More panentheist than pantheist; I think Spinoza understood God to be both immanent to and transcendent of nature, and by that, I mean transcendent of nature as we know it; knowing which is exclusively under the attributes of extensa and cogitans. Spinoza believed those are just the two of God's infinite attributes that we humans can know. Have you read Spinoza's Ethics? — Janus

No, I haven't read any of Spinoza's writings. Most of what I know comes from books and articles about his life & philosophy. And the general impression I got was that his deus sive natura description was intended to avoid attributing any transcendent or super-natural characteristics to his nature-god, hence Pantheism or more accurately PanDeism.

But centuries later, we now have a more comprehensive and detailed understanding of the natural world, including scientific evidence that our physical cosmos is not eternal, but had a sudden, something-from-nothing beginning, not in Time, but of Time. So, with that additional information, I have developed a PanEnDeistic worldview, that postulates some kind of Causal Power and Logical Laws that existed before the Big Bang beginning of our little bubble of space-time.

Beyond that logical implication, I know nothing of the interpolated deus super natura, that Plato called First Cause, and Aristotle labelled Prime Mover. So, it's just a philosophical conjecture, not the kind of god that would require human worship or sacrifice. I think even Einstein would have approved, once he became adapted to the then-emerging notion of an expanding physical universe, gradually evolving from a mathematically defined creation event. His next question would be : "what caused the bang?" :smile:

"Appears to be a natural fact", doesn't get us anywhere. it always appeared to be a natural fact, but that's irrelevant. The fact is that "uncertainty" is a property of the subject, not the object. And, it is always caused by the subject's mode of understanding not being properly suited to the reality of the object which it is attempting to apprehend. It makes no sense to blame the object here, therefore the subject's mode of understanding needs to be scrutinized. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that our subjective "mode of understanding" is suspect, but in the expression "natural fact", I was referring to the scientific evidence that Nature is inherently statistical (random chance) in its fundamental behaviors*1. Some might interpret the statistical nature of waveforms as a sign that coin-flipping Luck is a feature of natural processes. Hence, a smidgen of doubt smudged the surety of classical physics.

But another way to look at it, is to see that the indeterminate structure of quantum nature provides degrees of freedom*2 for the creative non-linear development of evolution. Quantum nature has been proven to be probabilistic (uncertain) instead of deterministic (certain). Einstein objected that his Spinozan nature-god didn't play dice. But Heisenberg's quantum-nature-god begged to differ. And Bohr answered, "Einstein, stop telling God what to do."

So nobody is "blaming the object" ; merely accepting that statistical probabilistic uncertainty is inherent intrinsic immanent in physical Nature. So, if we are going to blame anybody, pin the puzzlement on Newton, who defined physics in no uncertain terms*4. Or on Heisenberg who pulled-up the rug to reveal the squishy dicey foundations of physics. :smile:



*1. What Is Statistical Significance? :
“Statistical significance helps quantify whether a result is likely due to chance or to some factor of interest,” says Redman. When a finding is significant, it simply means you can feel confident that’s it real, not that you just got lucky (or unlucky) in choosing the sample.
https://hbr.org/2016/02/a-refresher-on-statistical-significance
Note --- Heisenberg defined the lack of confidence in quantum interpretations as Uncertainty on the part of the observer. But the source of that feeling in the observer is the unpredictability of the object being observed.

*2. Quantum nature not absolutely deterministic :
The wave function is a function of the degrees of freedom corresponding to some maximal set of commuting observables. Once such a representation is chosen, the wave function can be derived from the quantum state.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wave_function

*3. Quantum Universe: Fundamentally Probabilistic, Not Deterministic :
Einstein believed that the universe and its laws must be strictly deterministic. He felt that there could be no role for probability or chance, in nature's foundation. This is why Einstein didn't accept or agree with the theory of quantum mechanics.
https://www.wondriumdaily.com/quantum-universe-fundamentally-probabilistic-not-deterministic/

*4. Determinism vs Probability :
Determinism in the West is often associated with Newtonian mechanics/physics, which depicts the physical matter of the universe as operating according to a set of fixed laws.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism

Descartes categorically "divided" Soul from Body ; which in more modern terms might translate to a conceptual distinction between Mind and Brain. — Gnomon

We have to be careful here. Saying that body and mind are different things (res) is more that making a conceptual distinction. The distinction pre-dates Descartes. Aristotle and Aquinas distinguished intellect from sense as "a bodily process." That does not divide[ them. It is just saying that one being can act in different ways. They also knew that we needed physical representations (phantasms) to think and Aquinas knew that brain trauma interfered with thinking.

quote="Gnomon;846788"]from what perspective do you conclude that we "cannot divide" Res Extensa from Res Cogitans?[/quote]
Thinking of different aspects of one being does not require positing different things. An apple may be red and taste sweet. That implies that it can act in two ways, not that it is a sweet thing joined to a red thing.

As I tried to explain before, since rational thought requires physical representations,i.e. brain states, the aspect of us that thinks (Descartes's res cogitans) includes an extended, material part (res extensa), namely our brain. So, there is no clean division between being a physical organism and being a thinking one. That is why we are rational animals, not ghosts in machines.

A Monistic Materialist might assume that ultimately Mind is just a different kind of Matter, so the distinction is artificial, not natural. — Gnomon

That would involve equivocating on "matter." In dialoging with such a person, I would ask for a clear definition. We can give words technical definitions to articulate our thought, but it is a sign of confusion to use common word with uncommon intent, and not define what we mean.

Apparently, you have either a different meaning of "divide", or a different Prime Substance, in mind. — Gnomon

I have explained why we cannot divide res cogitans from res extensa. The current use of substance is not one to which I subscribe. Instead I follow Aristotle in taking the primary realities (ousia = "substance"), to be ostensible unities (his tode ti = this something), like electrons, viruses, bacteria, cows and people. Different systems can have different sorts of unity so people, the earth, the solar system, our galaxy and so on are all unities, and so substances, in their own way.

We can analyze unities in different ways, but the products of such analysis are not substances unless they have their own unity. Since human thought depends on the human body, the power to think is not a unity standing apart from the body, as Descartes believed.

