I think Mearsheimer argued that the Kremlin decided Crimea is important enough for a Russian power position to grab. Maybe that's just part of it. Anyway, never mind me, carry on. — jorndoe

In a nutshell, this is basically it. Crimea is the prize here, however the connection a lot of people don't make is that a Ukraine in NATO (or otherwise allied with 'the West') would put Crimea in a permanent state of vulnerability since its only connection to Russia proper is the Kerch bridge.

This is why Russia chose to invade Ukraine. The first thing it did during the invasion was establish a land bridge with Crimea.

Much of Russia's conduct in this war, including what we know about the peace negotiations that took place in March 2022 point towards the securing of Crimea being their main strategic goal, either through annexation of parts of Ukraine, or through a negotiated deal.

I think he wanted to squash Ukrainian prosperity and block its efforts to join the EU. I think he also wanted to use the war to shore up his grip on dictatorship. — frank

I don't think either of these explanations hold much water, and basically exemplify the inability that is prevalent in this thread to see the Russians as anything other than cartoon villains.

Yes, I'm not saying Adams promoted or intended to promote racial segregation, but that "woke" ideology implicitly promotes it.

Fixed.

The US bombed Nord Stream for the simple fact that it didn't want European opinions getting in the way of war, and the Europeans, especially Scholz, took it like a ...

Moreover, it implicitly promotes racial segregation, which Adams's comments are a clear indication of.

When I start looking at their actual effects, these "spontaneous" movements for "the betterment of society" seem to me premeditated attempts at spreading division, probably for the betterment of less than altruistic political agendas.

By the way, I can think of some that would like the US going all isolation and NATO closing up shop. Can't tell if that's what you're suggesting here; is it? — jorndoe

If European leaders are incapable of serving European interests, NATO is a threat to European security.

Hmm Are you deliberately skipping who's doing the warring here, ... — jorndoe

So you're just going to support the US efforts to stoke the fires?

The US is just waiting for Russia to exhaust itself. Putin seems happy to allow the event to tear a new butthole for Russia, so I guess the wait will be extended. — frank

What indication is there of this, and why would the Russians be pursuing a strategy like that?

This sounds like wishful thinking to me. The same kind that predicted the Russian economy collapsing, the Russian army disintegrating, the Russian government being ousted, etc.

You called it a good article, that's why I asked.

To me it smells of the kind of war rhetoric that must've been prevalent before World War I, but if anything I share your worry.

What do you think is good about it?

It talks about Europe as a "muscular geopolitical protagonist", Germany as having to reinvent itself to arm itself and Ukraine against aggression, etc. A lot of war trumpeting.


Not a word of Nord Stream 2.

The reality is, when the US bombed Nord Stream 2, a piece of major infrastructure critical to the German economy, all Scholz asked was how many tanks the US wanted him to send. He's an absolute tool.

As a European myself I find the Germans' servile attitude beyond shameful, and as indicative of the relationship between the US and Europe - one of vassalage. European political leaders are servants of the American agenda, not serving the European peoples.


The article represents what the US wants Europe to be, and it represents in essence why the US provoked conflict in Eastern Europe - to break ties between Russia and Europe, and to remilitarize Europe, so it can serve as a useful in ally in the looming geopolitical conflict between the US and China as a counterbalance to Russia.

The US isn't interested in peace (see the peace talks they blocked), nor is it interested in what the Europeans think of all this (see the bombing of Nord Stream).

It really wants the war in Ukraine to have set all this in motion, but it remains to be seen. The US narrative is losing ground all over the world, and that includes inside Europe.

A horrible and bloody internet "pariah-ship and contempt" is what the majority of anonymous users of this thread have to suffer from the minority of other anonymous users for advocating B. — neomac

Your idea of pariahship is having people engage with you in page-long discussions? :chin:

I'm sorry the forum isn't your personal echo chamber, I guess.

Also on the topic of Europeans.

Hersh's article implicated Norway in the Nord Stream 2 sabotage. Norway is the world's third largest exporter of gas.

I'll leave it up to the forum what to do with that information.

I think it's worth pointing out that while the US narrative is alive and well within NATO, NATO is standing more and more isolated internationally.

Recently the European Council on Foreign Affairs published this paper:

United West, Divided From the Rest: Global Public Opinion One Year Into Russia's War on Ukraine


The global shift towards multilaterality is well underway, and the Ukraine war really shows how estranged NATO has become from the rest of the world, with basically every major international player outside of NATO refusing to pick sides in the conflict.


My expectation is that NATO will see a brief surge in unity as a result of the the Ukraine war, however as the reality of this conflict becomes apparent - the US role in causing it and its lack of commitment to solving it - it might in fact flip the other way and be the last nail on the coffin for NATO.

Best thing to happen to Russia would be a disastrous, humiliating defeat ... — ssu

Anyway, I think authoritarian dictatorships are bad and they should go. — ssu

Hence the solution would be to give Ukraine the ample resources to make this one of those defeats that Russia has suffered before... — ssu

Sounds like you're on a warpath. Who should be next? China?

No, but really. You're sounding a little detached. Any idea how many lives your lovely plans would cost?

NATO's Biggest European Members Float Defense Pact with Ukraine

Possibly some important developments here.

With the UK, France and Germany seeking to encourage peace talks, more elaborate NATO intervention in Ukraine seems unlikely for the near future.

A lot hinges on the commitment of the European nations if things were to escalate in Ukraine. Prior to this, the war rhetoric suggested the Europeans would follow the American line without much question, but with happenings such as these it remains to be seen.

In my opinion, this should have come a lot sooner. The war could have likely been avoided altogether had the Europeans made clear to Washington that they would not back the US in a protracted conflict in Ukraine.

The question is whether they can keep their backs straight.


As for the proposals themselves, there are some odd implications:
- Apparently Kiev is the party that needs to be encouraged.

- The way the European leaders seek to encourage Ukraine is apparently by way of "stronger ties between Ukraine and NATO". Note, NATO membership is not mentioned - I wonder if that's intentional. You'd think some form of close security cooperation between NATO and Ukraine after the war would have been on the table since the very start, but apparently not?

- Stronger ties between NATO and Ukraine was what sparked this conflict in the first place, so it's counterintuitive that this would become part of a negotiated peace. However, perhaps with the territories Russia holds (and Crimea strategically more secure), NATO membership for Ukraine is less of an issue.

You might be surprised that the countries comprising the majority of the world's population (China, India, Brazil, Pakistan, among others) do not seem to believe in the one-sided image of this war that is so dominant in the western media.

So no, you're not the only person. Though, if you're been reading western newspapers I don't blame you for feeling that way.

Interesting take on various relevant subjects by a retired US Army Colonel.

Me personally, ↪Tzeentch...? — jorndoe

Yea, why not?

I think your view that the war in Ukraine doesn't represent genuine Russian security concerns is the prevailing view in the West.

The worry I have with that view is that it seems to ignore the risk of escalation, because Russian threats of escalation are seen as a bluff by Putin.

My view is that this war does in some ways represent genuine Russian security concerns and that the risk of (nuclear) escalation is not trivial.

So my question is, should we continue to push Russia to escalate until eventually we get to the point they can no longer back up their 'bluffs'?

And is there any escalation big enough that would convince you the Russians aren't bluffing?

