Second, nowhere we have discussed related terminology... — neomac

There's no need for us to discuss it, since those terms are already neatly defined. It's up to you to use those terms properly.

Initially, Russian forces captured key areas to the north and west of Kyiv, leading to international speculation of the city's imminent fall. However, stiff Ukrainian resistance sapped the momentum. Poor Russian logistics and tactical decisions helped the defenders to thwart efforts at encirclement, and, after a month of protracted fighting, Ukrainian forces mounted successful counterattacks. — neomac

Why are you using wikipedia as a source?

Also, note the claim there: "Stiff Ukrainian resistance sapped the momentum."

Where is the proof of that?

As far as I can tell the Russians never made a serious attempt at attacking Kiev itself.

Installing a puppet regime doesn’t need military control over the whole territory. — neomac

The invasion of Afghanistan started with the crushing defeat of the Taliban from which they took years to recover.

You're proving how far out of book you are by insisting on this issue. You're basically telling me the earth is flat.

The difference from the US case however is that Putin could arguably rely on collaborationists in the army/intelligence... — neomac

"Arguably" meaning, in contrived scenarios that you invented specifically to suit your argument, without a shred of evidence given?

Prof Mearsheimer, a noted political scientist of the University of Chicago, feels that Russia’s aim is not to seize and defend territory in Ukraine (as it could get bogged down in an Afghanistan-like quagmire). The Russian aim is simply to either wreck Ukraine as a functional state or ensure regime change. — neomac

I highly doubt Mearsheimer made that claim. There's no source given and a Google search yielded nothing.

I'm not randomly assuming Russian military/intelligence failures, I'm relying on what has been reported by legit sources. — neomac

What makes these sources legit in your mind? They provide no actual evidence to back up their claims, and their claims are counter to what military logic dictates.

As I said, I’m an avg dude so I’ll reason over the evidences accessible to me. — neomac

The thing is, you're not actually providing any evidence even when I've been repeatedly asking for it. Newspaper clippings and wikipedia articles are not evidence. Furthermore, you seem to lack the basic foundational knowledge on the topic to detect complete fiction.

In other words, so far, if Russians wanted to threaten/capture Kiev as expected, ... — neomac

Either of those options would have vastly different implications, so I'm not sure why you are treating them as though they are the same.

Threatening Kiev is what actually happened, and it actually ended up with the Ukrainians and Russians entering negotations, which proceeded to a stage where an agreement was nearly reached.

What you're arguing is that the "real" Russian intentions were to capture Kiev. To make that argument you will need to provide some kind of evidence that you know something about the "real" Russian intentions. Predictably, no such evidence has been presented.


There is little information about the Battle of Kiev and the Kiev offensive. The Ukrainian order of battle is undisclosed. The Russian forces were only estimated between 15,000 - 30,000 over a month-long period, out of a 190,000.

The only source for losses I was able to find was this one, stating some ~200 Ukrainians have died in the fighting for Kiev roughly one month into the invasion, and that includes civilians.

Does this give the impression that capturing Kiev was of great importance to the Russians?

No, of course not.

It suggests the exact opposite: that very little intense fighting took place at all.

You'll have to come with explanations why many of the facts do not seem to line up with your view. And with every "special" explanation that accounts for the lack of factual evidence, your position becomes less convincing.


I wonder why the Ukrainian order of battle remains undisclosed. Perhaps it has something to do with the heroic victory it has been framed as by the mainstream media, and that the Ukrainian order of battle may suggest something less heroic - perhaps even suggest something like a successful Russian diversion?

First, forcing a negotiation doesn’t exclude regime change. Putin’s request might have been a transition to a pro-West political leadership without bloodshed or detention or persecution for Zelensky. — neomac

We know roughly what was on the table during those first negotiations, and it didn't include regime change.

Second, I don’t need to question the fact that Putin had other options than the decapitation of Zelensky’s regime, or that Putin preferred ta negotiation over a regime change. Either cases do not exclude the fact that Putin ALSO pursued regime change, given that in phase one of the war there were also several Russian backed assassination attempts against Zelensky — neomac

Installing a puppet regime, regime change and decapitation are three completely different subjects. You are shifting your goalposts.

Decapitation is a military-strategic goal that aims to sow chaos in the enemy's command & control, for example by taking out leadership figures and destroying central communication networks. The Russians probably pursued that strategy as a integral part of their military doctrine (so does the US).

The idea that the Russians could pursue the political goal of regime change in Ukraine by killing Zelensky is just silly. Zelensky would simply be replaced by another pro-Western talking head and literally nothing would change.

And we've already discussed the notion of installing a puppet regime without actually controlling Ukraine or destroying the Ukrainian military - outlandish.

I would prefer to read directly from your source. — neomac

https://liveuamap.com/



You can see the territories the Russian forces occupied during their drive on Kiev, which are now coloured in blue. Urban areas were bypassed, large swathes of open ground were left completely ignored. That's not what an attempt to seize and hold looks like.

You can contrast it with the manner in which southern Ukraine was occupied - every free inch of ground was taken and nests of resistance were systematically sieged and wiped out.

Said that, I’m interested less in discussing the details of Putin’s military tactics and strategy on the battlefield, than discussing the overall status of Putin’s “special military operation” in light of Putin’s endgame — neomac

Alright. Lets start with hearing the details of how the Russians planned to install a puppet regime while occupying less than 20% of the country and with the Ukrainian military occupying the rest.

They somehow capture Kiev, install a puppet, and the western backing, Ukrainian military and Ukrainian resistance magically go 'poof!' while an 190,000 man army maintains control over a population of 41 million in a country that has an area of 600,000 square kilometers?

Concerning the first point, Kiev is the political capital if the endgame is to impact Kiev’s foreign politics would obviously be the first place to go. — neomac

The Russians clearly sought to impact Kiev's foreign policy. The point of contention is whether capturing Kiev was their main goal in order to do so, and there doesn't seem to be much evidence to support that view. Capturing Kiev would take days, weeks even months of urban fighting and an enormous amount of manpower.

It seems way more likely, given the way the Russian forces invaded northern Ukraine, that they sought to force Kiev to negotiate, which again, they succeeded at. In case negotations failed the attack in the north would have still created room for the attack in the south.

Concerning the second, as I said movements on the battlefield (independently from the intelligence/military poor performance) are not the only relevant factor, Putin might have counted also on a network of collaborationist insiders (he also publicly singled his favour for an Ukrainian military coup). — neomac

I will take verifiable facts over rumors and hearsay. The things you are suggesting; military incompetence, intelligence failures, miscalculations - they all fit the "Russian incompetence" narrative the West has been spinning since the start of the war, yet when we look at what evidence there actually is to support it, there's little to no substance. Speculation, anonymous US intelligence officals, etc.

Fact remains that the Russians went to war against a larger force, which had been heavily supported by the US for years. Going to war under such terms, even to a layman, should be a highly risky proposition and to suggest the Russians weren't aware of that I think is short-sighted and simple.

Concerning the fourth, your views do not change what we know about the geopolitical endgame of Putin, nor Putin’s and other Russian government representatives’ declarations against Zelensky’s regime, nor Russian deal-breaker conditions for a negotiation. — neomac

Ok, what do you think we know about the Russians' geopolitical endgame?

