Again, someone's day can be Negative, Negative, Negative ... Report = Good day or at least, "not bad". — schopenhauer1

Key word: Can. You have yet to prove this happens to a sufficient degree so as to distrust the overall report. It’s like saying “People sometimes lie therefore everyone is lying all the time”

Then it comes back to how many of those inconveniences we actually experience vs. an evaluative, summative, binary report of it. That is the crux of this current argument. I think we have covered our positions well enough. — schopenhauer1

It's just the report that is misaligned with the occurrence itself. That is the claim — schopenhauer1

Sure. But you need to do more than simply cover your position or make claims. You need to show that it is the case. You’re the one trying to argue for AN, starting a new thread every week on it. So you need to show that “life is an inconvenience or terrible burden” is true of everyone since you seem to think that everyone shouldn’t be having kids. It’s crucial to your position, yet you can’t show it’s the case despite being asked to do so 3 times now.

So I guess, it's not only duration but time displacement as to when the report is being taken from the actual occurrence. — schopenhauer1

Sure but still. That it can occur doesn’t mean it’s occurring all the time. You can guess that a negative experience will get remembered more fondly. But you can’t go from that to: “If you remember something fondly it was probably bad” like you seem to be doing.

For you, does one person have to say, "You are clearly the winner here?". Because obviously that isn't going to be the case. I think a thing to learn is how to gracefully and respectfully end a debate that clearly isn't going to be one side switching their position. — schopenhauer1

What do you think we’re debating? Whether or not AN is right? Again, that’s not what I’m arguing. What I am arguing is that your version of AN is personal and can’t be generalized.

You didn't seem to address my point. If no one exists, who is the injustice done to as far as "missing out" on the goods of life? — schopenhauer1

I did address the argument by showing you that there are analogous actions that you find acceptable. So either you’re being a hypocrite or the argument doesn’t make sense.

If the recipient doesn’t expect the party, who is the injustice done to as far as “missing out” on the goods of the party? Same deal. Yet you find it ok here.

No one is "losing out" to the "burdenites" because no one expects them to lose out on them. However, there is potential for someone to lose out who is in the party. Same deal. Yet you find it ok here.

I don’t understand why you’re going back to the asymmetry “argument” one I disagreed with even when I was AN. We addressed this so long ago. You seem to want to “reset the conversation” now that there is an argument you can’t address, hoping it’ll go in your favor this time. It’s tiring when I write responses that largely go ignored. You seem to have no trouble relentlessly debating people for days until you can’t respond anymore. Then it’s all “let’s agree to disagree” and willfully ignoring questions asked about your position 3 times in a row.

There is much to be gained without one person declaring some sort of victory or whatnot. — schopenhauer1

Agreed. Just not in this case. And it doesn’t seem to me that you have any intention of honestly addressing my responses so I’ll just stop writing them until maybe you stop trying to “reset” the conversation.

By being a member of the chosen tribe. IOW, it's not up to one's own choice. — baker

Or they’re just insane. How do they know it’s not that? — khaled

Sure — baker

So one can consistently hold that God is omnibenevolent and judge him.

Perhaps you don't, but that doesn't mean everyone else is the same as you. — baker

How might one go about finding out God’s standards?

If God is a tribalist, and a particular person is a member of the chosen tribe, then they very much have the clue. — baker

Or they’re just insane. How do they know it’s not that?

Because, by definition, God precedes and contextualizes us, makes us possible. Thus, whatever we do, is made possible by God. — baker

Right. Where does this preclude us from judging said God? God seems to have even made it possible seeing as how we can easily iudge him.

God's standards. — baker

As I said, we don't know those. So anyone who pretends to judge God by God's standards is bullshitting. He has no clue if he's correct or not.

Now, because he's God, his perspective is all that counts — baker

Doesn't follow. And even if it did, again, we don't know said perspective. So we have to make due with what we have, which is our own standards to judge by.

How?? — baker

Again, what does God being God with a capital G have to do with us being unable to judge him?

1.) The duration and the kinds of experiences matter here. Duration means there's a lot more experiences, which means memory can cherry-pick. The intensity and magnitude of the experiences in life are also that much more extreme, meaning the kind of pains being overlooked are that much more. Similarly, an event like, "Eating an ice cream cone" is a very limited event. The report can roughly match the experience being so short, and not being of a pervasive but always changing nature that characterizes life itself versus one very limited event within life.

2.) Similar to above, a single event is more of a subgenre of a subgenre of life itself. Life itself involves pervasive routines one has to fulfill to keep alive.. work, maintenance, etc. It is not one discrete event that one can analyze. Reporting on pervasive, yet constantly changing events that occur over a lifetime are just of a different kind than a discrete event that is not pervasive like a surprise party. — schopenhauer1

Fair enough. Finally some attempt at proving that OB applies to longer events more. Anyways, as stated above, it still doesn’t lead to “life is at best an inconvenience and at worst an incredible burden”. OB makes us remember things we used to hate more fondly. However this doesn’t mean that people's reports of their quality of life are significantly altered by OB. It could just be that they have few memories where they’ve really suffered and so their report will be accurate overall, even if they forget some of said suffering.

On a separate tangent, why should the people who don't think life is a burden make such an all pervasive and controlling decision for the people who think that life is indeed a burden? — schopenhauer1

What kind of control? I haven’t seen any natalists forcing antinatalists to have kids.

Unless by the “pervasive and controlling decision” you mean having children in the first place, I’d agree with you. That is, people who have kids that they know will consider life a burden are indeed wrong in doing so. But they don’t know. And they know that they most likely will like it.

Most people want this, therefore those who don't want this must deal with it. That is unjust when the converse would be "No person exists to even care they don't exist". — schopenhauer1

Going back to type arguments? Surprise parties are done simply because most people would want them and those who don’t have to deal with it, when the converse could be “The recipient didn’t know about a party they’re missing out on to even care”

Yet you find them acceptable despite them meeting all the features. So maybe it’s not so unjust?

Going back to cover the same ground we covered long before in countless threads instead of addressing the specific point I want you to address makes the weakness in your position clear. And I will repeat for the last time, because if you don’t address it this time it’ll be obvious you’re just dodging a valid argument that you can’t respond to. I thought it could be you didn’t see it but that’s clearly not the case.

I will repeat it again: You think life is "at best an inconvenience and at most a terrible burden". How did you come to this conclusion? Please retrace your steps and tell me. — khaled

This is required for your position. Since you use an extent argument, you must show that life meets the threshold. And I’m willing to agree that something that is “at best an inconvenience and at worst a terrible burden” is indeed too much to impose. So, how do you know life meets those features? Because if you don’t then a required premise in your argument is unjustified and is just as valid as “Life is at worst a good experience and at best heaven”, now I don’t believe that, but it has just as much evidence to support it as your view does.

