I have a general question about your system. If one can choose between a morally risky option (say, 50% chance of harm) and an even riskier option (say, 70% chance of harm), is one ever justified in picking the latter? Is it wrong to pick the latter?

If we take justice to mean what I said it meant: actions that have the well-being of the subject at heart (this is too simple, but it will suffice for now) then no. If there is no one's well-being to take into account, then there's no moral act to be done. — Tzeentch

Right but the charity example that I gave did have that. Do you believe donating to charity is not moral? I have the receiver’s interests in mind, but I can never be sure my donation actually furthers those interests.

Any “moral act” as you put it is not moral by this definition, since no one is ever certain they have the power to being their intent about

One either knows and has the power, or they do not. The result of their actions will confirm or deny that. — Tzeentch

Clearly they don’t. If I have never touched a computer in my life, but for some reason was convinced I can hack into the pentagon, and by sheer chance pressing random buttons I succeeded, does that mean I “knew and had the power” to bring about my intentions?

The problem is that there are two alternatives, both of which lead to ridiculous outcomes:

1- If possessing the wisdom and power to accomplish intentions means that there is a 100% chance of success, then no one possesses the wisdom or power, and there are no moral acts

2- If possessing the wisdom and power to accomplish intentions means some degree of certainty (X%) that's less than 100%, then one may possess the wisdom and power to accomplish his benevolent intent, but still fail to do so, leading to a negative outcome (with a (100-X)% chance), leading to some acts being both moral and immoral by the current criteria.

But if you're implying there's always an element of risk involved, I would agree with that — Tzeentch

Doesn’t this mean no one has the power you require for an act to be moral?

My advise would be, before donating to charity, figure out where the money goes.

Perhaps more importantly, aim to do good in ways where one actually possesses the wisdom and power to see it through — Tzeentch

But I can never be certain still, can I? After all, maybe all the evidence I found showing this charity is legit, or that I have the power to see this act through, is a hallucination. It’s possible isn’t it? Therefore no act is moral, as no one can be certain they possess the power to do as they intend 100% of the time

One would assume it gives much reason for pause, humility, reflection. — Tzeentch

But it doesn’t though. If I save someone’s life and he goes on to murder others in one instance, and I save another’s life and he becomes a very benevolent philanthropist, what am I to conclude?

I would certainly advise to spend a great deal of time reflecting on one's actions and their consequences, and if one suspects they have committed injustices unknowingly, to acertain these things — Tzeentch

Agreed. But it’s not every waking moment is it?

Similarly, inaction being wrong would mean you must spend every waking moment checking if you’re being immoral.

And in any case, what kind of argument is it to claim that since inaction being wrong would imply more effort, inaction is not wrong?

That depends on the individual. If one sees they have committed an injustice and it does not prompt them to change in some way, — Tzeentch

Let’s say I bought a piece of candy, like I have been doing for years. As a result, the person selling them makes enough money to buy a new tv. As he goes to buy the new tv he gets killed on the way. I know this happened. Now how would you suggest I change my behavior?

If I happened to be so unlucky that this happens every time I buy a piece of candy, how should I change my behavior then?

This is what I mean when I say that the mere fact that an act turned out wrong doesn’t really tell you what to do. Maybe it was just bad luck. Maybe it actually caused the harm.

What you have is correlation. But you shouldn’t change your behavior based on correlation alone should you?

I guess maybe your point is that the consequences one is ignorant of cannot influence their behavior, and that much is true. — Tzeentch

Not even the ones you’re aware of can always influence it. That’s my point. So what exactly is the point of keeping track of these correlations?

How does it not? Shouldn't the thoughtful person deeply consider the consequences before they act? — Tzeentch

Absolutely. But that’s not what your system advocates. Your system doesn’t judge the morality of the act based on a prediction of likely consequences, aka, before the act is committed. It judges the morality of the act based on what actually ends up happening.

You can’t actually state that murder is wrong by a system that judges after the act. Maybe the person was suicidal. Then it’d be good. But if we’re judging by the likelihood of each outcome, before the act is committed, you can unquestionably say the murder is wrong, as it’s very unlikely to result in a good outcome. This is true regardless of whether or not the victim is suicidal.

Judging by outcome doesn’t invalidate any act, as maybe it turns out good. Judging by expected outcome is what I’m advocating. As it will actually allow you to say X is wrong before doing X

Frankly, the idea that the morality of an action can be determined before the act, that is to say, without knowing the consequences, is entirely untenable. — Tzeentch

Frankly, I chuckled while reading this. I really don’t understand how you can think so.

If I am a fire fighter, and save a 100 people. Then the 101st turns out to be a serial killer and kills a 102 people, have I done something immoral in acting exactly as I’ve acted the 100 times prior all with good results? If so, what should be my takeaway? Am I obligated to retire? How should this new data be interpreted?

Certainly not. It does not influence the casual chain. — Tzeentch

Why not?

it is actually very common that producers are held liable for the harm caused by their products, even if it was never their intention. — Tzeentch

Only when they’re demonstrably negligent. If I put rat poison in candy and sell it, anyone can tell no good will come of that. In other words, only when one can expect that the outcome would be bad.

If I make tables for a living but for some reason, people always kill each other with my tables, I wouldn’t be held liable unless you can demonstrate that I had some reason to expect this outcome, and made the tables anyways.

Standing still is an action. It is something that one is doing, and thus refers to something that is, assuming the individual is actually standing still. — Tzeentch

Again, why is sserping an inaction?

You can detect me standing still (existence/action), and while I am standing still you cannot detect me running (non-existence/inaction). — Tzeentch

Sarah can detect you sserping (existence/action) and while you’re sserping she cannot detect you pressing (non existence/inaction)

What’s wrong with the above?

How do programmers write programs that they can't see? — Harry Hindu

I didn’t say you can’t see code. I said you can’t see code by simply looking at a computer. You can bust open the motherboard and look at it all you want (like looking at a brain) and you won’t see what’s happening in there.

you can see if you have the right software. You can't do this with your mind. — Harry Hindu

False. With the right software I can see what you’re feeling generally well. Whether it’s fear, anger, etc. Brain scans exist. They don’t show everything, but they are showing more and more.

1. The intention of the act must be just. — Tzeentch

2. One must possess the power and wisdom to make their intentions reality. — Tzeentch

criteria 2 cannot be fulfilled, for no other reason that the actor of has very limited control and little to no knowledge over the outcome.

That is to say, having children cannot be a moral act. — Tzeentch

Couldn't this be applied to all acts? After all, if by criteria 2, you mean the power and wisdom to make intentions a reality with 100% chance, then no act at all fulfills that criteria. People aren't omnipotent or omniscient. Let's take giving to charity. There is always a chance that the money I send gets stolen and used to fund the Russian mafia. I do not have the wisdom or power to ensure that that will not happen with 100% certainty. Therefore donating to charity is not moral by this formulation.

It seems clear to me that 100% certainty is not maintainable, or else all acts are not moral. So how certain should we be before an act with benevolent intentions becomes justified?

Also, what is the difference between "not moral" and "immoral"? Is it ok to do "not moral" acts?

An act that has a malicious intention, is immoral, regardless of the outcome.

An act that has a harmful outcome, is immoral, regardless of the intent. — Tzeentch

I have two important questions:

First, what happens when these criteria contradict? So what happens when one has benevolent intent, and has enough certainty that they'll succeed (so the act is moral) but the act has a negative consequence (so the act is immoral)? Or conversely, when one has benevolent intent, but not much certainty (so the act is not moral) but the act turns out ok (so the act is not immoral)? Until this is answered there are many things I cannot address.

And second, what counts as the "outcome" exactly? If, say, I help an old lady cross the road (out of benevolent intent), but then 3 years later she ends up murdering 5 people, have I done something wrong or right? How far into the future do we need to look?

But is it immoral? The same ignorance and hubris are present, with all the risks they bring, yet the intentions were good and no harm has come of it. Maybe it is not immoral. Or maybe it is. Unresolved. — Tzeentch

So? By the current formulation, this hubris and ignorance have no bearing on whether or not an act is immoral. Why do they factor in?

