I think the fact that events in the past affect the present, and the events in the present affect the future, should not be confused with either being real.

Neither past nor future is real. If they are real, then where are they?

Even in your metaphorical language ("the soul loses its wings"), you allude to obvious limitations. — Hanover

There are biological and physical realities, of course. People can't fly, if you don't breathe you die, etc.

But I don't view identity as a reality. It's a set of beliefs we have about ourselves. Or, If identity can be said to be real and impose limitations on the individual, my view would be that reason is the means to transcend it.

It's something we can control, or even dispose of altogether, if we want to, and if we develop the tools to understand it.

Even if one chooses to keep some concept of identity for the sake of interpersonal communication, there is likewise no reason one should come to view it as truly defining oneself or growing attached.

In order for there to be "radical free choice" or anything near it, there would have to be no human nature. Nothing built in. We would have to be born as blank slates. — T Clark

Close your eyes. Think of nothing. There's your blank slate. ;)

But in all seriousness, I view 'human nature' more as tendencies we humans have when we're not in control. If you let go of the steering wheel in your car, you'll probably not end up going straight and crashing into a tree.

We override our natural tendencies all the time, showing that we can be in control, if we want to.

These quotes strike me as a radical free choice position, suggesting we choose our gender, as opposed to our being born with a gender opposite our biology.

Your position doesn't remind me as much of Plato as it does Sarte. — Hanover

I suppose you could view it as a radical free choice position.

However, that freedom of choice can only come about in a well-organized mind, in which the reasoning faculty is firmly in control (for which I like to use Plato's three-part soul).

When it comes to gender debates, the question often seems to be whether it is nature (biological / instinctive drives) or nurture (societal pressures) that defines us.

I view both as obstacles.

Mine perhaps isn't so much a free choice position, but a 'free to explore' position, for which the same prerequisite applies.

I believe one can only explore that which is truly authentic to the self when one is free of external pressures on the mind. That includes both nature and nurture, and thus societally-constructed gender identities, whether they're traditional or trans.

In terms of identity men and women or trans do not exist. Those terms are societal shorthand - useful tools to make communicating a bit easier. But all that exists are unique individuals. The second the individual starts to accept these generalizations as actually defining them, the soul loses its wings.

We are conditioned to regard the self as something that is constructed by taking a shopping cart and putting in it those of society's boxes that we like. In so doing, we don't discover the self but we assume a fake, external identity or persona. To a degree that's necessary to function in society, but the problem is we end up unable to see the difference - unable to see that what we're doing is putting up a display for others.

Since you gave the metaphor of the wave and the horse, I could not help but remember Plato's allegory from Phaedrus of the charioteer and their chariot drawn by two steeds:

Of the nature of the soul, though her true form be ever a theme of large and more than mortal discourse, let me speak briefly, and in a figure. And let the figure be composite - a pair of winged horses and a charioteer. Now the winged horses and the charioteers of the gods are all of them noble and of noble descent, but those of other [beings] are mixed; the human charioteer drives his in a pair; and one of them is noble and of noble breed, and the other is ignoble and of ignoble breed; and the driving of them of necessity gives a great deal of trouble to him. I will endeavour to explain to you in what way the mortal differs from the immortal creature. The soul in her totality has the care of inanimate being everywhere, and traverses the whole heaven in divers forms appearing - when perfect and fully winged she soars upward, and orders the whole world; whereas the imperfect soul, losing her wings and drooping in her flight at last settles on the solid ground - there, finding a home, she receives an earthly frame which appears to be self-moved, but is really moved by her power; and this composition of soul and body is called a living and mortal creature. For immortal no such union can be reasonably believed to be; although fancy, not having seen nor surely known the nature of God, may imagine an immortal creature having both a body and also a soul which are united throughout all time. Let that, however, be as God wills, and be spoken of acceptably to him. And now let us ask the reason why the soul loses her wings!

I don't know if you'll agree on its relevance, but it's certainly a beautiful quote.

And that last line captures my feelings about this topic; when the individual simply accepts biological drives as facts of life, or accepts being put into a box by societal pressures, it's like the soul loses its wings - it loses a part of its essence, that part which in Plato's terms could be called divine and immortal.

It is questionable which people are in control, as having the 'tools for self-definition'? Is it the ones who conform happily to stereotypes or those who are gender dysphoric? — Jack Cummins

Defining the self through stereotypes seems contradictory whether they're traditional boxes or new boxes. We weren't happy with others trying to jam our square peg into their round hole - why would we want to take over the jamming?

