Can you explain how you conceive of a "matter wave"? — Metaphysician Undercover

In the late 19th century, electrons were discovered. We came to understand that they are part of every atom of matter. At first, for historical reasons, it was thought that they were particles. Because of that assumption, it was decided that there must be light particles (photons) as well. In 1923, it was shown that electrons interfere with each other and with themselves -- something only waves can do. So, electrons, an essential constituent of every atom, are waves. Every property previously explained using the particle assumption can be explained by their wave nature. On the other hand, no wave property is explained by the particle assumption. That means the particle hypothesis is falsified.

We have since found that wave mechanics also applies to protons and neutrons, the constituents of atomic nuclei. Every part of atoms, which constitute both ordinary and ionized matter, behaves like a wave. None is a point particle, or a hard object with a well-defined edge. That physics has nothing more to say about what is vibrating does not mean that the constituents of matter do not oscillate in both space and time in well-defined ways. So, ordinary matter is made of waves. That is what I mean by "matter waves."

We have known that there is electromagnetic field energy and momentum, permeating all space, since the late 19th century. As a result, Newton's third law is violated when electromagnetic forces are involved.

The momentum of the body could be provided by an energy equivalence with the energy of the wave, but the uncertainty principle would render the position of such a body, with a determined momentum, as having no determinable location. — Metaphysician Undercover

But, if there is no body, why would we expect it to have a well-defined (point) location or arrival time? Wave packets are spread out in space and time. Because of Fourier's theorem, which applies to all waves, to have a single wave length, a wave must be infinitely long, and to be at a single point, it must have all wave lengths. When you insist that we are not dealing with waves, but particles, this translates into indeterminacy. Since a quantum's energy is proportional to its frequency and its momentum is inversely proportional to its wave length, finite wave packets have neither well-defined energy nor momentum.

Hence the "matter" wave is better known as a "probability" wave. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no objective randomness. Randomness is a measure of our ignorance. The more we know, the less random processes are. In the quantum case, we know neither the exact initial state of the wave we are trying to measure, nor the exact initial state of the detector that will interact with it. So, all we can predict is a probability -- just as with a dice roll.

the particular wave in the particular set of circumstances is not ever actually represented — Metaphysician Undercover

That is exactly what the wave equations do represent. The problem is that you cannot pick the one actual solution out of an infinity of possible solutions without knowing the initial conditions.

it represents possible locations of the body with mass — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, there is no "body."

The problem being that these equations do not describe waves, and you know this. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am sorry, but you don't know what you are talking about.

What kind of substance (e.g. matter ; math ; other) are "wave structures" made of? — Gnomon

What are light waves made of? We do not know. That does not stop us from knowing that light is a wave. The same is true of matter waves. I should add that there are no mathematical substances, only mathematical concepts, based on abstraction form physical reality. We know some properties of the medium, namely, that it obeys, to a good approximation, the equations currently in use.

"Wave structures" refers to conceptual structures composed of mathematical ideals. — Metaphysician Undercover

Since I made the reference, I know what I am referring to, and I am not saying that bodies that are made of mathematical structures. They are made of waves that may be described by the Schoedinger equation, and more accurately by the Dirac equation. The fact that waves may be described mathematically does not mean that they are mathematical abstractions. Things are not their descriptions, and refusing to admit that is irrational.

The problem is that there is no conventional definition of "matter" which allows this "wave-like" feature of reality to be called "matter waves". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, there is. Matter is what composes bodies. They are composed of wave structures.

The inescapable indeterminacy of quantum non-particles was famously illustrated in his Cat in the Box paradox. — Gnomon

Schroedinger's cat was designed to show the absurdity of the probabilistic interpretation, not support it. It is not a fact. It is the consequence of a hypothetical interpretation, based on thinking of detectors as classical devices. If you think of detectors properly, as composed of atoms behaving quantum mechanically, there is no need for randomness. Indeed, assuming it is contradictory.

the observable properties of the system appears to be non-deterministic. — Gnomon

Only if you assume that electrons are particles. If you drop that assumption, there is no need for them to have either well-defined momentum or well-defined positions. All you have is a complex, extended wave structure.

The outcomes are not determined, so quantum mechanics is indeterministic. — Gnomon

This is a non sequitur. Being unable to predict the exact result of a measurement does not mean that it is not determined. We cannot predict turbulent flow and everyone agrees that it is deterministic.

Also, free will is not indeterminate will. It is will determined by the agent willing.

however that analogy has weaknesses, because electrons really can appear as particles. — Wayfarer

Some of what electrons do can be interpreted as particle behavior. All of what electrons do can be interpreted as wave behavior. That means that the particle hypothesis is falsified, while the wave hypothesis is not. What makes the waves appear to be localized is that they interact with atoms in which the electron waves are localized.

You see, the particular instances of observation utilized by the empirical sciences, do not provide any sort of "reality" to us. Nor do they provide us a window into reality. All they do is give us the information required to make judgements, against or for, the preexisting reality (the prejudices), which form our reality, the world of abstractions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Our concept of reality is based on what can be experienced, aka what can be observed.

You may insist that the idea of immaterial waves, waves without substance, is good enough for physics, but it's not good enough for metaphysics. — Metaphysician Undercover

While it is absurd to call matter waves "immaterial," physics is not the science of being, but of changes in space and time. So, you are right, metaphysics has different concerns.

Wave" is defined in physics as a disturbance moving in a medium. — Metaphysician Undercover

No one is denying this. Physics merely abstracts the aspects of reality it can deal with.

As I have already spent a lot of time trying to teach you what physics tells us, and this whole area is off-topic, I am going to stop here.

It’s probably more that I fail to see the point of the question. But if you mean, is uncertainty a consequence of the lack of knowledge of the initial conditions, I think Brian Greene answers that in the negative. If you don’t think so, maybe you might re-phrase it. — Wayfarer

Uncertainty arises from thinking of waves as particles. The wave structure is perfectly well-defined, but it you insist it is a particle, which it is not, you will be unable to assign particle properties with precision. Similarly, if you insist that a pig can fly, you will have difficulty explaining how.

In quantum mechanics, this determinism is replaced by inherent probabilistic behavior. — Wayfarer

No, it is not. Not being able to determine the exact value of classical variables does not mean that the system is intrinsically random. It only means that classical variables are not the best means of defining its state.

