Would you admit that my mother might have aborted me? — unenlightened

Yes, then, you would be no more.

I can be something else and still be me, in all kinds of ways, and that includes loss of memory, body parts, brain function and most of the things one identifies as one's self. — unenlightened

So then what is the you that is the same in all possible worlds? That is the you I am talking about.

Above and beyond this, even if not using all possible worlds logic, there is something unique about the causality and relations you have had as a physical being, with an ego, interacting with the environment that cannot be simply the same as another being.

So the point is that, a proper name is more than a description like "the person who wore X" or "identifies as Y". Rather, in another possible world, that person could have worn A and identified as B. There is something about a person that is the same in all possible worlds. That was about proper names and their referent specifically, but this points to a kind of essentialism about individuals.

Kripke calls designators like ‘The successor of 2’ rigid de facto, rather than rigid de jure: the description happens to be satisfied by the same object in every possible world and never anything else. Compare the intuitively distinct case of de jure rigidity in a name, like ‘Barack Obama’. Here the intent is to refer to this person in all possible worlds, whatever descriptions may designate him. — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rigid-designators/#RelBetRigAssTheRef

It doesn't matter what name is used to rigidly designate the individual, the causal baptism rigidly designates in all possible worldsno matter the name. You cannot not be you, in other words in all possible worlds. If you were not you, then there isn't even a "you" to be something else. "You" are more than the sum of a bunch of descriptions that could change in any possible world.

If you wish to argue that what you're describing is rational, you have a long way to go yet, imho. — Hippyhead

You are using rational as a vague signal that means nothing. Its a weasel word that stands for "what you believe to be right and true".

Certainly, if one thinks life is suffering, and it is "rational" to not bring new suffering into the world for a whole other life, one ought not to do this. If one believes its rational to not force others into the life-deal-with game, then one ought not do this. For ethics, its all about appealing to peoples shared sensibilities. Otherwise, there is no impetus. Of course we would have to agree on the premises, like not starting unnecessary suffering on other peoples behalf.

I think youre hitting many of the things I'm getting at. No one had a choice for this surivival, comfort, entertainment game, nor many contingent circumstances they are affected by. And it's a lifelong requirement to deal with these things. It was best never to have been. All the pessemist has now is communities of consolation with likeminded people, ones to share gripes and commiserate and find catharsis in shared griping. That and advocacy for not bringing yet more suffering into the world by antinatalism, not having more people that will do the suffering game and must deal with.

You mentioned choices to not suffer, but the choice never to be put in the game of making choices to not suffer is never on the table. That is often the line of thinking a philosophical pessemist is coming from. And of course there are often things that are not choices but often affects ones capacity for choice...mental illness disease, phyical illness, circumstances, etc. But besides all this, the suffering discussed by philosophical pessimism is often about the basic dissatisfaction we find that strives but without end. The circular absurdity of surviving, seek comfortable circumstances, and seek entertainment stemming from a profound baseline boredom of the never satisfied human animal that cant just be, but must continually need and want except for small brief reposes.

But the choice to not make a choice is never available. Again, we are always ameliorating after the fact. Somehow it is never questioned by some why we need to put more people into the game in the first place.

And again, I'd like to bring up Kripke..

In the course of making these distinctions, Kripke revived the ancient doctrine of essentialism, according to which objects possess certain properties necessarily—without them the objects would not exist at all. On the basis of this doctrine and revolutionary new ideas about the meaning and reference of proper names and of common nouns denoting “natural kinds” (such as heat, water, and tiger), he argued forcefully that some propositions are necessarily true but knowable only a posteriori—e.g., “Water is H2O” and “Heat is mean molecular kinetic energy”—and that some propositions are contingently true (true in some circumstances but not others) but knowable a priori. These arguments overturned the conventional view, inherited from Immanuel Kant (1720–1804), that identified all a priori propositions as necessary and all a posteriori propositions as contingent. Naming and Necessity also had far-reaching implications regarding the question of whether linguistic meaning and the contents of beliefs and other mental states are partly constituted by social and environmental facts external to the individual. According to Kripke’s causal theory of reference, for example, the referent of a given use of a proper name, such as Aristotle, is transmitted through an indefinitely long series of earlier uses; this series constitutes a causal-historical chain that is traceable, in principle, to an original, or “baptismal,” application. Kripke’s view posed a serious challenge to the prevailing “description” theory, which held that the referent of a name is the individual who is picked out by an associated definite description, such as (in the case of Aristotle) the teacher of Alexander the Great. Finally, Kripke’s work contributed greatly to the decline of ordinary language philosophy and related schools, which held that philosophy is nothing more than the logical analysis of language. — https://www.britannica.com/biography/Saul-Kripke#ref918554

