I was also going to remind of the formal duality that has been established between information and entropy. As signal vs noise, order vs chaos, message vs meaninglessness, we can see why information and entropy stand in relationship as the two faces of the same coin, the two dichotomous extremes of the one opposition. — apokrisis

This is classic Apo. Perfect specimen.

Half of us have no idea what Apo is talking about. He (it must be a he) regularly gets asked to put his stuff in more laymen's terms, but he never does. That's not to say it's not good stuff, just completely incomprehensible. I even bought a book once to try and help, but it didn't work. I read a bit of stuff on semiotics which helped a bit. Regarding consciousness, I still think Apo is a functionalist of sorts, but he disagrees. Who knows?

If you can explain in a few words, it’d be appreciated. — Olivier5

:gets popcorn:

No problem. I had some ideas that needed a sounding board; I suppose you had similar intentions. I'll leave the discussion now, much wiser than I was when I joined in. Thanks. Good day. — TheMadFool

I'll be especially on the lookout for fallacies of composition and division now.

Interesting. Thanks! — frank

You're every welcome, thanks for asking.

He penetrates the world "as honey does the honeycomb" (Tertullian, "Adv. Hermogenem", 44), this God so intimately mingled with the world is fire or ignited air; inasmuch as He is the principle controlling the universe, He is called Logos; and inasmuch as He is the germ from which all else develops, He is called the seminal Logos (logos spermatikos). — New Advent Encyclopedia

I like this bit. Wanking should be appreciated more for its cosmic significance.

You would have to say, as per the panpsychists' claim that everything has a soul/mind, that the original piece of wood has both 2^n souls/minds (the 2^n parts) AND 1 soul (the original piece of wood as a whole) and that's a contradiction. — TheMadFool

Not all panpsychists claim that everything has a mind, some claim only that where there is anything, there is consciousness also, i.e. the smallists mentioned above.

However you successfully target my panpsychism, because I do think that everything, however defined, is individually conscious. I see no contradiction in holding that the plank as a whole has a mind, and also that, say, individual molecules in the plank also have their own minds.

Do you know what a contemporary panpsychist would say about selfhood? If there are tiny consciousness units or vast waves of it, where is knowledge of self? Is selfhood emergent? Or is it in the tiny bits? — frank

I'm not very well read at the moment, sorry. I haven't kept up that well with developments.

There are two camps (among others) among panpsychists IIRC. One camp are the micropsychists (or smallists) who think that there is consciousness everywhere there is matter, because all matter at the level of fundamental particles possess a unitary consciousness. So quarks and electrons and leptons or whatever are conscious. So these panpsychists don't think that literally everything is conscious, just that consciousness is everywhere because tiny things are everywhere. At exactly which points in the complexification of matter consciousness arises again as a unitary mind (i.e. a self, a centre of experience) I'm not sure about. Is it at the level of atom? The organic molecule? The cell? The neuron? The brain? Or what? Smallism seems doomed to arbitrariness to me, and very vulnerable to all the usual objections: How do experiences 'sum'? This is still a kind of emergence so why not just have emergence from non-conscious stuff? How do we avoid the arbitrariness? No doubts smallists have their answers, but one way out of this is to drop smallism and opt for....

...Cosmopsychism, which could be called 'biggism' I suppose. This says we start with the universe as a whole as the primarily conscious entity. I'm not sure about that either, although I prefer it to smallism. I might be a cosmopsychist, I'm not sure. Need to read up about it. There is the possibility here of making a fallacy of division (the parts are conscious because the whole is) as @TheMadFool will be alert to. But it's likely that other arguments are made which do not fall foul of that.