It gives the probability distribution of where a particle is likely to be found at a given time. — Wayfarer

If you insist that quanta are particles, you will suffer the logical consequences of the error you have made. There are no "particles," only wave structures. Wave structures are not point-like and insisting that they are will cause you to think that your non-existent particles are in random places.

you can only predict the probability of obtaining a particular measurement result, not the specific outcome for a single measurement (per Quantum (Manjit Kumar) and Uncertainty (David Lindley)). — Wayfarer

If you are ignorant of the exact initial state, you will be ignorant of the exact final state, no matter how deterministic the dynamics are. Further, quantum measurement is a nonlinear process, which is mathematically chaotic, subject to the Lorenz Butterfly effect.

As with all natural science, it is a theoretical statement. The wave equations of quantum theory are well confirmed, and they are deterministic.

This means that if time ( where time = rate of firing) is not a factor in the formation of the distribution pattern, which implies that time is not a variable in the generation of the interference pattern. — Wayfarer

It is not a variable in describing the final pattern, but it is a factor in describing the dynamics that bring the pattern about. It takes time for the electron wave to arrive, and time for it to interact with the electron waves in the detector's atoms.

The outcome of the experiment, the interference pattern, is a result of the quantum probabilistic nature — Wayfarer

Yes, that is what people say. Yet, it is not the case. It is an accepted fact that all unobserved processes are deterministic. So, put the whole experiment in a box and do not observe it. (You could even include an observer in the box.) Then you can only conclude that the interaction with the detector is deterministic. (If you included an observer, that would also include her observations.) Looking at it after the fact will not change this. So, the hypothesis that observations are random is inconsistent.

In that sense, the wave function is not a function of time, in a way that is very different from physical waves, which are obviously time-dependent. — Wayfarer

There is an experiment in which a beam of neutral kaons interferes with itself, because the neutral kaon has two different states that have different masses and so different frequencies. This can be observed because different combinations of these states decay in different ways. As you move the detection apparatus along the the length of the beam different decay modes are detected, showing that the different mass states interfere with each other in real time.

Quantum waves, or more properly called "wave functions" are ideals, mathematical constructs. They have no physical existence. We ought to start with this clearly stated. — Metaphysician Undercover

Quantum waves constitute matter. Wave functions are the mathematical functions describing these matter waves and their interactions. The concept is an ideal, but it is based on the observation of real wave properties, specifically, interference of the type demonstrated in Young's experiment.

The problem is that physicists tend to represent these as bodies with mass. — Metaphysician Undercover

We do not represent the structures (they are not bodies in the classical sense) with mass. Rather, mass is a quantity associated with them.

So, there is an interaction problem between the bodies with mass representation, and the ideal (immaterial) waves representation. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. There are no bodies -- only waves and waves mischaracterized as "particles" because people apply Newtonian concepts without adequate justification.

Nice try Df, but Planck's law is based in the emission of electromagnetic radiation from bodies (black-body radiation). — Metaphysician Undercover

We have learned a lot since Planck proposed his Black Body Radiation law 1900 and Einstein his explanation of the photoelectric effect in 1905.

The simple fact of the matter is that physicists do not have the required theories, or principles, to measure the energy of wave activity directly, without converting this energy to the activity of a physical body. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, we use material instruments. That does not make the instruments classical bodies instead of quantum wave structures.

So, there is an interaction problem between the bodies with mass representation, and the ideal (immaterial) waves representation. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no such interaction. The interactions observed are between the waves being measured and the wave structures (instruments) used to measure them. These interactions are purely physical. The representations are how we conceive of these physical structures and do not involved in the measurement interactions -- only in how we come to know the results.

Instead, it dogmatically imposes unsubstantiated ideals, like the constant speed of light. — Metaphysician Undercover

You need to read the history of modern physics if you want to think about these things. It was assumed that we could measure different speeds of light as the earth passed through the either. In 1887 Albert A. Michelson and Edward Morley attempted to do so, and failed. They measure the same speed in each direction and at different orbital positions of the earth. So, we were forced, experimentally, to conclude that the measured speed of light is invariant. Contrary to popular belief, their experiment did not show that there is no aether, but that one aether theory was false.

I understand this, it is derived from the Fourier transform. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it is not. Fourier transforms enter into the derivation of the uncertainty principle.

our inability to make measurements of high energy in a very short period of time is the reason for the uncertainty of the uncertainty principle, in general. — Metaphysician Undercover

Whether or not the energy is "high" is irrelevant.

However, stating that energy is understood as "the dynamic variable conjugate to time", does not in any way state what energy is. — Metaphysician Undercover

It does. It is a definition in terms of more fundamental concepts.

This is the physicalist perspective — Metaphysician Undercover

By observation I mean fixing on or attending to experience, whether internal or external. I am not a physicalist. Read my January paper.

OK, you may call it "nearly perfect", but "nearly" is a subjective judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let me be more precise. I mean we have been unable to detect violations of conservation of energy.

The material world which we represent with forms, formal models etc., is not actually as we represent it because we cannot represent the material aspect. — Metaphysician Undercover

But, we can. That is what physics, chemistry, biology, etc. do.

All we have as representation is forms, and "matter" refers to those accidents which always escape the formal representation. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is not what anyone else means by "matter."

What they point to, is the fact that the real features of nature are not perfect symmetries, as modeled. — Metaphysician Undercover

We cannot say that. We can only say that in some cases, we are unable to observe possible imperfections, so, we have no reason to believe that the symmetries are imperfect.

Symmetries are perfectly ideal balances, just like the eternal circular motion described by Aristotle. If that perfect ideal has any interaction with anything else, then by that very interaction, it loses its status as a perfectly ideal balance. — Metaphysician Undercover

You do not understand the meaning of "symmetry" in physics. It is not the kind of thing that can interact. Rather it is a property of the way things interact.

Yes. Symmetries are not observed, but deduced. Like constellations in the sky, the inferred patterns are mental, not material ; subjective, not objective. — Gnomon

This is confused. We make observations and then deduce the consequences. As long as the logic is sound, the conclusions are justified by the observations. If the observations were objective, so are the conclusions.

that waves cannot be described simply by space and time. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not say "by," but "in" space and time.

