Nice post. :ok:

Who can discern the cause of our collective psychopathy? Perhaps it is the overabundance of social media, prescription drugs, something lurking in our sustenance, or the fluoride within our water... All I know is that we have become incapable of engaging in rational discourse. Decency is jettisoned when the prevailing narrative is challenged. It is met with outrage, hysteria, shunning, witch hunts, ad hominem attacks, or the hollow invocation of emotional platitudes—anything but a reasoned exchange.

This pattern of behavior first emerged in response to Trump's electoral triumph. — yebiga

My impression is that Trump's election, who ran directly against the neocon establishment, caused said political elite to press the panic button, and ramp up the propaganda.

Propaganda slowly drives people mad. It's literally the manipulating behavior of a psychopath, but applied on a societal scale. Lying, gaslighting, different kinds of blackmail, etc.

Regular people just aren't equipped to deal with that kind of malevolence.

They will subconciously realize something is wrong - they get nervous, anxious, frustrated, etc. - but the propaganda machine accounts for that as well by readily presenting scapegoats upon which those emotions can be projected.

And this is only one arm of the propaganda machine.


The other arm involves whipping people up into a self-righteous frenzy in pursuit of goals set by the political elite. These are essentially appeals to people's sense of moral superiority, seeking to bind their ideology directly to people's ego. Once the ideology is bound to their sense of self, they cannot leave the ideology without cutting off a part of themselves. This is why every discussion with such people turns hostile; they are in psychological survival mode. Losing means having to cut off a part of their ego.

Note the eerie similarity to the methods of nazism and communism; the assigning of scapegoats and the appeal to moral superiority.

You may get to vote for an actual person this time, Americans. Don't disappoint please.

I'm not sure the world can handle another four years of muppets and puppets on the throne.

The irony in all of this is that the "evil capitalist corporations" are actually public, and not private. In a similar vein, they owe much of their power to governments.

And governments essentially are nothing other than giant monopoly corporations either.

I would really recommend watching the following video to have a more historically aware sense of what these terms actually mean and where the current confusion stems from:



It's a long video, but well worth watching.

I really like Laozi's teachings. They never cease to instill virtue and a sense of moral duty in would-be leaders and people in general.

Virtuous people won't support corrupt leaders. And virtuous leaders won't abuse their power. To a society, the virtue of its people is truly more precious than gold.

Sadly, western society is way past that point on both fronts. And once that genie is out of the bottle who will take the power away from the corrupt, powerful elite?

Please elaborate! (Assuming you mean ‘the actual game-plan real politic’ of WC? And not the countless philosophies that have sprouted from within… and often opposed to… western civilization?) — 0 thru 9

What I mean is that concepts of Yin and Yang presuppose some form of sophistication.

It's hard to describe the behavior of apes through a concept like Yin and Yang (at least in the context of this discussion).

One could try, though. Does ignorance belong with Yin or with Yang? I think it belongs with neither, hence my previous remark.

Power here = ‘hard power’? Lawyers, guns and money? (so to speak. As opposed to the concept of ‘soft power’ which relies on influence. Cooperation and convincing, rather than coercion.) — 0 thru 9

Yes, but also science, politics, (what goes for) western philosophy has no other purpose than to further the pursuit of power. So both soft power and hard power.

Power for the sake of power, with no moral groundedness whatsoever. That's the axiom of what one might generalize as "western civilization". It's the language of Washington, of Brussels, of Davos and WEF, BlackRock, the central banks, etc.

The West has turned into a giant Nietzschean jungle.

The current western system is not philosophically coherent enough to be understood through Yin and Yang.

It has become a virtueless cult of power. Everything is understood through power. Everything revolves around power. Everything may be sacrificed for the sake of power.

Critically imbalanced, yes. In the sense that chimpanzee society works on the same principles.

If I say "Oppression is wrong", when I see oppression, I am horrified and enraged, I want to destroy it, correct it, and I'm filled with sympathy and deep sadness towards the victims. Morality requires this strong emotional reaction. — Judaka

I cannot agree with this.