99% of the time people say such things they mean to add "except this one" at the end. It's just less poetic so they don't.

Socrates said "All I know is that I know nothing" and didn't see any paradoxes because it was clear to his listeners that what he meant literally was "All I know is that I know nothing except this"

Logical nihilism reminds me of the law paradox: There is one law and that law is there are no laws. — TheMadFool

Unrelated but I never understood how statements like this are paradoxical. Just add a “except this one” at the end and the paradox is resolved.

That idea actually favors my argument though. — schopenhauer1

No it doesn’t. It doesn’t favor any argument. Just because it challenges the status quo doesn't mean it supports alternatives.

There is no "one" version, yet the one reported is given as accurate. — schopenhauer1

Right, and even if we accept this it gives no reason to accept that life is “an inconvenience or a terrible burden”.

Life truly has multivarious events of all shapes and sizes in just one day, let alone, a week, a month, a year, a lifetime. — schopenhauer1

Sure. So do surprise parties. People are capable of experiencing multivarious events and concluding that the sum of the events was good. You choose not to believe them for no reason only when it comes to life.

I think though, even on this theoretical scale, it is plain enough to see the difference in the two that the disanalogy is apparent. — schopenhauer1

Not to me. Putting "apparent" in front of something that you have no justification for thinking is apparent doesn't make the thing apparent.

I think this is another "We're going to have to agree to disagree" as we are repeating here and I am not interested in a large justification regress — schopenhauer1

This has nothing to do with "justification regress". I'm telling you that, just like life, a surprise party lasts for a certain duration (although much shorter) and has multivariable experiences. I don't understand how that's debatable.

You think it's disanalogous because you begin by assuming that life is bad to awful. More on that last paragraph.

A life time of events versus one event (one which indeed is pleasurable to many people), is not the same as experiencing a large time interval of events that were neutral to unpleasant, aggregating it over many years and reporting "Life is good". — schopenhauer1

But the difference is not significant for the purposes of the argument

Do you or do you not believe that someone can examine a long event, full of variable experiences, and accurately report that it was good or bad? Because every time I make any analogy to life you reply "Ah yes but life has variable experiences and is long so people's reports are false and it's actually at least an inconvenience and at most a terrible burden" as if that follows in any way. Even if we accept that people have an optimism bias only towards long events (something I've been begging you to justify without any success), that STILL doesn't lead to the conclusion that life is at best an inconvenience and at worst a terrible burden.

I will say this.. Perhaps it is not JUST duration. The example you picked was pretty skewed. If you had provided a more neutral or ambiguous one then perhaps you would get closer to the idea of reporting on life itself. — schopenhauer1

What makes you think I'm the one that's skewed and not you? What makes you believe that a surprise party is so unlike life, despite having a similar percentage of people reporting that they like the experience for both?

You refuse to address the question I specifically requested you address, if you address nothing else in the last comment.

I will repeat it again: You think life is "at best an inconvenience and at most a terrible burden". How did you come to this conclusion? Please retrace your steps and tell me. Reply to nothing else in this comment, but just address this question. This is the second time I request this, so kindly address it.

It's a very bold claim to make that everyone's reports of their quality of life are wrong, and that you know how it's "really like". You need to justify this claim. Every time I make an analogy between life and anything largely reported to be positive (which life also is by the way which is precisely why I liken it to other things commonly reported to be positive) you automatically say that's disanalogous. You start by assuming that life is at best an inconvenience and at worst a terrible burden. You do not prove this you assume it.

Anyone who thinks that life is either bad or awful will obviously not want kids. But you want more than that. You claim you know that life is bad or awful for everyone, despite the vast majority assuring you they don't think it is. What is your justification behind this belief.

Yes. But this doesn’t come into the debate yet. I could agree that there is fundamentally something wrong about serfdom and still make all the same arguments.
— khaled

Not sure what you mean here. — schopenhauer1

You wanted to establish that there are some impositions that are "fundamentally wrong", even if the person being imposed upon doesn't think of it as an imposition. I disagree, but I'm pointing out that's insignificant. I can agree that some impositions are fundamentally wrong while still doubting that life is one such imposition like I'm doing right now.

assault on something that unquestionably belongs to the individual is sufficient. — Tzeentch

That doesn't quite work, because one's own evaluation of what belongs to who can be completely different from the evaluation of another, hence the slippery slope

Perhaps the need in conjuction with the thief's mistake of imposing is sufficient. — Tzeentch

Note, it is not the need that may justify an action, it is the thief's imposition that justifies it. — Tzeentch

So you can't impose anything on anyone unless they impose first?

Say there is a drowning person and a sleeping ex-lifeguard on the beach. You can't swim to save them. Do you impose on the sleeping ex-lifeguard by waking them up to save the drowning person?

it is a reaction - protecting that which is rightfully theirs: their life and their body. — Tzeentch

But you said needs like these are insufficient.

So are they sufficient now?

The imposition that follows by the victim is of a different nature than the thief — Tzeentch

I agree, but this isn’t reflected in your blanket statement that your needs are not sufficient to impose. Here is a care where they are.

But maybe the right thing to do is to turn the other cheek? I'm willing to consider that option. — Tzeentch

I’m not.

I would argue that in this situation one's needs are sufficient, because they extend only to oneself (self-preservation). — Tzeentch

:chin:

In this case your needs clearly extend to the thief no? You need the thief to stop. Self preservation implies a party you’re preserving yourself from (by imposing on them).

Your needs extend to the thief just like the thief’s needs extend to you. He needs the money, you need to kick him in the face (in both cases to survive)

So if your argument for why said needs are insufficient is that “they only extend to me” that’s not true in this case. So by your first statement, your needs (to kick him in the face) would still be insufficient to justify stopping the thief (since they extend to the thief. Violently).

That doesn't quite work, because one's own evaluation of the harm done can be completely different from the evaluation of another, hence the slippery slope: — Tzeentch

But one often has a pretty reasonable estimate of how much harm they'll suffer vs how much harm they'll inflict by doing an action. In some cases it's pretty clear. For instance: Is it really reasonable for a sadist to believe that his pleasure from torturing compares to the victim's pain?

If, however, one comes to the sensible conclusion that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to judge what is good for others, then one will realize one must always tread carefully when imposing things on others — Tzeentch

Right. And one way to tread carefully is by making it so that:

One could simply treat one's own needs as just as valuable or less valuable as those of others. So don't do something to others that is harmful unless the alternative is equal or way greater harm onto yourself. — khaled

And then using common sense.

Anyways I want to ask you this: If a thief is about to stab you what justification do you have to stop them? Or is it not right for you to stop them?

