I think it’s a mistake to believe that you can explain numbers and the like. Mathematics is one of the main ways in which explanations can be found for all manner of things - almost anything that can be quantified, really. But explaining number is a notoriously difficult thing to do. — Wayfarer

Well "explanation" is subjective, and individuals have different criteria as to what counts as an explanation. I think that's where some of the dissatisfaction, disagreement, or non-conclusivity comes from.

What I don’t think your account allows for, is the ability of mathematical reasoning to predict otherwise unknowable things. I mean, you can’t do that just using language. It’s the fact that mathematical concepts and operations seem to have an uncanny correspondence with nature that gives mathematics what Eugene Wigner called it’s ‘unreasonable effectiveness’ and predictive ability. There are quite a few examples of discoveries falling out of mathematical physics that were predicted just by the maths - Dirac’s discovery of anti-matter is a classic example, not to mention the many predictions that came out of relativity — Wayfarer

I'm an anti-realist with regards to mathematical (abstract) objects, but I tend to take an instrumentalist approach to mathematics. So mathematical concepts or theories can be useful in making predictions about phenomena, but that doesn't necessarily mean I make ontological commitments to everything those theories posit.

This is obviously a very complex issue, but one response is to equate numbers with brain processes is a form of category mistake. — Wayfarer

Just to clarify, by "numbers" I take it you mean abstract concepts like "2", equations, and the like?

But the same operations can be outsourced to a variety of different devices, other than brains. — Wayfarer

The materials of "different devices" would not be brains though. That's an important ontological distinction. A calculator or operating system might "deal with" numbers, but in a different way than brains do.

And in studying brains themselves, there are major obstacles in understanding the relationship of neural events and such elements of rational thought as number, logic, language, syntax, and so on. — Wayfarer

We know some of the elements, locations and processes involved with regards to brains processing "number, logic, language, syntax", etc. We don't need to know more than that, in my opinion, in order to realise that brains are different than non-brains processing stuff like numbers, logic, etc.

So saying that 'numbers are dependent on the brain' (which is actually what you have said, not 'mind') doesn't really say anything. — Wayfarer

The mind is identical with the brain, in my view.

It just safely puts the whole issue into the category of 'things we'll figure out when we understand better how the brain works'. — Wayfarer

As I said, there's no need to or no good reason to withold the view that the brain processes stuff like numbers.

Another way I like to think about it is that arithmetic is a system of language (in the broadest sense) in which abstracts like "number" play a part, according to particular axioms. Any abstract number wouldn't make sense without at least some rough axiomatic system. Axiomatic systems are not extra-mental.

You might pause a moment and think about just what value is. — tim wood

Why ought I to do that? What makes you think I haven't already paused for moments in the past to think about what value is already?

And please keep in mind my remark about this not being a discussion about practical matters thought of in a practical way. — tim wood

I haven't been approaching this discussion in this way. I typically attempt to be analytical with regards to my philosophising, at least in this forum.

The thing can't value. Only a person can value. The person may well value something about the thing, but that is not the same as saying that the thing somehow has value. — tim wood

I agree.

All right, you choose something and list some qualities of that something, and we'll see whether or not if we can establish whether or not the things have in themselves those qualities. — tim wood

I don't think I made my view on "qualities" clear enough. I should have emphasised the subjective aspect more with regards to my comment about "quale". Let me try to make it clearer:

There are two types of "qualities": objective qualities (extra-mental) and subjective (mental). "Objective qualities" refers to the properties of existents/objects/phenomena. (I take "qualities" or "attributes" to be synonymous with "properties".) "Subjective qualities" refers to qualia--the mind experiencing (via direct perception) the qualities of some (objective) existent/object/phenomena.

So for example, when I view a particular bird that I think is beautiful, I am experiencing the qualities/properties of that bird interacting with my sensorial/perceptual/mental apparatus as qualia. I then have a feeling and make a judgement/evaluation that that particular bird is "beautiful".

Or maybe better you try reading some of George Berkeley's dialogue's between Hylos and Philonous - or google them. — tim wood

What makes you think I am not familiar with Berkeley's dialogue, btw? (I haven't actually read the dialogue but am acquainted with its content. But that's not the point of my question.) And for what reason should I read Berkeley's dialogue? It seems that you think that I need to learn more due to lack of understanding about this particular issue we're discussing.