Emotions may just as well mislead us in regards to morality. How many terrible things aren't done out of fear or anger? And why couldn't the ethical thing to do be something that we don't feel particularly strongly about?

'Oppression' in my view is way too vague a word to be useful in a moral context. It can describe a whole range of behaviors that may or may not be present when someone is accused of oppressing another.

Accurate language is important.

In the case of killing in self-defence, if it was necessary then most would say it's justified, I assume you feel the same. That would mean no triggering of any of the emotions associated with morality. You wouldn't hesitate to do it, you wouldn't stop someone else from doing it, and you wouldn't dislike that it was done, or any person who did it, so it was allowable and acceptable to you, right? Saying afterwards that it was still "immoral" because killing is wrong, well, that's just a bit hollow to me. It's your feelings that show what you find moral and immoral, not your words, right? — Judaka

Being forced to kill someone in self-defense is, I would assume, a deeply traumatizing experience. Tragically, it may leave people guilt-ridden for the rest of their lives, despite merely defending their lives.

In my view, Justice implies some kind of positive result. Therefore an act of killing cannot be Just. (despite possibly being legal/lawful).

Likewise, an act of killing, self-defense or no, cannot be moral.

In the particular case of self-defense, while the act of killing is still immoral, it would be hard to argue the person has committed an immoral act if they are involuntarily forced into a position where they must protect their lives. In that case, an intention to kill is not present, and without an intention there cannot be a moral act or immoral act.

The same could technically apply to any act which would otherwise be deemed immoral. If the act is 'accidental' the person has erred in some way, but it cannot be said they acted immorally, because an intention is not present. This is the realm of tragedy, ignorance, inevitability, etc.

An act of unintentional killing out of self-defense would fall in the tragic category.

That isn't so much a justification, but rather a means of rationally understanding the nature of the act.

I'm guessing you are not religious, but the way you talk about morality is as if hell is awaiting sinners.

Allowed by whom? Acceptable to whom? God?

Inevitably as one lives on may commit immoral deeds, and when that happens there is nothing left to do but take responsibility, learn something and live better afterwards. Not make petty excuses for why it was no big deal that one time.

If one is convinced of their moral principles, breaking them is a punishment all its own, and one would never do that voluntarily.

There's not some final punishment awaiting, other than the responsibility for and the consequences of one's misdeed, whether large or small.

I'm sure we could come up with many examples where lying is acceptable. Such as if it's to preserve something important, or because one is being threatened, or any number of other things. — Judaka

Note that you used the term 'acceptable', and not 'moral'.

Lets assume lying is immoral. In that case, lying is always immoral. Sometimes people still lie, when the circumstances are pressing enough. That doesn't make the act of lying any less immoral.

If one is forced to kill someone out of self-defense, that act of killing wouldn't suddenly become a moral act. It would still be deeply wrong.

Whether one deems the act 'acceptable' after the fact is irrelevant. Acceptable to whom? Society? The perpetrator's conscience? God? These are all concerned with avoiding punishment, whether at the hands of society, god or guilt. That has nothing to do with morality.

The damage has already been done. The only thing there's left to do is to accept one has committed an immoral deed, hopefully learn something and live better in the future.

Objective moral principles are fraudulent, they are to be applied as one wishes, when one wishes, towards whatever or whomever one wishes. There is no moral system that has ever worked differently. — Judaka

However, not only are there many exceptions but since one has complete control over whether they describe something as theft or something else, the judgement is really subjective and applied very flexibly. — Judaka

I think this is more a problem with people being fraudulent.

If people have no desire for developing and upholding a genuine moral code, then morality has no purpose for them anyway. They're fooling themselves and others.

And yes, that might very well describe the majority of people.

We even have different words for things, such as tax not being theft, [...] — Judaka

I'd say that's a typical example of deceptive language; the way we seperate immoral things that also happen to be very convenient (tax) from immoral things which are not convenient (theft).