Since I think your view is the prevailing one, by asking you I am trying to get a sense of how close we might be to the precipice.

In the same round, would Putin risk Russia over southeast Ukraine (perhaps by unleashing the nukes)...? — jorndoe

How close do we want to get in order to find an answer to that question?

Would the United States have used nuclear weapons over Cuba?

I don't know. I'm glad we never found out.

The doomsday clock is now closer to midnight than it was back then.

The UN isn't quite as inconsequential irrelevant insignificant as me. I don't know if anyone thinks they're a bunch of airheads, but here's a report from their assembly today (Feb 22, 2023) on the topic. The message is clear enough.

What's your (anyone's) take? — jorndoe

What I would be looking for are the voting patterns and statements of BRICS countries and nations that have expressed interest in becoming part of BRICS or the BRICS development bank (NBD), because I think these nations represent a growing dissatisfaction with the western 'world order' ran out of Washington, and seem increasingly interested in forming a formal economic and political coalition against it.

My general sense is that you don't seem to take the Russian perception of NATO as a security threat very seriously.

The assumption seems to be, if we just raise the costs for Russia, they will eventually back out of this war because they have no legitimate reason to be in it in the first place.

My question is, how far would this war need to escalate for you to reconsider that position?

I think when Putin talks about the "destruction" of Russia, what he is talking about is the West seeking to end Russia as a great power. Of course with a typical narrative spin added to it.

Assuming that's what he means, he's not wrong. There are various respected western experts (Brzezinski for example) who argue that Russia without Ukraine and Crimea is not a great power. He states that pretty much verbatim in his book The Grand Chessboard.

Many (Sachs, Chomsky, Mearsheimer, etc.) also argue that a major reason behind NATO expansion was to contain Russia, and prevent it from rising back to great power status after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Brzezinski has even argued that the US should pursue NATO expansion precisely for this reason.

The idea that the West under US leadership sought to hamper Russia's rise to prominence is quite credible. I would even go so far as to say it's obvious.

If the Russians were relying on certain conditions like a military coup from within Ukraine and the population wasn’t so hostile (compare to the case of Crimea) and the logistic/coordination wasn’t so shitty and they manage to kill Zelensky, etc. things may have panned out differently for the Russians even with a small number of ground troops. — neomac

190,000 troops is completely insufficient to control Ukraine. Everyone, even your own preferred experts, seem to agree on that. So we've made some progress.

Now we have two options:

Your option - that number is a product of astronomic Russian incompetence and wishful thinking. In other words: "the Russians are dummies".

My option - that number is a product of limited Russian goals.

Still Western source — neomac

Gee, really? You have a problem with western sources now? :roll:

If you rely on the estimate of “21,000 troops” from that report why don’t you rely on the claim “the Russian military’s main effort remains seizing Kyiv in an effort to force the Ukrainian government to capitulate” ? — neomac

Because those estimates are not being contested by anyone, while the claim is.

Are you really going to hide behind random objections like these?

This is getting a little childish.

OK but that’s your personal view. Maybe the Russians had different views. For example I wouldn’t exclude that the Russians might have considered the Malorossia region (Kiev) as less anti-Russian than the Western side of Ukraine (Galicia), giving them some hope to find less hostile masses. Or that Ukrainian military would have been less of a problem if part of it also in the highest ranks would have revolted against Zelensky. On the other side I wouldn’t exclude that the Ukrainians didn’t fully trust Western military aid, or they might have feared further mobilisation, escalations, involvement of additional Russian private militia, etc. from Russians. — neomac

That's a lot of "maybes".

Since you seem to like CSIS, here is an update they gave on the Russo-Ukrainian war on March 1st, 2022.



At several points in the video the topic of insurgency comes up.

Here's an amusing quote from one of the participants, starting at roughly 33:00.

Through indiscriminate killing of civilians and leveling cities Russian armed forces might eventually prevail, but they will have a lot of trouble in the urban areas trying to root out these many fighters, but much of [the Ukrainian armed forces] will survive.

And they have no prospects of being able to occupy the country. Putin has said (again you can't believe him) but he said he has no intention of occupying. So you think [with] the destruction that already happened, if we support an insurgency, and I know we'll get to this in a minute, Russian casualties will be through the roof.

This will be... This could be an insurgency that is bigger than our Afghan one in the 1980's in terms of things we could provide them that would really hurt the Russians.

And then if he pulls out, If he installs a puppet government, that government's not going to last hours. I don't see how they could control the territory.

What is amusing about this is that they are essentially making very strong arguments why the Russians probably did not intend to do any of these things.

The idea of a Russian puppet government is completely unfeasible to them, just like it is to me.

The only connection they fail to make is that the Kremlin was probably well aware of the risks they are describing, which is part of the reason, if not the reason, they pursued a limited aim strategy as described by Mearsheimer.


The connection you fail to make is that all these western sources have one thing in common - they all spin the "Russian incompetence" yarn. CSIS, as pointed out, is funded by the US government and the DoD - that could be a clear sign of bias, but perhaps it is just something so simple as intellectual arrogance or tunnel vision.

In any case, the contradictions in their analysis are plain for all to see, and I've been pointing them out repeatedly.

Do you want me to believe that ISW, CSIS, WilsonCenter, RUSI, Ukrainian military experts don’t know the Russian military doctrine and couldn’t possibly think it was a maskirovka operation? — neomac

Given the indicators that the northern operations of the Russian armed forces were not the main effort, I would expect them to openly discuss the possibility. I wonder why they don't. :chin: Maybe because it would make them look awful silly at this point.

_____________________________________________


Let's do a quick recap:


190,000 troops were insufficient to control large parts of Ukraine.


You argue instead that the Russians' main goal was to control Ukraine by installing a puppet in Kiev.


My objection to this is along two lines:

> A puppet regime is completely unfeasible under conditions that were known prior to the invasion. The amount of western influence in Ukraine, the threat of a western-backed insurgency, the lack of troops to maintain control, etc. Your experts at CSIS seem to believe a Russian puppet would have "lasted hours."

> The northern drive on Kiev in no way indicates either in its troop count or behavior that it comprised the Russians' main effort. If that had been the case we would have expected to see an attempt to overwhelm the Ukrainian defense through massed forces and firepower.

Note: I did not claim the drive was too small to capture Kiev, though it was likely too small to capture Kiev if any sizable Ukrainian defense was present, which likely there was since it's the Ukrainian capital, though the Ukrainian order of battle remains undisclosed.
Nor did I argue that the Russians didn't want Kiev. Just that the troop count and behavior does not imply the Russians were prepared to pay much of a cost to capture it, which in turn implies it was not of a high priority.


My alternative to this theory is as follows:

> Given the Russians' relatively low troop count in relation to the size of Ukraine and the Ukrainian military, their ambitions were likely limited to occupying strategically relevant areas in the south and east of Ukraine. Occupying small pieces of Ukraine mitigates the risk of insurgency.

> The drive on Kiev likely had multiple possible goals, the first of which was probably to try and force the West to negotiate. If this failed, the attack would still be functioning as a diversion to lure Ukrainian defenders away from the strategically relevant areas in the east/south. Had the Ukrainians left their capital largely undefended in favor of defending the east/south, Kiev could have been captured.



I've said all I have to say on the topic. I don't think further exchanges will yield much fruit, so I will leave it here. I suggest you try to make your case succinctly one last time like I did with my recap, so we end the conversation with a nice summary from both sides.

