I agree that "Ducks lay eggs" is called true, because most people think(believe) it is true. — creativesoul

So note that most people are aware of the individual exceptions yet continue to assert that "ducks lay eggs" is true. That is because they are asserting something about the category (species, genus, kind, etc.), not the individuals.

Which just is realism about universals as against nominalism, which rejects that categorical usage.

What's more puzzling; attributing meaning that is possible, or attributing meaning that is not? The notion of "generic" is 17th century. Aristotle lived two thousand years prior. — creativesoul

You seem to be confusing a formal analysis of generics with their use. From the SEP article on generics, "By 30 months, children understand that generics tolerate exceptions (Gelman and Raman 2003)". Is it your claim that people couldn't understand this in Aristotle's day? Or that generics have only featured in language since the 17th century?

"Ducks lay eggs" is not true. That's plain and simple.

It is called "true" as a result of our leniency towards such ambiguity. Most folk know that only female ducks lay eggs and that not all female ducks do. — creativesoul

There's nothing ambiguous about it. It is called true because most folk think it is true. If you disagree, then why not test your hypothesis and ask a few people whether they think it is true and why.

As far as I can tell, you're just denying that generics are a real feature of natural languages.

There's no reason to believe that he meant anything in that generic sense.... — creativesoul

Actually the puzzle is why you would think he didn't. Generic sentences are a feature of all natural languages, not just modern English. If instead, as you claim, Aristotle intended an "all" quantification over particulars (re rationality) then the far deeper puzzle would be why he would make such an elementary logic mistake or be curiously unaware of the cognitive differences between infants and adults. [*]

This paper "Truth-Conditions of Generic Sentences: Two Contrasting Views" doesn't mention Aristotle, but it contrasts nominalism and realism with respect to generics and I think gets to the core of that disagreement. Also note the reference to non-accidental generalization below:

Finally, to re-emphasize a point made by Goodman (1955) and more recently by Dahl (1975) (among a host of others), the truth of generics depends on a notion of non-accidental generalization for their truth. The world contains in its extension all manner of possible patterns and convergences, many of which we judge to be purely accidental, but others of which we take to be principled. Only the principled patterns are taken to support true generics. (author's emphasis) — Greg N. Carlson

Saying that "ducks lay eggs" is true because some ducks lay eggs would be equivalent to saying "humans are superstars" is true because some humans are — creativesoul

They are not equivalent. That is the point. "Ducks lay eggs" is true not because some ducks lay eggs, but because there is an essential connection between ducks as a species and egg-laying and only an accidental connection between humans as a species and being a superstar.

That is the nature, so to speak, of generic sentences. You can't straightjacket the wrong logical form onto those sentences (in this case, an "all" quantifier over particulars), you need to investigate and understand the logical form that is already there. This was the kind of situation that motivated the linguistic turn in the early 20th Century where philosophical problems were seen to arise from misunderstanding the logic of language.

--

[*] "Vizzini: I can't compete with you physically, and you're no match for my brains.
Man in Black: You're that smart?
Vizzini: Let me put it this way. Have you ever heard of Plato, Aristotle, Socrates?
Man in Black: Yes.
Vizzini: Morons."

Knowledge cannot be false. Belief can be false. — creativesoul

True, but not relevant here.

The truth or falsity of "humans are bipeds" is wholly and completely determined by whether or not humans are bipeds. Not all humans are. — creativesoul

On an ordinary interpretation, the sentence "humans are bipeds" evaluates as true. [*]

The problem is that you're misinterpreting that sentence as the universal "for every human, that human is a biped". Since that evaluates as false, your interpretation fails to match the logical form of the ordinary interpretation. In other words, you mean something different to what ordinary language users mean.

So I suggest looking at the SEP article on generic sentences. Per the quantificational theory, the logical form is "for every human, it is normal for that human to be a biped". Per the kind theory, the logical form is "humankind is characterized as being bipedal".

Both of these interpretations evaluate the sentence as true here, which matches the ordinary interpretation. I suggest trying to understand Aristotle's definition in this generic sense.

