Yes, but only if you're making an inference. Simply holding the position that both parts and the whole of, say, a plank, simultaneously have their own conscious identities (as I do) need not commit fallacies of composition/division if that conclusion was arrived at by other types of inference. You have to have an inference to have a fallacy. — bert1

I see but here's the deal. If I say everything has a soul/mind, what does everything mean?

Necessarily that nature is organized - simpler stuff combine in all and sundry ways to make more complex things. In other words, nature has, as a facet to its personality, parts-to-wholes relationships.

Now, when I say everything has a soul/mind, it can be interpreted in only one way in terms of parts and wholes viz. that both parts and wholes have souls. There's a boundary that's been crossed - the boundary between parts and wholes - and it's necessary that an inference be the means of doing that.

Also consider the paradox I mentioned in one of my posts. Does a 4 meter long wooden plank have 1 soul/mind or an infinite number of souls/minds? You can't say it has 1 soul because it can be divided infinitely, each piece itself being a thing and so possessed of a soul/mind. You can't say it has 1 soul for the reason that it consists of infinite pieces. You can't say it has both 1 soul/mind and an infinite souls because that's a contradiction.

Do you know what a contemporary panpsychist would say about selfhood? If there are tiny consciousness units or vast waves of it, where is knowledge of self? Is selfhood emergent? Or is it in the tiny bits?

You define consciousness as a "first person experience". But what does that really mean? What is an experience? What does it mean for an experience to be first person? Is there such a thing as second or third, or zero (views from nowhere) person experiences? — Harry Hindu

All of these are questions you already know the answers to. By trying to ask for more and more precise definitions all you end up doing is muddying things that are perfectly clear. It's like if I asked you to define "Red" or "Run" how would you? These concepts are too basic so as to require much definition.

I made a topic about this years ago but basically I think there are some concepts that don't need definition only "assignment". An "assignment" is when you already know the meaning of a word but just need to assign a word to the already present meaning. These concepts include: Color, Space, Shape, Time, Consciousness and many others. You can't define "color" or "shape" or "consciousness" in simpler terms, all you can do is assign a word to a concept that you come pre equipped with. At least that's what it seems like to me. If you want to disagree then by all means try to define "Space" or "Shape" in simpler terms.

Good question. The answer presumably is "Because I am me and no on else is." — bert1

But that doesn't really answer the question. What is "you"? It goes back to my question before...Are "you" one neuron, a group of neurons, a brain, a body, or what? And what is it about you that provides you with different evidence of your consciousness than I have of your consciousness?

How does Ententionality differ from or brings a nuance to Intentionality? — Olivier5

It's Deacon's word for a quality of aboutness. A thing doesnt have to be conscious to have it.

not anymore than you could predict what a car does based only on a description of its parts. — Olivier5

But you can know what a car does based on the description of its parts. If you know what each part does then you know exactly what will happen when you start driving.

you'd need to know additional stuff about the environment of the car / protein to understand its function. — Olivier5

Yes and in all my examples that information is given as well. This is not "new information arising from the structure of a car/protein".

We know this by looking at how it works in a cell, not by looking at it's atoms. — Olivier5

But if you knew all the atoms in a cell you'd be able to surmise what HSP 60-10 does.

Are you simply trying to say "You can't know what a car is used for just by studying its components"? Yes, obviously, no one is debating that. However if you DO know everything there is to know about cars and you were asked "what happens when the key turns", your explanation (while likely to be very techincal and complicated) has to be reducible to "the car turns on". The introduction of the concept of "car" and "key" does not change the result. There is no NEW information in the introduction of those concepts. They are just simplifications.

So in the same way, if P-zombies are impossible, then the introduction of the concept of "consciousness" must not be a new property with no existence in the subordiante parts. It has to come out of the components naturally, and so the componenets must have some property or other that interacts to produce it. Just like how temperature comes out of kinetic energy or "car" and "key" and "driving" come out of a hunk of metal.

All of these are questions you already know the answers to. By trying to ask for more and more precise definitions all you end up doing is muddying things that are perfectly clear. It's like if I asked you to define "Red" or "Run" how would you? These concepts are too basic so as to require much definition.

I made a topic about this years ago but basically I think there are some concepts that don't need definition only "assignment". An "assignment" is when you already know the meaning of a word but just need to assign a word to the already present meaning. These concepts include: Color, Space, Shape, Time, Consciousness and many others. You can't define "color" or "shape" or "consciousness" in simpler terms, all you can do is assign a word to a concept that you come pre equipped with. At least that's what it seems like to me. If you want to disagree then by all means try to define "Space" or "Shape" in simpler terms. — khaled

I understand what you mean. If you want to know what "red" means, I'd simply point to things that are red. But the same cannot be said about consciousness. Consciousness is not as simple as "red" and "square". Consciousness is a more complex entity that is composed of those things and much more. The goal for a proper definition and theory of consciousness would include how it interacts with, and relates to, the rest of the world, and defining it simply as a "first-person experience" just doesn't do that.

