I've always had the feeling that Schopenhaur1 has about this. I always said, "I never chose to be born."

And of course it's true. — Michael Ossipoff

It's only true in the trivial sense that you didn't exist prior to being born, which is in fact a mere tautology, but not in the sense that you were forced to exist. Anti-natalists want to make the latter claim so that they can declare birth an evil and procreation immoral.

"I've always had the feeling that Schopenhaur1 has about this. I always said, "I never chose to be born."

And of course it's true."— Michael Ossipoff


It's only true in the trivial sense that you didn't exist prior to being born, which is in fact a mere tautology — Thorongil

It doesn't matter, because tautologies are no less true by being tautologies.

A newborn is bewildered, and maybe frightened. All of us find ourselves here without it being obvious that we wanted to be here.

Tautology or not, of course it's true (except for the considerations that I mentioned in my previous post).

, but not in the sense that you were forced to exist.

Not entirely, for the reasons that I mentioned in my previous post.

But being forced into life doesn't require that you were a pre-existing person who was then forced into life. Being forced into life is something that can be said of the newly-existing person brought into the world.

As of the time of your conception and birth, that's when that new you was forced into life,

Listen to what a newborn has to say about that.

Michael Ossipoff

It doesn't matter, because tautologies are no less true by being tautologies. — Michael Ossipoff

I'm not saying it isn't true. I'm saying that it doesn't say what anti-natalists want it to say and/or imply.

But being forced into life doesn't require that you were a pre-existing person who was then forced into life. — Michael Ossipoff

Yes it does.

Yes it does. — Thorongil

But couldn't you have that perception at the beginning of your life?

"I don't want to be here. How did this happen?"

As a newborn, aren't you forced?

Michael Ossipoff

But couldn't you have that perception at the beginning of your life?

"I don't want to be here. How did this happen?"

As a newborn, aren't you forced? — Michael Ossipoff

You exist at the moment of conception. You're apparently trying to say that you don't exist until you're born, which is absurd.

You exist at the moment of conception. You're apparently trying to say that you don't exist until you're born, which is absurd. — Thorongil

Of course, you existed as a fetus before birth.

Ok, that just changes what moment is being talked about.

Before birth, you might have wondered what's going on, and why. And certainly even moreso again at the relatively sudden event of birth.

And, at birth, and maybe before it too, you might have felt an opinion about not wanting this unexplained state of affairs, about which you obviously, at any time during those times, had no choice.

But that's just hypothetical. I'm not saying for sure that you had an opinion that you didn't want what was happening. That probably isn't knowable, and there's some basis for arguing to the contrary (as suggested in my other post). Maybe you felt it to be an interesting, exciting, promising, adventure.

Michael Ossipoff

I've often wondered why infants cry at birth. Wouldn't that attract predators, and therefore be maladaptive and therefore selected against?

Michael Ossipoff

And, at birth, and maybe before it too, you might have felt an opinion about not wanting this unexplained state of affairs, about which you obviously, at any time during those times, had no choice. — Michael Ossipoff

This is false. A fetus, by definition, attempts to live and grow unless impeded from doing so by external factors.

why infants cry at birth — Michael Ossipoff

The crying is concomitant with trying to breathe air for the first time and is used to predict the health of the baby.

Wouldn't that attract predators, and therefore be maladaptive and therefore selected against? — Michael Ossipoff

Early humans were not stupid and so wouldn't give birth next to lion dens. They traveled in protected groups.

I'm interested in the absence of sex/gender in your musings about this topic. It doesn't require a psychoanalyst to wonder whether there isn't something about *mothers*, rather than people in general, that you're implicitly addressing. The abstractions you talk in seem to be the ways an academic could-be-father would think about such a topic. What of the could-be-mother's body and what the body's moods and tempers and temperaments tell a woman? — mcdoodle

The story told from a woman's point of view makes no sense at all. Procreation is something a man does, and a woman becomes. 'Why do it?' makes sense, whereas 'why be it?' does not. It is the toxicity of individualism that leads down this path, that a lifeless universe is to be preferred - by no-one.

A fetus, by definition, attempts to live and grow unless impeded from doing so by external factors. — Thorongil

Yes, the infant, and therefore the fetus s/he was, could be expected, if only by natural-selection, to want life.

Michael Ossipoff

"Thrown" has implicit normative connotation. It implies that someone who already exists is forced to do something without their consent. But as I argued and as you acknowledge here, that is not what happens. Parents cause their children to exist, but they do not, and cannot, force them to exist. Thus, the causative act of procreation is amoral and, for that very reason, permissible. — Thorongil

Parents cause their children to exist. Since it is an impossibility to ask something-that-does-not-exist to participate in its own birth, by being caused to be born, another human was affected without that person having input in the matter (by way of the impossibility of consenting in the first place). I am not saying this means the parent should be condemned (as I don't think of it in those terms with antinatalism), but just as I have explained it (that someone was affected without input).

However, it does implicate the parent in not perhaps thinking of the implications of causing that child's existence. The parent is causing a new being to contend with life, when there did not need to be anything to contend with in the first place. This is where I implore the future parent to look deeper at this implication. I also do not believe that we can choose NOT to deal with life once born. We are always dealing with life, forced to make goals, forced to make choices as is how life is structurally.. Thus to be caused to be born is to go through this, it is not something we can choose NOT to do (even the goal or choice of suicide is something we have to choose if we do not want the alternatives).

Why are you asking me? I don't plan on having children, but I recognize that other people do and that this can be beneficial with respect to the maintenance of civilization. — Thorongil

I just don't see how maintaining civilization or committing suicide is a goal unto itself. It is a hypothetical imperative that you seem to be making categorical..

Rather, if one is inclined to that civilization is something that is good because it provides X, Y, and Z and that is preferable, then by all means, one should support the cause of civilization, and ya know, "Rah Rah, Sis Boom Ba!" .. But if you would hypothetically prefer to see violence, chaos, and anarchy.. then that would make things less pleasant for those who do support the cause of civilization, and so unless you want to see, that nay nay.. but why ruin the parade of others boo boo!..

Even if people don't explicitly take this maintenance of civilization on as their goal, but rather pursue their self-interest within the framework of civilization we have now, not much would change.. No, listening to science and philosophy podcasts and books won't make much more contribution to civilization than the average folks that are producing stuff and buying stuff already... Those inclined towards invention will do so, those inclined towards art and philosophy will do so, just as those inclined towards sports, games, and the Wall Street investments will do so etc. etc., just as people have done through the ages who inadvertently without supporting violence, barbarism, or the other..

But again, all you are saying is "to maintain X, Y, Z society, you must support X, Y, Z factors". This is not saying much.. If you want to keep having nice cars.. you need to maintain engineers, manufacturing, and the like. Well ok, I just don't think that is much of a moral stance just a very basic understanding of how to keep the goods and services we prefer to have going.