Furthermore, the subject of the thread is an ontological topic — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but not the ontology of quantum waves.

This misconceives measurement. The instruments are also wave structures. — Dfpolis
Again, this is blatantly wrong, and I'm sure you know it. Energy is not measured by waves structures, it is measured by electrical voltage. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I know that material things are wave structures. I did not say what the units of energy are. They are not volts.

And calculations are done in terms of inertial frames and "rest mass" which is essential. — Metaphysician Undercover

Some are. Some are not.

These are concepts of classical mechanics of bodies, not waves. — Metaphysician Undercover

Both electromagnetic and matter waves have energy and momentum.

What kind of instruments are understood to be wave structures? — Metaphysician Undercover

Objectively, all physical instruments are wave structures. Subjectively, many people fail to understand this.

it doesn't make sense to claim that they are — Metaphysician Undercover

It makes perfect since once you realize that the electrons and nucleons composing atoms are waves.

So the certainty of this understanding of light waves is dependent on the certainty of the theories which relate it to the foundation, the movement of massive bodies, and ultimately the foundation itself, our understanding of the movement of massive bodies. — Metaphysician Undercover

Once you realize that electrons are waves, you need to rethink your understanding of massive bodies.

it's simple fact that these are the concepts which underly our understanding of energy. — Metaphysician Undercover

They underlie the classical understanding, not our quantum understanding. Now we understand that energy depends on the frequency at which elementary structures vibrate. E = h where h is Planck's constant and is the frequency.

This is because "energy" as a concept is fundamentally a property of the momentum of mass (kinetic energy being 1/2mv2). — Metaphysician Undercover

That is only a non-relativistic approximation. It was how the concept was first glimpsed, but it is not how it is understood now. Now we understand energy as the dynamic variable conjugate to time. To explain that, I would have to explain the conceptual framework of theoretical physics, and that is why I ask that you trust my opinion based on my education. If you wish to pursue this, look up Hamiltonian and Lagrangian formalism, and Emmy Noether's theorem

Symmetries are not observed in nature. Each thing that we observe as a near-symmetry is not actually a symmetry, which is an ideal balance. — Metaphysician Undercover

All observations are imperfect. In observing you, I do not gain perfect knowledge of you. Nonetheless observation is the basis of all human knowledge. It may well be that energy is not perfectly conserved. Still, that is very approximately conserved is a real feature of nature and points to nearly perfect time-translation symmetry.

Laws are artificial, and created as universals so your examples are irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. They point to real features of nature. Omniscience is not a rational standard for human knowledge. We know as humans know -- incompletely and approximately in matters involving measurement.

there is an interaction problem involved with trying to demonstrate how the particular partakes of the universal. — Metaphysician Undercover

There are no universal beings to partake in. Aristotle rebutted Platonic Ideas in Metaphysics I, 9 and universal exemplars ideas are incompatible with the simplicity, omniscience and omnipotence of God.

That symmetries are properties does not mean that they do not exist. It only means that they do not have independent existence.

Did you notice that I qualified "instantaneous" with "almost". We're talking about Planck Time here. — Gnomon

No, the times are much longer than the Planck time. Different spectral lines have different frequency widths. The transition time is proportional to the inverse of the associated frequency width. See http://www-star.st-and.ac.uk/~kw25/teaching/nebulae/lecture08_linewidths.pdf

Do you have a good reason for picking nits about metaphors? — Gnomon

Yes, because the transition times can be calculated using the wave model.

Instead of addressing the valid points I brought up, points which are very relevant to the subject, "interactionism", you retort with an implied 'you're wrong because I'm more highly educated than you'. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, that is not the reason you are wrong. It is a reason to trust my views more. The reasons you are wrong are outside the scope of this thread.

If you really have the education which you claim, you could very easily show me why you think I'm wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I can, but I choose not to here.

The problem here is that without a medium (aether or whatever), a substance to support this so-called "wave phenomena", it is fundamentally immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

Philosophically, I agree that waves are modifications of something; however, saying that contributes nothing to the goal of physics, which is to describe the behavior, and not the ontology, of physical systems. For physics, it is enough that the waves can be described in space and time. If a hypothesis about what they modified, say that it was made of particles or strings, led to a better description, then it would be relevant to physics.

Clearly, what we have here is an interaction problem between the immaterial waves (with no material substance), and the material bodies (instruments of measurement). — Metaphysician Undercover

This misconceives measurement. The instruments are also wave structures.

Quantum field theory and the standard model of particles are composed of immaterial ideals which have no direct correspondence in the physical world. If you have the education you claim, you know this. The truth of this is evidenced by the reality assigned to symmetry in the models, when such symmetries are simply not discovered in nature. Symmetries are ideals which may be artificially synthesized to an extent, in a lab, but have no true occurrence in the natural world. — Metaphysician Undercover

Quantum field theories, like all scientific theories, are hypotheses to explain observed facts. To the extent that they do so, they are adequate to reality and so true. Their truth is not absolute, but limited to how they actually reflect reality. So, it is open to refinement and revision.

Symmetries are observed in nature. We observe temporal translation symmetry when we see that the same laws that operated in the past operate now. Similarly, spatial translation symmetry means that the same laws that operate here, operate there. Rotational symmetry means that the laws do not involve a preferred direction, etc.

Symmetries are known by ideas, but so is everything. The question is whether these ideas are adequately grounded in reality, or simply imagined. So far, it looks like symmetries ideas are.

And this manifests as the problem of how the ideal world of symmetries described by the standard model could interact with the world of material bodies which we live in. — Metaphysician Undercover

It does not because physical symmetries are not interacting things, but properties of interactions of things.

It's simply the emphasis on the sovereignty of self or ego, on the one hand, and the consensus view of philosophical or scientific materialism, that is associated with political liberalism on the other. — Wayfarer

I see liberals as supporting the value of each individual, not their "sovereignty." And, I do not see materialism as a consensus view, although I do see it as a powerful intellectual and social thread.