Mearsheimer doesn’t explicitly talk about regime change in that video, all right. But he did it elsewhere:
You don’t think he has designs on Kyiv?
No, I don’t think he has designs on Kyiv. I think he’s interested in taking at least the Donbass, and maybe some more territory and eastern Ukraine, and, number two, he wants to install in Kyiv a pro-Russian government, a government that is attuned to Moscow’s interests. https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine (March 1, 2022) — neomac

This was a week into the war.

You're using statements made months apart, under entirely different circumstances and in both cases no actual argument is presented for your claim.

What else would be the purpose of capturing the political capital of Ukraine be? Forcing a negotiation (so surrender) and/or regime change. One can’t exclude regime change. — neomac

If the capture of Kiev would have forced a surrender and/or regime change, why was only a small portion of the Russian force dedicated to capturing it, and the Russians seemingly did not engage in heavy fighting in their operations around Kiev?

I don't believe capturing Kiev would have been decisive at all. With a sizable Ukrainian military and western support the war could have been carried on from elsewhere in the country, possibly even over the border from a NATO country.

Ironically, didn't Napoleon once invade Russia believing the capture of Moscow would end the war?

Besides he’s claim is more cautious than yours: “There are no exact formulas for how many soldiers are required to hold conquered territory, but a force ratio of as many as 20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants has sometimes been necessary to pacify a hostile local population.” — neomac

Ahem. From the very same article...

The force ratio of Russian soldiers in Ukraine was far too small to hold territory—including cities—for long.

____________________________

Mearsheimer does not contradict Jones, because Mearsheimer is arguing against the idea that Russia could conquer the entire of Ukraine. If I’m reading more into Mearsheimer’s claims in that video, you do the same. — neomac

Fair enough.

So the point of contention is whether regime change is a feasible option without occupying (the vast majority of) Ukraine.

I think it isn't because:
- The Ukrainian military was never decisively defeated.
- There is/was plenty of anti-Russian/pro-Western sentiment in Ukraine, especially in the western parts.
- Western backing would likely counteract Russian influence in areas not held directly by the Russian military, if not outright create and fund a widespread insurgency throughout the entire country.

We've seen the United States try to enact regime change under much more advantageous conditions with no success.

Where did you get the estimates of the number of Russian troops were between 15000 and 30000? — neomac

The day-by-day campaign assessments by ISW. (note: not western media)

On February 26th, 2022 their report stated:

The Russian military’s main effort remains seizing Kyiv in an effort to force the Ukrainian government to capitulate. The Ukrainian General Staff reported at 11am local time February 26 that Ukrainian forces halted 14 Russian BTGs northeast of Kyiv and that Russia has committed its northern reserves – an additional 17 BTGs – along this operational direction.

As you can see, these estimates are based on reports from the Ukrainian general staff.

31 BTGs each comprised of roughly 600 - 800 officers and soldiers amounts to roughly 21,000 troops.


As far as I know these numbers aren't being contested. If anything a western source would likely have a tendency to overstate rather than to understate Russian troop numbers. If they are being contested please show it to me and I might reconsider.

When you objected (“Russians were going to install a puppet regime in Kiev while occupying less than 1/5th of the country”) I argued yes so does Mearsheimer in that video by saying that a possible aim of Russia was capturing Kiev [2]. — neomac

Where did you get the idea that Mearsheimer argues the Russians could install a puppet regime by capturing Kiev?

He doesn't make that argument at all. Are you really going to stake your argument on a single line by Mearsheimer which he treats as no more than a passing comment?

I'd love to hear someone go into detail about how they believe installing a puppet regime under the circumstances we've discussed is feasible. Until then, I don't treat such a theory seriously, and it's pretty clear the comment of Mearsheimer you're relying on was only indirectly related to the subject matter of the lecture.

The predominant theory at the time that lecture was given was that the Russians attempted a serious attack to capture Kiev. By suggesting that the attack may have merely meant to threaten Kiev Mearsheimer was in essence already putting forward a controversial standpoint.

I'll repeat myself: it's obvious that Kiev was an interesting military and political target for the Russians. If they could have taken it at no cost they probably would have, for a myriad of possible reasons. However, the data from the battle does not indicate they were prepared to pay much of a cost at all, which puts into question the idea that their entire campaign hinged on capturing Kiev.

Your argument is just dismissive of what has been reported... — neomac

I think my argument holds true in face of the reported facts. I'd love to hear you present facts that would be at odds with my theory.

Reported opinions by potentially highly biased sources I assign very little weight to, especially if they blatantly ignore the facts.

I’m not over/underestimating anything because I’m relying on legit source reports. — neomac

Your own source, Seth G. Jones, states that subdueing a country's population with a force ratio of 4 to 1000 is woefully inadequate, regardless of what metric you pick. I've already rebutted your example of Afghanistan which serves as a clear example in favor of the case I am making.

You're cherry picking at best.

Whether those assumptions about early Russian intentions were wrong can’t be proved just by size and movement of ground troops over one month (even more so if one takes into account Russian logistical and coordination failures). — neomac

I think it's by far the strongest indication of Russian intentions we have.

according to British intelligence — neomac

Newspaper articles claiming things were claimed by British intelligence.

This isn't evidence of a planned coup. At most it is a possible indicator Russia-aligned politicians were in Ukraine. Well, color me surprised.

even in the very same article you took that excerpts it is still claimed: Russia failed to achieve what was likely its main political objective: to overthrow the Kyiv government in a blitzkrieg military operation. — neomac

And no source or argumentation is given - not very convincing. Mearsheimer contradicts Jones directly and gives a detailed argumentation as to why he believes the Russians did not aim for a classic blitzkrieg.

As if in Western media are impenetrable by pro-Russian propaganda that you can read and regurgitate here. — neomac

Except that I don't base my arguments on western media sources either. I base it on simple verifiable facts of the war (which as far as I am aware are not being disputed), and only rely on expert opinions like Mearsheimer to the degree they put forward theories that also rely on verifiable facts.

Again, nice try.

If you believe one of my sources suffers from a pro-Russian bias, I'd love to see you point it out.

As if experts can’t comment the war on Twitter. — neomac

Of course they can. I just won't take them seriously unless they make an actual case. Twitter, wikipedia, newspaper articles - I take none of that seriously.

Mearsheimer claims that the strategic objective Russians were aiming at were either capturing or threatening Kiev. — neomac

He does say that, without any elaboration whatsoever.

You look confused. — neomac

Are you really implying the Russians were going to install a puppet regime in Kiev while occupying less than 1/5th of the country, with a western-trained, western-backed Ukrainian military occupying the rest, and an angry Ukrainian population to reckon with, with 190,000 troops? — Tzeentch

Right, so it’s FALSE the assumption that one needs military control over the whole territory to install a puppet regime. — neomac

Do you know what a strawman is?

... yet in the same post you claim that my argument hinges on “occupy all of Ukraine”. — neomac

Which it essentially does, whether you realise it or not.

Second, I do not have an equation on how many ground troops are necessary to ensure the success of a regime change in Ukraine. So the quantities you are considering in your arguments (“1/5th with the 4/5ths”, “occupy all of Ukraine”, “the vast majority of the country”) may make sense to support your claims under certain conditions, but not under all conditions (e.g. it depends on how hostile the population is, the contribution from state apparatus insiders, the support of aircraft/rocket shelling, the size of the targeted territory, etc.). — neomac

It makes imminent sense in the conditions the Ukraine war is fought under.