No, they live in a primitive society. Primitive -> barbaric -> civilized. Merriam-Webster: "barbaric: possessing or characteristic of a cultural level more complex than primitive culture but less sophisticated than advanced civilization." — Thorongil

I mean, c'mon this is language employed by a select group of intellectuals in the 1700s-1800s.. It's very antiquated. Franz Boas, a leading anthropologist of the 20th century contended this model for example. It also smacks of red herring as it does not get at the heart of the issue which is why bring more people into existence in the first place, not "how to keep the whole civilization thing going". And, as I already explained above, by existing, for the most part simply living day-to-day life without screwing up too much with other people or large swaths of society, they are "maintaining" de facto. But to support civilization means nothing, without the people there that "benefit" from the civilization.. But I am saying is you don't need the people to be there to benefit from it in the first place.. Yeah civilization seems to bring some cool stuff, but that's only if you prefer it (which most do), and thus most would assent to this anyways. It's like saying.. "politicians are all terrible".. Many people can agree with this.. but it's not saying much.. It's a platitude. No one has to hold a toga together with one hand, stoically stare into space in a statue pose, and carry around philosophy books to continue civilization either.

I apologize for in any way souring the conversation, but I was simply interested in knowing where you stand on this issue. You and I go back a long time at this point, schop1. As you know, I used to be an anti-natalist, and I know you were one too, but as I explained earlier, over time I realized I couldn't reach its conclusion based on the ethical premises I accept. I have also come to find the arguments for anti-natalism unpersuasive. At the moment, I'm neither a natalist nor an anti-natalist. Your present position has remained a bit of an enigma, in that you make threads like this one that seem to beat around the bush. If you don't condemn people for having children, that is actually news to me, especially given the many artifacts of anti-natalist arguments you have employed thus far in this thread. When did you reject anti-natalism, and how did you come to such a position? — Thorongil

I know, we do go back a long time on these forums, especially regarding this issue. Yes, my present position is not really as forceful as previous iterations, but in the same spirit. I am less inclined to absolutist notions, and more interested in existential issues as a whole. I don't know if I necessarily reject antinatalism per se though.. I don't necessarily think in condemning or blaming ways is more like it. I think it is best not to be born, and promote this idea. I don't condemn people who do procreate though, which you may think is hypocritical, but may be different approaches to how we see the world. I see it more like eating animals.. Those who are strict vegetarians or vegans, may not participate in the animal byproduct industry as much as possible. They may even promote it as much as possible when they can.. But they don't need to be complete assholes to those around them, condemning them with full effect, etc.. just because this is something they strongly believe themselves. They can take a softer approach.. Yes, you can say if it is so important a cause, it should be akin to firebrand abolitionism, or civil rights activists. I don't think issues like these, where the norms are so beyond the common understanding, should be dealt in such a matter..

Also, I prefer antinatalism as an abstracted way to get at the instrumentality of life.. Birth is what leads to more life in the first place.. which leads to asking "why create more life in the first place?" This gets down to why people need to carry out this or that purpose that one is going to say needs to take place by individual humans who will carry out this mission. What is it about work, enculturation, dealing with life in general that needs to be experienced? What about the struggles that inevitabley occur? Why create more people that will need stuff? Etc etc.

another human was affected without that person having input in the matter (by way of the impossibility of consenting in the first place). I am not saying this means the parent should be condemned (as I don't think of it in those terms with antinatalism), but just as I have explained it (that someone was affected without input). — schopenhauer1

How is this not making the same contradictory point but with different vocabulary? How is "affect without input" different from "force without consent?" The former appears as merely a euphemism of the latter, made in order to hide the contradiction embedded in the latter.

However, it does implicate the parent in not perhaps thinking of the implications of causing that child's existence. The parent is causing a new being to contend with life, when there did not need to be anything to contend with in the first place. This is where I implore the future parent to look deeper at this implication. — schopenhauer1

Agreed.

I also do not believe that we can choose NOT to deal with life once born. We are always dealing with life, forced to make goals, forced to make choices as is how life is structurally.. Thus to be caused to be born is to go through this, it is not something we can choose NOT to do (even the goal or choice of suicide is something we have to choose if we do not want the alternatives). — schopenhauer1

I suppose suicide could be seen as dealing with life, but I don't see what this is a reply to. I'll take it as a general comment.

I just don't see how maintaining civilization or committing suicide is a goal unto itself. It is a hypothetical imperative that you seem to be making categorical..

Rather, if one is inclined to that civilization is something that is good because it provides X, Y, and Z and that is preferable, then by all means, one should support the cause of civilization, and ya know, "Rah Rah, Sis Boom Ba!" .. But if you would hypothetically prefer to see violence, chaos, and anarchy.. then that would make things less pleasant for those who do support the cause of civilization, and so unless you want to see, that nay nay.. but why ruin the parade of others boo boo!.. — schopenhauer1

But I would argue that one should support civilization because it's moral to do so. And it's moral because civilization is better than the alternatives at administering justice and providing for the well being of others. The person who prefers violence, chaos, and anarchy is not a moral person. So it's not that he's wrong to engage in such things "because they oppose civilization," but because they are wrong. On the other hand, it is not wrong not to support civilization for those who, as you say, peacefully pursue their self-interest within the framework of civilization.

It's very antiquated — schopenhauer1

Antiquation does not equal falsity.

But to support civilization means nothing, without the people there that "benefit" from the civilization.. But I am saying is you don't need the people to be there to benefit from it in the first place.. — schopenhauer1

Yes, and I am saying that the people will be there whether, by your lights, they "need" or "ought" to be or not! Call it a paradox, if you like, but that is the crux of my position.

No one has to hold a toga together with one hand, stoically stare into space in a statue pose, and carry around philosophy books to continue civilization either. — schopenhauer1

Maybe nobody "has" to, but they do. And they will continue to do so whether you and I like it or not. The sooner we own up to this fact, the better, for then the burden of pining away in lonely, illimitable exasperation for an impossible utopia where no human beings exist, assuming it is one, will be lifted.

I think it is best not to be born, and promote this idea. I don't condemn people who do procreate though, which you may think is hypocritical, but may be different approaches to how we see the world. — schopenhauer1

Yes, this does seem mildly inconsistent and slightly confusing to me still. Are you a moral relativist now perchance?

They can take a softer approach — schopenhauer1

I see. Anti-natalism, but not as loud and abrasive.

Why create more people that will need stuff? — schopenhauer1

Endlessly repeated questions like this, by the mere fact that they are questions, suggest that you wish you had an answer, or at least, a good answer, to them; that you believe there may be good answers to them that you simply haven't yet come across. Is this so or do you axiomatically deny that there could ever be any adequate answers given, such that these questions are meant merely to be rhetorical?

To take up the question again, no, maybe we don't need to create more people. But there are lots of things we don't need to do that we do, that you do. Why do you continue to do them? "Because of habit or natural instinct," you might reply. Ah, but if you realize that you do such things out of habit and instinct, and yet still continue do them, on what grounds can you criticize the act or the decision to procreate? Just because something is natural doesn't make it right (an appeal to nature), but it doesn't make it wrong either. "I just want parents to think about their decision more seriously." So do I. And if they have, and decide to have children while acknowledging and considering your questions, are they to be condemned? You have said both that you are an anti-natalist and that you don't condemn parents for having children. But you must choose, for these are not mutually compatible.

