensing human beings have already inherent within us a perspective form which we observe — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, we have a perspective -- a standpoint from which we observe. But, a standpoint is not a frame of reference. We may be on a train and yet chose a frame that is anchored in the world (so we see ourselves as moving) or we may anchor our frame in ourselves as resting, and see the world as moving. Neither is predetermined by what we observe (the phenomena).

The duality has been "solved" with quantum field theory, which considers fields as fundamental and particles as quantized ripples in fields. — Relativist

While I agree that quantum field theory, with its second quantization, provides us with consistent theory adequate to its purposes, it does not provide us with "particles" in the classical sense of point masses. Physics has no need of the particle construct or of the concept of wave-particle duality. Quantized fields are waves, not the point masses of atomists.

Sean Carroll, for example, has proposed that the heat death results in conditions from which a quantum fluctuation can occur which results in inflation — Relativist

And is a quantum fluctuation resulting in inflation "cycling" in the old sense of collapse? My choice not to say everything in a finite post does not mean what I do say is wrong.

It is entailed by the many worlds interpretation of Quantum Theory, so in that respect it is entailed by accepted theory. — Relativist

No, actually, it is not so entailed. If you actually read Everett's paper, as I have, he does not propose many worlds in any ontological sense, but only in an epistemic sense. What he argues is that as the measured quantum system is represented as a superposition of states, so we should model the brain of the observer as a corresponding superposition of states (a sort of Schrodinger cat). Each sub-state of the brain then represents one possible outcome of the quantum observation. So, we do not have many worlds, but many representations of one world.

Even if true, Everett's interpretation is entirely useless in rebutting the fine tuning argument, as each supposed representation has exactly the same physics, with exactly the same (fine-tuned) constants, as every other representation.

I have strong reasons, based on accepted physics, for rejecting both Schrodinger's cat and Everett's interpretation. As they are not germane to this thread, I will not offer them here.

a multiverse hypothesis is metaphysical, not mythological — Relativist

A metaphysical conclusion is one based on our experience of being (existence). A mythological claim lacks an adequate experiential basis -- as does the multiverse hypothesis.

multiverse hypotheses are tied to broader hypotheses (incomplete scientific theories) that are falsifiable. — Relativist

"Tied to" does not mean "derived from." When there is no logical implication, a hypothesis must be judged on its independent merits.

The true fundamental physics would almost certainly have different expressions. — Relativist

I agree. Nonetheless, the physics we have now is more than adequate to many purposes -- just as Newtonian physics continues to be more than adequate in its verified realm of application. So, while we can and should expect further, fundamental, revisions in our present physics, there is no reason to expect that the conclusions of a revised physics would overturn the conclusions of our present physics in its verified realm of application.

As the arguments for the fine-tuning of the various constants are sound applications of present physics in its verified realm of application, there is no rational reason to think that advances in physics would lead to their rejection.

The "laws" of physics are abstract descriptions of the physical relations among the things that exist in the universe. The relations are due to the properties of the existents. Properties and relations of physical things do not exist independently of the things that have them. — Relativist

First, as I explained, when I say "laws of nature" I mean the aspects of reality physics seeks to describe with its laws ("the laws of physics"), and not the descriptions themselves. Now either physics is describing (in a limited and approximate way), some aspect of reality ("the laws of nature"), or physics is a species of fiction. So, we may conclude that there are actual laws of nature -- which is to say that they are an aspect of reality.

Of course, the laws are co-extensive with the particles and fields they control, but not because they have parts outside of parts (are extended). They are not. Rather they are co-extensive because that is their domain of operation.

Nor can they be physically separated. Still, they can be separated in thought, so they are a different aspect of the universe than its matter and fields -- an aspect which is immaterial in the sense of lacking parts outside of parts and material constituents.

It is confusing to call laws "properties." "Property" usually means an aspect of a thing that may or may not be found in other things and that can vary between various tokens of the same type. Clearly, universal laws are not "properties" in this (usual) sense. If you are merely saying that we can have no operative laws without matter or fields for them to operate on, I am happy to stipulate that.

I am not a Platonist by any stretch, but this is unfair — SophistiCat

If there is an ideal, an exemplar human being, then that exemplar is male or female, of some particular race, introverted or extroverted, attracted to men or women, masculine or feminine in demeanor, etc. Those who lack one or more of these qualities are less than the ideal -- defective with respect to it. That can only be a basis for prejudice. We saw this kind of prejudice in 19th century slave holders who posited that blacks we not fully human; in Nazis who thought Jews, Poles and homosexuals sub-human; and in those contemporary Americans who seek to deny human rights and entry to the "inferior races" who come to the southern border -- even going so far as to steal their children.

