I find visciousness and vitriol a reason to stop all debate and is exactly the reason why discussions break down and become emotional fiat. I dont go into a discussion to stoke emnity like some troll. There should be some element of respect to keep the conversation from devolving into a brawl. I dont buy the idea that all arguments must get personal and that using condescension and ad personum attacks count as anything resembling phosophical discourse. If you resort to that, then its poisoning the well right off the bat. Who wants that except a bunch of asshole types that get pleasure at complete conflict mode.

Well there's always the possibility that you are or I am wrong, no? If two people disagree about something, isn't it strange to assume that one is always automatically right and the other must be wrong? Seems like a constructive conversation would have to start from the idea that you might also be wrong about some things. Otherwise aren't you effectively always taking on the role of teacher/moral authority? I don't think anyone really likes being on the receiving end of such a conversation.

But aside from that I also do believe that you can come to different conclusions on ethical questions. And I don't mean this in a totally relativistic sense, better and worse arguments can be made, something can be more or less coherent, you can be misinformed etc... but usually - if it's not about extreme clear-cut cases - ethics is not like mathematics or science where you can demonstrate with absolute certainty that this one answer is the right one. And with politics I think this becomes even more questionable because of the enormous complexity involved. There are ideas that seem better or worse, but I don't think anybody really "knows" with any kind of certainty, and I would have that epistemic uncertainty reflected in the terms I use and in the way I approach those conversations. — ChatteringMonkey

I came late to this, but think you are right on here as to what a constructive debate entails, and the way to approach ethics. In purely ethical matters this respectful stance of interlocutors should be taken. However, I can see @Pfhorrest frustration maintaining respect for people who may not agree on basic historical facts or always doubt to the point of absurdity. They can always say that you are being duped by media and the deep state and nothing convinces. But you are absolutely right in terms of how to not be a condescending prick debates where it is purely logic applied to moral axioms and applications.

As a pessemist, I bristle at trying to distance from this accurate philosophy. Read more Schopenhauer, less Nietzsche .

Whoops, really meant for

Is the disagreement. The distinction between what “unless necessary” means for before and after birth is what I don’t get. — khaled

Yes that is the main distinction here.

We are purely, that is to say, "absolutely" creating from "scratch" ALL instances of harm for a person rather than mitigating and ameliorating something.
— schopenhauer1

We are doing both. — khaled

But there is no "one" prior to birth that is part of that has interests that have to be ameliorated. The only people that have interests are the people already in the game. So I guess "dignity" for something with "no interests" (currently) is "Continue to not enable condition of any harm or that would be a violation". Once born, there are interests that are mitigated against other people because both have interests that can be ameliorated and balanced (currently).

The lifeguard did not have an interest to save the person in the water. But you didn’t care. It is true that the lifeguard had interests in general, but the only way to NOT have any interests or intentions is to not exist. So the difference again boils down to: “Is the person to be harmed born yet? if so, it becomes wrong to do unilaterally, if not it’s ok to balance”. Which I disagree with. Because it is special pleading. — khaled

First off, just as a meta-analysis of this whole debate, I sometimes lose track of my own argument(s) when it goes on this long and takes this many avenues. I just hope you can understand that at some level. Some posters on here just want to gnaw your face off no matter what, so they wouldn't care, but I think that is important because these debates become very modular really coming down to the last thing someone says rather than referencing 20 pages earlier. That takes too much time to reference all the time. In a traditional debate you have either a set time or it's done in a series of articles, but since this is continuous, you can keep on going and going, and there is no finality. I am not saying that's bad as obviously I keep going back to the debate forum, but I just want us to keep that in mind a meta-level of how these online debates go.

Anyways, keeping that in mind and knowing we are now in this particular phase in these debates, I would say that looking back at my axioms we have here an idea of "Don't cause unnecessary harm to another person if you don't have to". I related this to the idea of "dignity". So this becomes an interesting distinction between for me between what happens after birth and prior to (possible) birth. So I think that the caveat that we are stuck on is "if you don't have to". You are applying that to the whole picture. Everyone is aggregated in your view when applying this. Thus, the child being born is "necessary" for you because it might cause some "net positive" (this is assuming we can even calculate that which is another problem). However, "if you don't have to" in my argument is more connected to "person-affecting" view. That is to say, each individual is the target of "if you don't have to". While born, "if you don't have to" involves the community as well as the individual. But that does not mean I don't discount the people involved. Quite the contrary, if I took a baseball bat and whacked the lifeguard to wake him rather than nudge him, that would indeed be unnecessary. I am weighing some harm at a community level, but I am not completely ignoring the lifeguard's dignity as well. It was necessary for the drowning victim to be saved to respect his dignity, but that does not mean I can do anything I want to the lifeguard, and that his dignity is completely ignored.

However, in the case of the not yet born, what does "unnecessary" mean? Well, it would be unnecessary to bring about a whole lifetime of pain to ameliorate the people who already exist. Rather, to respect the dignity of the child, I would not put any of those considerations above the idea that I am enabling a lifetime of harm onto the child because maybe he would cure cancer or be someone's friend in the future. Rather, that would indeed be purely using that person for that cause. Notice in the case of the already born, that the weighing of dignity has to consider each person's interests and balance them against each other for the least violation of dignity. However, there is no "person" in this case to weigh these interests in this scenario. Rather, all we can do is apply the logic to its absolute logic of "don't cause unnecessary harm if you don't have to'. We are not weighing any mitigating factors here because there is no "person" who is the target for this. We are purely, that is to say, "absolutely" creating from "scratch" ALL instances of harm for a person rather than mitigating and ameliorating something.

And here is the important thing, we are actually creating the less absolute scenario of having to put someone in a position to have to need mitigation and amelioration in the first place. Now, you did put someone in the position where they will have to compromise, balance, and mitigate against other people. Now, instead of no new person who has to be a part of this "game" is recruited a new player, who has to play the game. That would be violating his dignity once born.

So there is a sense that each case needs to be looked at for "unnecessary harm". In the case of the not yet born, "unnecessary" becomes "not being born into harm" as it was unnecessary at the level of hte interests of that person for that person to be brought into the game. In the case of those who exist, unnecessary becomes "least amount of violation when possible to play the game". The lifeguard, being in the game of life already, has to already play by the rules of the "human survival/living in society" game. So, this compromises "absolute" rule of not violating dignity, but relativizes it to "the least amount of unnecessary suffering for that individual's dignity while balancing the other's people dignity". It becomes intricately caught up in playing in the game of survival in the social sphere. No such need exists prior to actually bringing the person into the world, and thus the absolute and ideal following of the rule would be the de facto application of the "Don't create unnecessary harm to someone else if you don't have to". No amelioration needs to take place for that person to balance against other people unlike the lifeguard and people already born.