I understand your view, but I have looked at all proposed mechanisms for determinism and have found no sound arguments. So, I credit my experience that when I am facing a choice, all the real alternatives are equally in my power. Having them in my power means that I am the decisive factor in my decisions and so morally responsible. That does not mean that I think every human act is free, or even that I am in a position to judge which are. Still, if there are no sound arguments, why should I try to escape responsibility for my decisions?

Being with someone I am sufficiently attracted to may indeed be more valuable to me that any number of views of Yosemite Falls. If am more motivated by one than the other then, absent addiction, the more motivating one is more valuable to me. — Janus

I have no problem with this, but it does not support determinism, because it does not point to a source of value beyond your own agency.

You seem to simply beg the question that intentionality can exist without physicality. The problem is that you can't provide any evidence of intentionality without physicality, so it seems you take the possibility of intentionality sans physicality on faith. — wonderer1

The way at this problem is to see what it is to be intentional, and then ask does being intentional require being physical.

You can see the fallacy to this way of thinking by considering the concept of energy. When it was first developed, every known case involved mechanical motion. Then we discovered potential energy in mechanical systems. Subsequently, we discovered thermal energy, chemical binding energy, mass energy, and now dark energy. It is totally irrational to say that because all the cases we know are of one type, no other cases are possible.

Another example is calling the standard model "the theory of everything" (TOE). It is now the TOE-96 -- the theory of everything except 96% of the stuff.

Also, if you read my "Mind or Randomness in Evolution" you will find argument for the existence of God and His being a mind.

Meaning depends on a physical interpretive context. The fact that aababbab doesn't have any clear meaning outside a physical interpretive context isn't relevant to anything. — wonderer1

A "a physical interpretive context" begs the question. The interpretive context depends on the minds of human interpreters. Meaning is not physical. No application of physics will show that X means Y. So, the interpretive context is essentially intentional, not physical except incidentally.

My example is highly relevant, because a and b are arbitrary physical states and neither has an intrinsic meaning. Your response does nothing to show that they do, but admits that they do not.

As far as I can tell there is no intelligibility outside a physically interpretive context so I think that you need to provide some reason to believe that there can be intelligibility outside a physically interpretive context. — wonderer1

If you mean by "a physical interpretive context" that people with brains interpret, I agree. That does not mean that what they know is material.

The reason we need brains is because what we normally think about is neurally encoded. But, not everything we experience is. I suggest you research mystical experience. Some authors you might start with are Richard Bucke (an atheist), William James, W. T. Stace, and D.T. Suzuki. You will find that humans can be aware of non-physical intelligibility. Such intelligibility cannot be neurally encoded for reasons that I do not have time to explain now.

You seem to be getting inputs and outputs confused. Your retinal state supervenes on the physical effect of an apple reflecting light from a light source into your eye. Your brain state supervenes on your retinal state. — wonderer1

My brain state also supervenes on the orbital motion of Halley's comment. Supervenience has absolutely no explanatory power. Tell me something that matters. Like what causes what.

As for input, it is the action of the apple in scattering light into my eye. The output is two distinct concepts. This is a one-to-many mapping. It cannot be explained on physical principles. If materialism is right, one brain state should only one concept.

When you are thinking about the apple you see, you will have a different neural state than when contemplating light striking your retina. — wonderer1

The result of my thinking will lead to different articulations, and they will be encoded differently. That is not the issue. The issue is how do I generate these thoughts, not how do I formulate them.

Let's try this again. The same neural inputs signal (1) something is seen, and (2) my retinal state is modified. No amount of neural processing can separate (1) from (2) because there is only one signal for both. Think of a neural net. The signals that that train it to activate "a retinal modification is occurring" are exactly the same signals that train it to activate "something is being seen." So, there is no way to physically differentiate these intentional states.

Physical ink arranged on physical paper serves just fine for encoding Godel's theorems. — wonderer1

Not alone. A human mind that understands the language is also required -- both for endoding and decoding. Without that intentional capability (the ability to transform marks into meaning and vice versa), there is no encoding. There are only weird ink stains.

Neural states can encode the concept. — wonderer1

How does it get decoded into a concept when required? We do not perceive the pulse rates or neurotransmitter concentrations. So, how do we know what is encoded?

I don't agree with this. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not the place to argue this. Let's just say that my education puts me in a better position to judge.

But the actual jumps seem to occur almost instantaneously. — Gnomon

No, they do not. They generate the light pulses we call photons, which have a finite duration in order to have a well-defined frequency (because of the uncertainty principle). So, we can tell how long the transitions take. Further, the transitions are much better described as wave phenomena than as particle phenomena. The electrons in each level have a well-defined energy and so a well-defined frequency.

'm not mentioning that as an exhortation to a specifically Catholic philosophy, but as preserving what I think of as a kind of universalist insight. Firstly the idea that there's a kind of understanding which also requires a transformation in order for it to be meaningful. Secondly that this is not easy or painless. I don't see an equivalent of that in much of secular philosophy. — Wayfarer

This is an Augustinian insight I touch upon in my current paper.

To know the truth, we must be open, and being open can be painful in many ways. It can rip away the mask hiding our true self. It can destroy the rationalizations excusing our immorality. It can destroy the premises on which we have built a career, or make a career difficult because what we see is rejected by our peers. Since we may see our beliefs as part of our core self, letting go of them can be a small death.

So, how do thought and matter interact? They don't -- because the question is ill-formed. What we have is being, with different beings having different capabilities. — Dfpolis
Is that negation based on a distinction between Real Things and Ideal Beings? — Gnomon

No. There are no Ideal Beings. There are only real and imaginary beings. We have different ideas about things because they can act in different ways. Red apples can cause us to experience red qualia. Sweet apples can cause us to experience sweet qualia.

Yet, you say that "thought and matter" have different (dual?) "capabilities". If "capability" is taken to mean the ability to affect other "beings", how would you characterize that innate power? — Gnomon

Things are defined in terms of their operational capabilities. Acorns can sprout into oaks, non-acorns cannot. When a thing acts on us in a certain way, we learn that it can act in that way. When I was a child, I learned that the thing that caused the image of a bee in me could also sting. Thus, my knowledge of the operational capabilities (the essence) of bees increased, even though it remains imperfect to this day.

Organisms have immanent activity -- activities like growth and nutrition that are self-perfecting, and so not directed at others. Theoretical, vs, practical, thought is self perfecting. It satisfies our innate desire to become one with the rest of reality.