Do you know more than us? The closest we have come to getting a glimpse are the negotiations that took place in March. Several reliable sources have given similar accounts that the Russians and Ukrainians were prepared to make serious concessions. The most important demand of the Russians: Ukraine does not join NATO.

That just so happens to fit exactly with what they have been telling us for the last 15 years.

I doubt that Russians would be free to acknowledge “colossal intelligence failures” especially if that might involve Putin’s responsibilities. — neomac

You're just assuming colossal intelligence failures took place, without actually having any idea of what Russian intelligence looked like? Odd.

I don't think the Russian invasion needs to be viewed as a colossal disaster when we take into consideration the Russians went into Ukraine with a "limited aim strategy," which is Mearsheimer's argument.

I think there are strong indications that the Russians went into Ukraine with limited aims. The number of troops they deployed, the terms they presented during the negotations, etc.

Have people mistaken this for the Lounge or something?

Keep things on topic please.

So what else was the purpose of aiming at capturing or threatening Kiev if not regime change? — neomac

Options include:
1) Showing the West the Russian threats were no bluff.
2) Forcing Kiev to the negotiating table, which, we now know, they succeeded in.
3) Creating a diversion for the offensive in the south.

The pattern of troop movements suggests the Russian drive on Kiev was unlikely to have as its goal to occupy and hold. They bypassed large pockets of resistance, which is something you can still see on the live maps today, and retreated as fast as they came.


The idea that Kiev represented the promise of victory is a notion I already dealt with before and you can find most of that exchange on page 309 and page 313 of this thread.

The idea that US experts were in some sort of unanimous agreement that Russia's invasion would be a cakewalk is debunked on the same page.


I've got nothing to say about statements of "anonymous US intelligence officials" or mainstream media.


Besides, you are making the point that the Russians suffered some colossal intelligence failure, so why are you referring to western experts and articles?

Yes I do. And also Mearsheimer is confirming it at minute 24:20 Mearsheimer of your video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qciVozNtCDM) where he claims that the strategic objective of 190K Russian troops were aiming at either capturing or threatening Kiev and conquer a large swath of territory in East and South Ukraine. And that is not implausible if one takes into account the Russian intelligence failure I was talking about (among other possible miscalculations, of course). — neomac

That's clearly not what Mearsheimer "is confirming".

You have no idea what you're talking about if you consider it feasible to install a puppet regime when an enemy force is occupying the vast majority of a country. Where'd you even get such a notion?

It's no wonder your theory hinges on Russian intelligence failures of colossal proportions, since it would require the Russians to know as little about the conduct of war as you yourself seem to.

What are you referring to with "losing the conflict over Ukraine"? Russia was already occupying Donbas and Crimea. No soft power was changing that until February 2022. — neomac

Ukrainian alignment is what the conflict is about. Donbas and Crimea did not stop Ukraine from being turned into what Russia deemed a "western bulwark on Russia's borders". That's why it was (or considered itself) losing.

So the war might have evolved in realistic ways that could still be more advantageous to Russia than the current war. — neomac

I don't see the point in indulging in fantasy. Where would you even find the type of information necessary to make a judgement about that? We probably have access to only a fraction of the relevant information as is.

I've done my homework on this. — neomac

Russia pursued regime change, denazification of Ukraine. This doesn’t require the occupation of all Ukraine, it requires to take control over Kiev and install a pro-Russian puppet regime (as the US did in Afghanistan) — neomac

When you did your homework, where did you come across ideas like this?

Straight out of military fantasy land.

Are you really implying the Russians were going to install a puppet regime in Kiev while occupying less than 1/5th of the country, with a western-trained, western-backed Ukrainian military occupying the rest, and an angry Ukrainian population to reckon with, with 190,000 troops?

If you're going to scoff at Mearsheimer and claim knowledge on the subject, don't come at me with outlandish notions such as this one. You're making a fool of yourself.

Edward Snowden's take on the significance of the balloon incident: engineered panic to divert attention from more important goings-on.

Edward Snowden claims U.S. using balloons to create panic

So all else equal (in the pre-war conditions) the counterfactual scenario I suggested would have favoured Russia more than it did the ongoing war. — neomac

I disagree, and evidently so did the Russians or they wouldn't have invaded.

Meaning? — neomac

That Russia was losing the conflict over Ukraine prior to the invasion when it was primarily decided through soft power, and is now winning (or at least shifted the balance in its favor) since by invading it shifted the emphasis to hard power, which under current conditions it can apply much better than the West.

Even if one is generically convinced about this, still Russia could have postponed further the confrontation to its own advantage. — neomac

Again I disagree, and apparently so did the Russians.

The longer the Russians let the US train, arm and finance the Ukrainians, the harder the eventual military invasion would be.

It would be more useful if you posted the military expert source, you rely on. — neomac

I already did, with time stamps and all.

Neither of these arguments are relevant to counter the arguments that there were intelligence failures on the Russian side that might have compromised their strategic objectives whatever they were. — neomac

Nonsense. Any notions your previous argument was based on isn't in any way compatible with the picture of the war from the Russian perspective that Mearsheimer sketches.

You stated the Russian troop numbers were the result of intelligence failures.

That doesn’t seem to support your claim “It's equally unlikely that with such a small force they sought to both occupy and hold Kiev and install a puppet regime and occupy and hold the southern regions”, it just supports that that military deployment wasn’t enough to subdue the entire Ukraine. — neomac

I think that supports my claim.

Mearsheimer explains how controlling a country as large as Ukraine with 190,000 troops is military fantasy, especially considering the expected resistance from the Ukrainian population. It doesn't even come close. He even states he doesn't believe the Russians had any major territorial ambitions in Ukraine for the very same reasons.

Some of China's response to the incident. It seems fairly level-headed.

It will be interesting to see what countermeasures Beijing is talking about here.

I'm fairly certain that if they shoot so much as a paper plane with an American flag out of the sky there will be a riot.

Not sure to understand what you are talking about here. — neomac

With the amount of financial and military support that was flowing into Ukraine before the war, there was no chance of Russia destabilizing Ukraine.

Ukraine was rapidly shedding all Russian influence. In terms of soft power the Russians were already on the defensive. That's why they had to resort to hard power and that's the reason they invaded.

The idea that Russia could have gotten what it wanted without military means is nonsensical given the gravity of the military invasion that took place, which they themselves must have been fully aware of.

In other words, I pretty much exclude the possibility that Russia could have gotten its way in Ukraine without resorting to military means.

I don’t see how the pre-war “amount of bilateral support” to Ukraine could have rendered the Russian resistance unsustainable in a counterfactual scenario that is way less challenging than the current conflict. — neomac

Because Russia changed the rules of the game when it invaded. In war, soft power goes (mostly) off the table, and in terms of hard power Russia (for now) has the advantage.