That seperation, in my view, is completely unjustified. The 'reasonable'/'fairness' part of the argument, window dressing - the sales pitch you spoke about.

(thought you'd like that one). — Judaka

:wink:

[...] but if we're talking about how things actually are, [...] — Judaka

What do you mean by this?

If we exclude these politically motivated, convenient definitions of morality, then no, it's always been the same. — Judaka

I'm inclined to agree with this view. What I don't understand is, if the nature of morality is unchanging, aren't we looking for principles, hard 'truths', rather than pliable notions of fairness and reasonableness?

Like in my earlier example, the princple would be that breaking promises is bad, and one shouldn't make promises one cannot keep.

One might say, but in certain situations it's reasonable to break a promise, no?

To which my response would be, whether it's reasonable is irrelevant. Breaking promises is immoral. Notions of reasonableness are just there to soothe our conscience or perhaps keep fear of eternal punishment at bay. But the damage has already been done, and all there is left to do is to try and live one's life better in the future.

Fairness and reasonableness are pivotal to my understanding of what morality is, so, perhaps we're just using the word differently. — Judaka

Probably so, but herein lies the problem.

People used to find it perfectly reasonable and fair to stone people to death for things we would now consider minor crimes or not even a crime at all.

Did the nature of morality change?

It's very difficult to talk about morality without a group as a context because the group's motivations and values are critical. For example, what's fair and reasonable within the context of a competitive soccer team will be different from a casual kids' soccer team. Whereas the competitive team might think it's fair to let the best players have the most field time and ball possession because of everyone's desire to win, it might seem fair to allow all the kids an equal chance to play in the casual kids' team. — Judaka

I'm not sure if fairness and reasonableness are terms I would use to discuss morality. They are too pliable and morality requires clarity, or it risks turning, as you aptly put it, into a "sales pitch for one's ideas" - becoming just another word for opinions and personal fancies.

But let me try to illustrate my point.

Let's say there's a kids soccer game and little Jimmy has to sit on the bench the entire game even though the coach told him he could play.

The coach broke a promise to Jimmy.

The soccer game, the team, the group, etc. are not morally relevant. What's morally relevant is the breaking of a promise, and it is between (in this case) two moral actors.

As I wrote, what you propose is basically Minsk 3.0. We know exactly how Minsk 1.0 and Minsk 2.0 have ended, so it is not a great surprise that Ukraine was not that willing to take another chance. There is absolutely no reason to think that Russia would uphold its part of the deal and plenty of reasons to think it would not. — Jabberwock

Actually, Mearsheimer argues that Putin was deeply committed to making Minsk work. (51:27)

And we know from recent revelations by former French President François Hollande and former German Chancellor Angela Merkel that it was NATO who chose to treat the Minsk Accords as a temporary armistice during which Ukraine could be armed and prepared for further war.

I would add that high-profile former officials leaking sensitive information like this is neither an accident nor is it a coincidence. They see what the United States has done in Ukraine, and they disagree with it.

So I'm afraid you've got this one completely backwards.

I'm not interested in setting rules for anybody but myself.

Morality mandates a perspective be taken as one member of a group, with an interest in the group's wellbeing, and any views that fall outside of this context are invalid. — Judaka

Any motivation that would clearly be contrary to the group's cannot be reasonably used as part of an argument for a moral position, [...] — Judaka

In my view, morality doesn't involve groups. It involves interactions between moral agents (individuals), which could perhaps even include interactions with oneself.

Personifying groups as though they think and act like individuals is virtually always an inaccurate representation of reality and tends to lead to all sorts of peculiar conclusions.

Secondly, I believe it is possible that the moral thing to do (or not do) can be contrary to the individual's (or for simplicity's sake, the group's) self-interest. That is self-sacrifice.


Onto your points,

Morality or discussions about morality aren't coercive by what you've described. It's people's relation to the ideas they hold which are. Fears of being wrong, of having to renounce their ideas,of ostracization, etc. - these are social or personal factors. Of course those are going to muddy the waters.