--

[*] For example, "Humans, birds and (occasionally) apes walk bipedally." from the first google hit on "humans bipedal" (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1571302/)

Would you also say the claim that "humans are bipeds" is false?
— Andrew M

Yup. Some are. Some are not. That's the issue I see. Not enough precision in the claims... — creativesoul

Precision isn't the issue. The issue is about what interpretive rule to apply to statements like the above which are termed generics (SEP). Some interesting points from these slides:

• Much of our commonsense knowledge of the world is expressed by generic sentences
• One of the notable features of generic sentences is that they are "exception tolerating"
• It is this feature that piques the interest of many logically-oriented linguists and philosophers

I think the interpretive rule here is that the truth or falsity of "humans are bipeds" isn't dependent on whether there are defective or incomplete instances of the type, but instead on whether there is a non-accidental (or essential) connection between humankind and the property of being bipedal.

For the same reasons, being a featherless biped is insufficient for being a human. — creativesoul

Would you also say the claim that "humans are bipeds" is false?

Since Aristotle set forth his own criterion for what counts as the 'kind' of definition in question, a charitable reading would grant that he would meet his own criterion of what it is to be a "man", and would also realize that being rational is insufficient. — creativesoul

It's a sufficient criterion if humans are the only rational animals. If it were recognized in other animals (say, as a consequence of future evolution), then it would then become necessary to differentiate those rational animals from our own species.

This dubiously presupposes a completeness that is later represented — creativesoul

Exercised rationality is how we come to recognize it. But the definition describes the kind of animal a human is, and is not negated by the developmental stage any particular human is at or whether their capabilities are currently being exercised.

As a similar case, consider the uncontroversial claim that humans are bipeds. Yet initial human embryos don't have two legs and neither does an adult that has had their legs amputated.

Being existentially contingent upon language and being a language construct are not equivalent. — creativesoul

The basic point is that the capability came first (i.e., animals evolved with the capability for language/rational thought). At some later point that capability was recognized and represented in language.

For the realist about universals, that capability is real independent of whether it is represented in language. Whereas for the nominalist, that capability is real only to the extent that it is represented in language. Essentially it comes down to whether universals are considered to be discovered or created.

BTW by rational animal, Aristotle was referring to a general capability (i.e., humans are capable of acting rationally or irrationally in addition to being instinctive animals). See the Wikipedia entry for the general idea or, for a more nuanced sense, try Matthew Boyle's article, Essentially Rational Animals.

I think Ernst Cassirer's definition is also apt here:

man, for many philosophers both ancient and modern, is the "representational animal," homo symbolicum, the creature whose distinctive character is the creation and manipulation of signs - things that stand for or take the place of something else. — W. J. T. Mitchell

Edit: animal symbolicum definition due to Cassirer, quote is Mitchell's.

Aristotle held that being a man is not dependent upon language because what is common to men is not dependent upon language.

I disagree with Aristotle strongly on that matter. If being a man is not dependent upon language, then nothing that is existentially contingent upon language counts as part of being a man. — creativesoul

I think you're misunderstanding what realism about universals entails.

Here's a specific example. Aristotle defined humans as the rational animal. For arguments sake, let's suppose that rationality just is the ability to use language. So humans are the language-using animal.

Does this mean that the existence of humans is dependent on language? Obviously if there was no language, then there would be no humans per the above definition. (Just as there weren't earlier in evolutionary history.)

But it doesn't follow that being human is therefore a language construct or human creation (as if humans created themselves via definition!) Instead that language-using ability is a feature of the world as exhibited by select individuals of the animal kingdom. And it is that feature of the world that is being picked out in the definition as the essential distinguishing feature between humans and other animals.

Aren't there more than one accepted use of the term universal? — creativesoul

There's more than one use of the term, though I'm not sure what 'accepted' adds here.

If what you say is accurate, then Aristotle does not use it in the same way as a nominalist would. — creativesoul

Right.

What's being talked about when the word 'man' is being used is determined wholly by the shared meaning of a community of language users. — creativesoul

Yes. So would you say that the ordinary use of the word 'man' is more accurately described by Aristotle's definition of universals (where what is common to being a man is language independent) or by the nominalist definition (where 'man' is just a name)?

So where exactly did Aristotle spell out an argument for prime substance? — apokrisis

Sorry, I wasn't clear. I regard prime matter and prime mover as Platonist remnants of Aristotle's view that were inconsistent with his own hylomorphism (which is the position that everything that exists, i.e., substances, are inseparably matter and form).