If the presence of this "hubris" makes the morality of an act undecided, then the morality of all well intentioned unharmful acts is undecided, since you consider anything less than 100% "hubris"

I don't think a system could make any sense without taking both into account. — Tzeentch

Of course, and one could always bet on those chances if one felt they had ample reason to do so. — Tzeentch

And this is the issue. Your system cannot say "this is wrong". Only "this was wrong". Who cares about the latter? It's already done. What does knowing that an act happened to be wrong accomplish? It doesn't guide you towards living morally.

It rests on the assumption that one is interested in living a moral life. If one isn't interested in that, this entire discussion isn't relevant to them. — Tzeentch

But as I explained, since your system also has the morality of acts depend on their consequences, you never know the morality of an act before it is done. So by the same logic shouldn't you spend every waking moment tracking the consequences of every act you have ever committed to ensure that they didn't have bad consequences that would make them immoral? Do you do that?

And let's say you do manage to track act X to have resulted in a negative consequence (putting aside the "how far into the future should we look" question), it doesn't seem like that fact alone (that an act happened to turn out wrong) would have any bearing on future behavior. If it doesn't impact your behavior surely it doesn't lead you to live a more or less moral life? So then, how does your system lead to a more moral life if doesn't impact behavior?

If impositions are in any way meaningful, one may expect some kind of signal from the person who one supposedly imposed on. — Tzeentch

Even then, one can bet on the chance that they're hallucinating that particular signal, once again making their intention benevolent. And since the morality of an act is only determined by its consequence at that point, they are free to do anything. The "intention" requirement is trivial to fill. And the consequence requirement doesn't deter an act. Resulting in an ethics that cannot say anything is immoral until after it's committed.

But if you take this discussion as an imposition on my part, and you find it impossible for yourself to stop partaking in this conversation for whatever reason, let me know and I'll stop. — Tzeentch

Hypothetically, if someone found your holding this belief that impositions are wrong, itself an imposition on them, and asked you to stop, would you? If not, why not? What justifies that imposition?

Whoever put them in their predicament is causing their death. — Tzeentch

Multiple things can cause the same event correct? It's not just the person that put them in their predicament, but also the person that supplied him with the tools, and the person that supplied him with funds, and so on. You sserping the button is also part of the causal chain. Any change in these variables could have prevented the event. However some people are responsible and some aren't.

Let's take the person who built the pods to trap Sarah and Jeff. If said person knew what their use would be, and built them anyways, is he wrong? Now, importantly, if he didn't know, and they happened to be used for evil, is he wrong?

By your system the answer would be yes to both correct? Because if the consequence is bad, then the act is wrong regardless of intention. How might one ever act morally then? Or conversely, if every single act can be immoral or moral assuming benevolent intention, isn't every act done with benevolent intention justified?

I explained; the difference between action and inaction is similar to that which is and that which isn't. — Tzeentch

That doesn't help very much. I can cite one of many differences between existence and non existence. For one: Existing things can be detected, non existing things cannot. Can you similarly cite a difference between action and inaction?

.. , what tells you that sserping is an inaction, instead of an action?
— khaled

It refers to something that isn't. — Tzeentch

How so? What is the "something" in this case?

I don't quite understand this critique as you've already claimed that the same act can be an action or an inaction based on.... I don't know:

Standing still is an act(ion). But while one is standing still, one may also be in inaction. — Tzeentch

But now you claim that there is a category for action/inaction that depends on "whether they refer to something that is/isn't". So is standing still an action or inaction now? Does it refer to something that isn't or something that is? Maybe if you answer these questions I could better understand what you mean by "refers to something that is/isn't"

My mind is not made up of jittering neurons and electric currents. My mind is made up of colors, shapes, sounds, smells, tastes and feelings. — Harry Hindu

I don't think anyone disagreed with that.

Why can't you see a mind when you look at a brain — Harry Hindu

For the same reason you can't see a program when looking at a computer.

like you can see walking when looking at legs? — Harry Hindu

I doubt you see all legs walking. If they belong to a sleeping person for example, it is very likely you can't see walking in those legs.

legs and the ground, both of which are processes themselves. Processes all the way down. — Harry Hindu

I think I'll stick to what I have.

delete

I think that question makes as much sense as "Why is this car a car? Why is this car not a chocolate cake? Out of all the things the car could have been, it turned out to be a car, not some type of cake! That just blows my mind"

“Causing change to occur in conformity with will”

Isn’t that literally everything we do? Or at least try to do?

I am however seriously considering the possibility that the act of having children is immoral. — Tzeentch

This is what I mean. But by the current standard, you cannot tell the morality of an act beforehand. So having children would only be wrong if the child grows up hating their life wouldn't it? Assuming of course that the parents don't have malicious intent with their children. What further consideration is needed?

An intent to harm can by itself be immoral. — Tzeentch

Well then it looks like further amendment is needed. It's not just about the consequence anymore, the morality of an act also depends on the intent before it takes place. What to do when those contradict?

If one has a benevolent intent but the outcome is bad, was the act immoral? Was the morality of the act determined after or before the act in this case?

On the other hand, if the intent is malicious, but the outcome is good, was the act immoral? Was the morality of the act determined after or before the act in this case?

What's the "timeline of morality" here? Is the morality of the act initially determined by intent but then we "add" the consequence after the act is done and recalculate the morality of the act? If so, what's the point of this extra addition and recalculation? That's the best I can make of this so far.

I've never come across a system that determines the morality of the act both before (intent) and after (consequence) the act, so I'm confused on what to make of this.

If we make the judgement that somehow, because we perceive the pinch to be only a minor sacrifice, we are justified in imposing on Jeff we open a box of Pandora. — Tzeentch

I think the idea that no matter how minor the sacrifice, it cannot be imposed, is a much bigger Pandora's box. I understand one should be very careful if they intend to impose a sacrifice, but not so careful that it's always wrong.

Besides, doesn't saving Sarah fall under "benevolent intent"? So the outcome could be wrong (benevolent intent, but the act ends up contradicting Jeff's wishes). What makes you so sure it is wrong? What variables determine when benevolent intent overrides the consequences of an act and when it doesn't?

This is how I would personally judge this hypothetical situation and I could of course be wrong. Maybe Jeff's anger is entirely out-of-character in which case one could take a risk, just like when he was intoxicated. — Tzeentch

Couldn't you say this regardless of how out of character the anger is? There is always a chance that Jeff doesn't mean what he says, or a chance that it's actually not Jeff speaking but you hallucinating. What if one bets on those chances? Can your system definitively state that imposing a sacrifice on Jeff is wrong? I don't see how it could given that morality is determined after the act is done, and given that the intent in this case is benevolent (save Sarah).

But you also seem sure that it is wrong. Why is that?

Because if inaction towards a perceived problem is immoral, then every moment not spent solving the problems one perceives is immoral. — Tzeentch

Correct. Now how would this imply that one has to spend all their time fixing things?

In your system, action can be immoral if it's against the victim's interest. That doesn't mean that one has to spend every waking moment checking if their actions have imposed or not does it? You typed many responses to me, did you once ask me if you were imposing?

One doesn't need to spend every waking moment checking if their inaction is immoral for the same reason you don't spend every waking moment checking if your action is immoral.

Personally, I think inaction is only immoral towards those situations one has voluntarily taken responsibility for. — Tzeentch

And how does responsibility work? Many would argue that you have a responsibility to save Sarah in that scenario.

Can one ethically have a child and choose not to take on the responsibility associated? If not, then it is not clear that responsibility is entirely voluntary.

I think there is, and I also think it is fundamental. — Tzeentch

What is it then?

Sarah has no grounds to demand (impose) one's involvement in their predicament. — Tzeentch

But they are involved aren't they? They're sserping the button! They're causing her death!

Standing still is an act(ion). But while one is standing still, one may also be in inaction. For example, one is not running. — Tzeentch

Well this doesn't help much. If the same act can be an action and an inaction, what tells you that sserping is an inaction, instead of an action?