First, let’s clarify the terminology here: to me “coup d'etat” typically means a violent/illegal overthrow of a regime by institutional figures like politicians and military (e.g. Trump backed US capitol riot can be accused of being an attempted coup d’etat). “Revolutions” are typically violent/llegal overthrow of a regime but stemming from ordinary masses.
Second, Maidan Revolution was a popular revolution. And as far as I know no Ukrainian politicians/military plotted to forcefully remove Yanukhovic. Indeed, Yanukovych signed a transition deal with Ukraine opposition brokered by Russia and the European Union (https://www.politico.eu/article/yanukovych-signs-transition-deal-with-ukraine-opposition/).
Third, the revelations about Victoria Nuland are not enough to support the claim that the US participated in a coup. The US supported the popular revolution and pro-European political candidates, but they may just have lobbied and supported campaign/propaganda to amplify or direct consensus over certain politicians (even the American domestic politics works that way). It would be different if you could provide compelling evidence that the US (intentionally) financed the armed revolutionaries (as the Americans did in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bay_of_Pigs_Invasion).
But even in this case, talking about “coup” and “orchestration” doesn’t seem to me more than an attempt to mount a preconceived polemic dismissive of the pro-Western Ukrainian movements, as if the Ukrainians didn’t have enough domestic reasons to be deeply dissatisfied with Yanukhovic and Russian interference and revolt (compare it with the recent revolts in Iran). — neomac

Spare me the apologetics.

Nothing so “inevitable” then. — neomac

Given the fact that the US was never planning to take Russian security concerns into consideration and basically invited war at every turn, certainly inevitable.

The small number of troops at the beginning of the war was likely because Russians didn’t expect the kind of fierce resistance the Ukrainians demonstrated... — neomac

Unlikely, since the Russians were fully aware of the size of the Ukrainian force, and the fact that it was equipped and trained by the US.

It's equally unlikely that with such a small force they sought to both occupy and hold Kiev ánd install a puppet regime ánd occupy and hold the southern regions.

The theories you're suggesting are basically military impossibilities, though popular among laymen and the ever-churning propaganda machines.

It would be easier if you specified at what point of that video Mearsheimer is offering arguments in support of your belief that "the territories they [the Russians] occupied in east and southern Ukraine probably roughly coincide with the initial aims of the invasion". — neomac

23:05 - 27:20 discusses the implications of the size of the Russian invasion force.

1:30:40 - 1:32:00 Mearsheimer makes the point that he believes Russian territorial ambitions escalated as the war progressed.

Mearsheimer throughout the lecture actually argues that Russia might not have had any major territorial ambitions at the start of the war.

And recent revelations about the peace negotiations that took place weeks into the conflict might actually support that view. The Russians were willing to make major concessions when they negotiated for Ukrainian neutrality, and it might only be after the negotiations failed that the Russian strategy changed to annexing parts of Ukraine.

Jeffrey Sachs's take on Naftali Bennett's revelations about the peace negotiations that took place in March/April 2022 start at 15:30.

In short, Sachs states Bennett's version of events pretty much exactly coincide with the information he had received from the various parties involved in the negotiations.


The US is becoming the elephant in the room, isn't it?

Kyiv says it shot down Russian balloons over Ukraine's capital

It seems other nations are following the example set by the U.S. and guarding their air space more tenaciously.

An alternative theory could be that, sort of in line with 's point, that the balloons have been there for a long time, possibly with full knowledge of the U.S., but it chose this moment in time to shoot them down to send a message.

Another possibility is that these balloons have indeed been there for a long time, but somehow managed to slip under the U.S. radar systems through some use of technology, and that they have now figured out how to spot them.

My point here is that if the Chinese came up with the grand idea that they were going to hold a camera over Montana and think they were going to see something that airplanes, radar, satellites, Google maps, and passersbys don't already see and that was going to give them some advantage, they aren't quite the threat we thought them to be. — Hanover

I agree, and we pretty much know for a fact that the Chinese are smarter than that, because they have all the capacity they need to perform reconnaissance from space.

This is part of the weirdness I tried to draw attention to.

At the same time, the Chinese weather balloon excuse doesn't sound that convincing either, would you agree?

I love these sorts of interviews and talks that were given before the full gravity of the situation in Ukraine became apparent. Less self-censorship, politicization and hindsight. Mostly just honest conversation.

I had never seen this interview. Thanks for sharing it.

Some interesting quotes:

At the beginning of [2014] there existed in Ukraine a slightly pro-Russian though very shaky government. That situation was fine for Moscow: after all, Russia did not want to completely control Ukraine or occupy it; it was enough that Ukraine not join NATO and the EU. Russian authorities cannot tolerate a situation in which western armed forces are located a hundred or so kilometers from Kursk or Voronezh.

The United States, for its part, were interested in forming a pro-Western government in Ukraine. They saw that Russia is on the rise, and were eager not to let it consolidate its position in the post-Soviet space. The success of the pro-Western forces in Ukraine would allow the U.S. to contain Russia.

Here you have two countries: one wants a Ukraine that is neutral. The other wants Ukraine to form part of a line of containment against Russian expansion. One cannot say that one party is mistaken: both are acting based on their national interests. It’s just that these interests don’t jive.

Russia had begun to take certain steps that the United States considered unacceptable. Primarily in Syria. (Note: NOT Europe!) It was there that Russians demonstrated to the Americans that they are capable of influencing processes in the Middle East. And the US has enough problems in that part of the world already without the Russians.

Russians intervened in the process in the Middle East among other reasons because they had hoped to get leverage to influence US policy in other areas. But they miscalculated. The United States thought that it was Russia’s intent to harm them.

It is in this context that we should be evaluating the events in Ukraine. The Russians, apparently, simply have not calculated how seriously the US side might perceive their actions or the extent to which they can easily find countermeasures. It was in this situation that the United States took a look at Russia and thought about what it wants to see happen least of all: instability in Ukraine.

KOMMRERSANT: So you think Ukraine is a form of revenge for Syria?

GEORGE FRIEDMAN: No, not revenge. But Russian intervention in the process in Syria, while the United States was still addressing the problems in Iraq, and was in negotiations with Iran … In Washington, many people have the impression that Russian want to destabilize the already fragile US position in the Middle East – a region that is of key importance for America.

About this question there were two different points of views in Washington: that the Russian were just fooling around, or that they have found a weak point of the US and were trying to take advantage of it. I’m not saying that Russia’s intervention in the Syrian conflict was the cause of the Ukrainian crisis, that would be a stretch. But this intervention tipped the balance of opinion in Washington in the direction of the opinion that Russian is a problem. And in that case what does one do? Not confront them in the Middle East. Better to pull their attention away to a problem in some other region.

Now all of this is a bit oversimplified, obviously it is all more complicated than this in practice, but the cause and effect relationship is as I just described it. As a result, the bottom line is that it is in the strategic interests of the United States to prevent Russia from becoming a hegemon. And it is in the strategic interests of Russia not to allow the United States to come to its borders.

How would you rephrase those expressions in more objective terms? — neomac

The U.S. acts self-interestedly to maintain its position of domination (basic realism).

About the term hubris I would change nothing, because that's exactly what it is. The U.S. has been acting with severe disregard for other nations' interests, and that behavior is now undermining its own power.

All right, then what were you referring to when you wrote “If there was any, it was one-sidedly coming from the West” in your previous post? — neomac

NATO expansion.

There is a misunderstanding. — neomac

The only misunderstanding here is that you seem to believe babbling on about cognitive dissonance is going to help your case any.