A large, capable Ukrainian military (outnumbering the Russians even). Vast amounts of Western support, etc.

Regime change under the conditions you have suggested is outlandish.

Russia might have had a complex strategy wrt Kiev (based on different possible scenarios), which include regime change. — neomac

Again, lovely theory, but where is the evidence?

Every time you need to invent a more complicated explanation as to why the facts don't line up with your view it becomes less convincing.

To achieve regime change ground troops might have not been enough (also depending on how hostile the population would have proven to be), but in addition to that rocket/air-force strikes, possible inside jobs (especially by collaborationists within military/intelligence service favourable to a coup [1]) and killing Zelensky might have compensated. All these conditions are not implausible since they have some support from the available reports. — neomac

You vastly overestimate the weight of miscellaneous factors, and underestimate the importance of boots on the ground. No control means no regime change.

Your own article already blows your theory out of the water since it puts into perspective what kind of force is needed to occupy and control a population and what the Russians actually fielded.

Remember your example of Afghanistan? The US enjoyed every advantage imaginable. A decisive military victory, complete air dominance, support from multi-national coalitions and indigenous forces, a way higher troop-to-population ratio - almost double.

It was fighting a third world country. And it still lost.

Russia has none of those things.

The West propaganda objection is as good as the Russian propaganda counter-objection. — neomac

Except that I'm not basing myself on Russian or even pro-Russian sources, but nice try.

But estimates about the number of the deployed Russian troops were available very early in March 2022 (while the Russian attempt lasted till end march), so that begs the question: how credible was the Russian threat to the Ukrainians backed by the Americans if the number of ground troops was all the counts and it was evident to all military experts that they were insufficient to capture Kyiv? — neomac

That the Russians might want to take Kiev is pretty obvious, even just as a bargaining chip or a symbolic victory. The question is what importance they attributed to it, and what cost they would be willing to pay. The facts imply the answer is 'relatively little'.

I can't look into the minds of the Ukrainian leadership.

The Ukrainian order of battle for the Battle of Kiev remains undisclosed, so we don't actually know how seriously they took the threat because for that we need to know the numbers of troops they deployed in defense of it.

Casualty figures as far as they are available imply little heavy fighting, which means that whatever the Ukrainians defended with was enough for the Russians to decide not to even try capturing the city.

Here for more details: https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/23003689/putin-ukraine-russia-donbas-energy-feint — neomac

Don't bother with such blatantly biased and low-quality articles. Some of the sources linked in that article literally lead to Twitter. I did read the article, and it's basic regurgitation of points already made and debunked here.

It insists Kiev was the main prize, while the fighting around Kiev does not imply this at all.

If you want to make a convincing argument, you should see if such articles are based on anything substantial, and provide a link to the substance instead.

So far, if Russians wanted to threaten/capture Kiev as expected (also because without control over Malorossia there is no buffer territory wrt NATO), they failed. If the Russians wanted just to consolidate the Eastern-South, they didn't ensure the geopolitical victory they were after (at minute 1:40:04 of your video “Winning for Putin is putting an end to Ukraine joining the West, joining NATO, joining the EU”). — neomac

If the point of the advance on Kiev was to force the Ukrainian leadership to the negotiating table they succeeded actually. Those negotiations failed, though - blocked by the US, we now know.

And obviously Russia is so far unable to end the western policy of NATO membership for Ukraine, which I agree is probably their primary strategic objective.

I think it was also fairly obvious from the onset of the invasion that such a policy change would only come as the result of a brokered deal, and Russia lacked the power to enforce it unilaterally through military force.

It might be a little more complicated.

The Chinese refer to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, aka the Chicago Convention.

I haven't taken the time to read through it all, but it does seem that civil aviation enjoys a great deal of protection under the convention, and the US is a signatory to it.

Shooting down civilian craft without any type of warning seems questionable.

Write to wikipedia if you want evidences for its claims. — neomac

Why would I? You're the one trying to use it to make an argument. If you don't care about searching and providing evidence for your views or the persuasiveness of your argument that's your problem, not mine.

(https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare — neomac

Russia failed to achieve what was likely its main political objective: to overthrow the Kyiv government in a blitzkrieg military operation.

No, I don’t think he has designs on Kyiv. I think he’s interested in taking at least the Donbass, and maybe some more territory and eastern Ukraine, and, number two, he wants to install in Kyiv a pro-Russian government, a government that is attuned to Moscow’s interests. — neomac

Both the article and Mearsheimer's view on regime change in Ukraine (that he shared only days after the invasion - way too early for it to be viewed as a detailed assessment, in my opinion) are directly contradicted by a point Mearsheimer made himself more recently, namely that the Russian troop deployments were far too small to carry out a classic blitzkrieg necessary to facilitate such a thing. He states that almost literally word for word in one of the clips I gave you.

I don't agree with the point Mearsheimer made in March. It's incompatible with arguments he put forward later.

Furthermore, the article makes the same point I made before. It literally states:

Second, the Russian invasion force was far too small to seize and hold territory, ...

... Russia utilized between 150,000 and 190,000 soldiers—including regular and irregular forces—for the initial invasion of Ukraine, a country of approximately 44 million people with an area of over 600,000 square kilometers.34 Those numbers translate into a force ratio of 4 Russian soldiers per 1,000 Ukrainian inhabitants.

There are no exact formulas for how many soldiers are required to hold conquered territory, but a force ratio of as many as 20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants has sometimes been necessary to pacify a hostile local population.35 Large numbers of troops are generally essential to establish basic law and order. By the end of World War II, for example, there were 101 U.S. soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants in the U.S.-controlled sector of Germany. More recently, there were 19 U.S. and European soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants in Bosnia in 1995 and 20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants in Kosovo in 2000.36

Lower ratios are generally insufficient to pacify hostile populations. In Iraq, for instance, the United States had 7 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants and faced a persistent deadly insurgency—even with the help of Iraqi government forces and Sunni militia members. U.S.

Note that this doesn't even yet take into account a 200,000+ strong Ukrainian military that would not magically disappear.

The rest of the article isn't particularly convincing towards your point, as it talks mostly of operational matters and not about the intelligence upon which the Russians based themselves.

First things first, the puppet regime in Afghanistan didn’t have military control of the whole country, right? — neomac

Anything that smelled of Taliban was bombed into dust by the US Air Force. There wasn't a Taliban flag or outpost left standing anywhere in the country. I don't see how that can be classified as anything other than an exceptionally high degree of military control. Of course that military control started getting gradually eroded by an increasingly intense insurgency.

But my point never was that control of the whole country is necessary (nice strawman), but that enacting regime change while holding less than 1/5th with the 4/5ths being occupied by a western-backed, western-trained enemy military is utter fantasy.

That regime change was a likely goal is confirmed by attempts to kill Zelensky. — neomac

That does not confirm that at all.

Killing off leadership figures is a common method in warfare, which I already explained to you.

And it's not obvious at all that killing Zelensky would change anything about Ukraine's political course. In fact, I believe it would change nothing. How much influence do you believe Russia has in Ukraine, outside of the areas it directly controls? Virtually zero.