How is this not making the same contradictory point but with different vocabulary? How is "affect without input" different from "force without consent?" The former appears as merely a euphemism of the latter, made in order to hide the contradiction embedded in the latter. — Thorongil

But I do not see the contradiction.. Just because that person was not around before his own birth does not mean that the impossibility of causing his own existence means that he was not affected without any input in the matter.. I don't see how that stands as a contradiction.

Agreed. — Thorongil

I think we agree on more than this discourse lets on, but I'll continue.

I suppose suicide could be seen as dealing with life, but I don't see what this is a reply to. I'll take it as a general comment. — Thorongil

It's a reply to my original comment about being "forced" or "thrown" into the world. One is "forced" to make choices where before, there was no choices to be made as there was no person to make them.. A person was created, and by direct correlation, must be forced with decisions, burdens, and the rest. This is something "forced" "foisted" whatever, as a person was created that is correlated with these things, where in a counterfactual case, there may not have been someone created who was forced to with decisions, burdens, and the rest. I think the semantic word-game your argument is taking, discounts that we probably agree on the point.. If you want to rephrase it so that it satisfies your word-game, be my guest.. But I think you are getting it, but are stuck on the language used. For example, I have used in the past instead of "forced into existence" that "a state of affairs will take place that leads to X. Y, Z, when another state of affairs could have taken place that did not lead to X, Y, and Z". If you prefer me to assert the claim in that fashion, I'll accommodate. "Forced" is a colloquialism for this more elongated version. I feel this does not need to be stated, as you probably know it already.

But I would argue that one should support civilization because it's moral to do so. And it's moral because civilization is better than the alternatives at administering justice and providing for the well being of others. The person who prefers violence, chaos, and anarchy is not a moral person. — Thorongil

Okay, fundamentally I agree with you here, but my point was that not many people are going to argue against you. As you agreed on, it is mostly in self-interest which is not working "against" civilization, but quite fitting in the framework and de facto consenting to the fruits of civilization. That's why I equated it to someone saying "All politician's are terrible". Well, most people can agree.. so it becomes a truism. It isn't saying much. I guess its aimed at terrorists and extremists who want to blow the system up or something, but when did the discussion veer to that? Also, who wold really want to live in utter chaos, anarchy, and violence their whole life? Not 95% of the population I'd guess. I think this came out of your answer to some sort of purpose.. Okay, but most people, as we both agree are just pursuing their self-interest in the given framework, trying to get by, so it is sort of a moot point. As you agreed with me on:

On the other hand, it is not wrong not to support civilization for those who, as you say, peacefully pursue their self-interest within the framework of civilization. — Thorongil

So, this is most people. The given of the system is to inadvertently contribute via the invisible hand, or on the rare occasion, those who have the skill and inclination and self-reflection to know they are contributing to something that provides some sort of "profound" innovation. However, I would not see people should be born to pursue this.. But I do not think you are too, so we can move on to the next topic.

Antiquation does not equal falsity. — Thorongil

Well, this is now getting caught up in that word-game thing again. No, of course I am not trying to say that because something is "out of fashion" that it must be wrong. Rather, I am saying that just as the "luminous ether" and the justification for acts of brutality like slavery were once something that was thought of as right, we have developed (more or less) more sophisticated observations and conclusions based on evidence and our general feelings towards diverse groups of people. So, in that regard, it is "outdated" like many scientific and social customs are "outdated" due to a better understanding of the world, not simply because it is "out of fashion".. On the similar token, some things like aesthetic preferences, like classical music is still "great" and not because it is not en vogue. But again, this is something I feel you know, and do not need to explain.

Yes, and I am saying that the people will be there whether, by your lights, they "need" or "ought" to be or not! Call it a paradox, if you like, but that is the crux of my position. — Thorongil

Okay, but then this is the crux of where we are crossing paths! I am not disagreeing with you about civilization, but the argument was about life's perpetual instrumentality.. Should we bring the system down as we contemplate the nuances of instrumentality? No, but I have never said that. Again, I feel you already know this.

Yes, this does seem mildly inconsistent and slightly confusing to me still. Are you a moral relativist now perchance? — Thorongil

No.. I will be answer this and your other comments soon..

Endlessly repeated questions like this, by the mere fact that they are questions, suggest that you wish you had an answer, or at least, a good answer, to them; that you believe there may be good answers to them that you simply haven't yet come across. Is this so or do you axiomatically deny that there could ever be any adequate answers given, such that these questions are meant merely to be rhetorical? — Thorongil

Well, these questions seem to lead to a certain conclusion- that of the concept of instrumentality and unnecessary struggle. The absurd repetitious nature of life, the need for survival and entertainment, the burden of dealing with one's self, society, surroundings, and the contingencies of life itself. My hope is this makes people take pause. I believe, if it does not make people take pause, the actual implications of these consequences for a future child have not been realized. But it also should make them take pause of their own lives. This is not strictly about antinatalism, but about our own existential condition as self-reflecting beings. It leads back to the vanity of our pursuits, the repetitious nature of life, the constant pressure from needs and wants from our own nature, impinging harms from contingent circumstances, and importantly, the constant, relentless "dealing" with our own choices, circumstances in life. In my view, anything that gets more focus on this rather than ignoring our own unique situation is a good thing. Questioning procreation happens to be the best tool to bring people to a more existential understanding. So if I place "value" on something, it is understanding the our situation more clearly, seeing some of the negative implications, and preventing it. It is kind of a whole package. It is existentially motivated- not consequential, not necessarily deontological, but methodological.. It is antinatalism via a more overriding Pessimism, not antinatalism stark and naked. Why the methodology? Because that is the part that answers the "how about the people already existing part". Simply saying.. more people means more suffering is hallow without the implications of what this means for us.. It makes us take stock of our own condition by going through the methodology and not merely acting on a principle in some "If-then" none self-reflecting way.

To take up the question again, no, maybe we don't need to create more people. But there are lots of things we don't need to do that we do, that you do. Why do you continue to do them? "Because of habit or natural instinct," you might reply. Ah, but if you realize that you do such things out of habit and instinct, and yet still continue do them, on what grounds can you criticize the act or the decision to procreate? Just because something is natural doesn't make it right (an appeal to nature), but it doesn't make it wrong either. "I just want parents to think about their decision more seriously." So do I. And if they have, and decide to have children while acknowledging and considering your questions, are they to be condemned? You have said both that you are an anti-natalist and that you don't condemn parents for having children. But you must choose, for these are not mutually compatible. — Thorongil

So this idea of antinatalism is very much tied to our own existential condition. The very "why" we do anything- why things are worth it. This is very abstract and to many people, this kind of abstractness does not translate immediately. Being more of a methodologically-oriented ethic, it takes time to grapple with these things. Similar to Schopenhauer's idea of the vanity of things unfolding over certain predisposed personalities over time, this questioning process and insights into instrumentality take time to understand its implications. This is the part that matters for the already-existing.. the concept of antinatalism again, is a tool for this self-understanding. So it is mutually compatible.. Also, secondarily, as I think I said earlier, like vegetarians that practice and promote their cause without being obnoxious or abrasive, when something that is way outside the normative view is abrasively shoved down people's throats, that does not really do much. There are certain things worth condemning that immediately affects those already-existing: torture, stealing, taking away people's relative freedom of choice, etc. etc. But this more abstract principle of antinatalism is a bit harder to qualify for people. Creating people that by correlation must deal with life by their mere existence, does not compute right away.