So, no, this is not "unfair."

Do you agree this means that the souls in heaven do not sin? Don't they have free will, or does God remove our free will when we die? — Relativist

This is a good question -- one that has been resolved by Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae. When we choose, we always choose some good -- something that will satisfy a natural desire. Motivational psychology agrees on this, differing, perhaps, on the number and kinds of motivating factors. So, a sinner does not choose evil per se, but a defective good. (E.g. I want money or a dopamine rush, so I kill someone to get it.) In life, each option before us satisfies some of our desires while leaving others unsatisfied. So, we are free to select one set of partial satisfactions over another -- leaving us open to choosing evil (under the guise of good).

Once we are in the presence of God, we are in the presence of the highest good, fulfilling all our desires. So, there is no reason to choose a partial and incomplete good, and so sin. That need not mean that we have no choices. We could still have many different completely good lines of action open to us.

1. There are things we don't know about the universe. [me: I agree]
2. Therefore, it must be like this. [me: uh.... wait;.. what?] — jajsfaye

I don't recall basing any claim on things we don't know about the universe. Could you be specific?

There is speculation that evidence of multiverses may be found — jajsfaye

It seems that you're the one relying on what we do not know. To be falsifiable, a theory must make a prediction that can be tested. Speculation about an unobserved possibility is not a prediction. If a theory predicted that we will find a specific feature of CMB radiation that is otherwise unexplained, then if we didn't find that feature, we'd know the theory was false. Any theory that does not provide such a definitive test is mythic, not scientific.

We cannot make any assumptions without additional information. — jajsfaye

Exactly. So, multiverse speculation is not a rational answer to the fine tuning argument. Let me be clear. I don't think the fine tuning argument proves anything. Still, it makes a very strong case in the legal sense. Evidence-free speculation about a multiverse with varied constants is not a rational rebuttal to that case. It is only an excuse for continuing to be an atheist in the face of overwhelming evidence of intelligence.

Let's be fair, since the fine-tuning argument is not a deductive proof, it can be ignored in good faith, but the reasons for doing so aren't scientific. They are usually an extra-scientific commitment to metaphysical naturalism. Letting ones faith-commitments influence one's science is no more rational for atheists than for creationists.

However, if we do come up with a good reason to conclude the universe was intentional, then that implies the universe is only part of a larger realm of which includes the entity that caused the universe as it intended. But then we just moved the original question (is universe intentional or random) to this larger realm. — jajsfaye

Yes, and no. It would be larger in a conceptual sense than that assumed by metaphysical naturalists. It need be no larger in a physical sense if the intelligence acted immanently, as suggested by Aquinas, inter alia.

Why continue stating falsities? — Metaphysician Undercover

Is it false to say that what motivates a scientist may not be what motivates those funding her research? Based on personal experience, I would say not. My interest in physics was always to come to a fundamental understanding of nature -- to know, purely for the sake of knowing. Funders have their own reasons. Sometimes, as with the funding of colliders and space telescopes, they do not expect any short-term return on investment. Other times they do.

the predictive capacity of the model does not rely on knowing that certain things are true. — Metaphysician Undercover

I beg to differ. I suspect that our difference is not on facts, but on our understanding of "truth." I said in my original post in this thread, "Following Isaac ben Israel and Aquinas, I take truth to be the adequacy (not correspondence) of what is in the mind to reality." I went on to explain that adequacy is an analogous term. What is adequate to one need may be inadequate to another.

Since Thales succeeded in his goal of predicting the eclipse, clearly his understanding of astronomic cycles, of his place in those cycles and of the relevant mathematics was adequate to the reality of concern to him (when the eclipse would occur). So, by definition, his knowledge was true. If he had an inadequate knowledge of astronomical cycles, his place in them, or the relevant mathematics, his knowledge would have been inadequate and so false.

You seem to fault Thales for supporting geocentrism. I think this is based on facts not in evidence; however, let's assume he did. How did his belief in geocentrism make his knowledge inadequate to the requirements of eclipse prediction? It did not. The fact is that the Ptolemaic model provided more accurate predictions than the heliocentric model throughout the 18th century -- up until La Place published his Celestial Mechanics.