The size of the attack and the use of paratroops to seize a central airport doesn't logically sound as a diversionary attack or feint. — ssu

What or whose logic are you referencing when you say those things aren't logical?

It goes totally against, actually the thing you mentioned, the Schwerpunkt-tactic. — ssu

A centre of gravity isn't a tactic, and there is no such thing as Schwerpunkt tactics. It's a military concept that describes the thing or a place a military force gains its strength from.

For example, one might claim the centre of gravity of the Ukrainian forces is the central communications and C&C hub in Kiev.

I disagree with that. I don't think at any point in this war the Ukrainian forces depended on Kiev to continue its operations.

And what then was then the effort that was called Kyiv convoy, a 64km long convoy stuck there to do what? — ssu

Sounds like logistical congestion?

Friction (another Clausewitzian concept) is a typical occurence in war, and failures big and small will always occur in massive military operations.

It wasn't a feint or diversion as the attacking forces were quite the same as the attacking forces attacking Kharkiv, which also wasn't taken. — ssu

Why would the same military force not be able to carry out the same two tasks?

A feint, a diversionary attack, an assault, etc. these are all standard military manoeuvres that units are able to carry out at all levels of command.

I think you should give some credible arguments that this operation was a feint or just a diversion. — ssu

If I use the Occam's razor, [...] — ssu

I can't look in your mind to see what you find credible. I've given you plenty of arguments already. If you're looking for simple explanations I can't help you there. War isn't a simple endeavor.

There's simply too much anecdotal evidence of this, just like this brief encounter from the start of the war: — ssu

Anecdotal evidence is evidence that cannot be verified (and thus is easiliy construed). The video you shared isn't an anecdote - it's actual evidence, of two vehicles breaking down. That literally happens all the time, so I'm not sure why you believe it to be significant.

As I quoted earlier a highly regarded Western think tank, they didn't believe that Ukraine could repel an attack towards Kyiv from the Russian armed forces just few months before it was tried. — ssu

Don't try to make your sources more authoritative than they actually are.

An expert wrote that article, and experts are often wrong. And they were wrong this time. Nothing new under the sun.

You're trying to make it sound like this article constitutes some form of official statement by CSIS. This is clearly not the case. Here's another article from CSIS, written by the same author no less, from January 2022: Russia's Possible Invasion of Ukraine

Suddenly there is no mention of Kiev falling within six hours. In fact, the author states:

Kiev has almost 3 million inhabitants, Kharkiv has roughly 1.5 million, Odessa has 1 million, Dnipro has almost 1 million, Zaporizhia has 750,000, and even Mariupol has almost 500,000. If defended, these large urban areas could take considerable time and casualties to clear and occupy. In the First Chechen War, it took Russian forces from December 31, 1994, to February 9, 1995, to wrestle control of Grozny, then a city of less than 400,000, from a few thousand Chechen fighters. In the Second Chechen War, the siege of Grozny also took six weeks.

And he continues:

Therefore, the best course of action for Russian troops would be to bypass urban areas and mop them up later.

Kiev poses a similar challenge and, as the nation’s capital, possesses great symbolic value for whichever side holds it.

This will be the first time since World War II that Russia’s ground forces will face a modern mechanized opponent, and its air forces will face an opponent with a modern air force and air defense system. Consequently, Russian forces will likely face notable challenges in command, control, communications, and coordination.

Kiev and the Dnepr River crossings are at least 150 to 200 road miles from the Russian border, and its army will require at least several days of fighting to reach them.

As the operational depth in Ukraine is far greater than in the Baltics, a Russian invasion of Ukraine could be a longer affair than some anticipate due to the time and distance to bring up supplies.

In addition, Ukraine could potentially prevent Russia from seizing and holding all or most of its territory with U.S. and other international aid.

Sounds like a few months later your guy, Seth G. Jones - the one you keep pretending represents formal positions of CSIS - is supporting my argument, and not yours.

Do your research, don't be lazy, and don't try to make your sources more authoritative than they actually are. Thanks.

I think we're done here.

It does seem to me that hypersexualisation is an aspect of Western culture. The context of this may be important in understanding why people develop transgender identities. This may be a useful area for thinking about, rather than simply viewing gender dysphoria as in terms of individual psychology. — Jack Cummins

It's interesting that hyper-sexualization in men and women, and gender dysphoria, all seem body dysmorphic in nature.

Simone De Beauvoir argued that women are not made but become women. The sociologist, Ann Oakley, developed this in her analysis of the nurture aspect of gender development. Of course, there is still the critical role, which hormones have on the brain, and possibly some biological significance of the chromosomes too. — Jack Cummins

I suppose there must be some biological "wiring" - after all, when we look at human societies throughout time and space we see by and large the same types of roles attributed to men and women. Though, not exclusively, so societal factors definitely play a role.

