It seems a similar delusion is happening here — Isaac

Only because you don't understand the argument. At the very least, that's not what I'm doing, don't know about the others.

if you want to use a term in a particularly unusual manner you'll need to explain it first — Isaac

What on earth kind of heterodox definition of 'conservative' are you using which allows the extinction of the human race to fall under it?
— Isaac

"Does no harm". — khaled

Right. Which is a harm if what I wanted was a suit. — Isaac

Whenever I use harm I mean it in the sense that I strictly made the situation worse. If I do not buy you the suit, I do not harm you. Even though it is not the best possible outcome. Because had I not been around you still wouldn't have your suit.

Now tearing your suit apart, that's a harm. Because had I not been around your suit would have been fine.

And I find this is a much more common use, so I would tell you:

if you want to use a term in a particularly unusual manner you'll need to explain it first — Isaac

If I had access to your credit card for some reason and did NOT buy you a suit, and you happened to want a suit but didn't tell me, I doubt you would say "You harmed me". If you want to use "harm" to mean "Did not bring about the absolute best outcome" then the word could be used for everything ever.

You've still not given anything close to an explanation of why you think non-action has some moral strength over action when faced with uncertainty about outcomes and the impossibility of consent. Either could equally bring about a negative consequence, or lack virtue, or defy a duty... whichever moral framework you subscribe to, inaction does not just magically trump action. — Isaac

There is no such thing as inaction first of all. Any action can be rephrased as an action and vice versa. "Did not save the drowning person" and "let the person drown" for instance (inaction in the first action in the second). It's not about action vs inaction it's about harm, defined as strictly making the situation worse.

The rule is: If I am thinking of doing something that could make the situation worse than if I wasn't even around there at all, don't do that thing. And that is the only rule I propose. Note: I am also part of this calculation of "worse situation".

How can you reasonably expect not to hurt others while driving? — Isaac

By being a good driver. Not being drunk. Etc. There is a difference between "reasonably expect" and "guarantee". I can't do the latter.

What on earth kind of heterodox definition of 'conservative' are you using which allows the extinction of the human race to fall under it? — Isaac

"Does no harm". Last I checked "the human race" was not a person. On the other hand, a generation of resentful malcontents comprises of many people.

You will have caused harm if it turns out you're right too. I'll have no suit. — Isaac

If I was right, and I didn't buy a suit, you would just be where you started. I wouldn't have worsened the situation. So unless by "caused harm" you mean "Did not bring about the absolute best outcome" then I did not cause harm.

The question is what happens if I do buy the suit. I could be wrong: In which case I make the situation worse (you have a useless suit and less money) or I could be right and make it better: In whichcase you got a brand new suit you like. Given these chances, I think we can both agree that buying the suit is wrong, without asking first.

Maybe a suit is too small, what about a house?

Every time you drive anywhere, for example. — Isaac

If I cannot reasonably expect not to hurt others while driving, I shouldn't be driving, you're right. But since I can, I can drive. Because not driving harms me, since I won't be able to go to work, and harm done to me is part of this calculation.

Disclaimer: I don't actually drive, I am speaking hypothetically.

If your moral framework includes a feature which you cannot even predict changes in, it would seem little better than just throwing your hands up and saying "I'll just do whatever everyone else is doing". If the law said you must murder Jews would you do so? — Isaac

I don't use law and responsibility interchangeably. It is just often the case that if the law think I have a responsibility to do something, I do. So if I am a doctor, I can be sued for refusing to treat a patient. This does not logically lead to the conclusion that I had a responsibility to help said patient, but oftentimes the two coincide. In the case of killing jews, even if the law thinks I have that responsibility, I do not.

I guess what it boils down to is the claim that at the point of decision there is no individual whose well-being can be violated, foregoing the fact that we already know such an individual will come about as a direct result of our actions. — Tzeentch

For Isaac he usually goes to the "The human race is worth preserving" wall. I'm curious why he's trying this one for a change this time. At least the former is unassailable. This one can be smashed by the malicious genetic engineering argument. If there being no one whose well-being can be violated leads to the conclusion that you can have kids whenever wherever, then it will also lead to the conclusion that it is fine to genetically engineer kids to be crippled, which is a very hard one to swallow.