Well, look at it this way: what makes you you is a set of thoughts and actions and the fact of the matter is someone else could've written the Tractus Logico-Philosophicus and not Ludwig Wittgenstein and someone else could've painted the Mona Lisa and not Leonardo da Vinci — TheMadFool

So this kind of leads into Kripke's Naming and Necessity a bit. You could not be anything but you, but it can possibly be the case that someone else besides X person had done a specific action. It probably would look slightly different, but in the same ballpark. "You" could be no one else, otherwise it is someone else we are talking about.

Philosophy of mind is disappearing into neuroscience, so metaphysics is best answered through there. Ethically and metaphysically with mirror neurons understood, it means we can envision ourselves as other beings, and likely allows us to sympathize and treat other things better. We can imagine ourselves as that being suffering, so we try not to cause it any suffering ourselves. — Philosophim

I would disagree that neuroscience takes over metaphysics, but I agree with your main argument. I am not saying that we cannot use counterfactuals to assess conditions, improvements, etc. once already born. The claim is simply that "you" could not counterfactually have existed as anything but "you".

Are ok with my hairdresser saying "You would look better with short hair."? — unenlightened

Sure, because there is a "you" there to have shorter hair.

Are you ok with my sister saying "I wish I had been born a man."? — unenlightened

No, because if born differently, she would not be her, she would be someone else. That is precisely what I mean. You can't be born something else without being someone else.

Are you ok with my hairdresser cutting my hair and my sister transitioning? — unenlightened

That is now a person transitioning and a person with existing with shorter hair.

These were good questions to clarify. I hope you see the difference between the 1,3 and 2.

To the degree one lowers the volume of thought becoming and suffering fade and are replaced by being. It's a mechanical problem which can be addressed by mechanical means. — Hippyhead

But I find it interesting that we are always in a position to "ameliorate" this or that in the first place. Why is it, that we we weren't "being" to begin with, but are always tinkering, dealing with, needing to fix? That is suspect in itself, and is more cause for pessimism :).

You don't have an argument. Not a shred of a reason for your claim. You just repeat it. — unenlightened

So are you making an argument for a soul that can be embodied by anything? There is an essence outside the physical substantiation? If so, then there is more evidence that there is no evidence for that. What we do know is there was you after birth.

My approach is similar yet different. I am also a philosophical pessimist. I like your picture by the way Augustusea! Anyways, a major difference between common "pessimism" and a "philosophical pessimist" is that "pessimism" often implies a depressed mood or outlook. Philosophical pessimism, on the other hand, is a worldview. Akin to but not the same as a religious aesthetic. It is an overarching way the world is seen to exist metaphysically, epistemologically, and ethically.

The main philosophical pessimistic stance is that the world is either inherently suffering or contains suffering as we experience. Usually it is a combination of both these views. I call inherent suffering "necessary suffering" as it doesn't go away by circumstances. That is to say, it is akin to the "seething, striving force" of Schopenhauer's Will. It is the human's need for need. It is the necessity of an individual being needing and wanting survival, comfort, and entertainments, always becoming, never being, always dissatisfaction, frustration, boredom impelling us forward.

The experiential suffering through causal circumstances of life, I call "contingent suffering". You banged your toe, you fell into a volcano, you had a bad interaction with someone, an accident, a disease befalls you. These are things that are contingently true, but are almost always inevitable at some point to some people.