Your problem is with using someone that doesn’t exist yet for a purpose outside themselves. But again, I don’t care if the person to be used is here now or not. — khaled

Because the people alive already have an interest. You are now introducing an interest (and ALL harms for a person) in order to resolve problems for people in the room. The people in the room already HAVE interests and are already harmed) so the balancing of interests in a society takes place.

Not the way I see it. You admitted that waking up the lifeguard is a violation of dignity right? Yet you are fine with doing so.

You seem to be using an aggregate heuristic for people that exist, and a "violation of dignity" heuristic for people that don't. As in, once you exist, it's fine for your dignity to be violated left and right if it is to prevent sufficiently greater suffering. But before you exist, the initial violation is for some reason a tier above the others and is completely taboo. — khaled

Answered that here:

Once born, there is an inevitable utilitarian element because there are already interests of people that will be violated. There is already someone who has an interest not to die. This utilitarian element takes the form of balancing harms with each other to look out for each other's interests.

So with this in mind, the drowning boy has an interest to not die. The lifeguard has an interest to keep sleeping. So "dignity" in this case is not just purely surveying harm above anything else. In the world of already born, the interests of the people involved are a complex, relation of balancing. To protect people's interests we have certain duties to each other. — schopenhauer1

Also here:

Indeed, anything beyond this would be violating this for some other consideration, like preventing aggregate harm. It would never escape the fact that this person would thus be used, because there was no interests beforehand for which there needed any amelioration to take place for this person. It is purely for a reason outside of the person in question where people already born are a balance between all parties. — schopenhauer1

Not in the way I define it. Harming someone is simply doing to them something they don't want done to them. Most people don't want to die. — khaled

Okay, but this is an example of aggregate above dignity of people already existing.

Yet you refuse to apply the same logic in the case of birth. The "unborn person" (you know what I mean) has no interests, but when I say "But I don't care because there are people in the room" you bring up that the child is not born yet, which is supposed to matter for some reason. — khaled

For the reasons I highlighted above, but will put here again to reemphasize:
So with this in mind, the drowning boy has an interest to not die. The lifeguard has an interest to keep sleeping. So "dignity" in this case is not just purely surveying harm above anything else. In the world of already born, the interests of the people involved are a complex, relation of balancing. To protect people's interests we have certain duties to each other.[/quote]

Also here:

Indeed, anything beyond this would be violating this for some other consideration, like preventing aggregate harm. It would never escape the fact that this person would thus be used, because there was no interests beforehand for which there needed any amelioration to take place for this person. It is purely for a reason outside of the person in question where people already born are a balance between all parties. — schopenhauer1

False. There was no balancing between parties for the lifeguard. You favored one party (the drowning boy) completely over the other (the lifeguard). You used the lifeguard for a reason purely outside of himself. There is no getting around that. — khaled

False. I balanced the harm done to the lifeguard against the harm done to the child. The life guard being "in the room" has interests that can be balanced against others now. There is no one "in the room" whose interests are balanced or needs to ameliorate or be ameliorated.

But you refuse to apply the same logic for having children. Which I think is fine, but you need to make it explicit that you consider the initial violation for some reason much more grave than all the others. Because that is a premise you require for your argument. You need it to matter whether or not the person whose dignity is being violated exists yet. Because that is the only difference between the lifeguard situation and birth. Unless you can show some other difference. — khaled

I believe I have again here:

Indeed, anything beyond this would be violating this for some other consideration, like preventing aggregate harm. It would never escape the fact that this person would thus be used, because there was no interests beforehand for which there needed any amelioration to take place for this person. It is purely for a reason outside of the person in question where people already born are a balance between all parties. — schopenhauer1

And probably better stated here:

Well, I think I disagree with you on most things, but as far as arguments like khaled that use aggregated harm as a basis, this indeed does become the case. People are "used" for their market value, purely, and without any reason as there is no person prior to their existence to have mitigating harms to reduce. Rather, the people already born do have interests of to ameliorate and reduce harm for each other. One is a case of being completely used, one is a case of relative use once already born for each other's mutual interests that the people born presumably have by being humans surviving in the world. — schopenhauer1

Among those interests figures the desire to perpetuate and transmit something, a culture, a way of life, a heritage, to leave something behind, rather than fade quietly into the night. — Olivier5

But then you are contradicting yourself as far as using people. Look at my argument above regarding that in the case of the future child (as opposed to people who already exist and actually have interests). It is never for the sake of the child, and all harm will befall it, putting it into a game it could not ask for.

Take just an average couple, let's say decent people, and with the resources to raise a child; as far as they're concerned, and the people that know them, there is nothing in their circumstances that would make having a child wrong. No guarantees -- maybe both parents will die in a car crash and the children will be miserably orphaned. Since that's not the sort of thing anyone can foresee, no one would blame them for having children even if that's what lies in the future. That's very far out on the rim from callous indifference, and way past "you should have known". No one knows the future.

I mean, if people are going to say, "We shouldn't have kids" or "They shouldn't have kids", they're going to want something specific, something concrete to support such a claim. Poverty, illness, civil war, "you're a whore and your husband's a drunk" -- something specific.

So what do you have in a typical case like this? What do you know that they don't? — Srap Tasmaner

There's a lot of stuff already discussed in this thread, so anything I say now is liable to be taken as the sum of all arguments I have made.. So keeping that in mind, let me get you a "piece" of the philosophy..

The person being born is like being "kidnapped" into a game that you either must keep playing or kill yourself. It indeed is the "only game in town", but does that justify putting someone in the game?

Also, here is a case where you could have prevented ALL harm to a future individual. Why would it be good to NOT prevent ALL harm when one could have? Why would you make a decision that will enable the conditions for ALL harm for someone else? On top of the axioms there, there is another axiom of not using people because clearly any answer you give seems to be unjustified.. YOU want to see something play out. SOCIETY wants to see something play out. etc.etc.