Well don't you think that looking into it might be relevant, if you're going to make claims about it? — Isaac

I have not made claims about the rate of change of laws. So I don't need to look at how they change. I have set out a moral framework where socially placed responsibilities play a role.

Why? The vast majority of people broadly agree about stuff that's good, so it can't be a case of making a poor prediction. It's not reasonable to deny action in cases where we cannot obtain all potentially relevant data (we'd literally do nothing if that were the case). So I'm lost as to why you think this particular inaccessible bit of data prohibits action. — Isaac

Not having complete data always makes us pick the conservative option, unless we have consent to do otherwise. Exceptions include when we have dependents that require us to make sure we maximize the other's wellbeing even if they don't want that (vaccines, surger, etc).

If I don't know that you're going to like a certain suit, I won't buy it for you with your money. Because if I turn out to be wrong, I will have caused harm. My decision should not depend at all on how much I personally like the suit, but simply on whether or not I can be sure you will like it. If I cannot be, then I don't take the risk with your money.

I'm curious why you think this is a special case actually. I cannot think of many cases where we take risks with others' wellbeing without permission.

Indeed. Sounds like a fantastic reason not to force those things upon someone.
— Tzeentch

There is no someone. — Isaac

No. Some might be making that point, but it's not mine. I'm quite comfortable with imagining a future child and acting in what I imagine to be it's best interests. — Isaac

Cmon now.....

So it is a moral premise of yours that whatever is the law or social norm is morally relevant? How, in your world, do laws and social norms get changed? — Isaac

The premise is that you have an obligation to uphold social contracts you are a part of. So if you work as a doctor for instance, you cannot refuse to treat a patient (unless you can't), because treating patients is what you "signed up for". Society has you "sign up for" a lot of things, depending on the society (Just today I discovered you can actually get sued in the Netherlands if you don't help someone as best you can to survive an accident @Benkei)

How do social contracts change? I don't know, I'm not a political theorist or sociologist. You seem to be implying that my premise implies that they don't change, but I don't see how.

No. Some might be making that point, but it's not mine. I'm quite comfortable with imagining a future child and acting in what I imagine to be it's best interests. — Isaac

Sounds backwards to me. Something that doesn't exist doesn't have future interests in existing. Making a prediction about another's future and acting to help them is one thing. So you can say something like "I will vaccinate my child because it is in their interests not to die to a rusty nail". But you cannot claim to have a child "for the child's sake". There is no child who has a sake, whereas in the first case there was.

The justification is... being able to foresee the consequences (life is really good - love, sunsets, adventure etc) and we can't possibly check in advance whether they want these things, so there's obviously no moral obligation to do so (to have a moral obligation to do something impossible is stupid). — Isaac

You say "life is really good- love, sunsets, adventure" as if the quality of life is not determined by the child. I would say that since you can't check in advance whether or not the child will actually think life is good, it would be unethical to have them.

Usually you say something like "Oh sure, risking harming the child is bad, but it is offset by the survival of the human race" but here you seem to be switching to "Sure, there is a risk the child hates life, but that doesn't matter". And I don't see a convincing reason why it shouldn't matter.

It should simply be "in accordance with freedom". — Echarmion

Have no clue what that means either.

And if you should have children, you should have children. There is no other result here, you either should or you should not. — Echarmion

So there ARE situations where it's wrong not to have kids.

You don't have to go out and create a specific situation just so you can then have children. — Echarmion

I would think that this is "in accordance to freedom" whatever that means. Then again, I have no clue what it means.

Fair enough. Wouldn't say "most countries" have that though. None that I've been in have.

See, what I consider funny about all this is that first you confuse law with morality — Benkei

When did I do that?

second that you let your morality depend on what others think is right with the lovely result that your morality will change by crossing a border. — Benkei

No. I let my morality depend on my responsibilities. Those are partially assigned by others. Wouldn't say that's unusual.

For instance, if you move to a country where it is considered disrespectful to do something that was not the case where you came from, shouldn't you respect the tradition and not do that thing? Changing morality based on the community you're in isn't that unusual I would think. If anything it's common sense.

Seriously though stop dodging the question.