I'm not sure what the example implies. Do you mean for example, that if I have an intended act X, then doing X is an action and not doing X is an inaction? What's the principle at work in the example?

To the same extent that a program is identical to a computer.

Incidentally, before I begin, you’re an antinatalist correct? Or am I misremembering?

If one did, it was permissable. If one didn't, it wasn't. There's no way to determine the morality of such an act beforehand, hence the risk. — Tzeentch

A consequentialist answer then? One cannot tell beforehand if what he’s about to do is permissible or not.

I don’t see how you square it with this however:

Just like when one intends to kill someone but fails, that is still an immoral act. — Tzeentch

The first quote implies that an attempt at murder is never wrong (“there is no way to determine the morality of the act beforehand”). Successful murder is itself only conditionally wrong (wrong only if the victim wants to live)

The second implies that the attempt itself is wrong.

Yes — Tzeentch

This is a situation where one could reasonably assume that the desires expressed by Jeff are not his true desires but a result of a deteriorated mental state. One could take the risk.

Whether that decision is right or wrong can only be accertained after Jeff sobers up. — Tzeentch

I find it curious that if Jeff is drunk then we shouldn’t respect his intentions, but when he’s malicious we should.

If it was 20 people in that room, and Jeff was purely evil, would it still be wrong? If there were 100 would it still be wrong? What about if it was between Jeff’s wish to cause death and the entirety of the human race on the other end? Would it still be immoral to pinch Jeff?

The issue with this is that it implies that inaction is immoral, which in turn implies that one has to spend their every waking moment and ounce of energy solving what one perceives to be the world's problems — Tzeentch

Yes I do believe inaction is sometimes immoral, but I don’t see how that means that we must spend every waking moment trying to fix things. As to why I believe inaction is sometimes immoral (one of the reasons):

There is no fundamental difference between action and inaction.

Let’s return to Jeff and Sarah. We say that the action is pressing a button correct? Let me coin a new verb: “sserp” and it means “to not press”. So now, Sarah can accuse you of imposing on her by sserping the button.

The split between action and inaction is a trick of the language.

This idea hasn’t gone under much scrutiny I’ll admit, so I’m curious what you’ll say. What is it about sserping that makes it an inaction as opposed to an action? What separates them in general?

Is standing still an action or inaction?

I find very little I disagree with in this comment.

No, not undoubtedly. As I tried to make clear, there must be a conflict of desires or the impression thereof to make it an imposition. — Tzeentch

Ok let's go with that. I'm assuming we're still using "all impositions are wrong"

In this example one can reasonably assume Jeff would want to be pinched if it meant saving Sarah, and thus one may choose to take that risk. But it is still a risk.

If it turns out Jeff disagrees, one has made an imposition. — Tzeentch

But the question is whether or not taking the risk is permissible. Is it permissible to risk imposing when our best judgement shows that it's the best option?

I ammended my claim, leaving the question of self-defense unresolved for now. Why skip over that? — Tzeentch

I didn't intend to. I misinterpreted it. I thought you meant to say that the morality of self defense is unknowable, not unknown, so I tried to show how it's clear from your definitions that it would be wrong.

Now let me change the situation a bit, because I'm not convinced that this:

If it is not one's desire to impose, but one is instead for whatever reason to make a judgement call, the desires of the victim and one's ability to accurately determine them become key. — Tzeentch

Is the end all be all. I'm not sure it's purely the imposition victim who has to be taken into account but rather also the victims of not imposing

Suppose Sarah is Jeff's ex-wife and he hates her with a burning passion. So much so, that he doesn't mind dying with her, and so verbally and loudly opposes your decision to pinch him to save both. Now does it become immoral to pinch Jeff? By the current formulation, you know you'd be opposing Jeff's intent, and so it would be an imposition, and so wrong. Do you agree with that?

Or another situation, imagine the Jeff is stoned out of his mind and mumbles something about how he hates blue so much so don't you dare press the blue button. Incidentally, that's the button to pinch Jeff. Would it be wrong to press it then?

In case it wasn't clear, the fact that one has to use force to make someone act in accordance with one's desires generally implies conflicting desires, and conflicting desires (or the impression thereof, in case of intentions) are key to determining whether something is an imposition. — Tzeentch

Again, I see contradiction between that and this:

If I do something to someone, not knowing it was their intent to do so anyways, have I imposed?
— khaled

And you answered:

Yes, but by coincidence you haven't done harm. — khaled

In one you claim that an imposition is an imposition regardless of the intent of the victim. In the other, you claim that the victim's intent is "key to determining whether something is an imposition". Which definition shall we proceed with?

And the real answer is, I don't know. — Tzeentch

But pinching Jeff is undoubtedly an imposition, yes? Does this mean that you're not sure if all impositions are wrong anymore?

That judgement could be completely wrong though, and if it is, one has made a mistake. — Tzeentch

Is this a form of consequentialism? It sounds to me like you're implying that an imposition is wrong only if it ends up conflicting with the victim's interests. Am I correct?

The crucial factor here, as mentioned in the previous line, is that one doesn't know if one is making an imposition. One can reasonably assume that Jeff agrees pinching him is much better than Sarah dying, but again, one could be wrong in which case one has certainly made an imposition, which is wrong. — Tzeentch

I believe there is a contradiction here. Remember I asked you already:

If I do something to someone, not knowing it was their intent to do so anyways, have I imposed? — khaled

And you answered:

Yes, but by coincidence you haven't done harm. — Tzeentch

But here you say that one "doesn't know if they're making an imposition", implying that if Jeff had been fine with getting pinched to save him and Sarah, then pinching him is not an imposition.

Additionally, by your original definition, pinching is certainly an imposition. So which is it? Is doing something to someone without consent, and it happening to coincide with their intentions, an imposition or not?

Perhaps now you understand why I often ask for clarification.

If one consciously attempts to use force to make someone act in accordance to one's desires, it is wrong regardless of the outcome. — Tzeentch

This seems to be your original definition of imposition, which is always wrong. We can agree that pinching Jeff falls here yes? (Desire: save Jeff and Sarah, Force: Pinch) If so that would make it wrong. But you said at the start that you're not sure.

One could imagine a situation where the other may be grateful for the imposition afterwards - lets say I push someone out of the way of a moving car. But in this example am I imposing my desires on someone, or simply acting on behalf of theirs? — Tzeentch

Again, intentions matter. — Tzeentch

I'm not sure why that would matter, could you elaborate? So far, your ethical system ruled out all impositions as wrong. So I'm not sure how intention factors into it. And intentions aren't mentioned in your definition of imposition as far as I can see.

It's just that you also tried to argue that stopping psychotic killers is not an imposition, ...
— khaled

I haven't argued that — Tzeentch

I thought you did here:

However, in such a situation one could argue that one is not imposing. — Tzeentch

The question that remains is whether it is also immoral to impose in such a situation. — Tzeentch

If you claim that all impositions are wrong, and that this (self defense) is an imposition, what question remains? Isn't the answer clearly that it's wrong? Which statement would you change (either not all impositions are wrong, or self defense is not an imposition)

Sure. If I try to deny a person from sitting in a chair by sitting there myself, and the person just walks by and never noticed I attempted to impose on them, was I not wrong for trying to impose on them in the first place? — Tzeentch

I certainly don't think you're always wrong. If you owned the chair, I would say you are definitely not wrong for instance. Do you believe that you would be wrong even then?

I'll try to keep it shorter this time. If I miss anything important, quote it and I'll address it.

Inaction would not be wrong. It is also not right. It is neutral.