You brought up Aristotle's matter and form as (probably) being different than my concept of matter and form. I intended to clarify my position to help clear things up.

In any case with respect to the context, your remark is at best a non sequitor.
— tim wood

Ok, could you explain how it's a non-sequitur?
11 hours ago ReplyShareFlag

Here's the context, post on p. 2.

Does the thing itself contain in itself that which satisfies the criteria? Think this one down and you get close to Aristotle's matter and form — tim wood

Right. I was responding specifically to this "the trouble with that is that Aristotle's understanding of matter is I am pretty sure no where near yours."

I was attempting to clarify my position with regards to Aristotle's "matter and form" in order to confirm that my "understanding of matter" is different from his.

The idea is that if you try to attribute things like colour to a thing, you find you cannot (except as a practical matter). — tim wood

I disagree. Colour is the interaction between the properties of some object and the (properties of the) mind via qualia.

All the qualities and accidents supposedly attributable to things prove similarly problematic (see Berkeley's dialogues) . — tim wood

I don't find Berkeley's position convincing.

Pretty soon all you've got left is matter and form - and they're problematic in their own way. So far you're arguing (if I may call it that) by opinion and personal definition: you don't agree with Aristotle and you "view qualities as phenomenal properties of some x." You can do that, but it doesn't make for productive discussion. — tim wood

All views and definitions are mental (because "meaning" is mental, in my view); one cannot not have personal opinions and definitions (although definitions can be objective in sense of observable text, for example).

Anyway, I take it you mean that I'm not agreeing with a conventional or traditional definition of "matter and form".

Why does not agreeing with a conventional or particular viewpoint not make for "productive discussion"?

What do you mean; an anti-realist in what sense? I don't believe numbers are 'out there' floating about in some 'realm' if that is what you mean. But I do believe natural complexes are real, and that they instantiate number (multiplicity and difference). — Janus

Sure. I should have asked instead "are you an anti-realist with regards to abstract/conceptual objects, like mathematical abstract objects like "numbers...'out there' floating about in some 'realm'".

I see. Are you an anti-realist with regards to mathematics?

It's a tough distinction for me, because, as I said, I find it to be often an erroneous distinction. — Noble Dust

I think I can see why it's tough for you to make a clear distinction.

The way I think about the dichotomy is like this:

Subjectivity and objectivity both have location. Subjectivity occurs only in minds. Objectivity occurs everywhere else (everywhere that is not a mind).

With regards to your example, two people could be reading a set of words (a set of signs and symbols as pixels on a computer monitor, for instance). Those actual words are objective: they don't exist in the mind; ontologically they are pixels. These two people would be interpreting those pixels subjectively (i.e. in their minds).

Now, is there an objectivity to my words? — Noble Dust

Here's where what you write becomes fuzzy or muddled to me. I don't know what you mean by "my words" there, but the words as pixels aren't part of you. They are external to you (and thus, external to your mind). The words/pixels exist objectively.

There's an objectivity to what I am trying to communicate to you. — Noble Dust

Hmm. In other words, you have (subjective) intentions that you are trying to express via technological means (i.e. a computer). The way you're expressing those intentions is via pixels on a screen. The intentions aren't identical to the expression of the intentions.

But language itself is subjective, not objective. — Noble Dust

Just to clarify, language is a mental system of thought that can be used for communication. The expression of language via verbal sounds, non-verbal behaviour, or signs/symbols (in whatever format, e.g. paper, pixels, etc.) is objective.

Subjectivity, then, seems hard to get away from! But have we still sufficiently out-run it? No, we haven't. — Noble Dust

We can't experience anything from non-subjective/objective frames of reference. The whole idea of "experience" is necessarily subjective. That's why I wanted to clarify what you meant by "experience". Experience is conscious and thus subjective. So it's contradictory to "out-run" subjectivity as subjects.

Why would you want to out-run subjectivity anyway? What motivates you to want to do that?

When you post on this forum, you are saying something, that to you, represents an objectivity. — Noble Dust

When I post on this forum I am expressing my intentions/views via pixels. The pixels are objective (non-mental), but the meaning assigned to the pixels by you or me is subjective.

I don't know whether you mean something different by "an objectivity" compared with "objectivity" there?

But the paradox and the tragedy is that you can only say it subjectively. — Noble Dust

I don't know why you think this is tragic.

Btw I don't think paradoxes are anything but logical/language related. They don't obtain ontologically apart from minds.