Extended Matter interacts with other things via exchanges of Energy. Do you think that Thinking Beings interact via Intention? — Gnomon

Bodies also also exchange momentum and angular momentum in interacting. Also, how much energy a body has depends on the frame of reference in which it is measured.

Intentions are modes of relating. There is no knowing, willing, hoping, etc. without something known, willed, hoped, etc. Some intentions, such as willing, result in physical changes, others, such as hoping and knowing, have no direct physical effects, but have many indirect physical effects.

Apparently, your objection to the Dualistic (proximate appearance) aspect is based on a Monistic (ultimate Ideality) worldview, in which Mind & Matter can be traced back to some primordial Origin, with the potential for both Material things and Mental beings. Is that summary anywhere close to your understanding? — Gnomon

Well, if you mean do think there is an ultimate cause, yes, I do. I am not a neutral monist, because I do not think in terms of substance as a "stuff" which is formed into experienced objects. That, view, even in Cartesian dualism, is fundamentally materialistic. It conceives of everything as "made of" one or more kinds of "stuff." Maybe that stuff is matter, or energy, or res cogitans, or a Spinozan substance than can become material or spiritual things.

My philosophical starting point, like Aristotle's, is experience, and the things experience reveals. Most of what it reveals is extended. Some of it can think. Some depends on being observed or measured, some does not. Some is natural, some the expression of human creativity.

In my thesis, the Ultimate Origin (First Cause) is neither Mind nor Matter, but the Potential for evolving a plethora of material Things & living Creatures & Thinking Beings in the Real world — Gnomon

It cannot be. Things that are purely potential are not actual, and things that are not actual cannot act. Evolving is an action, and so requires something actual to effect it.

And I use physical Energy as a metaphor for the "interactions" between those offspring of Plato's hypothetical ideal FORM*2 (configuration ; manifestation ; design), and Aristotle's original Prime Mover (causation ; creation). — Gnomon

Aristotle showed, in many ways, that Plato's concept of Ideas lead to many inconsistencies, and could play no role in becoming. So, these two pieces of the puzzle don't match.

From those different aspects of Monistic Potential, I can trace Cosmology from an initial Bang of omnidirectional Causation, which transformed into the dual aspects of Energy & Matter, and thence into the manifold Darwinian "forms most beautiful". Some of those sub-forms have material Properties and some have immaterial Qualities, such as Life & Mind. Does any of that conjecture make sense from your non-dual perspective? — Gnomon

I am fine with this, except to say that the theory of evolution must be mute on consciousness because it explains adaptation physically, and physics has no intentional effects. No one has reduced intentional realities to a physical basis.

I have to say I don't really know. I will choose that which motivates me more, and what motivates me more is a characteristic of my nature (my nature at the specified time, since it might change). So, for example, presuming that you were referring to someone of sexual interest, the choice I make might depend on the strength of my libido at the time. — Janus

The problem is that there is can be no more and less in comparing commensurates. That was the point of my question and is the fundamental flaw with utility theories. You cannot value a liter of oxygen against a liter of water. You need both, and no amount of one will meet your need for the other.

You can say that Jane (or John) excites you more than Mary (or Martin), but you cannot say that being with Jane or John is more valuable than 11 views of Yosemite Falls, but less than 12 views. To say that one is "more motivating" explains nothing. It just says the motive associated with the choice you actually make is more motivating -- rather like saying that this medicine makes you sleepy because it is a soporific.

I have never understood what "modernism" means — Dfpolis
I understand modernity as the period between the publication of Newton's Principia and Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity (or more precisely, the legendary 1927 Solvay Conference where quantum theory was introduced). — Wayfarer

Modernism is not modernity. It is a modern worldview, or some aspects of that view, that some find offensive. I do not understand exactly what they are offended by. Neither do I understand what you object to about liberal democracy.

Descartes categorically "divided" Soul from Body ; which in more modern terms might translate to a conceptual distinction between Mind and Brain. — Gnomon

We have to be careful here. Saying that body and mind are different things (res) is more that making a conceptual distinction. The distinction pre-dates Descartes. Aristotle and Aquinas distinguished intellect from sense as "a bodily process." That does not divide[ them. It is just saying that one being can act in different ways. They also knew that we needed physical representations (phantasms) to think and Aquinas knew that brain trauma interfered with thinking.

quote="Gnomon;846788"]from what perspective do you conclude that we "cannot divide" Res Extensa from Res Cogitans?[/quote]
Thinking of different aspects of one being does not require positing different things. An apple may be red and taste sweet. That implies that it can act in two ways, not that it is a sweet thing joined to a red thing.

As I tried to explain before, since rational thought requires physical representations,i.e. brain states, the aspect of us that thinks (Descartes's res cogitans) includes an extended, material part (res extensa), namely our brain. So, there is no clean division between being a physical organism and being a thinking one. That is why we are rational animals, not ghosts in machines.

A Monistic Materialist might assume that ultimately Mind is just a different kind of Matter, so the distinction is artificial, not natural. — Gnomon

That would involve equivocating on "matter." In dialoging with such a person, I would ask for a clear definition. We can give words technical definitions to articulate our thought, but it is a sign of confusion to use common word with uncommon intent, and not define what we mean.

Apparently, you have either a different meaning of "divide", or a different Prime Substance, in mind. — Gnomon

I have explained why we cannot divide res cogitans from res extensa. The current use of substance is not one to which I subscribe. Instead I follow Aristotle in taking the primary realities (ousia = "substance"), to be ostensible unities (his tode ti = this something), like electrons, viruses, bacteria, cows and people. Different systems can have different sorts of unity so people, the earth, the solar system, our galaxy and so on are all unities, and so substances, in their own way.

We can analyze unities in different ways, but the products of such analysis are not substances unless they have their own unity. Since human thought depends on the human body, the power to think is not a unity standing apart from the body, as Descartes believed.

Aristotle's "Self-Thinker" sounds like a dis-embodied Mind, and for a Materialist, would fall into the same nonsense category with Ghosts and Circular Logic. — Gnomon

Thus, materialists need to rethink their fundamental beliefs. For example, Daniel Dennett starts Consciousness Explained by saying he is a metaphysical naturalist. He then proves, to his own satisfaction, that there can be no physical reduction of consciousness. When I studied science, that was called the falsification of a hypothesis. For Dennett, it is a reason to discard data, for he concludes that there is no consciousness.