Remember your needs are insufficient here. And to stop them is an imposition on them. Tread carefully!

If nothing else just reply to the last paragraph.

My main point here is that OB can obtain in a surprise party, but it wouldn't be a surprise to me if the actual experience matches the report because often surprise parties have elements people like in it and so may not be reporting wrong if they say, "I like it". — schopenhauer1

And my main point is that exact paragraph but replace “surprise party” with “life”. You disagree with this evaluation because you think life is “at best an inconvenience and at worst a terrible burden” while surprise parties are “full of elements people like”. Where is your evidence this is the case?

It here being a very discrete event in their life versus many hours experiencing things other than they like — schopenhauer1

Ok stop with this. Surprise parties also often last many hours and for an introvert like me are MOSTLY comprised of things other than I like. This “single event vs many events” distinction is not real.

Because life has more than events that we just like in it going on in the lived experience — schopenhauer1

So do surprise parties…. According to most reports. Which you arbitrarily decide not to trust. More on his in second to last paragraph.

If they believe too much imposition is wrong, then why not be AN? — schopenhauer1

Literally everyone believes too much imposition is wrong. The statement is true by definition. And they’re not AN.

I am claiming impositions are often underreported and that often people are mistaken as to how much imposition there is imposed on them. — schopenhauer1

I agree that this is the crux of the disagreement so let’s focus on it. I’m claiming you have no evidence for this claim. Remember: you don’t have access to what an experience felt like for another person. So you must choose to decide whether or not trust their report, without any evidence about whether or not it’s accurate.

For surprise parties, you choose to trust the reports, so when people say they liked it you believe they actually liked it. For life you choose not to trust the reports, so it must be bad given that everyone says it’s good.

This is an arbitrary inconsistency. What evidence do you have that most people are lying about life but not about surprise parties? What evidence do you have that surprise parties are actually pleasant while life is an inconvenience or terrible burden?

Was it really that the serf's view was the only thing that changed the unjustness of serfdom — schopenhauer1

Yes. But this doesn’t come into the debate yet. I could agree that there is fundamentally something wrong about serfdom and still make all the same arguments.

The main question I’m asking you is: How did you come to the conclusion that there is something fundamentally wrong about life but not surprise parties. Please trace your steps and tell me.

since one's own needs are never sufficient to justify an action that involves other individuals. To argue otherwise would lead to a predictable slippery slope. — Tzeentch

No it wouldn't. One could simply treat one's own needs as just as valuable or less valuable as those of others. So don't do something to others that is harmful unless the alternative is equal or way greater harm onto yourself. That's a simple solution among countless others.

1) Are burdens underreported?
— schopenhauer1

Sometimes, but I don’t know the rules. You seem to know for a fact that they’re underreported for life and not for surprise parties though. Care to prove that?

2) Are burdens okay to give to someone if someone accepts the burden?
— schopenhauer1

I think so, but that’s irrelevant for now. I’ve been arguing as if I also think the experiencing self is what matters.

3) Are all burdens of this nature in #2?
— schopenhauer1

Well if they’re in a good state of mind yes.

4) How much of the burdens are not of the nature of #2 and are unwanted
— schopenhauer1

How many unaccepted burdens are unwanted? All of them? — khaled

For those.

And my main argument is:

Your position is inconsistent for you think that OB applies only to life and not surprise parties because of some unidentified psychological principle that you have no support for that you instead ask me to research and prove for you. Both are impositions. Either OB applies to both, or neither. Otherwise explain why it applies to one but not the other.

Also:

I believe this is like saying, "If I break someone's arm, someone MIGHT not mind it because I haven't surveyed everyone"
— schopenhauer1

No it’s more than that. it’s “Although I think X is unethical, I have no basis for telling someone who disagrees it is”. people can agree that too much imposition is wrong without being AN. — khaled

Which metaphor are you referring to? — Prishon

Robber to unvaccinated.

Robber wants money without a job, so he steals, and doesn’t care that it harms others.

An unvaccinated person is too scared of a needle (most), so they don’t get vaccinated, and don’t care that it harms others.

After which bans followed from: physics (for asking fantasy questions and about the rishon model), biology (just for doubting the central dogma) , philosophy (a Kant guy didnt like my ontological relativism), skeptics, worldbuilding (for being smarter than a mod), economy (for doubt about the growth model), mathematics, astronomy (bad contributions while in reality a mod didnt like my knowledge about black holes), psychology, polotics, law, AI, and now a yearlong networkwide suspension. The argument of the troll is a well known defense mechanism. — Prishon

Oh God it’s another Bartricks. Maybe you should consider the possibility that you’re not as smart as you pretend when faced with unanimous agreement that you’re a troll?

However, the optimism bias would indeed be absurd if we only applied it to times when people are generally actually happy about something. It is about going through a series of events during a longer duration and cherry-picking the good ones — schopenhauer1

What makes you think this isn’t what the surprise party recipient is doing? Cherry picking good experiences. Why do you trust he’s reporting accurately but the person giving an opinion on life must not be.

We agree OB exists. But you say it’s active in some scenarios and not in others as it suits the argument. Anyone who thinks life is good? OB. Anyone who enjoys surprise parties? Not OB. Arbitrary.

I believe this is like saying, "If I break someone's arm, someone MIGHT not mind it because I haven't surveyed everyone" — schopenhauer1

No it’s more than that. it’s “Although I think X is unethical, I have no basis for telling someone who disagrees it is”. people can agree that too much imposition is wrong without being AN.

Because you are picking one positive experience and saying, "This is like life" instead of a steady stream of a variety of daily experiences. — schopenhauer1

A surprise party is a steady stream of experiences not all of which are necessarily positive.

Life has a variety of experiences. Yes. — schopenhauer1

So does a surprise party. And similarly people report that they generally enjoy it and that most experiences are positive for them. A minority hates surprise parties (including me ironically). A minority hates life.

I mean, I don't get your gripe now. Are you trying to say that the events of the surprise party can have many negatives that people aren't reporting? — schopenhauer1

Yes. I’m printing out that you choose to believe a surprise party is not subject to OB but life is. Arbitrarily. You need to explain why you think so.

Our difference is that often there are negative events (maybe not conditions of slavery) that people encounter but do overlook because there is an optimism bias. The lived experience is disrupted from the reported one. — schopenhauer1

I don’t deny OB. I have a problem with you selectively using it though. Either both life and surprise parties are subject to OB, or neither is. Otherwise explain why one is and the other isn’t.

However, I think that most experiences during a surprise party are already positive and thus would accurately be reporting that. — schopenhauer1

You’ve been doing something weird the entire reply. You’ve been pretending like you’re privy to how an experience felt for a stranger. So a surprise party is positive both in experience and report. But life is positive only in report and not in experience.

