No one has ever claimed that these cases constitute knowledge. The whole point of the Gettier problem is precisely that the definition is fulfilled, yet what we have still doesn’t count as knowledge in the way we expect it to. Ergo, JTB doesn’t work as a universal account of knowledge. — DasGegenmittel

It works just fine if we drop a few needless assumptions. That simply meeting a technical version of something believed being justified could be mistaken for knowledge long enough to base an argument on it. And then that knowledge was ever intended to be more than aspirational in it's certainty. Not really sure what Plato was going on about; always assumed the clergy found him useful for mystification of things people ought to already understand. I suppose we're in some type of aggressive agreement. Don't really see the advantage of non-generalizing something as broad as knowledge. Some of things people think is knowledge. Analytics I assume were the cure for people hiding behind words. I prefer people don't believe me if they think I'm wrong. No need to force it with symbol games.

— just like the clock — DasGegenmittel

This is my entire point. All of these examples fail to rise to something accepted into a functional system that would be called "knowledge". All of them dissolve under a short temporal arc. A diagnostic error is not medical knowledge, AI bias is in the context of how the computer believes complicates at best. Post rationalization of a stock trade isn't thought of as persistent justified belief.

I acknowledge they apply when we ignore the context of a 4th dimension. But, I can't see that insisting one exists to be creating a new conditon. Gettier found a hole in the formulation of the theory; not in the existence of knowledge as we find it. I maintain there isn't a documented case of incidental knowledge that we can rationally point to as an analog for the daily occurance of alt-knowledge type-B. Once, exteneded over a reasonably implied temporal dimension these Gettier cases disolve.

— just like the clock. — DasGegenmittel

Or not.

The problem isn’t that belief fails to endure — it’s that the justification isn’t connected to the truth-maker in a reliable way. The broken clock case isn’t a fluke: it’s a stand-in for many real-world scenarios where we reason well, but for the wrong reasons — and get it right only by chance. — DasGegenmittel

Well, then this is excellent news. If the broken clock is a stand-in for a real world scenario we could examine one of those? Because scientific justifcation isn't something in a wave function about an afternoon. Having measured things before I'm very aware of the difference between it is and it was measured to be. So, a moment of belief doesn't imply a persistent justified belief over some course of time. But, since it's a stand in I'm expecting the real world scenerios drawn from the pervasive use of accident-coincidental knowledge making events will demonstrate this error in the clearest possible way. Proceed. Or not.

The problem with knowledge is that it is used in a paradoxical way; we need a knowledge dualism. On the one hand, we say “I know” in cases where we can be certain that something is true, such as in mathematics. On the other hand, we use the same expression in situations involving contingency, like traffic routes. The underlying distinction is that some domains, like mathematics, involve elements that do not change—numbers, for example. The number 1 is always 1, without exception. — DasGegenmittel

I see it as a problem in defining knowledge in a generalized way. Nothing paradoxical going on in the rational application of what is being said. One is a self-consistent model and the other a reference to the novelty of naming conventions.

Thus, we can even claim to have knowledge of things like current traffic conditions, which may be the best available to us so far, even if they don’t necessarily reflect reality. Since the world can change without our awareness, there can be no definitive knowledge about the future—only conceptual knowledge. — DasGegenmittel

Seems like a bit of a strawfolk argument to put foward that induction is an artifact of intuition alone. When assembling a puzzle and there's only one space remaining I can safely predict where the final piece is going to go?

One might object: “But we constantly experience that we do have knowledge!” However, this is a mistaken intuition, as illustrated by Gettier cases. The problem is what Popper also pointed out in the sciences: verification is a poor guide and a pathway to pseudo-science—or in our case, pseudo-knowledge. In dynamic environments, we can only corroborate, not verify. — DasGegenmittel

I disagree, I don't think Gettier breaks JTB once you qualify belief as having to persist. Which falls in line with Popper's recommendation of an attitude that treats knowledge as provisional. Again, knowledge in the context of dynamics implies a probablistic statement. Being willing to confuse it with a static declaration ignores the context for the sake of cobbling an argument.

