Hermit-ascetic life seems to require a lot of will power. — litewave

Yep, I would think so. I do not think Schop thought this was an easy task. It would take a lot of training by the ascetic practitioner over many years. I think the idea is that over time, the practices of asceticism become more effortless- the denying of wants and needs becomes less of a burden and more a relief as the "fat" of needless needs are trimmed. Eventually the practitioner confines needs and wants to very little and perhaps nothing at all. The will accepts existence itself, purely being is some sort of satisfaction in itself- there is no motives outside this state of purely seeing the world without intent.

I think this story (and others) had a hand in shaping my imagination of a hermit as a somewhat crazy, wise man in general. But is that accurate? Is it crazy to want constant solitude from other humans, or to create your own ideal, imaginary friend to argue with? Or, is it more like running away? — John Days

Schopenhauer would say that becoming a hermit-ascetic would be the ultimate goal in purging the Will for good. It is the only road that leads to full denial of the Will. There are types of people (outliers) that can do this for years on end, perhaps their whole life, but I would imagine that human psychology is meant for some sort of human relations- many times in the form of deep bonds. To be cared for and to care for someone in return seems to be woven into the social fabric of the species and persists through most sociocultural models, so I'm sure that is something that was there from our species origin. With the social aspect of language, it most certainly was. But there is something romantic about the vision of the hermit who slowly purges desires to the point of some blissful state of non-attachment to the wheel of desire. If you limit your needs and wants, they do not have as much hold over you, is the thought there.

My take is that our actions stem from dissatisfaction, boredom, and survival (everything really falling under dissatisfaction). You must pick a mode of survival- whether gathering a few wild berries to sustain you or monetary exchange in the current economic global system. You must entertain yourself- whether that be through running around the park or meditating to purge your desires all together. What you cannot avoid is the fact that life presents itself to us, and we must take a stance on how to cope with it. There is no escape if one is still metabolically functioning, and our self-conscious areas of the brain are still at work, we are still making decisions, and having to deal with how we spend our time.

This all seems like a highly skewed "just so" story that bolsters a victimization stance that the author clearly wants to be the case. The Hurst-Hamilton Hypothesis, is a very plausible hypothesis that proposes that the female gamete (the bigger one) does not have a suppressor gene and the male gamete (the small one) did develop a suppressor gene to prevent it from passing on its organelle DNA and cytoplasm. The suppressor gene always mates the non-suppressor gene gamete through chooser-type genes. At the end of the day, the non-suppressed gamete (the female) can pass on the mitochondrial and cytoplasmic DNA necessary for the zygote to survive.

Many animals have different mating strategies. Humans are too plastic due to cultural preferences to be "pinned" to one kind of strategy. Generally, conflict is not great for a thriving society for a species with self-reflection as ours, thus my guess is the sex which involves the least conflict would be the dominant form with the aggressive forms being the outliers.

Is it at all possible to loose the motivation to survive? one might argure that a suicidal person has lost the will to life, but im not sure, hence why im asking. — Gotterdammerung

Survival is just one manifestation of the Will as mediated in the world of phenomena (space/time/causality/subject/object). At root, I think it is more akin to a dissatisfaction. Suicide would simply be the will trying to will itself to no longer exist. It's still will, but turned against itself. There is a dissatisfaction with life itself, and the person thinks that this will resolve the dissatisfaction.

Additionaly can it be said that all humans, if possible will act to alleviate dissatisfaction or are there cases when people rather suffer. If so why? — Gotterdammerung

Ultimately there might be an underlying dissatisfaction which is alleviated by choosing to suffer. If the person is alive, the persons decisions are probably still mediated from the desire to survive in some fashion, or alleviate the boredom in some fashion. Otherwise, there is the dissatisfactions of the immediate.

What is motivation? Where does it come from? Why do we do what we do? — Gotterdammerung

Generally, we are motivated by three basic things (two of which are deeper- one of which is immediate).The deeper motivations are survival and boredom. The immediate motivation is dissatisfaction. Goals-directed behavior has become the primary tool to put the underlying drives into some form of activity. Why do we participate in the economy, etc, is because of survival. Why do we do this or that non-survival related thing? Because of boredom. Why did we turn on the air conditioner? Because of dissatisfaction. No matter how complex a behavior, it comes down to that. Even these three can just be distilled into dissatisfaction, as survival and boredom are forms of not having something fulfilled. So, the quarterback learns his routines and habits because he either needs to make money or is bored or both. Something is "fulfilling" when dissatisfaction seems to be at its least. Culture and personal inclination direct where the Will directs its relentless effort regarding survival and boredom.. A causal chain of watching an Iron Man competition, and hearing about a friend who is into it, makes someone (who may already be inclined) to get going on practicing for triathlons. The idea of being tough and completing the challenge becomes the immanent reasons. However, the whole time, it was driven by the underlying boredom. His cultural and causal setting simply gave him the content to relieve this boredom. It may not even be apparent to the person regarding the underlying cause. If we were completely content, no one would be motivated, as there is no impetus to action. We would be purely being without needing to become.

Great summary! (Y)

A goal is a mental object, like any conception or idea. It must be conceived. To produce a goal requires thought, and thinking is an activity which requires motivation. I think it is a mistake to represent the goal as driving you forward, because the goal does not drive you forward, it may just sit there in your mind. It is your dedication to achieving the goal, and the will to act, which drives you forward, not the goal itself. The goal itself is a passive thing with no causal power. — Metaphysician Undercover

Very Schopenhauer of you!

So per my earlier example, but in your language, thirst motivates drinking, but thought motivates the modification of behaviour from drinking some water to making tea, based on remembered previous experience. And one might say that biology, or evolution is motivated to provoke thought as a means to increase the diversity of responses through just such modification by learning. But in humans, thought reaches such a level that it can become wholly antagonistic to the motives of life that give rise to it, and this is the sad condition in which we find ourselves; that the thought that modifies the instinct to run to seed, to delay it rather than accelerate it perhaps, becomes anti-natalism, and wholly opposed to life. — unenlightened

The concept of antinatalism is a logical response to the self-reflection on the repetitious (instrumental) nature of existence, the unrelenting desires that motivate us (that you just described), the polar boundaries of survival and angst, and the myriad of contingent/circumstantial harms that befall us. It is simply a self-reflecting creature making the logical conclusion from such circumstances that we face when coming into existence. Perhaps Peter Zapffe was correct, our own self-awareness, makes us too aware of our situation- an exaptation from the simple evolutionary trajectory for better learning. However, what you cannot do is put the cat back in the bag. We have this ability, we can come to this conclusion. We can use techniques to ignore it, but the logic is there and apparent. X leads to Y, so prevent X. X = birth and Y= all the contingent and structural harms for a new person. What is the collateral damage? People sad that they don't have kids and that they cannot project some future person that does this or that. Is there a pre-existing person that is deprived? No.