Because I needed to keep reestablishing that you find it fine to harm people for the sake of other people in the game, to show that you need an extra premise to take having children off the spectrum. That premise being, that for some reason they get special value in the calculation because they aren't born yet. — khaled

I don't think so. This has a lot to do with the heuristic we are using to analyze the moral case. You are using a purely aggregate heuristic and I am using a dignity violation one. This is the same reason I don't like the "world exploder" argument for AN. Imagine you were to end all life painlessly (and harm) with a big red button. To press that button would, in aggregate prevent the most harm, let's say. But what is it about this argument that doesn't sit right? Something to do with things like rights and consent. They are alive, they have interests, they have ideas, and feelings, and dignity. It's of course, not all about preventing harm at all costs. It is more about how one treats the people being affected.

So as far as how dignity is applied in the two cases- not born and already born:
Once born, there is an inevitable utilitarian element because there are already interests of people that will be violated. There is already someone who has an interest not to die. This utilitarian element takes the form of balancing harms with each other to look out for each other's interests.

So with this in mind, the drowning boy has an interest to not die. The lifeguard has an interest to keep sleeping. So "dignity" in this case is not just purely surveying harm above anything else. In the world of already born, the interests of the people involved are a complex, relation of balancing. To protect people's interests we have certain duties to each other.

However, in the case of the child not yet born, indeed, there is no person who exists for which there are interests of things like "not dying" needs to be protected. This person is not in the "room" to have anyone look out for his interests and he look out for there's. However, in this case, there is a perfect opportunity to not cause harm to that person who will exist, and that opportunity can be taken. Not only that, but you are not only preventing harm, you are preventing that person from having to be in a situation of being compromised like the people that already exist. Here is a case where no "one" exists to experience ALL the harms of existence. Indeed, anything beyond this would be violating this for some other consideration, like preventing aggregate harm. It would never escape the fact that this person would thus be used, because there was no interests beforehand for which there needed any amelioration to take place for this person. It is purely for a reason outside of the person in question where people already born are a balance between all parties.

I guess my problem with that (and other forms of eugenism) is that I disagree with the view that the 'desirability' of a human life should be assessed purely based on its likely market or social worth, or any other material consideration of future consequences. — Olivier5

Well, I think I disagree with you on most things, but as far as arguments like @khaled that use aggregated harm as a basis, this indeed does become the case. People are "used" for their market value, purely, and without any reason as there is no person prior to their existence to have mitigating harms to reduce. Rather, the people already born do have interests of to ameliorate and reduce harm for each other. One is a case of being completely used, one is a case of relative use once already born for each other's mutual interests that the people born presumably have by being humans surviving in the world.

That's not purely about your intentions or purely about the consequences of your actions, so there's some middle ground available, and where I'd figure a lot of us land. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes agreed.

I guess the latter.

The principle to not cause unnecessary harm on someone else's behalf.

There was no you with a right to not be born prior to your birth. Once you are born, then a violation has occurred as unnecessary harm could have been prevented.

Before I was born, did I have a right not to be born? — Srap Tasmaner

There was no you, but could someone have prevented harm by not having what could have been you? Would you have been born to be deprived of anything "good"?

This is just bizarre to me. Who cares if the child doesn't have interests? The lifeguard didn't have an interest in saving anyone either (because he was sleeping). But you didn't care. Once he woke up, he probably would, but that's not an argument for the same reason that "Once the child is born he probably would like life" is not an argument.

But for some reason, the child not existing makes his interests "special" and impositions on him worse than on anyone else. — khaled

I'm sorry you feel that way. Don't know what to say. However, recruiting someone into the game with suffering so that I can help the people already in the game is a no go. The lifeguard is already in the game. Sleep is not being not born.

The problem I find here is that these analogies often create a false narrative. They are useful to a point, and then they don't become illustrative but obfuscating. You have somehow narrowed a lot of arguments I've made into a lifeguard that is woken up. A clever trick, but it's like summing up someone's whole life story in a one liner joke.

I don't think it should matter. Never have. I don't think that just because the child doesn't exist his suffering gets special value in the calculation. — khaled

I do. If the lifeguard can prevent all harm for a future person, then he should. No other things are required to consult. But I don't think ethics involves aggregation when considering something that does not exist yet because that is a case, where one does not have to ameliorate but rather, where one can prevent all suffering for someone else.

But that IS one of their interests. But you consider more than just their interests and so wake them up, for a purpose outside of themselves. But refuse to do the same with the child because the child doesn't exist yet, but agai — khaled

I don't agree that "enabling harm" is the problem as I said. If it was then having a child who would lead a perfect life would be wrong, because harm is still being enabled there. — khaled

n, I don't think that should matter.

The issue multiplies exponentially once born. It isn't a simple if/then, as no "one" exists prior to existence. The only consideration here that would violate what would be the child's dignity is putting anything above harm, as there is nothing to "ameliorate" for the child.

Once born, we ameliorate all the time to survive. We might make lesser harm for a greater good. Honestly, this seems like classical trolley problem as applied to AN. Does the individual count that you are harming? I am saying, while the aggregate could matter due to the constraints of being alive with interests, no such thing is the case for considering a future child who is not born.

This is the exact point I disagree with.

Because it leads to things like: The lifeguard did nothing wrong, therefore when considering whether or not to wake him up, the only consideration is harm for that lifeguard, not whatever else you might want to "see" happen from waking him up. Anything else is violating the lifeguard's dignity.

Point is you consider it fine to violate dignity sometimes, and to consider harms outside of the lifeguard/child. — khaled

Does the life guard exist? Does the child exist? Their interests are more than "not being woken up". A child not born, has no such interests like "not dying". Rather, it becomes a much more stark, "Do not enable harm, if it can be prevented".

Edit: rephrase "a child not born" to fit the linguistic threshold of making sense.. ya know what I meant.. in other words.

But you would wake up the life guard. How come? This is a quantitative difference. You only make it qualitative in the one case by giving harm done to people that aren't here yet special value over harm done to people that are here. — khaled

For the same reason that just because the lifeguard wasn't doing anything wrong doesn't mean he gets special treatment in the calculation. I won't absolutely abstain from harming the lifeguard at any cost just because he did nothing wrong. And neither would you, as you would in fact wake him up. — khaled

Because you are pinning the people born back to violating harm as the only way to overlook dignity. You don't look out for certain interests of people already born, like letting them die, you are violating the dignity. It's the same thing as a parent who needs to make sure the child is doing stuff that doesn't kill them or makes them survive better in society. However, in deciding on procreation, harm is the only consideration for that child, not whatever else you might want to "see" happen from its birth.