Nothing determines levels of hierarchy per se; what would be the thing that actually determines them in the first place? — Noble Dust

That's what I'm wondering about.

If I said "yes, priority and generation determine hierarchy", that would assume that priority and generation have some kind of agency in the way that we anthropomorphically think about agency. — Noble Dust

Not necessarily. Priority and generation could just refer to facts/states of affairs without agency being involved. By "determine" I mean what establishes relative levels of hierarchy. So you could say that hierarchies are mental constructs that match the facts according to priority and generation, for example. You could also say that hierachies are mental constructs that match the facts according to non-physical and physical properties/existents; four limbs relative to two; relative velocity; relative mass, etc. One point I'm trying to make is that hierarchies are mental constructs. They don't exist apart from us thinking about them.

But if generation has no agency, no cause, no beginning, then generation is a process without origin, per se, through which the non-physical gives birth to the physical. So there's no determinate function; there's only generation. — Noble Dust

Is that an assertion you're making?

No, because I'm not conflating "non-physical" with "consciousness". — Noble Dust

Ok, but logically my question still stands sans consciousness: "if the physical generated the non-physical, would you then say that the physical would be at the top end of the hierarchy?" If levels of hierarchy is established/acknowledged in terms of priority and generation regarding some "kind" of x, then it wouldn't matter what that x was. That x could be anything, logically.

Thanks for sharing that stuff about your personal, meaningful experiences btw.

It's hard to parse through, but I do think of it as both subjective and objective because that dichotomy tends to be misleading. — Noble Dust

These experiences are all subjective, and yet, through the experience itself, the possibility of something objective being experienced through the lens of subjectivity becomes apparent. — Noble Dust

How are you using "subjective" and "objective"?

I believe that we (subjectively) experience extra-mental (objective) phenomena/things.

Your abstract reasoning won't bring you to this conclusion, so if you rely solely on that faculty, you won't arrive at the same conclusion. The experience of beauty is like mysticism, or sex, or grand cru Burgundy; you have to experience it to know — Noble Dust

That sounds like you're making the distinction between acquaintance knowledge and propositional/declarative knowledge. I agree that one cannot know a particular experience that one feels is beautiful if one does not experience it. Propositional knowledge cannot achieve this kind of aim.

As with gold. What is its intrinsic value as a precious metal? As the "precious" suggests, it requires someone to think it precious. Without that, its "precious" value is nil. — tim wood

It's not clear to me whether you're (a) saying that objects don't have intrinsic value, or (b) you're saying that gold has intrinsic value, and this intrinsic value we/minds value as "precious". Which in other words means there exists both instrinsic (objective) and subjective value.

Careful here. It's hard to defend the notions that any thing has qualities in and of itself, or that a quality (value) itself has qualities. — tim wood

I view qualities as phenomenal properties of some x that the mind experiences. Essentially, I buy quale.

I'm not conflating "quality" with "value", btw. "Value" is the meaning-of-worth/importance/significance/etc. one assigns to something.

I wasn't aware we were discussing your opinions of Aristotle's ideas. — tim wood

You brought up Aristotle's matter and form as (probably) being different than my concept of matter and form. I intended to clarify my position to help clear things up.

In any case with respect to the context, your remark is at best a non sequitor. — tim wood

Ok, could you explain how it's a non-sequitur?

Number is inherent in nature if there are multiple things. — Janus

I don't know if you're not confusing and/or conflating "number" with "multiple things". "Number" is a mathematical construct existing within an axiomatic system. "Multiple things" are objects or groups of objects. Those are ontologically two different "kinds" of things. The former is a mental construct that is applied to the latter. The number "2", for example, is not actually in or between two objects. If you think it is, could you specify where it would be?

I'm not sure; why is the distinction important for you? — Noble Dust

Because your "intrinsic to our experience" isn't clear to me.

So we don't experience beauty as something external to us, is that the distinction you're making? — Noble Dust

Yes.

As I mentioned to Jake, the fact that the experience of beauty is subjective doesn't mean there isn't an objective reality of beauty external to the experience. — Noble Dust

Which is why I've been interested in finding out what "beauty" is ontologically for you. It seems that to you beauty is both subjective and objective. Well, what is objective beauty, ontologically? Is it the actual properties of things that we perceive? So objective beauty (external-to-mind beauty) exists in the objects themselves independent of any observer? Or is it a mixture all at once between subjective and objective beauty?