How did you come to this conclusion? What did you do to discover that life is not good in experience. You don’t trust the reports (arbitrarily), so how did you find out what others are feeling. Same with surprise parties. What did you do to discover that they’re good experiences?

It’s not:
1- Life is an inconvenience or terrible burden
2- People report that it’s good
3- The reports are not to be trusted

As there is no way you get premise 1 for anyone but yourself. But we’re talking from a general case here. You can’t get that life is bad generally without asking people what they think, which means you must choose to trust the reports FIRST then CONCLUDE whether or not the experience is good. Not the other way around.

It’s:
1- People’s reports of life are untrustworthy
2- People report it’s good
3- Life is an inconvenience or terrible burden.

But then how did you get 1? You arbitrarily chose to distrust reports about life but to trust reports about surprise parties. Is this because of the following psychological claim?

It is a psychological claim that this is the case that I am saying I think has validity and further proves a case where humans have a tendency to overlook, under report, etc. — schopenhauer1

Then where did you get the claim from? Just to be clear: the claim is that OB only applies to long experiences and not short ones. And you think it has validity, but refuse to provide evidence. Ok, let me at least ask you, is there any more justification behind this belief other than that you think it’s true?

If you want, let me block off the rest of my life to scour every article because khaled doesn't find my argument compelling on an internet forum. — schopenhauer1

Well it should only take a minute if you actually had a source to support your belief so I’m assuming you don’t.
It seems you came to the conclusion first, then decided to ask your interlocutor to do the research to prove it for you not knowing if such research even exists. An interesting strategy.

If you don't find it compelling, then do some research and see. — schopenhauer1

You instead want khaled to pause HIS life to search for a source to support YOUR arbitrary claim? Nah.

IT either convinces or doesn't', period. It doesn't have universality, not prima facie at least. It is compelling or not compelling. — schopenhauer1

So you think the natalist’s position is just as valid?

Murder is a set of things.. There's death, killing, accidental death, killing with intent, killing under some mitigating circumstance, 1st degree, 2nd degree — schopenhauer1

Not really. Accidental death is manslaughter. Intent is required for murder. And having a mitigating circumstance doesn’t make murder any less wrong, but does make the killer less culpable. Also, First and second degree murder are both wrong. Because remember: Murder is wrong. Extent doesn’t matter. All of the differences above are used for deciding punishment, not for deciding whether the act was wrong.

For AN, as you argued it, everyone can agree with the premise and not reach the conclusion.

I can imagine a society who values non-imposition as a very important rule and thus antinatalism becomes a principle constructed over time in a long process over many years and becomes ingrained where degrees are defined etc. — schopenhauer1

That’s… literally impossible. You can’t have a society of antinatalists. It’s going to die out in a generation. And how do you define the “degrees of imposition”. All you can do if you want any objectivity is define the properties that make an imposition bad. For instance “Impositions that last longer than 30 years are wrong”. But it’s up to you to come up with a definition in that case that doesn’t contradict with your other beliefs which you haven’t done.

1) Are burdens underreported? — schopenhauer1

Sometimes, but I don’t know the rules. You seem to know for a fact that they’re underreported for life and not for surprise parties though. Care to prove that?

2) Are burdens okay to give to someone if someone accepts the burden? — schopenhauer1

I think so, but that’s irrelevant for now. I’ve been arguing as if I also think the experiencing self is what matters.

3) Are all burdens of this nature in #2? — schopenhauer1

Well if they’re in a good state of mind yes.

4) How much of the burdens are not of the nature of #2 and are unwanted — schopenhauer1

How many unaccepted burdens are unwanted? All of them?

I tried to make it a bit shorter this time.

You can’t seem to understand metaphors. And you also say shit like:

The vaccines have already been developed a some time before the genetically manipulated virus was released — Prishon

I’ll give you the benefit of the doubt and assume you’re a troll

Do you compare me with a robber? — Prishon

Yes. In that you do whatever you want without thinking about others.

Someone robbing you does it because they don’t want to get a job and don’t care what they have to do to others instead. Someone not taking the vaccine does it because they are afraid of a needle and similarly doesn’t care about the consequences to others.

So actually I want to take it. But I just say that I diont want? — Prishon

No clue where you got that from. No, you don’t want to take it because you couldn’t care less about hurting the people around you severely just to avoid a needle.

I understand some people may actually be concerned about the efficacy and side effects of the vaccine but you just seem to be of the unfathomably selfish kind. You just don’t want it, and you know you’re hurting others by not taking it but fuck em.

An air conditioner. A fan.

My point is that judging God by human standards is in conflict with the basic definition of God. — baker

Then by what standards shall he be judged if not by humanist standards?

There is no standards (that we can know about) outside human standards (by definition). So if we are going to judge God, it can only be by these standards.

There can be no other meaning to “omnibenevolent” other than “omnibenevolent by humanist standards”. There are no other standards that we can use. What else do you think omnibenevolent meant?

God. One cannot hold, even if just for the purposes of argument, that God is omnimax, and then judge God, and still think one is being consistent. — baker

Yes one can

But here is what we are not born with: information, data, rules, software, knowledge, lexicons, representations, algorithms, programs, models, memories, images, processors, subroutines, encoders, decoders, symbols, or buffers – design elements that allow digital computers to behave somewhat intelligently. Not only are we not born with such things, we also don’t develop them – ever. — The Empty Brain, Robert Epstein

We don’t develop rules, knowledge, lexicons and representations?

I didnt say I demand it. — Prishon

Right… but I’m pretty sure you would. You’re telling me if you got COVID you would simply lie down and say “Ah, well, time to accept my fate”?

The reason I don't want it is because I dont want it. I dont think about others in that case. — Prishon

Yea. That’s the problem isn’t it.

If someone robs you and justifies it with “I don’t want to live honestly because I don’t want to. I don’t think about others in that case” would you think this is a reasonable justification? Is he in the right now? Should he not be punished?

“I know I’m a hypocrite and irrational. You can be mad at me but I won’t do anything about it”

Typical anti-vaxer

What’s the point of discussing anything with you then if you know you’re wrong and don’t care?

No, what I am saying that because a surprise party is one defined event, and not a course of day, a week, a month, a year, a decade, a lifetime, it can indeed align more closely with the report. — schopenhauer1

Ah, so the longer the period, supposedly the less accurate the predictions. Where is your evidence for this? You can't just claim it out of the blue.

What if the party lasted a week, suddenly not accurate anymore?

Indeed and that makes a difference. — schopenhauer1

Not until you explain why you believe it does. Where is your evidence that the longer the period, the less accurate the predictions are?