Aristotle's "Self-Thinker" sounds like a dis-embodied Mind, and for a Materialist, would fall into the same nonsense category with Ghosts and Circular Logic. — Gnomon

Thus, materialists need to rethink their fundamental beliefs. For example, Daniel Dennett starts Consciousness Explained by saying he is a metaphysical naturalist. He then proves, to his own satisfaction, that there can be no physical reduction of consciousness. When I studied science, that was called the falsification of a hypothesis. For Dennett, it is a reason to discard data, for he concludes that there is no consciousness.

As for circular reasoning, I have no idea why anyone would think that Aristotle's proof of the Unmoved Mover is circular. It starts form the fact of experienced change, and employs valid logic.

I accept that all of the Minds in my sensory experience have been associated with meat Brains — Gnomon

As do I.

So, the question arises : what is the relationship between Math and Mind? My answer is that both are subvenient (dependent) forms of the universal Power-to-Enform (Energy + Information = EnFormAction). That unconventional notion is not a derivative of pure Idealism, but a conjugation of Idealism & Physicalism. Or, as I like to call it Enformationism. — Gnomon

It sounds like a kind of hylomorphism, which is conceiving of bodies in terms of matter (hyle) and form (morphos). Aristotle sees form, not as shape, but as a thing's actuality (energeia). Similarly he thinks of matter, not as extension, but as the potential to assume form.

As for supervenience, it seems to mean dependence, but actually does not. For example, my writing this supervenes on the motion of Jupiter's moons. Let's go back to causality, which is more specific and so more demanding.

I have never understood what "modernism" means — Dfpolis
I understand modernity as the period between the publication of Newton's Principia and Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity (or more precisely, the legendary 1927 Solvay Conference where quantum theory was introduced). — Wayfarer

Modernism is not modernity. It is a modern worldview, or some aspects of that view, that some find offensive. I do not understand exactly what they are offended by. Neither do I understand what you object to about liberal democracy.

I have to say I don't really know. I will choose that which motivates me more, and what motivates me more is a characteristic of my nature (my nature at the specified time, since it might change). So, for example, presuming that you were referring to someone of sexual interest, the choice I make might depend on the strength of my libido at the time. — Janus

The problem is that there is can be no more and less in comparing commensurates. That was the point of my question and is the fundamental flaw with utility theories. You cannot value a liter of oxygen against a liter of water. You need both, and no amount of one will meet your need for the other.

You can say that Jane (or John) excites you more than Mary (or Martin), but you cannot say that being with Jane or John is more valuable than 11 views of Yosemite Falls, but less than 12 views. To say that one is "more motivating" explains nothing. It just says the motive associated with the choice you actually make is more motivating -- rather like saying that this medicine makes you sleepy because it is a soporific.

So, how do thought and matter interact? They don't -- because the question is ill-formed. What we have is being, with different beings having different capabilities. — Dfpolis
Is that negation based on a distinction between Real Things and Ideal Beings? — Gnomon

No. There are no Ideal Beings. There are only real and imaginary beings. We have different ideas about things because they can act in different ways. Red apples can cause us to experience red qualia. Sweet apples can cause us to experience sweet qualia.

Yet, you say that "thought and matter" have different (dual?) "capabilities". If "capability" is taken to mean the ability to affect other "beings", how would you characterize that innate power? — Gnomon

Things are defined in terms of their operational capabilities. Acorns can sprout into oaks, non-acorns cannot. When a thing acts on us in a certain way, we learn that it can act in that way. When I was a child, I learned that the thing that caused the image of a bee in me could also sting. Thus, my knowledge of the operational capabilities (the essence) of bees increased, even though it remains imperfect to this day.

Organisms have immanent activity -- activities like growth and nutrition that are self-perfecting, and so not directed at others. Theoretical, vs, practical, thought is self perfecting. It satisfies our innate desire to become one with the rest of reality.

Extended Matter interacts with other things via exchanges of Energy. Do you think that Thinking Beings interact via Intention? — Gnomon

Bodies also also exchange momentum and angular momentum in interacting. Also, how much energy a body has depends on the frame of reference in which it is measured.

Intentions are modes of relating. There is no knowing, willing, hoping, etc. without something known, willed, hoped, etc. Some intentions, such as willing, result in physical changes, others, such as hoping and knowing, have no direct physical effects, but have many indirect physical effects.

Apparently, your objection to the Dualistic (proximate appearance) aspect is based on a Monistic (ultimate Ideality) worldview, in which Mind & Matter can be traced back to some primordial Origin, with the potential for both Material things and Mental beings. Is that summary anywhere close to your understanding? — Gnomon

Well, if you mean do think there is an ultimate cause, yes, I do. I am not a neutral monist, because I do not think in terms of substance as a "stuff" which is formed into experienced objects. That, view, even in Cartesian dualism, is fundamentally materialistic. It conceives of everything as "made of" one or more kinds of "stuff." Maybe that stuff is matter, or energy, or res cogitans, or a Spinozan substance than can become material or spiritual things.

My philosophical starting point, like Aristotle's, is experience, and the things experience reveals. Most of what it reveals is extended. Some of it can think. Some depends on being observed or measured, some does not. Some is natural, some the expression of human creativity.

In my thesis, the Ultimate Origin (First Cause) is neither Mind nor Matter, but the Potential for evolving a plethora of material Things & living Creatures & Thinking Beings in the Real world — Gnomon

It cannot be. Things that are purely potential are not actual, and things that are not actual cannot act. Evolving is an action, and so requires something actual to effect it.

And I use physical Energy as a metaphor for the "interactions" between those offspring of Plato's hypothetical ideal FORM*2 (configuration ; manifestation ; design), and Aristotle's original Prime Mover (causation ; creation). — Gnomon

Aristotle showed, in many ways, that Plato's concept of Ideas lead to many inconsistencies, and could play no role in becoming. So, these two pieces of the puzzle don't match.

From those different aspects of Monistic Potential, I can trace Cosmology from an initial Bang of omnidirectional Causation, which transformed into the dual aspects of Energy & Matter, and thence into the manifold Darwinian "forms most beautiful". Some of those sub-forms have material Properties and some have immaterial Qualities, such as Life & Mind. Does any of that conjecture make sense from your non-dual perspective? — Gnomon

I am fine with this, except to say that the theory of evolution must be mute on consciousness because it explains adaptation physically, and physics has no intentional effects. No one has reduced intentional realities to a physical basis.