Combining these, philosophical pessimists see the world in terms of these necessary and contingent forms of suffering and have a stance of rebellion against it. Whereas most existentialists, post-industrial relativists, etc. try to find some sort of radical acceptance of the suffering, pessimists ultimately rebel. They don't accept suffering as a good thing, as necessary to endure, as needed. Thus, many philosophical pessimists are antinatalists. No one needs to be born to suffer or experience suffering.

One of my own solutions once already born is Communal Pessimism. That is to say, communities of like-minded people who can discuss their rebellious stance, their worldview, can console each other, etc. There is catharsis in consolation with others.

Yes it would. If the counterfactual were the factual I would be a woman, and the woman would be me, just as the blue shirt would be red if it had been dyed red, even though as it happens it was dyed blue. Is it an argument you are making or just an intuition being declared? Or a universal aversion to counterfactual conditionals? — unenlightened

There is no counterfactual where you were born something else. That other thing would not be "you". It's not an aversion, just an understanding of what it means to be a being born. You cannot have been born anything other than what you are.

If 'you' is a sort of personhood waiting in limbo for a body to become available then your argument is wrong. Your position relies entirely on us not conceiving of 'you' in this way, but you've given no reason at all why we shouldn't, only that you personally don't. — Isaac

Oh, the soul thing. Well, yes it is assuming there is no such prior entity waiting to enter a body. This is an argument based on the assumption that there is no person prior to being physically substantiated. If this is the case, then we cannot entertain notions of possibly being someone else, unless just in imaginative exercises.

Why not the same insubstantiality, just as it is the same insubstantial I that is not wearing a red shirt but might have? — unenlightened

Why is it insubstantial. One case is you born, the counterfactual, would not be you.

That's all very internally consistent, but you,ve not tied this entity 'you' to anything which we already agree exists, so there's no compulsion to see what you see. — Isaac

The point is, that there is no "could have been born a..". That would not be you then. It invalidates that kind of counterfactual line of thinking.

So in what sense is this fertilised ovum “you” rather than an undeveloped scrap of protoplasm? — apokrisis

In a way, Kripke's Naming and Necessity might be informative here.

First off, this isnt an anti-abortion argument or anything like that. Inevitably, ideas of conception are contrued as that, so just want that clarified.

It is about counterfactuals in terms of being something. There is something about being born that has limited any counterfactual of being born as something else. I am not denying the role of experience on development and its construction of identity. There was a you, that is not a tiger or another conceived entity. If it that circumstance of entity was not the case (you being born), there might be others then constructing an identity through the course of a life, but never you who are

So to take a strong stance on continuity over malleability doesn’t fit the facts of human development. It is an odd start to an argument. — apokrisis

Once you are conceived, you could not have been conceived as something else, whatever dynamical changes take place or don't from there. You could not have been him or her or that, otherwise you would no longer be you. You can imagine the counterfactual, but you can never actually have been the counterfactual, otherwise, there is no you anymore. There is never a different circumstance in which you were not you.

Yes true.

Is that like development of an identity?

The fact is, you are you, and not someone else. That identity is attached to someone born that could not be anyone else. You can choose certain things that develop identity, but what is the thing creating the identity? It's still you, and no other person. Wittgenstein would have a field day with the metaphors people use... becoming a different person, etc. "He's a different person" is a turn of phrase, but not literally a different person.

Just wasn't sure what you were saying. You agree. Got it. Thanks.

I don't really wish to talk about what it implies because the question is too large and there's a lot of "maybe" to it, since people don't usually cite it in their reasoning. — Judaka

Not sure what "you" mean here. Can you be anything else but you? If someone else was born from different parents, that is not you.

It doesn't matter if you would be oblivious of who "you" are today, in your head that "you" would be much happier and have a better life.

It is saying, "I wish my perspective were with a better being in a better situation then I am right now." — Philosophim

That's fine, but it's still not true that you could be anything else but you. It is just a turn of phrase in the way you describe it, but not an actual point of fact.

Not quite getting "you".