Consciousness is not as simple as "red" and "square" — Harry Hindu

Then we're probably not talking about the same thing. Consciousness is more fundamental than "red" and "square". Without consciousness "red" and "600 nanometer electromagnetic wave" would be synonymous, but they're clearly not (or else we would need to teach children about electromagnetic waves before they understand what "red" means). I don't see consciousness as a complex entity at all. When first you heard the word didn't you understand it? How is it complicated then and how come we can talk about it so easily?

I'm curious how you would define it now.

definition and theory of consciousness would include how it interacts with, and relates to, the rest of the world — Harry Hindu

And how might we test that?

By the way, just to spice things up, to open a new avenue for discussion, I'd like to point out that the question "why is panpsychism popular?" commits the complex question fallacy for it assumes that panpsychism is popular and asks for reasons why that's the case. :smile:

Then we're probably not talking about the same thing. Consciousness is more fundamental than "red" and "square". Without consciousness "red" and "600 nanometer electromagnetic wave" would be synonymous, but they're clearly not (or else we would need to teach children about electromagnetic waves before they understand what "red" means). I don't see consciousness as a complex entity at all.

I'm curious how you would define it now. — khaled

"Synonymous" isn't the word I would use. I would say that without consciousness, there would be no red - only 600 nanometer electromagnetic waves (and there is even question as to whether there is actually 600 nanometer EM waves, as 600 nanometers and waves are conscious constructs). Something cannot be synonymous with something else that doesn't exist.

I thought you were on the right track with "first person experience". It's just that this is the trope most people use, and I wanted you to try and paraphrase what it means to you. Are there other words that you might use, like "awareness", or "informed"? Does "first person" refer to the uniqueness of what you are aware of, or what you are informed of, as in only you have this view and no one else does?

Are you simply trying to say "You can't know what a car is used for just by studying its components"? Yes, obviously, no one is debating that. However if you DO know everything there is to know about cars and you were asked "what happens when the key turns", your explanation (while likely to be very techincal and complicated) has to be reducible to "the car turns on". — khaled

But you will never know everything there is to know about anything, so this is a false, unrealistic premise.

What is important is that the components do not, by themselves, contain the information you need to explain the function of the whole. The really useful information is at a level higher then that of components: it's in the way they are connected with one another to form a whole functional structure. It's a question of form, not hyle. And then about how this form interacts with other forms.

A thing doesnt have to be conscious to have it. — frank

So that's the important difference? That means it applies to anything alive? Eg like plants too are tenacious and stubborn in their own way?

So that's the important difference? That means it applies to anything alive? Eg like plants too are tenacious and stubborn in their own way? — Olivier5

Yes, it's just broader. I dont think it would apply to a virus because they don't have any moving parts, so to speak. They just passively wander into a system that does exhibit ententionality and their numbers are increased in the process. We may speak of them as doing this with purpose, but it's easy enough to dispense with that framing. It's much more difficult (not sure it's even possible) to describe the physiology of a vertebrate's cardiovascular system without speaking in terms of entention.

Plants, I guess you could look at it that way. We understand the process of germination to be directed toward maturity of the plant.

Deacon hasn't addressed whether he realizes that entention is an aspect of the way we understand things. Whether that's how things really are is another issue.

What is important is that the components do not, by themselves, contain the information you need to explain the function of the whole — Olivier5

You have yet to show an example of this. My point is that the higher level concepts must be reducible to the interaction of components do you disagree with that? If so please provide an example.

The really useful information is at a level higher then that of components — Olivier5

But has nothing additional to the components.

It's just that this is the trope most people use, and I wanted you to try and paraphrase what it means to you — Harry Hindu

Maybe because it explains enough?

Are there other words that you might use, like "awareness", or "informed"? — Harry Hindu

I can be unaware of my surroundings and still be conscious. And idk what informed has to do with it.

as in only you have this view and no one else does? — Harry Hindu

I don't know. Will get back to you after I become someone else and compare.

we ought to be able to identify it in an object of study by what how it behaves. — Kenosha Kid

Yes, we can identify consciousness in the human object by studying how the human behaves. All that is required is acceptance that a human also “behaves” in an internal domain apodeitically known only to himself, in addition to his observable behavior known to others, behavior tacitly understood as some ends in accordance with the means sufficient for it.