My claim is that Aristotle's cosmological argument actually implies a hylomorphic first cause which I described as "prime substance" (my coined term here, not Aristotle's).

Did you mean something like an Apeiron? — apokrisis

Yes, but hylomorphic.

I agree that nothing comes from nothing, but also it can't be the case that immanent being is an efficient/material tale of how something comes from something. That way lies only infinite regress. — apokrisis

That's true if it were a linear series where it's turtles all the way down. But the universe doesn't generate substances outside itself, but within itself as structure emerges and evolves.

So the first substantial act or occurence would be the least possible state of being in terms of being en-mattered and in-formed - some kind of spontaneous fluctuation. — apokrisis

Agreed. The logical point here is that it is substances that are the locus of action, not matter or form.

From your later post:

So finality, or the prime mover, is placed where it should be, at the other end of existence's journey. The Cosmos has to grow into its Being, even if - through mathematics - we can understand that Being to have retrospective necessity. — apokrisis

Yes, though just as I would question pure matter at the beginning, I would also question pure form at the end. However...

If the beginning was a symmetry, then only certain ways of breaking that symmetry were ever possible. And so the form of the Cosmos can be regarded as latent in prime matter. It could be considered "prime substance" on that ground. — apokrisis

Exactly. So semantics aside, the Peircean view and the Aristotelian view may not be far apart, particularly as Aristotle considered the prime mover to be a final cause, not an efficient cause.

So then, we could take the position that being a universal is determined by how the word is being used. — creativesoul

I don't think so unless I misunderstand you. Aristotle's point is that what is being talked about when the word 'man' is used is what select individuals (i.e., men) have in common. Even if the word 'man' was never defined or used, that commonality would be still be there.

Can we be wrong, not in the sense of using the word incorrectly, but can we both - use the word sensibly and say false things about universals? — creativesoul

Yes. One could mistakenly say that 'Callias' is a universal or that 'man' is just a name (per nominalism).

How would 'investigating the nature of the Universe' in this manner, be any different to what science is actually doing? — Wayfarer

It needn't be. It just characterizes it in hylomorphic terms.

Again - is this something which can be detected or known by empirical science? In other words, is there anything which might be used to convince a scientific sceptic that there is such a substance? — Wayfarer

The universe is something that can be detected or known by empirical science isn't it? If the criteria for a substance is that it exists (materially) with an investigable nature (form) then the universe meets that criteria. So it's a logical implication. Presumably a sceptic would reject that criteria or otherwise challenge it.

I mean, what is the criterion which when met by a candidate(s?) counts as being a universal? — creativesoul

Some things are universal, others individual. By the term 'universal' I mean that which is of such a nature as to be predicated of many subjects, by 'individual' that which is not thus predicated. Thus 'man' is a universal, 'Callias' an individual. — Aristotle - On Interpretation, Part 7

Doesn't answering that answer the OP's question? What is the ontological status of universals? — creativesoul

I would say so.

This is an ontology of a world of already given objects, not one that is in fact a story of immanent development - a process with a self-structuring flow. — apokrisis

It is both. Aristotle's hylomorphism was, in part, a response to Parmenides. A substance may change while retaining identity (accidental change). Also substances may come into and pass out of existence (substantial change). But in this latter case they are generated from other substances, since nothing comes from nothing.

To be fully immanent, a tale of prime matter and prime mover is not enough. — apokrisis

Yes. And that is because prime matter and prime mover mark a departure from hylomorphism. If, instead, Aristotle's first cosmological cause is hylomorphic then there exists a prime (ground) substance with cosmic potential. This is the universe, the nature of which can be investigated as with any hylomorphic particular.

But true metaphysical immanence is about how the potential produces the actual. And that requires a bootstrapping or self-structuring view of causality. — apokrisis

So with prime substance we have true metaphysical immanence. That bootstrapping or self-structuring view of causality just is the universe actualizing its own potential.

All this leads up to a simple question: is he right in claiming that there are only three possible Realist views: Platonic, Aristotelian, and Scholastic? — Mitchell

Traditionally the problem of universals is:

[1] Are universals real?
[2] If so, are they real apart from particulars?