I can be a Kantian non-nuanced person and say that all things which might cause harm are not okay. — schopenhauer1

Well, this would mean literally nothing is okay, and the fact that you're doing something right now shows you can't hold that position with your current beliefs.

I am willing to be more nuanced and say that an event with short duration with extremely minimal costs of imposition are acceptable — schopenhauer1

This isn't any better. You have no reason to say that life is long enough and that its impositions are not minimal enough. You can't establish that objectively. One can easily consistently hold that life is not long enough and not a big enough imposition to be unacceptable in the general case.

You still have no objective basis to push your belief.

The amount of impositions is so minimal and non-pervasive that it would be intellectually dishonest to claim it is. So disanalagous again. — schopenhauer1

You understand how analogies work right? I can't provide you with an example of an imposition that is lifelong, and just as much of an imposition as life, because that would just be life. All analogies will be different in magnitude from the originals but have the same properties. That's what an analogy is.

I'm not sure why longer duration with more perpetual, pervasive, and frequent impositions is not computing and is translated as arbitrary for you. — schopenhauer1

Because you haven't shown how either affect predictions. You want to make a claim that longer durations make us see the experience through rose tinted glasses. You have provided no support for this. So it remains an arbitrary claim until you do.

Length is not a factor when it comes to the degree to which the reports align with the lived experience.
— khaled

I think we are going to have to agree to disagree on this — schopenhauer1

I'm assuming this is what you mean we have to "agree to disagree on". I disagree. You've made a claim without evidence. That people generally embellish long experiences in a positive light and don't do so with shorter ones. You need to provide evidence for this. Then your position may have some objective legitimacy.

Forcing a burden on someone unnecessarily, do you think that is bad? — schopenhauer1

Depends on the extent of the burden compared to how likely it is the "burden" is enjoyed. Slavery? Bad. Surprise parties? Good.

This is your position as well.

Right, so it is a (what you call) extent argument I am making, at this point. That is to say, starting life for someone else is sufficiently meeting a threshold that is crossed to make it a violation and thus wrong. — schopenhauer1

This assumes there is a threshold, and it's not a simple yes/no question.

You will say report, I will say lived experience and we are back at square one. So where is this going to go but in circles with how we are arguing right now? — schopenhauer1

This is the problem. We both say report. Because that's all we have access to!

You think that the lived experience is what matters, but how do we get at what this lived experience was like? Well, only thing we can do is ask the experiencer correct? Except in one case (life) you think their reports should be dismissed and that life is objectively neutral to bad, but in the other (surprise parties) you think their reports are accurate. This is an arbitrary belief that you have to provide evidence for.

What we disagree on currently is how trustworthy the reports are. I say they're trustworthy, you seem to arbitrarily decide they are not when it fits your argument.

Then this goes back to my meta-argument for ethics in the first place. — schopenhauer1

Again, I'm not asking you to:

make my argument "THE ARGUMENT" because it is an argument. It is not a chair. It is not the laws of gravity, etc. — schopenhauer1

I'm showing you that there is no reason your belief should be universalized although you seem to think it has that kind of justification

However, to the point of "objectivity", you may be referring more to "universality in belief" which you seem to refer back to over and over for why antinatalism is wrong. — schopenhauer1

(Note: again, I'm not arguing antinatalism is wrong. I'm arguing that you have no objective (true of everyone) way to show it's right)

Because surprise parties are general happy experiences. — schopenhauer1

So is life. According to the reports. Which you choose not to trust without giving any reason as to why they shouldn't be trusted. "It's too long" is not a reason until you explain what length has to do with the accuracy.

That to me doesn't have much relevance when discussing every experience of life itself, as I have said ad nauseum now. — schopenhauer1

Which is arbitrary. Why is it that in the case of life our reports are inaccurate while for surprise parties they're not? I agree they're dissimilar in many aspects, but you have to still show instead of arbitrarily claiming, that one of those aspects results in inaccurate reports in the one case and accurate ones in the other.

Okay sure, but I have given various examples of things that were not seen as wrong in the past and have become considered wrong today. I think I have explained to you my meta-ethical idea that ethics can evolve over time. — schopenhauer1

No one disagrees there. What I disagree with is your belief that this is such a case where having children is something acceptable now that we will come to see as wrong later. It's unsupported.

And a very important point: ALL of these ethical evolutions were evolutions that took the form of type statements. Murder is wrong, not "too much murder is wrong". Slavery is wrong not "too much slavery is wrong". Yours takes the form of "too much imposition is wrong" which is already a (basically) universally held principle. You cannot get "having children is wrong" out of that as any more than a personal conclusion. At the same level as "Eating white chocolate is bad" because it's too sweet. It's not an objective statement, it's entirely personal, and depends on your definition of "too sweet".

You seem to think that if it does not convince people AT THIS TIME, it must be not right. — schopenhauer1

False. I'm not arguing it's not right. I'm arguing you have no basis for thinking it will eventually be right. And so no reason to push it. It's on the same level as: "Eating white chocolate is bad" because it's too sweet. In other words, that the natalist position is just as valid.

This is the 3rd or 4th time I've made it clear I'm not arguing for natalism. I'm arguing that your belief that antinatalism is superior in any objective (again, universality of belief not whatever else you thought it was) sense is unfounded.

Then the goal of the person who sees the extent as too much is to convince the other that it is indeed too much. — schopenhauer1

There is no meaning to "It is indeed too much". You are claiming that there is some objective measure of the "right extent" of imposition. Is there an objective measure of the "right extent" of sweetness?

The instinct to say "murder is universally wrong" is not held by everyone either. — schopenhauer1

But the person that believes it has a claim to objectivity. He can respond "actually murder is wrong because anything the prematurely and unjustly ends life without consent is wrong and murder is that". If anyone believes in the first premise, and that murder fits that category, they will agree it is wrong.

There is no equivalent for antinatalism. "Imposing on people is wrong"? well, you don't believe that (surprise parties). It's "Imposing on people too much is wrong". Literally everyone agrees with you there. And not everyone is an antinatalist. Because what is "too much" is personal. It's again like "Eating things that are too sweet is bad". Everyone agrees, yet they eat different foods,and none think that they're more "correct" than the others in doing so. But you seem to for some reason.

Both "murder is wrong" and "having children is wrong" are not universally held. But the difference is for the first, if the premises are true the conclusion is true, giving a way to objectivity if you hold that the premises are true of everyone. For the second, even if the premise is true of everyone the conclusion doesn't necessarily follow. Meaning that those who believe in the the second, have no reason to think it applies to everyone. They will disagree with people that think "Imposing on people too much is wrong" is false, but outside of that, they have no justification to claim that they're right as long as that first premise is shared.

I repeat, this is not my logic. — TheMadFool

Ok.