Second, maybe the US was going to pursue that policy as it did for 30 years, but it’s not evident that it would have succeeded since Germans and French could still have opposed Ukraine joining NATO — neomac

The problem is the one I have described earlier: the U.S. was in the process of turning Ukraine into a U.S. ally on a bilateral basis, completely circumventing NATO.

The Germans and the French had no power to stop that.

Yet even in the current conditions Western Europeans are still reluctant to discuss about NATO membership for Ukraine. — neomac

With the current condition being large-scale war between Russia and what is basically a NATO proxy, their opinions are even more irrelevant than they were in times of peace.

The European powers are a bunch of suckers, piggybacking on the U.S. defense budget and apparently believing that will not completely wipe out their bargaining power.

They're essentially U.S. vassals given the illusion of relevance.

I wouldn’t exclude the possibility that Putin was in condition to keep supporting the separatist fight in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea with the revenue from Nord Stream 2 to destabilise Ukraine ... — neomac

With the amount of bilateral support it was receiving from the U.S., I would pretty much exclude that possibility.

I’m not sure to understand why you keep talking about “coup d'etat” supported by the US. — neomac

We've got U.S. officials admitting to sending Ukraine billions of USD of support prior to 2014, and to being deeply involved in constructing the post-coup government in Ukraine.

Clearly the U.S. was involved, supported the coup and, as I said earlier, I am still entertaining the hypothesis that the U.S. largely orchestrated it. We know the U.S. is capable of such things, and its fingerprints are all over it.

(why wasn’t the Kerch Bridge enough?) — neomac

You can't seriously believe that the Russians would be content to dangle Crimea by a single bridge.

If any real attempt at attacking Crimea were made, that bridge would not last a single day.

If Putin’s was preparing for this war after 2014 for whatever reason [...], something has been holding his “special military operation” until 2022, — neomac

A war of this magntitude requires planning and preparation, obviously. Besides, they did not have the power of hindsight and did seek to exhaust the alternatives. Even late into 2021 the Russians were still trying to pursue a diplomatic solution.

so I find your claim of “inevitability” debatable — neomac

The U.S. started arming Ukraine shortly after the 2014 coup and subsequent invasion of Crimea.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/russia-fsb-intelligence-ukraine-war/ — neomac

Seems like a rather weak article to me, that presupposes the Russian invasion was a complete failure. While that seems to be part of the western narrative, I see little evidence to suggest it is true.

The Russians invaded Ukraine while outnumbered, with a force that was way too small to occupy all of it. This leads me to believe that the territories they occupied in east and southern Ukraine probably roughly coincide with the initial aims of the invasion.

Mearsheimer makes that point in detail.

According to Wikipedia, the U2 flies at a maximum altitude of about 70,000 feet and the edge of space is defined as about 300,000 feet. — T Clark

What exactly is considered national air space is up for debate, but the U.S. defines Class A controlled air space as the space from 18,000 feet above MSL up to and including 60,000 feet above MSL.

A good case could be made for extending national air space all the way into space, though.

Whatever definition is being used probably depends on whose spy planes have just been caught and at what altitude they were flying.

I said I don't understand why it is such a big deal. — T Clark

I don't live in the U.S., so I couldn't tell you how it feels when a nation you could be at war with tomorrow was performing reconnaissance over your nation's nuclear missile silos, but I don't imagine it feels very pleasant.

Just to repeat of a small snippet I included in the OP, the last time a confirmed hostile aircraft was shot down over U.S. soil, the U.S. entered WW2.

Obviously this cannot be compared to Pearl Harbour, but it goes to show that an incident such as this one is quite extraordinary.

I think we're already in that period. I'm very worried about where the war in Ukraine will lead. On the other hand, I think the idea that Russia and China will somehow "band together against the U.S. to challenge its position as hegemon," is wrongheaded on three counts. 1) Most importantly, the US's position as "hegemon" is going to over soon whether we like it or not. That's not because of China and Russia in particular but more because other countries, some former third world, are taking a larger role in the world. 2) That's probably a good thing, both for the world and the US. 3) Russia and China are in no position to become hegemons. Russia is very weak except for nuclear weapons. China is still a limited thread, although it is growing. 4) Neither Ukraine nor Taiwan is worth risking a wider war with other nuclear powers. Hey, wait. That's more than three. I could probably come up with more. — T Clark

I see all four points as perfectly compatible with my statement, so I'm not sure why you believe it is wrongheaded. Though I do believe that Russia and China will be the primary players challenging the US. Countries like India and Brazil seem less likely to do so, but will also challenge US hegemony indirectly by simply acting more as independent actors.

This is not true. Look up "U2 incident 1960." — T Clark

U2 reconnaissance aircraft flew on the edge of space, far above what is normally considered "national air space". So technically the U.S. did not invade Soviet air space in 1960.

You'll find a handful of air space violations happened during the Cold War, but exceptions confirm the rule as they say.

I maintain that these are quite uncommon, and at least overt violations are and were avoided because they tended to end very badly for the pilots involved.

I'm not saying it's not important, but why such a big deal? — T Clark

The first reason would be, because it's illegal under international law, just like violating national waters is illegal. Both are essentially breaches of a nation's sovereignty.

The second is that a nation's air space (especially that of superpowers) is heavily surveilled for purposes of national defense and security. All the missile defense systems in the world are not going to help if the enemy launches its attack when it's already ontop of one's cities.

During peace time the risk of an attack is negligible. However in a period like this, where large-scale conflict has already broken out in Europe and can break out tomorrow in the Pacific, an incident like this is not so innocent anymore.

Those balloons could have carried anything. Nuclear devices, biological agents, you name it. And the ballons apparently were carrying some sort of payload. I haven't heard any update regarding the nature, though.

Another factor was that the balloon was spotted over Montana where the U.S. houses a large portion of its nuclear silos. A nation's nuclear deterrent is about as classified as it gets, so having a potential enemy collect information about it is alarming to say the least.

I found this interesting article on the legality of the situation. I'm not qualified to judge it's contents, but it seems reasonable. — T Clark

Interesting to read.

The Chinese claim that the balloon(s?) invaded sovereign air space by mistake seems plausible, though also a bit predictable.

More interesting was how the act of shooting down the balloons was viewed, as the Pentagon apparently on several occasions made statements that would imply the shooting down of the balloon may have been unlawful.

To clarify once more my views, my general argument is not that Americans supported NATO enlargement due to a current military threat posed by Russia to Europe or the US. But that the US did so driven by the need to shape a global order ensuring the American hegemony in a post-Cold War era in the longer term (e.g. by controlling international legal and economic institutions like EU and global market) wrt the evolving security challenges posed by main hegemonic competitors (e.g. China in Asia and Russia in Europe), and pretty aware of all the implied risks (including e.g. overstretch, militarisation, provocation). On the other side, in the post-Cold War era the European interest of preserving/enlarging NATO was to let NATO deal with regional and global security concerns (for historical reasons France and the UK were more worried about Germany, while central-eastern europeans were likely worried about Russia), and to focus on economic development and integration, while being pretty aware of the implied risks (demilitarisation, conflict of interests especially between East and West Europe wrt Russia, provocation, etc.). I tried to roughly summarise the American carrot&stick strategy (economic globalisation vs NATO expansion or US interventionism) elsewhere in these terms: — neomac

:up:

If you ground your expectations on your realist geopolitical views and at the same time you hold moral beliefs fundamentally incompatible with those expectations, then there is a cognitive dissonance. — neomac

Nonsense. I suggest you debate me on arguments rather than attempting to make things personal.

