So, for us it would seem necessary that we perform--transcend. We transcend the limitations of our understanding of God by engaging in fervent prayer, fasting, and meditation--all actions. For us, we can't be here, then there, without actually moving from here to there. — Bitter Crank
Kant thought it was outside experience--which for us, I guess means we don't transcend and tell about it. — Bitter Crank
I think transcendence is an incoherent notion in metaphysics. If X is transcendent to Y, then there can be no relationship between X and Y (certainly no road from X to Y), because any sort of relationship (act of relating) would imply breaching the gap that we have just postulated through transcendence. If X and Y are transcendent, then in what kind of relationship can they be with the road that connects them? Clearly they can't be in any relationship - the road can't even exist - because if the road exists, then they aren't transcendent. With regards to existence - Being - nothing can be transcendent - that which is transcendent doesn't exist. — Agustino
Thus God needs the world as much as the world needs God, and therefore only God is necessary and has Being - but this God entails Creation as His shadow. — Agustino
It seems like you have ideas but I don't see any real convaincing argument compared to me and what i said, if you have nothing but assertions i would ask you to at least tell me where I'm wrong but not just by affirming things. — Hamtatro
basically you are telling me that they live because they are too lazy to kill
themselves ? ^^ — Hamtatro
So you judged that your life worth more (or "is so good that" depending on the level of fun that I want to put in my words .. ) than "nothing". It is exactly what i wanted to tell you. If you were suffering more than you enjoy your life (no familly for example etc..) then it would be smarter from you to chose death. — Hamtatro
What does it mean ? They live depressed because they like it ? — Hamtatro
Like I said before the final goal of any human is to satisfy his needs, which lead to happines, no one continue living if he have the choice in a case where there is more overall suffering than happiness (in his mind). — Hamtatro
there's not much to gain out of life — Agustino
there's nothing "big" you can get out of it. — Agustino
nothing is of real importance ultimately. — Agustino
life is worth living in and of itself, it doesn't require any particular thing — Agustino
So I'm skeptical about "cure all" solutions. — Agustino
The human condition doesn't have a cure, because it doesn't need one. — Agustino
Once you become satisfied with the idea that you can't gain anything out of life, and therefore neither can you lose, you are finally free — Agustino
Yet you find your life so good that you still want to live it — Hamtatro
I suggest that if Christness and altered appearance are emphasised, that is done by later writers trying to retro-fit their preferred theology to a text that does not support it. — andrewk
We must bear in mind that we are talking about someone that has divine powers, not some inarticulate savage, and hence they would be able to express themselves in the clearest fashion possible, so that no possible doubt could remain as to what they meant. — andrewk
Are they not the same person? My understanding is that 'Christ' is a name essentially meaning 'Messiah' that was applied to the historical Jesus some time after his death, and it is used mostly to refer to Jesus in relation to his post-resurrection activities. Use of the term also emphasises the belief of the speaker in the divinity, or at least the Messianicity, of Jesus. But they must be the same person because if post-resurrection Jesus is not Christ then Jesus was not resurrected - he was replaced. Hence either they both complain or neither does. — andrewk
Why do you think that? To me the story has always been very simple and has nothing to do with personal identity. It is simply that Thomas does not believe that Jesus's life has continued beyond the crucifixion, until he meets the risen Jesus, and Jesus complains about that. — andrewk
Why do you think that? To me the story has always been very simple and has nothing to do with personal identity. It is simply that Thomas does not believe that Jesus's life has continued beyond the crucifixion, until he meets the risen Jesus, and Jesus complains about that. — andrewk
But if we are to become like God, what are we to do? Isn't that the idea, to become like Christ? — Agustino
The response: "You believe because you have seen me. Blessed are those who believe without seeing me" — andrewk
He argues that at least part of the reason for the diverging economic fortunes between northern and southern Europe (e.g. between Germany and Greece) lies in the rampant mistrust of government among Southern Europeans, which leads to an impairment in civic and administrative functions such as tax collection (people conduct business in the "shadow economy" rather than keep it on the books and fork over the taxes to the government), leading to a substantial loss of revenue in the national coffers, and precipitating in part the financial hardships we're currently witnessing in some of those countries. — Arkady
I have another one which may be similar which happens to me whenever I don't sleep for a night, and then go to sleep. I half-wake from sleep still largely unconscious, trying to solve a problem which I cannot solve because it is irrational - it has no solution - a problem which is often related to my activities the day before and is somehow tied to my life. But the problem is very trivial and yet is made irrational by my mind. For example, I used to work in engineering, so when it happened after returning from visiting some friends late at night on a weekend, and going to sleep in the morning, I woke up in that half-awake state after about 1 hour of sleep, got up sweating in absolute fear, while I thought "the beam doesn't fit" - thinking and feeling as if the beam was my body :-O And I was trying to figure out how to make the beam fit lol, as if I was being suffocated by it.