But the real question is, why should the individual be content to let society or their supposed "biological wiring" define them?

The answer lies in the following; if the reasoning faculty of the mind isn't firmly in control, one essentially lacks the psychological tools for self-definition, and one will simply be a ball tossed between nature and nurture, forever blind to what was already there from the beginning - the self.

Physically and at the extremes, they are very different.

Psychologically and on average, they are not that different.

In terms of personality people have always exhibited traits from both ends. 'Masculine' women and 'feminine' men are nothing new. One might even say that developing certain traits from the opposite sex, or at least a strong understanding of them, is an important step into becoming a psychologically adult human.

It is only in recent times, quite possibly as a result the extreme comfort we live in, that societies started developing an infatuation with hyper-sexualization.

That isn't a surprise. It's supposedly well-documented that as barriers are removed, differences between the sexes tend to become more pronounced.

My personal theory about this is that it is a result of the lack of meaning a lot of people experience in modern society. They turn to the most basic source of self-esteem, which is sexuality and sex appeal - a product of the strong(est?) instinct to reproduce.

So we enter the era of hyper-sexualized men and women, who pride themselves in being "hyper-masculine" or "hyper-feminine", and of people whom by their personal physical and psychological makeup cannot attain these ideals, yet still are drawn to the same source of self-esteem. Because for many, there's nothing else. And it's something that western society (perhaps subconsciously) attempts to drill into people's minds from an early age.

The transgender movement is the counterculture reaction to this, and as with anything our decadent society comes up with, it's equally extreme and problematic, and devoid of all nuance.


The individual is wise to avoid all of these movements. Mankind has a long tradition of wisdom literature that pertains to the development of the self, the incorporation of the male and female, etc. For important things, turn to the wise, not to the masses.

Is biology destiny[...]? — Jack Cummins

Biology is destiny for those who do not develop the capacity to understand and control their biological makeup and instinctual and subconscoius drives. As Plato argues, the reasoning faculty of man should be in firm control over the temperamental and desiring parts of the mind.

What are your thoughts [...] in relation to what it means to be a man or a woman? — Jack Cummins

Apart from biological realities, it means nothing. It's up to the individual to discover and develop their own unique makeup, instead of trying to jam the square peg of the self into the round hole of society's defunct stereotypes.

If the monolith were to represent the Jungian shadow, this leaves the question of why the monolith on the moon directs mankind towards Venus, though. :chin:

Perhaps violence and violent technology are the shadow, and only a by-product of the monolith. And perhaps David's defeat of HAL signifies the mastery / incorporation of the shadow.

Sidenote; HAL's appearance is essentially a giant eye. David defeated Goliath by striking him in the eye with a rock thrown from a sling. (EDIT: Oops, no it seems he struck him in the forehead).

Maybe a bit off-topic, but have you ever noticed this?

David Bowman.

David slays Goliath - HAL.

Bowman, Sagittarius, has as its ruling planet Jupiter, travels to Venus. Just so happens to be an astrological match made in heaven. Jupiter, the Husband, Venus, the Wife, this synthesis turns Bowman into the starchild - seems to strongly imply a Jungian incorporation of the masculine and the feminine.

Speaking of Jung, could the monolith be a symbol for the Jungian shadow self?

Regarding violence, it is present in the prehistory, moon discovery, and the space voyage scenes. There was much establishment of a tense cold war problem in the moon scenes. HAL kills the whole crew except for one. Kubrick seems to be linking an element to each progression rather than transcending it. — Paine

That's true. I think especially the danger of technology is a theme that's present throughout the film. Even the ape's primitive bone weapon could be seen as man's first dabble with 'technology', but the weapons satellites and HAL are definitely examples of that.

Yet, the monolith is only involved with the very first step. The weapons satellite and HAL are made by humans. After the prologue the monolith doesn't seem to 'cause' any violence anymore.

I love 2001, and am a great fan of Kubrick's works.

The monolith is a fascinating theme. I've watched so many interpretations of it, but none seemed truly satisfactory.

My personal take on it is that the monolith symbolizes something like humanity's capacity for abstract thought (including things like geometry and mathematics). Its flat shape and straight corners are some of its defining features, yet these things are very rare in nature. They are completely prevalent throughout our society today. You could almost say our society is based on them. (If you want to entertain a particularly spooky thought - our society is completely filled with monoliths - computer/telephone/tv screens.)

It makes its first appearance during prehistoric times, when it seems to give the apes the idea to use bones as weapons.