For a theory of what makes a 'self' or private unitary centre of consciousness is a very interesting question and I don't know the answer to it. However we could plug in various functionalist theories of consciousness here, but rebranding them not as theories of consciousness, but theories of the self. For example, the Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (Tononi and Koch) is a really interesting idea, except it is wrong because it is a functionalist reductionist theory of consciousness. It says consciousness and integrated information are one and the same thing, which is just wrong. Consciousness is consciousness and integrated information is integrated information. Instead it could be much more profitably rebranded as a theory of the self. That is to say, any entity that integrates information is an individual. Everything (however arbitrarily defined) integrates at least 1 bit of information (I'm winging it here - it's ages since I read the papers) so everything is a centre of consciousness. However experiences start to get interesting when more than 1 bit of information is integrated. And when we come to brains, which integrate large amounts of information, we get the rich conscious lives we currently have. I think it's an interesting possibility.

In general I think there is a massive confusion which dogs both philosophy and science, the confusion between consciousness and identity. For example, when people take an anaesthetic, it is said they have lost consciousness, which is fine for everyday talk of the kind that @Banno likes. But if we take this a little more carefully, we might ask "What exactly is lost? Could it be identity that is disrupted, rather than a loss of consciousness? Experientially, for the person, wouldn't those two things be the same?" On one, identity remains, but consciousness is lost; Asil has no experience. The other, consciousness remains, but identity is lost; Asil has no experiences because Asil, defined as a functional unity, no longer exists; instead, lower level systems which do retain (complex or simple) functional unity are the ones having experiences. When Asil wakes up, what has happened? Has her consciousness rebooted? Or has her identity rebooted? It's hard to tell experimentally. But we tend to assume it is consciousness that has rebooted, but this is not a safe assumption. I think it's much more likely that identity is disrupted.

I see but here's the deal. If I say everything has a soul/mind, what does everything mean? — TheMadFool

For me, it means any arbitrarily defined object whatever, for example, half-a-biscuit-kilo-of-air-over-Brazil-rock-on-Mars considered as one thing. This is a very extreme form of panpsychism and seems maximally silly at first, but it becomes less silly when one considers functionally defined individuals which, except in very unusual cases, are incredibly simple and have minimally interesting or complex experiences. I'm open to the idea that individuals are defined by the amount of information they integrate (as per Tononi and Koch). Not at all sure though.

There's a boundary that's been crossed - the boundary between parts and wholes - and it's necessary that an inference be the means of doing that.

I'm not aware of any panpsychist who says that parts are conscious because a whole is, nor that wholes are conscious because their parts are. That would be very poor reasoning. If you want to pursue this line, I'd be grateful if you could show me some bit of reasoning written by a panpsychist which commits these fallacies. Not sure where we would go from there though, if you found something I would just agree with you that it is fallacious.

Sorry but I can't see your point. Begin from any point in an organized system - bottom-up or top-down, you're eventually going to have to make a jump from a whole to its parts and wherever, whenever, this happens, you're at risk of commiting the fallacy of composition/division. — TheMadFool

Yes, but only if you're making an inference. Simply holding the position that both parts and the whole of, say, a plank, simultaneously have their own conscious identities (as I do) need not commit fallacies of composition/division if that conclusion was arrived at by other types of inference. You have to have an inference to have a fallacy.

I'll take a look at that, thanks. I'm a Goff fan. He's done very good work on why emergence is problematic with regard to consciousness.

It's fine as long as you wear a mask and maintain a 2m distance from the people you are with.

Not me. Some panpsychists might be motivated by quantum theory, but I'm not sure who.

"theory of consciousness" is different from "definition of consciousness". — khaled

:nod:

When an idea gains traction, proponents of competing ideas must retreat, consolidate, and reassert themselves in ways that might even compromise the original point of their ideas. When evolution was put on even stronger theoretical ground by genetics, competing ideas re-emerged as intelligent design. When modern cosmology made a compelling argument for a godless genesis, we got the fine-tuning argument. And look what came after America's first black President. — Kenosha Kid

Is this intended to be an argument against panspychism?

EDIT: My bad, it's an answer to the OP!

"why is the evidence that I have for my consciousness different than the evidence others have for my consciousness?" — Harry Hindu

Good question. The answer presumably is "Because I am me and no on else is." This raises the further question, "Why am I this one and not some other one? And why aren't you, me?" But let's not derail the thread with that.