The internal behavior in the human object of study, such behavior apodeitically known only to himself, is his thinking. Any characterization of the means for such behavior, by which the ends of such behavior are sufficiently, but henceforth also necessarily, given, can have no possible external explanation whatsoever, for that which is known only to the self can be explained only by the self, and then only with respect to the self.

While it is established that the brain is ultimately responsible for any human occupation, sheer accident and pure reflex excepted, it is clear the human does not think in terms of brain mechanics, which are predicated on natural law, from which follows inexorably that thinking is entirely dependent on its own nature. And if human thought is never in terms of natural law, it becomes clear that the notion.....

The scientific study of all aspects of consciousness, such as perception and identity, fall within psychology and therefore, where possible, neurology. — Kenosha Kid

.....is catastrophically false, under the predication that scientific study is itself in terms of natural law, in conjunction with the absolutely necessary condition that consciousness is a product of human internal behavior alone, which is not. The intrinsic circularity, as ground for asserting the falliciousness, is obvious, insofar as no science is at all possible that has no relevant thought antecedent to it, of which consciousness itself is an integral member.

It is current physics which must throw up its hands in defeat, and grant extant metaphysics its true purpose, for even if it should eventually come to pass that certain natural activities in the brain are proven sufficient causality for some immediately correlating thought, it never will appear as such to the possessor of both the brain and the thought. Especially as metaphysics has already explained internal behavior sufficient for use by the human in possession of it, all the while in complete disregard for his own brain. Not to mention, metaphysics has already identified consciousness, and feels no need to prove anything about it, except the logical validity of its place in a system.

“....Besides, when we get beyond the bounds of experience, we are of course safe from opposition in that quarter; and the charm of widening the range of our knowledge is so great that, unless we are brought to a standstill by some evident contradiction, we hurry on undoubtingly in our course. This, however, may be avoided, if we are sufficiently cautious in the construction of our fictions, which are not the less fictions on that account....”

Not looking for a response; just opinionatin’, doncha know. But thanks for a decent opportunity.

But has nothing additional to the components. — khaled

The structure is additional.

But that would be akin to saying "When I press A on my keyboard the letter A is typed on the screen". This would work for explaining how a PC works eventually by testing countless hypothesis and sometimes breaking open the PC (neurology) but it does not answer whether or not the PC is conscious, or why it would or wouldn't be. — khaled

By your own words, a PC may or may not have a property you call <consciousness>. If something has or doesn't have a property, such as <configured to print A>, then there must be a circumstance in which the presence or absence of that property can be ascertained, otherwise it is meaningless to say that it has such a property, since ascribing it says nothing at all.

So the pragmatic way of proceeding is to define what we mean by consciousness in terms of what the property actually does, how it interacts with the world, what it's correlates are, then look for it. This is what some neuroscientists do. But often what we find is a recourse to mysticism. "It's the thing left over when all those other things are discovered by science." "It can't be explained in mere words!" "It's what it's like to be a conscious thing."

If you're of the former persuasion, i.e. you actually want to know what consciousness is, you have to do this iteratively. You start with a putative idea of how a conscious thing behaves such that a non-conscious thing would not behave that way, and then you refine.

Either way, saying "Science cannot explain" is not useful. You have to explain *why* science cannot explain, which means describing its properties such that they aren't amenable to scientific modelling. This is not what you are doing. Just pointing at the fact that it currently does not fully explain is an -of-the-gaps argument.

...a requirement of a proper definition of consciousness such that explaining consciousness is actually explaining something is that we can identify it in something that has it that is not ourselves... — Kenosha Kid

Agreed.

Hard to find something if you do not know what you're looking for.

By 'definition' the hard problem arises. The framework is the problem.

I made a topic about this years ago but basically I think there are some concepts that don't need definition only "assignment". An "assignment" is when you already know the meaning of a word but just need to assign a word to the already present meaning. These concepts include: Color, Space, Shape, Time, Consciousness and many others. You can't define "color" or "shape" or "consciousness" in simpler terms, all you can do is assign a word to a concept that you come pre equipped with. At least that's what it seems like to me. If you want to disagree then by all means try to define "Space" or "Shape" in simpler terms. — khaled

I will ask again. Are you asserting that electrons are "conscious"? If so, are they conscious in the same way and to the same degree as humans? When we say a human is unconscious (as in an accident or anesthesia) or that some action is subconscious as in reflexive response, what do we mean? What is the difference between experience, awareness, mental, mind and consciousness? Are all these term synonyms in your view or can you define differences in meaning?

Good points.

The structure adds no extra predictive power and is therefore merely a simplification. That’s what I’m saying.