Now is the question. Why must it be a near certainty? And more importantly, why is it wrong to claim that if there is any chance the proximate cause will exist and cannot be avoided, then it makes sense to move up the causal chain (Antinatalism)?
. — khaled

You claim that the "chance of bad outcome" needs to be near 100% for having children to start to be considered wrong. And you claim at the same time that putting the bar at >0% is wrong. On what basis?

Look op negligence. — Benkei

Literally the first element of negligence claims: Duty. And the fact that we do not sue bystandards for negligence claims shows that we do not believe they have a duty to help. Unless it's their actual job, like firefighters or doctors. Try suing bystanders in a car accident for negligence, you won't get very far.

But good to know you have no intrinsic moral compass and are easily swayed by what others expect from you. — Benkei

I would advise you to try to understand what others are saying before spouting nonsense. What in what I said leads you to believe that I have no moral compass, and only act in accordance with what others expect? I already said I would save a drowning person, but that I don't have to. Your inability to understand the difference between a personal moral compass, and a shared moral responsibility (don't harm) is showing. I've outlined the latter, and it is based on a social contract. That says nothing about the former.

But even IF I only act in accordance to social contract, what use is it pointing that out? Engage with the arguments or don't respond. Talking about the guy making the arguments, rather than the arguments just shows you have nothing to say.

For proximate causes, if it's a near certainty the proximate cause will exist and cannot be avoided or alleviated then it makes sense to move up the causal chain. — Benkei

Now is the question. Why must it be a near certainty? And more importantly, why is it wrong to claim that if there is any chance the proximate cause will exist and cannot be avoided, then it makes sense to move up the causal chain (Antinatalism)?

Stop dodging the question.

Same way you know Khaled. — Daemon

I don't

It's why different murderers get different sentences and why murder is sometimes excused due to circumstances. — Benkei

But we can still generalize there. I'm not asking for hard rules, just any indication at all. Murderers get different sentences or are sometimes excused due to the murderer's mental state, history with the victim, among other factors. You've given an example where the "risk of bad outcome" is high and one where it is lower and said that in one procreation is ethical and in the other unethical. You have given 0 factors or explanation. That wouldn't be a problem if you weren't at the same time claiming that setting the "acceptable risk of bad outcome" to 0% (Antinatalism) is wrong. You can only say it is wrong according to this or that factor, but you've provided none.

What if society agrees it's everybody's responsibility to intervene, so it's everybody's "job" to save drowning people? — Benkei

What a great society that would be! It's not the one we live in though. If society agrees about something there is generally a law to enforce it. This isn't a hard rule, but it is generally applicable. For example: When doctors refuse to treat they get charged with misconduct and their licence gets revoked. We don't punish bystandars. Because we don't all agree they should be punished.

To expound a bit, generally it's a good rule of thumb not to kill people but sometimes it is. Generally, it's a good rule to be nice to people but sometimes it isn't. When it isn't has such a wide variety of reasons that it's no use to try to catch that in a general rule. It's enough to realise that almost every moral rule we can think of, can be provided with circumstances where the opposite is better.

So generally it's perfectly fine to have babies but sometimes it isn't. — Benkei

But if asked to come up with reasons why killing in self defence is okay but killing for pleasure is not, I would provide a reason. You refuse to, or cannot, do that for your claims. Which again, wouldn't be a problem if you weren't at the same time claiming that a certain way of defining "acceptale circumstances" is wrong.

I'm going to sleep now, have a think on it, or don't. Good night.

Less than 100 comments left to overtake Brexit

But you just said you're not responsible if a thing would happen if you weren't there. Why is the doctor responsible for something that would occur even if he wasn't there and yet you're not when someone is drowning? — Benkei

When I said that I assumed it is not your job to save the drowning person, aka it is not your responsibility. A doctor already has a responsibility to save patients. Or else he wouldn't be a doctor.

You are responsible for what happens if you not being there would have resulted in the better outcome. But you can also be responsible in other ways, like jobs or parenthood, to prevent suffering that would have occured even if you weren't there.

But giving random percentages isn't "circumstances". — Benkei

I was just using it as an example. You refuse to give any indication of what the circumstances would be in order for procreation to be become unethical. You gave a single example (Sarah) where it would be unethical but did not make any effort to generalize from that what makes it ethical or unethical. That's what I'm asking for.