No, because I don't conflate experience and mental apparatuses. — Noble Dust

Note that by "mental apparatus" I don't mean some static object; rather, I mean a dynamic, mental processing structure. In other words, experience is a mental process.

In my view the physical is generated by the non-physical. I'm not sure how one being superior to the other would obtain in any meaningful way. Consciousness isn't the basis for the hierarchy because consciousness is in some way superior to the physical world; it's just prior to the physical, in my view. — Noble Dust

I see. So what determines levels of hierarchy is priority and generation? Is generation synonymous with causation there?

So if the physical generated the non-physical, would you then say that the physical would be at the top end of the hierarchy?

What do you mean by subjective? — Noble Dust

Of the mind. "Objective" or "extra-mental" would refer to everything that is not of the mind.

'Ontic' is what is, and 'Ontological' is the study of what is, its theory. — Cavacava

Within the study of what there is (i.e. one's ontology), it makes sense to say something like "x is y ontologically". It's about ascertaining what some x is within one's ontology.

Ontologically, beauty is first an experience. — Noble Dust

I just want to clarify something: For me, "experience" is synonymous with "conscious experience". Do you agree?

The combination in the bird of color, movement, and song, cause us to experience beauty. — Noble Dust

I'd prefer to say that the properties of a bird (which includes things like colour, movement, etc.) cause us to experience something that we feel and refer to as "beautiful".

But moving outwards from experience, the way I'm using beauty in this thread is as a fundamental aspect, an identifying characteristic, of a being. It's not the colors themselves, the movements themselves, or the songs themselves, that specifically make the bird beautiful. Even a flightless bird, a bird with a broken wing, a molting bird, or squawking crow is still experienced as beautiful. — Noble Dust

I take it you're only talking about those individuals who experience and label such birds as beautiful, since not all individuals will feel all birds are beautiful...?

There is something intrinsic to our experience of the bird that is beautiful, regardless of the specifics of the characteristics. — Noble Dust

By "intrinsic to our experience" are you referring to something intrinsic in our minds/mental apparatus?

I think number is inherent in nature; so number is not merely the product of minds.That much seems obvious to me. — Janus

Could you specify some examples of number being inherent in nature?

And yet you say you are a "physicalist" not a "mentalist". Seems like an ontological distinction to me. — Janus

Physicalism says that every thing/object/existent is physical; that includes minds since minds are things. Mental states are distinct from non-mental states. Both mental states and non-mental states are just particular kinds of physical states.

Because it's not a physical aspect like limbs or mass. Consciousness gives birth to reason, imagination, etc; the things you're using to discuss in this thread. It's the backdrop of you're entire human experience. — Noble Dust

Ah right. So the non-physical is what...superior to/better than the physical?

Would you say that the assertion that "consciousness/non-physicality determines relative levels of hierarchy" is subjective?

Agreed! But just what is that value? Ans.: in itself, nothing. What is the value of anything, beyond what some person will give it? — tim wood

So if value is subjective, then it is "nothing"? That doesn't make sense. Or do you mean, if value is subjective then it is worth nothing, or value-less? In other words, value can only be valuable if it is "beyond" subjectivity.

Is that what you mean?

I don't know what "ontologically" means, here. I assume you mean what is its being. — tim wood

Yes, by "ontologically" I mean what some thing/X actually (as in, in actuality) or really (as in, in reality) is.

Does the thing itself contain in itself that which satisfies the criteria? — tim wood

Yes, the "thing" has properties that satisfy whatever criterion we have in mind.

I'll try this: beauty is the name of a feeling, given voice as the expression of an appreciation for the compliance of something with something - like a set of criteria. — tim wood

So "beauty" is a name/label within some criterion that we assign to some appreciative feeling in relation to something. Is that right?

In other words, "beauty" is a name, and therefore...what?...a concept? A mental thing?

Aristotle's matter and form — tim wood

I do not agree with Aristotle's "matter and form", mainly because I don't buy universals or essences as real (in terms of realism). For me, "matter" is identical to "form". In other words, "matter" is synonymous with "form".