The brain in action needs not focus on goals, it may focus on intelligible ideas, logic, or other problems. This is contemplation, but an individual needs to be motivated to focus on these logical problems rather than focusing on goal-directed action as a means of release from dissatisfaction. — Metaphysician Undercover

I never understood what the big deal with the intelligible ideas, logic, and "other problems" were. I mean, sometimes I get a sort of buzz when I think of the world in a certain way, but what makes studying logic and math and intelligible ideas (whatever this really means) so special? If you ask a Buddhist, it is Nirvana/Enlightenment, if you ask a Hindu it's Moksha, if you asked one of the Abrahamic faiths, it's probably some sort of communion with the divine. In other words, there are a lot of variations on this concept of special states of experience. How is one to prove that these are "real" experiences, or just reified concepts with a ton of secondary literature built on a sandcastle of nonsense?

To add a bit, one of the better explanations for the differences in gametes specifically is the The Hurst-Hamilton Hypothesis which explains that when the two gametes combine, there has to be a deciding factor of which organelles are going to be passed down to the new organism. Bigger gamete evolved to combine with a smaller one so that there was no "battle" between the two gametes as to whose organelle was passed down. The bigger gamete kept the ability to pass down the organelles while smaller one did not contribute their organelles. Hence, for example, females pass on their mitochondrial DNA to their children but males do not.

There are some theories that sex purges deleterious genetic information with each generation. This combined with the Red Queen Hypothesis might be the biggest reason. The Red Queen Hypothesis has to do, at the microscopic level, with the arms race between host and parasite. Parasites try to find the best way to bind to proteins in the host's cell to infiltrate the cell. Asexual species have less defenses when a parasite finds the "key" of the right binding protein and can die out more easily. Sexual species can easily "change the key" and make it harder for parasites to infiltrate the host's cell.

This is the motivation of discontent. If one is inclined to move due to dissatisfaction, we can't really say that it is a goal or intention which motivates that person, it is just a general inclination toward change. — Metaphysician Undercover

How so? The underlying condition is discontent. This wells up in our linguistic brains as some sort of goal to move away from discontent in goal-directed action (get the date, get the ice cream, get the better job, build that career, etc. etc.) which according to Schopenhauer, never ceases to get rid of the underlying dissatisfaction which will always well up into more goals to be directed towards in our linguistic brains.

Generally, the cause of motivation is dissatisfaction. Specifically, dissatisfaction due to:
1) Negative affect produced by unpleasant sensations and/or feelings.
2) Unfulfilled human needs (i.e., requisites for good mental and corporeal health which facilitate human well-being).
3) Unfulfilled propositional attitudes (i.e., desires, hopes, opinions, beliefs, convictions). — Galuchat

This is the core of Schopenhauer's theory of Will.

As the title states.

Thoughts and ideas? — Posty McPostface

I have always made the distinction between pessimism (small "p") and Pessimism (capital "P"). Philosophical Pessimism is the idea that the human condition is inherently negative. Schopenhauer, for example, thought that the humans, at root, have insatiable desires that are never satisfied, creating a suffering and angst. Along this idea is instrumentality, the repetitious, absurd nature of our repeated goals, desires, and personalities that unify an otherwise absurdly senseless world. It is the hamster in the wheel. Pleasure, self-actualization, learning, achievement, scientific/technological innovation, aesthetics, humanities, and relationships and the anticipation of getting all this are the main reasons why people have hope and feel a sense of life's worth. Pessimism questions if life's structural insatiable desires related to survival and boredom, and instrumental repetitious absurdity, along with the harms of circumstantial suffering (all the usual harms that may befall someone) is worth it.

So i've found myself in a loop hole of questions , i've been trying to find out what is the purpose of life, but there are thousands of "purposes" some say happiness, some say love. But that brings up the question, why do we need happiness and love. happiness and love is a feeling created in our brain by certain chemicals and is a part of our anatomy. What is the purpose of any life existence, however i presume there is no answer for this question we just are, as everything is.... — joachim

Instrumentality- we do to do to do to do... repetitious absurdity of Sisyphus... survival-related and boredom related desires that always need more but are never satisfied.

You can also make the distinction between that which has the potential to exist outside an imaginary concept (given the right circumstances), and that which does not have even the possibility of existing outside an imaginary concept, under any circumstance. So for example, a pencil has the possibility of existing, while a mouse that can discuss the finer points of Shakespeare does not have the possibility of existing. Thus a pencil's potential to exist- its idea is an idea about a possible thing that exists outside the imagination, while mouse that is an expert in Shakespeare is only conceptual and can never be brought about outside the imagination. Those beings which have the possibility or existing outside the imaginary concept, thus have the extra distinction of being affected by someone or something. Thus, putting a potential human in the world, will be affected if it is born. Also, future tenses like "will" and "can" are used in ways that mean that something can actually be affected. This thing (that can exist outside the imagination under the right circumstances) "will" be affected by such and such event. The same can be said of past tense. That thing which did exist was affected by such and such event. Thus, being affected is also part of the difference between purely imaginative concepts and concepts which can be outside the imagination given the right circumstances.

You know I would say American society is failing our students.
I think schools and teachers are doing the best they can under current constraints and paradigms.
We have to get rid of the notion everyone can do integrals and differentials if the schools were just good enough. — prothero

Everything from parents, to motivation, to ability to control behaviors, to peer pressure, to natural ability, to inclination, and a whole variety of factors are involved in the "failing of our students". Schools and teachers are simply targets to shift the more nuanced and complex factors at play. Carpentry, plumbing, electricians, electronics, and the like should be taught with the math that is useful for carrying these functions out for many who are wrongly steered in a "college-only" direction. Unfortunately, in some communities, even these type of aspirations are lacking, in which case you are really screwed. Not everything can be socially engineered. Certain varieties of people don't want to be brought out of their habits and ways of thinking. The schools in these communities are called failed schools. Not all communities want or like the "middle class" lifestyle. Perhaps @Bitter Crank has a few words on this.

The first requirement was faith, then afterwards the various 'proofs' were contemplated. — Wayfarer

One can say this IS the religious position.

Psychological functions and conditions are socially learned verbal constructs which explain types of natural and acculturated behaviour. — Galuchat

How would "natural" be included in the explanation when "socially learned verbal constructs" usually falls under social and not instinctual, unless "natural" is used in a different way than a synonym for strict biologically determined behavior. If goals then are social constructs, is essentially everything we hold dear as humans in terms of our "supposed" desires, wants, hopes, motivations, etc. just a socially taught mechanism that has simply been one useful way for our species to survive? Are there alternatives for humans, or does the social construct of goals go along with having a general processor brains that have lost goal-oriented behaviors (instincts) of other animals? In other words, is the social construct just an exaptation- something that just so happened to arise but was not the reason for our unique evolution, or was it actually an adaptation- something that was specifically selected for? I'm pretty sure @unenlightened's desire for tea, for example, was not selected for :D.