However, faced with fierce Ukrainian defense and the West’s crippling economic sanctions, Putin appears to be recalculating his initial maximalist aims. — neomac

More articles with claims about the inner goings-on of the Kremlin, without a shred of evidence presented.

This is a recurring theme: the entirety of your argument, nay the entire western narrative, hinges on the idea that the Russians went in with a force to destroy the Ukrainian military and occupy all of Ukraine - something which is almost directly contradicted by the facts.

It's obvious why they should argue this - because the idea of Russian imperialism and a Ukrainian resurgence is much easier to peddle if a narrative of grandiose Russian goals followed by a massive Russian failure to achieve those goals is established. However, much seems to indicate that the Russian initial aims weren't "maximalist". I think the negotiations that took place in March provide a solid basis for that view, since the terms that were almost agreed upon there were essentially the exact ones that Russia had been insisting on for years.

Further, there's really no way to save the "maximalist" argument from the fact that the 190,000 troops Russia deployed are completely insufficient for the goals you purport they had.

Even if you want to make the point that their goal was to enact regime change in Kiev, you cannot explain why only a small portion of those forces actually marched on Kiev, and intense fighting over the city never took place.

You can’t raise the standards for what constitutes “evidence” arbitrarily high, — neomac

I'm not raising standards "arbitrarily" high. The holes in your argument are utterly blatant, and instead of addressing those holes, you pile on more articles of people who seem similarly unaware of them.

What makes those sources legit? — neomac

Sources are legit when they produce a coherent argument based on verifable facts and evidence, or at least things which can be verified with a high degree of certainty. When their argument defies common logic, or features obvious holes, a detailed explanation should be in place to account for that.

Third, as I never claimed I’m an expert or even an amateur of military/intelligence field, and made it clear repeatedly, it’s pointless to accuse me of lacking “basic foundational knowledge” in the military/intelligence field. I’m fine with relying on military/intelligence experts’ feedback for that matter. It’s not evident to me you are one, ... — neomac

You say that, but you don't give the impression you wish to solely base yourself on expert opinions.

You take the smallest snippets of circumstantial proof and use it to argue the most far-reaching claims, generally without even checking if the snippets you use are based on anything tangible and real.

Because to me, “threatening Kiev” roughly means “threatening to capture Kiev”.
BTW what does “threatening Kiev” mean to you? What did the Russian threaten to do with their troops in Kiev if it was evident to anybody with “basic foundational knowledge” that the Russians were most certainly unable to capture Kiev? — neomac

That's another strawman.

I never argued the Ukrainians could have known prior to the invasion that the Russians would not try to take Kiev.

The fog of war can make diversionary attacks very effective, and we know for a fact that the Russians employ deception as a core pillar of their military doctrine.

The fact that the Russians used 15,000 - 30,000 out of a 190,000 men in their offensive towards Kiev, and the fact that very little heavy fighting seems to have taken place, does not imply the Russians attributed high strategic significance to the capture of Kiev.

I’m talking about what has been officially reported suggested by legit western [potentially highly biased and/or politicized] sources — neomac

Fixed.

I simply find implausible to claim that it’s unlikely that Russia pursued regime change because of lack of manpower or because negotiation was most certainly the only realistic goal. — neomac

I don't see how regime change is even a reasonable option without decisively defeating the Ukrainian military and occupying the vast majority of the country.

Again I ask you, Russia installs a puppet. What happens to the areas that aren't under Russian control? What happens to the Ukrainian military consisting of hundreds of thousands of men? What happens to western support?

Do those things magically disappear?

No. The war would obviously continue and the "regime change" would be completely meaningless in areas that Russia doesn't directly control.

You just talked about size and movement of the Russian troops on the ground. — neomac

I've talked about those things because they are in direct contradiction to the argument you have been putting forward.

- Why did the Russians try to kill Zelensky? — neomac

I've already explained. Decapitation is a common military strategy to diminish an enemy's command and control capabilities. Killing Zelensky would be a big symbolic victory and sow chaos and fear.

- Why did the Russian troops try to encircle Kiev ? — neomac

The obvious answer would be that even a diversionary attack needs to be credible.

But what do you mean when you say "try"?

There is no evidence of particularly heavy fighting around Kiev. As such, there is no indication that the Russians were prepared to overcome significant resistance in order to achieve whatever their goals may have been.

- Why did the Russians engage in troop battles, if they could simply heavy shell Kiev? — neomac

I don't know how you envision incursions into a foreign nation to take place without troops getting into combat with each other.

Troop movements require scouting, vanguards, rear security, logistics, etc. All those things involve physical men putting themselves in harms way.

Blindly shelling Kiev from the other side of the border is just another silly notion. Kiev has an area of 839 square kilometers. Randomly lobbing shells into it would have no impact whatsoever, besides fueling western propaganda. Cities are captured through urban combat - notoriously bloody and difficult - not unguided artillery barrages.
________________________________________________

What's your excuse now? — neomac

It's odd you get so adverserial about a genuine inquiry for a source. Is it not normal to you that people ask for sources when they are presented with claims they think are questionable? I would expect you to do the same.

Second, nowhere we have discussed related terminology... — neomac

There's no need for us to discuss it, since those terms are already neatly defined. It's up to you to use those terms properly.

Initially, Russian forces captured key areas to the north and west of Kyiv, leading to international speculation of the city's imminent fall. However, stiff Ukrainian resistance sapped the momentum. Poor Russian logistics and tactical decisions helped the defenders to thwart efforts at encirclement, and, after a month of protracted fighting, Ukrainian forces mounted successful counterattacks. — neomac

Why are you using wikipedia as a source?

Also, note the claim there: "Stiff Ukrainian resistance sapped the momentum."

Where is the proof of that?

As far as I can tell the Russians never made a serious attempt at attacking Kiev itself.

Installing a puppet regime doesn’t need military control over the whole territory. — neomac

The invasion of Afghanistan started with the crushing defeat of the Taliban from which they took years to recover.

You're proving how far out of book you are by insisting on this issue. You're basically telling me the earth is flat.

The difference from the US case however is that Putin could arguably rely on collaborationists in the army/intelligence... — neomac

"Arguably" meaning, in contrived scenarios that you invented specifically to suit your argument, without a shred of evidence given?

Prof Mearsheimer, a noted political scientist of the University of Chicago, feels that Russia’s aim is not to seize and defend territory in Ukraine (as it could get bogged down in an Afghanistan-like quagmire). The Russian aim is simply to either wreck Ukraine as a functional state or ensure regime change. — neomac

I highly doubt Mearsheimer made that claim. There's no source given and a Google search yielded nothing.

I'm not randomly assuming Russian military/intelligence failures, I'm relying on what has been reported by legit sources. — neomac

What makes these sources legit in your mind? They provide no actual evidence to back up their claims, and their claims are counter to what military logic dictates.

As I said, I’m an avg dude so I’ll reason over the evidences accessible to me. — neomac

The thing is, you're not actually providing any evidence even when I've been repeatedly asking for it. Newspaper clippings and wikipedia articles are not evidence. Furthermore, you seem to lack the basic foundational knowledge on the topic to detect complete fiction.

In other words, so far, if Russians wanted to threaten/capture Kiev as expected, ... — neomac

Either of those options would have vastly different implications, so I'm not sure why you are treating them as though they are the same.