'm not mentioning that as an exhortation to a specifically Catholic philosophy, but as preserving what I think of as a kind of universalist insight. Firstly the idea that there's a kind of understanding which also requires a transformation in order for it to be meaningful. Secondly that this is not easy or painless. I don't see an equivalent of that in much of secular philosophy. — Wayfarer

This is an Augustinian insight I touch upon in my current paper.

To know the truth, we must be open, and being open can be painful in many ways. It can rip away the mask hiding our true self. It can destroy the rationalizations excusing our immorality. It can destroy the premises on which we have built a career, or make a career difficult because what we see is rejected by our peers. Since we may see our beliefs as part of our core self, letting go of them can be a small death.

I don't agree with this. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not the place to argue this. Let's just say that my education puts me in a better position to judge.

But the actual jumps seem to occur almost instantaneously. — Gnomon

No, they do not. They generate the light pulses we call photons, which have a finite duration in order to have a well-defined frequency (because of the uncertainty principle). So, we can tell how long the transitions take. Further, the transitions are much better described as wave phenomena than as particle phenomena. The electrons in each level have a well-defined energy and so a well-defined frequency.

You seem to simply beg the question that intentionality can exist without physicality. The problem is that you can't provide any evidence of intentionality without physicality, so it seems you take the possibility of intentionality sans physicality on faith. — wonderer1

The way at this problem is to see what it is to be intentional, and then ask does being intentional require being physical.

You can see the fallacy to this way of thinking by considering the concept of energy. When it was first developed, every known case involved mechanical motion. Then we discovered potential energy in mechanical systems. Subsequently, we discovered thermal energy, chemical binding energy, mass energy, and now dark energy. It is totally irrational to say that because all the cases we know are of one type, no other cases are possible.

Another example is calling the standard model "the theory of everything" (TOE). It is now the TOE-96 -- the theory of everything except 96% of the stuff.

Also, if you read my "Mind or Randomness in Evolution" you will find argument for the existence of God and His being a mind.

Meaning depends on a physical interpretive context. The fact that aababbab doesn't have any clear meaning outside a physical interpretive context isn't relevant to anything. — wonderer1

A "a physical interpretive context" begs the question. The interpretive context depends on the minds of human interpreters. Meaning is not physical. No application of physics will show that X means Y. So, the interpretive context is essentially intentional, not physical except incidentally.

My example is highly relevant, because a and b are arbitrary physical states and neither has an intrinsic meaning. Your response does nothing to show that they do, but admits that they do not.

As far as I can tell there is no intelligibility outside a physically interpretive context so I think that you need to provide some reason to believe that there can be intelligibility outside a physically interpretive context. — wonderer1

If you mean by "a physical interpretive context" that people with brains interpret, I agree. That does not mean that what they know is material.

The reason we need brains is because what we normally think about is neurally encoded. But, not everything we experience is. I suggest you research mystical experience. Some authors you might start with are Richard Bucke (an atheist), William James, W. T. Stace, and D.T. Suzuki. You will find that humans can be aware of non-physical intelligibility. Such intelligibility cannot be neurally encoded for reasons that I do not have time to explain now.

You seem to be getting inputs and outputs confused. Your retinal state supervenes on the physical effect of an apple reflecting light from a light source into your eye. Your brain state supervenes on your retinal state. — wonderer1

My brain state also supervenes on the orbital motion of Halley's comment. Supervenience has absolutely no explanatory power. Tell me something that matters. Like what causes what.

As for input, it is the action of the apple in scattering light into my eye. The output is two distinct concepts. This is a one-to-many mapping. It cannot be explained on physical principles. If materialism is right, one brain state should only one concept.

When you are thinking about the apple you see, you will have a different neural state than when contemplating light striking your retina. — wonderer1

The result of my thinking will lead to different articulations, and they will be encoded differently. That is not the issue. The issue is how do I generate these thoughts, not how do I formulate them.

Let's try this again. The same neural inputs signal (1) something is seen, and (2) my retinal state is modified. No amount of neural processing can separate (1) from (2) because there is only one signal for both. Think of a neural net. The signals that that train it to activate "a retinal modification is occurring" are exactly the same signals that train it to activate "something is being seen." So, there is no way to physically differentiate these intentional states.

Physical ink arranged on physical paper serves just fine for encoding Godel's theorems. — wonderer1

Not alone. A human mind that understands the language is also required -- both for endoding and decoding. Without that intentional capability (the ability to transform marks into meaning and vice versa), there is no encoding. There are only weird ink stains.

Neural states can encode the concept. — wonderer1

How does it get decoded into a concept when required? We do not perceive the pulse rates or neurotransmitter concentrations. So, how do we know what is encoded?

I agree that Spinoza wanted to refute any form of supernaturalism, but he also acknowledged that such beliefs may be necessary for those who don't want to think for themselves.

So, with that additional information, I have developed a PanEnDeistic worldview, that postulates some kind of Causal Power and Logical Laws that existed before the Big Bang beginning of our little bubble of space-time. — Gnomon

Sure, but this 'first cause' kind of argument is old stew reheated. I find no need to posit any such thing.

You can say that Jane (or John) excites you more than Mary (or Martin), but you cannot say that being with Jane or John is more valuable than 11 views of Yosemite Falls, but less than 12 views. To say that one is "more motivating" explains nothing. It just says the motive associated with the choice you actually make is more motivating -- rather like saying that this medicine makes you sleepy because it is a soporific. — Dfpolis

Being with someone I am sufficiently attracted to may indeed be more valuable to me that any number of views of Yosemite Falls. If am more motivated by one than the other then, absent addiction, the more motivating one is more valuable to me.

Of course, I am not claiming that what I or anyone values justifies claiming that those values are universal.

Being with someone I am sufficiently attracted to may indeed be more valuable to me that any number of views of Yosemite Falls. If am more motivated by one than the other then, absent addiction, the more motivating one is more valuable to me. — Janus

I have no problem with this, but it does not support determinism, because it does not point to a source of value beyond your own agency.

I think determinism is compatible with the idea that I am free, absent external constraints, to, and inevitably will, choose whatever is determined by my nature.

I think it follows that blaming or praising others has no rational warrant, although of course if we are determined by our natures to blame and praise then of course we will do that. This can change, though, if we come to see that people are no more responsible for their actions in any libertarian moral sense, than are animals or the natural elements like rain, lightning, and fire.