However, when it appears for a second time in a more modern era, it is no longer just associated with weapons. Though the way the bone weapon and the missile satellite overlap during the transition between scenes implies Kubrick still draws the parallel.
In modern times, abstract thought is very strongly manifested in the use of technology, as we see in 2001. I think it is implied this signifies the second stage of human abstract thought. This time, the monolith is found during a lunar excavation, and points the way to Venus, so its role during this stage seems to have changed, away from violence, towards advanced technology.

The third monolith that's encountered I believe is in Venus' orbit, and it is on Venus where David Bowman experiences a sort of transformation / rebirth / spiritual awakening / enlightenment. To me this strongly implies Kubrick sees this as the next stage of human abstract thought, and thus human evolution.


Do you know Rob Ager and his YouTube channel Collative Learning? He has a lot of material on Kubrick movies, including 2001 and the meaning of the monolith.

No one with any thoughts on Scott Ritter's interviews?

I linked this interview a few days ago and I'm curious what the forum thinks of this man.

Are we to believe then, that if the Russian 'probe' had succeeded all the way to Kiev, it would have been a failure of the Russian strategy? — Olivier5

A probing attack or a feint are non-committal attacks.

A probe is meant to gauge the degree of enemy resistance in a certain area. A feint is meant to provoke an overreaction.

Had the Russians been able to take Kiev with such an attack, it would imply the Ukrainians let them walk into Kiev basically unopposed.

Honestly, that hypothetical scenario isn't really worth considering.

It's a bit pointless to speculate over something as unlikely as the Russians being able to take Kiev free of cost. Who is to say what they would have done in that case?

Maybe they would not have taken the city, despite getting it "for free", for the reasons I've already explained. Maybe they would have taken the city, but abandoned it later. Or perhaps they would have taken and held the city for as long as they could, even though it's a massive commitment to occupy a city like Kiev. I find the first two options a lot more likely than the third.

But this is just speculation over a very unlikely hypothetical scenario, about an event that has already taken place.

Seems that you aren't a von Clausewitz fan. — ssu

Why not? 'Centre of gravity' (Schwerpunkt) is a Clausewitzian term. ;)

It is in Russia's primary interest that Ukraine continues to fight this war themselves. The capture of Kiev and it's C&C facilities could bring a western intervention closer. — Tzeentch

How? The US won't start WW3 because of Ukraine. — ssu

They probably won't start WW3, but the United States is deeply invested in Ukraine, starting with the Bush administration fourteen years ago in 2008, and possibly earlier.

A total defeat of Ukraine would be a major blow to the United States, both in terms of investments lost and reputation. That's something they cannot afford in a time where US hegemony is being overtly challenged.

If under current conditions a total defeat of Ukraine is threatened, the United States won't let that happen quietly, even if it means risking escalation.

Putin isn't the only one capable of brinkmanship.

I wonder why you find it so hard to agree that a) Russians did try to take the Capital — ssu

Because I remain unconvinced that they made a serious effort to do so, and the attack was likely a probe, followed by a diversionary attack or feint.

b) once the defense was far more stiffer than anticipated, they understood that some Stalingrad/Grozny -type slow methodical overtaking of the capital was immensely costly and likely counterproductive, so they opted to withdraw understanding their limited resources. — ssu

I think those things played a role in their decision-making process. Your particular take on it seems to be that the Russians ran into unanticipated resistance.

Again, I keep pointing to the limited troops the Russians have deployed, making it in my view unlikely that their war aims were to take the capital and take and hold a lot of territory in the south. They simply didn't have the manpower to make that happen.

At the onset of war, it was roughly 200,000 Russian troops versus roughly 250,000 Ukrainian troops. Most contemporary military doctrine prescribes at least a 3:1 numerical advantage when on the offensive, and preferably even a 5:1 advantage. The Russians didn't even have a numerical advantage, they were outnumbered!

Sure, they may have believed their troops were qualitatively superior, but no qualitative edge can bridge such a gap. These things were all on the table before the invasion began, so the Russians knew what they were in for.

Was the Ukrainian resistance stiffer than they had anticipated? Maybe. But we need to have a sense of proportion. We don't know the Russian war aims, so we have nothing to compare their current situation with, other than estimating what their war aims might've been, based on the few things we do know.

If one's opinion is that the Russians expected to take Kiev in a few hours and Ukraine in an equally rapid amount of time, they'd obviously not be doing well.

If however one's opinion is that the Russians aimed for a limited war - something which I believe is supported by the available evidence I have discussed - it paints a different picture.