I'm coming from: to me the outcome comes about precisely because you are there and don't do anything — Benkei

Oh I agree. If you let a man drown you caused his death. But that is not immoral. That's my view.

How about a doctor, who can treat a life-threatening condition, and he just decides not to treat a patient? That would be a serious breach of his duties and promises but since the patient would die any way, no responsibility based on the above. — Benkei

You said it yourself.

That would be a serious breach of his duties and promises — Benkei

So in that case he does actually have to treat them, because that's his responsibility.

What thread have you been reading? it's in the OP and has been discussed several times in these pages. And, no I don't specify what "too much" is, because it depends on the circumstances, so I can't. — Benkei

No one brought it up in our conversation so far. I have read the OP, and still wonder why Billy should be born but Sarah shouldn't. And what do you mean "depends on the circumstances"? It is these circumstances that I'm asking about. What makes procreation ethical in one (billy) and not the other (sarah)

This is rather perplexing to me. Your choice not to intervene causes the person to drown and die because if it hadn't been for your choice the person would still be alive. So your choice is a conditio sine que non for the drowning. If you aren't supposed to cause harm, you have to intervene. — Benkei

What you cause and what you are responsible for are different. If the bad outcome would have happened without you being there you are not responsible for fixing it. You are only responsible for not causing bad outcomes by being there. So don't drown people.

Nope. As you indicate yourself this is all surrounded by unknowns. All I do know is that these types of suffering aren't caused by living because being alive is not a sufficient condition for suffering, only a necessary condition. This is why when I "calculate" this borders on certainty. I'm not concerned with heartbreak of my daughter because I don't cause it. — Benkei

I have no clue how this relates to what I said. No one brought up sufficient and necessary conditions. I'm just looking at the conditions under which having children would be unethical rn. You made the claim that if you can reasonably expect your child to suffer too much, it would be unethical to have them. Yet you do not specify what "too much" means.

And yet it continually happens in this thread and I've already pointed it out several times. The last time was here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/480046 — Benkei

Ok maybe. But I'm not doing this.

Small quibble: I gave "abject poverty" as a reason, which is something different than just poverty. People can be poor and happy, abject poverty and happiness usually don't go together. — Benkei

"Abject" means extreme. People can be extremely poor and happy.

We can't calculate if someone is going to be happy or not so the question to me is for all intents and purposes moot and so would be my answer. — Benkei

And yet you did exactly such a calculation to conclude that people in abject poverty will in all likelyhood suffer and so one shouldn't have kids in abject poverty.

What's important is whether we can intervene in the circumstances leading to suffering. If I can intervene in the causal chain because there's a proximate cause that I can affect, then there's a moral duty on me to do so and avoid another person's suffering. If the proximate cause is certain but unavoidable, only then would I consider intervening earlier in the causal chain as a moral obligation. — Benkei

So here you are making a calculation about how likely it is that all your child's suffering will be such that you can intervene and stop it. And yet you have a problem with making calculations about whether or not someone is more likely to be happy than not happy? If anything the former is way harder to calculate.

Point is: You cannot know whether or not you will be able to intervene in the circumstances leading up to the suffering, and there is a very real chance you won't be able to. In fact, I'm willing to say it is almost impossible that there will no occasion where your child suffers due to circumstances you couldn't have stopped. So shouldn't intervening earlier be a moral obligation?

Which reminds me, I might have missed it but if you don't recognise moral obligations to save drowning people why a moral obligation not to have kids? — Benkei

You are not obligated to help, you are only obligated not to harm in my view. Helping is good though again, not obligatory.

There isn't much point in responding to the same thing over and over again. — Echarmion

Neither is there much point in psychoanalyzing.

I don't claim that there is a moral duty to produce more people, as I already wrote. Just that there is a motivation for having children which is in accordance with free will, and as such moral. — Echarmion

Sounds to me like: "It is good to have children, but you don't have to". Even though you kept asking me why I distinguish between things that are good to do and things that you must do, you seem to be doing it.

The subjects are an end in an of itself, and having a further presence of subjects furthers free will by creating it's necessary preconditions. It does not necessarily follow from this that not having children is immoral - freedom isn't quantified, so there being more subjects doesn't equal more freedom. — Echarmion

This seems like a contradiction to me. One sentence you're saying "furthers free will" and the next you're saying "free will is not quantified". Wtf does "furthers free will" mean?