I understand your view, but I have looked at all proposed mechanisms for determinism and have found no sound arguments. So, I credit my experience that when I am facing a choice, all the real alternatives are equally in my power. Having them in my power means that I am the decisive factor in my decisions and so morally responsible. That does not mean that I think every human act is free, or even that I am in a position to judge which are. Still, if there are no sound arguments, why should I try to escape responsibility for my decisions?

Still, if there are no sound arguments, why should I try to escape responsibility for my decisions? — Dfpolis

I think it is inevitable that we will feel responsible for our decisions, even if we are not really responsible. Imagine you ask your teenage daughter to go to the corner shop for milk and she is run over and killed. Surely you will feel somehow responsible for her death, and this will add to your agony, even though you are not really responsible.

I feel perfectly free to choose what to do in most instances, but this just means that there are no abnormal external constraints on my actions, and I can act freely according to what I want to do. I will be constrained sometimes by empathy for others, but if I could feel no empathy then I might act on desires that hurt others, provided I was confident I would not be caught and held to account.

The point is we may know where our own self-control begins and ends, more or less, but it is not rational to project that same awareness and knowledge onto others or blame them when they fail to live up to our own standards.

That said, a functional and more or less harmonious society must restrain those who cannot but act in ways that transgress its foundational values.

Modernism is not modernity. It is a modern worldview, or some aspects of that view, that some find offensive. I do not understand exactly what they are offended by. Neither do I understand what you object to about liberal democracy. — Dfpolis

I wouldn't use the term 'offensive'. It's simply the emphasis on the sovereignty of self or ego, on the one hand, and the consensus view of philosophical or scientific materialism, that is associated with political liberalism on the other. There are many philosophical beliefs or social attitudes that form around these core ideas which I think are problematical and unsatisfying. I would have thought that not too far from your own view of the matter.

It's simply the emphasis on the sovereignty of self or ego, on the one hand, and the consensus view of philosophical or scientific materialism, that is associated with political liberalism on the other. — Wayfarer

I see liberals as supporting the value of each individual, not their "sovereignty." And, I do not see materialism as a consensus view, although I do see it as a powerful intellectual and social thread.

I agree that our subjective "mode of understanding" is suspect, but in the expression "natural fact", I was referring to the scientific evidence that Nature is inherently statistical (random chance) in its fundamental behaviors*1. Some might interpret the statistical nature of waveforms as a sign that coin-flipping Luck is a feature of natural processes. Hence, a smidgen of doubt smudged the surety of classical physics. — Gnomon

The whole idea that coin-flipping is evidence of natural random chance is fundamentally flawed. The production of this random chance type of event is intentionally designed, as are all examples of such random chance generators, so these examples do nothing to support the claim of naturally occurring random chance events.

So nobody is "blaming the object" ; merely accepting that statistical probabilistic uncertainty is inherent intrinsic immanent in physical Nature. — Gnomon

This is a faulty conclusion, based in the unsound premise described above, that there could be a naturally occurring generator of random chance events.

This is not the place to argue this. Let's just say that my education puts me in a better position to judge. — Dfpolis

Again, I disagree. Instead of addressing the valid points I brought up, points which are very relevant to the subject, "interactionism", you retort with an implied 'you're wrong because I'm more highly educated than you'. You demonstrate childishness rather than education, and that's why I disagree with your claim "my education puts me in a better position to judge". If you really have the education which you claim, you could very easily show me why you think I'm wrong. Therefore I conclude that whatever education you do have, indicates to you that you are actually wrong, and you have not the gumption to address this problem.

No, they do not. They generate the light pulses we call photons, which have a finite duration in order to have a well-defined frequency (because of the uncertainty principle). So, we can tell how long the transitions take. Further, the transitions are much better described as wave phenomena than as particle phenomena. The electrons in each level have a well-defined energy and so a well-defined frequency. — Dfpolis

The problem here is that without a medium (aether or whatever), a substance to support this so-called "wave phenomena", it is fundamentally immaterial. There is no substance to these supposed waves, no material to their existence, The wave function is simply an immaterial, mathematical representation. And all it represents is something like the probabilities of how that supposed immaterial activity might interact with a material body. Clearly, what we have here is an interaction problem between the immaterial waves (with no material substance), and the material bodies (instruments of measurement).

@Dfpolis
Quantum field theory and the standard model of particles are composed of immaterial ideals which have no direct correspondence in the physical world. If you have the education you claim, you know this. The truth of this is evidenced by the reality assigned to symmetry in the models, when such symmetries are simply not discovered in nature. Symmetries are ideals which may be artificially synthesized to an extent, in a lab, but have no true occurrence in the natural world.

The interaction problem involves the question of how such ideals could interact with the true natural physical world which we live in. And this manifests as the problem of how the ideal world of symmetries described by the standard model could interact with the world of material bodies which we live in. The proposed solution, random chance symmetry breaking, suffers the problem I described in my response to Gnomon above. There is nothing in our experience of living in the world of material bodies, which would indicate that nature consists of any sort of random chance generator. Such implements are all known to be artificially created.

Instead of addressing the valid points I brought up, points which are very relevant to the subject, "interactionism", you retort with an implied 'you're wrong because I'm more highly educated than you'. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, that is not the reason you are wrong. It is a reason to trust my views more. The reasons you are wrong are outside the scope of this thread.

If you really have the education which you claim, you could very easily show me why you think I'm wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I can, but I choose not to here.

The problem here is that without a medium (aether or whatever), a substance to support this so-called "wave phenomena", it is fundamentally immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

Philosophically, I agree that waves are modifications of something; however, saying that contributes nothing to the goal of physics, which is to describe the behavior, and not the ontology, of physical systems. For physics, it is enough that the waves can be described in space and time. If a hypothesis about what they modified, say that it was made of particles or strings, led to a better description, then it would be relevant to physics.

Clearly, what we have here is an interaction problem between the immaterial waves (with no material substance), and the material bodies (instruments of measurement). — Metaphysician Undercover

This misconceives measurement. The instruments are also wave structures.

Quantum field theory and the standard model of particles are composed of immaterial ideals which have no direct correspondence in the physical world. If you have the education you claim, you know this. The truth of this is evidenced by the reality assigned to symmetry in the models, when such symmetries are simply not discovered in nature. Symmetries are ideals which may be artificially synthesized to an extent, in a lab, but have no true occurrence in the natural world. — Metaphysician Undercover

Quantum field theories, like all scientific theories, are hypotheses to explain observed facts. To the extent that they do so, they are adequate to reality and so true. Their truth is not absolute, but limited to how they actually reflect reality. So, it is open to refinement and revision.