Go ahead, insist that there is no such thing as "truth" in this matter, declare that it's all reference dependent, you are only arguing against your own claim that we need to know that certain things are true. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're not grasping what I'm saying. Going back to Isaac ben Solomon Israeli (ca. 855–955), and seconded by Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), truth has been defined as the adequatio (approach to equality) between intellect and reality. Approach to equality is not a univocal concept, but depends on our contextual need. How close to reality do our mental representations need to be? Close enough for the purpose at hand -- a concept reflected by the modern term "adequacy."

So, I'm not saying there is no truth about frames of reference. Rather, many frames can give adequate representations. (Remember, frames of reference are not aspects of nature, but means of representation -- just as quantum phenomena can be represented by matrices or wave equations.) Still, some frames are more adequate to specific needs than others. Thus, in the 18th c, the Ptolemy's geocentric model was more adequate to prediction, while the Newton's heliocentric model was more adequate to the dynamics.

the "reality" of what is being modeled depends on the model. — Metaphysician Undercover

This misunderstands of one of the central insights of 20th c. physics: Features that depend on our choice of representation are not features of nature. For example, there is nothing wrong with assuming the earth is at rest, or the center of the universe, as long as we recognize that these things are subjective choices rather than physical facts.

How can there be a veridical appearance when how things appear depends on the frame of reference? — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you are misunderstanding. Appearances (phenomena) do not depend on what frame of reference we choose -- mathematical representations do. Phenomena are aspects of how the cosmos acts on us. It is only after the cosmos has acted on us (or our instruments), when we describe the data mathematically, that we choose a frame of reference. There is nothing irrevocable in the choice -- we can transform data represented in one frame into another frame whenever we want.

the trend in modern science, due to the way that scientific projects are funded, is toward usefulness, and that is mostly found in predictive capacity. — Metaphysician Undercover

How we frame things for funding purposes is not evidence for our personal motivations.

Thales predicted a solar eclipse based on models which had the sun and moon orbiting the earth. — Metaphysician Undercover

Thales could not have predicted a solar eclipse without assuming truth of the body of astronomical knowledge he received. He need to know the observed cycles (the scientific laws of his day) and where in those cycles he was when he made the prediction (aka the initial conditions).

Whether we think of the sun orbiting the earth, the earth orbiting the sun, or both orbiting the galactic center depends on which frame of reference we chose to employ. None is a uniquely true frame of reference, only more or less suited to our present need.

You seem to think that we must know everything to know a data set adequate to our needs. Of course, we do not. Truth is the adequacy (not exhaustion) of what we think to the reality we are encountering.

appearance is not necessarily truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, but when appearances are false they're useless to physical science. Only veridical appearances (observed phenomena) are of use in the study of nature.

A few observations.

First, time neither exists as such outside of the mind, nor is it a mental fiction. Aristotle was dead-on when he defined time as the measure of motion (aka change) according to before and after. So, it is based on the reality of change, yet, it is not change itself, but the result of a humans processing (measuring) change.

Second, atomist prejudices aside, there is no reason to think that the cosmos is made of particles. Quantum theory uses wave equations to describe the nature of things, with so-called "wave-particle duality" resulting from an unwillingness to give up the old dogmas.

Third, our best cosmological theories do not see the universe as ending in collapse, but in an ignominious heat death. Thus, the idea of cycling is passe.

Fourth, while many cosmologists speculate about a multiverse,
a. A multiverse is not entailed in any accepted theory. (We have no accepted theory of quantum gravity.)
b. The multiverse hypothesis not falsifiable (since other universes are, by definition, dynamically isolated from ours), and therefore not scientific, but mythological.
c. Even if there were other universes, there is no reason to believe that their physics (including their fine tuned constants) would be any different from ours.
i. The most parsimonious assumption is that they do not differ in any fundamental way from ours.
ii. We have no theory explaining why our physical constants have the values they do. Absent such a theory, we can say how they could have different values, and cannot rationally predict that they will have different values in other universes.
iii. If we could deduce the existence of other universes (we cannot presently), our deduction would be based on the physics learned in this universe. But, if another universe had different physics (to avoid fine tuning in that universe), the physics learned in this universe would be in applicable, and the deduction would break down.
d. The reason given for the existence of other universes is explicitly atheological -- not scientific.