This is not my logic — TheMadFool

Yes it is. Your argument is that since some animals eat us, this justifies us eating all animals. Makes no sense.

Animals eat humans. So, why should humans not eat animals? — TheMadFool

No. Some animals eat humans. This doesn’t justify eating all animals.

Lions eat us, this doesn’t justify eating cows.

No one advocates eating all animals and plants. — Apollodorus

No, what’s being advocated for is eating animals that don’t harm us because there exist animals that do.

More like “That Asian just shot a man so this justifies shooting black people”

Besides, eating is a necessity. — Apollodorus

Not eating animals. At least not for anyone here. Where it is a necessity, sure.

Kindly tend to my original request. — TheMadFool

You should at least attempt to figure it out yourself, but if you want me to spell it out for you:

Discriminating against a group for the actions of individuals makes no sense.

"That black guy just shot a man. This justifies shooting all black people"

This is the logic you're employing for animals and plants

Imagine someone says this: You shouldn't have any qualms about being racist towards black people for there is a minority of racist people who are black — khaled

You would (hopefully) tell that person they’re wrong. What would you say to them if they asked you to unpack?

That’s what I would say to you.

They eat us and so why not eat them. — TheMadFool

Venus fly traps don't eat us. The plants we eat never eat us.

If the above makes sense then this too should make sense: Animals eat humans. — TheMadFool

Not the ones we eat. We eat herbavoirs. Who would not eat humans.

We explicitly avoid eating carnivoirs because supposedly they taste like shit.

If you think eating plants is acceptable because we have carnivorous plants then, you shouldn't have any qualms about being nonvegetarian for there are carnivorous animals. — TheMadFool

Imagine someone says this: You shouldn't have any qualms about being racist towards black people for there is a minority of racist people who are black. (except said minority doesn't even exist in your examples)

2. A justification for eating plants is tit for tat: plants eat animals and so why not eat them too? — TheMadFool

No it isn't. Not remotely. The justification is that plants supposedly don't feel pain. Again, the plants we eat and that animals eat never harm us or the animals.

But even if they do, going vegan globally will reduce the number of plants eaten anyways because we wouldn't be feeding cattle anymore.

1) The same may apply.. People can report one thing and experience another, — schopenhauer1

But you think it applies to one and not the other. Why? That's the question I'm asking you.

You trust people's reports when it comes to surprise parties but not life, why is that?

A surprise party lasts a certain duration with a set period of time. Life itself is a lifetime obviously. — schopenhauer1

A lifetime is a "certain duration with a set period of time". The only difference here is length.

You cannot compare the two. — schopenhauer1

You can't just keep stating this, you have to explain why you cannot compare the two. So far the only difference you outlined is the length of imposition which shouldn't be relevant (see next paragraph).

Again, I don't believe this is analogous to life itself because of the vast difference in duration — schopenhauer1

Irrelevant. The point of the surprise party example isn't to say "Surprise parties are ok so life is ok". That would be a stupid argument. The point is to show that acts that don't relieve any harm, while having a chance of causing harm, can still be ok to do. That's all I'm trying to argue.

And SINCE this is the case (again, you agree that surprise parties are ok even though they don't relieve harm, and can cause it), you have no objective basis for arguing that life is too much of an imposition. That's what I'm arguing, not that "It's ok to impose life" but "You have no objective (true of everyone) justification to say that it's not ok to impose life".

and the fact that one is one experience while the other is a lifetime of all experiences. — schopenhauer1

A surprise party is not a unitary experience. It's a duration full of experiences just like life is, just much shorter. This is not a real difference. Again, the only difference you pointed out is length.

Enduring and "finding it a thing they must endure" is almost the same as the experience and the report later of the experience so this is just restating what we are arguing as far as I see. — schopenhauer1

I'm saying that people's reports of their experiences should be the thing you take into account when you are trying to examine the quality of others' experiences.

You are claiming that no, these reports can be wrong, and that life is objectively "a minor inconvenience or a terrible burden for everyone". That would be a tenable position, if you didn't also take people's word for it when it comes to surprise parties with no explanation as to why you treat them differently. Length is not a factor when it comes to the degree to which the reports align with the lived experience.

But I would agree that a particular event of a surprise party might align the experience and report as good. — schopenhauer1

But life doesn't?

Being that this is disanalogous to life itself, being that life is the sum of all experiences — schopenhauer1

The differences that make it disanalogous are:

vast difference in duration and the fact that one is one experience while the other is a lifetime of all experiences. — schopenhauer1

Which one of those explains why the report is not to be trusted in the case of life? I don't see how either should be relevant (one isn't a real difference). It's like saying: "His report shouldn't be trusted because he has red hair while the other witnesses had black hair."

Even if this was correct, one major difference is I am not forcing the ice cream on others. — schopenhauer1

Irrelevant. Point I was making was purely about how extent arguments are not objective. Do you agree about that at least?

At least if you are going to be talking of extent, try to make an analogy of things that are daily X set of multiple experiences that are continuous and non-stop until death — schopenhauer1

See below.

But it does, especially if we are talking about an extent argument. — schopenhauer1

No it doesn't. Because I'm not saying "Surprise parties are ok so life is ok". I'm not arguing for natalism. I'm arguing you have no objective basis by which to push your belief. Yours is exactly as valid as natalism at best. For this argument to work, I would need to point out that you are making an extent argument. Which you are. And you haven't provided any basis for why your analysis of "bad enough" is any more "correct" than a natalist's.

Because I can probably agree that actual lived experience and reported experience are more aligned in the case of surprise parties. — schopenhauer1

You can't just arbitrarily agree that in one case the lived and the reported experiences are aligned and in the other case they aren't. Why are they not aligned in the case of life? Duration? How is that relevant?

Again, it's a meta-ethics thing about where it fits into the world of phenomena. — schopenhauer1

Not what I'm asking.

However, to the point of "objectivity", you may be referring more to "universality in belief" — schopenhauer1

This is what I'm asking. As highlighted by:

I mean objective as in: True of everybody. — khaled

Perhaps there are universal appeals to wrongs- things like murder and theft. — schopenhauer1

Yes but those are all type arguments. Murder is wrong. Period. And murder is: Killing innocents. There is no "Too much murder is wrong". Every single instance is wrong. That's why you can make universal appeals like these.

But in your case you want to use: "Imposing on others is wrong" to make a universal appeal relating to childbirth. That would be fine. Except you don't think imposing on others is always wrong ex: Surprise parties. So it's more like "Imposing on others too much is wrong". Now you have no basis to make a universal appeal. Unless you can show that your estimation of "too much" is more correct than that of a natalist somehow.