Regarding the second question, the transcendent realist says "yes" while the immanent realist says "no".

As Boethius put it, "Plato thinks that genera and species and the rest are not only understood as universals, but also exist and subsist apart from bodies. Aristotle, however, thinks that they are understood as incorporeal and universal, but subsist in sensibles."

That exhausts all the possibilities, so the question is really which of those two positions Scholastics subscribed to.

In the first place, nearly all medieval thinkers agreed on the existence of universals before things in the form of divine ideas existing in the divine mind, but all of them denied their existence in the form of mind-independent, real, eternal entities originally posited by Plato. — SEP - The Medieval Problem of Universals

The "agreed on the existence of universals before things" indicates the Scholastics essentially rejected immanent realism in favor of regarding mind (in this case the divine mind) as the realm where universals reside.

So to answer your question, there are various realist views even within Scholasticism. But I think they ultimately boil down to either transcendent or immanent realism.

Indeed, that is one of the arguments that is often given. I was trying to steer us away from that particular line of thought because it takes us pretty deep into epistemology. In scholastic terms, phoenixes do not have "subjective" existence - that is, they are not mind-independent subjects of existence. However, they do exist "objectively" - that is, mind-dependently. Qua objects of thought, phoenixes have a form all their own. Indeed, it is via such forms that we classify imaginary creatures into "this" or "that" type. When I imagine a particular phoenix, I am objectively instantiating the form "phoenix".
[...]
Yes, all formal distinctions trace their ultimate genesis in subjective reality as appropriated by the senses. A more metaphorical way to put it is to say that all distinctions are woven from the raw materials provided by the senses. That doesn't imply that every formal distinction is a real distinction, and I believe that Aristotle recognized that distinction to some extent. — Aaron R

The crucial distinction that Aristotle recognized here was between perception and imagination. Mythological writings and pictures exist (and can be perceived) and so we can classify the various ideas people had about phoenixes (e.g., Ezekiel the Dramatist said the phoenix had striking yellow eyes and Lactantius said that its eyes were blue like sapphires). That is, what we're actually investigating are people's (sometimes contradictory) ideas about mythical creatures, not the nature of mythical creatures.

"Mind-dependent objects" is really a metaphor that derives its meaning from the concrete (natural) particulars that can be investigated. But a metaphor doesn't imply anything about the literal notions of existence and nature as applied to concrete particulars.

If a particular's form (essential nature) does not exist in its own right, then a particular's existence cannot be identical with its form (essential nature) and there must be a real distinction between a particular's essential nature and its existence. This is exactly what Aquinas is arguing for. — Aaron R

A particular's existence is itself a formal notion (a universal). We distinguish in language between existence and form, but there is no such distinction in the particular. There isn't an apple that has form but does not exist, nor an apple that exists but lacks form.

We're simply talking about information - what it is and how it flows. — Harry Hindu

What information is, is a universal. How information flows is dependent on the nature of the particulars (human being, dog, thermostat, rock, particles, and so on) that are the locus of cause-and-effect.

The difference between humans and other animals is simply the degree in which we can delve into the causal relationships of nature. — Harry Hindu

Yes. And that difference of degree is significant enough to warrant making a distinction between automatic, concrete perceiving (present in humans and animals generally) and reflective, abstract thinking. Which was why Aristotle characterized humans as the rational animal.

I think we are in essential agreement.

Right, but I don't believe that this is what is being called into question. — Aaron R

I think it is. In "On Being and Essence" Aquinas says, "I can understand what a man is or what a phoenix is and nevertheless not know whether either has existence in reality."

Aquinas is saying that a phoenix has an essence (or, put differently, that there is a phoenix essence - "what a thing is") even though phoenixes don't exist. That becomes the basis for his distinction between existence and essence.

This would have been foreign to Aristotle, who held that valid (formal) distinctions can only be made on the basis of existents (particulars).

If only particulars have form (and an essential nature) then there is no implication of necessary existence. It is not the form that exists (or not), it is the particular.

All we are doing is talking about causation and how information flows from the first cause to the final effect we are talking about at any given moment. — Harry Hindu

Yes, so the ship arrival details were transmitted via a causal process that resulted in those details being entered into a log book. We agree about that.