Symmetries are observed in nature. We observe temporal translation symmetry when we see that the same laws that operated in the past operate now. Similarly, spatial translation symmetry means that the same laws that operate here, operate there. Rotational symmetry means that the laws do not involve a preferred direction, etc.

Symmetries are known by ideas, but so is everything. The question is whether these ideas are adequately grounded in reality, or simply imagined. So far, it looks like symmetries ideas are.

And this manifests as the problem of how the ideal world of symmetries described by the standard model could interact with the world of material bodies which we live in. — Metaphysician Undercover

It does not because physical symmetries are not interacting things, but properties of interactions of things.

The whole idea that coin-flipping is evidence of natural random chance is fundamentally flawed. The production of this random chance type of event is intentionally designed, as are all examples of such random chance generators, so these examples do nothing to support the claim of naturally occurring random chance events. — Metaphysician Undercover

OK, but I was using the term "coin-flipping" metaphorically, not literally. Einstein used the similar metaphor of God playing dice, to ridicule the quantum evidence that Nature is inherently indeterminate*1*2. Also, I was not talking about un-natural Random Number Generators. Instead, I was referring to the innate Quantum Indeterminacy that provoked Heisenberg to define his Uncertainty Principle in terms of statistical Probability*3.

Since you found my implication that Nature is not rigidly Deterministic problematic, are you a strict classical Determinist*4 like Einstein? Newtonian physics was based on the, mathematically convenient, assumption of rigid laws controlling all actions in nature*5. But Quantum Physics demonstrated that Nature is more flexible than that*6. I even use the malleability of Nature as an argument in favor of FreeWill, and against Fate*7, for those who can manipulate the natural system culturally*7. But that's a topic for a different thread. :smile:


*1. Einstein's Determinism :
Like Spinoza, Einstein was a strict determinist who believed that human behavior was completely determined by causal laws.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_and_philosophical_views_of_Albert_Einstein

*2. Does True Randomness Exist? :
Randomness as a fundamental property of nature: Also called True randomness, is when a phenomenon is intrinsically random and not dependent on our knowledge of the phenomenon.
https://medium.com/illumination/does-true-randomness-exist-5d2fc7f413dd

*3. Uncertainty principle :
The uncertainty principle, also known as Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, is a fundamental concept in quantum mechanics.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncertainty_principle

*4. Statistical Determinism :
According to classical determinism, the laws of nature are all strict rather than statistical, . . .
https://uh.edu/~psaka/sylla/stet.htm

*5. Quantum indeterminacy
Quantum indeterminacy is often understood as information (or lack of it) whose existence we infer, occurring in individual quantum systems, prior to measurement. Quantum randomness is the statistical manifestation of that indeterminacy, witnessable in results of experiments repeated many times.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_indeterminacy

*6.Bayesian Belief-based Probability :
Bayesian statistics mostly involves conditional probability, . . .
https://statswithr.github.io/book/the-basics-of-bayesian-statistics.html

*7. Randomness :
In ancient history, the concepts of chance and randomness were intertwined with that of fate. . . .Although randomness had often been viewed as an obstacle and a nuisance for many centuries, in the 20th century computer scientists began to realize that the deliberate introduction of randomness into computations can be an effective tool for designing better algorithms. In some cases, such randomized algorithms even outperform the best deterministic methods
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Randomness

But the actual jumps seem to occur almost instantaneously. — Gnomon
No, they do not. They generate the light pulses we call photons, which have a finite duration in order to have a well-defined frequency (because of the uncertainty principle). So, we can tell how long the transitions take. Further, the transitions are much better described as wave phenomena than as particle phenomena. The electrons in each level have a well-defined energy and so a well-defined frequency. — Dfpolis

Did you notice that I qualified "instantaneous" with "almost". We're talking about Planck Time here. I suppose your definition of "instantaneous" is more rigidly rigorous than mine. Do you have a good reason for picking nits about metaphors? :joke:


Instantaneous :
The adjective instantaneous means “happening very quickly, in a single moment.”
https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/eb/qa/instant-or-instantaneous-what-s-the-difference

Did you notice that I qualified "instantaneous" with "almost". We're talking about Planck Time here. — Gnomon

No, the times are much longer than the Planck time. Different spectral lines have different frequency widths. The transition time is proportional to the inverse of the associated frequency width. See http://www-star.st-and.ac.uk/~kw25/teaching/nebulae/lecture08_linewidths.pdf

Do you have a good reason for picking nits about metaphors? — Gnomon

Yes, because the transition times can be calculated using the wave model.

Do you have a good reason for picking nits about metaphors? — Gnomon
Yes, because the transition times can be calculated using the wave model. — Dfpolis

OK. I am duly chastened. I'm guilty of using physical concepts as philosophical metaphors . . . without doing the "calculations". :joke:

Philosophically, I agree that waves are modifications of something; however, saying that contributes nothing to the goal of physics, which is to describe the behavior, and not the ontology, of physical systems. For physics, it is enough that the waves can be described in space and time. If a hypothesis about what they modified, say that it was made of particles or strings, led to a better description, then it would be relevant to physics. — Dfpolis

This is incorrect. If you take any time to study the physics of waves, you'll know that waves cannot be described simply by space and time. A wave is an activity of the particles of a substance. This is Physics 101.

Furthermore, the subject of the thread is an ontological topic, so an appeal like 'it's enough for physics' has little if any bearing on the subject of the thread, which would be whether it's enough for metaphysics. There is no logic to the implied premise, that if it is outside the goal of physics it is not significant to the ontological subject of the thread.

This misconceives measurement. The instruments are also wave structures. — Dfpolis

Again, this is blatantly wrong, and I'm sure you know it. Energy is not measured by waves structures, it is measured by electrical voltage. And calculations are done in terms of inertial frames and "rest mass" which is essential. These are concepts of classical mechanics of bodies, not waves. I'm sure you know this, and this is why I was so frustrated by your refusal to attempt to justify your claim, and the reference to a higher education. It's as if you believe that a high education can magically make what you know to be false claims, true. What kind of instruments are understood to be wave structures?