Take Popper's gold standard for a scientific theory, general relativity, well when we do find a unified theory it will be tested by corroborating GR, not dismantling and rejecting it.

Imagine you believe Route A is the fastest way to work. You’ve taken it many times, it’s usually reliable, and today it gets you there quickly. But tomorrow, a construction site appears, traffic backs up, and Route B would have been faster. Your belief was reasonable — but only under yesterday’s conditions. — DasGegenmittel

I'm not sure anyone's really arguing that knowledge implies certainty of traffic conditions. You know which way has been statisically faster I imagine. Perpetual empiricism™ feels aspirational.

What's real is whatever hazards Bayesian updating and persists.

Seems to me Gettier simply remarked that we defined knowledge and left out a temporal dimension. And noticed people are wrong a lot for how perfect knowledge ought to be by our standards. I wouldn't dispute we can know things, but taken as a body of work, knowledge has errors. What's the point of even noticing that belief plays a part if it can't later be disbelieved. If folks would stop confusing knowledge for what they think it ought to be things would run a lot smoother.

Put another way, how long do I have to believe it for it to be knowledge? Or not.

However God actually exists, people seem to think of him as being whatever they themselves are able to understand to be the best and most important. So, God as a concept is typically a projection of one's own values. So, a secular interpretation of Jesus' command to love God with all one's heart, is that one ought to put first things first, and thus feel, think, and do whatever one is able to understand to be best. "Fear of the Lord" may be understood to mean that there exists an external reality which is bigger than not only one's own personal desires, but also bigger than the local social consensus, and one might be very badly hurt for ignoring it. Although for the religiously-minded, they do not distinguish between abstract ethics and a personal God, so that the moral meaning of passages such as these do not need interpretation. — Brendan Golledge

Pretty much the observation I've come to recognize. There's a distinct lack of disagreement between people and what their god would have them do. It seems like divine administration ought to run into more conflict with people unable to understand directives from a completely different point of view. Unless of course they're talking to themselves.

That said, I think an emergent god might be an easier sell.

Deeply held beliefs about the sanctity of a factory labor supply?

Right, if set theory shave's itself sort of thing.

What specific remarks by Godel are you referring to? — TonesInDeepFreeze

None. I thought that was the result of his numbering system for mathematical proofs. The Godel numbers, lead to a conclusion that you can't in fact provide support for every mathematical assertion. Without reaching some paradox. I don't remember the details.

No. A tautology is a formula that is satisfied by every interpretation. No contradiction is satisfied by any interpretation. Therefore, no tautology is a contradiction. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Fair point. Trying to see if I could argue it. Boolean logic is pretty solid.

Cheshire is saying that this view, that may cement logical monism, especially in the sense of using logical principles as laws, is an internalist conceit. Cheshire points to the way classical logic is self-contained and self-protecting. It's a castle built on air, and potentially leaving us deluded.

Cheshire would prefer to see us start from where we are, here in the world, with our problems in view instead of down in a brain-vat. — frank

I wouldn't put it that well, but yes, that's essentially what I'm saying. Perhaps not start with our imagination.

Might you be conflating foundationalism with monism here? Hegel has a circular and fallibalist epistemology, but it is monist. Artistotle thinks that "what is best know to us," our starting point, are concrete particulars, the "many." But what are "best known in themselves," are unifying, generating principles (the unifying "one(s), which virtually contain the many. Nor is Aristotle particularly rigid; he admonishes us not to expect explanations that are more detailed than the topic area under discussion allows in the ethics (pace analytics who have tried to quantify "moral goodness"). Both have a monistic theory of logic/Logos, but neither are foundationalists. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, but not in a tactical sense. Didn't realize it was a point of contention.

EDIT: So, what's that got to do with monism? The LNC isn't usually claimed to be a substance, even if it is foundational in some sense. — bert1

A monistic view of logic. I take it to mean that logical law is flawless or ought be treated that way. There's plenty of semantic room for other or better terms. It stems from a Logical Nihilism discussion frank and I were privy to.