In this instance one could use their best judgement to conclude that pinching Jeff is a meaningless imposition that does not compare in any way to being burned alive, and thus choose to impose on Jeff and save Sarah. Jeff will probably agree and thank you for it. If he doesn't, you have made a terrible mistake, but alas people aren't perfect. — Tzeentch

Would you say it is wrong to press either button here? Let's for a moment agree that inaction here (leaving them both to die) is neutral, though I find that ridiculous. Thus we have 3 alternatives:

1- Pinch Jeff
2- Kill Sarah
3- Allow both to die

The first 2 are undoubtedly impositions. The last is supposedly not. Since impositions are wrong that leaves us with the conclusion that it's wrong to pinch Jeff and so save both of their lives, and that the morally correct option (relatively, it's a neutral option with 2 bad alternatives) is to allow both to die. Do you agree with this?

In this instance one could use their best judgement to conclude that pinching Jeff is a meaningless imposition that does not compare in any way to being burned alive, and thus choose to impose on Jeff and save Sarah. Jeff will probably agree and thank you for it. If he doesn't, you have made a terrible mistake, but alas people aren't perfect. — Tzeentch

Is it right to refer to better judgement, even if it involves imposing? (different way of asking the same question as above)

Yes, but by coincidence you haven't done harm. — Tzeentch

Ok. Next question: Is such an imposition wrong regardless of how certain we are that the victim will not mind it?

Once one starts imposing based on their conviction on having the better guess, that's when things get muddy quickly. That's what I meant with saying it is debatable. — Tzeentch

I think the alternative, where one doesn't impose whatsoever, is much muddier.

Ok, so I do my duty, I do all I can to come to a "sense of the better guess", and then start imposing my ideas on you. They just happen to be wildly different from yours, but that doesn't matter — Tzeentch

Why would it not matter? My having wildly different ideas should be reason to reevaluate the quality of your research. Clearly someone should be careful before imposing, I don't disagree with that. I disagree with the idea that it's always wrong to impose.

If I thought that stabbing a power outlet with a fork would produce candy, please, kindly impose on me and stop me. By your system, such an imposition would be wrong. That's what I'm against.

It is not a slight imposition. A law is an imposition made under threat of violence. — Tzeentch

Banning people from drinking while they're driving is very slight. They can drink afterwards. Or get a taxi or a friend to drive them. That's what I meant by "slight", not how strongly it's enforced.

I don't disagree with them at all. In fact, I am willing to consider that they are right. It would be consistent with the rest of my ideas.

I'm also willing to consider that the direct protection of one's physical body deserves a clause. — Tzeentch

No offense, but I don't much care for what you're "willing to consider" and I mean this in the nicest way possible. I'm interested in what you're arguing. If you argue that imposition is always wrong, that means there are no such clauses.

If you change your argument by adding said clause, I would ask why you added this specific clause, and which other clauses may be added.

Doubtful. I'll maintain that the more conflict-prone individuals there are, the more conflicts there are. And the more conflict-avoidant individuals there are, the fewer conflicts there are. — Tzeentch

If so, then why did you claim that my ideas were "the source of all human conflict" if it's only about "conflict proneness"?

I've provided a straight-forward definition in the very post you replied to. Please, lets keep our discussion honest. — Tzeentch

I apologize. I didn't mean to be dishonest. It's just that you also tried to argue that stopping psychotic killers is not an imposition, when it very clearly is by that initial definition. That's why I asked for clarification.

The fact that there's no one to notice it only stops you from doing harm, so the imposition is meaningless, but it is still an imposition.

Intention matters. — Tzeentch

So are you saying that, by denying you this space (where I'm sitting) I am imposing on you? You also maintain that all impositions are wrong correct? Wouldn't that mean that I'm doing something wrong by being sat here? I suspect I misunderstood you, I can't quite tell what you mean here.

Since someone will always occupy some space, and if doing so is an imposition, how would one go about not imposing in your system? Does your system not permit someone to not be wrong?

If I try to kill someone, but I fail and the victim never notices I tried to kill them, was I not wrong for trying to kill them? — Tzeentch

Agreed. Is this intended as an analogy for sitting in chairs?

Neither. They're both imposing on each other and thus both are wrong. It only takes one of them to wisen up and step aside, but they both choose not to. It's a conflict of egos. — Tzeentch

Ok, how about we generalize a bit. Say A tries to impose X on B, and B tries to impose Y on A. In this scenario, it seems your system would produce that both A and B are wrong, regardless of X and Y correct? And if A wants to not be wrong, he should cease trying to impose X and if B wants to not be wrong he should cease trying to impose Y. Do you agree with this?

You pasted the URL for the URL shortener. Not the actual URL

I thought you meant differences between individuals don’t exist. You clarified.

division between people is arbitrary and artificial, or at least superficial, the differences continuous instead of discrete — tim wood

Gotcha.

Depends on how you define "I" or "my", There is a thread going about it.

In my experience "I" has no defined meaning. It is a great superpower of humans to be able to switch what they mean by themselves, and to recognize certain parts as "of them" or "alien". When someone scores a touchdown it's "all me baby" but when they murder someone it's all "the voices"

'I' in the sense of it being the cohesive centre of experiences and it appears to exist throughout life, as the central focus in human identity. — Jack Cummins

That's one use. Very rarely used though. For one, this use doesn't allow possessiveness. By this definition: "I own a car" makes no sense. Neither do most other uses. "I thought about X" also doesn't make sense by this definition, etc.

I wonder why does each of have an 'I' as an aspect of consciousness, or self consciousness? Are human beings the only living beings with a sense of 'I'? — Jack Cummins

By the definition of "I" you're using, you wouldn't know if each person has an "I" in the first place. Much less anything else.

I think open, closed, and empty individualism also ties into this topic.

@Tzeentch said both of those. Go ask him.

What do you do when some fool comes around with "a sense of the better guess" — Tzeentch

Opinions are all equally silly — Tzeentch

It's not about getting everything right. It's simply revising your position when it's contradictory. Partially correct isn't a contradiction. "I am partially correct and also fully correct and also not correct at all" is.

It’s not racist or sexist to change the gender of fictional characters. Doing so at the expense of quality is stupid though. I don’t think the movie advertised how the Ancient One is a woman so it didn’t seem out of place.

Too often producers change the gender of a character, then mention the fact that the character is now a woman/man every other scene. That’s annoying. If they want to make a movie about gender discrimination, they can do that, they don’t have to shove it into another story.

there is no such thing as race — tim wood

I tend to stay away from threads about race, but I’m interested in what this means. Just seems arcane to me since I don’t participate in those kinds of threads.

Ideas can approximate reality to varying degrees, and the closer they approximate reality, the "better" (for the lack of a better term) they are. — Tzeentch

Ok. So at least we're past "all opinions are equally silly" yes? I can agree with the above.

But I'm not sure you answered the question anywhere. Can I assume you mean to say that your goal here is to arrive at ideas that approximate reality even better?

I realize however, that I am fallible and have no way to confirm, therefore I shall not impose those ideas on anyone. — Tzeentch

An important thing to point out: The idea that we should not impose because we're fallible is just as susceptible to being wrong as any other idea. Agreed?

I haven't proposed a principle of non-interference. I have however stated that I do not think non-interference is an imposition. — Tzeentch

My misunderstanding.

In your example I would say it is not wrong to remove someone from a train track who is clearly being held there against their will. — Tzeentch

But it's not clear if they're being held against their will or if they're there by choice. Maybe it's actually a very expensive movie shot, and the tied person is an actor and by attempting to remove them you would ruin the shot. What to do then?

In other words, what do we do when we're not sure if we're imposing or not?

And I would like some further clarification on what makes an imposition: If I do something to someone, not knowing it was their intent to do so anyways, have I imposed? If, for instance, I wake someone up not knowing whether or not they wanted to be woken up, and it turns out that they actually did want to wake up at that time because they have an appointment, have I imposed?

Correct me if I am wrong, but you have stated that when one gets the sense one's ideas are closer to truth, one gets a right to impose them. — Tzeentch

Yes. Though one also has a duty to do as much research as they can to make sure their idea is actually closer to truth.

I also don't believe choosing non-interference (leaving the person on the track) is wrong — Tzeentch

Does this apply regardless of the potential damage and ease of the act? If, for instance you had a button that could cure all strains of COVID, is it morally permissible not to press it and just walk away?