Fifth, we know that there are laws of nature that physics studies and tries to describe. if these laws had no ontological reality, physics would be a species of fiction, not a science.
a. These laws are immaterial -- it is a category error to ask what they are made of.
b. They are also intentional. Franz Brentano determined that the defining characteristic of intentionality is "aboutness." Ideas are about their potential instances. Acts of will are about the states they seek to instantiate. In the same way, the laws of nature (as opposed to their approximate descriptions, the laws of physics) are about the states they bring to pass.

Thus, physics reveals that our universe is fundamentally intentional, both in its laws and in the values of its constants.

Real Truth is inaccessible to us because of physical and mental filters between us and the real world, namely biological, cultural, and psychological. — Kaiser Basileus

Of course this is meaningless in the absence of a definition of "real truth" as opposed to faux truth. Fr me, truth is the adequacy of what is inthe intellect to reality. Adequacy is a relative concept, depending on contextual need.

Further, you seem unaware that all knowledge is both subjective and objective. There is always some known object and some knowing subject. Further, the objective content we know has both an objective object, and a subjective object. If we see an apple the objective object is the apple and the subjective object (the data about the knowing subject) is that we can see, see these colors, etc. Thus, there is no biological, cultural, or psychological distortion -- there is only biological, cultural, and psychological data admixed with data on the objective object. If someone is too unreflective to recognize this, that can be corrected if the person is open-minded.

There is no a priori knowledge, no logical necessity independent of metaphysical necessity. What we call a priori is a posteriori with resect to our learning experiences, and the only "a priori" thereafter because it is constrained by our experiential understanding of being. Logic is not about laws of thought, but about laws of thought applicable to reality. I can think <square circle> but I can't make a real square circle, nor can I instantiate an image of a square circle. These are ontological, not conceptual limitations. The ideas <square> and <circle> are abstracted form experience, not granted from on high. So, logical necessity isn't an independent category, but something we grasp by experiencing reality.

Finally, as we have no way of measuring subjective certainty, assigning it a mathematical value is only a way of clothing subjective bias in mathematical garb.

8. God created this world instead of a world of free willed beings that do not sin.
9. Therefore God chose a world with needless pain and suffering.
10. Therefore God is not omnibenevolent. — Relativist

This is a fallacious. It assumes that God could know, independently of actually creating, what free-will creatures would choose. This requires that free will choices can be known independently of the existence of the agents making them. That is contrary to the nature of free-will agency.

The existence of free-will is convertible with the existence of creatures who are responsible for at least some of their own acts. But, no one is responsible for acts that must occur independently of their actual existence. So, in order to know what a free-will agent chooses, the agent must actually choose it. If this were not so, the agent would be pre-determined to the choice, and so not free -- at least not in the sense that would underwrite responsibility.

Thus, while God can create a creature who does not choose to sin, God cannot know that the creature does not choose to sin in the absence of creating that creature. This does not contradict divine omniscience as God still knows all that actually is, and all that it is in His power to do. Note that God does not know creation by prediction, but by His self-awareness in holding creation in being throughout the space-time manifold.

Exactly!

I am an Aristotelian.

1. I reject the correspondence view of truth.
a. While it works in many cases, it is flawed. Nothing corresponds to universal ideas or negations. There is no one-to-one mapping between what we think and reality. Reality is much more coomplex than our limited experience and abstractions reveal.
b. The definition of Isaac ben Israel, adopted by Aquinas is much better: Truth is the adequacy of intellect and reality. Adequacy is a relative concept. What is adequate to one requirement need not be adequate to another. It is not lying to teach Newtonian physics to civil engineers, even though it is woefully inadequate in quantum and relativistic contexts. This means that truth is an analogous concept -- partly the same and partly different depending on context. What is adequate for physics may be inadequate for metaphysics.

2. I think knowledge is not a species of belief.
a. I define knowledge as awareness of present reality. Reality is present by acting on us, My knowledge of my keyboard is due to it acting on my sensory system, and my awareness of some of the effects it has wrought. Things can be cognitively present directly (by acting on me) or indirectly (by having acted on others, who act on me).
b. A belief is completely different. It does not require awareness of the presence of the object of belief. Instead it is a commitment to the truth of a proposition which is the object of belief. So, while knowing is an act of intellect (our capacity to be aware), believing, as a commitment, is an act of will. So, while Descartes knew he was in his chamber (because it acted on him via his senses), he chose (for methodological reasons) not to believe he was in his chamber. This act of will (Cartesian doubt) was completely orthogonal to his knowledge, and so, no reason to question what he knew.