Here you speak of humans, plural. Your clause at the end speaks of structural suffering, which refers to suffering that all humans must experience simply by virtue of being alive. Thus, you are talking about reducing suffering writ large. — Thorongil

Not really. I am talking about the suffering that that individual will suffer, not as suffering as this tangible mass that accumulates or decreases with every birth. It is not about reducing suffering even, just preventing it to begin with.

Fine by me. As long as you understand that it depends on both a deontological claim that I believe admits of exceptions and on a certain conception of personhood with which I disagree. I'm glad we were able to at least narrow down where our disagreement lies, but it seems I wasn't all that off the mark in my suspicion that you were still arguing for anti-natalism on fairly convention grounds. — Thorongil

Well, it is the ethical part of a larger Pessimism. As I said, what leads to this conclusion? The ethical system has to have an emotional import, in my opinion.. otherwise it is hollow. The aesthetic part is the understanding of what it means "structural" suffering. Also the aesthetic part involves the people already here, not just focusing on future people as the aesthetic contemplation of the structural suffering is a kind of therapy.

It seems here that the answer to my question is, "yes." If so, then I disagree with this hitherto unstated premise in your argument. I don't think personhood arises at some magical date after conception. I take personhood to exist concomitantly with the distinct generic code that results from fertilization. — Thorongil

That's just going to be a line in the sand then.

Implicit in this line of reasoning is negative utilitarianism. Thus, when all the dust has settled, you're actually presenting the most well known and popular argument for anti-natalism, despite your seeming protestations to the contrary. — Thorongil

But this is agent-centered and not about reducing suffering writ large. If I used my formula from previously in this thread:

1. It would be wrong to treat humans as a means and not as an ends in themselves, if it brings about all structural and contingent suffering for another person's life.
2. Procreation treats humans as a means and not as an ends in themselves as it brings about all structural and contingent suffering for another person's life.
3. Therefore procreation is wrong.

This means that another person's life cannot be used if it brings about all their structural and contingent suffering that they will ever experience. Perhaps you can say that it is negative utilitarian in that it is preventing suffering, but there is definitely a strong deontological bent because it does not allow the individual to be used for a principle or external reason. You can then call it agent-centered deontological negative utilitarianism, and I would not have a problem with it.

What is motivation? Where does it come from? Why do we do what we do? — Gotterdammerung

I wrote this similarly about goals:

Goal: the object of a person's ambition or effort; an aim or desired result (Google)

1) Are goals "real" in that they are a natural phenomena that are a part of certain animal biological/psychological make-up, or a nominal label for a very pervasive social convention/habit?

2) Do the origins of goal-directed behavior come from evolutionary forces of biology/psychology or are they social conventions that ride on top of some more basic component? Related, If animals have goals are they different than human-directed goals?

3) If goals are more on the nominal side of the spectrum, what does that mean in terms of ethical implications? If ethics aims at goals, and goals are nominal, does this invalidate certain ethical standards that are goal-directed?

4) Are some goals better than others? If so, how do justify a weighting to the goals such that one takes priority over the other? Are goals related to survival self-evident, for example? If goals of survival are superior than other goals, does this have implications for ethics? For example, can one say that since there is a de facto goal of not being hungry, humans must do X action to accomplish not going hungry?

Yes! But if you grant, as you have here, that you exist at the moment of conception, then "coming into existence" isn't a harm, because there is no one to harm prior to conception. You also previously granted that literal birth (exiting a mother's womb) isn't a harm. So whence anti-natalism? It has no leg to stand on now. — Thorongil

The person was brought about by someone conceiving and then birthing a child. Do you really believe it is the act of conception and birthing that antinatalists are talking about? Of course not, they are talking about "coming into existence" which usually correlates to becoming a fully functioning human (even if reliant on others). Most Pessimists (capital P) would say that the world has structural harm, and thus bringing someone into existence is bringing someone into this world means creating the circumstance for a fully functioning human who by this fact experiences the structural harm inherent in the system.

You are caught up on the semantics of the "anti-natalist". Being born implies more than the birthing or conception. So no actual person was being harmed until X time, then that person who started at x was harmed (X being some X time of becoming a fully functioning human- whether that be awareness, being in the world as a separate entity completely from the mother's womb, etc.). Existing in the world came about through events that were not self-caused. Something caused this to happen.

The "no one" referred to the nonexistence of any person prior to conception. We can trace your existence all the way back to the point at which an egg was fertilized in your mother. Before that, "you" didn't exist. — Thorongil

Even if I grant you that "You" began at the instant of conception, as I stated, it is the whole process of gestation and birth that contributes to the person. The harm does not maybe start with conception, but it does start at what ever X time after conception.

I think the problem is that along with increased intelligence and civilization came this perceived need to always be achieving, thriving, and improving. This perceived need drives much of the mental suffering that takes place. — CasKev

Good points, but when you have a workplace with various levels of engagement, talent, abilities, and effort, that might be hard to justify and hence the wheel continues. Though, these are contingent realities and not structural like the instrumentality and repetitiousness of "being", so may be solvable in a local way.

Then it wouldn't be such a question of morality when bringing a child into the world; it would just be the natural thing to do, in line with our instinct to survive and procreate, like any other animal. — CasKev

This is more at the heart of structural suffering- why are we surviving and procreating? What is it about the repetition of eat, work, crap, maintain lifestyle through MASSIVE socioeconomic infrastructure (and the myriad of things people must do to maintain it), and entertainment that we must keep doing and procreating for a new person? Why must they go through it too? As I said earlier: Why this repetition of going through goal-seeking and fulfilling structural survival and entertainment needs in a historical-cultural framework? Why do these needs need to be brought forth to a new generation, ad infinitum, until species or universal death is the question more or less. It is not necessarily one of why things exist in the first place, but rather, why we want to put more subjectivized beings in the world who will need to form goals to follow and make more people who will also form their own subjectivized world and need goals to follow, etc.

I also stated: The thoughtful answers would be something like: self-actualization, scientific discovery, art/music/humanities, creativity, flow experiences, physical pleasures, friends, relationships, achievement in some field or area of study, and aesthetic pleasures. However, the thoughtful person may also know that these experiences have some vague repetitiousness to it. It seems old hat that just repeats for each person in each generation. Why does it need to be carried out? Why go through it in the first place? In our linguistically-wired brains, we take the chaos of pure sensory information and through many cognitive mechanisms, create concepts and provide an impetus for our actions. In other words, we create goals. These goals, whether short-term, long-term, vague, or well-planned are executed as we have no choice. They well up from the unformed and provide some sort of ballast to the chaotic, undefined world. We must make one goal, then another, then another, even if just to get something to eat. What is really a value-less, goal-less world, is subjectivized into one where the individual human now has "priorities", "preferences", "tendencies", "hopes", "way of being in the world", and "personality". The structural needs of survival, the existential needs of entertainment, and the contingent setting of cultural surroundings that provide the content for surviving and entertaining, what is it that we want from this? Why do we need more people to exist who need goals to work towards, over and over, relentlessly until we die?