As for circular reasoning, I have no idea why anyone would think that Aristotle's proof of the Unmoved Mover is circular. It starts form the fact of experienced change, and employs valid logic.

I accept that all of the Minds in my sensory experience have been associated with meat Brains — Gnomon

As do I.

So, the question arises : what is the relationship between Math and Mind? My answer is that both are subvenient (dependent) forms of the universal Power-to-Enform (Energy + Information = EnFormAction). That unconventional notion is not a derivative of pure Idealism, but a conjugation of Idealism & Physicalism. Or, as I like to call it Enformationism. — Gnomon

It sounds like a kind of hylomorphism, which is conceiving of bodies in terms of matter (hyle) and form (morphos). Aristotle sees form, not as shape, but as a thing's actuality (energeia). Similarly he thinks of matter, not as extension, but as the potential to assume form.

As for supervenience, it seems to mean dependence, but actually does not. For example, my writing this supervenes on the motion of Jupiter's moons. Let's go back to causality, which is more specific and so more demanding.

For me the answer lies in secularization. The older Judeo-Christian culture had an anchor for equality, namely the imago dei and a "balancing" afterlife, which was thought to reestablish justice. The religion and the anchor were lost, and at that point equality became an all-or-nothing affair. E.g. A Rawls-or-Nietzsche affair. — Leontiskos

This seems a reasonable hypothesis, although I suspect that there are other factors as well.

It's incompatible with //some aspects of// democratic liberalism. That's why most of the exponents of the various forms of the perennial philosophy are hostile to modernism. — Wayfarer

I have never understood what "modernism" means, because I have never seen it precisely defined. As I read it, it seems to mean whatever recent changes the author does not like. Instead of discussing them pro and con, they are labeled and dismissed.

Similarly, "liberalism" is another ill-defined label. As I read history, American liberalism grew out of (1) disgust for British government inaction in response to the Irish potato famine and (2) the abolitionist movement. Neither of these roots seem poisonous to me.

Of course, there are abuses labeled "liberal" as there are abuses labeled "conservative." Unless these abuses can be shown to be a consequence of the principles of these movements, which I have rarely seen, condemnation by label only serves to divide people. Wanting to preserve the true values of the past does not mean you are a racist unless you view past racism as a "true value." Wanting to advance human freedoms and dignity does not mean you reject the true values of the past.

What actually happens is that people who want to preserve privilege or free themselves of moral constraint dress themselves in one of these labels as a disguise. Which one is a matter of convenience, because there is no real difference between continuing in immorality and seeking to be free of moral restraint.

how the particle gets from A to B, etc., and this is represented as a wave function. — Metaphysician Undercover

Quantum observations are completely explainable without invoking the "particle" concept. Modelling the physics using the concept of particles works in many, but not all cases. Modelling it in terms of waves works for all the observations.

Anyway, despite my criticism I do like your work. As a novel variety of science based metaphysics, it's like a breath of fresh air. That's why I'm quick to engage you when you post a thread, I like you. — Metaphysician Undercover

Thank you for the kind words.

I agree with what you say, but I see imagiation as involved in both interpreting or undertsnding something as something and in imagining something that does not actually exist. Note that this latter function of imagination relies on the combining of preformed images of objects that do exist. — Janus

We agree.

Of course, if I read other authors I will be moved to agree or disagree depending on how what they say accords with that experience or not. — Janus

My point was that I chose what to read and, implicitly, what to think about, even though I was not yet neurally informed by the printed word. So, my later neural state was, to a degree, a result of my prior intentional state.

I don't experience myself as being able to freely decide what to value or agree with; I experience that as being determined by what I have, through my own experience, been led to think. — Janus

Suppose that your experience leads you to a fork in the road. On one fork is said to be a place of great natural beauty, on the other a person you have texted with and are interested in, but not met or made any commitment to. I am saying that your choice of which fork to take is based on how you choose to value these incommensurate goods. On your theory, how is this valuation made?

But it definitely has something to do with the act of measurement, does it not? “No phenomena is a phenomena until it is observed”, said Bohr. — Wayfarer

As I said, the the wave function collapses because the detection process (used in measuring) is nonlinear and cannot sustain superposition.

I assume that by "non-sensical" you mean : from the perspective of Realism & Materialism. You may be correct, that many-if-not-most posters on TPF identify as materialists or physicalists, to the exclusion of psychological or metaphysical views. But not all. — Gnomon

No, I mean from the perspective of anyone who takes science seriously. (I am not a materialist.) It is nonsensical because it has been known since Galen (129-216 AD) treated gladiators that thinking depends on the brain. Any well-grounded theory of mind has to take that into account. So, we cannot divide extended reality from human mental reality.

So now, there are good empirical reasons to doubt*1 the evidence of the physical senses, and to apply the 6th sense of philosophical Reasoning. The "science" I'm referring to is Quantum Physics, not Spiritualism. — Gnomon

As one with a doctorate in theoretical physics, I do not think that the facts support the far-reaching quantum interpretations that astound people. Some come from confusing the particle model with real particles (for which there is no irrefutable evidence). Some come from inconsistently treating measuring processes classically instead of quantum mechanically. Some comes ignoring entanglement over large distances, or accepted but little discussed trans-temporal symmetry principles, and some come from ignoring the nonlinearity of interactions.

There is a tendency to think that because quantum theory and consciousness are both mysterious, they must be related. The theories I have read trying to do so have not stood up. The wave function does not collapse in the brain as von Neumann and Wigner proposed, but in measuring devices because interactions with them are nonlinear and do not support superposition. So, the collapse of the wave function has nothing to do with consciousness.

It's obvious that Minds are always Embodied ; unless you give credence to invisible intangible ghosts. — Gnomon

No, one need only give credence to logical analysis such as that by which Aristotle established the existence of an immaterial unmoved mover, described as "self-thinking thought."