I think for Hegel a thing contains its opposition. So for redness, non-redness is part of what it is. Everything you think about is like that. You think in oppositions. But dialetheism would be a mystical state of mind? — frank

Unlike the brickhouse arguments in Objective Spirit?

And ↪Cheshire's "a thing can't really be otherwise or not," would be a similar sort of reasoning. Dialetheism is normally argued for in the context of paradoxes related to self-reference (as has been the case in this thread). I think critics would argue that these are no more mysterious than our ability to say things that aren't true (which perhaps IS mysterious). At any rate, the "actual" true contradictions that get thrown out, in the SEP article for example, etc. tend to be far less convincing. For example, "you are either in a room or out, but when you are moving out of a room, at one point you will be in, out, both, or neither." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I haven't started excluding middles quite yet. Not suggesting a paradox either. I'm saying a tautology is the truth relative to your point of view. Which is the case where you don't know the truth about P. P is not (P or ~P), you are (P or ~P) about P. If we have to jump to cases of ambiguous Ps to support the tautology this early, we may have another pointy circle.

Isn't a tautology as much a contradiction as anything? (p or ~p) We always take as true but really it's only going to be 1 p. We aren't describing two possible things. A thing can't really be otherwise or not.

Fair summary. Always a pleasure.

Could you explain that again? Sorry if I'm a little dense.

You're saying that a monistic system has no constraints on truth? — frank

I'm saying the counter argument to the denial of the LNC is explosion from a monistic system. It wants to be correct so bad that it's willing to claim an exception would completely unravel the whole of human knowledge. It's an argument that tries to imply absurdity while being absurd. There's no reason to think a counter instance of the LNC suddenly flips all correspondence to truth on its head. Or that anything can be true if we let in a contradiction. It's over essentialized. It's not necessary for it to hold completely for things to retain a truth value. Or not.

Honestly, I don't think I can. If it looks like the LNC isn't holding for me, I'd wonder if I just had a stroke. :razz: — frank

Right, it's not the strength of the principle rather the thing that's being contradicted. Save self-consistent systems like mathematics where dropping a few laws would probably make a mess of things. In the real world of nuance and context it's the nuance and context. The LNC is a pattern we notice in it, not some meta causal force that makes our arguments correct by force.

Yet the objection is explosion? That's more radical than suggesting the law doesn't hold periodically.

A really good one? A good what? — frank

A really good exception.

I think we call the LNC necessary because we can't conceive an exception. It's not like we thought: "let's ordain this thing!". Right? — frank

It's only "necessary" in monistic or foundational; whatever the word for 'correct' in an academic sense seems most appropriate. Hence, it's that system that promotes explosion. I can tolerate 'laws' not holding occasionally in a relativistic view of logical law.

But, the assumption that 'if we had a really good one' it would have any actual implications to how reality is perceived strikes me as daft. Why does it have to be "necessary" to be in effect.

Like questioning whether a valid argument can be conclusive in the other thread.
So what if the LNC isn't really a law. It still applies enough of the time to consider it a constraint on any conclusions.

So the sense of "complete generality" also allows Russell to consider variations over interpretations and the relationship of interpretations with syntactical elements of languages - it's thus a highly metalinguistic notion. Which is not surprising, as the Logic Of All And Only Universal Principles would need to have its laws apply in complete generality, and thus talk about every other logical apparatus in existence. — fdrake

It's clever, she's avoiding a semantic counter argument by using an essentially open ended term. But not in the sense of fallacy. What does this have to do with logical nihilism? Were people still under the impression there were perfect things and that needed to be addressed?

There are two questions with this pluralism/monism debate: What the heck is the thesis supposed to be, and Who has the burden of proof in addressing it? The answers seem to be, respectively, "Who knows?" and "The other guy!" :lol: — Leontiskos

But we have plenty of criteria and that's what matters.