X could only refer to the moment of conception, in which case we're talking about a fertilized egg. I don't think fertilized eggs can be harmed, so I disagree with you here. — Thorongil

But yet you said earlier, no one is the recipient of harm. When that "one" comes into existence (let's say 6 months is when some sort of conscious awareness begins), that X moment is the beginning of harm. Procreation is not just the conception but the whole process of bringing a new person into the world which includes the gestation process. Why would you be so caught up in when X begins and not simply note that at some point, X suffering will begin and this was caused by something or someone who brought directly brought this situation about where it otherwise would not. It does not matter whether it is a process overtime that brings about X moment or an instantaneous event.

But no one is the recipient of birth (for we agreed that pre-born souls do not exist), so no one is the recipient of harm in being born. Please tell me if you follow this. — Thorongil

No one is the recipient of birth? Who cares.. Someone EXISTS who did NOT EXIST beforehand. Existing is harmful. Who brought about the existence of this person ergo the harm? Do you agree that people exist? Let's hope we can at least start there.. Do people "start" to exist at X time? Let's hope we agree there. At the X time of starting to exist, starts the harm. There need not be people before X time. You cannot try to word-game your way into trying to say that because there was no identity of a particular person prior to birth, no one was actually harmed, because harm "began" at the instant of X- there need not be someone prior to that to be harmed. Just the fact that X happened (and then X1, X2, etc. etc.) and that something prior to this brought this about, means something caused X to happen.

Ah, finally! This admission constitutes real progress in our discussion! :P

Now, this means that you are not an anti-natalist. Or, if you still think procreation is wrong, it means that you have some reason other than that birth is wrong for thinking procreation wrong. It would seem that that reason might be that you think life or existence itself is a harm. If so, then I'd want to see how that fact is used in reaching the conclusion, "procreation is wrong." — Thorongil

Admission of what? Birth is the CAUSE of existence for an individual, thus the CAUSE of suffering in the individual who is BORN as being born CAUSES existence and thus suffering.

Procreation is the direct cause of life which correlates with structural suffering. Thus procreation caused the structural suffering that will occur in an individual. How does that not follow for you?

Really? The subtitle to Benatar's book reads, "The Harm of Coming into Existence." The Wikipedia entry on anti-natalism says that it is "a philosophical stance that assigns a negative value to birth." Emphasizing birth as a harm is in fact the most typical claim made by anti-natalists. It's their raison-d'etre. — Thorongil

Negative value to being born (which causes the structural suffering that correlates with existence?)

But arguments for anti-natalism depend on this claim, which means that, because it is false, anti-natalism is false. — Thorongil

Pessimists think that being born itself is a harm. The proof being the examples provided from aesthetic pessimism I described earlier. I guess I should rephrase this.. The act of birth has nothing inherently harmful (except the physiological pain involved I guess), but rather than "birth" I should say "life" or "existence" itself- not the birthing process. No one ever emphasized "birth" as the wrong.

It feels like you're pulling my leg now. If they exist at the time of making lemonade, then they existed before one made lemonade. — Thorongil

If someone is born, that person is exposed to structural and contingent harms where there could have been no person born who would be exposed to structural and contingent harms. I am not sure why you would disagree with this. The cause of the person being born is the parents who have the kids.. Just as the cause of X event was the person who directly caused the event. Trying to put the starting point at a ridiculous causal chain that goes back infinitely makes no sense if you agree to how we attribute most events which is the direct cause of how something came about. The carpenter built the chair, but yes there were many circumstances that came about in order for the carpenter to build the chair.

Now perhaps the parents didn't realize this logic- I guarantee that this is indeed the case. This does not mean that the parents were not the cause of exposing the child to being harmed by causing it to be born. However, that is where antinatalism, and Pessimism more broadly would make its case, and thus see the logic of this.

I've already addressed this. I think this will be my last post. We're just spinning our wheels and continuing any further would not be productive. I will just reiterate that 1) the arguments in favor of anti-natalism don't work, 2) because they don't work, procreation is admissible, and 3) I fail to understand how your position refutes either 1 or 2. And let me just say that I would love it if someone could refute 1 and 2, because I still possess the deep, stomach knotting intuition that procreation is wrong. But I simply fail to see how any argument can get to that conclusion. — Thorongil

I feel that my arguments presented in this thread were strong enough to defend "antinatalism" in the form of aesthetic antinatalism mixed with basic (non-Kantian) deontological principles. Your "stomach knotting intuition" should be more at ease, but if it is not sufficient, I'd rather respond to a succinct itemized rebuttal to a summarized version of my responses. If you do this 1) I might find a flaw in your interpretation through your summarizing of my own arguments (and can thus fix any misguided notions that lead to the rebuttal) and 2) I can have chance to defend the rebuttal if the interpretation is indeed correct. However, if you feel that you no longer want to engage in the conversation, I understand. Just realize, just because Thorongil states that I have not defended (a certain form of) antinatalism, does not mean that I have in fact, not defended antinatalism.. That is of course, Thorongil's judgement of the matter, not necessarily the actual case.

No, I don't. You seem stuck in the land of the hypothetical. "People don't need to be born, so it's possible that humans will refrain from procreating." Yes, except the possibility of that ever happening is infinitesimally small; so small, in fact, that it has no relevance to the problem of human suffering in terms of its present, not to mention its past and future, character and arrangement. My argument seeks to address human suffering on the terms that it presents itself to us. Ingredient to those terms is the fact that humans will continue to procreate until they are no longer able to do so. We both know this. Repeating the statement that "we don't have to" is like yelling at a brick wall and expecting it to fall over. In the end, it's a waste of breathe, time, and energy, and will fail in its intended goal, an apt definition of anti-natalism.

In the meantime, humans continue to suffer. How might their suffering be alleviated, if its alleviation is a moral and noble enterprise? Again, not by writing books no one will read about how we ought not to have children. It will have to be done by other means. I have suggested one of those means, its generalness notwithstanding. Preserving civilization is no small task but easier than convincing the planet not to procreate. darthbarracuda has his own ideas about how best to alleviate suffering, most notably what he and others call "effective altruism." That smacks of consequentialism to me, and so rubs me the wrong way, but we are both agreed that there are better ways to confront suffering than anti-natalism (I think; I don't want to put words in his mouth). Thus, the change in my views is not an evolution out of anti-natalism and into some kind of Panglossian casuistry, but out of the former and into what I take to be a morally serious position. — Thorongil

See my answer in the next quote to some of what you raise here. I would like to note, that you mention "serious" question versus not going to happen. I have never been caught up with the end result. Perhaps it will never happen. Part of the point of aesthetic understanding of structural suffering like instrumentality is that there is no end goal.. We do to do to do.. A new person born, is ipso facto a new person that is born and must deal with life. Is it noble to try to alleviate contingent suffering for those already here? I think so, but not at the cost of starting a new life that will now have to deal with life and its own structural and contingent harms when this did not have to occur.

Wouldn't "structural" and "contingent" be opposites? — Thorongil

Yes, they are in a way opposites. Structural is suffering that never goes away, whatever circumstance someone experiences and contingent harms are based on time, place, upbringing, causal reasons, setting, culture, genetics,etc. etc.