Cartesian dualism was merely a compromise, intended to allow Science to proceed without interference from Religion — Gnomon

Have you read Hannam, The Genesis of Science: How the Christian Middle Ages Launched the Scientific Revolution? No one interfered with his physics, which btw was atrocious.

A more pertinent observation in the 21st century is that Mind is the Function of physical brains. — Gnomon

How does one observe this?

I'm not proposing a Triality, but merely that both space-occupying things, and thinking things, might be merely various products of evolutionary Causation. — Gnomon

As I explain in my January paper, for this to be so, mind must have physical effects.

The uncertainty principle presents a philosophical challenge to one of our basic assumptions about the nature of physical objects, namely, that physical variables have precise and definite objective existence. — Gnomon

This is a non-problem for Aristotelians who see that measured values do not exist befoe measuring operations.

You haven't established that thinking of mathematical concepts can occur without supervening on matter. — wonderer1

Maybe that is because I think that empirical knowledge is informed by physical action via a modification of our brain state. However, since the same thoughts supervene on astronomical motions, saying that they supervene on brain states is not at all helpful. Saying that brain states encode the information we become aware of is.

You seem to simply be considering a "subject" as a pure abstraction without recognizing the subject's supervenience on matter — wonderer1

No, I see subjects only in subject-object relations. There is no being a subject without having an intentional relation to an object known, willed, hoped for, etc. All of this is essentially intentional. Nothing about it demands physicality.

That the objects human subjects typically relate to are physical does not mean that all objects are physical and, if they are not physical, they will not be physically encoded. The essence of knowing is the union of the mind with its objects. The object informing the mind is, identically, the mind being informed by the object. Noting about this demands a physical substrate. So, what you are doing is generalizing from a single form of knowing, to all knowing. Clearly, there is no logical justification for this kind of induction.

Think about information. While it can be physically encoded, it is not physical. What computers process is not information in virtue of any physical property. Label a bit’s physical states a and b, and ask what the byte aababbab means? Reading left to right and interpreting a as 0, and b as 1, the byte means 00101101. Interpreting a as 1 and b as 0, it is 11010010. Reading right to left, it means 10110100 or 01001011. Thus, a, an arbitrary physical state, lacks intrinsic meaning.

Since information is not it's encoding, there is no contradiction in having intelligibility without a physical substrate.

Finally, your assumption that human intentionality supervenes on brain states is demonstrably false. Consider my seeing an apple. The same modification of my brain state encodes both my seeing an apple and my retinal state being modified. So, one neural state underpins two distinct conceptual states.

I'm not seeing how the fact that the object of thought need not be material is of much relevance. — wonderer1

It is relevant because it shows that matter is not essential to all objects of thought. Ask yourself how physical states can determine immaterial contents. For example, what kind of physical state can encode Goedel's concept of unprovability? Physical states interact physically, producing physical, not intentional results. So, how can a physical state interact with immaterial contents? It can't.

Instead, we have neural states encoding examples from which we can abstract concepts. Clearly, producing concepts is an intentional, not a physical operation.

The physical informs by developing intentional outputs. See this video on neural nets producing outputs that are about numerals in a visual field. Intentionality shows up at a relatively low level of neural network processing. — wonderer1

That does not happen. Neural nets only produce physical activation states. As with my computer example, the meaning or intentionality of these states is not intrinsic, but imposed by human interpreters.

Being a response to something, however complex that response may be, is not being about (in Brentano's sense) what is responded to. Believing that it is is an example of anthropomorphic thinking. Is a ringing bell about the bell puller's act? Of course not. It can, however, be used to infer that there is a bell puller acting.

Aristotle used no faith based premises to deduce that God was "self-thinking thought." Greek religion at the time was pantheism. — Dfpolis
I'll leave discussing Aristotle to Fooloso4. — wonderer1

As you will. Still, it rebuts your claim.

With a well informed perspective on the matter, a person understands that the physical effect of celestial objects on the functioning of our brains is generally so negligible that we are justified in ignoring it. It is disappointing to receive sophistry like this as a response. — wonderer1

My point exactly! Supervenience alone is worthless. You have to look at causality, which supervenience theory was designed to avoid. And why? Because there is no possible reduction of intentional effects to physical causes. Dennett recognized that explicitly in Consciousness Explained and Chalmers recognizes it in discussing the hard problem. I showed why it impossible in my January article.

Superveniences are a class of abstractions. — wonderer1

Yes. That does not make every abstraction an instance of supervenience.

To think that you have done a serious inspection while ignoring neuroscience is just fooling yourself. — wonderer1

That is rather gratuitous! Where have I ignored neuroscience? I find it useful, but limited. It is like a street lamp's light. The light being under it does not mean that's where you lost your keys. It is better to think about what you did with your keys.

Since philosophers were able to discuss this for millennia without the concept of supervenience, it can hardly be necessary. — Dfpolis
Fallacious appeal to tradition. — wonderer1

No, a counter-example to the claim of necessity.

Let's face it. When you needed supervenience to rebut my claim about astrology, it failed you. You had to abandon it, and bring in causality -- the very move it was designed to avoid.

No, because mind of God is not a human mind, but only analogous to our minds. God does not now in the same way as humans do. — Dfpolis
Do you recognize the special pleading? — wonderer1

It would be special pleading if I held a general principle that this violates. I hold no such principle. Since you have insufficient evidence to generalize from some minds on a peripheral planet to all minds, neither I am not violating a universal principle you have justified. I merely reject your hypothesis.

You didn't qualify "informed opinion". I certainly can and do have opinions informed by much that Aquinas didn't understand. Why try to change the subject to Aquinas' uninformed opinions? — wonderer1

Because, that is what a truth-seeker should do. I did not read the Churchlands, Dennett, Chalmers any number of other naturalists because I expected to agree with them, but because I hoped to find insights -- and I did. It always helps to see things from a perspective very different than your own.

I do not agree 100% with Aquinas. The paper I am writing is quite critical of his theory of knowledge. Still, I have not found any glaring errors of fact, and he is one of the great minds in philosophy -- well worth reading even if it is only to clarify your own position.

As for changing the subject, it was you who brought up the mind of God without researching it.

Responding to you is time-consuming and seems to provide little benefit to either of us or to anyone else. I need that time to work on my articles for publication. So, I have decided to spend it there.