And what about your implied claim that Russia was aiming for a full-scale invasion of Kiev? — Tzeentch

Please now, Tzeentch, try yourself to back up your words and say that the battle for Kyiv wasn't a push to try to take the capital. — ssu

I meant to write 'full-scale invasion of Ukraine' there, but I also find it plausible that the Russians did not intend to take and hold Kiev, even if they could have. I've already presented arguments why I believe that.

In summary:

- The Ukraine's centre of gravity is not in Kiev, because this war isn't conducted from Kiev. It's foreign support that is keeping this war going. Capturing Kiev would be symbolic, but not decisive.

- With the limited amount of troops Russia has deployed, it is unlikely they intended to spend the time and effort it would require to capture Kiev, when they had areas of strategic significance to occupy in the south.

- It is in Russia's primary interest that Ukraine continues to fight this war themselves. The capture of Kiev and it's C&C facilities could bring a western intervention closer.

- My view is that the drive on Kiev was a show of force and Russia's last attempt at finishing the conflict quickly. By showing they were not bluffing, they could conceivably have made the West back off and forced a renegotiation of Ukraine's position. If this were to fail, which it did, it could double as a diversionary attack to allow Russian forces to occupy the south with less resistance.

And then you say that doesn't refute the idea that everybody thought Ukraine was prepared and could stage a fight as it has done. :roll:

That's simply laughable. Insane. — ssu

LOL! :rofl: — ssu

Much of the things we are discussing here are speculatory, and not factual. Multiple perspectives are possible, and finding one perspective more convincing than others does not mean that the other perspectives are completely without merit. Time will tell, and it's entirely possible that when they open the archives that all of us were wrong.

But if you're so convinced you're right and find perspectives that conflict with yours "laughable" and "insane", then why are you here? If an echo chamber is what you're looking for you can just turn on the tv.

Yesterday there was a lengthy interview with Scott Ritter, a former USMC intelligence officer, who I gather is a fairly controversial figure.

Still, he had some interesting things to say and gave the impression of being both knowledgable and relatively unbiased.



Starts getting into the Ukraine war and the Kherson offensive at 18:30.

Also interested to know what the forum thinks of this man. Has he been brought up before?

And while we're on the topic of historical throwbacks.

When Nazi-Germany invaded Ukraine in June of 1941, they deployed roughly 800,000 - 1,000,000 troops, fighting against an extremely weak and disorganised Soviet military.

To anyone familiar with military doctrine and strategy, this should be no surprise. Invading and occupying a country isn't just about defeating troops, but also about supply lines and holding the ground that is taken. That requires troops, and a big country like Ukraine would require a lot of troops to fully invade and occupy.

Russia only deployed a fraction of what would be necessary to accomplish this. Mearsheimer makes this point ( The causes and consequences of the Ukraine war, he addresses it during the lecture and answers a specific question about it during the Q&A at 1:55:00 ) . To me that implies a full invasion and occupation was not their objective.

And what about this claim?

Putin made quite easily same kind of mistakes like Hitler after the victories against Poland and France. — ssu

And this claim...

Similarly Putin's earlier victories and the West's mute response made him confident the Ukrainians wouldn't be much of a match and he could pull off the invasion that he started on the 24th of February this year. — ssu

And this claim...

Russia modeled it's attack from the most successful military operation that the Soviet Union did post-WW2: Operation Danube.

The objective was to capture Kyiv ... — ssu

______


And what about your implied claim that Russia was aiming for a full-scale invasion of Ukraine?

The number of troops the Russians have deployed indicate they never intended to invade all of Ukraine. — Tzeentch

If the Ukrainians would not have defended at all, just why would you think Putin would have stopped? What Putin has said about the "artificiality" of the sovereignty of Ukraine shows clearly what he thinks about Ukraine. — ssu

Oh, and when I stated that it was a highly questionable assumption that Russia intended to hold all the territory that it occupied at one point or another, you replied characterstically with:

LOL! :rofl: — ssu

So lets hear you substantiate the claim that Russia intended to hold all territory it occupied as well.

You're going to substantiate your claims, or will you hide behind snarky comments to hide the fact you're backpeddling?

Learn what a strategic strike means in military terminology first. — ssu

Strategic strike isn't a military term used to denominate ground invasions.

I won't hold it against anyone that they're not experts on military terminology, but don't try to fake expertise.