Threatening Kiev is what actually happened, and it actually ended up with the Ukrainians and Russians entering negotations, which proceeded to a stage where an agreement was nearly reached.

What you're arguing is that the "real" Russian intentions were to capture Kiev. To make that argument you will need to provide some kind of evidence that you know something about the "real" Russian intentions. Predictably, no such evidence has been presented.


There is little information about the Battle of Kiev and the Kiev offensive. The Ukrainian order of battle is undisclosed. The Russian forces were only estimated between 15,000 - 30,000 over a month-long period, out of a 190,000.

The only source for losses I was able to find was this one, stating some ~200 Ukrainians have died in the fighting for Kiev roughly one month into the invasion, and that includes civilians.

Does this give the impression that capturing Kiev was of great importance to the Russians?

No, of course not.

It suggests the exact opposite: that very little intense fighting took place at all.

You'll have to come with explanations why many of the facts do not seem to line up with your view. And with every "special" explanation that accounts for the lack of factual evidence, your position becomes less convincing.


I wonder why the Ukrainian order of battle remains undisclosed. Perhaps it has something to do with the heroic victory it has been framed as by the mainstream media, and that the Ukrainian order of battle may suggest something less heroic - perhaps even suggest something like a successful Russian diversion?

First, forcing a negotiation doesn’t exclude regime change. Putin’s request might have been a transition to a pro-West political leadership without bloodshed or detention or persecution for Zelensky. — neomac

We know roughly what was on the table during those first negotiations, and it didn't include regime change.

Second, I don’t need to question the fact that Putin had other options than the decapitation of Zelensky’s regime, or that Putin preferred ta negotiation over a regime change. Either cases do not exclude the fact that Putin ALSO pursued regime change, given that in phase one of the war there were also several Russian backed assassination attempts against Zelensky — neomac

Installing a puppet regime, regime change and decapitation are three completely different subjects. You are shifting your goalposts.

Decapitation is a military-strategic goal that aims to sow chaos in the enemy's command & control, for example by taking out leadership figures and destroying central communication networks. The Russians probably pursued that strategy as a integral part of their military doctrine (so does the US).

The idea that the Russians could pursue the political goal of regime change in Ukraine by killing Zelensky is just silly. Zelensky would simply be replaced by another pro-Western talking head and literally nothing would change.

And we've already discussed the notion of installing a puppet regime without actually controlling Ukraine or destroying the Ukrainian military - outlandish.

I would prefer to read directly from your source. — neomac

https://liveuamap.com/



You can see the territories the Russian forces occupied during their drive on Kiev, which are now coloured in blue. Urban areas were bypassed, large swathes of open ground were left completely ignored. That's not what an attempt to seize and hold looks like.

You can contrast it with the manner in which southern Ukraine was occupied - every free inch of ground was taken and nests of resistance were systematically sieged and wiped out.

Said that, I’m interested less in discussing the details of Putin’s military tactics and strategy on the battlefield, than discussing the overall status of Putin’s “special military operation” in light of Putin’s endgame — neomac

Alright. Lets start with hearing the details of how the Russians planned to install a puppet regime while occupying less than 20% of the country and with the Ukrainian military occupying the rest.

They somehow capture Kiev, install a puppet, and the western backing, Ukrainian military and Ukrainian resistance magically go 'poof!' while an 190,000 man army maintains control over a population of 41 million in a country that has an area of 600,000 square kilometers?

Concerning the first point, Kiev is the political capital if the endgame is to impact Kiev’s foreign politics would obviously be the first place to go. — neomac

The Russians clearly sought to impact Kiev's foreign policy. The point of contention is whether capturing Kiev was their main goal in order to do so, and there doesn't seem to be much evidence to support that view. Capturing Kiev would take days, weeks even months of urban fighting and an enormous amount of manpower.

It seems way more likely, given the way the Russian forces invaded northern Ukraine, that they sought to force Kiev to negotiate, which again, they succeeded at. In case negotations failed the attack in the north would have still created room for the attack in the south.

Concerning the second, as I said movements on the battlefield (independently from the intelligence/military poor performance) are not the only relevant factor, Putin might have counted also on a network of collaborationist insiders (he also publicly singled his favour for an Ukrainian military coup). — neomac

I will take verifiable facts over rumors and hearsay. The things you are suggesting; military incompetence, intelligence failures, miscalculations - they all fit the "Russian incompetence" narrative the West has been spinning since the start of the war, yet when we look at what evidence there actually is to support it, there's little to no substance. Speculation, anonymous US intelligence officals, etc.

Fact remains that the Russians went to war against a larger force, which had been heavily supported by the US for years. Going to war under such terms, even to a layman, should be a highly risky proposition and to suggest the Russians weren't aware of that I think is short-sighted and simple.

Concerning the fourth, your views do not change what we know about the geopolitical endgame of Putin, nor Putin’s and other Russian government representatives’ declarations against Zelensky’s regime, nor Russian deal-breaker conditions for a negotiation. — neomac

Ok, what do you think we know about the Russians' geopolitical endgame?

Do you know more than us? The closest we have come to getting a glimpse are the negotiations that took place in March. Several reliable sources have given similar accounts that the Russians and Ukrainians were prepared to make serious concessions. The most important demand of the Russians: Ukraine does not join NATO.

That just so happens to fit exactly with what they have been telling us for the last 15 years.

I doubt that Russians would be free to acknowledge “colossal intelligence failures” especially if that might involve Putin’s responsibilities. — neomac

You're just assuming colossal intelligence failures took place, without actually having any idea of what Russian intelligence looked like? Odd.

I don't think the Russian invasion needs to be viewed as a colossal disaster when we take into consideration the Russians went into Ukraine with a "limited aim strategy," which is Mearsheimer's argument.

I think there are strong indications that the Russians went into Ukraine with limited aims. The number of troops they deployed, the terms they presented during the negotations, etc.

Have people mistaken this for the Lounge or something?

Keep things on topic please.

So what else was the purpose of aiming at capturing or threatening Kiev if not regime change? — neomac

Options include:
1) Showing the West the Russian threats were no bluff.
2) Forcing Kiev to the negotiating table, which, we now know, they succeeded in.
3) Creating a diversion for the offensive in the south.

The pattern of troop movements suggests the Russian drive on Kiev was unlikely to have as its goal to occupy and hold. They bypassed large pockets of resistance, which is something you can still see on the live maps today, and retreated as fast as they came.


The idea that Kiev represented the promise of victory is a notion I already dealt with before and you can find most of that exchange on page 309 and page 313 of this thread.

The idea that US experts were in some sort of unanimous agreement that Russia's invasion would be a cakewalk is debunked on the same page.


I've got nothing to say about statements of "anonymous US intelligence officials" or mainstream media.


Besides, you are making the point that the Russians suffered some colossal intelligence failure, so why are you referring to western experts and articles?

Yes I do. And also Mearsheimer is confirming it at minute 24:20 Mearsheimer of your video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qciVozNtCDM) where he claims that the strategic objective of 190K Russian troops were aiming at either capturing or threatening Kiev and conquer a large swath of territory in East and South Ukraine. And that is not implausible if one takes into account the Russian intelligence failure I was talking about (among other possible miscalculations, of course). — neomac

That's clearly not what Mearsheimer "is confirming".