Right, so what's with complete generality? Why not say all logics.

Well, even "necessary" has differing interpretations depending on which logical system one chooses - S1 through S5 for a start. And we have logical systems that are incomplete. I'm not sure what to say. — Banno

It seems odd to define something as what it can't be. Like a 'law of aviation' can only exist if it applies to lead plane flight. There are no lead planes. There are no laws of aviation.

Bit suspect is all.

Right, it's had excellent branding for years. My question is rather is Russell making up a necessary rule here? Tossing in a strawman universal?Holding in qualified completeness is not holding in completeness. Its other than completeness.

1) To be a law of logic, a principle must hold in complete generality. — Banno

Its sound if complete generality is a thing. Does it follow that it must hold in partial specificity? If following things applies. Is obfuscation a system of logic?

So there are multiple logics? — Banno

Cirtangles for the win

I agree with underlined point completely. The scientific and metaphysical arguments for monism tend to be abductive arguments based on this idea. This is why deflation is problematic as a background assumption. It needs to be an explicit premise, else we end up talking past each other, since the disagreement is really about what is properly "truth-preserving" in the most perfect* sense, not about what is true of formal systems and the logical consequence relationships each uses. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Thanks for the generous read and I'm still looking up some of these references. I suppose I have cake and eat it to approach to deflation. I think we we can know the truth of things. I don't think we have complete access to when that is the case and when it isn't. So its deflationary in the sense that truth claims are only assertions, but the truth itself isn't. Its a thing to be approximated. A type of perfect in this same sense.

Anyhow, I think you get at a good point, in that I can imagine that many who subscribe to "classical metaphysics" (i.e. the serious "neo-neoplatonists" today, or Thomists) might actually agree with the nihilist that laws, as in short, stipulated formulae, are incapable of capturing the logical consequence relationship because they cannot capture analogical predication of truth and being properly. But I think they would disagree in concluding that the logical consequence relationship can be either arbitrary or unintelligible as a unity. Just for an example, I don't think Eriugena's four-fold distinction of being where "to say 'angels exist' is to negate 'man exists'" (when using exists univocally) is going to fit nicely into formal context. You could add four distinct existential quantifiers related by some sort of formalism of analogy, but I don't think that's going to cut it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm still missing the jump from a symbolic system lacks the richness of embedding found in natural language to - logical consequence is arbitrary or unintelligible as a unity. Following your discussion with Leontiskos I get how "interesting" might be on the right path. To say there's a link between a formulated argument and the compulsion to accept it doesn't seem outrageous by any stretch. I just think it's naturally limited to saying, this is why I think I'm right versus why I must be right. The 'right' part is still "truth" properly inflated. But, it's relative to a person and we come with mistakes. Not to say logic doesn't get us closer and contradictions don't indicate a likely error, but neither are flawless indications of inflated truth. So, nihilistic with respect to guarantees, but realistic in thinking ideas ought to be consistent.

I've always noted that disagreements about 1 thing, imply a disagreement about another. Is that a concession to anti-nihilism?

This seems like a useful clarification of terms. Where I have seen the term used, and how it is used in the papers we have been discussing, the idea is that there is no logical consequence relationship. It is not that there is no general consequence relationship that obtains in all cases. The idea that there are truth-preserving rules of logical consequence but that they might vary is called logical pluralism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree, speaking the same language always helps. Based on this I would fall more in the nilishist camp I suppose. The truth of the conclusion isn't a consequence of the premises. I could make most arguments backwards. Any assertion of truth comes with the 'consequence' and it is true or and it is false.

Nihilism seems more to me like we all have wood blocks and jigsaws and we can cut out whatever we please. Which, as an analogy for "how does one derive conclusions from true premises," seems like a poor one if one has any notion that truth is not some sort of post-modern "creative act." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Isn't this just an attempt to dismiss the idea out of hand? I suppose if I thought nihilism was wrong I would posit that the relationship between ideas can be by free association(under nihilism), but I wouldn't confuse it with a compelling position.