So in a very roundabout, with many caveats way, Thorongil, I agree with you. I have sympathy with people who have children out of some joyful hope of things. I think there might be non-reflection going on, but this again is methodological... The person can come to the existential conclusions about life even after they have a kid. It is not the direct consequence that matters, but the self-reflection and understanding from this. Thus, no the "blame" is not necessarily on the parents, the way someone who is torturing can be blamed. I am not sure if what I am laying out is even considered "ethics" in the traditional sense as more of a theory of value and aesthetic outlook in a more general sense.

Just because that person was not around before his own birth does not mean that the impossibility of causing his own existence means that he was not affected without any input in the matter.. I don't see how that stands as a contradiction. — schopenhauer1

The contradiction resides in the word "affected" here, or any other synonym you might use. Prior to birth, the person was not affected by anything, because he didn't exist. Birth is not itself an affection but rather the condition for being affected.

If you want to rephrase it so that it satisfies your word-game, be my guest.. But I think you are getting it, but are stuck on the language used. For example, I have used in the past instead of "forced into existence" that "a state of affairs will take place that leads to X. Y, Z, when another state of affairs could have taken place that did not lead to X, Y, and Z". If you prefer me to assert the claim in that fashion, I'll accommodate. "Forced" is a colloquialism for this more elongated version. I feel this does not need to be stated, as you probably know it already. — schopenhauer1

The language here matters precisely because, put one way, procreation and those who engage in it are immoral, and put another, they are not. In other words, if it's true that all people are "forced" into existence, then anti-natalism follows, and possibly suicide along with it. If it's not true that people are forced into existed, but are merely caused to exist, then anti-natalism doesn't follow.

Let me give an example. When Iceland beat England in the European Cup a year ago, nine months later the country experienced a surge in births. See here. Now, if we use the language you have just agreed to use, namely, that "a state of affairs will take place that leads to X, Y, Z, when another state of affairs could have taken place that did not lead to X, Y, Z," then the Icelandic footballers form a link in a causal chain that leads to the creation of more human beings. Would it make sense to cast moral blame on them? No, of course not. We're just describing a state of affairs, which, by definition, carries no normative weight. But if human beings are "forced" to exist, then the situation changes, for such language cannot but entail negative moral evaluation of procreation. The footballers would then be implicated in the creation of human beings, so that if procreation is wrong, you would have to be opposed to football. But think of all the other things that play a causal role, however dimly, in the creation of children. One would have to be opposed to civilization itself. This is why a consistent anti-natalism is incompatible with civilization, such that to accept one is to reject the other, and vice-versa.

I would not see people should be born to pursue this.. — schopenhauer1

I would, though. My position is that there is a general duty (or that it is good) to support civilization, which directly entails the creation of life for that purpose, not in order to support civilization for its own sake, but for the sake of those who will be born into the world regardless of whether there is civilization or not. If it were the case that only people who understood this had children, there would be no reason to have children. But there are people who have children for a multitude of other, less justifiable reasons, and so there is a reason for the former to have children for the sake of the latter. This is why I spoke of my position as being somewhat paradoxical. Does this make sense, and, if so, do you still believe we are in agreement?

that of the concept of instrumentality and unnecessary struggle. The absurd repetitious nature of life, the need for survival and entertainment, the burden of dealing with one's self, society, surroundings, and the contingencies of life itself — schopenhauer1

I don't think these things are for naught, for to believe that they are would entail metaphysical naturalism, which I don't believe is true. But if you think they are, then I would love to know why.

My hope is this makes people take pause. — schopenhauer1

Fully agreed.

It is existentially motivated- not consequential, not necessarily deontological, but methodological.. It is antinatalism via a more overriding Pessimism, not antinatalism stark and naked. Why the methodology? Because that is the part that answers the "how about the people already existing part". Simply saying.. more people means more suffering is hallow without the implications of what this means for us.. It makes us take stock of our own condition by going through the methodology and not merely acting on a principle in some "If-then" none self-reflecting way. — schopenhauer1

So is it that you think that by merely encouraging people to think about the topic, to "take pause," as you said, they will choose not to procreate of their own accord and as a matter of course?

So in a very roundabout, with many caveats way, Thorongil, I agree with you. I have sympathy with people who have children out of some joyful hope of things. I think there might be non-reflection going on, but this again is methodological... The person can come to the existential conclusions about life even after they have a kid. It is not the direct consequence that matters, but the self-reflection and understanding from this. Thus, no the "blame" is not necessarily on the parents, the way someone who is torturing can be blamed. I am not sure if what I am laying out is even considered "ethics" in the traditional sense as more of a theory of value and aesthetic outlook in a more general sense. — schopenhauer1

Again, though, what of the people who choose to have children after having taken pause, considered anti-natalism, and charitably listened to your thoughts on instrumentality? Can such people exist or would you simply declare of them that they weren't reflective enough (meaning that, if one reaches the level of reflection you seek, they couldn't not choose not to have children)?

The contradiction resides in the word "affected" here, or any other synonym you might use. Prior to birth, the person was not affected by anything, because he didn't exist. Birth is not itself an affection but rather the condition for being affected. — Thorongil

Being birth is "affecting" someone as there is now an existence of an identity where there was none before. So I still contest this objection.

The language here matters precisely because, put one way, procreation and those who engage in it are immoral, and put another, they are not. In other words, — Thorongil

To me, this is a false dichotomy as I explained later on in my last post, that blameworthy is a spectrum and not an "if then" binary case.

Let me give an example. When Iceland beat England in the European Cup a year ago, nine months later, the country experienced a surge in births. See here. Now, if we use the language you have just agreed to use, namely, that "a state of affairs will take place that leads to X, Y, Z, when another state of affairs could have taken place that did not lead to X, Y, Z," then the Icelandic footballers form a link in a causal chain that leads to the creation of more human beings. Would it make sense to cast moral blame on them? No, of course not. We're just describing a state of affairs, which, by definition, carries no normative weight. But if human beings are "forced" to exist, then the situation changes, for such language cannot but entail negative moral evaluation of procreation. The footballers would then be implicated in the creation of human beings, so that if procreation is wrong, you would have to be opposed to football. But think of all the other things that play a causal role, however dimly, in the creation of children. One would have to be opposed to civilization itself. This is why a consistent anti-natalism is incompatible with civilization, such that to accept one is to reject the other, and vice-versa. — Thorongil

I have several issues with this. You are making a lot of tenuous jumps here to get to your argument. The decision to create the child "forces" the child into existence. You can take any act and make a claim of determinism. So a murderer killed someone but he had a bad upbringing too. Are the parents then put on trial? Society as a whole? Certainly a state of affairs where someone is dead by the hand of another occurred where it may not have occurred.. You can use blame there. But, as I stated earlier, I do not even look at procreation in the same moral category as murder and the usual suspects of ethical inquiry. At least that is my current position.