You may state that because 90% of subjects could not drive at an acceptable level, the other 10% may rightfully be imposed upon. — Tzeentch

That's not quite it. The problem is that it's a choice of either imposing slightly on 10% of drivers or imposing on everyone a much higher risk of accidents (including said drivers in the first place). This gets difficult to discuss without a clear definition of what an imposition is. Is refusing to instantiate a law that you know will benefit the community an imposition? Or is instantiating it the imposition?

But better than not trying. — khaled

Debatable. I'm sure you're aware of what happens when collectives disagree on what is the better guess. — Tzeentch

Isn't attempting at getting a better answer better in your eyes too? If it wasn't, why would you comment here?

If we didn't try to get at better guesses, any guess would be just as good. Wars happen when large amounts of people disagree on something. Imagine what would happen if everyone disagreed on everything. That would be worse wouldn't it?

It seems to me you believe that if we recognized our fallibility, and thus gave up on trying to approach objectivity, people wouldn't be trying to impose as much. I think the opposite will happen, people will try to impose more.

How? — Tzeentch

Because that's the described situation. Either you press a button that kills Jeff. You press a button that kills Sarah. Or you press neither (escaping would involve this) and both die. (I'm not sure if I kept the same names)

I could make it a bit more obvious. Let's say one button would impose on Jeff by pinching him. The other button would impose on Sarah by burning her alive. Walking away leads to both being burned alive. Now in all situations, you're imposing correct? Or do you think that walking away here is not an imposition? Incidentally, do you think non interference is right here too?

I do follow that, since I've never been in the highly unlikely situation that my life is directly threatened — Tzeentch

I said you would impose sometimes, so you don't follow that maxim. Point is that you would be willing to break it at a specific degree of inconvenience. Just that yours is supposedly much higher than most. You claimed that you apply the principle consistently but to say that you must seriously believe self defense is morally wrong.

However, in such a situation one could argue that one is not imposing. — Tzeentch

That's what I would argue, but I've been using your definition of imposing this whole time, and it seemed to me that you counted even self defense as imposition, so I didn't question it.

An imposition is the use of force to make an individual act in accordance to one's desires. Force can be physical, it can be verbal, it can be mental, etc. — Tzeentch

This seems to fit the bill here too though. One of your desires is for the psychotic killer not to kill you. And you impose that one desire on the killer through the use of force do you not? I don't think your definition leaves much wiggle room.

Then again, maybe the right thing to do is to sit there and accept one's fate - to turn the other cheek. Perhaps that is what Buddha would do. And didn't Jesus carry his own cross to Golgotha to die on it? I'm willing to consider that option. — Tzeentch

In ethics it all depends on your starting premises. Do you truly believe that turning the other cheek is always the correct thing to do? Some people do. Some people would just sit there and die. But neither of us would, so we seem to agree that turning the other cheek is not always the correct thing to do. Pointing out that others disagree is not helpful for this conversation because we both disagree with said others.

What do you do when some fool comes around with "a sense of the better guess" and starts imposing on you? — Tzeentch

Impose on him by stopping him because I have the better guess.

These ideas are all fine and good, until someone comes around to uses them against you, and that is essentially the root of all human conflict. — Tzeentch

Oh I don't doubt that they're the root of human conflict. But I maintain that your ideas would lead to much more conflict. If the fool believes in my ideas as I do, he would cease his imposition the moment he realizes his guess is bad. He would even apologize and thank me for showing him a better guess.

In your case, there is nothing that can be used to stop the psychotic killer or the fool. I would try to imagine a world where everyone think all impositions are wrong but I can't really do so without knowing what you mean by imposition, which brings me to the next point:

Correct, assuming the standing person is not consciously attempting to deny the other person of this space. If it is a conscious attempt to deny, it is an imposition. — Tzeentch

This doesn't help much. I noticed you also ignored my question on what constitutes an imposition.

I'm sat in this chair right now. Right now I am denying you the space I am sitting in. Is that an imposition? I doubt it. What if the stander doesn't see it as denying? After all, what of the person trying to pass? Isn't he consciously trying to deny the stander that space as well? Isn't he the one asking the stander to move?

The stander would tell you the walker is imposing, by trying to deny him that space. The walker would tell you the stander is imposing, by trying to deny him that space. Who's right here? Both only see the other as imposing because they feel entitled to that passage. Who's entitled to the passage? This is why I asked for a clarification on what imposition is.

Incidentally, this is why I believe your system would lead to more conflict. People believe they're being imposed on all the time. People believe they're entitled to all sorts of different things. If we didn't try to systematize these beliefs, and lay out clear boundaries for acceptable and unacceptable activity, there would be way more conflict, not less. Even if this systematization sometimes inevitably makes some feel like they're being imposed upon, a lack of it would mean virtually everyone feeling they're being imposed upon.

It is our reason that tells us that our sensations (some of them - I am not going to keep putting in this qualification hereafter) are resembling an actual world. — Bartricks

Sensations - some of them - tell us about reality by resembling it. — Bartricks

How did you come to this conclusion? How do you know this:

At the moment there appears - visually - to be a blue mug on my desk. If there is no desk or mug there in reality and I am actually stood in a field, then I am not seeing the field by means of the visual appearance of the mug and desk, for there is barely any resemblance between the field that is actually there and the mug and desk I am getting the impression of. A fortiori, if there was no resemblance at all between my sensations and the external world, I would not be perceiving the world at all but living in a dream world. — Bartricks

is not the case? Because it seems to me that defining sensations to be "of reality" iff they resemble something leads to us not knowing if our sensations are "of reality" or of some dream world. Just like how you can't be sure from the contents of a painting whether or not it represents a real landscape or something the author imagined.

I have not claimed that all sensations are 'of' things (indeed, the word 'of' is ambiguous anyway). — Bartricks

I took it as part of the definition. I wouldn't use the word "sensation" without it being of something. "Sensation of heat", "Sensation of cold" etc. I have never seen "sensation" used in vacuum without it being a sensation OF something, have you? I can't think of a sentence that uses "sensation" without it being a sensation of something.

I wouldn't call imagination a sensation for instance. The confusion may be due to us not using "sensation" in the same way.

Is a civil tone of conversation too much to ask? — Tzeentch

My apologies

I post on this forum to test my ideas, — Tzeentch

But you believe that any idea is as good as another. What does “testing” mean then? All the ideas are just as good what is there to test?

Non-interference is not an imposition. — Tzeentch

There is no such thing as non interference sometimes. But let’s test this theory. You see a train barreling at someone who’s tied to the tracks. By this principle of non interference, it would be wrong to attempt to remove them. Do you agree with that?

Reason requires premises. Those premises are moral intuitions. — khaled

Context.

It's what your arguments seem to boil down to every time you try to explain what constitutes a "better guess" — Tzeentch

Where did you get that? What argument is the one that boiled down to that?

But what constitutes a better guess, then? — Tzeentch

Closer to truth.

How do we tell when that’s the case? Very difficult. But better than not trying.

Try to escape? — Tzeentch

This would get everyone killed. Have you not been paying attention? Do you still believe this is the right answer?

Don't impose. — Tzeentch

The problem is that you don’t follow this. Admittedly, you would impose sometimes. You just pretend to think it’s wrong to do so in those times.

Debatable. I don't pretend to have all the answers, but I don't take shortcuts and apply principles consistently. — Tzeentch

What shortcuts am I taking?

And no you don’t. Admittedly, you would stop a psychotic killer barreling towards you.

And a separate problem is that these principles cannot be applied consistently. There are situations where inaction is an imposition. Or do you not think so? The example of someone standing in the way and not moving is good. He’s not doing anything to you, is he? How is he interfering? You’re the one that wants him to move. So he’s not imposing correct?

I want to understand how exactly you define an imposition. Because “non interference” doesn’t seem to be it.

I'm really interested in your answer to this before we move on:

If you truly think there is no opinion that's better than another, why discuss anything at all? Whatever you end up with will be just as good as what you started with. What do you hope to accomplish in this thread (or any thread)? — khaled

I see a performative contradiction between what you say and the fact that you're still replying.

