But you can't model the world predictively unless you are modelling the causes of its material patterns. That is what the mathematico-logical framework of a theory does. It describes a formal structure of entailment. — apokrisis
Why would you need to know anything about the causes of the patterns? — Metaphysician Undercover
You mean, the pattern of the causes? — apokrisis
Let's get real. What do you even mean by "cause" here? What is your model of "a cause" - the "true" one? — apokrisis
No, it's a pattern of events, occurrences, observed appearances. — Metaphysician Undercover
Positing a Platonic idea or exemplar implies, for example, that some individuals are more human (better reflect the exemplar) than others. This can only foster prejudice and injustice. — Dfpolis
some individuals are closer to the human ideal — SophistiCat
Again, there might be a bunch of events. But you are talking about a pattern. And to even think there is a pattern is to hypothesise the existence of some set of relations, some explanatory form of connection sufficient to produce an observed regularity. A generic cause, in short. — apokrisis
So, you take one paragraph from a philosopher who wrote volumes, and refer to this to judge him as a shitstain of a philosopher. — Metaphysician Undercover
Why continue stating falsities? — Metaphysician Undercover
the predictive capacity of the model does not rely on knowing that certain things are true. — Metaphysician Undercover
Go ahead, insist that there is no such thing as "truth" in this matter, declare that it's all reference dependent, you are only arguing against your own claim that we need to know that certain things are true. — Metaphysician Undercover
the "reality" of what is being modeled depends on the model. — Metaphysician Undercover
How can there be a veridical appearance when how things appear depends on the frame of reference? — Metaphysician Undercover
I am not a Platonist by any stretch, but this is unfair — SophistiCat
Is it false to say that what motivates a scientist may not be what motivates those funding her research? — Dfpolis
I beg to differ. I suspect that our difference is not on facts, but on our understanding of "truth." I said in my original post in this thread, "Following Isaac ben Israel and Aquinas, I take truth to be the adequacy (not correspondence) of what is in the mind to reality." I went on to explain that adequacy is an analogous term. What is adequate to one need may be inadequate to another. — Dfpolis
So, I'm not saying there is no truth about frames of reference. Rather, many frames can give adequate representations. (Remember, frames of reference are not aspects of nature, but means of representation -- just as quantum phenomena can be represented by matrices or wave equations.) Still, some frames are more adequate to specific needs than others. Thus, in the 18th c, the Ptolemy's geocentric model was more adequate to prediction, while the Newton's heliocentric model was more adequate to the dynamics. — Dfpolis
Again, you are misunderstanding. Appearances (phenomena) do not depend on what frame of reference we choose -- mathematical representations do. Phenomena are aspects of how the cosmos acts on us. — Dfpolis
It is only after the cosmos has acted on us (or our instruments), when we describe the data mathematically, that we choose a frame of reference. — Dfpolis
If there is an ideal, an exemplar human being, then that exemplar is male or female, of some particular race, introverted or extroverted, attracted to men or women, masculine or feminine in demeanor, etc. — Dfpolis
I've never heard "truth" defined in this pragmatic way, such that "truth' is reduced to adequacy. The following statement, "I take truth to be the adequacy of what is in the mind to reality." is nonsensical. You are denying correspondence, so "adequate correspondence to reality" is denied. — Metaphysician Undercover
The judgement of "most adequate", in the sense of a representation, is a judgement of correspondence. — Metaphysician Undercover
As "phenomena" is how we perceive the cosmos through means of our senses. We cannot jump across the gap between how we perceive the cosmos, and what is acting on us, to assume that phenomena is what is acting on us. — Metaphysician Undercover
We, as sensing human beings have already inherent within us a perspective form which we observe — Metaphysician Undercover
Not necessarily. One can abstract all these details, leaving only essentials. — SophistiCat
I am sorry that you've never heard of the definition used by the most prominent medieval metaphysician. — Dfpolis
You seem confused. If we are discussing metaphysics, only the most precise statements are adequate. If we are discussing singulars, then adequacy and correspondence come to the same thing. However, while correspondence does not work for negations or universal propositions, adequacy does. It also works for teaching. When we begin teaching a subject, we can't possibly teach all the complexities we know, Instead, we teach the students something suitable to their level of understanding -- something adequate. Doing so is not lying, but advancing them in true knowledge. Teaching Newtonian physics is not teaching falsehoods. Nor does teaching relativistic quantum field theory give students an understanding fully corresponding to reality. — Dfpolis
It is only if you take "truth" as naming something unattainable by humans that one can avoid the notion of adequacy. I see "truth" as applying to what humans actually know, not a Platonic ideal. What we actually know is always limited, not exhaustive, but generally adequate to the needs of the lived world. — Dfpolis
Let me say again, I'm not rejecting correspondence when it works. I'm saying that it only works in a limited number of cases (e.g., not for negations or universals as no real thing corresponds to either) while adequacy works in all the cases I know and becomes correspondence in some cases. — Dfpolis
I don't really believe that these ideas are separable from 'Plato's views' — StreetlightX
*PD: "The social conflicts of the fourth century, the greater dependence on slavery, after a decline at the end of the Peloponnesian War, made [Plato's] attempt to justify and rationalize the social relationships of the polis comprehensible. Difference had invaded and disrupted the city, and was acknowledged and almost despaired of by Euripides. Plato's response to the presence of difference was to look even more deeply inward and to justify the differences within the city in terms of an attribute of the citizen, logos. The Greek male human being thus reconstructed his notion of the world; the dominance of the citizen, the philosopher, was justified not in terms of autarkeia, but rather in terms of inevitable and natural superiority. The contradictory position of women, in which they were both objects of exchange necessary for the reproduction of the city, and outsiders, bestial and irrational, was also rationalized in a new way. Women were associated with the body, which was inferior to the mind; thus they, like the body, served the soul, the head, the philosopher, the male". — StreetlightX
One may, but then one has no adequate plan for creating an individual. Where does the other information (the things you wish to abstract away) come from? Remember, the role of the ideal is to explain the intelligibility of the individuals we observe. — Dfpolis
One may, but then one has no adequate plan for creating an individual. Where does the other information (the things you wish to abstract away) come from? Remember, the role of the ideal is to explain the intelligibility of the individuals we observe.