Does this make sense, and, if so, do you still believe we are in agreement? — Thorongil

I am not sure I get this reasoning. Why do people who do not want children but support civilization need to have children? That is paradoxical indeed. As we agreed on earlier, the average folk will follow self-interest and thus inadvertently advance civilization. You don't need to force those who don't agree to procreate to do this to carry on a tradition for the others. Even if that is the case, using someone for the needs of civilization (if you do not think life should be carried out by a new person if it can be prevented reasonably) would be performing a greater wrong.

I don't think these things are for naught, for to believe that they are would entail metaphysical naturalism, which I don't believe is true. But if you think they are, then I would love to know why. — Thorongil

These are the reasons I gave for not putting forth new humans if it can be helped. To not give them these burdens.

So is it that you think that by merely encouraging people to think about the topic, to "take pause," as you said, they will choose not to procreate of their own accord and as a matter of course? — Thorongil

Sort of. Yes, I hope this is the conclusion, but then they can see these aspects in their own lives so it is a greater self-awareness of the instrumental, repetitious, burden-overcoming nature of life, so it becomes therapeutic in its own goading to questioning our own existence. I thought you would understand this, especially after seeming to be a devote of many of the observations that Schopenhauer elaborates on that are similar in theme.

Again, though, what of the people who choose to have children after having taken pause, considered anti-natalism, and charitably listened to your thoughts on instrumentality? Can such people exist or would you simply declare of them that they weren't reflective enough (meaning that, if one reaches the level of reflection you seek, they couldn't not choose not to have children)? — Thorongil

I would like to think the latter. However, if it is the former, than what can I do? They had a different perspective on it. But since the topic is so outside the purview of the average understanding of things, I do not condemn with blame at least not in the same way it might be for murder, torture, etc.

Being birth is "affecting" someone — schopenhauer1

This is incoherent to me. "Birth" just designates the moment that one came into being. It can't "do" anything, for it describes a fact, a state of affairs. It's a noun, not a verb.

See, above.

The decision to create the child "forces" the child into existence. You can take any act and make a claim of determinism. So a murderer killed someone but he had a bad upbringing too. Are the parents then put on trial? Society as a whole? Certainly a state of affairs where someone is dead by the hand of another occurred where it may not have occurred.. You can use blame there. But, as I stated earlier, I do not even look at procreation in the same moral category as murder and the usual suspects of ethical inquiry. At least that is my current position. — schopenhauer1

I genuinely don't know how this is a reply to what you quoted of me, and I'm not sure what you're trying to say either. It seems that we can't get past the question of whether people are forced to exist. I say, unequivocally, that they are not and cannot be forced to exist. To say that they are is strictly meaningless, though, I admit, has the appearance of meaning. I've tried explaining why several times now. If you don't understand or I'm just being unclear, there's not much more I can say.

Why do people who do not want children but support civilization need to have children? — schopenhauer1

They don't! I said many posts ago that I was speaking of a general, not an individual, duty. There is more than one way to support civilization, not just procreation. But I say procreation is one way.

These are the reasons I gave for not putting forth new humans if it can be helped. To not give them these burdens. — schopenhauer1

Yes, but I'm saying that if naturalism is false, it's possible that such negative experiences do have some greater meaning or purpose. I believe I said this earlier, but naturalism directly entails anti-natalism. If nothing but the physical world exists, i.e. the world is self-justifying, then nothing in principle could ever justify all the suffering, misery, etc that it contains. In fact, suicide would be a perfectly moral decision in that case. Why stick around and prolong the burdens of "instrumentality?" There would be no reason to, absent any possibility of greater meaning and salvation.

I thought you would understand this, especially after seeming to be a devote of many of the observations that Schopenhauer elaborates on that are similar in theme. — schopenhauer1

I've moved beyond Schopenhauer a bit in recent years. His philosophy still forms the prism through which I view the world, but precisely because I know it so well (or at least I think I do), its deficiencies are put in starker relief.

I would like to think the latter. However, if it is the former, than what can I do? — schopenhauer1

I have asked myself the question I just posed to you. In contemplating the former option I sketched, what I have done is engage in critical self-reflection. Anti-natalists take great pride in the fact that hardly anyone seems to problematize procreation like they do. Anti-natalism's obscurity is therefore perhaps its greatest strength. But it doesn't follow from the fact that it appears as though most people don't think about the morality of procreation that procreation is wrong.

Anti-natalists take great pride in the fact that hardly anyone seems to problematize procreation like they do. Anti-natalism's obscurity is therefore perhaps its greatest strength. — Thorongil

Yo I'm gonna steal this (Y) 8-)

I'll give credit, of course.

:D

I think that could be generalized and applied to basically any marginal ethical/political point of view, regardless of its validity. Radicals like to pride themselves as being the few noble individuals who fight for justice for the forgotten. And fuck everyone else.

Yet that's not my goal at all- fighting for the forgotten, or self-righteous whatever. I'm frankly a bit offended you would try to characterize my argument like that. I especially went at length to say that the theory isn't meant to be condemning and that it is more aesthetic than moral and that my theory was being characterized in a way that made it moralistic despite my protestations in order to make it a foil for whatever beef you had with "antinatalists" writ large.

I think that could be generalized and applied to basically any marginal ethical/political point of view, regardless of its validity. Radicals like to pride themselves as being the few noble individuals who fight for justice for the forgotten. And fuck everyone else. — darthbarracuda

Probably so.

Yet that's not my goal at all- fighting for the forgotten, or self-righteous whatever. I'm frankly a bit offended you would try to characterize my argument like that. — schopenhauer1

I don't think he was necessarily talking about you.

I especially went at length to say that the theory isn't meant to be condemning and that it is more aesthetic than moral and that my theory was being characterized in a way that made it moralistic despite my protestations in order to make it a foil for whatever beef you had with "antinatalists" writ large. — schopenhauer1

Is this directed toward me? I still don't understand what "aesthetic anti-natalism" means, if that is in fact your position. I don't see how anti-natalism could be anything other than a moral position.

I wasn't particularly focused on your brand of antinatalism, but I will say I disagree with it. It's not just aesthetic, it's a definite ethical problem.

They don't! I said many posts ago that I was speaking of a general, not an individual, duty. There is more than one way to support civilization, not just procreation. But I say procreation is one way. — Thorongil

I see, but then I go back to my objection that you are weighting civilization greater than the individual's suffering. People should be born to keep civilization going is using individuals for some cause. Using people for this means, seems uncaring towards the individual. If people must be used to make the people existing not suffer, then there is a knot that needs to be untied, and the solution is not more people (and ipso facto suffering people).

Yes, but I'm saying that if naturalism is false, it's possible that such negative experiences do have some greater meaning or purpose. I believe I said this earlier, but naturalism directly entails anti-natalism. If nothing but the physical world exists, i.e. the world is self-justifying, then nothing in principle could ever justify all the suffering, misery, etc that it contains. — Thorongil

Okay, so we agree on something if naturalism holds true (I am not sure I am a naturalist, but I will entertain it for the sake of argument).

Why stick around and prolong the burdens of "instrumentality?" There would be no reason to, absent any possibility of greater meaning and salvation. — Thorongil

Because as I've stated in another discussion: Fear of death, the "unknown", pain, and the unsettling idea that there will be no future "self" that we are so used to chattering with, are sufficient enough reasons to me for why people do not commit suicide often outside of extremely painful circumstances.