So assuming you know how to play the game according to the rules that you believe it should be played by, it is true? — Tzeentch

Yes

Mathematics is not objective. — Tzeentch

Uh, ye it is. <---- This is as valid as the above statement.

Make an argument, or don't say anything. No one is interested in admittedly silly opinions.

If the whole world believed the same lie, it wouldn't make it true. — Tzeentch

But you think "true" in an objective sense doesn't make sense in the first place. Ok. Agreed. Now can something be "intersubjectively true"? As in after passing all the different filters everyone still gets the same thing.

You are seeing these problems as well. You spoke about them openly. And obviously there are entire collections of philosophy that discuss these problems; a discussion that is as old as philosophy itself. You're choosing the dismiss these fundamental discussions for practical reasons, and I do not. — Tzeentch

So let me get this straight: Do you believe that we have no right to impose because of a lack of objectivity?

That still leaves you with the problem of what to do when not imposing is not an option. That's the fundamental problem with your philosophy. You believe in every situation there is the "aggressor" or "imposer" and the victim. You believe one can choose "Don't impose" at every turn. What you don't recognize is sometimes inaction IS imposing, like with the buttons example.

Imposition is unavoidable. You can either pretend it's always wrong, and so have no rules to stop you or anyone else from doing it (because stopping an imposition is an imposition so is wrong), or you can actually try to do philosophy.

Maybe so, but they're still only guesses, and the brightest minds have been wrong on countless occasions about things they thought were true. Horrible things have been done under the guise of ignorantly believing one has all the answers. — Tzeentch

So what do we do about this? Not act until we're sure? You're acting right now. If the brightest minds have been wrong before what chance do you or me have of being right? How do you know you're not imposing unknowingly? Perhaps you are. Maybe we should just not act? Another performative contradiction.

You begin by saying we can't be 100% sure of anything (objective knowledge is inaccessible), then go on to say that we shouldn't act unless we're 100% sure. Then you act. And when asked how you justify your action you don't respond.

The only disagreement I have is with the "we shouldn't act unless we're 100% sure" bit. Clearly you don't believe it, so why pretend you do? Or do you think any action is wrong for it could possibly be an imposition without us knowing? (again, making the whole conversation moot)

Are all premises moral intuitions? — Tzeentch

No, where did you get that?

Because moral intuitions differ of course. If I had a moral intuitions that makes me believe stoning women for adultery is fair and just (In certain parts of the world a lot of people even agree with me - must mean I have some "better guess than others"), should I just start imposing that on the people around me because I believe it is right? — Tzeentch

First off, quote where I said that agreement of a large group is what makes a better guess. Or stop putting words in my mouth. Again, if you want to argue against made up arguments, do so alone.

But no, clearly you shouldn't. Because large agreement doesn't make something right. It's a factor, not the end all be all.

Now let me ask you a similar question: If someone had the belief that women should be stoned, period, and so started stoning a close family member would it be right if you just imposed on him by stopping him just because you believe he's wrong and you're right??!?!??!??!?!?!

We don't know what gravity is, so we don't know if it exists or not. We found a way to predict how a certain phenomenon works to a degree that is accurate enough for our practical purposes. — Tzeentch

How about "things fall to earth when they are within 1 meter of the ground and there is no solid impedance in their path" vs "things don't fall to earth when they are within 1 meter of the ground and there is no solid impedance in their path". Is one a better guess than the other?

Stop being tedious.

You are seeing these problems as well. You spoke about them openly. And obviously there are entire collections of philosophy that discuss these problems; a discussion that is as old as philosophy itself. You're choosing the dismiss these fundamental discussions for practical reasons, and I do not. — Tzeentch

Even if true, there would still be many more problems in your philosophy than mine, as well as a slew of performative contradictions. Why is mine the only one getting critiqued here? Just the pot calling the kettle black.

The problems created by ignoring some "philosophical" issues for practicality (which only you seem to think is what's happening) are much fewer than the problems created by thinking no answers are possible at all.

And I'll ask you the same question again: What gives you the authority to decide what's a problem and what isn't? Or are you simply stating another admittedly silly opinion? What do you hope to gain by doing so?

I must nothing.

My tip would be, do not get involved in situations that have only bad outcomes. — Tzeentch

Ok. Say you got kidnapped in your sleep and forced in that situation. Now what? Should we not sleep so that may never happen?

Stop dodging the question. It's prudent and more wise to recognize the limitations of a broken system than to dodge any attempt at critique.

Sure that is possible, unless one's desires require one to impose them on other individuals. — Tzeentch

Well this seems to be the case. So what is to be done by your system? Or is it so useless it only tells us "if no one has an intention to impose on another then the right thing to do is to not impose, but the second one desires to impose on another..... dodge the question!"

Maybe you cannot have everything you want. — Tzeentch

What was this about then:

But I don't believe such a practical limitation exists — Tzeentch

(looking back I took this to mean that you think no practical limitations exist at all, maybe that's not what you meant in which case ignore this)

If you feel the need to get personal, maybe it is time you sit on the time-out chair for a little while. — Tzeentch

What's personal about it? I'm stating a fact. Asking "why why why" tends to stop at a young age as children realize it's a pointless exercise.

If you're getting aggravated maybe you should heed your own words:

Anger is vulnerability, and when opinions of others make one angry, perhaps it is out of fear they may be right? — Tzeentch

I’m not sure it’s so much a desire for consistency as much as a hatred of inconsistency. Hatred of inconsistency seems to be the one thing I’ve never seen anyone disagree with. People take all sorts of opposing positions but I haven’t seen anyone maintain an internally inconsistent position. Some people hate nazis, some don’t, but everyone hates a hypocrite.

But I don’t often see people re-examining their beliefs purposefully to see if they’re consistent or not.

I think people operate by a “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” principle when it comes to their beliefs. People have different standards for “broke”. People whose standard is very easy to meet are called “philosophers”

These concepts do not exist outside of the human experience, and thus are completely subjective. — Tzeentch

Non sequitor. Again, "2+2=4" is true regardless of who you are or what you think (assuming you know how to do arithmetic). That makes it objective, by the definition I gave.

If you don't want to use objective like that then let's call it "inter-subjective". Something that is subjective yet is the same for everyone (like 2+2=4). There is an inter-subjective morality.

The question is, how would you ever know that you have stumbled upon objective morality? — Tzeentch

How would you ever know you have stumbled upon an objective anything? You don't, but some guesses are better than others. For instance: "Gravity doesn't exist" is an attempt at an objective statement. It is easily found to be false. "Gravity exists" is a better attempt.

You approach it, but never know you got there. Do you think there is such a thing as "moral progress"? What about progress in physics?

If you truly think there is no opinion that's better than another, why discuss anything at all? Whatever you end up with will be just as good as what you started with. What do you hope to accomplish in this thread (or any thread)?

And second, if one, by some miracle, was able to verify that their idea of morality was objective true,does that give one a right to impose it on others? — Tzeentch

If they found morality objective and found said objective morality? Of course.

Intuition may give us some hint to what is moral and what is not, but it doesn't create morality, nor is it preferable over reason. — Tzeentch

Reason requires premises. Those premises are moral intuitions.

Definitely not feasible as a basis for impositions on other individuals. — Tzeentch

Why?

It seems that the desire to impose one's opinions on others always leads there, yes. — Tzeentch

Non sequitor. There is the word "usually". It is doing something.

That is a very poor definition of something objective. If 51% of intuitions think A, and 49% of intuitions think B, is A objective? — Tzeentch

False. The system that provides as much as it can of both is objective. If for instance, 51% of people think A is the best president and 49% think B is the best president, the best thing to do, objectively, is to have the 51% be under A and the 49% be under B. That’s clearly not feasible, but it’s the ideal solution is it not? Do you have a better solution in mind?

Not really. — Tzeentch

How did you get this? How did you get that there is no such thing as unreasonable doubt?