[...] you keep talking about “the United States jealously guarding its position at the top” and “U.S. hubris” which seem to me bearing a moral connotation (even though neither Russia nor the US are moral actors). — neomac

I'd say it's a fairly accurate description of how the United States acts. I could have used more objective terms.

Here for more details: https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Report_The%20Kremlin%27s%20Worldview_March%202019.pdf — neomac

I might read this later, but I don't consider these kinds of reports very valuable. In 2019 the inevitability of conflict was already well-understood among political elites, and they were probably already busy "shaping the battlefield".

The writer of that report for example served under the post-Maidan Ukrainian government.

Take the example of the Orange Revolution. — neomac

There's no question that the West and Russia sought to influence Ukraine prior to 2008, but I explicitly used the term "security competition".

On one side, “peaceful coexistence” should be “the goal of nations” (at any price?), on the other, many nations pursue hegemonic ambitions at the expense of peaceful coexistence. How can any non-hegemonic geopolitical actor ensure that all other hegemonic or non-hegemonic geopolitical actors will give up on pursuing hegemonic ambitions? — neomac

They can't, which is part of the reason why I consider myself a realist. But that doesn't change the fact that any reasonable human being desires peace.

Geopolitical actors simply aren't very reasonable when it comes to that. They are only reasonable when it comes to maximizing their power.

I have no illusions that geopolitical actors will ever pursue policies that are compatible with my moral views.

You can stop spinning your cognitive dissonance yarn now. Didn't I recall you saying something about intellectual dishonesty?

You yourself keep overlooking the fact that for 15 years Russian security concerns led France and Germany to oppose Ukraine inside NATO. Plus, with pro-Russian governments, like Yanukovych’s, the Ukrainian cooperation with NATO wasn’t an issue for Putin, also because it didn’t exclude a strategic partnership with Russia at all. I understand that Putin got more worried when Yanukovych was ousted , however the popular opinion in Ukraine still wasn’t favourable to joining NATO until Putin aggressed Ukraine in 2014 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine%E2%80%93NATO_relations#Popular_opinion_in_Ukraine). As if it wasn’t enough, his “special military operation” is eroding also the support Putin got from the Western Europeans. — neomac

As I have said earlier in this thread, I don't believe what the French or the Germans wanted, or even to a large extent what the Ukrainians themselves wanted, was very relevant to Russia's perception of the threat of Ukraine joining NATO.

And I would agree with that Russian assessment.

If the United States wanted Ukraine into NATO, it was going to pursue that policy whether the French, Germans or Ukrainians wanted it or not, and it would likely have succeeded also.

Allied leaders also agreed at Bucharest that Georgia and Ukraine, which were already engaged in Intensified Dialogues with NATO, will one day become members. In December 2008, Allied foreign ministers decided to enhance opportunities for assisting the two countries in efforts to meet membership requirements by making use of the framework of the existing NATO-Ukraine Commission and NATO-Georgia Commission – without prejudice to further decisions which may be taken about their applications to join the MAP. (Source: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm)
MAP is the Membership Action Plan, a programme which helps nations prepare for possible future membership. Participation does not guarantee membership, but is a key preparation mechanism.
As a commitment it’s still pretty vague about timing and in any case conditional on a series of requirements which Ukraine must fulfil prior to submit candidature. Not to mention that to realists like Mearsheimer such international commitments do not deserve much credit. — neomac

The official statement was that "[Ukraine and Georgia] will become members of NATO."

There's nothing ambiguous about that.

Don't come at me with 2022 interpretations of what that sentence meant.

Moreover, NATO explicitly reaffirmed their commitment to the Bucharest declarations on several occasions. And the U.S. took away all doubt, if any remained, when it supported the 2014 coup d'etat.

Yanukhovic was widely considered a Russian puppet by Ukrainians. Putin practically and publicly ran his political campaign, and supported him against fierce Ukrainian opposition. Besides Yanukhovic’s policies concerning national security although pursuing formal neutrality were arguably pro-Russian — neomac

All very regrettable, of course. Sometimes Ukrainian leaders were in the pocket of the West, sometimes in the pocket of the East. It was a delicate balance that they had to protect.

Hard to see this as evidence of "puppetization".

So whatever doubt about Russification/puppetization one might have had prior 2014... — neomac

After 2014 war was essentially inevitable, because from the Russian point of view, Crimea being cut off from Russia without a land bridge was unsustainable for the same reason Ukraine in NATO was unsustainable.

We must see everything after 2014 as the opening moves of war, and not as representative of policies prior, which is what you and many others here are trying to do.

It's a little crazy how quick things seem to be moving in the background, and how little of it reaches you unless you go looking for it.

Practically everything governments have done with regards to the pandemic has been brought into question.

Next on the list:



Good ol' vitamin D. Safe and effective. Who knew?

Well, we all did. Doctors, medical experts, my old granny and my hypothetical 6-year old brother.


Literally everybody knew this already, but so dependent on "experts" have we become that we need to wait until they tell us we can rely on our common sense, intuition and past experience again.


During the pandemic there was an effort to keep people indoors, away from the sun. Lockdowns, a bans on grouping, etc.

Scarcely a word about vitamin D supplementation from mainstream media or the political establishment (though political opposition seemed more aware of alternatives).

Is it really feasible to think that mankind forgot something so simple? What are we really looking at here? Incompetence bordering on the criminal, or was vitamin D simply not lucrative enough? Was it deemed "unhelpful" to give people the sense that they themselves held the key to their health by getting out in the sunshine or supplementing vitamin D?

My view is the same as the governments of Australia, US, Britain — Wayfarer

The "Anglosphere" for short.

It might be interesting for you to research the geopolitics surrounding the Anglosphere, their role as "island nations" and the implications that has for their relation with the Eurasian continent.

Perhaps that might help you perceive these nations less as honest brokers of truth, and more like independent political agents, with interests and agendas other than the benefit of all mankind.

That's a pretty extreme position to take, and there are serious indications that it is wrong.

For example, what do you make of academics and intellectuals that put a significant amount of the blame with the U.S. and the West? (Mearsheimer, Sachs, Chomsky, etc.)

And what about former Israeli PM Naftali Bennett going on record saying the U.S. stopped a truce from being made a few weeks into the conflict, even though both Russia and Ukraine were prepared for serious compromises?

Are they fools? Kremlin stooges? Pathological liars?

What about the (atleast) 15 year build up to this conflict? Irrelevant?

You need to ignore quite a bit of the information that is out there to take your position and I'm wondering about your justification for that.

The Budapest Memorandum, the hearings entitled “Debate about NATO enlargement”. Mersheimer’s article "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent” (1993). Russia starting a territorial dispute over Crimea practically immediately after recognising Ukrainian independence. — neomac

A-ha.

So NATO enlargement was all about Ukraine, then?

Interesting theory.