In other words, the world is what we know, and to dissolve all of what we know is scary, so fear keeps us from answering that existential question posed to life with the suicide.

As far as a possible religious answer to the suffering (as I think you are gravitating towards that right?), I think an answer in another discussion fits as well:

Why does reconciliation need to be maintained though? So God wants humans to exist so that they make right decisions in order to reconcile back to God. Why go through all this in the first place? Sounds like a game of sorts. No matter how you look at it, if you value "you" as an individual with your own feelings, pains, wants, etc. then you mean nothing to this deity as far as "you" as an individual person is concerned. You are only good insofar as your plans comport with "the good", which is all that matters to this vision, as this leads to reconciliation. If this is the case, humans are instrumental to this end for God. He is in the end, uncaring about you, the individual, as much as your value in the vision of how you are to be used for his plan.

The situation sucks no matter what. What does it matter whether you suffer for a grand plan, or for no reason at all? As far as the measily human is concerned, is the grand plan supposed to be comforting? As a matter of practical import, there is not much difference between the two. We can imagine things which don't exist. Our guilt knows no bounds. Combine those together and you have a God that created free-willed humans who are constantly transgressing and need to reconcile. Evil occurs due to our fallen state, a punishment. Boy can we reify some guilt.

I've moved beyond Schopenhauer a bit in recent years. His philosophy still forms the prism through which I view the world, but precisely because I know it so well (or at least I think I do), its deficiencies are put in starker relief. — Thorongil

Sure, same here.. There are a lot of things, especially regarding his metaphysics (ugh, the "Forms" and his mis-understanding of evolution.. he was just a bit before Darwin's theory was popularized). But many of his observations about the nature of suffering and the nature of our own needs and wants were very well-stated. The spirit of his message still rings true.

But it doesn't follow from the fact that it appears as though most people don't think about the morality of procreation that procreation is wrong. — Thorongil

No, but it is at least misguided that most people don't think of procreation in the realm of moral theory in general (whether it is right or wrong). However, my point was exactly that because it is so outside people's purview, I would not be self-righteous about it (at least not outside philosophy forums and those who would possibly understand its implications and even then I would not characterize my arguments as self-righteous but more explanatory, descriptive, etc.).

Is this directed toward me? I still don't understand what "aesthetic anti-natalism" means, if that is in fact your position. I don't see how anti-natalism could be anything other than a moral position. — Thorongil

Okay, I have not explained this well. I will retract that it is not just aesthetic, but the ethic entails an aesthetic aspect to it. So where something like Benetar's conception (which is not the only antinatalism, just the most popular, especially due to the neologism) is based on utilitarian reasoning, this is mainly based on a mix of aesthetic and deontological reasoning. It is deontological, as the individual human life is not calculated based on a grand plan, or vision of some abstract principle.

Aesthetic here means the recognition of the suffering that occurs through a series of existential question-asking. You work to work to work. You do to do to do. You exist to exist to exist. The repetitious nature of existence coupled with subtle and profound, necessary and contingent forms of suffering become apparent with enough reflection. That is important in this ethic- the self-reflection. Simply stating "procreation is wrong" is simply a conclusion but does not encompass the full picture. You can say that the ethic is more Pessimism with antinatalism as one main idea that comes out of it, but not antinatalism completely separated as its own thing that is independently and starkly thrown out as a polemic against people for blame or condemnation. So in this view it is a whole package.

but then I go back to my objection that you are weighting civilization greater than the individual's suffering — schopenhauer1

That's not how I see it. I'm privileging civilization precisely for its ability to address the individual's suffering better than the alternatives.

People should be born to keep civilization going is using individuals for some cause. Using people for this means, seems uncaring towards the individual. If people must be used to make the people existing not suffer, then there is a knot that needs to be untied, and the solution is not more people (and ipso facto suffering people). — schopenhauer1

But again, it's not uncaring. It has the care of the individual primarily in mind. Also, you can't "use" people who don't exist.

This actually reminds me of what I called a deontological argument for anti-natalism that I made some time ago. It went something like this:

1. It is wrong to treat humans as means and not as ends in themselves.
2. Procreation is to treat potential humans as means and not as ends in themselves.
3. Therefore, procreation is wrong.

Both premises, however, can be challenged. The first doesn't seem to admit of universal applicability. If I use a doctor as a means to fix my tooth, have I really committed wrongdoing? Clearly not, as both parties have consented to an action that will mutually benefit them. In fact, there doesn't seem to be any actions that would escape being wrong, according to the first premise, apart from rare instances of pure altruism and compassion perhaps. Concerning the second premise, as I said right before the argument, you can't treat or use people who don't exist as or for anything, so the premise is nonsensical.

Okay, so we agree on something if naturalism holds true (I am not sure I am a naturalist, but I will entertain it for the sake of argument). — schopenhauer1

Yes.

Because as I've stated in another discussion: Fear of death, the "unknown", pain, and the unsettling idea that there will be no future "self" that we are so used to chattering with, are sufficient enough reasons to me for why people do not commit suicide often outside of extremely painful circumstances. — schopenhauer1

They may be sufficient reasons, but they are not good reasons, for they make the individual a coward and a hypocrite. And if you're going to excuse hypocrisy in this instance, then why would you likely not excuse what you would consider the hypocrisy of someone who chooses to have children despite knowing all about instrumentality and the like? That is to be quite selective in the hypocrisy you condone. Feel free to challenge my assumption about you, though.

As far as a possible religious answer to the suffering (as I think you are gravitating towards that right? — schopenhauer1

Not necessarily. It could be a philosophical one. I'm merely concerned with the possibility.

ugh, the "Forms" and his mis-understanding of evolution.. he was just a bit before Darwin's theory was popularized — schopenhauer1

Ironically, I tend to think he ought to have reversed the status of the Ideas and the will, as in fact he did do in his early manuscripts. In other words, I think he ought to have moved closer to Platonism, not farther away.

But many of his observations about the nature of suffering and the nature of our own needs and wants were very well-stated. The spirit of his message still rings true. — schopenhauer1

Yes, but no less stated by countless other religious, philosophical, and poetic texts.

No, but it is at least misguided that most people don't think of procreation in the realm of moral theory in general (whether it is right or wrong). However, my point was exactly that because it is so outside people's purview, I would not be self-righteous about it (at least not outside philosophy forums and those who would possibly understand its implications and even then I would not characterize my arguments as self-righteous but more explanatory, descriptive, etc.). — schopenhauer1

Granted, but I would expand this by saying that the anti-natalist ought not to assume that anyone who has looked into anti-natalism and rejected it rejects it because they're an incorrigible and delusional optimist. I witness a lot of armchair psychologizing among many anti-natalists: "Oh, you reject our arguments? Well, that must be because you don't really understand them and are just looking to make excuses for your own selfish, immoral behavior." It's exactly equivalent to what the fundamentalist often says to the person who has lost his or her faith: "Oh, you rejected Christianity? Well, that must be because you never really believed, just didn't pray hard enough, or were abused by a Christian as a child."