Ah, but if the prevention of suffering is what matters, then I have an easy reply. I could grant for the sake of argument that, on consequentialist grounds, humans ceasing to procreate prevents more suffering than preserving civilization, but once we factor in the given likelihood of these options occurring, then the first option is clearly the more likely and so the one that will prevent more suffering. In other words, my argument can be construed as beating the anti-natalist at his own consequentialist game.

As an aside here, I want to remind you that I gave you two hypothetical scenarios in which ceasing to procreate might not have the effect that you and the anti-natalist desire and expect. See here:

I don't think you can say in an absolute sense that there is no issue with not being born. How could you possibly know that, unless, again, you had prior acquaintance with nonexistence so as to make the comparison? It could turn out that God exists, in which case, nonexistence is known to be worse than existence from his larger perspective. It could turn out that rebirth and/or reincarnation is true, in which case, even if all human beings ceased procreating, they would still be reborn as other creatures and so continue the cycle of birth and death, or else be reborn as human beings in a future kalpa.

The only way to dispute these possibilities is, once again, to argue that naturalism/materialism is true. — Thorongil

Nope, because it is not consequential. Rather, it is agent-centered- the individual's suffering is what matters, not this amorphous "suffering" as seen aggregated in some equation. The individual being born to lessen the suffering of others, is still creating a WHOLE new life that suffers and must be lessened by yet others. It's a treadmill of sorts. You have to draw the line in the sand. Preserving civilization to me, as explained earlier, is a tautology of sorts. I thought we agreed, most average folk do support this, just in their own self-interested, inadvertent way. It's already happening. Can there be a little more of this or that? Sure. "Civilization", despite the overblown rhetoric is still up and kicking, and defended and advanced by lawyers, judges, scientists, entrepreneurs, charities, universities, businesses, government entities, non-profits, and the like. This however, does not end the suffering en toto. Suffering will exist in a structural way. The aesthetic aspect is to see the structural suffering, which is subtle but all-pervasive. It is hard for some to see it as we are so used to seeing only contingent suffering as the form that "matters". The structural is existential and goes deeper than the foundations of material goods which your consequential formulation seems to indicate.

As far as nonexistence being worse, etc.. Non-existence has no worse.. you are actually doing what you are trying to accuse me of, reifying something that does not exist. It literally is nothing.. Since nonexistence can only be talked about in relation to the already-existing, we have no more to say about it, literally. As far as reincarnation, this again is the aesthetic aspect. It's not about the end goal, it's about understanding the situation and not wanting to put others in the situation.. It's not about a final consequence of complete nonbirth, it's about an understanding of the existential situation and doing something that comports with that. It is more than just stark naked antinatalism. It's about understanding our own existential condition.

Well, with respect, I still think you're trying to have it both ways. You seem to be in favor of anti-natalism in one comment (and in general), but are then seemingly opposed to it in others. I haven't been convinced that you're not an anti-natalist, in the strict (read: moral) sense of that term. — Thorongil

See above.

Well said. I would add, though, that I don't think pessimism is absolutely committed to there having been no progress or to the impossibility of progress in the future. Ending slavery in the US was a form of moral progress, for example. An objectively better state of affairs for human beings living in this corner of the globe occurred. The pessimist is not pessimistic about such developments, seeing as they plainly exist, but about the ability to ever reach a state of perfection by our own efforts. Or at least, this would be my brand of pessimism. An even more radical form of pessimism might say that no one can ever reach a state of perfection by our own efforts or by any other means. I don't think Schopenhauer goes this far, though, for example, for he is adamant that the complete abolition of the will (his stand-in for perfection) is possible but not by mere human effort alone. I could go on at length about this aspect of Schopenhauer's thought, but I shall simply say that, for him, something akin to grace is necessary to achieve salvation.

I do have a question now: how might anti-natalism be asserted on non-consequentialist grounds? And I mean principled, ethical grounds, not contingent reasons like "overpopulation" (which is a myth) that some people like to give for not having children. Some kind of misanthropic nihilism and/or moral relativism come to mind, but that's about it. — Thorongil

Okay, the antinatalism comes from existential grounds.. Think of it as a first step in a questioning process that leads to greater understanding of the instrumental nature of things. So it's almost like existential therapy, if you will (with no connection to logotherapy, just in the fact that it has a self-questioning aspect). It also comes from deontological grounds- you don't treat people as a means to an end when it comes to starting a whole new life which will ipso facto have suffering by being in the first place. As far as the existential questioning, it is more fully stated in the OP:

The more fundamental question is why we continue bringing forth more people. What is it about having a next generation that needs to take place? The thoughtful answers would be something like: self-actualization, scientific discovery, art/music/humanities, creativity, flow experiences, physical pleasures, friends, relationships, achievement in some field or area of study, and aesthetic pleasures. However, the thoughtful person may also know that these experiences have some vague repetitiousness to it. It seems old hat that just repeats for each person in each generation. Why does it need to be carried out? Why go through it in the first place? In our linguistically-wired brains, we take the chaos of pure sensory information and through many cognitive mechanisms, create concepts and provide an impetus for our actions. In other words, we create goals. These goals, whether short-term, long-term, vague, or well-planned are executed as we have no choice. They well up from the unformed and provide some sort of ballast to the chaotic, undefined world. We must make one goal, then another, then another, even if just to get something to eat. What is really a value-less, goal-less world, is subjectivized into one where the individual human now has "priorities", "preferences", "tendencies", "hopes", "way of being in the world", and "personality". The structural needs of survival, the existential needs of entertainment, and the contingent setting of cultural surroundings that provide the content for surviving and entertaining, what is it that we want from this? Why do we need more people to exist who need goals to work towards, over and over, relentlessly until we die? — schopenhauer1

Premise 1: If a person has an experience that a rational and well-informed person would prefer not to experience, then this person has been harmed (definition of harm).

Premise 2: But life as an experience is not something a rational and well-informed person would prefer (the negative perspective).

Conclusion 1: Therefore, life is harmful to a person.

Premise 3: But the life of a person depends on them having been born (self-evident truism).

Conclusion 2: Therefore, the birth of a person is harmful to this person.

Premise 4: But it is wrong to hurt other people (the fundamental ethical articulation).

Conclusion 3: Therefore, it is wrong to give birth to a person.
" — darthbarracuda

I can definitely get on board with this formulation. However, you are going to get the most flack from Premise 2. As Thorongil was alluding to, well-informed people may not agree that life is something not preferable. You may question their rationale (or whether they are rational) if this is the case though. I'd like to see your take on that objection.