That’s also why you are trapped in a cognitive dissonance, because you seem to hold realist expectations in geopolitics that systematically frustrate your idealistic moral standards or your relatable desire for peace. — neomac

Has the time already come for psychoanalzying?

Realism is the lens through which I understand the why and how. A moral framework is what I use to judge how I feel about that.

First, that Ukraine was “a bridge too far” wasn’t always so obvious as you seem to believe. Here is an interview with Sergej Lavrov by the German business newspaper Handelsblatt (02.01.2005):
Question: Does the right to sovereignty also mean for Georgia and Ukraine, for example, that Russia would have nothing against their accession to the EU and NATO?
Lavrov: That is their choice. We respect the right of every state - including our neighbors - to choose its own partners, to decide for itself which organization to join. We assume that they will consider for themselves how they develop their politics and economy and which partners and allies they rely on
(Source: https://amp2.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/handelsblatt-interview-mit-aussenminister-lawrow-russland-oeffnet-ukraine-den-weg-in-die-nato/2460820.html)
Although that conciliatory response by Lavrov was questioned by Putin himself, especially in the case of Ukraine, a few months later: https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x88b9ii — neomac

During this period the Russians were committed to playing nice with the West.

Since there wasn't any indication that NATO or the EU were making serious attempts at incorporating Ukraine or that such a thing was even feasible, why would they have answered any different?

It seems to me they went to great lengths not to give the impression of being aggressive, even when it touched on vital security concerns. Even when it finally did become a real worry to them, they gave warnings for 15 years.

Second, what would be the difference between vital interests and sphere of influence in the case of Ukraine? I see the letter as a desirable condition to ensure the former. — neomac

Russian vital interests were protected with a neutral Ukraine. There'd be little to gain and much to lose for them to change that status quo, so incorporating it into their sphere of influence would not have been desirable at all.

... Russia could still keep its access to the Mediterranean through the Port of Novorossiysk. — neomac

Crimea is about more than just access to the Mediterranean. It's about control over the Black Sea, the Kerch Strait, the Sea of Azov (highly important in connecting the Russian heartland to trade), Odessa, etc.

Besides it’s also up to Russia’s signalling good intentions by acts and words, [...] Unfortunately Russia (especially under Putin) didn’t send the right signals most of the time. — neomac

Prior to 2008, there was a clear commitment from Russia to maintain good relations with the West, and the West was mostly receptive to that.

It is when the U.S. realized Russia was not going to subjugate itself to the U.S. that it started to pursue its policies in Ukraine.

I see no evidence for real security competition between the West and Russia prior to 2008. If there was any, it was one-sidedly coming from the West.

What do you mean by "Russia is not a moral actor"? Is the US a moral actor? — neomac

Individuals are moral actors.

I see at least 2 issues: 1. How can democratic countries best deal with security concerns of non-democratic countries, especially if driven by hegemonic ambitions (imagine a nazi regime, isis, soviet union, etc.)? Appeasement might be a very risky game 2. Your idea would sound more plausible if every geopolitical agent had a full understanding about the security concerns of its peers, yet any defensive move can be perceived as hostile (NATO enlargement was defensive for the ex-Soviet Republic but perceived as hostile by Russia, but also Russian perceiving NATO enlargement as hostile was perceived as hostile by ex-Soviet Republic, etc.). — neomac

Fair points, and the nature of the security dilemma does not need elaboration.

I shared my perspective in response to your question whether nations have a moral right to a sphere of influence. My perspective presupposes peaceful coexistence is (or "should be") the goal of nations. Sadly, many nations and certainly the U.S. are not driven by that goal. They are driven by hegemonic ambitions like the ones you consider risky to appease.

Security concerns were taken seriously, that’s the reason why Ukraine felt safer under NATO. What is implicitly suggested by that claim is that Ukraine should have surrendered to Russian demands... — neomac

That's presupposing that Ukraine sought to join NATO for security reasons. It also sought to join the EU, and join the "western world" at large - the U.S. sphere of influence. There were plenty of other benefits that could have guided their decisions.

What was stubbornly ignored were 15 years worth of the Russians voicing their security concerns. A recipe for disaster, anyone could have told you 15 years ago, and that is what we got.

What I'm explicitly suggesting is that whoever drove Ukraine to try and join NATO was either A) extremely foolish, or B) not acting in pursuit of Ukrainian interests. (I'm still entertaining the hypothesis that this whole ordeal is largely U.S.-orchestrated).

Not sure what you are referring to. Is any of such trivia on wikipedia? Do you have links? — neomac

I'm referring to the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, during which it was decided that:

"... [Ukraine and Georgia] will become members of NATO."

NATO officially reaffirmed its commitment to this promise on several occasions between 2008 and 2014.

It’s a bit naive to think that Russia would have explicitly demanded the puppetization or Russification of Ukraine in these terms (e.g. “denazification” is Putin’s ersatz for puppetization and Russification). — neomac

If you believe puppetization or Russification was Russia's goal you must provide some evidence.

I can go along with the idea that Russia, like any nation state, acts in its self-interest. I do not go along with the idea that Russia can only do so by acting in hostile ways, and therefore must always have sinister intentions even if we can't see them.

Brzezinski was a National Security Advisor and participated to the official “the debate on NATO enlargement” (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-105shrg46832/pdf/CHRG-105shrg46832.pdf). Mearsheimer has always been just an academic. — neomac

I think it's crazy that you would dismiss academics in such a way, but whoever you base your views on is your business.

If practical knowledge is required in order not to be considered by you a "armchair academic" then why are you referring to someone whose practical experience is nearly half a century old?

Anyway.

Have you ever considered the difference between the words of an "armchair academic" and a politician?

it’s just that I’m more pugnacious when I suspect intellectual dishonesty. — neomac

Concerning my “bit of self-awareness”, is the following enough? — neomac

If you are so quick to suspect intellectual dishonesty when someone disagrees with you, defer to phoney psychoanalysis and believe everybody here to only be "avg dudes", it begs the question what you are doing here.

You can not say that NATO enlargement doesn’t have to do with threat from Russia, because I brought you evidence that that’s the case. — neomac

And what evidence would that be? The Budapest Memorandum?

However the accusation about “the United States jealously guarding its position at the top” sounds like a moral judgement which presupposes your moral assumptions (which I might not share). — neomac

Certainly. This is a philosophy forum after all, and realism is one lens through which I might view current events - not the only one.

So American “jealousy for being on the top” seems perfectly in line with what Mearsheimer’s “offensive realism” predicts. — neomac

Indeed. Which is why I've been making the argument that that is the core of why things in Ukraine happened the way they did.

The criticisms were out of fear of Russian reaction in case of NATO enlargement. But why would a superpower like the US fear Russia for NATO enlargement? Russia is no threat to the US right? — neomac

That answer should be obvious: just because the U.S. is/was the hegemon, does not mean they can force anyone to do their bidding, or enter war with anyone they like and come out the victor. That much should be painfully evident from the failings in the Middle-East.

As I said earlier, to the U.S. independence is a threat, resistance is aggression.

We can use such hubristical notions to understand U.S. behavior, but to consider them rational would be an entirely different subject. Moreover, we see now how U.S. hegemony is slowly crumbling as a result of this hubris, so even the realist may start to question the nature of these actions.