Do you also agree that the humans involved in transmitting that message were thinking abstractly in order to understand the message and relay it on?

If by definition, you mean quite literally the description of the concept, and not the concept in itself, then I agree with you. (man this topic is hard). — Samuel Lacrampe

Yes that's what I mean.

Nevertheless I think ‘the domain of natural numbers’ is a perfectly intelligible expression, even if it’s not something that exists in a spatial or temporal sense. — Wayfarer

Yes, the expression is fine as a metaphor. The key point is that number is a universal and so ultimately derives its meaning from observed particulars.

So again, a Platonic realist view, as I would understand it, is not that natural numbers are existing things in an existing place, but that they’re real, insofar as they’re the same for anyone capable of counting. It’s possible to be wrong about maths (as I nearly always was, and failed the subject). — Wayfarer

Agreed and this is also consistent with Aristotle's realist view.

Furthermore, numbers are not ‘aspects of the natural world’, if by that we mean the world that is perceptible by sense, as they are only perceptible by means of reason. — Wayfarer

This is the sticking point.

A cat has four legs. It seems to me that the number of legs the cat has is an aspect of the natural world.

It's true that we have to reason in order to know that. But we do so by abstracting from what is perceived via the senses, in this case the cat (and other four-legged animals). Hence why Aristotle characterized humans as the rational animal.

How did you even know that flags are being waved if a flow of information (that flags are being waved) didn't happen? It seems to me that you thinking abstractly isn't necessary for information flow. You simply need to have eyes and brain to process sensory information. — Harry Hindu

That's true, but I'm not just referring to seeing the flags and that they're being waved (which, as you say, also involves a flow of information). Seeing the flags waving is presumably automatic and instinctual for humans and animals alike.

I'm instead referring to the higher-level information that is being communicated via the flag waving, namely, the ship arrival details.

Now that information is in the world as well. But to interpret and understand it requires the ability to think abstractly, it is not just an automatic sensory process.

In other words I don't think that the idea that universals are physical or non-physical is a proposition that could be correct or incorrect; but merely more or less useful or fruitful in different contexts. — Janus

A different way to state my basic claim is that universals (such as information, gravity and mind) are aspects of the natural world. This distinguishes it from Platonism, which posits a non-natural realm for universals, and Nominalism, which denies that there are universals.

Is that also your view of universals?

You seem to be misunderstnding; it is the incoherence of such a distinction that I have been arguing for both in this thread and the other. The reference to incoherence is right there in the OP. — Janus

OK, then I'm not clear on what we would be disagreeing about. Do you agree that information, gravity and mind (as universals) are all physical? Which is to say, aspects of the natural world that we empirically investigate?

An abstraction is not, by definition, physical; but what it is an abstraction from may be. So gravity is not an abstraction as you previously said it is, but is a phenomenon that may be thought of as physical insofar as its effects are observable even though it is not. My original point was to ask how mind is different than this. — Janus

The mind is not different from this. All that exists are physical particulars and those particulars are identifiable in universal (or abstract) terms. But universals are not something additional to or separate from particulars. (This is Aristotle's immanent realism.)

In the case of mind, the particular is the person that thinks, acts and feels. The effects of a person's intentional activity are observable whether in behavior or brain activity.

So I think the distinction you are trying to draw between physical universals and non-physical universals is not a tenable one.

It seems to me you are conflating explanations with what is being explained. — Janus

Can you be more specific or give an example?

But you haven't addressed the point of what I said; which is the question as to why we should not therefore think of gravity as 'non-physical". Gravity is considered by physicists to be more than merely "a physical abstraction". There is even a search for 'gravity particles', referred to as gravitons. Neuroscientists believe they have already found 'mind particles'; they refer to them as neurons. (Of course they are not fundamental since they are cells composed of more fundamental particles, but what if there were fundamental mind particles, would we then say that mind is non-physical?). — Janus

No, those abstractions are physical whether or not there are explanations in terms of fundamental particles. We are just describing the same world at different levels of abstraction depending on our purposes, whether in intentional, qualitative or mathematical terms.

