OK. How conscious are the latest famous bots ? Do they have selves ? — green flag

You mean like ChatGPT? Not sure. It's a good question. I think probably not, although the matter in the chips that run the program is.

So the dead do or do not have consciousness ? — green flag

The dead don't exist any more. But as a good panpsychist I think that the rotting corpse is conscious. Just not conscious of very much.

Suppose we create a mechanical brain that we believe is functionally equivalent to a normal working brain. For those who think science can explain consciousness, how would we scientifically determine whether the mechanical brain is conscious or not? — RogueAI

That's a nice question. Lets add it to the others that haven't been answered.

But they are given general anesthetic for certain surgeries, and we bury them when they are dead because we don't think they will mind -- are no longer 'conscious.' — green flag

I think this is muddled. It's not consciousness that ceases, but the self.

How it is achieved?
https://www.inverse.com/mind-body/neurobiology-of-consciousness-study-explained
https://neurosciencenews.com/consciousness-brain-generation-loss-13009/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3722571/
https://www.inverse.com/mind-body/tiny-brain-area-could-enable-consciousness
https://neurosciencenews.com/consciousness-brain-mapping-21146/
https://neurosciencenews.com/consciousness-brain-network-17491/
https://neurosciencenews.com/consciousness-conductor-16352/
https://neurosciencenews.com/brain-organization-consciousness-15132/
https://neurosciencenews.com/l5p-neuron-conscious-awareness-14997/
https://neurosciencenews.com/consciousness-brain-patterns-10756/
https://neurosciencenews.com/consciousness-brain-patterns-10698/
https://neurosciencenews.com/consciousness-neuroscience-7189/
https://neurosciencenews.com/consciousness-time-slices-4034/
https://neurosciencenews.com/how-the-brain-loses-and-regains-consciousness/
https://neurosciencenews.com/math-models-brain-state-22789/
https://neurosciencenews.com/eyes-consciousness-22032/
https://www.cmu.edu/dietrich/news/news-stories/2017/june/brain-decoding-complex-thoughts.html
https://aeon.co/essays/the-hard-problem-of-consciousness-is-a-distraction-from-the-real-one
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8121175/ — Nickolasgaspar

Yeah, I'm not going to read all that. I've read things people have suggested before on consciousness and it hasn't helped. Most notably Tononi on the IIT theory, which is just another kind of functionalism. It's interesting but irrelevant. Please would you:

1) Select two of those that you think are most relevant and I'll have a look
2) Summarise in your own words 'How it is achieved'

I imagine much of the dispute regarding whether neuroscience and its philosophical analysis suffices for an explanation concerns whether ( 6 ) should be included in the list. — fdrake

Yes, I think you are probably right about that. From what I recall, Dennett and a few others (forget their names) give accounts of 1-5 and then say "That's it, we're done, there's no extra bits left." And woo-mongers (like me) say "Actually I'm not really talking about 1-5, I'm only really interested in 6, the subjectivity, the first person perspective, the experience, the what it's like to be me, etc."

From my perspective, I'm actually quite happy with a functionalist account of self, your 1-5. For a while now I've made a distinction between self and consciousness:

Self is sufficiently complex to be vague, and have permeable borders. Memories come and go, atoms in our bodies get replaced, values and beliefs change over time, when I stop and the rest of the world starts is a vague matter. Consciousness does not seem to be a vague matter.

In ordinary talk we speak of 'losing consciousness' during sleep or anaesthesia. I think that is strictly inaccurate; what changes is the boundaries of self. When I 'lose consciousness' bert1 ceases to exist for a while as a functional unity in terms of your 1-5. The total consciousness, I suggest, remains. Just as the total mass an energy remains.

Why questions again. — Nickolasgaspar

I can get rid of the 'why'. I think this may be a language barrier. 'Why' isn't always meant in a teleological sense, it often, perhaps usually, meant to elicit an explanation of whatever sort. "Why is the engine making that noise?" for example is not about ascribing intentions to the engine.

So, to rephrase:

"How does brain function necessitate consciousness? What is it about brain function that means it can't happen without consciousness also happening?"

Thanks fdrake that's really good. Lots there to chew on. I'll respond in detail when I get a mo.

What would an answer look like? Give me an example answer. It's doesn't have to be the right answer, just an example of what sort of thing would satisfy you. — Isaac

This is a great question, and I'm sorry to say I can't even give you an example bare-bones answer. Absolutely no idea.

@apokrisis suggested a switcheroo, which was quite interesting, basically saying that the burden of proof not on the neuroscientist to say why some or their function of the brain is consciousness, but on the neuro-skeptic to say why it isn't.

If we had a much more sophisticated and intelligent cognitive system, we could discover how it is that brains produce experience. But we don't, so we are going to remain puzzled about how this phenomenon could ever arise from such an organ. — Manuel

Are you sympathetic with Colin McGinn then? Consciousness is in principle comprehensible, but not by us at the moment? Is this because we lack the concepts we need, perhaps? Perhaps we have mental concepts and physical concepts, but we lack a third kind that relate the two?

