Question begging. — Bartricks
You're one of those people who thinks that all valid arguments beg the question. Tedious. Learn to argue properly. — Bartricks
That is, there must be some resemblance between our sensations of reality and reality itself, else our sensations will simply not qualify as being ‘of’ reality at all. — Bartricks
What on earth are you on about? First, it is 'Berkeley' not 'Barkley' (it's pronounced Barkley, but spelt 'Berkeley'). — Bartricks
Berkeley argued that sensations resemble sensations and nothing else. — Bartricks
I explained why it is a single mind. — Bartricks
As for the 'waht's the source of those' question - er, a mind. — Bartricks
And yes, sensations are 'of' sensations — Bartricks
I said you haven’t proven it is. — khaled
Why should our sensations resemble reality to be "of" it? — khaled
False. You argued that. Berkeley argued sensations resemble reality. You don't even understand your own argument.... — khaled
You had terrible explanations for why you think your God is a single mind, but no explanation for why this is a single mind. You have to connect this mind with your idea of God, they're not necessarily the same. — khaled
when my interlocuter is so determined that I am wrong about everything. It's just boring. — Bartricks
I didn't phrase the question right. A sensation is a sensation "of" something correct? You say my sensation is "of" another sensation. So what is this other sensation "of"? This leads to infinite regress. — khaled
I could give you any number of arguments in support of there being a single, unified reality that our sensations give us some awareness of, and it would make no difference, would it? — Bartricks
From this it follows that change itself is the sensation of a single mind. — Bartricks
Berkeley argued that sensations resemble sensations and nothing else. — Bartricks
I think so, thanks to a simple argument of George Berkeley’s. Sensations, argues Berkeley, give us insight into reality by resembling parts of it. — Bartricks
Next step: sensations can resemble sensations and nothing else. — Bartricks
If the external world bore no resemblance whatsoever to any of our sensations, then in what possible sense would our sensations be enabling us to perceive the world? — Bartricks
That is, there must be some resemblance between our sensations of reality and reality itself, else our sensations will simply not qualify as being ‘of’ reality at all. — Bartricks
At the moment there appears - visually - to be a blue mug on my desk. If there is no desk or mug there in reality and I am actually stood in a field, then I am not seeing the field by means of the visual appearance of the mug and desk, for there is barely any resemblance between the field that is actually there and the mug and desk I am getting the impression of. A fortiori, if there was no resemblance at all between my sensations and the external world, I would not be perceiving the world at all but living in a dream world. — Bartricks
I don't think this is what a circular definition is.In simple terms, change is "An act or process through which something becomes different" (Oxford LEXICO)
— Alkis Piskas
That is circular as well. For what does 'becomes different' mean if not 'changes'? — Bartricks
I didn't offer any synonym of "change". I described the essence of change. "Movement" just came naturally to me --without the presence of any dictionary-- as something that characterizes and is similar to change. Besides, I also mentioned two of Heraclitus great sayings that also show the nature of change.it is no good just offering up some synonym for change. — Bartricks
That's not what I said, or meant. I merely pointed-out that "cause", "effect", and "change" are inextricably (logically) linked in our experience. If we notice a Change in something, we look for the Cause of that Effect. Change, or Difference, is a clue that something happened. So, curious humans instinctively want to know how or why that happened, and the answer is in the Causation. The Cause is not the Effect ; the Change is not the Cause ; and the Effect is not the Cause, but merely a sign of Causation. Cause & Effect are the "causal relata" of Change.You reply by just stipulating that 'effect' and 'change' mean the same. — Bartricks
However, that either doesn’t tell us what change in itself is - it just tells us when we typically recognize there to have been a change - or it is a circular and so tells us nothing. — Bartricks
For it appeals to a change in temporal properties. When a thing goes from being present to being past, it has already changed – changed from being present to being past. — Bartricks
I suggest that we first detect change by way of sensation. For after all, it can seem to us that something has changed even when we cannot identify 'what' has changed. — Bartricks
Typically anyway, we have the sensation of change and then notice what seems to have caused that sensation in us — Bartricks
That is, there must be some resemblance between our sensations of reality and reality itself, — Bartricks
So what, then, is change in itself? — Bartricks
Yes there is. I suspect that, like most people here, you don't know an argument from your elbow. Here is the argument:
1. There is a sensation of change
2. A sensation can only resemble another sensation (and so if a sensation is 'of' something, then what it is of is itself a sensation)
3. Therefore, change is a sensation. — Bartricks
I think that premise 1 here needs to be justified. If you can explain how change can be sensed by one sensation, rather than needing a number of sensations to be perceived, then we might have a solution to your question of what is change. — Metaphysician Undercover
What is not still, changes. Thus, change is movement/motion. There is no overall Stillness, else naught would go on; therefore, something is ever changing. — PoeticUniverse
I disagree, it tells us what change ontologically amounts to. — neomac
No it doesn’t. First of all, that definition of change makes no mention of predicates like “being present” and “being past“. — neomac
Secondly, “being present” and “being past” may not be properties in strict sense. — neomac
This sounds like a categorical confusion between “sensations” as an ontological type (the sensation of "red" is neither true or false) with “seeming” which is an epistemological type (what seems to be red can be blue so the red-seeming can be true or false). — neomac
If A is a sensation of B, and B is a sensation, then what is B a sensation of? If it's another sensation, that would lead to infinite regress. If it stops at one point "P is a sensation of X" and X is not a sensation, then why is A not simply a sensation of X? Why presume all the middlemen? (middleminds?) — khaled
It is our reason that tells us that our sensations (some of them - I am not going to keep putting in this qualification hereafter) are resembling an actual world. — Bartricks
Sensations - some of them - tell us about reality by resembling it. — Bartricks
At the moment there appears - visually - to be a blue mug on my desk. If there is no desk or mug there in reality and I am actually stood in a field, then I am not seeing the field by means of the visual appearance of the mug and desk, for there is barely any resemblance between the field that is actually there and the mug and desk I am getting the impression of. A fortiori, if there was no resemblance at all between my sensations and the external world, I would not be perceiving the world at all but living in a dream world. — Bartricks
I have not claimed that all sensations are 'of' things (indeed, the word 'of' is ambiguous anyway). — Bartricks
The definition of change that I gave was: "An act or process through which something becomes different" (Oxford LEXICO)As already explained, movement makes reference to change. So to reduce change to movement is to go in a circle. — Bartricks
We can get the impression a change has occurred, without being able to identify what, if anything, has changed. Thus there seems to be a feeling or sensation of change. For this would not be possible if, rather than having a sensation of change, we had instead to infer change from some kind of comparison between cases. — Bartricks
1. There is a sensation of change
2. A sensation can only resemble another sensation (and so if a sensation is 'of' something, then what it is of is itself a sensation)
3. Therefore, change is a sensation. — Bartricks
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.