With kind regards,
Dennis Polis

Great OP. Your paper also looks interesting. — Leontiskos

Thank you. As I said, I am revising one on how the agent intellect works. If you would like to read it, and possibly comment, message me with your email.

Why think a mind is something that can exist without an information processing substrate to supervene upon? I.e. why think that a belief that God is metaphysically possible is not faith based? — wonderer1

Because the essential requirement for thought is a subject and an object. The object of thought need not be material, as we can think mathematical concepts that do not involve matter. So, while content may be encoded in matter, that presents more of a problem (how does the physical inform the intentional?) than a solution.

Aristotle used no faith based premises to deduce that God was "self-thinking thought." Greek religion at the time was pantheism.

Supervene" is a pragmatic word for considering things from a more simplistic but useful view. — wonderer1

How is it useful to know that my thoughts supervene on celestial motions? If you take supervenience seriously, you have to take astrology seriously.

For example I can usefully discuss the workings of logic gates without concerning myself with whether the logic gates are instantiated with transistors and resistors, or vacuum tubes, or relays. — wonderer1

That is abstraction, not subservience.

It simply isn't feasible for us to discuss the physical behavior of a whole brain at the level of particle physics. — wonderer1

True, but irrelevant to the philosophical question of how physicality and intentionality relate. To study that you need to inspect, not ignore, their relation.

So talking in terms of supervenient properties is simply a pragmatic necessity — wonderer1

Since philosophers were able to discuss this for millennia without the concept of supervenience, it can hardly be necessary.

The question is, will you be consistent and agree that the mind of a god has an isomorphic dependency? — wonderer1

No, because mind of God is not a human mind, but only analogous to our minds. God does not now in the same way as humans do. Aquinas discusses this at length. You may not agree with Aquinas, but unless you know his theory, you cannot have an informed opinion.

Furthermore, will you recognize that a god dependent on some sort of information processing substrate is not in itself an unmoved mover? — wonderer1

Sure. That is why it is "a god" and not God.

As far as we know nature has always behaved invariantly. We agree that nature's behavior is
not logically necessary, but that might not mean much more than that we are able to think counterfactually. — Janus

Quite likely, so let us think factually. Really, no matter how we think, we are not going to have exhaustive knowledge.

If you know an object then you must have an idea of what it is, and I would count that as being possible due to imagination, — Janus

It depends on what you mean by imagination. I know that it can act as it acts on me when I sense it. Say, it can scatter light, or make a strange sound. That action modifies my brain state, causing a presence we can be aware of as an "image." That is Aristotle's phantasm. We can also imagine things not so caused. If an image is not caused by an object, it cannot be our means of knowing an object, because it is not the dynamic presence of an object.

We have 'images' of things, of their patterns or forms, which enable us to recognize them. — Janus

Yes, or others of their kind. But, on the first encounter with a new type of thing, we have no such image.

Appearances are relational, the thing in itself is not; it is what the thing is apart from all its relations. — Janus

I agree with this statement. I don't think it is what Kant meant, but I am not a Kantian and so no expert. As I understand him, the mind adds forms of understanding, rather than basing concepts such as space, time and causality on reality.

If all thoughts are preceded by neural processes, then those prior thoughts would also have been. — Janus

Being preceded by is not the same as being determined by. My passing through a signal is preceded by the signal turning green, but determined by my decision to go. Yes, that decision is partially determined by neural processes, but in the end, it is determined by my valuation of various factors, and valuation is an act of the will.

For Spinoza there is no real separation between thought and neural process, it is not that thoughts are caused by neural processes, but that "thought" and "neural process" are the two ways we have of understanding the one thing. We are not aware of our neural processes, but we can become aware of our thoughts. — Janus

If you mean, as Spinoza did not, that thoughts and neural processes are two activities of a single person, I agree. But, being two ways of understanding, of of acting, does not explain the correlation of neural processes and the contents of awareness. We are aware of information encoded in neural processes. This cannot be an accident, and so calls for an explanation grounded in the relation of subject and object, for otherwise, our thoughts cannot put us in touch with reality.

Parallelism does not put us in touch with nature. It is a ridiculous theory because if true, it could never be justified. We would have no way of knowing what extended reality is actually doing to compare it with our thoughts and see that they are parallel. Extended reality could be doing not-A while we think it's doing A.

Further, since physics has no intentional effects, neural states need to inform mental states via an intentional operation. That is the subject of the paper I am finishing, should you care to see it.

Does our explicit awareness of our thoughts come as we think them or after the fact? My experience tells me that I do not decide what to think prior to thinking it, and that my explicit awareness or consciousness of what I have thought comes after having thought it, via the "echo" of memory, wherein I can "hear" my thought repeated as a "silent locution" in my "mind's ear". — Janus

Clearly, this is not completely true. I wanted to know how physical processes engender knowledge, so I decided to study authors who had written on cognition, such as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Bucke, James, Stace, Suzuki, the Churchlands and Dennett. Clearly, I decided what to think about before I analyzed their arguments. As I read, my neural net activated related contents, giving me the means of testing what I read. Yet, even there, I valued some contents more and other contents less, and that valuation determined the amount of time I spent thinking about various points in light of various facts.

I certainly agree that we cannot understand contents until we have properly disposed contents to be aware of. But, I also see, that thinking, unlike processing, is impossible without awareness. Processing can lead to activation sequences, experienced as change of association, but it cannot judge that though the setting sun is associated with an orange, it is not an orange.

Churchland is clear that there is no neural structure corresponding to propositional knowledge. His conclusion is that there is no propositional knowledge; mine that there is more to thinking than neural structures. Dennett is clear that there can be no naturalist model of consciousness. His conclusion is that consciousness does not exist; mine that this falsifies the hypothesis of naturalism.

Yes, we use language to articulate our thoughts. Still, there is more to thought than language because we often find it difficult to find the right word to express our thoughts. If thought were fundamentally linguistic, this would never happen. Indeed, we would have little language indeed, because language grows in response to our need to express thoughts current language cannot.

I'm out of time at this moment so I'll have to address other points you made later. — Janus

As am I. Thank you for sharing your thoughts.

Mincing words. God is a premise that underlies your claim, which is not an argument, that: — Fooloso4

This warrant no further response