In the Timaeus Plato is quite explicit about the relation of the Ideal to individuals, saying that individualization is the result of the Ideal making an imperfect impression in matter, as a seal makes an impression in wax. Thus, explicitly, all individuality is imperfection. — Dfpolis
One may claim that the essence of humankind is not bound up with race or gender, just as when we identify some object as a chair, say, we abstract away a lot of the things that would be required to create the individual chair, like its precise shape and size and material and manufacturer. Or something like this. You should rather take this up with a competent Platonist. — SophistiCat
I have little regard for such speculative sociopsychology. — SophistiCat
The role of the ideal is to identify an essence of an individual thing, separating it from other, inessential qualities, but what that essence is in any particular case is arguable. — SophistiCat
I've read a lot of Aquinas and have yet to see where he defines truth as adequacy. — Metaphysician Undercover
So I still don't see how you equate adequacy, which refers to method, with truth, which refers to how things are — Metaphysician Undercover
You are trying to lower truth from an ideal, so what remains is adequacy. — Metaphysician Undercover
You have a definition of "truth" which is adequate for you, and your purposes, but it's not acceptable to me because I see that you've compromised the ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you not believe that there is a real definition of "triangle", such that if I were to give a definition of triangle, it must correspond to that real definition of triangle in order to be a correct definition? — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you not believe that there is a real definition of "triangle", such that if I were to give a definition of triangle, it must correspond to that real definition of triangle in order to be a correct definition? Isn't this the case with all universals? Any definition or description of the universal must correspond with the real concept in order that it be a true definition. — Metaphysician Undercover
this would allow anyone to make a logical argument proving any conclusion they desired, simply by designing the definitions which are adequate for the purpose of proving the conclusion they desired. — Metaphysician Undercover
There seems to be a disconnect here between "creating an individual", and, "the intelligibility of the individuals", as these two are quite distinct. — Metaphysician Undercover
That is rather the whole point: unbelief was the point of departure, so belief is the only point of return. — Galuchat
Science speaks to the pragmatics of a modelling relation with the world. — apokrisis
[Plato] thinks that matter is entirely unintelligible... — Dfpolis
Certain kinds of ideas can't be accomodated with the naturalistic framework that is taken for granted in secular culture and so are bracketed out of consideration on those grounds. This happens on a cultural level - it is not just a matter of individual choice. But it is implicitly enforced through what kinds of ideas will be considered in peer-reviewed science journals, and so on; what amounts to 'a scientific attitude' and what doesn't. — Wayfarer
Its kind of hard to miss if you've read much Aquinas in Latin. De Veritate q.1, a.11, resp: "alio modo diffinitur secundum id in quo formaliter ratio veri perficitur, et sic dicit Ysaac quod Veritas est adequatio rei cum intellectus". Q.1.a.1: "Isaac dicit in libro De definitionibus, quod veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus." Summa Theologiae I, q.16., a.2. a.3: "Isaac dicit in libro De definitionibus, quod veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus." In I Sententiarum, d.19, q.5.a.1; Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 59; "Veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei" — Dfpolis
As I said, adaequatio means "approach to equality" (according to McKeon) Translators sometimes say "agreement," but the Latin is telling. He does not say aequatio (equality) as would be expected if he meant correspondence, but "approach to equality," which leaves open the question: how close we need to be to be speaking truth? It seems clear that we need to be close enough not to mislead our audience, and that depends both on the audience and the context. So, I have chosen the English cognate of adaequatio, "adequacy," to express this. — Dfpolis
So, no "truth" can fully correspond to reality. Nonetheless, we can have an account that is adequate to the needs implicit in our reflection or discourse. I'm saying that such an account qualifies as true. — Dfpolis
Human truth is partial, not exhaustive. It approaches (adaequatio) reality -- it is not reality as God's Truth is. — Dfpolis
You may define your terms as you wish, but if you set the standard of truth so high that no limited mind can attain it, you rule out logical (salve veritate) discourse amongst humans. I am unwilling to do that. — Dfpolis
Suppose I have a universal concept, <triangle>. There is no Platonic Triangle corresponding to it. — Dfpolis
You're forgetting the terms joined by "adequacy": "Veritas est adaequatio] intellectus et rei" -- truth is the adequacy of intellect to reality. I'm not talking about what's adequate to win an argument, but what's an adequate to reality (rei). — Dfpolis
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