Anyone who is guided by fear rather than their honest reason will risk falling prey to delusion or deceit.

Even if one does speak honestly in a moral context, we can never be sure, [...] — Judaka

The fact is that people can virtually never be sure as to the genuineness of their interactions with one another. We can't look into other people's heads to figure out whether their behavior is authentic or some carefully crafted facade to mislead us.

That's an unfortunate fact.

But largely, to the honest intellectual it's irrelevant. Either what someone says holds merit, or it doesn't. If it doesn't, one can dismiss it. If it does, one is forced to pay heed. Truth is truth, after all, whether it is delivered by someone who intends to deceive or not.


In the end, morality is about actions and behaviors, and not about opinions. So with that point I agree - any moral opinion that is not put into practice (or about which we're skeptical whether it could be put into practice) may be taken with a large grain of salt.

Talk is cheap, as they say.

Surely you have something better than a pedestrian attempt at semantics?

Nope.

He used the terms either / or.

Clearly he thought it was a possibility that the Russians only meant to threaten Kiev.

And no amount of copium is going to make those words go away. Sorry.

So Mearsheimer expressly disagrees with you that the northern offensive was just meant to distract Ukrainians while Russians take the south. — Jabberwock

Untrue.

As I have stated before, he expressly considers it a possibility that the Russians meant to threaten Kiev:

The Russian military did not attempt to conquer all of Ukraine. That would have required a classic blitzkrieg strategy that aimed at quickly overrunning all of Ukraine with armored forces supported by tactical airpower.

That strategy was not feasible however, because there were only a 190,000 soldiers in Russia's invading army, which is far too small a force to vanquish and occupy Ukraine, which is not only the largest country between the Atlantic Ocean and Russia, but also has a population of over 40 million people.

You're not gonna conquer, occupy and absorb a country of that size with a 190,000 people. And you're not even gonna have enough troops to launch a classic blitzkrieg, which is essential to conquer the entire country.

Unsurprisingly the Russians pursued a limited aim strategy, which focused at either capturing or threatening Kiev, and conquering a large swathe of territory in eastern and southern Ukraine.

In short, Russia did not have the capability to subdue all of Ukraine, much less conquer other countries in Europe. — John J. Mearsheimer

You understand that nothing he says in that March 2022 interview takes anything away from the contents of the lecture he gave in May 2022.

If anything, the lecture represents a more up-to-date representation of his views.

So I'm not sure what you think you have proven.

... Mearsheimer says himself that the limited objectives that Russia had was to take or threaten Kyiv. — ssu

Ta-daa.

If Russia had started moving towards Kiev in the conservative fashion it advanced upon Kherson, — Paine

I don't see what's conservative about the way the Russians advanced into Kherson. They penetrated quite deeply, and seemed to have encountered very little resistance until they were counter-attacked.

The difference is that Kiev was heavily defended, which should have been entirely expected.

Instead, the Russians attempted an incredibly risky airborne infantry move. — Paine

Leaving the reading of strategic intentions aside, stupid or not, the issue not touched upon in your analysis is that the airborne operation could have worked. — Paine

Your thesis does not make sense of what success might have led to. — Paine

Even if everything went the Russians' way, Kiev was way too heavily defended to be taken given the amount of troops the Russians deployed. Unless you have different information than me, I don't see any way the numbers could be interpreted to fit this idea.

The Russian force movements don't seem to imply they were preparing for a months-long battle either. In the north, huge swathes of land were bypassed and never cleared - something which would have been absolutely crucial in preperation for such a thing.

If they had advanced into Ukraine from Belarus to establish defensive lines as they did in the east, that would have pinned the forces to the northern front more effectively than joy-riding tanks with no infantry support. — Paine

I think that's untrue.

The Russians went into Ukraine being outnumbered, even though military logic would dictate going on the offensive would require a sizable numerical advantage.