Because for the longest time we thought that by coming up with the right physics or chemistry or biology we could find the "equation for consciousness". That eventually concsiousness will be consumed by the sciences and be regarded as mundane as temperature. That one day we may develop a "consciousness-o-meter" which measures consciousness the same way a thermormeter measures temperature. But we've slowly given up on that view, it seems that consciousness is not approachable by scientific method. Heck I can't tell if YOU'RE conscious, or if my couch is conscious, much less come up with a theory for consciousness. So the simplest explanation then is to attribute it to everything, so that you no longer need to explain how it arises from "inanimate matter"

In other words, the assumption that there are these physical objects that have no mental properties that somehow come together and suddenly have mental properties has gotten us nowhere, so people are starting to reject it. — khaled

This is the best answer to the OP so far.

Why would by big toe be conscious when my brain is conscious of the state of my big toe? Is it my brain that is conscious or my neurons? Are you the consciousness of your whole brain or just one neuron? Panpsychism is just another type of anthropomorphic projection. — Harry Hindu

Your questions are all good ones and need answers from the panpsychist.

If panpsychists are anthropomorphic, everyone else is anthropocentric, or at least neurocentric. What we all have in common is cuntishness, so let's gloss over that and stick to what is true and false, not which ones of us are the worst assholes.

In addition it is also because deflationary accounts of consciousness that don't involve emergence are also taken to not be treating consciousness seriously enough.

By the process of elimination that would lead to a substantive theory of non-emergent consciousness, which panpsychism seems to fit the mold of. — Mr Bee

Yes, I think panpsychism is often arrived at after a process of elimination. The worst theory apart from all the others.

The fallacies of division and composition are likely to be straw men, because no panpsychist I am aware of thinks that humans are conscious simply because they are composed of conscious cells, nor that cells are conscious simply because they are parts of humans. Their justification for panpsychism does not involve this particular bit of fallacious reasoning.

The combination problem is different and is a real problem for all panpsychists. The combination problem is about which objects are conscious, and how smaller conscious entities somehow 'pool' their consciousness to make a larger conscious entity, and at exactly what stages of complexification this happens. Any panspychist has to either find a version of panpsychism that avoids this problem or a version that solves it. I'm not completely sure what my response to it is.

It works wonders. Should be used more often if you ask me, on scores of other problems. Whence art? Panaesthetism is the answer: atoms love beauty too, you know. Whence morality? Panmoralism of course! Electrons followed rules too, after all. Whence politics? Panpolitism, what else? Quarks know how to spin. Etc. — Olivier5

:100:

In other words, it's an easy way out of the problem — Olivier5

That's good isn't it?

I think it's a lot to do with conceptual difficulties around the emergence of consciousness from what has been presumed to be severally non-conscious things.

EDIT: Whatever emergentist theory is proposed, the question "Yes, but why can't all that happen without consciousness?" is often not satisfactorily answered.

Maybe it is different for a woman because at least for me the goal of masterbation is to orgasm. — ArguingWAristotleTiff

Whereas for me the goal is to traumatise schoolchildren.

How do y'all think Bernie would have done? Would it have been this close?

Very close. Looks like Ar-Pharazon the Golden may be on the way out.

Biology should be taken seriously by philosophers. — Olivier5

As Melkor stole Elves and corrupted them into Orcs, so biologists took the concept of life and removed all subjectivity from it. Can't bear the buggers. They don't take philosophy seriously. All of them, no exceptions. The worst of the scientists.

We all know it does. — Philosophim

Apparently I know that. But how do I know it?

jorndoe, what's wrong, if anything, with the response that from God's point of view, there is no evil? That preserves all the omnis and there is no contradiction.

Children suffering terribly and dying uselessly from cancer ain't good — jorndoe

I agree. Read it again.

Cease and desist? No more vaccines and whatever else medicine, prevention/relief/cure? — jorndoe

It's all good to God. Disease, vaccines, suffering, stopping suffering, all of it's fine.

The OP isn't nonsense

EDIT: admittedly it isn't crystal clear and concise, but that's hard to do

I wrote an essay on it for a class on moral psychology 13 years ago: — Pfhorrest

You've thought about everything haven't you? You must be a brain in a vat or something, fed on royal jelly.