This is effectively special pleading though. Because in no other scenario is it possible for harm to be absolutely prevented. I don't understand why the child's dignity and suffering should be placed above the dignity and suffering of the people in the room, just because one can be prevented entirely and one partially. — khaled

For the reason I wouldn't make a society of life guards to defend the public or cannabilize a person from the next tribe to help my tribe out.

There are people in the room, not some mass of goo. — khaled

As is the case with the life guard recipients and cannibals.

I don't see why the fact that harm can be absolutely prevented in an instance makes it more valuable to prevent than harm that can be partially prevented. You make it a qualitative difference when it is a quantitative one in every other scenario. — khaled

Because in the procreation decision, there is only one way to violate dignity- overlooking harm of that person for any other reason. The person does not exist, so anything outside considerations of harm violate the dignity. However, if someone exists, that person has interests etc. once born. Presumably, those interests are things like not drowning. It starts getting complicated in terms of what "violation of dignity" means for people with interests, needs, wants, experiences, and the like. That is a qualitative difference, not one of degree.

That's quite the understatement you got there. Life is unmitigated, absolute HELL. That's what it is. I can't wait for it to stop, personally. — Olivier5

Yeah?

you are taking a risk with another person and you have no right to; schopenhauer1 seems to hold a position that, even if we knew for a fact that life is always and only pure bliss, it is a violation of that person's dignity (or perhaps "autonomy") to force them to lead such a blissful existence without so much as a "by your leave".

I'm with you: this whole "summing up" of a life is a bizarre and pointless approach. But even granting that, anti-natalism claims to be, as it were, defending someone's rights, albeit in the strangest way imaginable. That's a whole different confusion. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, but with the caveat that if you know that life has suffering for everybody (it's not a paradise), the indignity comes not only from violating consent (which I think there is a case for), but the unnecessary "overlooking" of harm on someone else's behalf. Any cause outside "don't cause unnecessary harm" in the case of procreation would indeed be using that person, and violating that person's dignity as your need for seeing X play out was more important than preventing suffering (and no person to even exist to be deprived of anything either).

Expressing your position in terms of tenseless indicatives is not only misleading, it's unnatural: there should be a future tense in here somewhere, or a subjunctive. ("If you have a child, they will suffer." "If I hadn't been born, I wouldn't be suffering." "If you were to bring a new a person into the world, they would suffer.")

But of course then you would have to describe a possible future world that includes the hypothetical person, and they would then hypothetically have exactly the same standing as everyone else, the same rights and duties, the same potential for good to their fellows or evil, the same potential to be helped or harmed. In describing that world, it's not clear why one person is singled out for special consideration above all others. — Srap Tasmaner

I've gone over this prior in the thread. The parent can prevent the wholesale suffering of a future person by not having them. As you mention, no "one" is losing out. However, no one will suffer either. I had a couple reformulations of it to make it pass this language barrier you describe. If you can, please try to look back in the thread for that discussion as it came up many different ways.

Both of these are true but only one is a moral claim. 1) says that you are obligated to cause indignity to reduce suffering elsewhere. I would disagree with this actually. My point is not that you must wake up the life guard or save the drowning person, I don't think there is an obligation there. My point is that you could. And that a system that has it where you cannot wake up the life guard or save the drowning person is ridiculous, I think we can agree there.

But 2 is only a statement of fact. Yes you do in fact have the ability to completely prevent kidnapping someone against their will. But in doing so you harm others. So it is not clear from this fact alone that the action should be taken (not having children) as we know there are cases where harm to others trumps "kidnappings" -as you called them- as a consideration. — khaled

But you are assuming that I follow this aggregate model. There are two scenarios here. One can absolutely be prevented. One can only be relatively prevented. Always do the absolute if it's available. If it's not available, that is indeed an impossibility.

Again, true, but only a statement of fact. This does not lead to it being wrong to nonetheless do that thing that enables harm, if the harm alleviated elsewhere is enough. — khaled

Only if that is your assumption of what is right. If you are in the game, and the game has harm, I must follow the rule of alleviation of harm, which goes contra to the ideal of not causing any unnecessary harm above the individual. However, this game does not dictate the rule that thus if unnecessary harm for someone is attainable, it is now justified to have the child.

My point is your argument is not unilateral. You cannot conclusively say "having children is wrong". Since you do not mind violating dignity elsewhere for the sake of preventing harm.

Unless you would argue that the child's dignity is somehow "special" and different from the lifeguard's dignity. I don't see a reason it should be. — khaled

But then you are not caring about the distinction between the two scenarios. It has nothing to do with aggregated harm. Again, I see ethics as person-affecting, not aggregate. Once born, we live in a society where in order to survive, we need to ameliorate suffering. However, if we were starving, I am not going to justify killing someone from a different tribe and eating them as the solution to our problem. That is essentially what you are doing here. I am not going to create a whole lifetime of suffering to another person for the calculus of some aggregated summary of those who already exist. At the same time, do you see there to be a qualitative difference in (since I'm already born) waking up the life guard, and then kidnapping the life guard and forcing him to save everyone I can think of? Maybe that is the better outcome, right? I mean.. maybe I have a cult where I kidnap all the life guards and make them into an emergency service or something that is meant to help the most people possible. But no, that would be violating his dignity in a MAJOR, reckless, and unnecessary way. It affects that person by violating their dignity and it mattered not that it helped the aggregated masses or technically led to less suffering.

Say the human population is exactly 100 people. I can buy that those 100 people having children and increasing the population to say, 250 would overall reduce harm on the entire group. But I cannot buy that continuously having children can ever compare to the original suffering prevented by the first act. I cannot buy that a population of billions is suffering less than the original 100 suffering due to childlessness. As shope said: It's kicking the can down the road. In the end, if you look purely at consequences, having children is always the more harmful option.

Edit: Nevermind it doesn't really work as a rebuttal. Because if everyone abides by the rule: "Only have children when it is likely that doing so prevents more suffering than the alternative" then it becomes sustainable. Even a population of 1 billion would suffer less than the original 100 if everyone abides by the rule. Though we'll likely never get to 1 billion doing so. Which I think is a win-win honestly. And saying "But there is no way everyone abides by the rule" is not an argument against this as it can also be used against AN (much more effectively).