Maybe it’s because NATO was interfering with the Russian sphere of influence (euphemistically called “Russia’s backyard”)? — neomac

Let's be frank. Russia accepted most of NATO's enlargement. Ukraine was simply a bridge too far. That has more to do with the way Russia views Ukraine with regards to its vital interests, and less with its sphere of influence, though it would stand to reason Russia would prefer to have Ukraine in its sphere of influence for this reason.

For such a position as yours to make sense, you would have to provide some evidence that Russia viewed the ex-Soviet republics in Eastern Europe as part of its ("rightful") sphere of influence. I don't think you'll find much of the sort.

Why should the US (or neighbouring countries or Ukraine for that matter) care for Russia to have a sphere of influence at their expense exactly? — neomac

I don't think "sphere of influence" is the right description, as I said earlier, but it's in U.S. interest to understand the vital interests of other big players on the global stage, to avoid getting into conflicts it cannot or is not willing to win. That's what we see now, and in my view it is bringing the end of U.S. hegemony one step closer since it now has to juggle its attention between Europe and South-East Asia.

Does Russia have a moral or legal right to have a sphere of influence? — neomac

Neither of those (moral or legal) are particularly useful lenses to view the current situation through. International law is entirely ignored, and Russia is not a moral actor.

From a perspective of how nations can best coexist peacefully and war can be avoided, it is of vital importance that countries' security concerns are taken into consideration.

Or is it convenient to the US, neighbouring countries or Ukraine for that matter to let Russia have a sphere of influence at their expense? How so? — neomac

It certainly would have been convenient for the Ukrainians had Russian security concerns been taken more seriously. If they had been, many would not have lost their lives and homes.

Or maybe the “conflict was initiated” by Russia when it sought to forcefully preserve the “alleged” Ukrainian neutrality? — neomac

I view this conflict as having started in 2008, with war becoming extremely likely after the U.S. backed coup, and practically unavoidable after the 2014 invasion of Crimea.

What if Ukraine didn’t want any of that? — neomac

What the Russians demanded was Ukrainian neutrality, not puppetization or Russification.

If they were willing to have their country wrecked as a consequence of not wanting to meet the Russian concerns in any way, fair enough.

If having their country wrecked was unexpected, I think their political elite should have thought a little harder about their actions.

At best, they can appease some avg dude’s sense of moral entitlement which on the internet is very cheap and verges on virtue signalling, right? — neomac

I think you're letting a little personal animosity bleed into your realism yourself. :nerd:

On the other side Mearsheimer is an armchair academic... — neomac

Said what I assume is also "some avg dude on the internet"?

A bit of self-awareness would suit you well, I think.

And simply sidelining them here is simply wrong. It's you who is counting 1+1=1, when you argue that everything evolves around the US and the security issues of European countries don't matter in the equation when they have applied to NATO. — ssu

My position is clear.

The U.S. and Russia, and to a lesser extent Ukraine are the big players in this conflict, and all the other countries involved (primarily in NATO) play no role of significance. That's not to say they play no role at all, but their influence isn't big enough to warrant paying much attention to.

Maybe you should provide some argumentation why you believe that approach is wrong. Why these smaller countries are worth paying attention to.

Your point seems to be we cannot sideline their agendas and interests. My question would be, why not?

Absolutely stomach-churning stuff.

I'm glad some people seem to have finally had their "Hans, are we the baddies?" moment.

Also somewhat reassuring that the mainstream media are calling this episode for what it is: dystopian, totalitarian stuff of nightmares.

The second link isn't working, by the way. But I was able to find what you referred to via Google.

I think that is the explanation they eventually settled on when maskwearing didn't seem to yield the results they were expecting.

Not surprisingly NATO enlargements as expression of the US hegemony fits very well Mearsheimer's "offensive realism" theory ("states recognize that the best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible relative to potential rivals"). — neomac

Exactly. NATO enlargement had nothing to do with a threat from Russia, but the United States jealously guarding its position at the top. The United States, for which any semblance of independence is a "threat", resistance is aggression, etc. case and point: Yugoslavia, Lybia, Russia, China, etc.

This is further supported by the fact NATO enlargement received a great deal of criticism over the years, precisely because there was no Russian threat - in the end, NATO enlargement turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

That Russia violated by invading Ukraine which is why the United States and the UK felt compelled to react. — neomac

Yes, and that happened under entirely different circumstances. This conflict was initiated by the U.S. when it sought to change Ukrainian neutrality, which was obviously a prerequisite for a robust peace.


Further, Brzezinski is a terrible source to quote in favor of your position, since he basically laid out how U.S. domination of the globe works and how to maintain it, and it fits perfectly into the picture of U.S. hubris.

The point I’m making is that fears of European instabilities due to historical legacies from 2 WWs and the Cold War (from ethnic nationalisms like in Yugoslavia to imperialistic ambitions like from Germany and Russia), were shaping the risk perception of European countries and the US. That’s why Western European (like France and the UK) and East European (like Poland and the Baltic states) welcomed NATO presence. That’s how you get a British lord, H.L. Ismay, the NATO’s first Secretary General, claim that NATO was created to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down” or a debate on NATO enlargement by the American committee on Foreign Relations talking about Russian imperialism. — neomac

My argument is that none of this 50-year old argumentation is particularly relevant after the Cold War. It's a completely different situation. There is no threat of European infighting. The Germans didn't need to be "kept down", the Soviet Union no longer existed and the Americans had no military reason to stay in Europe (but of course they had a geopolitical reason to want to be "in"). Russia is severely weakened, the United States is the undisputed hegemon.

There was no threat of war in Europe after the Cold War. You're just making it up.

I presented an argument to explain why your approach is flawed. — neomac

You did none of the sort. You avoided giving me a metric, probably because you're fully aware that they all point towards the same thing - that Russia was weak after the Cold War, and not a threat to NATO.

First, you are contradicting your previous argument. If deltas in “military capacity” is enough to identify "real" threats, then the "real" threat for Ukraine was there even before 2008 (most certainly after Ukraine returned 1/3 of soviet nuclear weapons to post-Soviet Russia in 1994). — neomac

I never argued as much. I gave Russia's military capacity in relation to the West as a measure to support the idea that Russia did not pose a threat after the Cold War.

Second, since now you are reasoning in terms of “threat perception”, then again your claim is very much questionable. The Budapest Memorandum (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum) was proof that Ukraine had legitimate worries from Russia not only for historical reasons but also for the case of Crimea, which became a contested region practically immediately after Ukraine declared its independence. — neomac

How can you interpret this in any other way than a solid commitment to peace and cooperation?

Note that the United States and the United Kingdom also signed this treaty, vowing to respect the sovereignty of its signatories.

... because you need to support the narrative that basically the US started aggressing Russia for no other reason than its hubris. — neomac

Yes, and there are plenty of experts that make this point for me. Mearsheimer explicitly makes the point that the U.S. pushed NATO expansion all the way into Ukraine because it felt Russia was weak and it could get away with it.

“Collective defence and Article 5” is a binding commitment. There is no equivalent for offensive operations. — neomac

Nice words on a piece of paper mean nothing when NATO goes around the world invading countries wherever it pleases. To make the argument that NATO is a defensive alliance in view of its appaling record of expansion and aggression after the Cold War is just detached.