David Bohm (physicist) talked about a similar thing. He called it the 'rheomode' I think. From 'Wholeness and the Implicate Order'.

I don't have any strong view on it. It seems convenient to think of things as beings rather than persistent doings, even if it is less metaphysically accurate. Maybe we could try and have a conversation in this mode here. Or even just try and come up with some example sentences to see how it works.

It has long been a rather intense recurring fantasy of mine to have, instead of my silly thin cold skin, a nice thick coat of greasy fur like a seal. I would be so much more secure. The spectre of homelessness loses its horror. I could just sleep on the ground somewhere. I could earn money by allowing people to stare at me and stroke me. I could casually swim in rivers and lakes. It would be amazing. If I had a wish, it would be that. Sometimes I think feathers would be better. But at the moment I favour thick waterproof fur.

I'd like to hear @Hanover's thoughts on this.

That would suggest that God’s POV on morality is completely alien to ours, or conversely (since presumably God’s POV is right), that we have absolutely no idea what it really means for something to be moral. Which then raises the question of what we’re even saying when we say that God is omnibenevolent. — Pfhorrest

This is good. If God is incapable of pain, then yes, his POV on morality will lack a component that is crucial to ours. The relativist theist does not have to say God's POV is the right one, though. It's right for God, but right not from our point of view. But you and I have more fundamental differences on that issue (from another thread) which have surfaced here when considering God. Regarding what a theist might say (according to a friend of mine) about what it means for God to be omnibenevolent, it could just mean that God is omnipotent. For an omnipotent being, whatever is, is good. Because if it wasn't good, it could not exist. For an omnipotent being to not will something is for that something not to exist. God's omnibenevolence just follows from God's omnipotence. As I think we may already agree (not sure) what is good just is what is willed.

Human morality is very much bound up with our limited power. The values of an omnipotent being is a very different kind of ballgame.

Why would an all good God have created an array of life forms that can only flourish at the expense of each other's suffering — Pfhorrest

Perhaps because suffering is morally irrelevant from God's POV.

My position is that consciousness is the result of nervous systems being in a modelling relation with the world. So I am talking specifically about that kind of process. One where there is mental modelling going on. — apokrisis

I'm going to rudely put words in your mouth as I am more likely to understand them that way. How do you feel about the following recasting:

Your position is that a nervous system (any other kind of system?) is conscious if and only if it models the world it is in. Is that right?

This allows for degree, perhaps. A nervous system that models the world in a very useful and detailed way so that it can respond effectively to a wide variety of circumstances is, perhaps, more conscious than a nervous system that models the world in a much simpler (but still useful) way. Perhaps simpler systems are more specialised to certain environments. Is that what you think? I'm not laying any traps here, I just want to understand your view without reading a bunch of books first.

No, I just “have terminal goals” (i.e. take morality to be something*) that involves the suffering and enjoyment, pleasure and pain, of all people. — Pfhorrest

Thanks, this is interesting. It seems to me that that is consistent with metal-ethical relativism. FWIW, I share these terminal goals. However I don't think that other people who do not share these terminal goals have necessarily made a mistake (although they might have done). They are just my enemy. Do you think they have made a mistake such that they could be reasoned with?

Whether or not other people actually care to try to realize that end is irrelevant for whether that end is right. Some people may not care about others’ suffering, for instance; that just means they’re morally wrong, that their choices will not factor in relevant details about what the best (i.e. morally correct) choice is.

It means they are morally wrong from yours or my perspective. But I can't get away from the need to specify a perspective when evaluating the truth of moral claims. What is right and wrong just changes depending on whose point of view one is. This just seems like a fact that follows from the idea that people just can have divergent terminal goals.

*One’s terminal goals and what one takes morality to be are the same thing, just like the criteria by which we decide what to believe and what we take reality to be are the same thing. To have something as a goal, to intend that it be so, just is to think it is good, or moral, just like to believe something just is to think it is true, or real.

Yes, I agree with that.