I'll just leave this here if anyone thinks of arguing along the same lines. — khaled

But I think you might be right before the edit.. In this scenario, you are worried about outcomes. "Only have children when it is likely that doing so prevents more suffering than the alternative". Well, you did say "likely" which lives some wiggle room, but if it is outcomes you are interested in, then perhaps you want the best estimate of probabilities. If someone did indeed realize that the best scenario was the the least people being born bringing the least amount of harm, and this resulted in eventually no people born, would you accept it? For example, if it was found that all the models noted that when you ran it completely, everyone suffered more by continuing the next generation rather than abstaining from continuing it, would you accept that model?

I think that there might be a "hidden assumption" in the model...something to do way back with how community is above and beyond the consideration of the child that will be affected here. So this presents as a straight up utilitarian thing, but is really more of an argument to "keep the community going at all costs".

So you are saying that there ARE cases where you would violate dignity to reduce harm. — khaled

Yes, there are some distinctions to be made to my argument:
1) There IS a difference between bringing a child into existence vs. being alive currently. The distinction is about absolute and relative prevention. For a possible child, we are preventing that harm for that future person, as it wholesale can be prevented, "right off the bat". There is no having to compromise anything to do with violating harm or dignity.

If I was to say to you, in situation 1) You have no choice but to do mini-versions of "kidnapping" someone against their will (causing indignity by overlooking the harm you do to someone), but you can try to do this as little as possible.. and 2) You have the ability to completely prevent kidnapping someone against their will if you simply don't do a certain action.. Cannot 1 and 2 be right at the same time? I think they can.

False. You’re still forcing them into a dangerous game. Just one you know they’ll enjoy.

To use the gaming analogy, you’re still kidnapping them, taping them to a chair, and forcing them to play the game, they just happen to enjoy this whole process. And you knew they would enjoy it. — khaled

Yes the other distinction to be made...
2) The indignity comes not just from the kidnapping (the decision made for the other) but kidnapping with knowing of harm.. The indignity is putting someone else in a position of harm, putting other considerations above this.

Again, false. You keep saying this but by not procreating you are harming the people in the room. And if harm done to the child should not be treated differently to harm done to the people in the room, then there will be cases where it is acceptable to have the child. And you can’t use the dignity argument either because there ARE cases where you would violate dignity to reduce harm as we’ve gone over. There should be no reason the dignity of the child is in any way different from the dignity of anyone in the room. So if you are willing to violate dignity in “inter-room interactions” there should be no difference between that and violating the child’s dignity with the goal of reducing suffering. — khaled

I think this can be answered with understanding the distinction of 1 and 2.

Why not? It is a harm (though a very slight one) inflicted for a purpose outside of the lifeguard. You are using the lifeguard as a means to an end. — khaled

Fair enough. Doesn't really change the compromise that takes place in the room and bringing someone into the room who wasn't there before, so that they will now have to compromise, "for their own benefit".

No. Perfect life =/= paradise. The situation is that you know your next child will not suffer at all. But it’s still the same game. — khaled

So you are looking for something that has never taken place, a completely charmed life? If you knew that was a guarantee that is different than if you know that it is definitely not.

Who cares if it COULD? Until this better calculation actually DOES show this this is just idle speculation. — khaled

But that's the thing.. have you consulted the best calculation? I mean, you have your own. You care about outcomes right? You are serious about this, no? Are you really an expert in this kind of statistical analysis? Have you really factored in everything? With this kind of thinking, the person with the least knowledge is still justified, because they didn't care to look into it a bit further.

It’s never a possibility until it is :cool: — khaled

So there is a precedent for alien invasions? I mean I guess if you want to put that in the equation, I'm not opposed. Doesn't hurt the argument one way or the other. But certainly there is a precedent for war, disaster, pandemics, and the like.

Because if your problem is with enabling harm, then having a child you know will not suffer in an imperfect world is wrong, as that is still enabling harm. But I find that an absurd conclusion. — khaled

If you absolutely "know" they won't be harmed, then you aren't violating dignity. That is not the actual world. If the possibility exists, that someone can live a charmed life, show me proof. With the almost near 0% chance the person born will have lived a life with no harm, this indeed would violate dignity if you knew how the world is. I just don't believe a charmed life can ever be the case based on that no life has ever been so charmed as far as I know.. That's not the same as having a "happy" disposition or what not. Let's keep that in mind.

I don’t see why “enabling harm” should be worse than harming the people in the room. And it’s not even an argument of magnitude, you’re not arguing that “enabling harm” is nevertheless the more harmful option, no, you’re saying that “enabling harm” is fundamentally worse than directly harming. I don’t see why it would be. Why does the fact that a person doesn’t exist yet, make enabling harm for them fundamentally worse than harming people who do exist right now? The outcome is the same: someone gets hurt. Why does the fact that that someone doesn’t exist yet give their hurt some special value as opposed to the suffering of people that are here already? — khaled

It isn't. Ideally we should not unnecessarily harm anybody. However, there is only one case where we can ideally prevent this, procreation. It is bringing more people into the world who will then be harmed. For those of us already here.. we have to compromise our ideal of causing unnecessary harm to be able to survive.

I think this is demonstrably false. If this were true then humans would be each better off living as hermits. And you would expect that when they live around each other that they’ll all be miserable since they create more undeserved suffering than they prevent. But this is not the case. So it must be that the average human is a positive influence on others. — khaled

I'm not so sure, this is the full story. We certainly are drawn to socialize, but I think the picture is more accurately captured by Schopenhauer with his "Hedgehog Dilemma":

One cold winter's day, a number of porcupines huddled together quite closely in order through their mutual warmth to prevent themselves from being frozen. But they soon felt the effect of their quills on one another, which made them again move apart. Now when the need for warmth once more brought them together, the drawback of the quills was repeated so that they were tossed between two evils, until they had discovered the proper distance from which they could best tolerate one another. Thus the need for society which springs from the emptiness and monotony of men's lives, drives them together; but their many unpleasant and repulsive qualities and insufferable drawbacks once more drive them apart. The mean distance which they finally discover, and which enables them to endure being together, is politeness and good manners. Whoever does not keep to this, is told in England to 'keep his distance.' By virtue thereof, it is true that the need for mutual warmth will be only imperfectly satisfied, but on the other hand, the prick of the quills will not be felt. Yet whoever has a great deal of internal warmth of his own will prefer to keep away from society in order to avoid giving or receiving trouble or annoyance.[2] — Arthur Schopenhauer

The hedgehog's dilemma, or sometimes the porcupine dilemma, is a metaphor about the challenges of human intimacy. It describes a situation in which a group of hedgehogs seek to move close to one another to share heat during cold weather. They must remain apart, however, as they cannot avoid hurting one another with their sharp spines. Though they all share the intention of a close reciprocal relationship, this may not occur, for reasons they cannot avoid.