3. As Aristotle pointed out, not all propositions can be proven. Some must be accepted without proof, i.e., as fundamental.
a. Fundamental propositions are knowable. Although we cannot prove them, we can know them experientially. For example "This apple is red." We know from experience that the phantasm (bound contents) that evokes the concept <this apple> is the identical phantasm that evokes the concept <red>. As the proposition's truth is based on identity of origin, the copula "is" denotes identity -- not of concepts, but of foundation in reality.
b. Once we have a population of fundamental, experiential propositions, we begin a constructive movement we can call "modeling." It adds to our experienced content new notes of intelligibility to "fill in the gaps." These constructive elements or gap fillers, are not known, but are believed. That does not make them unimportant, or even unreliable, as we test them in daily living. E.g., we expect objects to persist, even when we don't experience them. Many of these gap-filling beliefs are so reliable, that we are willing to say we "know" them -- even though we can't derive them from experience.
c. Considering Eddington's two tables, for example, we think of the table of everyday experience as continuous and not atomic because the construct of continuity is adequate to our everyday needs. Our dishes, knives and forks do not fall through it, onto the floor. We don't think it's continuous as a result of direct experience of its microstructure. So, while the notion of macroscopic continuity is experiential, adequate to our usual needs, and so true; that of microscopic continuity is a gap filler, and unreliable when consider the table's microstructure.

4. If our knowledge were merely a self-consistent set of beliefs, we would have no reason to think they would be applicable to reality. Why?
a. In order to apply our knowledge to reality, we need to recognize that we're dealing with an instance of something we know. For example, to apply "Coral snakes are dangerous," we must recognize that we are facing a coral snake. If the animal before us could not evoke the concept <coral snake>, we could never recognize it as one. But if sensing it can evoke the concept, then our knowledge is not merely a self-consistent web, but linked to reality.
b. Again, if our knowledge were merely a self-consistent web, experimental data could never change our knowledge. First, we would not know the results, because that requires experiential input, and second, what was self-consistent before would not become inconsistent. The only inconsistency is between what we used to think and the new, experiential data.

I myself am obliged to accept the reality of Platonic forms, essences and substantial being — Wayfarer

I wonder what so obligates you? I see no need for Platonic forms, only several concrete objects able to evoke the same concept. This gives our concepts an objective basis in the power of each token to evoke the same concept, but does not imply that there is some exemplar that is more or less perfectly reflected in each instance.

Positing a Platonic idea or exemplar implies, for example, that some individuals are more human (better reflect the exemplar) than others. This can only foster prejudice and injustice.

"That's pragmatism for you. It's why science has turned to prediction as its MO rather than truth. Prediction is useful, truth is just interesting ... but only to some."

Metaphysician Undercover — Metaphysician Undercover

To define my terms: Following Isaac ben Israel and Aquinas, I take truth to be the adequacy (not correspondence) of what is in the mind to reality. Tis definition makes "truth" an analogous, rather then a univocal term. In other words, it is often predicated in sense that are partly the same and partly different. The sameness lies in the element of adequacy, and the difference in the needs to which the mental representation is adequate. What is adequate for moral decision making may be inadequate to engineering purposes, and that again need not be adequate for metaphysical reflection. What is adequate for classical situations is inadequate for relativistic or quantum conditions.

That said, this is a mischaracterization of science. Science is, in part, descriptive of what is and has been, and so concerned with states of reality, not merely prediction. Biology, astronomy and oceanography provide numerous examples of objective description rather than prediction. Cosmology is at least as concerned with the origins of the cosmos as with its fate.

Second, unless we know that certain things are true, reliable prediction is impossible. We need a set of initial conditions (e.g., the present sate of reality), an adequate knowledge of the relevant dynamics, and, usually, a knowledge that they mathematics we are employing is adequate to the reality we wish to predict. Thus, whatever practical end our prediction msy seek to advance, our foundation needs be a firm grasp of truth.

Finally, recall Aristotle's bold opening claim in the Metaphysics: "All humans by nature desire to know." We find things interesting because knowing them brings satisfaction, and where there is satisfaction, there is a desire satisfied, The present discussion and those like it are not aimed at practical prediction, but at theoretical satisfaction.