I was just wondering if someone has some kind of arguments to help answer that question because I've been thinking about it but haven't got far. — TheMadMan

Yes it's interesting. I think it's a genuine hard problem for pure idealists. In fact it's much easier to see the hard problem when you try to derive the physical from the non-physical. I have thought a bit about non-vague concepts and how they relate to fundamental properties. A number of philosophers perceive that the concept of consciousness is not vague (but that is not intuitive to many). The idea is that there is no intermediate step between x being conscious and x not being conscious. It's easier to see in the case of spatiality. I'm not a mathematician, but intuitively it's hard to conceive of space emerging from non-space: adding millions of 0inch lengths doesn't get you a length. There seems to be no intermediate step in-between non-spatiality and spatiality. I don't know if vagueness is essential to emergence or not, but they do seem to go together naturally. And conversely, there does seem to be a relationship between what is fundamental and what is not vague. Just conceptually, it seems easy and natural to think that both spatiality and consciousness are fundamental properties, and one could not emerge from the other. Neither admit of degree and complexity that would allow for borderline cases.

EDIT: I don't think I've explained that well.

Of course I am! I am pointing out a huge error in the OP! — Nickolasgaspar

There is no error in the OP. It's not making a claim about the world. It's a hypothetical. If anything it's a challenge to those who think consciousness is fundamental, a project I would have thought you would approve of.

At least someone gets it. — TheMadMan

Drives me up the fucking wall. It's not complicated is it? It's a good OP, interesting question. I don't have much more to say on the subject unfortunately, so I should probably shut the fuck up as well.

Walking is what legs do just as minding (i.e. "consciousness") is what a sufficiently intact & self-reflexive CNS interacting with its dynamic environment does. No legs, no walking. No embodied cognition, no minding (i.e. "consciousness"). — 180 Proof

Yes, I suspect TheMadMan understood your point the first time you made it. Would you like to answer his question?

The OP isn't addressed to you. It is addressed to people who think consciousness is more fundamental than matter and asks how matter can emerge from consciousness. If you want to talk about how we are all engaging in pseudophilosophy, I suggest you start a thread about it. There are plenty of other threads when it might be more on topic to go on about pseudophilosophy. If this thread was arguing for the view that consciousness is fundamental, then fair game. But it isn't. It asks us to assume that (rationally or not) and proceed to enquire how matter could emerge. That's the subject of the thread, and you are not engaging with it. Twiggez-vous?

In all 3 questions the answer "because it does" is adequate. — Nickolasgaspar

No it isn't

thats a fallacy — Nickolasgaspar

No it isn't.

ARAS state of awareness and alert/ stimuli arrive as signals/ the Central lateral thalamus share them to other areas specialized in Symbolic language, Memory/expeirence/ pattern recognition/ reasoning etc and the feedback enables our conscious content to emerge — Nickolasgaspar

No it doesn't

Consciousness is a testable, quantifiable mental ability — Nickolasgaspar

No it isn't.

Both are a great example on how pseudo philosophy can derail our philosophical inquiry. — Nickolasgaspar

No they aren't!

Fab, I've fixed all your errors Nick and we can move on. No need to thank me.

Correct , the diversity of properties emerging from different arrangements of matter is the amazing thing. Asking "why" this is possible its like a kid asking his mum ....why the sky is blue as if there is a purpose behind it. — Nickolasgaspar

'Hard problems' ,of the kind that Chalmers referred to, are not about 'why' in the teleological sense. They are about how. How is it that consciousness can emerge from non-conscious systems? How could a material world arise from consciousness? I think both of these are insoluble, and we need more than one fundamental property.

Without matter consciousness doesn't have a home. No place, no body to be in. I'm doubtful consciousness is enough by itself. How can extension emerge from non-extension? Can something with no spatial properties at all give rise to space?

In real life ONLY claims and Arguments can be true or not. — Nickolasgaspar

Bicycle wheels can be true. Forum posts can be thoroughly buckled.

Do not attribute to me arguments I have not made. — Banno

Do you always do as you are told? Old Nick definitely won't.

But the topic of this OP is different. — Eugen

Sorry, I'll stop!

Don't you get a much simpler and better explanation by just understanding it as matter evolving in complexity... — Metamorphosis

I don't think so, no. You just get more problems. Why do some complexities result in or instantiate consciousness, while others don't?

How can you demonstrate that? — Nickolasgaspar

By showing the alternatives are worse. Panpsychism is the worst theory of consciousness apart from all the others.

Well in science we have ways to quantify our conscious states. — Nickolasgaspar

The examples you give are of differing content of consciousness, from unfocused and fuzzy, to sharp, or something like that. They are all conscious states.

The minimum requirement for a conscious state is the arousal of the Ascending Reticular Activating System. — Nickolasgaspar

OK, how do you know that?