Is it? So one cannot call for help, because one cannot use another person to reduce suffering? — Isaac

Why do you like to straw man my argument? You know very well that it is from the perspective of not causing suffering to begin with for a future person right? You combine that with person-centered ethics, and you see what I mean. A future person who can have all harm prevented should not be then created and harmed, such that already existing people can MAYBE have people that reduce their suffering. I already stated that the situation is different for people already born. Please stop conflating scenarios to suit your rebuttal.

As I stated earlier:

Once born, reducing harm becomes a necessity of living in a society with people who are brought into existence already. However, to cause all cases of harm (bringing someone into existence) in the first place is unjustified. That is causing the very harm that needs reduction in the first place. It is creating the very circumstances that people have to deal with in the first place. No one needs anything prior to birth, obviously. No one needs harm reduced prior to birth obviously. No one needs prior to birth, period. And so while it is justified once born to reduce suffering, as it is "too late" to prevent all cases of harm for a person, it is certainly not justified to bring about the very situation for "all harms to take place" just because there is the potential for the harm to get mitigated at some point. There is no reason to cause the situation for harm to take place in the first place, and certainly not for a third-party agenda (thus using people for this agenda). — schopenhauer1

All one is doing by giving birth is facilitating a duty of the next generation to help reduce suffering. — Isaac

And of course that is my main problem, you are conflating the case of birth with already being born. Thus, read what I said above.

No it isn't. The harm in need of reduction is caused by other people having children. The reduction in question is caused by you having children. Two different events. All that is required to make the decision sound is that you have reason to believe you're a better than average parent. — Isaac

And you see that this is not really person-centered ethics, and therefore unethical. It is unethical to create ALL harm for a person that will be born (all the challenges, dealings and CONTINGENT harms of unknown quantities) for a child, especially for any agenda that the birth of that child is supposed to fulfill. Again, by aggregating harm into some odd ratio of less harm here more harm there, etc. doesn't negate the fact that you did created an individual that will be harmed, when this did not have to happen.

Your bizarre understanding of suffering/harm as an entity which is aggregated and not happening to actual people is unethical in my opinion. I am all for people already existing reducing suffering in other people, but not wholesale creation of the very circumstances for which this whole harm-reducing scheme needs to be there in the first place. All of that can be prevented for a future person if their birth was prevented in the first place (remember, person-centered, not third-party outcome centered). People's inevitable suffering should not be used for any cause, whether you think it's noble or not.

Have a look back at the proposition I actually opposed. Unless you are advocating the immediate annihilation of the human race then the situation in which harm takes place is happening anyway, that is not within your control. — Isaac

And again, look back to my argument. It is person-centered. One less child is one less experiencer of suffering. It is not about quantity but creating agents who suffer, when it comes to procreation. Once born, there is now no chance to completely prevent all suffering, only amelioration. Do not cause harm, do not force. If someone is harmed. I agree, it is best to develop a moral sense to help reduce people's suffering if you see immediate suffering, but certainly with that one must not FORCE or CAUSE all circumstances of suffering in another, just so they can ameliorate suffering. People are not tools to be used for your cause.

that failing to help reduce suffering when is it well within your power to do so is bad, even if that means forcing another to help (if forcing another is the only action you can take - you yourself are unable to help for some reason). — Isaac

I just don't know what you are trying to get at.. So you are claiming that people should procreate in the hopes that their progeny will reduce suffering? You realize this is an absurd, unnecessary pyramid scheme right? By creating more people, you are creating more sources of suffering, thereby needing more people to prevent suffering. But besides being absurd on its premise, it is also unethical to use people as suffering-reducers. As with any "grand scheme" (e.g. keeping civilization or the species going), using individual people for some third-party agenda, however noble you think it is, is still using people. This is actually one of the reasons I explained earlier that I don't agree with aggregate total happiness principles and maximizing happiness only in aggregate, which are not person-centered but focus on some outcome.

Once born, reducing harm becomes a necessity of living in a society with people who are brought into existence already. However, to cause all cases of harm (bringing someone into existence) in the first place is unjustified. That is causing the very harm that needs reduction in the first place. It is creating the very circumstances that people have to deal with in the first place. No one needs anything prior to birth, obviously. No one needs harm reduced prior to birth obviously. No one needs prior to birth, period. And so while it is justified once born to reduce suffering, as it is "too late" to prevent all cases of harm for a person, it is certainly not justified to bring about the very situation for "all harms to take place" just because there is the potential for the harm to get mitigated at some point. There is no reason to cause the situation for harm to take place in the first place, and certainly not for a third-party agenda (thus using people for this agenda).