Hilarious, sad and scary at the same time.

This is also to say that it’s not just that US wanted to extend its sphere of influence (say for economic reasons), but for keeping safe and stable a dangerously unstable Europe by their own request too. — neomac

There was no "dangerously unstable Europe" after the Cold War. First off, Yugoslavia hardly represents all of Europe. Second, the U.S. played a major role in destabilizing Yugoslavia, because Yugoslavia insisted on neutrality instead of joining the U.S. bloc.

You are clearly playing dumb. — neomac

You are clearly clutching at straws.

First you were talking about threats in terms of deltas in “military capability”, ... — neomac

And when asked for a metric that you would find more acceptable you presented nothing.

Indeed, what was the military capacity of Ukraine wrt Russia prior to this war?! — neomac

Ukraine is not NATO.

What you're doing is using the present situation to retroactively justify NATO expansion in a period that was marked by cooperation, not hostility, between the West and Russia.

When after 2008 it was becoming clear Ukraine might be the stage for a new geopolitcal rivalry, Ukraine was right to fear a Russian invasion.

But who started that conflict? NATO, at the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, and through its continued efforts to make good on the promises that it made back then.

So any notions that NATO did what it did in response to a Russian threat is utter nonsense.

Take the case of Ukraine, even its joining NATO defensive alliance wasn’t an actual threat to Russia. — neomac

I'm not sure what to make of the fact you're still referring to NATO as a defensive alliance. I don't know if you've been paying attention, but NATO has invaded several countries post-Cold War, and left ruin in its wake.

Today it is not a defensive alliance by any stretch.

Even more so if such event wasn’t imminent at all. And most certainly so if Germany/France were stubbornly against it. — neomac

There's no point in regurgitating points that have already been discussed at length.

NATO membership for Ukraine mattered because of the role the United States would take in its security. The situation that developed in Ukraine is that the US took that role without NATO membership, causing de facto the same situation. NATO membership, and thus the German and French opinions, became of secondary importance, if of any importance at all.

Even Pax Romana and Pax Britannica weren’t exactly Disneyland. — neomac

Then don't come with bullshit like this:

While you (like many here) keep focusing on arguable failures of the American interventionism in middle-east (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, etc.) and whine over the drawbacks of American imperialism (as if any avg dude on the internet could plausibly offer a better and realistic alternative), you close an eye over the part of the world that abundantly profited from the Pax Americana (or, if you prefer, the neoconservative liberal democratic capitalist Blob military-industrial-complex satanist American foreign policy). This intellectually dishonest attitude reminds me of a famous Napolitan maxim: “chiagne e fotte”, it roughly means “whine (over injustice of the system) and keep screwing them (the system) over”. — neomac

Do you think throwing money at the aforementioned countries will benefit them. — Andrew4Handel

I don't think throwing money at anyone would necessarily benefit them.

I'm not really sold on the idea of reparations, in case that wasn't clear from my comments.

But you've made clear this isn't what you intended to discuss, so lets move on.

I am mainly concerned with the question of whether someone's descendant can inherit guilt. — Andrew4Handel

I believe a key ingredient for an immoral deed is the desire to cause harm intentionally.

There's a different category of behavior in which one causes harm unintentionally. In that case ignorance is the key ingredient. I believe such behavior to be fundamentally different from immoral behavior.

But in the proposed case of inherited guilt, there is no harm caused by the moral agent, nor any intention to do so.


Is there another definition of immoral behavior (or behavior that leads to guilt) under which inherited guilt would make sense? Without such a definition I don't believe inherited guilt will make much sense.


On the topic of man being inherently sinful or original sin, I think that could be understood more along the lines of the Buddhist concept of "Dukkha", which in simplified terms means that man finds himself in a natural state of dissatisfaction and want, and the drive to satisfy want leads to behavior problematic to both the individual and their surroundings.

It's essentially a replay of the covid pandemic.

This is the denial phase. The phase is prior to the last one, quiet shame.

It makes you wonder how many this circus has to be repeated before people wisen up.

Why get personal instead of answering his question?

On a different topic, Ukraine's frontline is starting to look severely compromised, with pockets closing around Vuhledar, Bakhmut and Krasna Hora, and several cities being at risk of ending up in a similar situation, like Bilohorivka, Avdiivka and the urban area south of Bakhmut.

There are also rumours of a Russian offensive being expected within the month.

Under these circumstances I expect a serious simplification of the Ukrainian lines in the coming week, because this situation seems to be unmanagable. If large portions of defenders are cut off from supply lines this might turn into a disaster, because I am not getting the impression the Ukrainian forces can afford to lose many more troops.

It also makes me wonder why the Ukrainians haven't started a tactical withdrawal yet. It seems to me that the longer they wait, the harder it will be.

Are we just going to ignore that this happened then?



In what world is the U.S. not the primary suspect after such a statement has been made?

The topic of maskwearing was also quite hot in the Netherlands.

Somewhat amusingly (but not really) Dutch government officials went on record first stating on several occasions that maskwearing was completely nonsensical and ineffective, only to make a u-turn a few months later making them mandatory for everybody (after the WHO had already advised against it).

Later inquiries were made into the governmental record to see how these decisions came about. Something that was repeatedly brought up, was how it was believed that maskwearing could cause behavioural changes among the population.

In less euphemistic terms, those in charge believed maskwearing could cause people to become more fearful of the virus.

Anyone know much about this Seymour Hersh beyond Wikipedia? — Mark Nyquist

He seems to have a solid record of uncovering U.S. atrocity, being noted for his investigations into the Mỹ Lai massacre, Watergate and Abu Ghraib, to name a few.

Supposedly he was put on the NSA watchlist for this.


The story does sound believable (the U.S. role in the bombing was already widely speculated) and for a journalist of Hersh's caliber I cannot imagine him implicating high-profile people by name if he was just making things up.


On a somewhat related topic, the West's role in the war in Ukraine seems very impopular in Israel. We've recently had Israeli former PM Naftali Bennett stating in an interview that a truce was on the table very early on in the conflict (with major concessions from both Russia and Ukraine), but this was sabotaged by the West.

Recently there was also a Turkish news agency that reported casualty figures of the Ukrainian war which it supposedly had based on a report by the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad. These figures were very different from what is commonly accepted in the West, but the veracity of this news article was also very questionable.


There's a chance people are just making things up. There's also a chance the "accidental" leaking of unwelcome information is an act of quiet disapproval.

There are so many clear cut cases where it's practically undeniable the U.S. government owes people compensation. Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. - countries that were invaded and thoroughly wrecked, with no justification.

If people were interested in justice via reparations, how come we never hear about those? Mind you, the victims of these events have never even been in a position to bring their case infront of a court.

These things make me skeptical. What are these reparations discussions really about?

It's not crime and punishment, otherwise it would be discussed infront of a court instead.

Genuine justice? Well, if that were the case why do we see a selective interest for vague, grey area cases and the blatant, undeniable injustice is simply ignored?

Is justice only interesting when one can profit from it?

Morally speaking, probably not. However, I'd say a direct link between the benefit and the crime should be present for it to be immoral.

If you want my opinion, a person shouldn't be punished for a crime they didn't commit.