Not quite, beauty doesn't entail an entity in the sense of it being an entity itself, but it does require an entity in the sense that it requires an observer. But if you take the second sense, then your (a) and (b) descriptions would be right, yeah. — Noble Dust

Ok, so if "beauty" is not an entity but requires an observer, then what, ontologically, is "beauty" in your view? Does it have a spatiotemporal location? Does it reside within the observer? Is "beauty" a concept? If so, what is a concept ontologically?

OK, I certainly agree that abstract concepts do not exist extra-mentally. But the problem seems to be that, for example, numbers are independent of any particular mind. — Janus

What are "numbers" ontologically in your view?

In my view, "numbers" are abstract concepts that exist in the mind. Ontologically, they exist as particular mental abstracts in the form of brain processes. That means that "numbers" are dependent on minds; they are not independent of minds. If that were so, then that would obviously mean they exist extra-mentally.

I tend to think the whole distinction between mental and physical ( beyond its ordinary commonsense applications) is fatally flawed — Janus

Strictly (and ontologically) speaking, I don't make a distinction between "mental" and "physical", so there is no problem or flaw.

I had the thought then, so much for beauty. Probably so much for any aesthetic judgment. — tim wood

Just because (present) judgements (aesthetic or otherwise) can change doesn't mean they can't have value as (present) judgements.

Their level of development of consciousness. — Noble Dust

Ok. Why is that particular quality/aspect the determinant of relative levels of hierarchy? Why not, say, limbs or mass, for example?

Higher in the sense of hierarchy, not in the sense of higher number. — Noble Dust

Let me put it another way: what determines whether the beings/objects on this macrocosmic hierarchy are relatively higher or lower?

Do you define features of experience as extra-mental then? — Janus

Yes, although I realise "features of experience" isn't so clear. Just to clarify, by "features of experience" I mean features/properties of the environment (which are extra-mental) that we experience via our biological apparatus. (Although we could more broadly say we experience relating/applying abstract concepts to other abstract concepts in our minds as a sort of "inner" experience. But ultimately, my point is that abstract concepts such as "number" do not exist extra-mentally.)

If numbers, shapes and ideas have no extra-mental existence then what are the "extra-mental things" "we apply those concepts to"? — Janus

Features of experience. We employ abstract concepts to classify, organise, structure, associate etc. to features of reality for various purposes.

The following from SEP:

Aristotle famously contends that every physical object is a compound of matter and form.

Ah, I don't agree with Aristotle.

Form and matter are bound together, their mix is inexorable in the same way each separate being is inexorable bound to Being, to existence. — Cavacava

That doesn't really clear things up for me. What is the difference between "form" and "matter" ontologically?

Are you saying that "Being" is identical to "existence"?

What is "Being" ontologically?

We are a unique 'mix' of form & matter — Cavacava

We are? In my view form is identical to matter. For something/matter to exist it must have form. It doesn't make sense to me to think that matter has no form. On the other hand, you could say that particular "kinds" of matter have particular "kinds" of forms. But either way, ontologically, form and matter are not different things.

The bird's connection to what it is (its being) — Cavacava

What is the difference between "the bird" and the bird's "being"? They sound like two distinct things in the way you're claiming.

Yes, but the word 'subjectivity' does not (in my opinion) encompass the totality that word 'being' is capable of expressing. — Cavacava

Could you say more...?

The bird is as tightly caught in the spell of its own being as we are tightly caught in the spell of our own being. A bird can't sense the beauty we see it in any more than we can sense the beauty a higher being (might) see in us. — Cavacava

You mean that any being cannot escape its own subjectivity? If so, I agree. For the bird to sense/perceive/evaluate anything from a perspective other than its own doesn't make sense.

Quick tip, highlight the text you want to quote, then click "quote". — Noble Dust

Thanks for the tip. :)

But how does "beauty", aesthetically speaking, obtain evolutionarily? How would Adorno respond to you, for instance? — Noble Dust

I think it's essentially a combination of acquiring anatomical features that serve us functionally in (mentally) organising and categorising things and an upshot of that functionality that allows us to obtain pleasure from such experiences.

I know next to nothing about Adorno. If you think it will help, maybe you could summarise a position he has related to this stuff?

In this particular case in this thread, beauty first refers to our perception of the bird (view the attached photo for context), and then secondarily refers to an abstract concept in which the first concept of beauty is creatively applied to a possible form of being which is higher than humanity. — Noble Dust

That took me a while to make sense of, and yet I'm not sure I've understood.