Zygote, to newborn, to baby, to toddler , to kid, to adult to senior... We can see consciousness develop and change over a lifetime — Metamorphosis

What is experiened changes. That experience happens at all doesn't change. If a system has an experience at all, no matter what it is an experience of, then it is conscious. The presence or absence of experience, of whatever content, is a binary. There isn't anything in between consciousness and non-consciousness, in the same way that there isn't anything in between 7 and less-than-7.

We can also see it fade in and out during sleep, deep sleep, anesthesia, drugs... — Metamorphosis

Again, it doesn't matter how dim the experience gets, it's still experience.

ol why they are magical when those properties are quantifiable. — Nickolasgaspar

I don't think they are magical.

Can you offer us a method by which you can demonstrate and quantify the conscious states of a rock similar to the methods we use to quantify the mass and charge of a particle? — Nickolasgaspar

No, consciousness is not quantifiable. It does not admit of degree. X is either conscious or not, there is no middle.

You literally stated that particles molecules and chemicals are conscious...that isn't magical for you? Can you explain the Ontology of Consciousness? — Nickolasgaspar

No more magical than saying particles have mass or charge. It's just another property of matter.

So you are suggesting something that resembles magic ...but you have issues with the label used ? — Nickolasgaspar

I'm not suggesting any magic as far as I am aware. But it seems you think I am.

Kicking a football causes the window to smash.

But kicking a football is not the same thing as the window smashing.

On the other hand, the action of the gut doesn't cause digestion.

The action of the gut is digestion.

So what should we say with consciousness?

Does some brain activity cause consciousness?

Or is some brain activity the same thing as consciousness?

I'm not sure how else to ask the question. There may be a language barrier issue perhaps. Can anyone else help?

I don't know what you mean by the statement "Is the feeling we get when we smell a rose the result of a neural function? Or is it the same thing as a neural function?" — Nickolasgaspar

It's not a statement, it's two questions. I'm trying to get clear in my head what you think the relationship is between the experience of smelling a rose and what happens in the brain. Is the experience the same thing as events in the brain, which we simply call smelling a rose? Or is it a product of events in the brain? Or something else?

I'll use an analogy which I hope will help. Is digestion the product of action of the gut? Or is it just the name we give to an action of the gut?

Is consciousness a product of brain function? or is it just the name we give to some kinds of brain function?

The the experience of smelling a rose produced, or caused by brain function? Or is it just the name we give to a particular brain function? Or what?

Do you see what I'm asking?

bert1, I've recently had this type of debate and I think this is a trend. From a philosophical point of view, they kind of realize one cannot defend materialism. So here's what they do: they deflect the topic into the scientific realm, falsely implying:
a. that this is science, not philosophy
b. science is all-powerful
c. science hasn't proven yet that consciousness is fundamental, therefore we shouldn't believe that
Then, they come back to philosophy and say:
d. therefore, materialism must be true — Eugen

Maybe, I don't know! I try to assume good faith where I can. If people start guessing at agendas in discussions they stop actually responding to what people actually say. Like @Nickolasgaspar keeps mentioning magic as if I've been pushing it when I've never actually mentioned it. A bit like a court's job is not to ascertain the will of Parliament, but to work out what the words of parliament mean (or something, I may have misquoted that).

How can one reconcile the scientific view, say that the the universe is billions of years old or that natural selection functions on individuals, with the idealist view that nothing exists without a mind to believe it exists? — Banno

By concluding that there must have been a mind at the beginning of the universe, obviously.

EDIT: Ignore this, I shouldn't come to a thread late without digesting the whole thing.

OK, the words 'result,' 'enabled by,' 'formation,' suggest something other than an identity with function. Could you clarify? Is the feeling we get when we smell a rose the result of a neural function? Or is it the same thing as a neural function?

I see, so you have observed the emergence of consciousness. Is that right? Consciousness is nothing other than certain functions of the brain, and if you observe these functions working, you observe consciousness. Do I understand you?

Emergence in Science is nothing more than a Classification label of phenomena with observable differences between their mechanisms and their properties....nothing magical there. — Nickolasgaspar

Sure, and if you think consciousness has emerged from the structure and function of brains, then you are an emergentist with regard to consciousness, as I said. Just like digestion is nothing other that a function of guts. Is that right?

They say, we always hurt the one's we love! — universeness

I hurt myself with self love twice a day.

I think it's a case of peace, love and now where's ma f****** gun!!! — universeness

Yeah, pretty much. I like him other times.

A strange wee dance guys?? What gives? — universeness

I'm just sick of his catchphrases. There's a whole bunch of them he uses over and over.

And no comparing Pseudo philosophical worldvies (like eliminativism, emergence or panpsychism) doesn't change the Default Position on the subject. — Nickolasgaspar

But you're an emergentist! And a functionalist as far as I can tell. These are philosophical positions. You haven't escaped into science.

I neither said nor implied it wasn't a non-sequitur

You're not saying anything. Again. — 180 Proof

Non sequitur. I neither said nor implied that I did say anything.