Both Arthur Schopenhauer and Sigmund Freud have used this situation to describe what they feel is the state of the individual in relation to others in society. The hedgehog's dilemma suggests that despite goodwill, human intimacy cannot occur without substantial mutual harm, and what results is cautious behavior and weak relationships. With the hedgehog's dilemma, one is recommended to use moderation in affairs with others both because of self-interest, as well as out of consideration for others. The hedgehog's dilemma is used to explain introversion and self-imposed isolation.[ — Hedgehog Dilemma

Edited the first quote a bit there.

That doesn’t answer the question. How the heck is it that waking someone up is violating their dignity but breaking their arm isn’t? There is a person existing in both scenarios. — khaled

Maybe I didn't understand what you were arguing for.. Did I have a typo? I'll have to look back. I meant that, waking the lifeguard up to save the person is not violating dignity.. and even if by mistake I broke that person's arm, perhaps if that was violating his dignity (though if he had good intent to have wanted to save that child, would he think so).. this is exactly what I mean by the compromises that we have to make for those already in the room (but not necessary for new people to endure).

Why?

How about waking up the lifeguard for the sake of the person in the water? That was fine. EVEN THOUGH it is a violation of his dignity. — khaled

Yes, I accept that the ideal will never be realized for the people in the room. Almost all social decisions are compromises of some sort, even ethically. However, not bringing a new person into the world is preventing wholesale all suffering for that person. I consider that a win at least in terms of realizing the ideal.

It’s not unnecessary. It’s for the people in the room. Who already exist. — khaled

It's unnecessary to cause it for that person being born. The lifegaurd exists, and the drowning person exists. The future child, does not exist. If I had the capacity to completely prevent the situation of the lifeguard's indignity and the child drowning, I certainly would. Here is a chance to prevent all harm, period. So I will. Certainly, I will not enable all harm on his behalf for the people already existing. But if you already exist, there's no other choice unless you want to commit suicide or something. Ideally, no one's dignity would be violated. In reality, it can't work that way as it is at odds with living communally. This is not the situation with possible future people. They don't have to be unnecessarily violated like us who are here and must make do.

Then having a child who will have a perfect life is not justified. But you have stated before that it is. So this cannot be your principle. It is not the simple act of forcing someone to play the game that is problematic. It only becomes problematic if there is a risk they get harmed. But if you’re only looking at risks that people get harmed then you cannot ignore the people in the room either. — khaled

The people in the room in the perfect life would presumably also be experiencing paradise no? So force recruiting in a perfect life.. is that violating dignity? Not sure. Certainly force recruiting in a non-paradise is.

Says you. Wait until aliens come down and lead us to a new age of technological prosperity. It’s never a real possibility until it is.

Again, idle speculation. — khaled

Aliens.. unless you pay attention to the historical conspiracy theories, aren't proven. Deadly viruses have been. And famines, and wars, etc. etc. True story (and continuing to this day). But anyways, it doesn't negate the fact that a better calculation could indeed show that not having children is the best course for the least harm.

Then you can’t unilaterally say that violating the child’s dignity to not harm the people in the room is wrong. — khaled

I patently think this is an extreme, to create a whole new life for the sake of the people in the room.

Typo? How in the world is waking up the life guard violating his dignity (I assume violate and “not recognize” are synonymous here) and breaking his arm is not violating his dignity? — khaled

Because he already exists and so will have to live in compromised situations. One of the harms of coming into existence ;).

In one case, there is someone that will be harmed unless you violate another person's dignity. Wait, no that’s both cases. — khaled

Compromised once born. There is no "one" that needs to compromise prior to birth. You are making someone from "scratch" that will then indeed be put in these compromising situations. I do indeed make the distinction and see it as real. It is not rolled up into aggregated harm with no distinctions.

What Isaac said. — khaled

I don't pay attention to him anymore. I did for a second, and then realize I don't like feeding antagonizing trolls and sticking to my original policy of that. There's a way to disagree without being disagreeable. He has decided not to follow that policy.

Which you can’t say is unilaterally wrong, assuming that having them is the less harmful option. Because you think it’s fine to wake up the lifeguard / ex-lifeguard. — khaled

Again, I make the distinction. To enable a whole new life of conditions for suffering doesn't necessarily follow from "because relationships are enjoyable". Starting harm unnecessarily when one could have prevented it, is that matters here. The life guard is already forced "recruited" on the team. He was already kidnapped into the game. To force recruit and kidnap into the team/game is not justified. You can use the players that have already been created, but don't keep violating the principle.

Again, this is idle speculation. You cannot use “But maybe some terrible event will happen” as real evidence that not having the kid is less harmful. Statistically speaking, I would say it’s pretty clear that having children is overall, a positive influence. And this is taking into account catastrophic events. — khaled

Says you. Wait until the unexpected airborne Ebola happens or something.. It's never a real possibility until it is.

Again, this “dignity argument” seems extreme. It means you shouldn’t wake up the life guard who is sleeping on the job even if someone you can’t save is drowning. Because that involves using them. And this is unlike the “stop the gunner” example because the lifeguard did nothing wrong. You could argue that “sleeping on the job” is something wrong, but then I’d just modify the example to being about your ex-lifeguard friend sleeping as a relative of his is drowning, you can’t wake him up. — khaled

But I don't apply it in extremes. Rather, I recognize that there is a substantive difference in how it is applied to someone not yet born and explain that this is because it a case of absolutely not creating unnecessary harm, vs. people who already exist and recognize that there are compromises in living in groups and socially. It's not ideal, but it can never be ideal once born. Here is a case where the ideal can be applied. Thus it would be a violation to unnecessarily start a life to use them to try to create benefits, vs. people being able to compromise with each other once alive for the sake of survival and mutual benefit. Once born, you indeed would be overlooking someone's dignity if you ignored egregious harm, and didn't make the compromise to recognize this. The dignity doesn't necessarily "look the same way" for each case. I certainly would be not recognizing someone's dignity by not waking up the life guard. I would go further and say, if I had to violently shove the life guard to wake him, to the point of causing a broken arm, I might say that was necessary to preserve the drowning person's dignity. I do not believe breaking the life guard's arm in the attempt to get them to do their job was violating the lifeguard's dignity. Certainly I harmed them in some way though.