You have no idea what you're talking about if you consider it feasible to install a puppet regime when an enemy force is occupying the vast majority of a country. Where'd you even get such a notion?

It's no wonder your theory hinges on Russian intelligence failures of colossal proportions, since it would require the Russians to know as little about the conduct of war as you yourself seem to.

What are you referring to with "losing the conflict over Ukraine"? Russia was already occupying Donbas and Crimea. No soft power was changing that until February 2022. — neomac

Ukrainian alignment is what the conflict is about. Donbas and Crimea did not stop Ukraine from being turned into what Russia deemed a "western bulwark on Russia's borders". That's why it was (or considered itself) losing.

So the war might have evolved in realistic ways that could still be more advantageous to Russia than the current war. — neomac

I don't see the point in indulging in fantasy. Where would you even find the type of information necessary to make a judgement about that? We probably have access to only a fraction of the relevant information as is.

I've done my homework on this. — neomac

Russia pursued regime change, denazification of Ukraine. This doesn’t require the occupation of all Ukraine, it requires to take control over Kiev and install a pro-Russian puppet regime (as the US did in Afghanistan) — neomac

When you did your homework, where did you come across ideas like this?

Straight out of military fantasy land.

Are you really implying the Russians were going to install a puppet regime in Kiev while occupying less than 1/5th of the country, with a western-trained, western-backed Ukrainian military occupying the rest, and an angry Ukrainian population to reckon with, with 190,000 troops?

If you're going to scoff at Mearsheimer and claim knowledge on the subject, don't come at me with outlandish notions such as this one. You're making a fool of yourself.

Edward Snowden's take on the significance of the balloon incident: engineered panic to divert attention from more important goings-on.

Edward Snowden claims U.S. using balloons to create panic

So all else equal (in the pre-war conditions) the counterfactual scenario I suggested would have favoured Russia more than it did the ongoing war. — neomac

I disagree, and evidently so did the Russians or they wouldn't have invaded.

Meaning? — neomac

That Russia was losing the conflict over Ukraine prior to the invasion when it was primarily decided through soft power, and is now winning (or at least shifted the balance in its favor) since by invading it shifted the emphasis to hard power, which under current conditions it can apply much better than the West.

Even if one is generically convinced about this, still Russia could have postponed further the confrontation to its own advantage. — neomac

Again I disagree, and apparently so did the Russians.

The longer the Russians let the US train, arm and finance the Ukrainians, the harder the eventual military invasion would be.

It would be more useful if you posted the military expert source, you rely on. — neomac

I already did, with time stamps and all.

Neither of these arguments are relevant to counter the arguments that there were intelligence failures on the Russian side that might have compromised their strategic objectives whatever they were. — neomac

Nonsense. Any notions your previous argument was based on isn't in any way compatible with the picture of the war from the Russian perspective that Mearsheimer sketches.

You stated the Russian troop numbers were the result of intelligence failures.

That doesn’t seem to support your claim “It's equally unlikely that with such a small force they sought to both occupy and hold Kiev and install a puppet regime and occupy and hold the southern regions”, it just supports that that military deployment wasn’t enough to subdue the entire Ukraine. — neomac

I think that supports my claim.

Mearsheimer explains how controlling a country as large as Ukraine with 190,000 troops is military fantasy, especially considering the expected resistance from the Ukrainian population. It doesn't even come close. He even states he doesn't believe the Russians had any major territorial ambitions in Ukraine for the very same reasons.

Some of China's response to the incident. It seems fairly level-headed.

It will be interesting to see what countermeasures Beijing is talking about here.

I'm fairly certain that if they shoot so much as a paper plane with an American flag out of the sky there will be a riot.

Not sure to understand what you are talking about here. — neomac

With the amount of financial and military support that was flowing into Ukraine before the war, there was no chance of Russia destabilizing Ukraine.

Ukraine was rapidly shedding all Russian influence. In terms of soft power the Russians were already on the defensive. That's why they had to resort to hard power and that's the reason they invaded.

The idea that Russia could have gotten what it wanted without military means is nonsensical given the gravity of the military invasion that took place, which they themselves must have been fully aware of.

In other words, I pretty much exclude the possibility that Russia could have gotten its way in Ukraine without resorting to military means.

I don’t see how the pre-war “amount of bilateral support” to Ukraine could have rendered the Russian resistance unsustainable in a counterfactual scenario that is way less challenging than the current conflict. — neomac

Because Russia changed the rules of the game when it invaded. In war, soft power goes (mostly) off the table, and in terms of hard power Russia (for now) has the advantage.

First, let’s clarify the terminology here: to me “coup d'etat” typically means a violent/illegal overthrow of a regime by institutional figures like politicians and military (e.g. Trump backed US capitol riot can be accused of being an attempted coup d’etat). “Revolutions” are typically violent/llegal overthrow of a regime but stemming from ordinary masses.
Second, Maidan Revolution was a popular revolution. And as far as I know no Ukrainian politicians/military plotted to forcefully remove Yanukhovic. Indeed, Yanukovych signed a transition deal with Ukraine opposition brokered by Russia and the European Union (https://www.politico.eu/article/yanukovych-signs-transition-deal-with-ukraine-opposition/).
Third, the revelations about Victoria Nuland are not enough to support the claim that the US participated in a coup. The US supported the popular revolution and pro-European political candidates, but they may just have lobbied and supported campaign/propaganda to amplify or direct consensus over certain politicians (even the American domestic politics works that way). It would be different if you could provide compelling evidence that the US (intentionally) financed the armed revolutionaries (as the Americans did in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bay_of_Pigs_Invasion).
But even in this case, talking about “coup” and “orchestration” doesn’t seem to me more than an attempt to mount a preconceived polemic dismissive of the pro-Western Ukrainian movements, as if the Ukrainians didn’t have enough domestic reasons to be deeply dissatisfied with Yanukhovic and Russian interference and revolt (compare it with the recent revolts in Iran). — neomac

Spare me the apologetics.

Nothing so “inevitable” then. — neomac

Given the fact that the US was never planning to take Russian security concerns into consideration and basically invited war at every turn, certainly inevitable.

The small number of troops at the beginning of the war was likely because Russians didn’t expect the kind of fierce resistance the Ukrainians demonstrated... — neomac

Unlikely, since the Russians were fully aware of the size of the Ukrainian force, and the fact that it was equipped and trained by the US.

It's equally unlikely that with such a small force they sought to both occupy and hold Kiev ánd install a puppet regime ánd occupy and hold the southern regions.

The theories you're suggesting are basically military impossibilities, though popular among laymen and the ever-churning propaganda machines.

It would be easier if you specified at what point of that video Mearsheimer is offering arguments in support of your belief that "the territories they [the Russians] occupied in east and southern Ukraine probably roughly coincide with the initial aims of the invasion". — neomac

23:05 - 27:20 discusses the implications of the size of the Russian invasion force.

1:30:40 - 1:32:00 Mearsheimer makes the point that he believes Russian territorial ambitions escalated as the war progressed.

Mearsheimer throughout the lecture actually argues that Russia might not have had any major territorial ambitions at the start of the war.

And recent revelations about the peace negotiations that took place weeks into the conflict might actually support that view. The Russians were willing to make major concessions when they negotiated for Ukrainian neutrality, and it might only be after the negotiations failed that the Russian strategy changed to annexing parts of Ukraine.