And while I agree with you that there is a fundamental "uncalmness" to phenomenal existence, I'm specifically focused on the anxiety produced by our inherent moral disqualification. We have to make do with the "lesser of all evils", go for the "greatest good", oftentimes solve difficult problems by appealing to the majority, and inevitably hurt or manipulate other people simply because we feel the need to live, progress, survive. We feel forced into political discourse, dirtying our hands and getting pissed off. We have to make exceptions to the fundamental ethical articulation, we can't get bogged down and worry about the "little things" we do that hurt other people. They are expendable and forgettable, apparently. — darthbarracuda

I agree, by default of having to deal with life, many transgressions and aggressions have to be performed to simply sustain life, society, and adapt to everyday interactions. This means de facto that by being born we are going to be forced into morally suspect decisions, because its inherent in the "making do" process we need to perform to just get by. Moral perfection seems to be an impossibility by way of the moral compromises we have to make or overlook to get by.

I happen to have consequentialist leanings but only because I believe the world we live in is incapable of sustaining a more natural, primordial deontological ethic. Deontology is often criticized for not addressing the problems with agent-relative reasons (refusing to hurt one person to prevent five more from equal treatment - it has an air of irrationality to it) - but that's not really the fault of deontology per se as much as it is the fault of those who decide it's okay to sustain a world in which we have to substitute this ethic for another one. — darthbarracuda

I think deontology can be helpful to think of moral problems when not used in too broad a way. Kant's 1st formulation, for example, leaves it open for too many bizarre (i.e. repugnant) conclusions. He tried to make an airtight formula, and broadened it to such a degree that if there is a contradiction when universalizing a law, it is wrong. The spirit is good but the application is disconcerting.

The deontology of not using people as ends, which is his second formulation, is a bit more able to withstand some of these disconcerting conclusions and I think can be decoupled from his first formulation. What it does do well, is put individuals (agent-relative) as a starting point. However, this formulation does not seem to work when used in too universal a fashion either.

Rather, the "problem of suffering" is the heart of Pessimist ethics and involves existential issues of self-reflection on the human condition. Here is where the aesthetic aspect comes in. In order to understand suffering in its necessary (uncalmness/vanity/absurd/instrumentality) and contingent (numerous circumstantial) harms, one has to see the structural conditions of human life. Here the "insight" into how these sufferings manifest would probably have to be recognized through some sort of assent that this indeed is the case. Once this is recognized then you can say that using people by creating more people who will suffer for an abstract principle or any other reason would be not good.

In my view, the existence of substantial moral disagreement is a very troubling thing. — darthbarracuda

Agreed.

Therefore I believe that life is structurally negative and is morally disqualifying. We will never have a satisfactory ethic that affirms life, and this produces an anxiety in us. There's no such thing as "the good life", and everyone is guilty of doing something wrong. Most of the time it's not even our fault. — darthbarracuda

Agreed.

That's not how I see it. I'm privileging civilization precisely for its ability to address the individual's suffering better than the alternatives. — Thorongil

I don't see how using future people's lives who will suffer is justified for the reason that they will contribute to something that helps already existing humans as a general concept via "civilization". It's also somewhat circular. People need to be born so others don't suffer, but that causes more suffering, but let's solve it with more birth, which caused suffering in the first place. If my claim is that suffering is structural and is there from the beginning of existence for an individual, you can see how this indeed is circular reasoning.

But again, it's not uncaring. It has the care of the individual primarily in mind. Also, you can't "use" people who don't exist. — Thorongil

I'm not sure how you are not understanding the concept that something "will" be used in the future tense, and once born "has" been used. Once born, the whole being used part occurs. This being used could have been prevented. There's no logically invalid anything going on. I tried to point to this earlier but you were not liking or getting it.. You made the argument that Iceland winning world soccer or whatnot caused more babies to be born, therefore, what are you going to do, blame soccer? Any my point was that this argument can be made of any act. At what point do you stop the causal chain of pointing to the actual moment when the act can be considered someone's doing? Well, I would say the parents having sex and bringing the baby about is a good place to start.. Just as maybe a murderer had a bunch of causal chain events that led him to kill someone, but we usually look at the actual events that directly brought this even about. So we can talk about causal chains and such, but then we are abusing our common notions of attribution, and thus render all language regarding this moot.

1. It is wrong to treat humans as means and not as ends in themselves.
2. Procreation is to treat potential humans as means and not as ends in themselves.
3. Therefore, procreation is wrong.

Both premises, however, can be challenged. The first doesn't seem to admit of universal applicability. If I use a doctor as a means to fix my tooth, have I really committed wrongdoing? Clearly not, as both parties have consented to an action that will mutually benefit them. In fact, there doesn't seem to be any actions that would escape being wrong, according to the first premise, apart from rare instances of pure altruism and compassion perhaps. Concerning the second premise, as I said right before the argument, you can't treat or use people who don't exist as or for anything, so the premise is nonsensical. — Thorongil

Well first off that is not a great example as both parties consented to this use of the doctor and thus the doctor was no unaware that his services in the role of doctor was being used and assented to it as this was also his own will. So, it is not so binary. Second, you can probably conjure up a better example where someone is not consented but clearly what was done helped the person in the long run. This is where I would say the first premise is simply too broad. It should be rather:

1. It would be wrong to treat humans as a means and not as an ends in themselves, if it brings about all structural and contingent suffering for another person's life.
2. Procreation treats humans as a means and not as an ends in themselves as it brings about all structural and contingent suffering for another person's life.
3. Therefore procreation is wrong.


Thus bringing a person into the world for some cause (for civilization, other people, etc.) but creates the situation of structural and contingent suffering for the individual being born has occurred.

They may be sufficient reasons, but they are not good reasons, for they make the individual a coward and a hypocrite. — Thorongil

Cowardice in the face of mortal death and pain is reasonable for the reasons I listed. That doesn't bother me. As far as hypocricy, it is not hypocritical to feel life as suffering but then not kill yourself. Suicide and the projection of an unknown non-existing self is scary for most. Rather, I think giving a new person the option of continuing to exist or make a most painful decision of suicide as well is rather an inescapable choice. There is no third alternative, though people like Schop's ascetics and the religious and the utopian theorists they may have found them.

Ironically, I tend to think he ought to have reversed the status of the Ideas and the will, as in fact he did do in his early manuscripts. In other words, I think he ought to have moved closer to Platonism, not farther away. — Thorongil

Ha, I knew you were going to say that :P. Whether we disagree on the exact points he got wrong, we still agree that we think he got some things wrong (the fact that there is a verb of striving or that space/time exists along with Will.. how can there be one if there is something more than one.. the fact that the first animal of consciousness seems to be the time when the world of appearances started in time, which makes the first animal a very special creature indeed.. etc. etc.).

Yes, but no less stated by countless other religious, philosophical, and poetic texts. — Thorongil

Yeah but not compiled in such a way in my opinion. Indeed I have mentioned many a time on here how Pessimism is a theme that goes back to ancient times and possibly further back.