And hence, as a person-centered approach, preventing suffering will prevent suffering to any future individual who might be born. And again, preventing birth, prevents deprivation. Interestingly, this means there will be no actual person deprived of any good/benefit either.

Optionality isn't the point. The point is that if someone chooses to walk by we would probably think them a sociopath. No one's talking about being forced to walk by, we're talking about an obligation to help. — Isaac

I think it is interesting how force and harm have inverse aspects to them. If someone is harmed, it is okay to help them (even if not asking.. this isn't aggressive force). Also, if someone harms another, there can be force taken to ameliorate or defend against this. So the violation of the principle allows for the enacting of the other (in proportion, etc.. but that is epistemological application decisions, not general principle).

However, in the case of procreation, we are talking about a state of affairs where a future person can be prevented ALL harms, period. Also, in the case of procreation, we are talking about a state of affairs where no one is being forced to participate in life (being born). Interestingly, being born causes all deprivation. However, no one existing means no one is deprived, and that means, no one is deprived of good things as well.

Sounds like a fairly convoluted post hoc ethics stemming from, rather than leading to, a commitment to antinatalism. — Isaac

Not really. Not using people and not harming them.. non-force (unnecessarily) and non-harm (unnecessarily) principle are pretty standard ideas.

If someone routinely saw another person in pain and just walked by we would likely label them a sociopath. — Isaac

Don't know how you construed that. Forcing people into harmful situations unnecessarily is the point. Once born, of course one can help reduce harm. I don't consider that force. Similar to once born, children need to be "forced" to do stuff, etc.

Yes shocking that applied ethics is nuanced. What I'm not going to let you do is strait-jacket me so you can try to say it doesn't fit your strait-jacket definition.

I don't see how you can justify that assessment. That person's net effect on the world might be to reduce the suffering of others to a greater extent than their own suffering was increased by being born. The 'logic' of antinatalism (such as it is) does indeed rely on immediate annihilation of the human race, because if there's even one person left, it is possible that creating a second person could feasibly reduce overall suffering. — Isaac

My conception of it is not utilitarian, though a huge component is preventing harm. I don't consider it utilitiarian because I see ethics as agent-based, and not how it affects aggregate total sums (an impersonal maximization sum).

I believe ethics has to be person-centered, not greatest good centered or greatest harm reduction in the aggregate sense. The reason for this, is that there is a nuance of deontology that couples the idea of not harming people and balancing that with not using people either. That is to say:

If we don't want to use people (for any scheme like living for the greater good or flourishing, or keeping parents happy or keeping the species going), AND we want to reduce suffering to what could be a specific person who would if born suffer, then preventing birth is the proper course of action.

One of the interesting things with agent-centered approach is that the asymmetry makes sense:
One of the stronger arguments for AN, is that if we were to say "flourishing" was some benefit of being born. If no person "flourished" to begin with, there is no loss to any particular person. However, it is certainly good that all forms of suffering were prevented for that possible person. In other words, where it is always a good state of affairs that suffering is prevented, it is neither good nor bad state of affairs if flourishing doesn't take place unless there was an actual person who already existed for which this would be a deprivation. In the case of no child being born, there is of course no human which is deprived, nor knows if they would be.