I greatly appreciate your perspective, and I would probably agree if you said that the instruments and their measurements ought to be represented as wave structures. But they simply are not, under the principles and theories currently employed. So it doesn't make sense to claim that they are, and it would make a lot more sense to look at the reasons why they are not. And the reason is that we understand energy and all movement in terms of massive bodies existing in space, and the movement of light waves is understood as relative to that fundamental understanding. So the movement of massive bodies is foundational, and the movement of light waves is layered on top as relative to this. So the certainty of this understanding of light waves is dependent on the certainty of the theories which relate it to the foundation, the movement of massive bodies, and ultimately the foundation itself, our understanding of the movement of massive bodies.

You might insist that these concepts are archaic, and even be able to demonstrate how problems arising from the theories which relate the activity of light waves to the activity of massive bodies indicates that the foundational understanding of the activity of massive bodies is deeply flawed, but still it's simple fact that these are the concepts which underly our understanding of energy. None other are employed. Even a quantum of wave energy, a photon, must be assigned a "relativistic mass" to make the wave energy consistent with he momentum of moving bodies. This is because "energy" as a concept is fundamentally a property of the momentum of mass (kinetic energy being 1/2mv2).

Symmetries are observed in nature. — Dfpolis

Symmetries are not observed in nature. Each thing that we observe as a near-symmetry is not actually a symmetry, which is an ideal balance. Laws are artificial, and created as universals so your examples are irrelevant. That the Pythagorean theory is true here, and also over there, does not indicate the existence of a natural symmetry because these laws are artificial and intended to state something universal. Natural things are particular, and there is an interaction problem involved with trying to demonstrate how the particular partakes of the universal.

It does not because physical symmetries are not interacting things, but properties of interactions of things. — Dfpolis

Exactly, properties do not exist independently of the things that they are properties of, except as abstractions in the mind. Natural, "interacting things" do not exist as symmetries, the mind creates the symmetries in an attempt to understand these things. But the artificial symmetry does not grasp the accidentals which inhere within the thing, so that the natural things do not actually exist as symmetries.

To explain this in a different way, let's say that "a property" is a part of a thing, but not the whole thing. We represent the property as a symmetry. But that representation does not show how the property is related to, or inheres within the thing itself. Since the property is a part of the thing, and is necessarily connected to the thing, as it does not exist independently, there is something more to the property which is not represented by the symmetry, i.e. how it is connected to the thing. This "something more" necessarily breaks the symmetry as the means by which the assumed symmetry must be united to the whole. This indicates that symmetries simply do not exist naturally.

OK, but I was using the term "coin-flipping" metaphorically, not literally. Einstein used the similar metaphor of God playing dice, to ridicule the quantum evidence that Nature is inherently indeterminate*1*2. Also, I was not talking about un-natural Random Number Generators. Instead, I was referring to the innate Quantum Indeterminacy that provoked Heisenberg to define his Uncertainty Principle in terms of statistical Probability*3. — Gnomon

My point still stands, all known instances of random chance occurrences are artificially created. Something natural may appear to be a random occurrence, but a claim to know it to be a random occurrence could not stand up to epistemological scrutiny. This is because the reason why the occurrence is designated as random, is that its cause is unknown. And "unknown cause" does not justify "no cause", or randomness. From the position of not knowing the cause we cannot conclude that there is no cause.

Artificially, we can create the conditions for chance occurrences, the coin flip, the dice roll, etc.. Likewise, in a lab we can sufficiently isolate the conditions as required to produce an approximation of a symmetry. But all of these are not naturally occurring situations, they are fabricated. The randomness of the coins and dice dependent on the design, and the lab-created symmetry depends on the lab. Therefore these instances do nothing to support the claim that there could be an independent, natural random chance occurrence.

Since you found my implication that Nature is not rigidly Deterministic problematic, are you a strict classical Determinist*4 like Einstein? — Gnomon

No, I'm definitely not rigidly deterministic. I just find that the method you use to reach your conclusion is deeply flawed.

Again, this is blatantly wrong, and I'm sure you know it. Energy is not measured by waves structures, it is measured by electrical voltage. — Metaphysician Undercover

I suspect you are confusing volts with electronvolts:

In physics, an electronvolt (symbol eV, also written electron-volt and electron volt) is the measure of an amount of kinetic energy gained by a single electron accelerating from rest through an electric potential difference of one volt in vacuum. When used as a unit of energy, the numerical value of 1 eV in joules (symbol J) is equivalent to the numerical value of the charge of an electron in coulombs (symbol C). Under the 2019 redefinition of the SI base units, this sets 1 eV equal to the exact value 1.602176634×10−19 J.[1]

that waves cannot be described simply by space and time. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not say "by," but "in" space and time.

Furthermore, the subject of the thread is an ontological topic — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but not the ontology of quantum waves.

This misconceives measurement. The instruments are also wave structures. — Dfpolis
Again, this is blatantly wrong, and I'm sure you know it. Energy is not measured by waves structures, it is measured by electrical voltage. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I know that material things are wave structures. I did not say what the units of energy are. They are not volts.

And calculations are done in terms of inertial frames and "rest mass" which is essential. — Metaphysician Undercover

Some are. Some are not.

These are concepts of classical mechanics of bodies, not waves. — Metaphysician Undercover

Both electromagnetic and matter waves have energy and momentum.

What kind of instruments are understood to be wave structures? — Metaphysician Undercover

Objectively, all physical instruments are wave structures. Subjectively, many people fail to understand this.

it doesn't make sense to claim that they are — Metaphysician Undercover

It makes perfect since once you realize that the electrons and nucleons composing atoms are waves.

So the certainty of this understanding of light waves is dependent on the certainty of the theories which relate it to the foundation, the movement of massive bodies, and ultimately the foundation itself, our understanding of the movement of massive bodies. — Metaphysician Undercover

Once you realize that electrons are waves, you need to rethink your understanding of massive bodies.

it's simple fact that these are the concepts which underly our understanding of energy. — Metaphysician Undercover

They underlie the classical understanding, not our quantum understanding. Now we understand that energy depends on the frequency at which elementary structures vibrate. E = h where h is Planck's constant and is the frequency.