So "beauty" in the sense you're using it in this thread entails some entity/process/X/?? which involves

(a) perception of the bird (first concept of beauty?);
(b) a second (abstract) concept of beauty that refers to the first concept (perception), and that which then is possibly creatively applied to "a form of being which is higher than humanity".

Have I got that right?

As to an ontological view of beauty, I love that stuff, but at this point...it's tough ground, and a lot of the ground feels tough because of language.

I would say Divine Being is primary, and Beauty might possibly be secondary. Beauty might be the generative outgrowth of divinity. That's not very good, though. Go easy on me. Or not. — Noble Dust

When you say stuff like "Divine Being is primary", it reminds me a bit of "The Great Chain of Being": https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_chain_of_being

What makes you say "that's not very good, though"?

My response is that I would have to understand what "Divine Being" actually is? I take it it's not material and therefore immaterial?

Higher in the sense that we are higher than the birds. Who's higher than us? No one/thing? — Noble Dust

"Higher" is a quantitative term (conventionally speaking). So I'm asking in what sense "higher" are we than birds per that definition. You might be using an unconventional definition of "higher" though, so you'd need to share that with me in order for me to grasp what you're getting at.

But I don't know what you mean by "superior/inferior/valuable". I get "superior/inferior" from my suggestion that we see something the bird does not, and maybe something/someone else sees something in us that we do not (superior/inferior here, for clarity, has no moral connotation). But I'm not sure how "valuable" plays into that.

So, I'm entertaining the possibility of a macrocosmic hierarchy in which various beings grade along the scale (slugs, birds, humans, angels??? God???), but any sense of inferior/superior is just a sense of ontological scale. If that make sense. — Noble Dust

By that I'm assuming you mean "intrinsic qualities" that some things have that others do not which determines whether things are "higher" or "lower". In that sense, I'd guess some intrinsic qualities that make something "higher" than other things would include superior qualities or superior values, for example.

Ok, but I see the "scale" as subjective, fyi. We could use scales for many purposes; in other words, there is not one "true" or "correct" purpose for using/applying scales to things.

Would there be a sweeter ice cream sweeter than the sweeter ice cream, btw? — Noble Dust

It depends on the individual tasting the ice cream and the amount of properties that produce sensations/perceptions of "sweetness" for that individual. There might be a limit as to an individual's taste budes being able to make distinctions of sweetness once they taste things that are intensely sweet. One could still compose some product with whatever properties makes something sweet to an individual with an excessively large amount of those sweet properties to ensure that it's relatively one of the sweetest products to taste.

I agree, but I'm not talking about evolutionary functions.

In that case, I don't think that animals that are relatively dissimilar to us perceive qualities as "beautiful" apart from them being able to do so for evolutionary purposes.

Plus the only minds thinking are human minds; no other minds are thinking, presumably.

I assume that other animals that are similar to us, that is, animals that share similar anatomical/biological features/apparatus (e.g. apes) can think too. By "think" there I mean rational/implicative/relational thinking, although it wouldn't be as abstract or "complex" as our thinking.

If you re-read that section of the OP, you'll see that beauty there is metaphorical and not literal in a physical sense.

What is "beauty" in the sense that you're using it? And would you also have a view per what beauty is ontologically?

But it sounds like you're just talking about people observing people. Again, if you re-read the OP, I'm using the bird as a metaphor for imaging if a similar scenario of us observing the bird applies to some higher form of being observing us.

I'm confused. Let me try to clarify something of my position in case it helps further the discussion.

Any perception/appraisal is going to involve some mind (human or non-human (including something like a god)) observing some other (or some mind perceiving/appraising aspects of itself). That's necessarily the case.

A form of being higher than humans.

In what sense "higher"?

I agree, but it looks like you're thinking within a physicalist/materialist framework; I'm not. I agree that what you say here is true, but it's not an argument against the possibility of a higher form of being existing above the being of humanity; a form of being that apprehends a different view of humanity in the same way that we observe a different view of the bird.

Well, I am a physicalist. ;)

I wasn't presenting "an argument against the possibility of a higher form of being existing above the being of humanity". I still don't know what "higher" means. I don't view things as intrinsically "superior/inferior/valuable, etc.". That's all I'm saying; and it seems that you do.

Would there be a higher being higher than the higher being, btw? Would it be an infinite sequence of higher beings in that regard?