I know you are going to say you don't buy it, but I guess that is where the line is drawn. I see the distinction as valid and substantive and you do not. You seem to lump everything together with the aggregated approach without looking at the distinction between starting a life and then living out a life that already exists. It's not a matter of special pleading but a different case.

Unlikely. Considering that most people are a positive influence. If they weren’t, then as Isaac said, we’d all be happier as hermits. But we’re clearly not. — khaled

This is simply a variation of the "there is not enough suffering" variant of objection. I mean, I can also say the social relations lead to suffering, as much as we are drawn to them. But what is the case, is that social relations in and of itself, don't mean, that everything is now "not suffering". It's almost an aside. Also, it can be construed as a sort of naturalistic fallacy. Just because we are social animals, does not mean, we must have more people to keep sociality going. As related to my previous statement, suffering occurs despite, in spite, along side, and due to being social.. so it is somewhat irrelevant to the argument of harm/suffering. How much emotional anguish comes from other people along with the joy of relationships? So, while already existing, certainly it is a good idea to cultivate good relationships, to then say that this justifies making other people experience the harms of existence to have this would be violating the dignity, and overlooking the unnecessary harm on a personal assessment of your doing.

As a further argument I just thought about.. In the aggregate calculation, there are always mitigating circumstances if you only care about outcomes. Most likely, no parent was thinking about the real possibility of a deadly pandemic, for example. That should at least give some pause.

If I can somehow predict the future, and I find every person your future child (were you to have one) would help then I bring them all together in a room, why do you treat harm done to them as "aggregate" but harm done to the child as concrete and immediate. By not having a child, you are in fact harming everyone in that room. There is no "abstract cause" here. It's not like saying "For the country", where you are asked to harm someone for the sake of a fiction. There are real people in that room. — khaled

I think there is a point at which you can use people to prevent harm on other people, which sets a high, but not unreachable, standard for when it is ok to have children. I'd say we do so all the time. Taxing the rich for example, even though they don't benefit from it much if at all in comparison to what they're paying. — khaled

The problem is that none of these analogies get to really what's happening..
By procreating someone, you are enabling the conditions of harm. That is not the same as some concrete example of breaking someone's leg to give someone else some more beneficial thing. Rather, a whole lifetime's worth of suffering will befall that person. So it is hard to measure. But besides this measurement problem, what I want to convey is that you are not "making do" with what is already here to try to ameliorate the situation in the case of procreation as you would be for people who already exist. So one guy exists and another guy exists and so we are in this inextricably intertwined situation. Rather, now you are making, from complete scratch, another situation of enabling harm, so that you can ameliorate the situation. I just don't see that as right to do, even if it means that you think it will have some beneficial outcome. Enabling harm by creating harmfulness "anew" in a new person, so that you can "fix" something for people that were already born is just not good enough to say, "Oh, this justifies creating the harm for that person". You can keep digging and say, "Why"? And I would probably go back to the dignity argument. You are overlooking that person's dignity for the cause of ameliorating other people. So I never argued straight up that it is all about harm reduction. Otherwise, I indeed WOULD be an aggregate utilitarian, which I NEVER claimed that I was. Rather, I have always maintained in this thread that there is an important element about not overlooking the dignity of that person, etc. So that involves not using them, even if it is trying to ameliorate unnecessary harm. So, if it is to be an ethical claim (and not a political one), then it is not only about harm reduction or some aggregate calculation, but rather how the dignity is recognized in people as well, which we are doing by NOT affecting them negatively in the sense of "stealing from Sam to pay for Sally", or however that phrase goes.

On another note, I also think you have a problem with the aggregate because someone with a better model, that can see the "bigger picture" can simply override your more primitive model of "just seeing what's in front of your face". The better model might actually predict that it was better overall not to procreate that child, no matter how prima facie it emotionally "seems" to bring them into the world to for some benefit. So it is indeed a slippery slope for your own stance.

Hard to sell. No taxes, no laws, no jails, etc. Also can be taken to many unpleasant extremes. Say I want to donate to charity. But there is someone in my family who is a strict capitalist and very much against the idea of donating to charity. If I donate, I would certainly be harming that person for a purpose outside themselves. Heck, I would say MOST of what we do is harming someone out there for a goal outside of themselves. — khaled

Are you using your family member in this case? I'm not so sure. If that is the (weak) example you are going to give, then I would say that is indeed the price of the compromises in life that need to take place for anything to happen. As you say, MOST of what we do in harming someone out there for a goal outside of themselves. However, here is a chance to no cause any unnecessary harm to anyone. No one has to be used as there is no one in the first place to be used. That family member already exists.. the compromise is inevitable. If that is the case, then that in itself should give you pause to bring people into this situation.

A more clear cut case of using someone, is if you sold your family member's car in order to give the money to charity. That wouldn't be right, even if that charity was going to benefit more from the money than your family would from their car.

Also, regarding taxes, laws, jails.. These are political actions, not personal ethics. If you're trying to get at something like, is it okay to stop a killer from killing.. I would ask, is that killer causing unnecessary harm? Stopping the killer is necessary harm, because it was he who was causing unnecessary harm. I also never said that once born, punishment and self-defense for violations of the axiom were not something that is legitimate. But I did mention that in procreation, here is a case where it is absolutely unnecessary.. There are no relative scenarios where we must weigh things like self-defense and punishment which are necessary to live in the community when violations of the axiom does take place.

What I definitely agree with however is that appealing to goals like “For mankind” or “For the country” as justification to hurt someone is utter BS. If you want to harm someone, the alternative has to also be harmful to specific people, not to some abstract cause for the act to begin to be considered acceptable. That is exactly the case with birth however. — khaled

Agreed.

Sure. And this makes it risky to do so. Problem is, there is also a very high chance someone will get harmed by NOT having children. Which makes having children acceptable in cases where the latter trumps the former. Aka, when someone can be a good parent. — khaled

I still think this is actually inadvertently perpetuating the harm, if you are going to use the aggregate approach.. You are just kicking the can down the road for yet more generations. When does the calculation stop? Not only is it hard to quantify the amount of harm/good a person actually contributes to the world, it might be a case of projection of what one wants to see than what might actually be the case. You using X product might have inadvertently killed thousands of Y across the world. I do know something for sure though, that no person suffered if they were not born.