The similarity with the occupation of Czechoslovakia and Crimea should be evident: Both were military operations where the opponent didn't fight back. Both achieved strategic surprise. Both events we even don't call wars, they were so successful. When you can achieve your objectives without even a shot fired, the military operation has really achieves it's goals. The tanks just appeared on the streets of Prague, just like the Russia paratroops appeared in Crimea, whom the Western media even didn't call out to be Russian, so totally dumbfounded was back then the Western media. The totally insane lie that these would be "Crimean volunteers" got the media confused and it fell into bothsidesing. — ssu

Czechoslovakia wasn't a Soviet Republic (like Ukraine was during the Soviet Union). And Ukraine in 2014 was totally unprepared for any military attack. There were no shots fired when Russia took over Crimea. The military was able to respond to the Donbas insurgency only far later. Ukraine was militarily prepared by the West. — ssu

And what does any of this have to do with the invasion of Ukraine?

I am talking about the troops deployed in the invasion of Ukraine. You replied by asking questions about the Crimea invasion, implying they're in any way comparable - they are not.

Now you went from comparing the invasion of Ukraine to Crimea, to comparing Crimea to Czechoslovakia. Your goalposts move quickly.

Proof:

The US offered Zelenskyi to evacuate him. Why would they offer this, if they were certain that there would be a war fought for months? Before the attack the ability for Ukraine to defend itself from a Russian aggression was seen quite futile. — ssu

How is that proof of anything? Zelensky is an obvious target for assassination regardless of what course the war took.

Why would they offer this, if they were certain that there would be a war fought for months? — ssu

There was no certainty at the onset of war. War is a terribly unpredictable thing that has a way of defying all expectations. So why would anyone assume the Russians were singularly expecting an easy repeat of Crimea? Taking into account worst-case scenarios in the monumental decision to invade Ukraine seems no more than common sense, and it's a standard of military planning.

Something like fighting a conventional war was obviously out of the question to the author above. — ssu

The author, T.X. Hammes, doesn't make that claim at all. You're making stuff up.

Secondly, he's speaking on his own behalf - not on behalf of the US government or the Atlantic Council. He simply wrote an article. And I don't find the article to be without merit. However, it doesn't claim or prove what you believe it does.

This is what the CSIS think tank thought of the chances of Ukraine in November of 2021, just months before the attack happened: — ssu

This is not what the CSIS thought - at the bottom of the page it reads:

"Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s)."

I suggest you get your quotes and attributions right.


Further, here's CNN reporting two Ukrainian officials (foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba and Ukrainian ambassador Sergiy Korsunsky) on January 26th 2022 going on record saying Russia does not have a sufficient amount of troops for a full invasion of Ukraine: CNN: Ukrainian Foreign Minister says current Russian troop numbers insufficient for full invasion

Official statements by the Ukrainian government, one month before the invasion.

At this point everyone knew the invasion was coming - the only question was when. Obviously there was plenty of reason for uncertainty. I still see zero evidence of the idea that Russia went in expecting an easy victory.

Does that mean you are indifferent to the outcome of the war? — Olivier5

I don't see it as my role to be a cheerleader for either side.

As of yet, I am not able to see the full implications of either outcome, so I reserve judgement. I just sit and watch, and try to understand.

Whose side are you on? — Olivier5

No one's. I'm not a part of this conflict.

Russia modeled it's attack from the most successful military operation that the Soviet Union did post-WW2: Operation Danube. — ssu

First it was Crimea, now it is Czechoslovakia.

Invading a diplomatically isolated, unprepared Soviet republic and invading a western-backed, militarily prepared Ukraine? The two couldn't be further apart.

You're now claiming the Russians modelled their invasion of Ukraine after their invasion of Czechoslovakia - a conflict that took place over 50 years ago? Lets see some proof then. Or anything that resembles a reasoned argument.

Similarly Putin's earlier victories and the West's mute response made him confident the Ukrainians wouldn't be much of a match and he could pull off the invasion that he started on the 24th of February this year. That since 2014 when the war started, the Ukrainians basically wouldn't have done anything. — ssu

Mhm. Except that there was an eight year period between the invasion of Crimea in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The conditions surrounding the invasion of Crimea were completely different from the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Furthermore, the element of surprise the Russians had in 2014 was not present in 2022. The United States has been preparing Ukraine since at least January 2021, and probably earlier.

Everybody and their dog knew it wasn't going to be a repeat of 2014, and that the Ukrainians would be prepared.

So getting back to your earlier response, what your claim boils down to is that Russia's troop deployments aren't a product of meticulous planning as is standard in modern militaries (argued also by experts such as Mearsheimer), but it's because they're a bunch of dummies who underestimated their opponent.


So, let's take stock:

1. The invasion of Ukraine was modelled after the invasion of Crimea? Czechoslovakia? Conflicts that couldn't be more different in nature. Wild claim. Zero substantiation. Lets see some proof then if you want to argue wild!