So in a little while my mind clarified a bit more, and I realised that my mind was simply functioning by itself - I had no meta-cognitive sense, and no real awareness of who I was at all - no sense of self, and the mind was desperately trying to grasp after it. I had a vague sense of self I mean - objects weren't very clearly not myself anymore though. So I gave in to it, and waited, doing nothing. I remember in those moments as if I were begging from something to be given, something that could only be given from the outside - I was powerless. And slowly, as if something had been granted to me from outside, the sense of self came back, and things started to clarify - and I felt grateful. I could never identify the cause of the extreme fear and anxiety that I felt, as it was irrational - it had no cause. So my mind couldn't figure out why it felt so anxious, even though it was trying desperately trying to do it. And despite knowing that the fear was irrational - for my mind knew that - it still kept compulsively searching for a cause. — Agustino
So, you're reading things into what I say, now? I spoke of reality involving loyalty as a vice, but that isn't as same as your careless misunderstanding above. If you were paying enough attention, you'd know that I think that reality also involves loyalty as a virtue, and that it is neither one nor other in itself. — Sapientia
I'm not in favour of bringing children into the world, I just don't see anything wrong with it in numerous cases, so I'd defend those cases. — Sapientia
And I don't accept as my basis for morality anything as simplistic as the prevention of immorality or suffering in future. I'd have to add qualifications, and by doing so, your implication about an internal inconsistency wouldn't apply. I argued against such a principle at length in the anti-natalism discussions. I take the anti-natalist argument and turn it against them as a reductio ad absurdum. If you start with such a principle, and if it were universally adopted, then, in light of the consequences, I'd conclude that the principle, in its original form, should be rejected, at that it would need to be revised. — Sapientia
I don't understand why it doesn't make sense to you. Yes, I tend to think along consequentialist lines, and have done so in this discussion. I might've been using one type of ethical reasoning more than others. But I'm not tied down to think only along those lines. I can judge immorality in light of various respects, rather than just a single respect. I think that to suggest otherwise would be another oversimplification. — Sapientia
In the example under discussion, it can be immoral in all three respects that you mentioned in your question. It's immoral if you knowingly intend to commit your loyalty to an organisation which you know to be immoral, without good reason. It'd be immoral to commit immoral acts as part of such an organisation that you're loyal to. And it'd be immoral - or even more immoral, if it is already so - if there are immoral consequences as a result. — Sapientia
I thought I'd made that clear by saying: virtue, good - vice, bad. The nature of virtue is good. It can't be otherwise, or it wouldn't be virtue. — Sapientia
I've said this already, too. I mentioned two conditions. Have you forgotten them, or did you not read them in the first place? — Sapientia
Perhaps you were too busy trying to think of a sarcastic comeback or a suitable gif to use. — Sapientia
Heister, actually I must ask you, how do I begin my study of the real Meister? >:O What works would you recommend to start with? O:) — Agustino
I think about how things are, and I try to match my thinking so that it reflects reality. — Sapientia
And the reality I see involves loyalty as what must surely be a vice, since it is present in immoral situations — Sapientia
- think about the Mafia - in which the right thing to do would be to break off this loyalty, even if it means betrayal; and, furthermore, since loyalty can and - in some situations - does make matters worse, leading to further immorality.
Loyalty to a heinous organisation which commits immoral acts is surely a vice. How can it not be? — Sapientia
Because it would ruin your quaint little idealised notion of loyalty as a virtue? Sorry, but that's just how it is. You can either face up to this harsh reality or stick your head in the sand. Your choice. — Sapientia
given the nature of virtue — Sapientia
If loyalty is inherently good, then it's good even when it's loyalty to something (or someone) bad. If it is inherently good, then it is good in itself, by virtue of it's nature, regardless of what (or who) one is loyal to, or whether it (or they) is (or are) itself (or themself) good or bad. — Sapientia
Loyalty being good even when it's loyalty to something (or someone) bad seems absurd or lacking in meaning. — Sapientia