What you're doing is essentially saying "There's all these problems with my ideas, but I'll call them all irrelevant and dismiss them for practical reasons", and then be surprised when things don't work out very well. — Tzeentch

You're the only one seeing problems. If anything, to you, what counts as a problem is entirely subjective. So what authority do you have to make such a strong statement? Or are you simply stating your opinion?

ANY system needs premises or a starting point. These aren't "problems". For instance: You think impositions are always wrong. Why is that? Whatever answer you give, I can keep asking "why" until you can't give an answer. That's all you did here, acted like a 3 year old. You didn’t point out any problems, only starting premises.

What a surprise then that the world is filled with suffering and injustice, if we allow ourselves such liberties. — Tzeentch

Do you seriously think there will be LESS suffering if the "horrible imposition" that is traffic laws isn't there? All impositions cause suffering?

Ok think of the following scenario:

You must kill at least one person. If you press the red button, Jeff lives. If you press the blue button, Sarah lives. If you press neither, they both die. What is correct here?

There is no choice where you don't impose here. And this is very common if you do some living. How does your "system" address such scenarios?

But I don't believe such a practical limitation exists — Tzeentch

Really? So we can all have everything we want without hurting anyone else? Why this is groundbreaking! Would you care to explain your ingenious method by which we can satisfy everyone for all time without any practical difficulty?

If Mr X wants to kill you and adopts a zero negotiation policy, and you want to live, how do you resolve this such that both get what they want without any practical difficulty?

Considering everything you observe has to go through the subjective filter of your mind, it is a given that objective truth ("ultimate reality") is, and I'll put it cautiously, extremely difficult to access for humans. — Tzeentch

"Objective" means "true for everyone". As in after passing the filter, everyone gets the same thing. That's not very difficult. Example: 2+2=4. When our filters are working properly that's the answer we get.

There is just something about 2+2=4 that transcends pure subjectivity. No one can really think 2+2=3 assuming we're using the same definitions and arithmetic. And if someone thinks so, they are quick to admit they were wrong after being shown the correct answer. That "thing" is objectivity.

For instance: Genociding a race is evil. That's like the "2+2=4" of ethics.

The claim is that there is also such an "objective morality" in the sense that there is a best answer that everyone would agree to provided the filters are working correctly.

The definition you use is "the thing in itself" by Kant. That's impossible to access yes. Also highly inconsequential.

Given this: Are you still the kind of ridiculous skeptic that thinks objective truth is impossible in everything? Is 2+2=4 not objectively true given an understanding of the operations and numbers ?

Well, it's not really the only option, is it? — Tzeentch

Your words not mine. It is certainly the best option sometimes. Objectively.

What happens when those intuitions conflict? — Tzeentch

I take this to mean you agree that the source of morality is moral intuitions yes?

Usually people fight, sadly. But even conflicting intuitions do not mean that there is no objective answer. The objective answer would be the one that satisfies the most intuitions.

Results from these methods would not be open to different interpretations? — Tzeentch

Not always very variable. In some instances it is clear. For instance: Being drunk makes you drive worse.

It's one of the first thing I was taught in academics. — Tzeentch

The second thing I was taught after that is not to then dismay at the impossibility of any objective answer. Sometimes there is an objective answer (true regardless of what we think).

There is such a thing as unreasonable doubt. What you're doing is an example.

According to the subjective opinion of whom? — Tzeentch

Me and almost everyone else. But there are some scientists that think that "Intoxication (which deterioration in motor skills) leads to driving worse" is debatable. So here are a few studies:

https://www.hindawi.com/journals/mpe/2014/607652/
https://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/arh27-1/63-78.htm

Do you actually believe that drinking doesn't affect driving ability?

It's arbitrary, based on convenience. That's not a justification, which is what I asked for. — Tzeentch

It's completely unjustified. It's a practical limitation. If we could effortlessly detect who can drive while intoxicated safely, and chose to still ban them from drinking while intoxicated, that would be wrong. It's unfair that such alcohol immune individuals are banned from drinking and driving. But it would be far more unfair to the innocent victims to create a system that would allow drinking and driving in some cases (as it will be abused).

It's the (much) lesser of two evils. I would think that counts as justification but apparently not.

That’s a silly opinion, and so I have no reason to listen to it.
— khaled

And yet, here you are. — Tzeentch

Yes, I'm arguing against the silly opinions not listening to them.

Before we start, are you just the kind of ridiculous skeptic that thinks no objective truth is possible in anything? Just want to get that out of the way.

No. Like I said, there are situations where force is the only option, but even then I'd regard the use of it as immoral and as a personal failure. — Tzeentch

It cannot be immoral if it is the only option and you’re doing it reluctantly.

if we have established that might cannot make right, then what determines what is right? What is the source? — Tzeentch

Our moral intuitions.

Data is often open to multiple interpretations. What determines which interpretation is the right one? — Tzeentch

Statistical analysis, methods of sampling, etc. There are classes on that if you’re interested.

If I test 10000 people under controlled circumstances and find that 3 of them would NOT have deteriorated driving skills while drunk, it seems the interpretation that drinking deteriorates driving is much more likely than the interpretation that it doesn’t, and that it was simply coincidence.

Is that true? How many people drive while intoxicated and how many of those cause accidents? — Tzeentch

Yes though the experiment wasn’t done as I described (not that I know of). Because that’s not needed. We already know that drinking would impair driving from studying its effects elsewhere.

And apart from that, what justifies the use of force to impose on all drunk drivers, when only a part of them would go on to cause accidents? — Tzeentch

Because a formal system to distinguish people that are ok to drink and drive and people who aren’t will inevitably be abused leading to more people drunk driving and more accidents. It’s a practical limitation.

Sure, but where one draws the line is a subjective matter, and not every drunk driver is the same (and we're not testing all of them). — Tzeentch

False. There is a medical definition:“ Intoxication is the term used to describe any change in perception, mood, thinking processes and motor skills that results from the effect of a drug(s) on our central nervous system.”

So technically any alcohol consumption counts. But there are also accurate tests. There are field sobriety tests taught to cops, and there are medical tests that can detect if you’re intoxicated or not.

Opinions are all equally silly (including mine) and should never be a basis for the use of force. — Tzeentch

That’s a silly opinion, and so I have no reason to listen to it. (Self defeating as I said)

when my interlocuter is so determined that I am wrong about everything. It's just boring. — Bartricks

Do you not see how this applies to both sides? I'm fine with having a less hostile and more productive conversation, but every time I try to do that you go back to ad homs as soon as you're cornered. If you want to try again sure.

A perfect example is how you choose to ignore valid critiques in favor of long winded responses to minor points. For instance, this goes unaddressed:

I didn't phrase the question right. A sensation is a sensation "of" something correct? You say my sensation is "of" another sensation. So what is this other sensation "of"? This leads to infinite regress. — khaled

If A is a sensation of B, and B is a sensation, then what is B a sensation of? If it's another sensation, that would lead to infinite regress. If it stops at one point "P is a sensation of X" and X is not a sensation, then why is A not simply a sensation of X? Why presume all the middlemen? (middleminds?)

I could give you any number of arguments in support of there being a single, unified reality that our sensations give us some awareness of, and it would make no difference, would it? — Bartricks

Correct because that's not what I'm asking you to prove. I agree there is a unified reality. I'm asking you to show this mind:

From this it follows that change itself is the sensation of a single mind. — Bartricks

Is the same one as God.

Or to show that it is a single my by some other means.

And this is another good example of your trolling. Purposeful misinterpretation. When has "single unified reality" ever been questioned in my responses? What made you think I was asking for a proof of its existence?

Berkeley argued that sensations resemble sensations and nothing else. — Bartricks

In your op:

I think so, thanks to a simple argument of George Berkeley’s. Sensations, argues Berkeley, give us insight into reality by resembling parts of it. — Bartricks

Next step: sensations can resemble sensations and nothing else. — Bartricks

Maybe Berkeley argued that sensations resembled sensations and nothing else as well, I haven't read much of his work so I wouldn't know. But since you said it without citation, I assumed it came from you.