No, because as repeated over and over, the analogy is dis-analogous. — schopenhauer1

Not in a way that matters. What does the length of the experience have to do with the accuracy of the reports? Do people tend to report long experiences favorably or something? I'd say it's the opposite of that if anything.

I am not sure I would classify it as an imposition if people like it. — schopenhauer1

You sure? That would make life not an imposition......

If a surprise party is harmful then it is an imposition. If it is simply unexpected, I wouldn't necessarily say it's an imposition. — schopenhauer1

But you can't tell beforehand if it's an imposition or not. So now what? Is it wrong to do?

You seem to think they're not wrong to do, so I take it you think that if most people don't find a situation harmful, then it's not an imposition. Cool, so life isn't an imposition!

life itself can be classified as suffering from a Buddhist standpoint. — schopenhauer1

No Buddhist ever claimed life is suffering. The original quote is more like "Life has suffering". Not a groundbreaking discovery. "Life is suffering" is a problem not a serious philosophical position.

I wouldn't necessarily say it's an imposition. A burden, a thing one must "endure" (not relish in). — schopenhauer1

Again, most people relish in the burden of life. Few find it a thing they must endure.

However, with what I was saying earlier, much of life is full of burdens and inconveniences and harms etc etc. and its simply the post-facto reports that say, "Life is good" or "Good to be born", etc. — schopenhauer1

A surprise party at its worst might be an inconvenience for someone, but then that is situational to the person — schopenhauer1

How do you know if a surprise party was burdensome or not? You ask the recipient right? And each recipient will give a different answer but most will likely agree the party was good.

So it's post facto reports and so invalid when someone says "Life is good". But when the recipient of a surprise party says "This surprise party is good" we should take his word for it.

Why exactly? They're both post facto reports. Why should one be dismissed in favor of "Actually, you're wrong, life is at best an inconvenience and at worst a terrible burden and harm" while the other should be trusted?

A burden, a thing one must "endure" (not relish in). It is an inconvenience at the least and a terrible burden at most. A surprise party at its worst might be an inconvenience for someone, but then that is situational to the person. — schopenhauer1

This is an extent argument. You're saying life is "too bad" while surprise parties aren't bad enough. You are in the minority in thinking this. Yet you want to make a global statement, that having children is wrong (at least in 99% of cases) and that life is suffering despite you thinking it's fine (at least in 99% of cases). You have provided no support for this. Because extent arguments can't be true for everyone.

Not everyone is going to think that vanilla is too sweet and chocolate isn't sweet enough like you do. You telling them that they're wrong and actually both are too sweet, just doesn't apply. Your position is just as valid as theirs when it comes to this.

Okay, so the lifetime of the subject a lifetime of all such possible harms small and large vs. one temporary event within that lifetime. These are the types of things that make this non-analogous in the first place. — schopenhauer1

One is still subject to all possible harms even during a surprise party, it's not different in that sense. So the only difference is the length of the imposition.

All analogies break down at some point. However this isn't relevant. The length of the imposition shouldn't matter for what we're discussing.

Yes as stated earlier, at the least inconvenience at most terrible burden and harm. — schopenhauer1

Again, this is an extent argument. Most people wouldn't say that life is "at least an inconvenience". They would say something like "At best an incredible joy, at worst a terrible burden (leaning more towards the former)". Again, the statement you're making is your view of life, and it is the minority view. Yet you want to say that this view is true of everyone, and that their post facto evaluations should be dismissed. Yet you don't dismiss post facto evaluations when it comes to surprise parties (you don't tell people "Actually you're wrong, and surprise parties are absolutely Satanic"). Why is that?

This was a meta-argument about ethical arguments. There is no way I can "prove" to you "objectively" any of my claims — schopenhauer1

I mean objective as in: True of everybody. Do you think that having kids is wrong for everybody or at least the vast majority?

Similarly, do you think that life is "at the least inconvenience at most terrible burden and harm" for everyone? They all seem to disagree with you. But those are just fallible post facto explanations eh? Not to be trusted. Unless we are talking about surprise parties then they are to be trusted :up:

See the problem?

Presumably, it would be a bad idea if you knew the person made it known they hate surprise parties or they can easily get a heart attack. — schopenhauer1

It is assumed that you don't similar to how you don't know if your child will hate life or love it. Also similarly, most people like life, and surprise parties, with few that don't. And for obvious reasons, you can't ask beforehand ("Hey Jeff, would you mind if we threw you a surprise party on Saturday").

However, if we go to the extent argument- the surprise is temporary, a set period of time — schopenhauer1

So is life....

and is it an imposition really? — schopenhauer1

Yes. Since you didn't consent to it for obvious reasons.

That definition can be debated for the kind argument — schopenhauer1

I don't think so. You have to show it, you can't just say "Oh you can come up with a definition that suits my view". My definition of an imposition is something that is done to you without your consent. I think this is reasonable. You think this isn't sufficient so present your definition of imposition that makes life an imposition and surprise parties not.

but it can also work for the extent argument that it is finite, temporary and very little in the imposition scale. — schopenhauer1

We are agreed on that. Except life is also finite and temporary. And you need to present a case for why it is high enough in the imposition scale objectively. Which you can't do because that's how extent arguments work.

And so far you haven't actually argued that kind arguments here are tenable with your position. You need to give a definition of imposition that includes birth but not surprise parties. Not just say one can be found.

If a magician can snap his fingers and bring a person into a situation that they would not want, knowing the outcome will be a future person in harmful/unwanted situation, what say you then? Is the magician justified to make that choice for someone else? — schopenhauer1

Depends on how bad the position is and why the magician is doing it.

Also I'm assuming you went back on this?:

I never claimed there was any "objectivity". You seem to ignore that. The case is made and people either find it compelling or not. — schopenhauer1

You cannot select the option for no option. Is this just? — schopenhauer1

Well yes, according to you:

You're wasting typing by repeatedly pointing out that "life is an unconsented imposition". So are many things you find ok. We are now arguing about whether it is bad enough. — khaled

Right, so it is a (what you call) extent argument I am making, at this point. That is to say, starting life for someone else is sufficiently meeting a threshold that is crossed to make it a violation and thus wrong. — schopenhauer1

So yes, sometimes impositions of this nature are ok. It depends on whether or not the options given are "bad enough". This was what you said 3 months ago. As to what determines "bad enough": It's a subjective feeling according to you, and there is no objective way to determine it

We both agree that a certain amount of imposition is too much. Except you, want to convince everyone that birth does objectively fit the bill of too much imposition. How can you do that with any objectivity?
— khaled

I never claimed there was any "objectivity". You seem to ignore that. The case is made and people either find it compelling or not. — schopenhauer1

Another way of determining "bad enough" is how most people would react to the options.