This is why the Russians ended up overextended, and retreated from the north in April 2022.

Forming a defensive line in the north and attempting to hold onto both the north and the east was probably unfeasible from the start. Forming a defensive line in the north would have also given away the fact that the Russians had no intention of taking Kiev, which would have severely decreased the strategic impact it might have had.

The feint theory assumes the Russians had a plan going into this, and thus it does not rely on the argument that the Russians were incompetent. That's why I think it is a lot more compelling.

Tzeentch, you have to understand that when you give as reference or say that someone has the same thing in mind, you simply have to have the ability to produce a direct quote or a copy-paste quote that people can see that they really think so — ssu

That's not the video I meant. By now I have dug up and shared these links so many times I can't be bothered to do so again, since none of you seem to take any of the contents to heart anyway.

If you want the information, it's all there in my posts. You use the forum search function to look them up.

I'm past putting any effort into educating you.

If you have information that only 20000-30000 troops were on the Kiev axis, please provide it. — Jabberwock

I already have. Direct communications by the Ukrainian General Staff.

If you had anything better you would have provided it by now, so all of this is just posturing.

Come with sources, or spare yourself the effort of replying.

So now its hypotheticals. — ssu

Essentially everything we talk about here is hypothetical, because hard facts are not available.

I hope this is nothing new for you.

[...] and anybody with the slightest understanding of how militaries work can see that this wasn't a feint. — ssu

Simply untrue.

Mearsheimer considers the possibility in one of his lectures which I have already linked here. Seymour Hersh states it outright in an interview which I have also linked.

But I suppose these are people without "the slightest understanding of how militaries work." Oddly they are also some of the few that go against the western propaganda narrative.

That's not a coincidence.

Understanding that Ukraine put up a fight, understanding the pre-attack intel was horrifically wrong, and above all the attack being got stuck with lots of losses, Russia withdrew it's forces from the Kyiv operations area to reinforce other fronts as a) Ukraine won't follow them to Belarus. [...] , what happened was a withdrawal. — ssu

Even if we would assume everything you write here is true, it does nothing to discredit the feint theory.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the Kyiv attack had not been part of the Feb 24 invasion.

In terms of strategy, what might reasonably have been expected for north-Ukrainian/Kyiv forces? — jorndoe

This is quite hard to say (too many moving parts to make even an educated guess, in my view), but in a general sense if there had been no significant threat to Kiev, the Ukrainian defense would have been a lot denser, because there would have been less frontline to cover. This is generally seen as being in favor of the defender.

More strawmanning.

The amount of BTGs involved in Ukraine is entirely part of your argument.

My argument is that we have information showing 21,000 (numbers ranging between 15,000 - 30,000 depending on different reports) troops moved on Kiev. (and 190,000 troops maximum operating in Ukraine at the onset of the invasion).

That's from where I draw my conclusions.

All this math and mental gymnastics you're doing is you not being able to accept that 21,000 troops is all you have to work with and it's woefully insufficient for what you're claiming the Russians intended.

Stop pretending any of what you're spinning here is part of my argument.

But wait, your whole claim for the 21000 attacking Kiev was supported by the calculation based on that inaccurate assumption. — Jabberwock

Ehm, no.

This was in reply to your claim that 190,000 troops would translate into 283 BTGs.

The confusion lies primarily with you.

If the goals were different, then the invasion force would seek to achieve a goal different than just grabbing the land bridge. — Jabberwock

Taking the land bridge would obviously still be of vital importance, because the negotiations failing was a clear possibility from the start.

Perhaps not all Russian soldiers were deployed in BTGs.

Anyway, the 190,000 figure is provided by Mearsheimer as the upper limit of troops the Russians deployed at the start of the invasion. I don't think that number is actually being seriously disputed, and I take Mearsheimer quite seriously.

I think it's more llkely there's something lacking in your logic, and not in his.