2. Putin is Hitler in 1941, except everything is completely different. Supposedly the invasion of Crimea eight years prior gave him all the confidence he needed to wing an invasion of a western-backed Ukraine.


You expect me to take your "they're a bunch of dummies" argument seriously, when everything from common sense to military doctrine and expert opinion points towards the Russians having made a carefully weighed decision?

That the Russians did not have enough troops deployed in and around Ukraine for a full invasion was already known in the West before the start of the invasion, with Ukrainian officials going on record stating they were not expecting a full-scale invasion, but were fearing for a more localized conflict.


All I'm seeing from you and is knee-jerk reactions whenever your flimsy ideas of how this war is going are challenged. Accusations of partisanship and "subconscious biases" - have either of you ever looked in a mirror?

How much troops did they need to annex Crimea? And the way Russia could interfere in Ukrainian politics before makes it easy to underestimate Ukrainian resolve. — ssu

Putin made quite easily same kind of mistakes like Hitler after the victories against Poland and France. — ssu

Seems like there's two wild, unsubstantiated claims in here:

1. Russia modelled their invasion of Ukraine on the previous conflict in Crimea.
2. Russia's invasion of Ukraine can from a military-strategic viewpoint be compared to Hitler's invasion of Poland and France.

The podium is all yours friend. Show the world you've got more than clowning, 'pro-Russian' accusations (which are beyond sad, by the way) and parroting western propaganda.

The reason you are "struggling to see where this idea comes from that Russia is losing" is simply that you subconsciously assume that whatever happens is a desirable outcome for the Russians. — Olivier5

I don't think this characterizes my position very well. But already said about this what needed to be said (and thank you for that ).

A wise lad once said, "Why do you see the speck in your brother's eye, but fail to see the beam of wood in your own?"

What you're implying is that all territory Russia at one point or another controlled they also meant to hold.

I think that's a highly questionable assumption.

As far as I know, Russian advances around Kiev began from the onset of the war, so I'm not sure what you're getting at.

I would say they gave the Ukrainians (but more specifically the West) a chance to back down when they threatened Kiev. — Tzeentch

My view is that this initial drive was a last attempt by the Russians to end the conflict quickly, not necessarily by taking Kiev, but by showing they weren't bluffing and their threats of war were real.

This failed, but it also drew a lot of Ukrainian manpower to the north, reducing resistance in the south, which is where the areas are located that are strategically relevant to the Russians.

If they really wanted to take Kiev, I believe they could have. But it would have taken them a lot of time and manpower, and occupying capital cities isn't all that relevant in a conflict where foreign support is the centre of gravity, so there wasn't much of a point.

Not to mention, if Russia manages to destroy Ukraine's C&C (which is generally the goal of occupying a capital city), who is going to take over that role? The West - likely the United States. The centre of gravity would shift even further towards the foreign backers, drawing them in. Russia will likely try to avoid this.

Putin is a human being, not a god. He makes mistakes, and rest assured that there are things he cannot understand. You should not assume that what seems obvious to you necessarily seems obvious to him. — Olivier5

Of course. But there are dozens if not hundreds of people working in the Kremlin. Analists, advisors, a general staff etc.

They tried and failed to capture Kiev and to kill Zelensky. Explain these facts, ... — Olivier5

I already explained my view on Russia's initial drive on Kiev.

As for Zelensky - I don't see how an assassination post-invasion would have facilitated the installation of a puppet regime. The goal behind such a move is probably aimed at sowing general chaos in the command structure.

We are long past the stage where regime change would be an option.

In the final analysis, this is not our war but we're sacrificing entire families by pushing them into poverty - that includes all the missed opportunities as a result of a lower socio-economic position in society. We're destroying the future of thousands of children in the Netherlands and I doubt it is much different in other European countries. — Benkei

I've gotten the impression the EU has taken the opportunity to use the war in Ukraine to both excuse its desastrous economic policies and to push its energy ideology.

"Never waste a good crisis," seems to be the motto they go by.

If the Ukrainians would not have defended at all, ... — ssu

That's a rather big if.

... just why would you think Putin would have stopped? — ssu

The short answer is, occupying large countries with too few troops is asking for trouble. The Russians know this first hand.

If they wanted to invade and occupy all of Ukraine, the troops they'd need to deploy to keep it under control would have to be several times what they've deployed now.

So the why is: they don't want a repeat of another Afghanistan or Vietnam.

A dictator for instance may find it difficult to fathom that killing Zelensky would not stop the resistance. — Olivier5

I would turn that around, actually. Putin and his cronies aren't fools, nor is Zelensky, nor is the Pentagon or the EU leadership - they likely know a lot more than us.