If information isn't the sort of thing you can "bump into, or detect with your senses", then how is that you know anything about the world at all? — Harry Hindu

Seeing flags being waved is necessary but not sufficient to know what information is being conveyed. It also requires the ability to think abstractly.

How did your ideas get from your head to ours without using something "physical" to convey it? — Harry Hindu

It did require using physical means to convey it. There is no other way.

The answers are all related to causation. If your information is still there in the log book after everyone living creature is dead, does the log book still contain information? — Harry Hindu

Yes. And that information is, in principle, discoverable by any future creature that has the ability to think abstractly.

I am not sure what you mean, Andrew, regarding "the definition is not separable from particulars either". Could you clarify? — Samuel Lacrampe

Sure, there are the books that contain the definition and the people that know it. The definition, while abstract, is not something ontologically separate from those physical books or people. (It is also implicit in the natural world which means it is discoverable by anyone with the requisite intelligence and skills.)

If the essence of being a lion included its existence, then lions could never cease to exist. What you are arguing implies that lions have always existed and will always exist just in virtue of what they essentially are. — Aaron R

My view is that only existents have essential natures. Why would that imply an eternal existence?

I notice that this specific issue seems to mark a point of departure for Aquinas from Aristotle. From the SEP entry on Existence:

Aristotle seems to have seen nothing more to existence than essence; there is not a space between an articulation of what a thing is and that thing's existing. Saint Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, famously distinguished a thing's essence from its existence.

It is simple enough to demonstrate that information is not physical (at least certain types). We can use the Test of Imagination, as Chesterton calls it: If a thing x is imaginable without the property y, then y is not essential to x. Thus if a certain type of info is imaginable without any physical properties, then physical properties are not essential to this type of info. And this is precisely what we do when we imagine universal forms such as triangle-ness, whiteness, justice, etc. — Samuel Lacrampe

How would you imagine a universal triangle that is not a particular kind of triangle, namely scalene, isosceles or equilateral?

I think that fails Chesterton's test.

So maybe you're thinking of the definition of a triangle (e.g., a plane figure with three straight sides and three angles). And, yes, we can think coherently about that. But the definition is not separable from particulars either, whether the human being that thinks about it or the books that contain it.

Nowadays I think naturalists believe, mistakenly, that science explains the order. But science doesn't explain that order - it assumes it. However, the question of the ‘nature of order’ is, by its very definition, 'meta-physical'; the order is physical, but the 'cause of the order' is beyond, or prior to, the forms in which the order shows up. Trace all the sequence of material causes back to the year dot, and it is said to begin at 'the singularity' (as if by magic!) — Wayfarer

Yes, order (or, in a deeper sense, causality) is necessary to explain anything. But note that those terms are also universals and so are also grounded in observable particulars. There is no view from nowhere.

While classified as metaphysics, Aristotle expected his own cosmological argument to be evaluable on natural and empirical grounds.

How can information be detected if not by means of the senses.? — Janus

What we detect with our senses are particulars - we see the flags and the person waving them, the log book, and so on, but we don't literally see information. To detect it requires the capability of abstracting over those particulars.

It is true that you cannot "bump into" information; it is not a physical object. You cannot bump into gravity, neither is it a physical object; does it follow from that fact that gravity is not physical — Janus

Like information, gravity is a physical abstraction. What we actually feel is the ground beneath us (as it accelerates towards us).

Then the theory of natural selection proves that Aristotle was right as opposed to Plato? — Harry Hindu

"Prove" is not the right term. Instead it is a theory that is consistent with Aristotle's natural philosophy.

What are "particulars"? Would that be similar to saying that nature is made up of "information"? — Harry Hindu

Not quite. Particulars are individual things that exist (e.g., an apple, Harry Hindu, a chair). This is contrasted with universals which are common to many particulars (e.g, red things, humans, things with four legs).

Information is a universal. A relevant definition in the context of this thread would be, "What is conveyed or represented by a particular arrangement or sequence of things" (Oxford dictionary).

Part of Wayfarer's argument, I think, is that information isn't the sort of thing you can bump into or detect with your senses. Therefore it shouldn't be considered to be part of the material world. Since information is not an illusion and also not reducible to material, it would seem to imply there is an immaterial (Platonic) realm of ideas or forms.