Your claim was that the bridge of Crimea was the primary goal of Russia in the war. Now you also claim that in the negotiations Russians would accept Ukraine out of NATO, but it would lose the bridge. — Jabberwock

The land bridge with Crimea was Russia's primary goal if negotiations failed. There, are you happy now?

You have given the number at least three times. — Jabberwock

Sure. The 21,000 (31 BTGs) figure is pretty solid.

The 190,000 as an upper limit for how many soldiers the Russians field is too.

Those are the numbers I've used.


Your math with how many BTGs the Russians supposedly fielded and what percentage the 31 BTGs participating in the invasion is part of your argument, and not mine. So I'm not sure why you're trying to accuse me of inconsistencies in an argument you are making.

This is strawmanning at its worst.

You just choose to ignore the reality of what has actually happened. — Jabberwock

Taking Kiev with the numbers the Russians fielded was unfeasible, no matter how you twist the numbers. That's the reality you're ignoring.

All you have is 21,000 troops marching on Kiev.

You do not need bargaining chips to negotiate your defeat. — Jabberwock

This is why I told you to look up information about the peace negotiations.

The Russians were bargaining to keep Ukraine out of NATO, and under those circumstances the land bridge to Crimea could be given up.

There's nothing inconsistent about that.

You were already given many clues what their aims might be: Putin's speech, claims of propagandists, the order of the battle etc. You just ignore them. — Jabberwock

That's rather ironic, considering the Russian order of battle included no more than 190,000 troops, making the notion that the Russians had large territorial goals something that can be dismissed outright.

One third of the BTGs were committed to the northern axis, [...] — Jabberwock

We don't know that. That's an assumption that you seem to keep hinging on, so you're questioning your own assumption here, and not mine.

how exactly forming a 60 km immobile column works as a feint? Was it planned or not? — Jabberwock

How should I know?

The question is irrelevant as to what the Russian goals might've been. Columns will be found during any large-scale military operation. Mistakes will be made and losses will be incurred regardless of the Russian goals. That's inherent to military operations.

Your source claimed that Russians were ready to give up the land bridge to Crimea which you claim was the primary goal of the invasion. That basically means that your source claims that Russians were ready to surrender their primary goals. — Jabberwock

If you take half a second to think about what you just wrote, you'll understand why this isn't contradictory at all.

Why would they need 'threatening Kiev' for that? — Jabberwock

To negotiate you need bargaining chips. Kind of obvious.

They took some land, but the goals of the war were not achieved. It is a matter of interpretation how much success is that. — Jabberwock

I think the primary goal of the invasion was safeguarding a land bridge to Crimea. However, neither me nor you know what the actual Russian goals are/were.

Western media have tried hard to spread a narrative that the Russians were essentially hoping to take over all of Ukraine. Of course, given such a narrative it is easy to frame the Russian operations as a massive failure.

However, scholars such as Mearsheimer underline that given the 190,000 troops that participated in the initial invasion, the Russian goals must have been limited. Mearsheimer doesn't rule out the possibility that the operations in the north were meant to threaten (and not capture) either.

Seymour Hersh in one of his interviews states directly Kiev was a feint, and the number of Ukrainian defenders in and around Kiev he puts on 60,000. With that, we arrive at a whopping 180,000 troops necessary to reach a bare minimum of a 3:1 advantage with which the Russian could go on the offensive.

Instead, we see 21,000.

There is literally no way these numbers could be interpreted to support your view.

We could halve the number of Ukrainian defenders to 30,000, and double the Russian troops to 40,000, and we wouldn't come close to numbers with which the Russians could realistically take Kiev.

I was just pointing out that the source you have provided contradicts your previous claims. — Jabberwock

It's perfectly possible for a military operation to have multiple purposes, so I'm not sure where you're getting this idea.

The fact that it was unable to sustain its movements shows their embarassingly bad execution, not lack of trying. — Jabberwock

I think the casualty figures clearly imply said lack of trying.