If the external world bore no resemblance whatsoever to any of our sensations, then in what possible sense would our sensations be enabling us to perceive the world? — Bartricks

Who said anything about "enabling us to perceive" or whatever. You asked what sensations "of" the real world mean. The key word is "of"

That is, there must be some resemblance between our sensations of reality and reality itself, else our sensations will simply not qualify as being ‘of’ reality at all. — Bartricks

The answer: In the sense that the perceptions are caused by the external world. That makes them perceptions "of" the real world.

Just like the code of this site is "of" this site, despite bearing no resemblance to this site, because the cade causes the appearance of the site.

At the moment there appears - visually - to be a blue mug on my desk. If there is no desk or mug there in reality and I am actually stood in a field, then I am not seeing the field by means of the visual appearance of the mug and desk, for there is barely any resemblance between the field that is actually there and the mug and desk I am getting the impression of. A fortiori, if there was no resemblance at all between my sensations and the external world, I would not be perceiving the world at all but living in a dream world. — Bartricks

If the field is causing the perception of the mug and desk, then the perception of mug and desk are of the real world. That's a more productive definition.

Otherwise how DO you resolve this? This could indeed be the case. We could be living in a dream world. So requiring the perception to resemble the reality (phenomena to resemble the thing-in-itself) would lead to the conclusion that: Maybe our perceptions are of reality. There is no way to confirm from the perceptions whether or not they are of reality or of a dream world.

And resemblance seems like a terrible standard in other ways too. Mainly that it's vague. If in reality there is a red cat, but I see a blue cat, is my perception "of reality" or not? What about if I see a purple elephant? "resembles" has no clear meaning. The table and mug DO resemble the field in some ways. All 3 have a horizontal flat portion for example.

I view the use of force as categorically undesirable and immoral, and if I were ever to feel that the use of force is the only option, I would have to tread extremely carefully. — Tzeentch

No, I have no desire to impose anything on anyone. — Tzeentch

Would you let a psychotic killer kill you or a member of your family?

It is my suspicion that whatever "sometimes" entails is dictated by governments and by majority opinion of whatever society one happens to live in. — Tzeentch

What "sometimes" practically entails is different from what it should entail. Might makes what happens. Might doesn't make right.

Yes governments or even majorities can determine that Jews don't deserve to live. That doesn't have anything to do with ethics.

What makes one opinion better than the other? — Tzeentch

The data, for one. Of all the people that think they can drive fine while drunk, a majority are wrong. A majority of drunk drivers think they can drive fine but still run into accidents. Etc.

Also the simple fact that measurable deterioration in your performance exists when you're drunk.

I ask you that question. Do you think no opinion is better than another? That's self defeating.

Question begging. — Bartricks

You're one of those people who thinks that all valid arguments beg the question. Tedious. Learn to argue properly.

And besides I did not definitively state that reality is not a sensation. That would indeed be begging the question. I said you haven’t proven it is.

You're one of those people who thinks that all valid arguments beg the question. Tedious. Learn to argue properly. — Bartricks

If I state that A resembles B. Then state that A resembles A and only A, without evidence, that must mean that I think B is A correct? That’s begging the question, when the conclusion is that B is A.

That is, there must be some resemblance between our sensations of reality and reality itself, else our sensations will simply not qualify as being ‘of’ reality at all. — Bartricks

They could very well not be, which is why I don't find that argument convincing in the first place. And it doesn't seem clear to me that they have to resemble reality to be "of" reality. The binary code of this site doesn't resemble this site. Yet is very much the binary code "of" this site. Why should our sensations resemble reality to be "of" it?

What on earth are you on about? First, it is 'Berkeley' not 'Barkley' (it's pronounced Barkley, but spelt 'Berkeley'). — Bartricks

Cats and dogs? Barkley? Joke just went over your head.

Berkeley argued that sensations resemble sensations and nothing else. — Bartricks

False. You argued that. Berkeley argued sensations resemble reality. You don't even understand your own argument....

I explained why it is a single mind. — Bartricks

No you haven't. You had terrible explanations for why you think your God is a single mind, but no explanation for why this is a single mind. You have to connect this mind with your idea of God, they're not necessarily the same.

As for the 'waht's the source of those' question - er, a mind. — Bartricks

And yes, sensations are 'of' sensations — Bartricks

I didn't phrase the question right. A sensation is a sensation "of" something correct? You say my sensation is "of" another sensation. So what is this other sensation "of"? This leads to infinite regress.

From this it follows that change itself is the sensation of a single mind. — Bartricks

And this doesn't follow either. Why single? Why not a coalition of minds?

If we sense changes and changes are sensations, then are we "sensing sensations"? What does that even mean? And the sensations that we're sensing, what's the source of those? Other sensations?(infinite regress)

Reality potentially. Depends on whether reality is a sensation or not. In order to say that sensations represent sensations and only sensations, given that sensations represent reality, you must assume that reality is a sensation. You haven’t derived that fact, it was necessary for your second premise. Your conclusion is assumed in your second premise. I’m sure you know what that means.

The problem with your proof is the same as the problem here:

Barkley argued that cats resemble X. Assume that’s true.

Cats resemble cats and only cats.

Therefore X are cats.

The validity depends on what X is, let’s assume “X” is “dogs”. Then the conclusion is clearly false, so where was the error? Either premise 1 or 2 is wrong. Let’s trust Barkley for now. So premise 2 is wrong, cats must not resemble cats and only cats given that cats resemble dogs. That or premise 1 is wrong and cats don’t resemble dogs.

So this type of argument doesn't work for any X. What makes you think reality is such an X that it works?

sensations can resemble sensations and nothing else. — Bartricks

Evidence? Specifically the “and nothing else” bit, where did you get that?

Sights resemble sights, sounds resemble sounds, smells resemble smells and so on — Bartricks

This doesn’t mean sights resemble sights and nothing else. Same with smell and sound.

I also haven't said they are or should be responsible for " the societal and personal impact of the site", I was just pointing to possible negative effects of such a rejection and advocating a bit of compassion. — Janus

“You shouldn’t be responsible for societal impact”

“But watch out, doing this will cause have a negative societal impact, so you shouldn’t do it”

All I was suggesting is deletion of offending posts (with of course a warning) rather than immediate banning in all cases — Janus

It’s rarely in all cases. This is an exception, understandably because the banned member openly said he breaks a rule.

Also, its kind of hypocritical in my eyes, that intolerance is ok as long as its only toward people with certain ideologies. Eg, its ok to express intolerance or be inflammatory toward republicans or religious people, or anti-vaccers etc here, up to a point. What is it that makes one form of intolerance less bad than any other? — Yohan

It is hypocritical only for those who profess tolerance for all. No one here lives up to that, as far as I can see, though some claim it. Which is far worse than being honest in my opinion. Would you be tolerant of someone trying to rob you? Or are you just another person who claims tolerance for all, until someone inconveniences you enough (like everyone else)?

What makes some kinds of intolerance less bad than others? Many things. For instance, how harmful is the object of intolerance. I doubt you think intolerance of animal cruelty is as bad as intolerance of the existence of Jews. One is harmful one isn’t. And that leads to another difference: Accuracy of facts the intolerance is based on. Anti semites will claim that the existence of Jews is more harmful than animal cruelty, and will base their opinions on that. And they would be wrong, and their intolerance misplaced and unacceptable.

I think banning people for low quality posts is just a way to allow removal of aggravating people. Driving while annoying. — T Clark

I highly doubt that. A specific individual comes to mind.

My point was not to ban anyone at least not on the strength of one outburst or statement. Delete offensive posts was my suggestion; reject the idea, not the person. So, your objection is misdirected. — Janus

Ah ok. So we should just delete any posts that seem pessimistic. Wouldn’t want it affecting people, their partners, or society after all. Gotcha.

My objection is to the idea that mods should be responsible for the societal and personal impact of the site. That’s ridiculous.