Aristotle would instead say that information is in the particulars (e.g., the flags being waved or the ship log book) and, as a consequence of being intelligent creatures, humans can perceive the information, or form, that is there. This is no different in principle from perceiving that the flag is red or that the ship log book has a rectangular shape, which are also formal aspects of those particulars.

For Aristotle nature is an inseparable unity of matter and form. Whereas for Plato, matter and form (or ideas) constitute separate and distinct natures.

I don't think it makes sense to suppose that ideas are apart from the natural world. Aristotle's view was that they were not.

Andrew M understands the problem! — Wayfarer

And Aristotle had the solution!

It seems quite obvious that, if humans are products of the natural world and their ideas are influenced by and in turn influence the natural world, then they are part of the natural world. — Harry Hindu

Yes, which was Aristotle's naturalist view as opposed to Plato's dualist view (realm of matter plus realm of forms).

But it is also important to note that Aristotle's position was not that nature is equivalent to matter (which is just to reject one horn of Plato's dualism) but, instead, that nature is hylomorphic. That is, what exists are particulars and they are an inseparable unity of matter and form.

Why do we keep quoting philosophers from 1000s of years ago, when it is likely that they wouldn't say the same things today given the knowledge we have today. — Harry Hindu

Obviously knowledge has progressed immensely since the time of the ancient Greeks. Yet philosophical disputes remain. Those disputes often find their origin in the fundamental differences between the views of Plato and Aristotle. In particular, whether ideas have a reality apart from the natural world or whether they are grounded in the natural world. In general terms, this is the problem of universals.

I'd be interested to hear what other Aristotelians think about the importance of arguing over definitions. — andrewk

If substantive, yes, if merely about word symbols, no.

For an Aristotelian, a definition signifies what it is to be something. For example (per the Oxford dictionary), an apple is a round fruit of a tree of the rose family, which typically has thin green or red skin and crisp flesh.

Note that this is not merely defining the word "apple". It is describing something in the world, namely, those objects we call "apples". The definition serves to distinguish those objects from other objects, such as pears (a different kind of fruit) and rocks (not a kind of fruit at all), and so can be considered a valid definition.

So... if someone genetically engineered a horse to become a unicorn, then the unicorn would be fictional? :s — Agustino

No, see again what I said about real lions and fictional lions.

Engineering a horse to become a unicorn would involve natural processes. It doesn't assume that fictional unicorns have essences, let alone an immaterial essence that just lacks the property of existence.

What makes them different, apart from existence? If existence is what makes them different, then you're granting Feser's point that existence is a property, and denying Kant's. — Agustino

One can eat you, the other can't. You find one in a jungle and the other on a bookshelf. One has an evolutionary history, the other is a product of humans.

Lions have an essential nature, as do books, which is what it means to exist. Unicorns and fictional lions do not.

I read Feser's chapter and I was wrong: he is talking about the actualization of a substance's existence, not just the actualization of its potencies. Your response is to deny the dichotomy presented in proposition 9 and affirm the possibility of a substance that both exists necessarily and yet is a composite of act and potency. Feser will deny this possibility.

That's because Feser accepts the real distinction between essence and existence (Thomistic Proof) and also the contingency of composite substances (Neo-platonic Proof). In the Thomistic model, a being is necessary if only if its existence is identical with its essence. Not only is such a being absolutely simple (because there's no distinction between its existence and essence), but since existence is the purest and highest form of act, it is also pure act. As such, a being that is a composite of potency and act could not exist necessarily. — Aaron R

Interesting. I disagree that there is any ontological separation between existence and essence as Feser argues for in his discussion (from p117).

Feser gives the example of a lion and a unicorn and argues that one could, in principle, know their essences without knowing whether they existed or not.

In my view, part of the essential nature of a lion is that it lives in the world that we inhabit, whereas a unicorn is a merely a fictional creature represented in books and pictures. So for someone to mistakenly talk about lions as if they were fictional entities would be for them to entirely misconceive the essential nature of lions.

That's because real things and representations belong to different logical categories. It's not that a real lion and a fictional lion share the same essence where one exists and the other does not. Instead they are essentially different things.