For example, if you can expect that the person will be equipped to deal with all the common harms and will themselves act morally most of the time.

This seems entirely consistent with everyone's interests, and so would be "good" in my estimation — Echarmion

Ah, so I just think that
a) We can't know if they will be equipped (that's more the approach of @khaled, but I agree.. there is that 10% or whatever figure it is). Also, it is hard to really know how to judge this. At some points someone might be okay, others not, and then there is total evaluation which is separate than the individual experiences. Which version is it? I don't think we can say, and there are certainly times one someone would ideally rather not have had those experiences.

b) Even if I equipped someone, putting them in the game in the first place is wrong.

Another strategy..
Act as though one is already right, but do so with as much condescension in tone of the "obviousness" of your opponent's argument being wrong. Thus, the argument itself isn't so much as wrong as the appearance of it.

I would simply add to that, that by coming at someone by being completely antagonistic and rude, you can try to throw them off their "game", creating emotional resentment on top of the actual argument at hand.

This is probably the one I see the most, and even Schopenhauer named it (and saved it for last) as "The Ultimate Stratagem".

A last trick is to become personal, insulting, rude, as soon as you perceive that your opponent has the upper hand, and that you are going to come off worst. It consists in passing from the subject of dispute, as from a lost game, to the disputant himself, and in some way attacking his person. It may be called the argumentum ad personam, to distinguish it from the argumentum ad hominem, which passes from the objective discussion of the subject pure and simple to the statements or admissions which your opponent has made in regard to it. But in becoming personal you leave the subject altogether, and turn your attack to his person, by remarks of an offensive and spiteful character. It is an appeal from the virtues of the intellect to the virtues of the body, or to mere animalism. This is a very popular trick, because every one is able to carry it into effect; and so it is of frequent application. Now the question is, What counter-trick avails for the other party? for if he has recourse to the same rule, there will be blows, or a duel, or an action for slander.

It would be a great mistake to suppose that it is sufficient not to become personal yourself. For by showing a man quite quietly that he is wrong, and that what he says and thinks is incorrect - a process which occurs in every dialectical victory - you embitter him more than if you used some rude or insulting expression. Why is this? Because, as Hobbes observes,17 all mental pleasure consists in being able to compare oneself with others to one's own advantage. Nothing is of greater moment to a man than the gratification of his vanity, and no wound is more painful than that which is inflicted on it. Hence such phrases as "Death before dishonour," and so on. The gratification of vanity arises mainly by comparison of oneself with others, in every respect, but chiefly in respect of one's intellectual powers; and so the most effective and the strongest gratification of it is to be found in controversy. Hence the embitterment of defeat, apart from any question of injustice; and hence recourse to that last weapon, that last trick, which you cannot evade by mere politeness. A cool demeanour may, however, help you here, if, as soon as your opponent becomes personal, you quietly reply, "That has no bearing on the point in dispute," and immediately bring the conversation back to it, and continue to show him that he is wrong, without taking any notice of his insults. Say, as Themistocles said to Eurybiades - Strike, but hear me. But such demeanour is not given to every one.

As a sharpening of wits, controversy is often, indeed, of mutual advantage, in order to correct one's thoughts and awaken new views. But in learning and in mental power both disputants must be tolerably equal: If one of them lacks learning, he will fail to understand the other, as he is not on the same level with his antagonist. If he lacks mental power, he will be embittered, and led into dishonest tricks, and end by being rude.

The only safe rule, therefore, is that which Aristotle mentions in the last chapter of his Topica: not to dispute with the first person you meet, but only with those of your acquaintance of whom you know that they possess sufficient intelligence and self-respect not to advance absurdities; to appeal to reason and not to authority, and to listen to reason and yield to it; and, finally, to cherish truth, to be willing to accept reason even from an opponent, and to be just enough to bear being proved to be in the wrong, should truth lie with him. From this it follows that scarcely one man in a hundred is worth your disputing with him. You may let the remainder say what they please, for every one is at liberty to be a fool - desipere est jus gentium. Remember what Voltaire says: La paix vaut encore mieux que la verite. Remember also an Arabian proverb which tells us that on the tree of silence there hangs its fruit, which is peace. — Schopenhauer

Sure, we don't have to but that's not saying anything about whether we should. You're just short-circuiting ethics by making you preferred outcome also the basic ideal. And so you arrive at ridiculous claims like "Me having any goal apart from preventing suffering violates the dignity of future persons".

Claiming that your, and only your, moral position is the one with only positives and no drawbacks is a good sign that you're no longer actually saying anything apart from "I am right because I am". — Echarmion

But you can say that about any ethical claim.. Why? Why? Why? Why? So then, let's turn this a bit and look at your thought process.

First, why would causing unnecessary harm, absolutely (and I defined that versus relative once born), not a good thing?

But an "absolute paradise" is just a meaningless phrase. Not only can it not practically exist, it doesn't even have theoretical properties. It cannot be defined. You're comparing existence to something incoherent.

You even realize this yourself, but somehow this has no implications for your position. You just gloss over it and change the topic. That should be a further red flag to you that your position is no longer rational. — Echarmion

I don't think it is meaningless. I don't see why just because that world doesn't exist or is not the actual world means that it is wrong to compare with this world. That is to simply say that, there may be a world where it is good to bring people into but it is not this one, and I gave the major reason why not this world. Just like the case of existence vs. non-existence, then don't even bother defining the paradise world, just look at this world as sufficiently not paradise.

Do you literally believe this? That all that matters is that no unnecessary harm befalls someone? Did you arrive at this conclusion by some process of reasoning of is that just what you personally consider to be the meaning of life? — Echarmion

IF there is a chance to cause unnecessary suffering, than don't cause it, sure. That's not all that matters though, clearly. I have to eat if I don't want to starve and die, for example.

Before I rebut this, do you have any comments on this part:

Also, I would say that in the realm of ethics, using someone for some greater good, is a violation. Giving to charity is a good thing. Duping someone to give you money so you can give to charity is not, cause you are using someone, even if it is supposed to help a greater amount of people, or some abstract cause. So rather, I would not think so much on the aggregate level, but on the person you are affecting with your decision. That person is the one whose whole life will be affected by this decision. All instances of harm will befall that person. An abstract group of people might benefit from this person being born, but you now using this person's harm for this cause. Rather, we should help those people in need without using someone else, similar to taking someone's money to give to charity situation. — schopenhauer1