This is because "energy" as a concept is fundamentally a property of the momentum of mass (kinetic energy being 1/2mv2). — Metaphysician Undercover

That is only a non-relativistic approximation. It was how the concept was first glimpsed, but it is not how it is understood now. Now we understand energy as the dynamic variable conjugate to time. To explain that, I would have to explain the conceptual framework of theoretical physics, and that is why I ask that you trust my opinion based on my education. If you wish to pursue this, look up Hamiltonian and Lagrangian formalism, and Emmy Noether's theorem

Symmetries are not observed in nature. Each thing that we observe as a near-symmetry is not actually a symmetry, which is an ideal balance. — Metaphysician Undercover

All observations are imperfect. In observing you, I do not gain perfect knowledge of you. Nonetheless observation is the basis of all human knowledge. It may well be that energy is not perfectly conserved. Still, that is very approximately conserved is a real feature of nature and points to nearly perfect time-translation symmetry.

Laws are artificial, and created as universals so your examples are irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. They point to real features of nature. Omniscience is not a rational standard for human knowledge. We know as humans know -- incompletely and approximately in matters involving measurement.

there is an interaction problem involved with trying to demonstrate how the particular partakes of the universal. — Metaphysician Undercover

There are no universal beings to partake in. Aristotle rebutted Platonic Ideas in Metaphysics I, 9 and universal exemplars ideas are incompatible with the simplicity, omniscience and omnipotence of God.

That symmetries are properties does not mean that they do not exist. It only means that they do not have independent existence.

Symmetries are observed in nature. — Dfpolis
Symmetries are not observed in nature. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. Symmetries are not observed, but deduced. Like constellations in the sky, the inferred patterns are mental, not material ; subjective, not objective. It's good to be aware of that distinction when engaged in metaphysical discussions. Symmetries are, however, handy tools for mathematical analysis of topological transformations. :smile:

Since you found my implication that Nature is not rigidly Deterministic problematic, are you a strict classical Determinist*4 like Einstein? — Gnomon
No, I'm definitely not rigidly deterministic. I just find that the method you use to reach your conclusion is deeply flawed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hmmm. What "method" was I using to reach the conclusion that Nature is not rigidly deterministic?? Actually, I'm not qualified to derive such a conclusion. I was just accepting the opinions of the scientists referenced in the quotes above below*2*3. I assume their reasoning was some combination of induction & deduction from experimental evidence or theoretical inference. :smile:

Quotes from my last post :

*2. Quantum nature not absolutely deterministic :
The wave function is a function of the degrees of freedom corresponding to some maximal set of commuting observables. Once such a representation is chosen, the wave function can be derived from the quantum state.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wave_function

*3. Quantum Universe: Fundamentally Probabilistic, Not Deterministic :
Einstein believed that the universe and its laws must be strictly deterministic. He felt that there could be no role for probability or chance, in nature's foundation. This is why Einstein didn't accept or agree with the theory of quantum mechanics.
https://www.wondriumdaily.com/quantum-u ... rministic/

Yes, but not the ontology of quantum waves. — Dfpolis

Quantum waves, or more properly called "wave functions" are ideals, mathematical constructs. They have no physical existence. We ought to start with this clearly stated.

It makes perfect since once you realize that the electrons and nucleons composing atoms are waves. — Dfpolis

I accept that the electrons and nucleons of atoms are composed of waves. The problem is that physicists tend to represent these as bodies with mass. And then of course there are the quantum waves which you refer to above. These so-called waves are ideal constructs composed of mathematical axioms. So, there is an interaction problem between the bodies with mass representation, and the ideal (immaterial) waves representation. The solution I proposed is to determine the substance which the waves that compose electromagnetism, as well as electrons and nucleons, exist in. This would allow us to speak of waves with physical existence. Then all activities, electromagnetism and the activities of massive objects, would be activities of the same substance.

They underlie the classical understanding, not our quantum understanding. Now we understand that energy depends on the frequency at which elementary structures vibrate. E = h where h is Planck's constant and is the frequency. — Dfpolis

Nice try Df, but Planck's law is based in the emission of electromagnetic radiation from bodies (black-body radiation). This is the activity of a body with mass, not the activity of waves. The simple fact of the matter is that physicists do not have the required theories, or principles, to measure the energy of wave activity directly, without converting this energy to the activity of a physical body. And, like I've been explaining, this is done through the precepts of relativity theory which pays no respect for the true medium, or substance, which the waves and the bodies are a part of. Instead, it dogmatically imposes unsubstantiated ideals, like the constant speed of light.

Now we understand energy as the dynamic variable conjugate to time. — Dfpolis

I understand this, it is derived from the Fourier transform. And, our inability to make measurements of high energy in a very short period of time is the reason for the uncertainty of the uncertainty principle, in general.

However, stating that energy is understood as "the dynamic variable conjugate to time", does not in any way state what energy is. That's like saying "hot" is understood as the opposite of cold, that says nothing about what hot is. The only difference in your expression is that you use fancy jargon to make it look like you're saying something important.

Nonetheless observation is the basis of all human knowledge. — Dfpolis

This is the physicalist perspective, and the perspective of scientism, the idea that observation is the basis of knowledge. "Observation" is understood as the collection of data from external sources through the use of sensation. The alternative perspective is that internal experience is the basis of all knowledge. If we compromise and say that both are a requirement for "knowledge" as we know it, then we can't say either one is the basis of all human knowledge.

Still, that is very approximately conserved is a real feature of nature and points to nearly perfect time-translation symmetry. — Dfpolis

OK, you may call it "nearly perfect", but "nearly" is a subjective judgement. So, do you agree then, that a good ontology must respect this fact, that natural things are not perfect, as sometimes modeled, but are actually "nearly perfect". This is represented by Aristotle as the reality of accidents. The material world which we represent with forms, formal models etc., is not actually as we represent it because we cannot represent the material aspect. All we have as representation is forms, and "matter" refers to those accidents which always escape the formal representation.

They point to real features of nature. — Dfpolis

What they point to, is the fact that the real features of nature are not perfect symmetries, as modeled. You might say, reality is "nearly" like it is modeled, but to me that is just an admission that it is not like it is modeled. And if it is not like it is modeled, then the models are wrong, the theories and principles need to be revisited, and improved upon.

That symmetries are properties does not mean that they do not exist. It only means that they do not have independent existence. — Dfpolis

This is exactly the point of the interaction problem. Symmetries are perfectly ideal balances, just like the eternal circular motion described by Aristotle. If that perfect ideal has any interaction with anything else, then by that very interaction, it loses its status as a perfectly ideal balance. Therefore these ideals cannot play any role in the real physical world, because they could no longer be perfectly ideal.