Jeffrey Sachs's take on Naftali Bennett's revelations about the peace negotiations that took place in March/April 2022 start at 15:30.

In short, Sachs states Bennett's version of events pretty much exactly coincide with the information he had received from the various parties involved in the negotiations.


The US is becoming the elephant in the room, isn't it?

Kyiv says it shot down Russian balloons over Ukraine's capital

It seems other nations are following the example set by the U.S. and guarding their air space more tenaciously.

An alternative theory could be that, sort of in line with 's point, that the balloons have been there for a long time, possibly with full knowledge of the U.S., but it chose this moment in time to shoot them down to send a message.

Another possibility is that these balloons have indeed been there for a long time, but somehow managed to slip under the U.S. radar systems through some use of technology, and that they have now figured out how to spot them.

My point here is that if the Chinese came up with the grand idea that they were going to hold a camera over Montana and think they were going to see something that airplanes, radar, satellites, Google maps, and passersbys don't already see and that was going to give them some advantage, they aren't quite the threat we thought them to be. — Hanover

I agree, and we pretty much know for a fact that the Chinese are smarter than that, because they have all the capacity they need to perform reconnaissance from space.

This is part of the weirdness I tried to draw attention to.

At the same time, the Chinese weather balloon excuse doesn't sound that convincing either, would you agree?

I love these sorts of interviews and talks that were given before the full gravity of the situation in Ukraine became apparent. Less self-censorship, politicization and hindsight. Mostly just honest conversation.

I had never seen this interview. Thanks for sharing it.

Some interesting quotes:

At the beginning of [2014] there existed in Ukraine a slightly pro-Russian though very shaky government. That situation was fine for Moscow: after all, Russia did not want to completely control Ukraine or occupy it; it was enough that Ukraine not join NATO and the EU. Russian authorities cannot tolerate a situation in which western armed forces are located a hundred or so kilometers from Kursk or Voronezh.

The United States, for its part, were interested in forming a pro-Western government in Ukraine. They saw that Russia is on the rise, and were eager not to let it consolidate its position in the post-Soviet space. The success of the pro-Western forces in Ukraine would allow the U.S. to contain Russia.

Here you have two countries: one wants a Ukraine that is neutral. The other wants Ukraine to form part of a line of containment against Russian expansion. One cannot say that one party is mistaken: both are acting based on their national interests. It’s just that these interests don’t jive.

Russia had begun to take certain steps that the United States considered unacceptable. Primarily in Syria. (Note: NOT Europe!) It was there that Russians demonstrated to the Americans that they are capable of influencing processes in the Middle East. And the US has enough problems in that part of the world already without the Russians.

Russians intervened in the process in the Middle East among other reasons because they had hoped to get leverage to influence US policy in other areas. But they miscalculated. The United States thought that it was Russia’s intent to harm them.

It is in this context that we should be evaluating the events in Ukraine. The Russians, apparently, simply have not calculated how seriously the US side might perceive their actions or the extent to which they can easily find countermeasures. It was in this situation that the United States took a look at Russia and thought about what it wants to see happen least of all: instability in Ukraine.

KOMMRERSANT: So you think Ukraine is a form of revenge for Syria?

GEORGE FRIEDMAN: No, not revenge. But Russian intervention in the process in Syria, while the United States was still addressing the problems in Iraq, and was in negotiations with Iran … In Washington, many people have the impression that Russian want to destabilize the already fragile US position in the Middle East – a region that is of key importance for America.

About this question there were two different points of views in Washington: that the Russian were just fooling around, or that they have found a weak point of the US and were trying to take advantage of it. I’m not saying that Russia’s intervention in the Syrian conflict was the cause of the Ukrainian crisis, that would be a stretch. But this intervention tipped the balance of opinion in Washington in the direction of the opinion that Russian is a problem. And in that case what does one do? Not confront them in the Middle East. Better to pull their attention away to a problem in some other region.

Now all of this is a bit oversimplified, obviously it is all more complicated than this in practice, but the cause and effect relationship is as I just described it. As a result, the bottom line is that it is in the strategic interests of the United States to prevent Russia from becoming a hegemon. And it is in the strategic interests of Russia not to allow the United States to come to its borders.

How would you rephrase those expressions in more objective terms? — neomac

The U.S. acts self-interestedly to maintain its position of domination (basic realism).

About the term hubris I would change nothing, because that's exactly what it is. The U.S. has been acting with severe disregard for other nations' interests, and that behavior is now undermining its own power.

All right, then what were you referring to when you wrote “If there was any, it was one-sidedly coming from the West” in your previous post? — neomac

NATO expansion.

There is a misunderstanding. — neomac

The only misunderstanding here is that you seem to believe babbling on about cognitive dissonance is going to help your case any.

Second, maybe the US was going to pursue that policy as it did for 30 years, but it’s not evident that it would have succeeded since Germans and French could still have opposed Ukraine joining NATO — neomac

The problem is the one I have described earlier: the U.S. was in the process of turning Ukraine into a U.S. ally on a bilateral basis, completely circumventing NATO.

The Germans and the French had no power to stop that.

Yet even in the current conditions Western Europeans are still reluctant to discuss about NATO membership for Ukraine. — neomac

With the current condition being large-scale war between Russia and what is basically a NATO proxy, their opinions are even more irrelevant than they were in times of peace.

The European powers are a bunch of suckers, piggybacking on the U.S. defense budget and apparently believing that will not completely wipe out their bargaining power.

They're essentially U.S. vassals given the illusion of relevance.

I wouldn’t exclude the possibility that Putin was in condition to keep supporting the separatist fight in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea with the revenue from Nord Stream 2 to destabilise Ukraine ... — neomac

With the amount of bilateral support it was receiving from the U.S., I would pretty much exclude that possibility.

I’m not sure to understand why you keep talking about “coup d'etat” supported by the US. — neomac

We've got U.S. officials admitting to sending Ukraine billions of USD of support prior to 2014, and to being deeply involved in constructing the post-coup government in Ukraine.

Clearly the U.S. was involved, supported the coup and, as I said earlier, I am still entertaining the hypothesis that the U.S. largely orchestrated it. We know the U.S. is capable of such things, and its fingerprints are all over it.

(why wasn’t the Kerch Bridge enough?) — neomac

You can't seriously believe that the Russians would be content to dangle Crimea by a single bridge.

If any real attempt at attacking Crimea were made, that bridge would not last a single day.

If Putin’s was preparing for this war after 2014 for whatever reason [...], something has been holding his “special military operation” until 2022, — neomac

A war of this magntitude requires planning and preparation, obviously. Besides, they did not have the power of hindsight and did seek to exhaust the alternatives. Even late into 2021 the Russians were still trying to pursue a diplomatic solution.

so I find your claim of “inevitability” debatable — neomac

The U.S. started arming Ukraine shortly after the 2014 coup and subsequent invasion of Crimea.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/russia-fsb-intelligence-ukraine-war/ — neomac

Seems like a rather weak article to me, that presupposes the Russian invasion was a complete failure. While that seems to be part of the western narrative, I see little evidence to suggest it is true.

The Russians invaded Ukraine while outnumbered, with a force that was way too small to occupy all of it. This leads me to believe that the territories they occupied in east and southern Ukraine probably roughly coincide with the initial aims of the invasion.

Mearsheimer makes that point in detail.