I thought antinatalism takes the position that people should not reproduce, as anyone born will suffer. If that's not the case, and it instead takes the position that the decision to procreate should be made on a case-by-case basis considering the circumstances in which the child would be born and its prospects, I think that would be quite reasonable. — Ciceronianus the White

No, you misinterpreted what I meant. I meant that, in terms of dealing with suffering, one doesn't have to put emphasis on the aggregate, but rather can put emphasis on the margins. In other words, you can say something like "For antinatlism to be truly effective, all suffering needs stop". This leads to absurd ideas on how to do this. Rather, I'm saying all that needs to take place is incremental non-procreation (and not by case-by-case as not reproducing in any case is always good). So in the marginal approach it would be something like, "One less person procreating, is one less person who will suffer". Suffering is not aggregated into an apersonal entity of "Suffering", but is seen rather as a person not born is a person not suffering. It's the way the problem is approached. For those who get caught up in language games, you can rephrase that "A decision made to not have a child, is a decision that prevents a future sufferer".

if that were the case why is it that we avoid death? Surely a rationalist would just give in to a painless death or jump off a bridge. — JacobPhilosophy

There is a thread on suicide, so ideations and actual acting on suicide does occur. Having the instinct to fear death and pain is not the same as preventing a person from entering into the world (who will inevitably suffer) in the first place. One of the stronger arguments for AN, is that if we were to say "flourishing" was some benefit of being born. If no person "flourished" to begin with, there is no loss to any particular person. However, it is certainly good that all forms of suffering were prevented for that possible person. In other words, where it is always a good state of affairs that suffering is prevented, it is neither good nor bad state of affairs if flourishing doesn't take place unless there was an actual person who already existed for which this would be a deprivation. In the case of no child being born, there is of course no human which is deprived, nor knows if they would be.

Why is their suffering of less significance than ours? — Ciceronianus the White

This doesn't negate that one can prevent human source of suffering via antinatalism. It's a red herring of sorts. Not all forms (or many) look at suffering in aggregate, but more on the margins.. how it affects each individual (or how it would affect each individual). One person not born, is one person not suffering. It doesn't have to be this savior of the universe version you are parodying here.

Fine. But the unborn child’s “protection” from harm is also predicated on the harm of others. As a third party, you must at least allow the harm of others (those who desire children, grandchildren, siblings, etc.) to continue, and perhaps at times directly cause their harm so that the unborn child is protected at all costs. The point being that Antinatalism’s conclusion isn’t a “win-win” situation. New harm will be introduced in the world regardless. The only difference is who is experiencing it, and possibly the extent/severity of it. — Pinprick

Again, my point is the idea of forcing pain on someone else for one's own benefit of alleviating pain is not a good one. If you can't see the wrong in that, don't know what to say. People should not enact pain on others just to alleviate their own pain, when it is not necessary to do so (necessary meaning, immediately vital to your life or safety). One can agree with another of course, by way of contract, but that is different. You can concoct some weird scenarios, and there will always be exceptions, but my answer will remain the same for them. A person who likes to assassinate, doesn't get to do so just because they get joy from it and are pained not to do what they get joy from. You know where this goes and am a bit perplexed that you don't see it. Pain is not an amporphous thing that gets passed on. .There are agents and actors involved who experience the pain. Rights of autonomy, force, etc. are involved here when dealing with other actors then oneself.

You can make an argument of intent, perhaps, but I think it is weak. Even if your intent is to not cause pain in alleviating your suffering, the collateral damage is still well known. That is to say, it is well known life has many sources of pain and suffering, let alone all the pain and suffering that we know can happen but cannot predict.

Rather, if you force others in the grand old pursuit of the game of flourishing, and in doing so, force unnecessary harm and challenges on another person because you deem this worthy, or you would feel pain if you did not force this situation on another, that may be immoral.

I don't believe that everyone is doomed to feel in that way, it's not part of the human experience. I feel like we're going post-human. — MadWorld1

But that's part of the suffering too...

I'm going to bypass all of this and reiterate the main point:
The bomber and the parents have the same problem.. their "harm" is predicated on causing harm to others. That's my point.

Exactly where the person falls on this scale is too difficult to predict, as is the amount of suffering/pleasure the person will endure throughout their life. The point being that everyone is connected. One unhappy couple can cause more people to be unhappy, etc., etc. At least in principle. So it’s too difficult to know, and I’d rather not base my decisions on such an uncertainty. Especially when the cost is so great. — Pinprick

The funny thing here is that while it is always good that that future person will not suffer if not born, the pleasure foregone for the future person, is not good or bad for any particular person (as there is no one to exist to be deprived).