I'll leave it there for now. I'll just add that I don't dispute that the first actualizer is a simple (non-composite) substance. However, as with existence/essence and form/material, I don't see that act/potency should be understood as ontologically separate parts or aspects of a substance.

You might inquire as to how creation ex nihilo is possible, but I don't think that is the point of Feser's argument. — Aaron R

Creation ex materia is the natural assumption if we observe how things come into existence in ordinary experience. For example, a builder constructs a house using existing material such as wood and bricks.

If creation ex materia of other substances is not ruled out for the first actualizer then statement 9 of Feser's argument remains at issue. Creation ex nihilo is just as in need of demonstration as pure actuality, immateriality, etc., are.

I just purchased Feser's book and have started reading the chapter in question. Interested to see where this goes. — Aaron R

Agreed. It's good to see the argument clearly laid out such that it can be evaluated.

But in this case the potentials belong to the other substances, not to the unactualized actualizer. If the unactualized actualizer, even if it were to exist necessarily, had potencies of its own then it wouldn't truly be an unactualized actualizer because its potencies would require actualization from something more fundamental. See also the above comments regarding conservation and creation. — Aaron R

The potential that the first actualizer has to create other substances would be actualized by the first actualizer itself. To use the builder/house analogy, the builder has the potential to construct a house. The builder actualizes that potential when he constructs a house.

Note that the builder is a hylomorphic substance, so the material of the builder also contributes to the construction of the house as well as the wood and bricks. This is taken to its logical conclusion in the first actualizer since there is no external material.

In Aristotelean metaphysics matter is potency. Therefore, something that is purely actual is immaterial by definition. Furthermore, change is defined in that system as the transition from potency to actuality. So something that is purely actual is also immutable by definition. — Aaron R

Yes. So the pivotal issue is whether the first actualizer is purely actual. Feser doesn't assume it, he concludes it in statement 14. I argue why I think that conclusion doesn't follow from its premises .

That said, I would hazard to suggest that the argument as presented by Darth is not quite right (no offense Darth). For instance, I can't imagine that Feser would accept premise 6 as stated, because it implies that a purely actual substance cannot exist. — Aaron R

Yes, to avoid any interpretational issues I've been directly referencing the argument statements in Feser's book which Darth links to in the OP.

In other words, "being" could never get off the ground if the actualizer at the bottom had any potency that needed to be actualized by something more fundamental. — Aaron R

Agreed. So I reject the idea that the first actualizer has potential for its own existence which is why I've said that it necessarily exists. However it doesn't follow that it doesn't have potentials for the existence of other substances.

Basically it's not clear to me how anything else could come into existence if there weren't potential for them to exist in the first actualizer.

This is going in the the neo-Platonic demonstration, but if this material being had both actuality and potentiality, then it would be a complex composite with parts — darthbarracuda

I agree with the rest of your analysis, but I think this conclusion assumes dualism. A hylomorphic substance has both form and matter without being ontologically separable into form and matter. I would argue the same for actuality and potential. So the first actualizer could be a hylomorphic and mutable simple.

A purely actual being cannot change and thus cannot exist in time, which means it cannot be material. — darthbarracuda

Sure, but what I'm saying is that the proof fails to demonstrate that the first actualizer is a purely actual being. As I argued initially, the problem is with premise 9 of Feser's proof.

What notably distinguishes the first actualizer from other substances is that it necessarily exists. But there is no reason why it can't be material and mutable and have potentials just as other substances do.

Sure, but that's because your body is a material substance. God is not a material substance. — darthbarracuda

The proof, from premise 9 onwards, is about the nature of the first actualizer and isn't assumed to be immaterial. It could be a hylomorphic substance that necessarily exists and has potentials for causing other hylomorphic substances to exist. Premise 9 doesn't eliminate this possibility and Feser's discussion on p66 doesn't consider it.

Just because change requires the actualization of a potential doesn't mean causing the actualization of a potential requires change. Indeed it would lead to an infinite regress if we tried to explain change by reference to something that, itself, changes. — darthbarracuda

It would, but that doesn't describe the scenario. Causing substance S to exist just is the actualization of a potential.

So, for example, suppose Alice has the potential to construct a chair (i.e., to cause a chair to exist). If Alice subsequently does construct a chair then she has actualized a potential. Thus, per premise 2, she has changed.