Antinatalists are using the same "as if the child existed" model as well. As I stated over and over, it all about someone who could exist in the future. That person X (you called him Billy or Sarah as a placeholder), would prevented from suffering. — schopenhauer1

I think he goes on to generalize form this that we mean to HELP Billy or Sarah. We don't. That makes no sense. We are using the same model, we just set the "Acceptable chance of bad outcome" to 0%.

He has given 2 cases where it is above 0% and procreation is acceptable in one and not the other. Yet there is no indicator as to why one is fine and the other not.

But would you will such a world into existence? Rawls' veil of ignorance provides a good analogy here: Imagine you're going to end up in this society as an inhabitant, but your socio-economic position is chosen at random. Would you want to live in a world where people go around doing whatever they want? — Echarmion

Oh. I thought you meant "will" as in actually bring it about.

But, having children in order to continue a society of free subjects is different. — Echarmion

Really? Well:

There is no outside reason for this to exist - the universe doesn't care. — Echarmion

The universe doesn't care about your relationship or your farm either.

The subjects are an end in an of itself, and having a further presence of subjects furthers free will by creating it's necessary preconditions. — Echarmion

This has not been shown to be good in what you have highlighted. You have shown that maximizing PEOPLE'S ability to choose is good (or rather, that limiting it is bad, same thing). You have not shown that producing more people so that those people can go around making choices is good. Those are 2 different things.

It does not necessarily follow from this that not having children is immoral - freedom isn't quantified, so there being more subjects doesn't equal more freedom. — Echarmion

But whenever having more children would equal more freedom, then not having children does in fact become immoral. Are you comitted to that view? Because it follows if we are to accept that you must work to maximize freedom.

This is why I have categories of "moral" and "good" be different. I think what you mean is closer to "reduce freedom is immoral", "maximize freedom is good". As in you must not do the former but you don't have to do the latter.

Or else everyone who can support kids who doesn't have kids is being immoral, a position I find very few people commit to outside of hardcore christians.

Robots don't have experiences. They don't feel, they don't hear, they don't see things. — Daemon

How do you know?

I can't pretend "as if" a non-existent child (eg. nothing) is better off because I don't know how nothing feels because it can't have feelings. They're not the same comparison. This point seems rather obvious. — Benkei

No one is doing this. Antinatalists are not trying to improve life for anyone. There is no one to be better off. It's a very common misconception.

No, the difference is that I can pretend "as if" a child would exist and attribute qualities and states to it and compare that what I know about lives lived by those around me. — Benkei

Agreed. So for the next child to be born in this world let's do this. Let's call him Billy. Billy will NOT be born in poverty or have severe disabilities. However despite this, after countless calculations we find that there is a 6% chance Billy becomes more unhappy than happy. Should Billy be born?

You already gave an example of a situation where you shouldn't have a child (poverty and disability). But the only difference between that pretend person (Let's call her Sarah) and Billy is that Sarah has a higher chance of becoming more unhappy than happy due to the circumstances she would be born under. Let's say 60%.

On what basis do you say Sarah should not be born but Billy should be born?

Nothing comes out of psychonalayzing the guy giving arguments. Respond to the arguments or please don't respond at all.

Something that always didn't seem right to me in the OP;

And if they would be born into a situation of abject poverty, where the good does not outweigh their suffering or because of a biological defect that cannot be treated, we understand that "poverty" or that "defect" would cause unacceptable suffering and we should not have a child under those circumstances. What we are comparing then is a possibility of existence with other examples of possible lives lived and we find that possibility unacceptable. — Benkei

You recognize that people shoulnd't have children in some circumstances. This conclusion is arrived at by comparing the (non existent) "potential person" with lives that have actually been lived.

But what I don't buy is this:

But this is fundamentally different from saying this "non-existent" child is better off never having been born because when we talk that way, it is neither a child nor a person nor capable of having any properties, because it is nothing. — Benkei

They seem like the same kind of comparison to me. In the first case, you look into the future and predict that the child will likely suffer too much (be more unhappy than happy), and based on that conclude that you shouldn't have a child in poverty. In the latter, you look into the future and predict that the child could suffer too much (be more unhappy than happy) and based on that conclude that you shouldn't have a child, period. The only difference is the probability.