Granted, but I would expand this by saying that the anti-natalist ought not to assume that anyone who has looked into anti-natalism and rejected it rejects it because they're an incorrigible and delusional optimist. I witness a lot of armchair psychologizing among many anti-natalists: "Oh, you reject our arguments? Well, that must be because you don't really understand them and are just looking to make excuses for your own selfish, immoral behavior." It's exactly equivalent to what the fundamentalist often says to the person who has lost his or her faith: "Oh, you rejected Christianity? Well, that must be because you never really believed, just didn't pray hard enough, or were abused by a Christian as a child." — Thorongil

Yet, based on my quote, have I said this? This seems to be a red herring aimed at antinatalists writ large but somehow is supposed to allude to my arguments though I keep on reiterating that I am not trying to be self-righteous or condemning, just explanatory of the situation. What you explain is the "bad" antinatalist/Christian's reaction to someone who "rejects" their worldview.. something I have not done. At the end of the day, you can only explain your point and if someone sees it, then they see it and will possibly change something as a result. Philosophy is not a totalizing thing where if you come up with the magic grail of arguments no one can ever claim you are wrong. Value is inherently hard to prove and so it is up to individual's to really work it out in their own head based on the evidence and arguments provided. I also stated how antinatalism, being so far out of people's recognition of what even counts as "moral", is not something that should really be condemned, just considered in the dialogue and at least heard out. If it's rejected, then it is not my job to shun them, yell at them, or want them arrested. Rather, I can keep making arguments respectfully if they are willing to listen or just let it be.

Hmm. I'm still not quite sure I follow this, alas. :( — Thorongil

Well, I stated something in a post a while ago something l like this in discussions with darth:

Some Pessimists might be at odds with especially utilitarian consequentialism altogether because utilitarian consequentialism assumes that improvements can take place when in actuality we are never really improving. The human condition is such that it does not happen. It is veiled utopianism, the most optimistic of optimistic ideas. It is to buy into the carrot and stick.. if we just work harder to live together better now, we can make it work for a future, more ideal state. That is just something you will rarely see a Pessimist say. So no, they are probably not breaking their own ideals- they probably never had them. If you want to REFUTE their ideals, that is one thing, but I do not think they are being hypocritical to their own ideals. So again, to entail utilitarianism with Pessimism is to unfairly tie two concepts together that are not necessarily entailed. Pessimism actually has very little in the way of ethics- it is mostly an aesthetic comprehension of the world. What one does about it is more open for interpretation. What it does have (i.e. Schopenhauer's compassionate ideal), is not necessarily utilitarian anyways.

This aesthetic comprehension, despite your protestations, does have to do with the ennui/instrumentality/vanity/absurdity of existence. It is the idea that there is an uncalmness to existence. With the animal, especially the human animal, this becomes its own self-contained suffering in the organism. There is the need to survive, and then this need to thrash about on the stage of the world with whatever entertainments we can pursue. We not only deal with present pains, but must anticipate future ones and worry about the past. What there is not, is ability for complete repose. This would be sleep. We MUST get up, we MUST survive, we MUST entertain. On top of this kernel of uncalmness, is the complexities of contingent harms that we must face. Is this the real metaphysical "truth" of the world, or is this just the product of a certain temperament? I brought that up in a previous thread, but indeed, there is a Pessimist aesthetic and a certain byline that runs through it.

As you note, Schopenhauer's ethic came from lessening one's will by way of being less individuated- it was not necessarily about the outcome of compassionate acts. It is much more of a metaphysical problem he is working on. Each person, being a manifestation of Will in some illusory individuation that causes suffering, is supposed to extinguish one's Will by being less individuated and more concerned in others. However, Schopenhauer also thought that character was generally fixed, and only the rare individual had the capacity to be truly compassionate, or at least compassionate in a way that makes them less individuated. Compassionate acts are one step, but even this is not complete in his conception, to be complete everyone must be an ascetic and renounce one's will-to-live. This of course, is a tall order. — schopenhauer1

But @darthbarracuda, I don't know do you have anything to add to explain more clearly "aesthetic Pessimism"?

They don't! I said many posts ago that I was speaking of a general, not an individual, duty. There is more than one way to support civilization, not just procreation. But I say procreation is one way. — Thorongil

I see, but then I go back to my objection that you are weighting civilization greater than the individual's suffering. People should be born to keep civilization going is using individuals for some cause. Using people for this means, seems uncaring towards the individual. If people must be used to make the people existing not suffer, then there is a knot that needs to be untied, and the solution is not more people (and ipso facto suffering people).

Yes, but I'm saying that if naturalism is false, it's possible that such negative experiences do have some greater meaning or purpose. I believe I said this earlier, but naturalism directly entails anti-natalism. If nothing but the physical world exists, i.e. the world is self-justifying, then nothing in principle could ever justify all the suffering, misery, etc that it contains. — Thorongil

Okay, so we agree on something if naturalism holds true (I am not sure I am a naturalist, but I will entertain it for the sake of argument).

Why stick around and prolong the burdens of "instrumentality?" There would be no reason to, absent any possibility of greater meaning and salvation. — Thorongil

Because as I've stated in another discussion: Fear of death, the "unknown", pain, and the unsettling idea that there will be no future "self" that we are so used to chattering with, are sufficient enough reasons to me for why people do not commit suicide often outside of extremely painful circumstances.

In other words, the world is what we know, and to dissolve all of what we know is scary, so fear keeps us from answering that existential question posed to life with the suicide.

As far as a possible religious answer to the suffering (as I think you are gravitating towards that right?), I think an answer in another discussion fits as well:

Why does reconciliation need to be maintained though? So God wants humans to exist so that they make right decisions in order to reconcile back to God. Why go through all this in the first place? Sounds like a game of sorts. No matter how you look at it, if you value "you" as an individual with your own feelings, pains, wants, etc. then you mean nothing to this deity as far as "you" as an individual person is concerned. You are only good insofar as your plans comport with "the good", which is all that matters to this vision, as this leads to reconciliation. If this is the case, humans are instrumental to this end for God. He is in the end, uncaring about you, the individual, as much as your value in the vision of how you are to be used for his plan.

The situation sucks no matter what. What does it matter whether you suffer for a grand plan, or for no reason at all? As far as the measily human is concerned, is the grand plan supposed to be comforting? As a matter of practical import, there is not much difference between the two. We can imagine things which don't exist. Our guilt knows no bounds. Combine those together and you have a God that created free-willed humans who are constantly transgressing and need to reconcile. Evil occurs due to our fallen state, a punishment. Boy can we reify some guilt.

I've moved beyond Schopenhauer a bit in recent years. His philosophy still forms the prism through which I view the world, but precisely because I know it so well (or at least I think I do), its deficiencies are put in starker relief. — Thorongil

Sure, same here.. There are a lot of things, especially regarding his metaphysics (ugh, the "Forms" and his mis-understanding of evolution.. he was just a bit before Darwin's theory was popularized). But many of his observations about the nature of suffering and the nature of our own needs and wants were very well-stated. The spirit of his message still rings true.