Aesthetic here means the recognition of the suffering that occurs through a series of existential question-asking. You work to work to work. You do to do to do. You exist to exist to exist. The repetitious nature of existence coupled with subtle and profound, necessary and contingent forms of suffering become apparent with enough reflection. That is important in this ethic- the self-reflection. Simply stating "procreation is wrong" is simply a conclusion but does not encompass the full picture. You can say that the ethic is more Pessimism with antinatalism as one main idea that comes out of it, but not antinatalism completely separated as its own thing that is independently and starkly thrown out as a polemic against people for blame or condemnation. So in this view it is a whole package. — schopenhauer1

Hmm. I'm still not quite sure I follow this, alas. :(

That's not how I see it. I'm privileging civilization precisely for its ability to address the individual's suffering better than the alternatives. — Thorongil

I don't see how using future people's lives who will suffer is justified for the reason that they will contribute to something that helps already existing humans as a general concept via "civilization". It's also somewhat circular. People need to be born so others don't suffer, but that causes more suffering, but let's solve it with more birth, which caused suffering in the first place. If my claim is that suffering is structural and is there from the beginning of existence for an individual, you can see how this indeed is circular reasoning.

But again, it's not uncaring. It has the care of the individual primarily in mind. Also, you can't "use" people who don't exist. — Thorongil

I'm not sure how you are not understanding the concept that something "will" be used in the future tense, and once born "has" been used. Once born, the whole being used part occurs. This being used could have been prevented. There's no logically invalid anything going on. I tried to point to this earlier but you were not liking or getting it.. You made the argument that Iceland winning world soccer or whatnot caused more babies to be born, therefore, what are you going to do, blame soccer? Any my point was that this argument can be made of any act. At what point do you stop the causal chain of pointing to the actual moment when the act can be considered someone's doing? Well, I would say the parents having sex and bringing the baby about is a good place to start.. Just as maybe a murderer had a bunch of causal chain events that led him to kill someone, but we usually look at the actual events that directly brought this even about. So we can talk about causal chains and such, but then we are abusing our common notions of attribution, and thus render all language regarding this moot.

1. It is wrong to treat humans as means and not as ends in themselves.
2. Procreation is to treat potential humans as means and not as ends in themselves.
3. Therefore, procreation is wrong.

Both premises, however, can be challenged. The first doesn't seem to admit of universal applicability. If I use a doctor as a means to fix my tooth, have I really committed wrongdoing? Clearly not, as both parties have consented to an action that will mutually benefit them. In fact, there doesn't seem to be any actions that would escape being wrong, according to the first premise, apart from rare instances of pure altruism and compassion perhaps. Concerning the second premise, as I said right before the argument, you can't treat or use people who don't exist as or for anything, so the premise is nonsensical. — Thorongil

Well first off that is not a great example as both parties consented to this use of the doctor and thus the doctor was no unaware that his services in the role of doctor was being used and assented to it as this was also his own will. So, it is not so binary. Second, you can probably conjure up a better example where someone is not consented but clearly what was done helped the person in the long run. This is where I would say the first premise is simply too broad. It should be rather:

1. It would be wrong to treat humans as a means and not as an ends in themselves, if it brings about all structural and contingent suffering for another person's life.
2. Procreation treats humans as a means and not as an ends in themselves as it brings about all structural and contingent suffering for another person's life.
3. Therefore procreation is wrong.


Thus bringing a person into the world for some cause (for civilization, other people, etc.) but creates the situation of structural and contingent suffering for the individual being born has occurred.

They may be sufficient reasons, but they are not good reasons, for they make the individual a coward and a hypocrite. — Thorongil

Cowardice in the face of mortal death and pain is reasonable for the reasons I listed. That doesn't bother me. As far as hypocricy, it is not hypocritical to feel life as suffering but then not kill yourself. Suicide and the projection of an unknown non-existing self is scary for most. Rather, I think giving a new person the option of continuing to exist or make a most painful decision of suicide as well is rather an inescapable choice. There is no third alternative, though people like Schop's ascetics and the religious and the utopian theorists they may have found them.

Ironically, I tend to think he ought to have reversed the status of the Ideas and the will, as in fact he did do in his early manuscripts. In other words, I think he ought to have moved closer to Platonism, not farther away. — Thorongil

Ha, I knew you were going to say that :P. Whether we disagree on the exact points he got wrong, we still agree that we think he got some things wrong (the fact that there is a verb of striving or that space/time exists along with Will.. how can there be one if there is something more than one.. the fact that the first animal of consciousness seems to be the time when the world of appearances started in time, which makes the first animal a very special creature indeed.. etc. etc.).

Yes, but no less stated by countless other religious, philosophical, and poetic texts. — Thorongil

Yeah but not compiled in such a way in my opinion. Indeed I have mentioned many a time on here how Pessimism is a theme that goes back to ancient times and possibly further back.

Granted, but I would expand this by saying that the anti-natalist ought not to assume that anyone who has looked into anti-natalism and rejected it rejects it because they're an incorrigible and delusional optimist. I witness a lot of armchair psychologizing among many anti-natalists: "Oh, you reject our arguments? Well, that must be because you don't really understand them and are just looking to make excuses for your own selfish, immoral behavior." It's exactly equivalent to what the fundamentalist often says to the person who has lost his or her faith: "Oh, you rejected Christianity? Well, that must be because you never really believed, just didn't pray hard enough, or were abused by a Christian as a child." — Thorongil

Yet, based on my quote, have I said this? This seems to be a red herring aimed at antinatalists writ large but somehow is supposed to allude to my arguments though I keep on reiterating that I am not trying to be self-righteous or condemning, just explanatory of the situation. What you explain is the "bad" antinatalist/Christian's reaction to someone who "rejects" their worldview.. something I have not done. At the end of the day, you can only explain your point and if someone sees it, then they see it and will possibly change something as a result. Philosophy is not a totalizing thing where if you come up with the magic grail of arguments no one can ever claim you are wrong. Value is inherently hard to prove and so it is up to individual's to really work it out in their own head based on the evidence and arguments provided. I also stated how antinatalism, being so far out of people's recognition of what even counts as "moral", is not something that should really be condemned, just considered in the dialogue and at least heard out. If it's rejected, then it is not my job to shun them, yell at them, or want them arrested. Rather, I can keep making arguments respectfully if they are willing to listen or just let it be.

Hmm. I'm still not quite sure I follow this, alas. :( — Thorongil

Well, I stated something in a post a while ago something l like this in discussions with darth:

Some Pessimists might be at odds with especially utilitarian consequentialism altogether because utilitarian consequentialism assumes that improvements can take place when in actuality we are never really improving. The human condition is such that it does not happen. It is veiled utopianism, the most optimistic of optimistic ideas. It is to buy into the carrot and stick.. if we just work harder to live together better now, we can make it work for a future, more ideal state. That is just something you will rarely see a Pessimist say. So no, they are probably not breaking their own ideals- they probably never had them. If you want to REFUTE their ideals, that is one thing, but I do not think they are being hypocritical to their own ideals. So again, to entail utilitarianism with Pessimism is to unfairly tie two concepts together that are not necessarily entailed. Pessimism actually has very little in the way of ethics- it is mostly an aesthetic comprehension of the world. What one does about it is more open for interpretation. What it does have (i.e. Schopenhauer's compassionate ideal), is not necessarily utilitarian anyways.