The structure adds no extra predictive power and is therefore merely a simplification. That’s what I’m saying. — khaled

I would have thought the structure adds predictive power where knowledge of the components may be incomplete.

then there must be a circumstance in which the presence or absence of that property can be ascertained — Kenosha Kid

Yes but maybe it can’t be ascertainable for most cases. That is different from it not existing.

otherwise it is meaningless to say that it has such a property, since ascribing it says nothing at all. — Kenosha Kid

Incorrect. Ascribing it says something. However we may not be able to ascribe it to most things due to not having enough evidence to do so. That’s how I see consciousness. Ascribing it means something but we have yet to find what causes it (and I don’t think we will)

So the pragmatic way of proceeding is to define what we mean by consciousness in terms of what the property actually does, how it interacts with the world, what it's correlates are, then look for it. — Kenosha Kid

You start with a putative idea of how a conscious thing behaves such that a non-conscious thing would not behave that way, and then you refine. — Kenosha Kid

You’re starting as if there is this word “consciousness” that means nothing that we then ascribe meaning to by specifying some capacity or other. But I would say that consciousness already has a well defined meaning. It is whether or not something can have experiences. And so defining consciousness as something like a certain level of data integration or a certain neural oscillation or whatever is just misleading. It is hijacking the word for a different use and does nothing to explain what people actually mean by consciousness.

You have to explain *why* science cannot explain, which means describing its properties such that they aren't amenable to scientific modelling. This is not what you are doing — Kenosha Kid

I did that already but not in response to you. The reason it cannot be scientifically modeled is because we cannot experiment on it. The only thing that I definitely know has the property “conscious” is me. And 1 data point is not enough to come up with a theory of any accuracy. And unlike a property such as color or length or density, I have no instrument by which to measure consciousness.

I would have thought the structure adds predictive power where knowledge of the components may be incomplete. — Possibility

But assuming complete knowledge of the componenets the structure is just simplification and adds no predictive powers. So if "consciousness" is a structure it has to arise out of some prooperty or other of its componenets.

I will ask again. Are you asserting that electrons are "conscious"? — prothero

To know whether they are or not I would have to somehow morph into an electron and back to compare. All I'm asserting is that there is no reason to assume that consciousness is only present in the highest level organisms such as humans without even having any sort of theory that predicts so.

And yours, too, re: the argument that the hard problem is defined into being so.

Leave it to reason to confuse itself.

The structure is everything. There's a very large difference between a car and a pile of parts. It will cost you time, skills and money to change the latter into the former.

The internal behavior in the human object of study, such behavior apodeitically known only to himself, is his thinking. Any characterization of the means for such behavior, by which the ends of such behavior are sufficiently, but henceforth also necessarily, given, can have no possible external explanation whatsoever, for that which is known only to the self can be explained only by the self, and then only with respect to the self. — Mww

Which assumes that thinking is ethereal, i.e. the mind is a closed system and anything that goes on inside it is completely transparent to outside interrogation. But what neuroscience sees is the opposite: we can see you think. What remains is a difficult classification problem: how we identify a particular neurological activity with a particular mental activity.

is catastrophically false, under the predication that scientific study is itself in terms of natural law, in conjunction with the absolutely necessary condition that consciousness is a product of human internal behavior alone, which is not. — Mww

It's not, to the same extent that psychology is not. Psychology of perception, for instance, is as concerned with the external world as perception itself is.

The intrinsic circularity, as ground for asserting the falliciousness, is obvious, insofar as no science is at all possible that has no relevant thought antecedent to it, of which consciousness itself is an integral member. — Mww

What is the claim here, that since thinking involves consciousness, we cannot start to think about consciousness? It simply doesn't follow. Philosophy has the exact same features you describe btw, so:

It is current physics which must throw up its hands in defeat, and grant extant metaphysics its true purpose — Mww

by your own logic, metaphysics is doomed. Which it is, but not for that reason.

I see but here's the deal. If I say everything has a soul/mind, what does everything mean? — TheMadFool

For me, it means any arbitrarily defined object whatever, for example, half-a-biscuit-kilo-of-air-over-Brazil-rock-on-Mars considered as one thing. This is a very extreme form of panpsychism and seems maximally silly at first, but it becomes less silly when one considers functionally defined individuals which, except in very unusual cases, are incredibly simple and have minimally interesting or complex experiences. I'm open to the idea that individuals are defined by the amount of information they integrate (as per Tononi and Koch). Not at all sure though.

There's a boundary that's been crossed - the boundary between parts and wholes - and it's necessary that an inference be the means of doing that.

I'm not aware of any panpsychist who says that parts are conscious because a whole is, nor that wholes are conscious because their parts are. That would be very poor reasoning. If you want to pursue this line, I'd be grateful if you could show me some bit of reasoning written by a panpsychist which commits these fallacies. Not sure where we would go from there though, if you found something I would just agree with you that it is fallacious.