No, committing one third of forces to a diversion is not reasonable, it is absurd. — Jabberwock

That leaves less than 40 in the South, for the 'real' offensive. — Jabberwock

And the southern operations were successful, weren't they?

So now you are claiming [...] — Jabberwock

I'm hypothesizing.

I suggest you read up on the peace negotiations that took place during March / April 2022.

First of all, you haven't given ANY reasoning for your idea (here ↪Tzeentch) — ssu

I have provided my reasoning, in our current discussion and the many we have had before.

But in case it was unclear, my reasoning is:

- 21,000 troops are completely insufficient to capture Kiev. It doesn't even come close.
- The behavior of the Russian forces does not suggest a blitz.
- The casualty figures do not suggest intense fighting.

Then even the link that you gave yourself states done in February 26th states: — ssu

Kyiv axis: Russia’s likely main effort to rapidly isolate Kyiv and force the Ukrainian
government to capitulate has failed as of February 26.

As I said, I'm not particularly impressed by the ISW's analysis and I disagree with most of it. But they do provide hard data - 31 BTGs. That's why I referenced it.

Hence Russians advancing in long columns close together is an obvious irrefutable proof that they weren't suspecting a fierce fight from the Ukrainians. — ssu

You'll find long columns during virtually any large-scale military operation, so I don't share your point of view this is 'obvious and irrefutable proof'. It's nowhere close.

They expected a blitz and failed. — Jabberwock

A blitz means punching through defensive lines with massed numbers and firepower. In a blitz operation one doesn't stop at the first sign of resistance, but will attempt to overpower the defensive lines with maximum force to keep the momentum going.

Had this been the Russians' intention, we would have seen a lot more casualties and intense fighting.

Do you think it is reasonable to use one third of invasion forces for a diversion? — Jabberwock

Yes, I think that's perfectly reasonable.

A threat must be credible in order to serve as a diversion. Consider also that the threatening of Kiev may have had an additional objective, namely that of getting Ukraine and NATO to the negotiating table.

Russia and Ukraine in fact entered negotiations shortly after the invasion, and we have accounts that claim there was a peace accord being written up before the negotiations were blocked by the US.

The 31 BTGs, roughly equivalent to 21,000 troops, comes from an ISW report, which in turn gets the figure directly from communications by the Ukrainian General Staff on the days of the invasion.

The 70,000 figure comes from an off-hand comment by Ukrainian Defense official Oleksandr Pavliuk which was made several months after the fact. There's no mention in the ISW reports of 70,000 troops.

That of course doesn't add up.

If the Russians really wanted to occupy Kiev, why is there no mention of these extra 50,000 troops anywhere else, including in any of the ISW reports? To take a city with several million inhabitants they would have needed every soldier they had. If you want to argue they participated, show it to me.

One would expect these forces on the frontline, attempting to punch through Ukrainian defensive lines with massed firepower in a classic blitz.

We saw nothing of the sort.

Casualty figures surrounding the Kiev and Kharkiv offensives (as far as those are known) do not reflect prolonged high-intensity combat, with casualties over a two-and-a-half-month period ranging in the hundreds up to perhaps a few thousand for both battles respectively.

Compare this to the casualty figures of the battle of Bakhmut, and you will see the story doesn't add up.

Besides, the RUSI article used captured plans to make out what the plans were. — ssu

'Captured plans' - sure. Show them to me.

Ironically, RUSI seems to use ISW's daily reports as its main source, most of which I've actually read, and I wasn't terribly impressed with them.

The reports provide very little hard evidence. The 31 BTG figure is one of the more concrete numbers they give, and it's retracable directly to its source, coming from the people directly involved.

Until you can give me a hard figure that shows something different, all your arguments are just conjecture. And so are RUSI's, or ISW's for that matter. No data, no bueno.

Still no sources. I've already given you mine.

Also, what losses are you talking about here?

If this would have been a feint, then obviously it would have been totally different. The forces wouldn't have been committed to face such losses. — ssu

Sources, or no bueno.