It's up to us to make sense of their actions - not to dismiss these people as dummies for acting in ways we can't make sense of at first.

But take whatever approach you will. I will stick with the one I just expressed.

The plan B was evidently to take Kiev and install a puppet regime. Didn't happen either. — Olivier5

I don't think that's evident at all.

For one, with western backing it was obvious from the outset that taking Kiev would not end the conflict. Leadership of the war is not and never has been conducted from Kiev.

Secondly, taking Kiev (or any kind of full-scale invasion of Ukraine) would have made direct western military intervention a lot more likely - Russia is obviously trying to avoid this. Keeping the conflict small(-ish) makes the bar for western powers to intervene military high. It also would have discredited the Russian narrative.

I think plan B was to accept war with the West, occupy the strategic areas in the south, and take it from there. The south is crucial, because it is both the key to Russian strategic interests pertaining to Crimea and Transnistria, and cutting off Ukraine from the sea would greatly hamstring it in the long run.

That is only your interpretation of it. — Olivier5

Sure. All we have are interpretations. But it's supported by figures like Mearsheimer. Mearsheimer makes the same point - the number of deployed troops are far below what would be feasible for a full-scale invasion and occupation of Ukraine.

My interpretation is that they expected a rapid Ukrainian surrender. — Olivier5

I would change that slightly - I would say they gave the Ukrainians (but more specifically the West) a chance to back down when they threatened Kiev.

In my opinion, this was the last point where a neutral Ukraine was still an option. They showed their hand and made it clear they weren't bluffing.

That doesn't mean they expected it to lead to a surrender or a re-negotiation of Ukraine's position, but they must've thought it was a possibility. And they must've also had a plan B, that's no more than standard military practice.

Larger still are the Ukrainian regions the Russians failed to invade. — Olivier5

The number of troops the Russians have deployed indicate they never intended to invade all of Ukraine.

And that's sensible - modern armies have the experience of many failed wars in the Middle-East to know the risks of that.

Because the Russians blown up the bridges over the Oskil river while leaving, duh... — Olivier5

Blowing up bridges doesn't stop a modern army. Ukrainian vehicles have amphibious capability, and their engineer corps possesses over bridging equipment like AVLBs.

If your position is they had the Russians in a full on rout, why didn't they take advantage of their breakthrough?

I simply said that if Russia can be beaten in this oblast, it can be beaten in other oblast. — Olivier5

But not in Kherson, apparently.

Allow me to be a bit more cynical and posit a theory of my own:

The failed Kherson offensive signaled that Ukraine was, as many had feared, no longer capable of conducting offensive operations - which would mean they had all but lost the war.

This risked to undermine support, especially abroad, at a crucial time. Likely a months-long operational pause is coming during winter, and Ukraine will need this time to rebuild and repair. To do that it needs foreign aid and a lot of it.

Meanwhile, European countries' Ukraine policies are under pressure due to growing energy insecurity. Their support for a war which many fear will be lost cannot be maintained indefinitely.

They needed something they could write off as a victory, and to convince their populations that they would not be sitting in the cold for nothing.

So after the failed Kherson offensive they chose to stage an offensive over dead ground - the Russians would not be defending it so victory was essentially guaranteed.

Then they just needed to let the propaganda machine inflate this to a victory of epic proportions - that notion probably won't be challenged before the onset of winter. Hopefully for the Ukrainians that will safeguard foreign support and buy them time to recover.

Admittedly a bit cynical. I could be totally wrong. But this is my genuine impression.

Why look at a map? — Olivier5

Because it puts things into perspective.

The Ukrainian forces took back some territory, but large parts of Ukraine remain in Russian hands. Further, it shows the offensive halted at the first natural line of defense it encountered - the Oskil river. Why would that be?

It is significant because it means that the Russians can be beaten. — Olivier5

The aforementioned implies the Russians weren't beaten, but their forward troops retreated to the first line of defense.


Anyway, back to your point.

You're implying that because Ukraine has shown the Russians can be beaten (lets put it in military terms - "is capable of offensive operations") Russia is losing the war. Seems like a jump to conclusions to me.

From them losing ground on the battlefield. — Olivier5

Looking at a map of Ukraine now, why is this significant?

I'm struggling to see where this idea comes from that Russia is losing, and I'm starting to get the impression this forum's ability for reason is buckling under a constant barrage of media propaganda.

I can't blame anyone for that, because the propaganda has been relentless.

Still, I'd like to know what factual circumstances give rise to this idea.