This aesthetic comprehension, despite your protestations, does have to do with the ennui/instrumentality/vanity/absurdity of existence. It is the idea that there is an uncalmness to existence. With the animal, especially the human animal, this becomes its own self-contained suffering in the organism. There is the need to survive, and then this need to thrash about on the stage of the world with whatever entertainments we can pursue. We not only deal with present pains, but must anticipate future ones and worry about the past. What there is not, is ability for complete repose. This would be sleep. We MUST get up, we MUST survive, we MUST entertain. On top of this kernel of uncalmness, is the complexities of contingent harms that we must face. Is this the real metaphysical "truth" of the world, or is this just the product of a certain temperament? I brought that up in a previous thread, but indeed, there is a Pessimist aesthetic and a certain byline that runs through it.

As you note, Schopenhauer's ethic came from lessening one's will by way of being less individuated- it was not necessarily about the outcome of compassionate acts. It is much more of a metaphysical problem he is working on. Each person, being a manifestation of Will in some illusory individuation that causes suffering, is supposed to extinguish one's Will by being less individuated and more concerned in others. However, Schopenhauer also thought that character was generally fixed, and only the rare individual had the capacity to be truly compassionate, or at least compassionate in a way that makes them less individuated. Compassionate acts are one step, but even this is not complete in his conception, to be complete everyone must be an ascetic and renounce one's will-to-live. This of course, is a tall order. — schopenhauer1

But @darthbarracuda, I don't know do you have anything to add to explain more clearly "aesthetic Pessimism"?

I'll take a swing at it, although my take is more ethical. Here's the argument I give in the book I'm writing:

"
Premise 1: If a person has an experience that a rational and well-informed person would prefer not to experience, then this person has been harmed (definition of harm).

Premise 2: But life as an experience is not something a rational and well-informed person would prefer (the negative perspective).

Conclusion 1: Therefore, life is harmful to a person.

Premise 3: But the life of a person depends on them having been born (self-evident truism).

Conclusion 2: Therefore, the birth of a person is harmful to this person.

Premise 4: But it is wrong to hurt other people (the fundamental ethical articulation).

Conclusion 3: Therefore, it is wrong to give birth to a person.
"

This is what I call the fundamental argument for antinatalism.

And while I agree with you that there is a fundamental "uncalmness" to phenomenal existence, I'm specifically focused on the anxiety produced by our inherent moral disqualification. We have to make do with the "lesser of all evils", go for the "greatest good", oftentimes solve difficult problems by appealing to the majority, and inevitably hurt or manipulate other people simply because we feel the need to live, progress, survive. We feel forced into political discourse, dirtying our hands and getting pissed off. We have to make exceptions to the fundamental ethical articulation, we can't get bogged down and worry about the "little things" we do that hurt other people. They are expendable and forgettable, apparently.

I happen to have consequentialist leanings but only because I believe the world we live in is incapable of sustaining a more natural, primordial deontological ethic. Deontology is often criticized for not addressing the problems with agent-relative reasons (refusing to hurt one person to prevent five more from equal treatment - it has an air of irrationality to it) - but that's not really the fault of deontology per se as much as it is the fault of those who decide it's okay to sustain a world in which we have to substitute this ethic for another one. In my view, the existence of substantial moral disagreement is a very troubling thing.

Therefore I believe that life is structurally negative and is morally disqualifying. We will never have a satisfactory ethic that affirms life, and this produces an anxiety in us. There's no such thing as "the good life", and everyone is guilty of doing something wrong. Most of the time it's not even our fault.

Premise 1: If a person has an experience that a rational and well-informed person would prefer not to experience, then this person has been harmed (definition of harm).

Premise 2: But life as an experience is not something a rational and well-informed person would prefer (the negative perspective).

Conclusion 1: Therefore, life is harmful to a person.

Premise 3: But the life of a person depends on them having been born (self-evident truism).

Conclusion 2: Therefore, the birth of a person is harmful to this person.

Premise 4: But it is wrong to hurt other people (the fundamental ethical articulation).

Conclusion 3: Therefore, it is wrong to give birth to a person.
" — darthbarracuda

I can definitely get on board with this formulation. However, you are going to get the most flack from Premise 2. As Thorongil was alluding to, well-informed people may not agree that life is something not preferable. You may question their rationale (or whether they are rational) if this is the case though. I'd like to see your take on that objection.

And while I agree with you that there is a fundamental "uncalmness" to phenomenal existence, I'm specifically focused on the anxiety produced by our inherent moral disqualification. We have to make do with the "lesser of all evils", go for the "greatest good", oftentimes solve difficult problems by appealing to the majority, and inevitably hurt or manipulate other people simply because we feel the need to live, progress, survive. We feel forced into political discourse, dirtying our hands and getting pissed off. We have to make exceptions to the fundamental ethical articulation, we can't get bogged down and worry about the "little things" we do that hurt other people. They are expendable and forgettable, apparently. — darthbarracuda

I agree, by default of having to deal with life, many transgressions and aggressions have to be performed to simply sustain life, society, and adapt to everyday interactions. This means de facto that by being born we are going to be forced into morally suspect decisions, because its inherent in the "making do" process we need to perform to just get by. Moral perfection seems to be an impossibility by way of the moral compromises we have to make or overlook to get by.

I happen to have consequentialist leanings but only because I believe the world we live in is incapable of sustaining a more natural, primordial deontological ethic. Deontology is often criticized for not addressing the problems with agent-relative reasons (refusing to hurt one person to prevent five more from equal treatment - it has an air of irrationality to it) - but that's not really the fault of deontology per se as much as it is the fault of those who decide it's okay to sustain a world in which we have to substitute this ethic for another one. — darthbarracuda

I think deontology can be helpful to think of moral problems when not used in too broad a way. Kant's 1st formulation, for example, leaves it open for too many bizarre (i.e. repugnant) conclusions. He tried to make an airtight formula, and broadened it to such a degree that if there is a contradiction when universalizing a law, it is wrong. The spirit is good but the application is disconcerting.

The deontology of not using people as ends, which is his second formulation, is a bit more able to withstand some of these disconcerting conclusions and I think can be decoupled from his first formulation. What it does do well, is put individuals (agent-relative) as a starting point. However, this formulation does not seem to work when used in too universal a fashion either.

Rather, the "problem of suffering" is the heart of Pessimist ethics and involves existential issues of self-reflection on the human condition. Here is where the aesthetic aspect comes in. In order to understand suffering in its necessary (uncalmness/vanity/absurd/instrumentality) and contingent (numerous circumstantial) harms, one has to see the structural conditions of human life. Here the "insight" into how these sufferings manifest would probably have to be recognized through some sort of assent that this indeed is the case. Once this is recognized then you can say that using people by creating more people who will suffer for an abstract principle or any other reason would be not good.

In my view, the existence of substantial moral disagreement is a very troubling thing. — darthbarracuda

Agreed.

Therefore I believe that life is structurally negative and is morally disqualifying. We will never have a satisfactory ethic that affirms life, and this produces an anxiety in us. There's no such thing as "the good life", and everyone is guilty of doing something wrong. Most of the time it's not even our fault. — darthbarracuda

Agreed.