So, what I explained about designating these symmetries as properties, is that they cannot be properties, because a property is only a part of the thing it is a property of. And anything which is a part of something else, has some sort of interaction with the rest of that thing. So it is impossible that a part could be a symmetry because this interaction would break the symmetry. By the very fact that a part has a relationship of interaction with the thing that it is a part of, the proposal that the part is a symmetry is made impossible. Therefore it is impossible that symmetries are properties.

es. Symmetries are not observed, but deduced. Like constellations in the sky, the inferred patterns are mental, not material ; subjective, not objective. It's good to be aware of that distinction when engaged in metaphysical discussions. Symmetries are, however, handy tools for mathematical analysis of topological transformations. — Gnomon

If these symmetries were deductions, then they would be faulty deductions, just like the ancient ideal that the orbits of the planets were perfect circles, therefore eternal circular motions. However, I do not think that such things are deductions. I think that they are mathematical principles or axioms which are not properly applied. So they are handy tools, as you say, but when they are applied where they ought not be applied, they become misleading.

Quantum waves, or more properly called "wave functions" are ideals, mathematical constructs. They have no physical existence. We ought to start with this clearly stated. — Metaphysician Undercover

Quantum waves constitute matter. Wave functions are the mathematical functions describing these matter waves and their interactions. The concept is an ideal, but it is based on the observation of real wave properties, specifically, interference of the type demonstrated in Young's experiment.

The problem is that physicists tend to represent these as bodies with mass. — Metaphysician Undercover

We do not represent the structures (they are not bodies in the classical sense) with mass. Rather, mass is a quantity associated with them.

So, there is an interaction problem between the bodies with mass representation, and the ideal (immaterial) waves representation. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. There are no bodies -- only waves and waves mischaracterized as "particles" because people apply Newtonian concepts without adequate justification.

Nice try Df, but Planck's law is based in the emission of electromagnetic radiation from bodies (black-body radiation). — Metaphysician Undercover

We have learned a lot since Planck proposed his Black Body Radiation law 1900 and Einstein his explanation of the photoelectric effect in 1905.

The simple fact of the matter is that physicists do not have the required theories, or principles, to measure the energy of wave activity directly, without converting this energy to the activity of a physical body. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, we use material instruments. That does not make the instruments classical bodies instead of quantum wave structures.

So, there is an interaction problem between the bodies with mass representation, and the ideal (immaterial) waves representation. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no such interaction. The interactions observed are between the waves being measured and the wave structures (instruments) used to measure them. These interactions are purely physical. The representations are how we conceive of these physical structures and do not involved in the measurement interactions -- only in how we come to know the results.

Instead, it dogmatically imposes unsubstantiated ideals, like the constant speed of light. — Metaphysician Undercover

You need to read the history of modern physics if you want to think about these things. It was assumed that we could measure different speeds of light as the earth passed through the either. In 1887 Albert A. Michelson and Edward Morley attempted to do so, and failed. They measure the same speed in each direction and at different orbital positions of the earth. So, we were forced, experimentally, to conclude that the measured speed of light is invariant. Contrary to popular belief, their experiment did not show that there is no aether, but that one aether theory was false.

I understand this, it is derived from the Fourier transform. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it is not. Fourier transforms enter into the derivation of the uncertainty principle.

our inability to make measurements of high energy in a very short period of time is the reason for the uncertainty of the uncertainty principle, in general. — Metaphysician Undercover

Whether or not the energy is "high" is irrelevant.

However, stating that energy is understood as "the dynamic variable conjugate to time", does not in any way state what energy is. — Metaphysician Undercover

It does. It is a definition in terms of more fundamental concepts.

This is the physicalist perspective — Metaphysician Undercover

By observation I mean fixing on or attending to experience, whether internal or external. I am not a physicalist. Read my January paper.

OK, you may call it "nearly perfect", but "nearly" is a subjective judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let me be more precise. I mean we have been unable to detect violations of conservation of energy.

The material world which we represent with forms, formal models etc., is not actually as we represent it because we cannot represent the material aspect. — Metaphysician Undercover

But, we can. That is what physics, chemistry, biology, etc. do.

All we have as representation is forms, and "matter" refers to those accidents which always escape the formal representation. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is not what anyone else means by "matter."

What they point to, is the fact that the real features of nature are not perfect symmetries, as modeled. — Metaphysician Undercover

We cannot say that. We can only say that in some cases, we are unable to observe possible imperfections, so, we have no reason to believe that the symmetries are imperfect.

Symmetries are perfectly ideal balances, just like the eternal circular motion described by Aristotle. If that perfect ideal has any interaction with anything else, then by that very interaction, it loses its status as a perfectly ideal balance. — Metaphysician Undercover

You do not understand the meaning of "symmetry" in physics. It is not the kind of thing that can interact. Rather it is a property of the way things interact.

Yes. Symmetries are not observed, but deduced. Like constellations in the sky, the inferred patterns are mental, not material ; subjective, not objective. — Gnomon

This is confused. We make observations and then deduce the consequences. As long as the logic is sound, the conclusions are justified by the observations. If the observations were objective, so are the conclusions.

that waves cannot be described simply by space and time.
— Metaphysician Undercover
I do not say "by," but "in" space and time. — Dfpolis

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I’ve noticed that there is a peculiar fact about the interference patterns observed in the double slit experiment. I asked this question on Physics Forum also.

One of the interesting facts about the double-slit experiment is that the interference pattern that appears on the screen doesn't seem to be affected by the rate at which electrons are fired through the slits. So, even if particles are fired one at a time, an interference pattern still occurs, which doesn't vary with the rate at which they're fired, at least up to a certain point. This means that if time ( where time = rate of firing) is not a factor in the formation of the distribution pattern, which implies that time is not a variable in the generation of the interference pattern.

The outcome of the experiment, the interference pattern, is a result of the quantum probabilistic nature and the interaction of particles with the double slits, but it does not depend on the specific timing or rate at which individual particles are fired. In that sense, the outcome can be considered independently of the specific time parameters of the experiment. It's a manifestation of the inherent probabilistic behavior of quantum particles. In that sense, the wave function is not a function of time, in a way that is very different from physical waves, which are obviously time-dependent.

Does that make sense?