Well that is one version. Was that so hard to type? — charleton
To be omniscient and omnipotent it would have to be omnipresent too.
Here's one problem omnipresent and good would mean that no evil can exist.
Here's another: it cannot be incorporeal AND actual.
It cannot be immutable and an omnipresent, since there is such a thing as change.
In fact it cannot be an actualiser and immutable. — charleton
To be omniscient and omnipotent it would have to be omnipresent too. — charleton
Here's one problem omnipresent and good would mean that no evil can exist. — charleton
Here's another: it cannot be incorporeal AND actual. — charleton
It cannot be immutable and an omnipresent, since there is such a thing as change. — charleton
In fact it cannot be an actualiser and immutable. — charleton
Hah! Interesting. I thought the Augustinian one was the strongest, though I've always favored Aristotle over Plato :PI liked the Neo-Platonic proof the most. Though I've always favored Plato over Aristotle anyway so that might just be a bias of mine. — darthbarracuda
I will be making several threads in the near(-ish) future about the general proofs of God's existence argued by Edward Feser in his new book, Five Proofs for the Existence of God so we can discuss them and hopefully learn something. First up is his "Aristotelian" proof. — darthbarracuda
Feser has a response to exactly this criticism (why does the actualizer have to be purely actual and not simply have unrealized potentials?) on page 66: — darthbarracuda
But it may nonetheless have unactualized potential for, say, causing substance S to exist.
If A subsequently does cause S to exist, then it has actualized a potential and thus has changed per premise 2:
2. But change is the actualization of a potential. — Andrew M
Just because change requires the actualization of a potential doesn't mean causing the actualization of a potential requires change. Indeed it would lead to an infinite regress if we tried to explain change by reference to something that, itself, changes. — darthbarracuda
Sure, but that's because your body is a material substance. God is not a material substance. — darthbarracuda
A purely actual being cannot change and thus cannot exist in time, which means it cannot be material. — darthbarracuda
What notably distinguishes the first actualizer from other substances is that it necessarily exists. But there is no reason why it can't be material and mutable and have potentials just as other substances do. — Andrew M
In Aristotelean metaphysics matter is potency. Therefore, something that is purely actual is immaterial by definition. Furthermore, change is defined in that system as the transition from potency to actuality. So something that is purely actual is also immutable by definition. — Aaron R
That said, I would hazard to suggest that the argument as presented by Darth is not quite right (no offense Darth). For instance, I can't imagine that Feser would accept premise 6 as stated, because it implies that a purely actual substance cannot exist. — Aaron R
In other words, "being" could never get off the ground if the actualizer at the bottom had any potency that needed to be actualized by something more fundamental. — Aaron R
This is going in the the neo-Platonic demonstration, but if this material being had both actuality and potentiality, then it would be a complex composite with parts — darthbarracuda
But there are several concrete ways around this:A potential cannot be actualized except by something already actual.
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.