This is why deflationism is question begging. You can set up the argument like so:

1. Truth is defined relative to different formalisms.
2. Different formalisms each delete some supposed "laws of logic," such that there are no laws that hold across all formalisms.
3. The aforementioned formalisms each have their own definition of truth and their systems preserve their version of truth.
C: There are no laws vis-á-vis inference from true premises to true conclusions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This sounds more like arguing against the "no general" bit of the definition that you claimed doesn't apply. I guess I'm confused as to what question I'm begging. Do people think that ordering statements they've asserted as true eliminates the possibilty of error? Something more than a persuasive assertion?

There's no formula for making a false statement true when it isn't. So, formulation doesn't cause the truth of something. It simply presents the reasoning in an arguably unnatural way. The truth of things is constrained by the facts and the state of affairs, not the way I choose to write it down. What question is that unfair to? Thanks for the explanation though, I tried to parse it best I can.

Well, logical nihilism is not the position that true and false are always relative, it's the position that nothing follows from anything else. It is certainly easier to argue for it if truth is relative, but it's the claim that truth cannot be inferred. You could presumably claim that there are absolute truths, just not that there is anyway to go from one truth to another. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Pretty sure that's just a conclusion some would assert about it. Saying there's no general rule that universally ties evidence to truth is a bit different than, no logic. And I disagree, if I'm arguing there are multiple routes to a true conclusion then I'm discussing a relativistic system. If I'm just wrong by definition then it's business as usual I suppose, but those sound like secondary assumptions.

No, I'm saying foundationalism/monistic systems lead to explosion. And relativistic truth implies constraint. Where is the correct position of the first puzzle piece? It's anywhere and nowhere. The last one is determined. I'll take the system that relies on the other pieces.

It's always true or false or maybe otherwise relative to some context. Thinking you can establish truth without a point on the map seems like the radical approach. So, nihilism is atheism. A label given to people for being correct.

The problem has always been the assumption of a foundation instead of lateral corroboration. It's like doing a puzzle, but taking all the pieces apart to put a new one in. We don't really confirm things against everything that's come before in a linear process.

It's faith. — frank

Well, if we follow the evidence it suggest that self-reference isn't a reliable source of truth, in the sense the system breaks down per Russell and Godel. So, Popper's principle that we can know the truth about things, but not when in a technical sense has always seemed reasonable to me. It preserves truth and seems to model the evidence available.

That wasn't reframing. We were talking about why a monist might insist on a logic for all cases when it's not clear what that logic would be. — frank

That's my issue with the monistic approach. There's only one correct way to think about it and no one seems to know what that is exactly.

If we accept this, not as a useful tool, but as a claim about truth tout court, what exactly makes STT a better theory of truth than any other? Can it be truly better? True relative to what, itself? — Count Timothy von Icarus

True relative to something else some one could assert. It's an approximation with an arrow toward truth.

The story at least since Russell's paradox and Gödel seems to indicate that this is not what happens. — Banno

Isn't it though? What did they both do but modify their systems. Russell decided you can't have self-referential sets and Godel concluded that no system really has a foundation. And both did it based on the generalized principle that things should make sense. I wasn't being dismissive, if you want a one stop shop for logic that's it. Things ought be sequitur when explained.

If that fits in catagory A or catagory B, I'm not asserting. So, if we need to translate it due the massive hurry philosophers are always in call it
For Every X is some Y
if you want to make it a party
For Every X is some Y or not some Y.

And if we can't agree on that, then what's the point of breaking it down further. All knowledge is likely probabilistic and referential and yet facts exist. Why? Some Y. Or not.

Not really pluralistic. Discovery of the undeniable rejection of monism would be one. If pluralism entails the monism of pluralism then logic has to be pluralistic and essentially monistic in that fact. The error is thinking they're two things.

The problem for logical monism is that if there is only one logic, then which one? — Banno

Generalized. Return to the basic principle things ought to make sense. How that is accomplished may vary.