What kind of existence do numbers, shapes and ideas have outside our thinking them, and their temporal and spatial instantiations in nature? — Janus

They have no extra-mental existence. We apply those concepts to extra-mental things.

Is there a macrocosmic hierarchy in which beings "look down on" beings lower on the hierarchical scale and observe qualities of those beings which are invisible to those lower beings themselves?

Do you mean a hierarchy in which certain animals that have evolved particular capacities to evaluate qualities (like beauty) in other animals that have not evolved such capacities? Apart from humans, I do think that some animals can evaluate such qualities in other animals insofar as what is "beautiful" to them might serve different evolutionary functions (e.g. avoiding or falling prey to predation).

I don't think that hierarchies are objective things, btw. They are just ways that minds organise things. So there is no intrinsic "superior/inferior" "valuable" differences in things apart from minds thinking about things in that way.

"Does a human person know that it's beautiful?"

It depends on the person, since beauty is subjective.

And secondly, could there be a higher form of being that observes and apprehends a beautiful quality in us which we are incapable of seeing?

Again, beauty is subjective. There is no objectively "beautiful quality" that exists in things apart from some mind judging qualities to be beautiful.

It could be true that someone/thing observes a quality in us that we aren't aware of and judges it as beautiful. But that judgement belongs to the mind of the observer judging that quality.

I'm not sure what a "higher form of being" means. I'd say we have evolved particular features that enable us to perform particular functions that some animals cannot. But the same is true for other animals that are able to perform particular functions that we cannot. Neither is "higher" or "lower" than the other in the sense of intrinsic "superior/inferior/value, etc."

That's my entire argument; we see an aspect of the bird which the bird is not capable of seeing.

I'd put it like this: we are capable of perceiving and appraising aspects of non-human animals that other non-human animals cannot perceive and appraise (based on our biological apparatus). But it's probably also true that some non-human animals are able to perceive and appraise aspects of humans that humans cannot perceive and appraise (e.g. infra-red perception, sonic detection, etc.).

Events could be non-randomly probabilistic, too. That's why I put "random causation" in quotation marks by the way. — Terrapin Station

I see. Thanks for explaining.

Keep in mind that "random causation" need not be B or C happening with a 50/50 chance. — Terrapin Station

Hmm. I thought randomness involved equiprobability. Could you explain?

Thanks for taking the time to explain. I'll give what you've written some thought.

Neither sort of light is ontologically privileged. What would actually be the case with the object is that in light 1, it looks green, and in light 2, it looks blue. Both would be accurate. — Terrapin Station

I'd also go further and add that not only does the object look a particular colour in a particular light, but that that object IS that particular colour in that particular light (from a particular perspective, of course). The object's properties are being directly affected by the properties of the light source, which is affecting the properties of our perception of the object. So the object is "blue" in one kind of light, and "green" in another kind of light, and so on.

That's weird. If language and reasoning would be circular, then words would be meaningless (e.g. 'food' would not refer to edible things in the world but only other words), and all reasoning would be invalid. — jkop

Well, I'm an internalist on meaning, so it's not "meaningless" in my view.

Re your example, "food" as a word would refer to particular objects we might eat, but defining the word "food" would involve synonymous definitions.

I meant "reasoning is circular" in the sense that if reasoning relies on the view that (linguistic) meaning is instantiated via words/sentences, then reasoning is circular due to synonymy. So I don't mean "reasoning is circular" in the sense of invalid arguments.

Our awareness of the phenomenal leads us to epistemological analysis, — Cavacava

I think Terrapin Station is suggesting that that's only one way to initiate or arrive at ontological claims or commitments. Some philosophers might not use epistemology as a foundation to arrive at ontological commitments. Another way might be starting with what meaning is, for example, or starting with propositional/predicate logic, or science methodology, etc. Which would mean that these are all "channels" people can use to arrive at their ontological conclusions.

Ontological commitment suggests necessity, but it is subject to continued empirical verification, every thing that is, is contingent . What is experienced is not necessarily circumscribed by our logical analysis. — Cavacava

Well then can't ontological commitments also be contingently true in lieu of empiricism? A priori ontological claims might be about contingent ontological commiments, e.g. law of identity with regards to entities.

I've posted so much today I don't really have the energy to write something more detailed about it at the moment. I might be inspired to do so later. Maybe we should start a thread on it, by the way. — Terrapin Station

No problemo. I was actually thinking about starting a thread on it anyway.