Always? If a nurse takes pleasure in vaccinating people it’s bad? — Pinprick

And again, unnecessary suffering (for someone else).

Forcing my daughter to not jump out the window because I desire her safety is immoral? — Pinprick

Was it necessary for her to not get harmed further or are you causing the very harm in the first place because you enjoy it?

Neither is allowing the continued suffering of two people to spare the suffering of one. It’s just a different version of the trolley problem. — Pinprick

No it isn't. Straw man. This actually has only surface similarities at best. The trolley problem is picking between two bad alternatives to other people. This is about creating all instances of future suffering for someone else to alleviate one instance of suffering of oneself.

Nor are they means to your end. You desire extinction and are willing to persuade others to alter their behavior to bring about that end at the potential expense of their happiness. — Pinprick

Again, it's to alter their behavior to prevent other people's suffering. Just like the person who likes to blow up stuff in residential neighbhorhods who gets joy from it, should alter their behavior...

In your view, what types of suffering are necessary? — Pinprick

If someone else is born already and was blatently going to get harmed, and you were trying to prevent this, thus causing slight harm... vaccines, pushing someone out of a moving train, educating one's offspring, not neglecting them, that sort of thing.

Well then consider foul tasting medicine, or something else that illustrates the point that in certain cases harm/suffering is good, even if it only benefits the person involved. — Pinprick

Don't understand this argument.. it is making my point. Again I said:

One can argue, since already born, taking the vaccine is preventing oneself from harming others, besides preventing future harm for oneself. — schopenhauer1

That implied, the small harm to oneself to prevent others harm.. affecting others.. Similar to going through loss of no child to prevent child from future suffering.. Makes my point actually.

Right, but there are actual negative consequences for those already born. — Pinprick

Again, other people's suffering is not a means to your end.. If someone likes blowing up stuff in residential neighborhoods but is prevented from doing so, and cries about it, tough shit.

So possible, or potential suffering is worse than actual suffering that is occurring? — Pinprick

All known and unknown forms of suffering will occur when born. Don't see a problem here. I don't need to actaulize torture on someone to prove that preventing possible torture is bad.

Also, part of your critique of procreation is the expectation for the person being born to deal with whatever suffering it may occur. But, in this case at least, you’re doing the exact same thing; expecting those who suffer because they can’t have children to just deal with it. — Pinprick

If someone got pleasure from something that caused someone else known collateral damage (i.e. not intended but known to cause damage), that ain't good. It doesn't matter if they are heartbroken for not getting the pleasure, that action would still cause the collateral damage to someone else. Forcing collateral harm on others, to alleviate one's own desires is not moral. It is an action that is a consequence to another person, not oneself and this needs to be the consideration. If someone likes blowing up stuff in residential areas, but is known to cause people to get maimed by doing so... should we let the person doing this continue because he's heartbroken? He doesn't intend to hurt people, but he really likes the feeling of blowing stuff up in residential areas.

One reason being that you can’t assess whether or not the amount of suffering the person being born will experience will be greater than the amount of suffering experienced by the unhappy couple. It seems logical that you should reduce/prevent the greatest amount of suffering possible, and seeing how the unborn person isn’t even experiencing suffering, why not focus on reducing actual suffering that is being experienced? — Pinprick

This is ridiculous reasoning. Forcing suffering on others to alleviate one's own is not justified because you don't know the quantity of suffering that will take place. Again, it involves another person, not oneself. People are not means to your ends. Antinatalism, (perhaps counter-intuitively) honors the dignity of the possible person who will inevitably suffer in known and unknown ways instead of using them as a means to ones own agenda. The reasons prior to birth, can never be for the sake of the child. This is all selfish fulfillment with collateral damage as consequence.

I’m also not convinced that all suffering is bad and should be eliminated/prevented at all costs. The suffering experienced by receiving a vaccine, for example, pales in comparison to the potential reward. — Pinprick

I said unnecessary suffering. Don't straw man. One can argue, since already born, taking the vaccine is preventing oneself from harming others, besides preventing future harm for oneself. But certainly, preventing birth, prevents all unnecessary harm from occurring for a future person with no negative consequence to that future person.