I don't see why poverty had to be introduced. Isn't the goal merely to determine whether or not the child will be likely to be more unhappy than happy? The former case (poverty) is much more likely to cause a negative outcome (more unhappy than happy) and so you find that having a child in that case is wrong. But that doesn't justify taking a risk in the first place at all. Where do you draw the line? What justifies putting it anywhere above 0% chance of a bad outcome?

The essential nonsense that we cannot consider the future person being born because there is no person currently existing. — schopenhauer1

But malicious genetic engineering is wrong because it causes harm. Also being born itself doesn’t. Idk how they pull off the mental gymnastics there.

If you wanted a “better” reason why I value the individual over the community:

The community is not bearing the brunt of what it means to live out a life. It is simply a notion in the head of the actual people living out life. It is the individuals which are what are being prevented from suffering. — schopenhauer1

What sort of community do you envisage existing according to this premise? — Brett

One much like the current one. We don’t really all have a “unifying ideology” today. And yet we have communities.

Then why mention it in the same post as you seemed to imply that evidence was required for such claims? — Isaac

Because you said that if a sizeable minority of the population doesn’t see the whole community project as worthwhile we wouldn’t have survived. That seems way less obvious with how common it is for everyone to bash their own governments and communities, and how prevalent depression is. And I’m not seeing how studies about food sharing solve the issue.

Why would they be relevant to the moral case? — Isaac

Why would it not? Premises.

The community. You and them — Isaac

But in the case of having children there is no “them” or did you forget? That was your whole point. If no one is harmed by being brought into the world then no one is benefited either. So it’s you and the community in that case, but definitely not them. That I find problematic.

That would depend on the net gains you foresee. If you can see net gains, then you have no choice but to pursue them in the environment you have available. — Isaac

Net gains for who? You or them?

How could you determine this from your position of moral relativity? — Isaac

Social contracts. Laws and such.

So do you have a citation for me for your assertion? — Isaac

That if everyone in a community harms for their own desire that the community would break down? No.

Your citations seem irrelevant to me from a skim. But maybe they’re not, I’ll check later. I’ll take it as a given for now.

Why? — Isaac

People should come to their own conclusions rather than be forced to accept what would be good for the community to accept. Why? That’s just a premise of mine. No further explanation.

That you can will it be universalised. — Echarmion

What do you mean “will it be universalized”? I can conceive of a world where personal pleasure is a worthy moral goal and people go around doing whatever they want.

Premises can also be conclusions, those aren't ontological categories. — Echarmion

I know. But you didn’t present any reasoning behind your premise that having the next generation is a worthy goal. So until then it’s an unreasoned premise.

What's innocence in this context? — Echarmion

An innocent party would be one that didn’t inflict any harm on you. A murderer did clearly, so is not innocent.

Because we live in a community of generally like-minded people who rely intrinsically on each other for our mutual survival. So... — Isaac

I would say this is justification not to risk harming people for your own desires. That tends to break down the community if everyone does it.

(if anything like even a significant minority didn't we'd never have survived this long). — Isaac

Highly doubt this. What’s your evidence?

If ever this is not the case, again, it is the fault of the society, not the act of having children. — Isaac

It is both. The fault of society for causing harm, and the fault of the parents for making it possible. Blaming it only on one is like blaming society for your child getting corona, even though you were the one that told him to go shopping for you (not the best example, I know). Putting someone in imperfect conditions, and them getting harmed as a result is your fault, not just the conditions.

We impose all sorts of harms on children for the sake of wider community goals. — Isaac

Not really. We impose them for the children’s own sakes. What you’ve described is brainwashing. I think it’s unethical for example, to push religious beliefs on children too strongly. Even though often those beliefs would benefit the community greatly if everyone shared them.

Anything from social censure to full on imprisonment imposes harms on parties who may consider themselves innocent for the sake of the community. — Isaac

It doesn’t matter whether or not they feel innocent. It matters whether or not they are. And we take very good care not to imprison or socially censure innocent people, even if it would be for the benefit of the community to do so. We don’t imprison people who claim to be anarchists for example, until they do something illegal, even though getting rid of subversive beliefs is in the interests of the community.