But it doesn't follow from the fact that it appears as though most people don't think about the morality of procreation that procreation is wrong. — Thorongil

No, but it is at least misguided that most people don't think of procreation in the realm of moral theory in general (whether it is right or wrong). However, my point was exactly that because it is so outside people's purview, I would not be self-righteous about it (at least not outside philosophy forums and those who would possibly understand its implications and even then I would not characterize my arguments as self-righteous but more explanatory, descriptive, etc.).

Is this directed toward me? I still don't understand what "aesthetic anti-natalism" means, if that is in fact your position. I don't see how anti-natalism could be anything other than a moral position. — Thorongil

Okay, I have not explained this well. I will retract that it is not just aesthetic, but the ethic entails an aesthetic aspect to it. So where something like Benetar's conception (which is not the only antinatalism, just the most popular, especially due to the neologism) is based on utilitarian reasoning, this is mainly based on a mix of aesthetic and deontological reasoning. It is deontological, as the individual human life is not calculated based on a grand plan, or vision of some abstract principle.

Aesthetic here means the recognition of the suffering that occurs through a series of existential question-asking. You work to work to work. You do to do to do. You exist to exist to exist. The repetitious nature of existence coupled with subtle and profound, necessary and contingent forms of suffering become apparent with enough reflection. That is important in this ethic- the self-reflection. Simply stating "procreation is wrong" is simply a conclusion but does not encompass the full picture. You can say that the ethic is more Pessimism with antinatalism as one main idea that comes out of it, but not antinatalism completely separated as its own thing that is independently and starkly thrown out as a polemic against people for blame or condemnation. So in this view it is a whole package.

Yet that's not my goal at all- fighting for the forgotten, or self-righteous whatever. I'm frankly a bit offended you would try to characterize my argument like that. I especially went at length to say that the theory isn't meant to be condemning and that it is more aesthetic than moral and that my theory was being characterized in a way that made it moralistic despite my protestations in order to make it a foil for whatever beef you had with "antinatalists" writ large.

See, above.

The contradiction resides in the word "affected" here, or any other synonym you might use. Prior to birth, the person was not affected by anything, because he didn't exist. Birth is not itself an affection but rather the condition for being affected. — Thorongil

Being birth is "affecting" someone as there is now an existence of an identity where there was none before. So I still contest this objection.

The language here matters precisely because, put one way, procreation and those who engage in it are immoral, and put another, they are not. In other words, — Thorongil

To me, this is a false dichotomy as I explained later on in my last post, that blameworthy is a spectrum and not an "if then" binary case.

Let me give an example. When Iceland beat England in the European Cup a year ago, nine months later, the country experienced a surge in births. See here. Now, if we use the language you have just agreed to use, namely, that "a state of affairs will take place that leads to X, Y, Z, when another state of affairs could have taken place that did not lead to X, Y, Z," then the Icelandic footballers form a link in a causal chain that leads to the creation of more human beings. Would it make sense to cast moral blame on them? No, of course not. We're just describing a state of affairs, which, by definition, carries no normative weight. But if human beings are "forced" to exist, then the situation changes, for such language cannot but entail negative moral evaluation of procreation. The footballers would then be implicated in the creation of human beings, so that if procreation is wrong, you would have to be opposed to football. But think of all the other things that play a causal role, however dimly, in the creation of children. One would have to be opposed to civilization itself. This is why a consistent anti-natalism is incompatible with civilization, such that to accept one is to reject the other, and vice-versa. — Thorongil

I have several issues with this. You are making a lot of tenuous jumps here to get to your argument. The decision to create the child "forces" the child into existence. You can take any act and make a claim of determinism. So a murderer killed someone but he had a bad upbringing too. Are the parents then put on trial? Society as a whole? Certainly a state of affairs where someone is dead by the hand of another occurred where it may not have occurred.. You can use blame there. But, as I stated earlier, I do not even look at procreation in the same moral category as murder and the usual suspects of ethical inquiry. At least that is my current position.

Does this make sense, and, if so, do you still believe we are in agreement? — Thorongil

I am not sure I get this reasoning. Why do people who do not want children but support civilization need to have children? That is paradoxical indeed. As we agreed on earlier, the average folk will follow self-interest and thus inadvertently advance civilization. You don't need to force those who don't agree to procreate to do this to carry on a tradition for the others. Even if that is the case, using someone for the needs of civilization (if you do not think life should be carried out by a new person if it can be prevented reasonably) would be performing a greater wrong.

I don't think these things are for naught, for to believe that they are would entail metaphysical naturalism, which I don't believe is true. But if you think they are, then I would love to know why. — Thorongil

These are the reasons I gave for not putting forth new humans if it can be helped. To not give them these burdens.

So is it that you think that by merely encouraging people to think about the topic, to "take pause," as you said, they will choose not to procreate of their own accord and as a matter of course? — Thorongil

Sort of. Yes, I hope this is the conclusion, but then they can see these aspects in their own lives so it is a greater self-awareness of the instrumental, repetitious, burden-overcoming nature of life, so it becomes therapeutic in its own goading to questioning our own existence. I thought you would understand this, especially after seeming to be a devote of many of the observations that Schopenhauer elaborates on that are similar in theme.

Again, though, what of the people who choose to have children after having taken pause, considered anti-natalism, and charitably listened to your thoughts on instrumentality? Can such people exist or would you simply declare of them that they weren't reflective enough (meaning that, if one reaches the level of reflection you seek, they couldn't not choose not to have children)? — Thorongil

I would like to think the latter. However, if it is the former, than what can I do? They had a different perspective on it. But since the topic is so outside the purview of the average understanding of things, I do not condemn with blame at least not in the same way it might be for murder, torture, etc.

It isn't one. Evolution lumbered along for hundreds of millions of years, not in spite of, but because of predation, disease, suffering, natural disasters, and death. And God is said to have "guided" this process? Please. — Thorongil

Remember, it's all part of the Grand Plan! That slow-moving sloth being eaten by the leopard by having its head pierced by sharp fangs is just part of the vision, man. C'mon!

Right, that's what I thought he meant, as I said in the beginning. That human free will is good, and God's reconciliation plan requires that this free will be maintained. — darthbarracuda

Why does reconciliation need to be maintained though? So God wants humans to exist so that they make right decisions in order to reconcile back to God. Why go through all this in the first place? Sounds like a game of sorts. No matter how you look at it, if you value "you" as an individual with your own feelings, pains, wants, etc. then you mean nothing to this deity as far as "you" as an individual person is concerned. You are only good insofar as your plans comport with "the good", which is all that matters to this vision, as this leads to reconciliation. If this is the case, humans are instrumental to this end for God. He is in the end, uncaring about you, the individual, as much as your value in the vision of how you are to be used for his plan.

The situation sucks no matter what. What does it matter whether you suffer for a grand plan, or for no reason at all? As far as the measily human is concerned, is the grand plan supposed to be comforting? As a matter of practical import, there is not much difference between the two. We can imagine things which don't exist. Our guilt knows no bounds. Combine those together and you have a God that created free-willed humans who are constantly transgressing and need to reconcile. Evil occurs due to our fallen state, a punishment. Boy can we reify some guilt.