I'm not sure who the "experts" are in judging life's goodness or other qualities, — schopenhauer1

I’m not sure either. Who I was referring to is experts in ethics.

You're missing the point.. A majority of people can be wrong.. — schopenhauer1

So, give an example of a time period where the majority of people thought something was right but it turns out to be wrong (ethically)

Or does having children just occasionally happen to be the example with this phenomenon never occurring at any other time. Seems kind of suspicious.

mixing up a thought-experiment with thinking I didn't know history. — schopenhauer1

I’m not asking for a thought experiment I’m asking for a concrete example. You claim it’s possible for everyone or for the majority to be wrong in the realm of ethics. When has this ever happened?

And you didn’t respond to the main point:

First you dismiss majority vote as being indicative of what’s right. Then you dismiss expert opinion. And now you even dismiss subjective evaluations.

There is nothing left. You’ve made the right thing to do unknowable. — khaled

Is it sufficient if what action is being taken is imposing X things on another person, and doing so unnecessarily (not ameliorating greater with lesser harm)? — schopenhauer1

I thought we went over this already in previous threads. You and I said yes. Examples being surprise parties/gifts. Those impose a risk of harm and don’t alleviate anything.

But besides that, as explained to Isaac, the extent of the majority doesn't mean much about the rightness or wrongness — schopenhauer1

Even when the majority is among professionals that suffer much less from these biases? Sounds like what an antivaxer or flat earther would say.

A country of Nazi-followers that let's say won the war and defeated their enemies aren't "right" because they perceive as so and they are the only ones left to perceive and evaluate such things — schopenhauer1

But they wouldn’t be the only ones left to perceive such things. Even most Germans didn’t think what was going on was right. The people who thought the Nazis were right, weren’t even all the nazis. It was never the case that Nazism ever approached a majority in any population (except the population of nazis). So, an example please?

I really shouldn't give any example, because it was meant to show that perception of the wrong isn't really the determining factor of the right or wrong. — schopenhauer1

Yes and this is a point of contention. I say that all that exists is the “perception of the wrong” and it is meaningless to talk about “the wrong” outside of that.

You’re making a claim you can’t give an example for. Fine. At least give an argument as to why you think “the wrong” exists outside of the “perception of the wrong”

And besides, if you propose that the perception of what’s right or wrong isn’t a determining factor in finding what’s right or wrong then that cuts both ways. Your perception that having kids is wrong isn’t a determining factor to whether or not it is. How is anyone supposed to argue for anything being right or wrong then?

I think you got too busy trying to get around the fact that there is overwhelming evidence that AN makes no sense that you ended up making it impossible for any ethical position to be correct. First you dismiss majority vote as being indicative of what’s right. Then you dismiss expert opinion. And now you even dismiss subjective evaluations.

There is nothing left. You’ve made the right thing to do unknowable. You’re the one that’s made it “all subjective”

Not so with other activities where other hopes are clearly being achieved with the explicit entry and participation in mind (winning, friends, achievement of some kind, etc.). Once this becomes a negative, one can opt out. — schopenhauer1

This also applies to life (except for explicit entry, which I don’t think should matter much is the rest is there)

If you knew that someone will find X worthwhile is it ok to force them to do it despite protests? What about if you were almost certain?

But hey, no matter how well you argue or even how popular AN becomes there is no reason for anyone to be convinced by your arguments because popularity, expert opinion and even your own evaluation are not indicative of what’s right or wrong.

For some reason I had a feeling you’d come here to jab without addressing the OP. Who’s on a “quest” to attack who again? I’m starting to think maybe there is some truth to Isaac calling you a Proselytizer.

The key difference is that God can will that there be no suffering and so if he chooses to let there be suffering he is immoral.

A parent cannot will that there be no suffering. Whether they have children or not, there are consequences to both decisions.

Also the slew of other arguments that you refuse to really address while coming up with excuses as to why you’re not addressing them. Like “you’re aggravating” followed by a pointless jab on a completely unrelated thread that doesn’t relate to the OP in any way.

At least be consistent. Don’t at one moment pretend to be the poor victim of the evil Isaac-Khaled complex and then the next do the exact thing you hate about this Isaac-Khaled complex….

Sometimes people don't want to be convinced. You must admit that too. — schopenhauer1

Sure. But I doubt professional philosophers have much of that bias. Why is it that even out of the people that don’t have kids ANs are still a minority? Why is it that even among professionals who shouldn’t suffer from these biases, AN is still a minority.

I just think a wrong can take place without "most people" knowing it. — schopenhauer1

Give an example then. Or has this never happened? Note that beforehand it was “without anyone knowing it”.

I think the nuance not in there is that the achieved goal is always in that equation — schopenhauer1

Wat? Please elaborate.

I just don't need even more aggravation in my life and you can be very aggravating. — schopenhauer1

See I’d respect that as a way of bowing out. Not “Haha the Isaac Khaled complex, they’re colluding” bullshit. It’s annoying for me to write a detailed response only for you to keep brushing it to the side or to make jabs at it. If you don’t want to discuss with me, say so. Don’t make up bullshit excuses.

But more importantly, they are ideas I think I are worth thinking about. — schopenhauer1

Yet you just said above you don’t want to talk about them, at least not with me.

But you often write something like, "Well, this doesn't convince me." — schopenhauer1

No I write something like “this isn’t convincing” as in “it’s not justified” or “it’s fallacious”. It’s not about convincing me specifically. There is a reason AN arguments convince very few (including me once)

In other words, you can write in a more conducive to dialogue way, but it's slash and burn like your friend Isaac. — schopenhauer1

I didn’t think I was being slash and burn. At least not in the beginning. I was trying to rush through what we talked about before so maybe we can get to something new so maybe that’s why I sounded like that. But I apologize nonetheless. Though I stopped caring about my tone so much after you started brushing off my replies.

And ANs don't think it's right as being shown in real time. — schopenhauer1

Yes, agreed. I thought you didn’t wanna discuss this anymore? Anyways, all I was saying is that we have never unanimously agreed on something being wrong/right and it turned out right/wrong. Having children falls here as well.

I mean one evaluation might indicate life was not so great, the other a positive affirmation. — schopenhauer1

If you had an athletic adoptive child, and they wanted to compete professionally in ice hockey or something. You then go and ask ice hockey players to rate their experience from 0 to 10 and you find a lot of 0s to 3s during training hours (which comprise a large chunk of what they do). And a lot of 0s when they lose or get insured. The overall average of their lives turns out to be a measly 3.2. Based on this you tell your child they shouldn’t participate. They say “I know all of that already, I still want to participate”. Is it unambiguously wrong to let them participate?

Just a long way of asking whether the average of the moment by moment evaluation should trump the overall evaluation. And why you think it should.