I think you ascribe way too much of what we do in the name of the community. We tend to value the individual more than the community in most cases.

What's unwarranted about harm that results from following a "worthy goal"? — Echarmion

I would expect the person being harmed to also share the goal at least. Or else I can just say go around killing people because I find my own enjoyment a “worthy goal” and I’d be innocent then.

I justify it by making the assumption that other humans are like me, are capable of reasons, and thus if I use my reason sufficiently well I will reach the same conclusions they would. — Echarmion

You do not reach the conclusion that the next generation of humans is something worth striving for by employing reason. That’s a premise, not a reasoned conclusion. One your child may not share.

Like putting people in prison I judge to have violated the law (if I have that power), — Echarmion

INNOCENT party.

boycotting a business I judge to be unethical. — Echarmion

INNOCENT party. Also, you don’t owe businesses your money so you don’t have to give it to them. Boycotting is perfectly within your rights.


You haven’t answered the main question. What makes a goal “morally worthy” or not?

"Intending to" isn't enough. You also need to be able to actually being the goal about. Which includes considering other outcomes. — Echarmion

Fair enough.

Nothing I said had anything to do with "arbitrary desire". I said your reasons need to be moral. That's the opposite of allowing your arbitrary desire to rule. — Echarmion

So just like Isaac, the only reason inflicting harm by having children is acceptable for you is because there is some "more worthy" goal which apparently justifies causing unwarranted harm. And just like Isaac, if that's your conclusion then fine, though it is completely unsatisfactory to me. I do not see how you justify causing suffering on a third party for your own desire, knowing full well they may not share your goal of creating the next generation of caring and capable humans, and knowing full well that they may come to despise their existence.

Are there many other situations where you impose harm on an innocent party for your own goals? This is not some moral condemnation, I'm just curious what your conditions are. We both just agreed that punching your neighbor in the face for fun isn't allowed but you've just shown that some forms of harm are okay to inflict, as long as your goal is "good enough" (and "for fun" isn't good enough). Where else do you employ that reaonsing? What makes a goal "moral" in other words?

It'd be wrong even if we also genetically engineer the slaves to like it, on the basis that the motivation is immoral. — Echarmion

So the motivation is the only determining factor?

So someone who is millions in debt with no home, who has a drinking problem, and 15 inheritable genetic disease should have children in his current state as long as he intends to try his best to raise them?

Sounds disgusting and backwards to me. Something akin to letting anyone perform surgery because they intend to do their best, without actually caring about whether or not they're qualified and without caring about the person being operated on.

If the motivation is not the only factor, then what else is?

So long as you could honestly judge having the child is in line with the maxim, having it would be ethical. — Echarmion

So as long as I can judge that the child will fulfill my arbitrary desire of them (in your case to create the next generation of compassionate people) then having them is ethical? Might as well say it's ethical in every situation, which I strongly disagree with, and you don't even have to be an AN to disagree with that one.

For example, if we're creating some sort of slave caste, because we'd like others to serve us as slaves, this seems like "bad" motivation regardless of the fact that no slaves are yet around. Should we act with the intention to make other sentient being serve us? I'd say no. — Echarmion

Here you seem to be placing the child's wellbeing ABOVE the desire of the parents. So creating a slave caste is wrong because everyone in said caste will hate it, even if its creators will love it.

For example, you may want children so you can help create a new generation of compassionate and capable humans. — Echarmion

But here you place the parent's desire above any consideration for the child's wellbeing (as you don't mention it). Why is that? Where is this "hard line" coming from?

What if for example, you knew your next child was going to be severely disabled, would it still be ethical to have them? They WOULD contribute to making a generation of compassionate humans in all likelyhood, but does that justify the harm they will go through? Why or why not?

Both these problems stem from looking at morality as a set of injunctions against specific outcomes, like a criminal law code listing a bunch of injuries you are not allowed to cause. And if a victim cannot be found and thus a prohibition not established, it then follows whatever you do is moral.

The alternative view is to ask what reasons we have for doing something — Echarmion

The latter must include the former. When looking at reasons to do something, some of those reasons will be "bad" and therefore the action should not be done. For example malicious genetic engineering. I am asking why that is bad.

Creating suffering for the sake of suffering is not an acceptable motivation regardless of the outcome. It doesn't matter if I apply it by genetically engineering beings that suffer, or whether I punch my neighbor in the face for fun. — Echarmion

What is the reason that makes creating suffering acceptable in the case of having children then?

...you imply there's a moral duty beyond that which any community merely 'think' is a moral duty. — Isaac

Incorrect. Look at my wording:

I think most people would say that I do NOT have a moral duty to steal and murder. — khaled

Had I been a moral objectivist I wouldn't have included the bolded area. I would have just outright said that you have a moral duty not to steal and murder.

I never play the objectivist, I operate within premises I think we agree on.

Anything which attempts to work forward from some premise to undermine an already held position is a form of moral realism. — Isaac

Incorrect. I could work from a commonly held premise to undermine a conclusion that does not follow from it by showing inconsistencies, or connections people have not noticed. Or I could show that some commonly held premises lead to contradictory conclusions.

We also have a moral intuition that ending the human race would be wrong. — Isaac

You*. As I said, we don't agree here. So by your own words:

It's disingenuous to keep switching as it suits your argument — Isaac

It is only the task of a moral realist to attempt to show one to e 'wrong' by use of the other. — Isaac

Agreed. Which is why I don't do it.

It won't hurt if you use enough bombs. — Echarmion

The way I define harm is doing something to someone that they don't want done. People don't want to die. Simple.

Well then, nothing else needs to be said. Your argument ultimately rests on nonsense, in the most literal sense of the word. — Echarmion

I wouldn't be so sure. Your main problem is that you cannot compare the suffering of someone to the "suffering of nothing". Maybe that's true. But that would imply some nasty things I'll start with one.

Malicious genetic engineering is fine. Even if your next child would have been born healthy. Because there is no actual harm being done when you genetically engineer a child to be blind and deaf for example. There was not a child that was harmed, as once the child is born they are already blind and deaf, the relevant decision is in the past.

I am sure you don't agree. But how do you justify it? There is no one being harmed here, and so no comparison can be made. You cannot compare the non-existent "potential" unmodified child with the one you genetically modified. Because one of those doesn't exist.

This is why I think the comparison is legitimate. I don't see another way you can have malicious genetic engineering be wrong without it.

If you’re indifferent, then you don’t care enough either way to make the issue a moral one. — Pinprick

That doesn't make it not a moral issue. Gangsters are indifferent to your suffering. Doesn't mean they can go around shooting people.

Not putting much thought into an action doesn't make it okay to do...

I think this is mostly down to interpretation. — Echarmion

Agreed.

I mean if you don't care about whether rules like "you cannot kill people" can be derived from more basic principles, that's fine. But it is kinda the point of moral philosophy. — Echarmion

Well whatever "more basic principles" you find from which "you cannot kill people" derives I can still ask that question about. As in "where do these more basic principles derive from". You have to stop at some point. And I don't really care to dig 50 layers in for no reason. A handful will do.

I only really associate "conservative" with a political movement and an approach to social questions. In that sense it's very much associated with the root "to conserve". I don't know where you take your usage of the word from, but if that's the definition you wanna go with, I am not going to argue. — Echarmion

Definition of conservative by marriam webster: 2-b: Marked by moderation or caution.

It's trivially true only if you suppose that people that don't exist nevertheless exist — Echarmion

That's just false.
Grass is greener than freedom. Because freedom has no color.

The problem is that you then have to answer why we're not nuking the planet into oblivion. — Echarmion

Because that hurts people, and Antinatalists are striving to eradicate all suffering. I don't understand why people keep using this ridiculous argument. It's tiring.

And if we cannot divine what the child's feelings are about being forced to live, isn't that a great reason to refrain from forcing it to?
— Tzeentch

This implies that there is a child with feelings, floating around as a disembodied soul or something, before the decision to even have a child is made.

Otherwise, the sequence of events doesn't work out, because by the time there is a child, it's already living, and the relevant decision is in the past. — Echarmion

It doesn't imply that. It implies precisely what it says. That by taking this course of action you can have a child that hates life. And that is reason enough to not have them.

"The relevant decision is in the past" so what? Doesn't say anything about whether or not the decision was right to take.